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FOREWORD 
The	  idea	  of	  an	  Almanac	  evokes	  an	  annual	  reference	  book	  of	  useful	  observations	  in	  a	  field	  of	  
interest.	  For	  farmers	  an	  almanac	  helps	  to	  predict	  conditions	  for	  the	  coming	  year.	  What	  is	  
happening	  to	  the	  climate?	  Which	  ways	  will	  the	  wind	  blow?	  What	  does	  the	  future	  hold?	  
For	  those	  who	  work	  in	  and	  watch	  the	  not	  for	  profit	  Sector	  the	  Legal	  and	  Accounting	  Almanac	  
not	  only	  observes	  what	  has	  happened	  but	  indicates	  the	  way	  change	  is	  taking	  the	  sector.	  	  
The	  case	  summaries	  are	  not	  confined	  to	  Australia	  or	  indeed	  the	  common	  law	  jurisdictions.	  We	  
benefit	  from	  the	  perspectives	  of	  regulators,	  tribunals	  and	  courts	  around	  the	  world	  —	  all	  
grappling	  with	  common	  issues.	  There	  are	  signs	  that	  historically	  kindred	  common	  law	  
jurisdictions	  are	  choosing	  divergent	  paths.	  For	  example,	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
decision	  in	  the	  Greenpeace	  case	  (covered	  here	  in	  a	  casenote	  and	  a	  detailed	  article)	  illustrates	  
an	  explicit	  divergence	  of	  views	  between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  and	  on	  the	  place	  of	  
advocacy	  by	  charities.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  more	  to	  be	  considered	  on	  that	  issue	  in	  an	  Australian	  
election	  year.	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  development	  for	  Australia	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Australian	  
Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  (ACNC)	  on	  3	  December	  2012	  and	  the	  various	  reforms	  
around	  that	  initiative.	  The	  objects	  of	  the	  Act	  governing	  the	  ACNC	  refer	  to	  public	  trust	  and	  
confidence	  in	  the	  sector,	  sustaining	  a	  robust,	  vibrant,	  independent	  and	  innovative	  sector	  and	  
reduction	  of	  unnecessary	  regulation.	  The	  ACNC	  has	  the	  potential	  as	  a	  focused	  and	  dedicated	  
regulator	  to	  become	  a	  catalyst	  for	  actions	  that	  will	  contribute	  to	  trustworthy,	  healthy	  charities	  
thriving	  in	  a	  facilitative	  environment.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  actions	  of	  a	  regulator	  but	  the	  participants	  
in	  the	  sector	  –	  volunteers,	  staff	  of	  charities,	  professional	  advisers,	  researchers,	  legislators,	  
dispute	  resolvers	  and	  those	  who	  benefit	  directly	  from	  the	  work	  of	  charities.	  
As	  a	  professional	  adviser	  to	  charities	  in	  a	  past	  life	  and	  now	  as	  part	  of	  the	  regulatory	  community	  
in	  a	  new	  role	  at	  the	  ACNC,	  I	  find	  that	  this	  authoritative	  Almanac	  assists	  me	  greatly	  to	  keep	  up	  
with	  constant	  change	  and	  see	  the	  patterns	  emerging	  in	  the	  sector.	  
The	  sector	  is	  indebted	  to	  Myles	  McGregor-­‐Lowndes	  and	  the	  contributors	  to	  the	  Almanac	  for	  
this	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  those	  who	  assist	  charities	  to	  achieve	  their	  mission	  better	  and	  thus	  
enhance	  the	  health	  of	  our	  wider	  community.	  	  
Murray	  Baird	  
Assistant	  Commissioner	  General	  Counsel	  








There	  is	  no	  slowing	  in	  either	  the	  cases	  or	  legislation	  impacting	  on	  nonprofit	  organisations.	  A	  
function	  of	  a	  reformist	  Commonwealth	  government	  and	  the	  increasing	  activities	  of	  the	  sector,	  
this	  growth	  challenges	  boards,	  management,	  professional	  advisers	  and	  regulators	  to	  keep	  their	  
knowledge	  current.	  This	  publication	  seeks	  to	  provide	  a	  consolidated	  record	  of	  the	  recent	  legal	  
developments	  which	  touch	  Australian	  nonprofit	  organisations	  and	  their	  stakeholders.	  It	  states	  
the	  law	  as	  at	  31	  December	  2012.	  The	  Australian	  Charity	  Law	  Association	  and	  PilchConnect	  
(Victoria)	  have	  again	  supported	  the	  Almanac	  through	  contributions	  and	  dissemination.	  	  
This	  year	  the	  Almanac	  will	  only	  be	  available	  in	  digital	  format.	  It	  is	  available	  in	  PDF	  format	  
through	  QUT	  e-­‐prints	  http://eprints.qut.edu.au/	  (search	  for	  all	  of:	  ‘nonprofit	  legal	  almanac	  
2012’).	  Earlier	  editions	  of	  the	  Almanac	  are	  also	  available	  at	  that	  location.	  
CASES 
For	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  Professor	  Myles	  McGregor-­‐Lowndes,	  Frances	  Hannah	  and	  Anne	  Overell	  
have	  compiled	  one	  to	  two	  page	  summaries	  of	  cases	  involving	  nonprofit	  organisations	  and	  
published	  them	  on	  The	  Australian	  Centre	  for	  Philanthropy	  and	  Nonprofit	  Studies,	  Developing	  
Your	  Organisation	  (DYO)	  website.1	  You	  can	  be	  alerted	  of	  new	  case	  summaries	  as	  they	  are	  
posted	  to	  the	  DYO	  website	  by	  subscribing	  to	  the	  ACPNS	  RSS	  feed	  or	  the	  ACPNS	  twitter	  service.2	  
A	  number	  of	  cases	  summarised	  in	  this	  Almanac	  are	  working	  their	  way	  through	  the	  appeals	  
process	  and	  care	  should	  be	  taken	  with	  their	  application.	  In	  addition,	  some	  of	  the	  cases	  
included	  are	  from	  jurisdictions	  outside	  Australia,	  and	  readers	  should	  exercise	  caution	  when	  
considering	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  cases	  for	  Australian	  law.	  
LEGISLATION 
Alterations	  to	  significant	  legislation	  that	  affects	  nonprofit	  organisations	  in	  state,	  territory	  and	  
Commonwealth	  jurisdictions	  have	  been	  identified	  and	  summarised.	  There	  is	  considerable	  
legislative	  reform	  proposed	  in	  the	  short	  term	  through	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  ACNC	  reforms	  as	  
well	  as	  proposed	  adjustments	  by	  states	  and	  territories	  to	  the	  new	  regulatory	  regime.	  
Special	  thanks	  must	  go	  to	  the	  PilchConnect	  team	  for	  providing	  legislative	  updates	  for	  Victoria.	  
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
Again	  this	  year	  we	  have	  sought	  to	  capture	  some	  of	  the	  more	  important	  accounting	  issues	  that	  
face	  nonprofit	  organisations.	  The	  proposed	  publication	  by	  the	  ACNC	  of	  charities’	  financial	  
reports	  will	  bring	  further	  reforms	  in	  this	  area.	  Stephen	  Marsden	  discusses	  important	  changes	  
to	  accounting	  standards	  and	  John	  McIntosh	  outlines	  Fringe	  Benefits	  Tax	  changes	  affecting	  
nonprofit	  organisations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Legal+Case+Notes.	  
2	  Click	  on	  ACPNS	  RSS	  feed	  at	  https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/ACPNS+Wiki+Home;	  or	  go	  to	  
http://twitter.com/CPNSinsides.	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SPECIAL ISSUES DURING 2012 
A	  number	  of	  legal	  and	  governance	  practitioners	  have	  contributed	  articles	  on	  significant	  issues	  
facing	  nonprofit	  organisations.	  These	  include:	  workplace	  health	  and	  safety	  law	  reform	  and	  
consolidation	  of	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Acts,	  both	  by	  Frances	  Hannah;	  development	  of	  the	  law	  of	  
charity	  in	  Australia	  by	  Jennifer	  Batrouney;	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  churches	  by	  Brian	  Lucas;	  taxation	  
of	  school	  building	  funds	  by	  John	  King,	  Anne	  Robinson	  and	  their	  colleagues	  at	  Prolegis	  Lawyers;	  
governance	  of	  nonprofit	  organisations	  by	  Jonathan	  Casson;	  the	  ins	  and	  outs	  of	  DGR	  status	  by	  
Darren	  Fittler;	  and	  a	  round-­‐up	  of	  reforms,	  cases	  or	  contentious	  issues	  in	  the	  UK	  (Kerry	  
O’Halloran),	  Canada	  (Don	  Bourgeois),	  and	  New	  Zealand	  (Susan	  Barker	  and	  Michael	  Gousmett).	  
DOWNLOAD 
This	  publication	  is	  available	  in	  PDF	  format	  through	  QUT	  e-­‐prints:	  http://eprints.qut.edu.au/	  
(search	  for	  all	  of:	  nonprofit	  legal	  almanac	  2012).	  Earlier	  editions	  are	  also	  available.	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2.0 CASES BY CATEGORY 
 
Cases	  in	  this	  section	  are	  presented	  alphabetically	  under	  designated	  subject	  headings	  (with	  a	  
‘Miscellaneous’	  heading	  for	  cases	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  elsewhere.)	  
	  
2.1 CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE STATUS 
2.1.1  BODALLA ABORIGINAL HOUSING COMPANY LTD V EUROBODALLA SHIRE 
COUNCIL [2012] NSWCA 408 (COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
MCCOLL, HOEBEN JJA, TOBIAS AJA, 12 DECEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  appellant	  was	  a	  public	  charity,	  and	  hence	  
whether	  it	  was	  liable	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  local	  government	  rates.	  The	  appellant	  owns	  28	  
properties	  in	  the	  Eurobodalla	  local	  government	  area	  (the	  properties),	  27	  of	  which	  are	  used	  or	  
occupied	  as	  residences	  for	  persons	  of	  Aboriginal	  descent.	  Twenty-­‐four	  are	  tenanted	  by	  persons	  
dependent	  on	  government	  pensions,	  and	  three	  are	  tenanted	  by	  persons	  who	  earn	  a	  low	  
income.	  One	  of	  the	  28	  properties	  is	  used	  by	  the	  appellant	  for	  administrative	  and	  general	  
purposes.	  The	  28	  properties	  were	  acquired	  between	  1979	  and	  1992	  with	  funding	  from	  the	  
Aboriginal	  Development	  Commission	  or	  the	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander	  Commission.	  	  
The	  appellant	  paid	  council	  rates	  on	  the	  properties	  up	  to	  and	  including	  the	  rating	  year	  
commencing	  1	  January	  2004,	  but	  not	  for	  any	  subsequent	  rating	  year	  commencing	  1	  January	  
2005.	  In	  2006	  the	  appellant	  applied	  to	  the	  Eurobodalla	  Shire	  Council	  (the	  Council)	  for	  
exemption	  of	  the	  properties	  from	  the	  payment	  of	  rates	  pursuant	  to	  section	  556(1)(h)	  of	  the	  
Local	  Government	  Act	  1993	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act).	  That	  section	  exempts	  land	  from	  all	  rates,	  other	  
than	  water	  supply	  special	  rates	  and	  sewerage	  special	  rates,	  where	  that	  land	  belongs	  to	  a	  public	  
benevolent	  institution	  or	  public	  charity,	  and	  is	  used	  or	  occupied	  by	  the	  institution	  or	  charity	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  the	  institution	  or	  charity.	  
At	  first	  instance,	  the	  primary	  judge	  rejected	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  appellant	  was	  a	  public	  
benevolent	  institution	  and	  this	  finding	  was	  not	  appealed.	  The	  primary	  judge	  also	  rejected	  the	  
contention	  that	  the	  appellant	  was	  a	  public	  charity	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  section	  556(1)(h)	  of	  
the	  Act.	  
The	  appellant	  was	  incorporated	  as	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee.	  The	  Council	  agreed	  that	  
four	  of	  the	  company’s	  objects	  were	  charitable,	  but	  said	  that	  others	  were	  not.	  The	  non-­‐
charitable	  objects	  related	  to	  business	  undertakings	  of	  the	  appellant.	  The	  appellant	  accepted	  
that	  prima	  facie	  their	  objects	  comprised	  both	  charitable	  and	  non-­‐charitable	  objects	  which	  
meant	  that	  it	  did	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  ‘public	  charity’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  section	  556(1)(h).	  
The	  appellant	  sought	  to	  avoid	  that	  consequence	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  it	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  
was	  a	  distinction	  drawn	  in	  the	  cases	  between	  non-­‐charitable	  objects	  and	  powers	  which	  are	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independent	  or	  collateral,	  even	  if	  subsidiary,	  which	  have	  a	  disqualifying	  effect,	  and	  those	  
which	  are	  merely	  ancillary,	  incidental,	  dependant	  or	  concomitant	  to	  charitable	  objects	  or	  
powers	  which	  do	  not.	  The	  appellant	  sought	  to	  argue	  that,	  looked	  at	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  impugned	  
objects	  were	  in	  fact	  ancillary,	  incidental,	  dependant	  or	  concomitant	  to	  the	  four	  charitable	  
objects	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  have	  a	  disqualifying	  effect.	  Secondly,	  the	  appellant	  relied	  upon	  
the	  provisions	  of	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1993	  (NSW).	  
The	  appellant's	  submissions	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  application	  of	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charitable	  
Trusts	  Act	  were:	  
(a) Notwithstanding	  that	  the	  appellant	  was	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee	  it	  was	  able	  to	  
be	  a	  trustee;	  
(b) As	   owner	   of	   the	   properties,	   it	   held	   them	   in	   trust	   for	   the	   charitable	   purpose	   of	  
providing	  housing	  for	  persons	  of	  Aboriginal	  descent;	  
(c) As	  the	  appellant's	  objects	  were	  both	  charitable	  and	  non-­‐charitable,	  section	  23	  applied	  
to	  excise	  the	  non-­‐charitable	  and	  invalid	  objects	  from	  the	  valid	  charitable	  objects;	  
(d) The	   objects	   of	   the	   appellant	   included	   four	   identified	   non-­‐charitable	   objects.	   It	   was	  
appropriate	   to	   apply	   section	   23	   to	   ‘blue	   pencil’	   those	   objects	   thus	   leaving	   the	   valid	  
charitable	  objects	  with	   the	   result	   that	   the	   appellant	  was	   a	   ‘public	   charity’	   in	   that	   its	  
objects	  were,	  by	  virtue	  of	  section	  23(2),	  confined	  to	  those	  that	  were	  charitable.	  
The	  Court	  rejected	  these	  propositions.	  Section	  23	  of	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  could	  not	  apply	  
to	  the	  appellant’s	  position.	  The	  appellant	  was	  a	  company	  and	  not	  a	  trust	  (although	  a	  company	  
limited	  by	  guarantee	  could	  be	  a	  trustee	  in	  appropriate	  circumstances).	  Moreover,	  the	  purpose	  
of	  section	  23	  of	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1993	  was	  to	  preserve	  the	  validity	  of	  testamentary	  or	  
inter	  vivos	  gifts	  for	  purposes	  which	  are	  both	  charitable	  and	  non-­‐charitable.	  It	  had	  no	  other	  
purpose.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  ancillary	  objects	  which	  are	  not	  charitable,	  the	  appellant	  submitted	  that:	  
(a) It	  was	  permissible	  to	  look	  at	  the	  nature	  and	  circumstances	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  
appellant	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  determining	  its	  status	  as	  a	  public	  charity.	  The	  High	  Court	  
took	  that	  course	  in	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  v	  Word	  Investments	  Ltd	  [2008]	  
HCA	  55;	  (2008)	  236	  CLR	  204	  at	  [25];	  
(b) There	  were	  a	  number	  of	  textual	  indicators	  which	  pointed	  to	  an	  over-­‐arching	  objective	  
of	  providing	  housing	  to	  persons	  of	  Aboriginal	  descent,	  being	  the	  name	  of	  the	  appellant	  
and	  the	  order	  in	  which	  the	  objectives	  set	  out	  in	  clause	  2	  of	  the	  Memorandum	  were	  
listed;	  	  
(c) The	  appellant's	  actual	  activities	  were	  relevant	  in	  characterising	  the	  impugned	  
objectives	  as	  incidental	  and	  ancillary.	  Although	  it	  was	  accepted	  that	  it	  is	  the	  purposes	  
of	  an	  association	  that	  determine	  its	  charitable	  status,	  so	  that	  an	  activity,	  taken	  in	  the	  
abstract,	  can	  rarely	  be	  deemed	  charitable	  or	  non-­‐charitable,	  extrinsic	  evidence	  of	  
those	  activities	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  determining	  its	  charitable	  status	  in	  three	  
circumstances:	  first,	  where	  the	  constitution	  of	  an	  association	  expressly	  identifies	  an	  
object	  as	  its	  main	  (or	  subsidiary)	  object	  in	  circumstances	  where	  that	  is	  not	  conclusive	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and	  there	  is,	  therefore,	  doubt	  as	  to	  the	  association's	  main	  objects;	  second,	  where	  the	  
constitution	  of	  an	  association	  may	  not	  indicate	  with	  clarity	  its	  main	  object(s)	  in	  which	  
case	  the	  expressed	  objects	  are	  assessed	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  association's	  activities;	  
and	  third,	  where	  an	  association	  lacks	  a	  written	  constitution,	  its	  status	  may	  be	  
determined	  by	  reference	  to	  its	  nature	  which	  will	  be	  a	  function	  of	  its	  activities.	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  dealt	  very	  shortly	  with	  these	  submissions	  saying	  only	  (at	  [51])	  that:	  
...the	  primary	  judge	  was	  correct	  in	  holding	  that	  the	  impugned	  objects	  were	  
independent	  and	  not	  ancillary	  or	  incidental	  to	  any	  other	  object	  including	  that	  in	  clause	  
2(a)	  of	  the	  Memorandum	  [to	  provide	  housing	  to	  persons	  of	  Aboriginal	  descent].	  In	  this	  
respect,	  I	  cannot	  improve	  on	  his	  Honour's	  reasoning....	  The	  appellant	  has	  not	  
demonstrated	  any	  error	  in	  that	  reasoning	  which	  would	  justify	  appellate	  intervention.	  
The	  primary	  judge	  had	  said	  in	  this	  respect	  (at	  [53]–[54]	  of	  the	  primary	  judgement):	  
These	  objects,	  neither	  by	  express	  words	  nor	  by	  implication	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
activities	  described	  in	  the	  objects,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  ancillary	  or	  incidental	  to	  the	  object	  
in	  clause	  2(a)	  of	  providing	  housing	  for	  persons	  of	  Aboriginal	  descent.	  Clause	  2(l),	  (m),	  
(s)	  and	  (t)	  do	  not	  expressly	  state	  that	  the	  diverse	  businesses,	  trades	  or	  industries	  
described	  therein	  are	  only	  to	  be	  undertaken	  by	  the	  plaintiff	  for	  achieving	  any	  other	  
object	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  object	  in	  clause	  2(a)	  of	  providing	  housing	  for	  persons	  of	  
Aboriginal	  descent.	  By	  no	  means	  can	  undertaking	  the	  diverse	  businesses,	  trades	  and	  
industries	  listed	  in	  clause	  2(l),	  (m),	  (s)	  or	  (t),	  which	  are	  of	  a	  wholly	  different	  and	  
unrelated	  nature	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  housing	  for	  persons	  of	  Aboriginal	  descent,	  be	  
described	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  to	  achieve	  the	  provision	  of	  housing	  for	  persons	  of	  
Aboriginal	  descent	  or	  even	  as	  powers	  to	  carry	  out	  such	  an	  object.	  
Therefore,	  the	  appellant	  failed	  to	  show	  on	  either	  of	  the	  grounds	  it	  advanced	  that	  it	  was	  a	  
public	  charity,	  and	  thus	  exempt	  from	  land	  rates.	  The	  appeal	  was	  dismissed	  with	  costs.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2012/408.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  appellant	  company	  had	  four	  charitable	  objects:	  
(a) To	  provide	  housing	  for	  persons	  of	  aboriginal	  descent;	  
(b) To	  render	  such	  assistance	  to	  members	  as	  the	  members	  see	  fit,	  subject	  to	  clause	  3	  [of	  
the	  Memorandum];	  
(c) To	  carry	  out	  services	  for	  the	  social,	  intellectual	  and	  cultural	  advancement	  of	  members;	  
(d) To	  strengthen,	  build	  up	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  identity,	  sense	  of	  purpose	  and	  culture	  of	  
persons	  of	  Aboriginal	  and	  Island	  descent.	  
However,	  these	  objects	  were	  only	  four	  of	  numerous	  objects	  many	  of	  which	  dealt	  with	  business	  
ventures	  which	  the	  company	  was	  to	  undertake	  or	  become	  involved	  in.	  The	  ‘business’	  objects	  
were	  neither	  charitable	  nor	  incidental/ancillary	  to	  the	  charitable	  objects.	  Therefore,	  the	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company	  was	  not	  a	  public	  charity.	  As	  it	  was	  not	  a	  public	  charity,	  it	  was	  not	  exempt	  from	  paying	  
rates	  on	  the	  28	  properties	  it	  owned.	  
Where	  an	  organisation	  has	  mixed	  charitable	  and	  non-­‐charitable	  purposes,	  the	  non-­‐charitable	  
purposes	  must	  be	  ancillary	  to	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  –	  merely	  supporting	  or	  facilitating	  the	  
main	  charitable	  purposes.	  
 
2.1.2  GREENPEACE OF NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED [2012] NZCA 533 (COURT OF 
APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND, HARRISON, STEVENS, WHITE JJ, 16 NOVEMBER 
2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  against	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  New	  Zealand	  which	  agreed	  with	  the	  
Charities	  Commission	  of	  New	  Zealand	  (as	  it	  then	  was)	  that	  Greenpeace	  of	  New	  Zealand	  
(Greenpeace)	  could	  not	  be	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  because	  its	  main	  purposes	  were	  not	  
charitable,	  but	  rather	  political.	  The	  appeal	  was	  allowed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  certain	  changes	  which	  
Greenpeace	  proposed	  to	  its	  objects	  and	  activities.	  
The	  decision	  of	  the	  Charities	  Commission	  
Greenpeace	  had	  applied	  for	  registration	  as	  a	  charity	  in	  2008,	  but	  was	  denied	  charitable	  status	  
because	  of	  its	  purposes	  and	  activities.	  Before	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2005	  (NZ)	  (the	  
Act),	  Greenpeace	  had	  enjoyed	  charitable	  status,	  but	  when	  it	  applied	  for	  registration	  as	  a	  
charity	  under	  the	  Act,	  the	  Charities	  Commission	  (the	  Commission)	  held	  that	  Greenpeace	  was	  
not	  a	  society	  or	  institution	  that	  had	  been	  established	  and	  maintained	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  
purposes.	  	  
Registration	  was	  still	  possible	  under	  the	  Act,	  if	  the	  non-­‐charitable	  purposes	  were	  ‘merely	  
ancillary	  to	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  of	  the...society’	  (section	  5(3)	  of	  the	  Act).	  Ancillary	  was	  defined	  
as	  ‘ancillary,	  secondary,	  subordinate,	  or	  incidental	  to	  a	  charitable	  purpose’	  and	  ‘not	  an	  
independent	  purpose’:	  section	  5(4).	  
The	  Charities	  Commission	  took	  the	  view	  that:	  
• Although	  other	  purposes	  of	  Greenpeace	  were	  charitable,	  the	  purposes	  of	  promoting	  
peace	  and	  disarmament	  were	  political,	  not	  charitable.	  
• Because	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  political	  activities,	  the	  purposes	  
which	  were	  political	  amounted	  to	  independent,	  non-­‐charitable	  purposes.	  
• Some	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  Greenpeace	  (such	  as	  possible	  trespass)	  were	  illegal	  and	  
therefore	  could	  never	  be	  charitable. 
The	  High	  Court	  of	  New	  Zealand	  decision:	  Greenpeace	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Incorporated	  [2011]	  
NZHC	  77	  [see	  casenote]	  
The	  judgement	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  New	  Zealand	  was	  given	  after	  the	  Australian	  decision	  in	  
AID/WATCH	  Incorporated	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  [2010]	  HCA	  42	  (Aid/Watch)	  so	  that	  the	  
central	  question	  as	  to	  ‘whether	  a	  modern	  law	  of	  charities	  ought	  to	  exclude	  from	  registration	  
societies	  that	  promote	  charitable	  objectives	  through	  the	  use	  of	  advocacy,	  interacting	  with	  the	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executive,	  legislative	  and	  judicial	  branches	  of	  government’	  was	  decided	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  
affirmative	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  having	  been	  given	  in	  Australia.	  
While	  agreeing	  that	  some	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  Greenpeace	  were	  charitable,	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  
New	  Zealand	  held	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  been	  correct	  to	  deny	  Greenpeace	  registration	  as	  a	  
charitable	  entity.	  The	  Act	  did	  not	  change	  the	  common	  law	  meaning	  of	  ‘charitable	  purpose’	  as	  it	  
applied	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  The	  case	  of	  Bowman	  v	  Secular	  Society	  Ltd	  [1917]	  AC	  406	  (HL)	  was	  still	  
good	  law	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  and	  Molloy	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  [1981]	  1	  NZLR	  688	  
(CA)	  (Molloy)	  was	  held	  to	  be	  binding	  on	  the	  Court.	  	  
His	  Honour	  considered	  the	  conclusions	  in	  Aid/Watch	  but	  felt	  that	  they	  were	  reached	  through	  
an	  analysis	  of	  the	  particular	  Australian	  Constitutional	  provisions,	  for	  a	  system	  of	  representative	  
and	  responsible	  government	  with	  a	  universal	  adult	  franchise	  that	  pertained	  to	  Australia,	  but	  
not	  New	  Zealand.	  His	  Honour	  applied	  the	  Bowman	  principle,	  and	  the	  decision	  in	  Molloy,	  
though	  ‘with	  a	  degree	  of	  reluctance’.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  findings	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  were	  that:	  
• The	  objects	  of	  Greenpeace	  promoting	  disarmament	  and	  peace	  were	  held	  to	  be	  non-­‐
charitable,	  on	  both	  a	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  analysis.	  
• These	  objects	  were	  not	  merely	  ancillary,	  but	  rather	  were	  independent	  purposes	  which	  
disqualified	  Greenpeace	  from	  registration	  as	  a	  charitable	  entity.	  
• His	  Honour	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  made	  no	  findings	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  illegal	  activities.	  
This	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  decision	  	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  allowed	  the	  appeal	  in	  this	  case	  on	  the	  basis	  that:	  
• Greenpeace	  proposed	  to	  alter	  its	  objects	  to	  replace	  the	  object	  of	  ‘promoting	  
disarmament’	  with	  the	  object	  of	  ‘promoting	  peace	  and	  nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  the	  
elimination	  of	  all	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction’.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  found	  that	  this	  
object	  enjoyed	  such	  wide	  support	  in	  New	  Zealand	  that	  it	  was	  not	  political,	  but	  was	  
indeed	  charitable.	  
• Greenpeace	  proposed	  to	  limit	  its	  political	  activities	  to	  those	  which	  were	  ancillary.	  
The	  decision	  to	  register	  Greenpeace	  as	  a	  charitable	  entity	  was	  remitted	  to	  the	  Chief	  Executive	  
of	  the	  Department	  of	  Internal	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Charities	  Registration	  Board	  (the	  Board),	  in	  lieu	  
of	  the	  Charities	  Commission	  which	  no	  longer	  exists.	  The	  registration	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  decided.	  
The	  issue	  of	  change	  of	  objects	  to	  facilitate	  registration	  as	  a	  charity	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  agreed	  that	  most	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  objects	  were	  charitable	  as	  expressed.	  
However,	  they	  sought	  clarification	  on	  two	  of	  those	  objects	  (objects	  2.2	  and	  2.7)	  which	  
Greenpeace	  agreed	  to	  amend	  during	  the	  hearing.	  These	  objects	  are	  to	  be	  amended	  as	  follows	  
[amendments	  in	  bold]:	  
2.2	  Promote	  the	  protection	  and	  preservation	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  environment,	  including	  
the	  oceans,	  lakes,	  rivers	  and	  other	  waters,	  the	  land	  and	  the	  air	  and	  flora	  and	  fauna	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everywhere	  and	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  conversation,	  peace,	  
nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  all	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction.	  	  
2.7	  Promote	  the	  adoption	  of	  legislation,	  policies,	  rules,	  regulations	  and	  plans	  which	  
further	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  Society	  listed	  in	  clauses	  2.1–2.6	  and	  support	  their	  
enforcement	  or	  implementation	  through	  political	  or	  judicial	  processes,	  as	  necessary,	  
where	  such	  promotion	  or	  support	  is	  ancillary	  to	  those	  objects.	  	  
Greenpeace	  submitted	  that	  the	  law	  as	  set	  out	  in	  Molloy	  (that	  political	  purposes	  sought	  
through	  advocacy	  were	  not	  charitable)	  was	  ‘stale’	  and	  should	  be	  changed	  to	  align	  with	  
Aid/Watch	  in	  Australia.	  Greenpeace	  said	  that	  disarmament	  and	  peace	  were	  accepted	  goals	  in	  
New	  Zealand	  and	  met	  the	  public	  benefit	  test.	  Only	  ‘contentious’	  political	  advocacy	  was	  non-­‐
charitable.	  
The	  Board	  of	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  submitted	  that	  Greenpeace’s	  own	  website	  yielded	  many	  
examples	  of	  political	  advocacy	  which	  involved	  direct	  action,	  including	  activities	  which	  might	  
become	  illegal.	  These	  activities	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  objectives.	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  reviewed	  the	  website	  material	  and	  considered	  whether	  Greenpeace	  was	  
‘established	  and	  maintained	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  purposes’:	  section	  13(1)(b)(i)	  of	  the	  Act.	  
The	  requirement	  that	  a	  charitable	  entity	  be	  both	  ‘established	  and	  maintained’	  exclusively	  for	  
charitable	  purposes	  reflects	  the	  need	  to	  focus	  not	  only	  on	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  society	  but	  also	  
on	  its	  activities,	  current	  and	  proposed.	  	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  confirmed	  that	  for	  New	  Zealand	  the	  following	  matters	  had	  not	  changed	  
(at	  [41]–[46]):	  
• Section	  5(1)	  of	  the	  Act	  defines	  charitable	  purpose	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  the	  common	  
law:	  
‘In	  this	  Act,	  unless	  the	  context	  otherwise	  requires,	  charitable	  purpose	  includes	  
every	  charitable	  purpose,	  whether	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty,	  the	  
advancement	  of	  education	  or	  religion,	  or	  any	  other	  matter	  beneficial	  to	  the	  
community.’	  
• Although	  parliament	  clearly	  intended	  that	  the	  four	  recognised	  heads	  of	  charity	  remain	  
the	  law	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  this	  is	  an	  inclusive	  definition	  (by	  the	  use	  of	  word	  ‘includes’)	  
which	  in	  its	  terms	  is	  not	  exhaustive.	  
• ‘Any	  other	  matter	  beneficial	  to	  the	  community’	  brings	  with	  it	  the	  public	  benefit	  test,	  
and	  defines	  ‘charitable’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  coming	  within	  the	  spirit	  and	  intendment	  of	  the	  
preamble	  to	  the	  Statute	  of	  Charitable	  Uses	  1601	  (43	  Eliz	  I	  c	  4)	  (the	  preamble).	  
• The	  specific	  reference	  in	  section	  5(3)	  of	  the	  Act	  to	  ‘advocacy’	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  
‘advocacy’	  may	  be	  an	  ancillary,	  non-­‐independent	  non-­‐charitable	  purpose,	  but	  not	  a	  
primary,	  independent	  purpose.	  
• The	  specific	  terms	  of	  section	  5(4)	  of	  the	  Act	  clarify	  that	  an	  ancillary	  non-­‐charitable	  
purpose	  that	  is	  not	  an	  independent	  purpose	  of	  a	  society	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  society	  
from	  qualifying	  for	  registration.	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On	  the	  section	  5(3)	  point	  relating	  to	  advocacy,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  said	  that	  a	  similar	  
distinction	  is	  drawn	  in	  the	  Canadian	  legislation,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  Australian	  legislation,	  which	  
does	  not	  contain	  a	  definition	  of	  ‘charitable	  institution’	  (see	  Aid/Watch	  at	  [11]	  and	  Income	  Tax	  
Assessment	  Act	  1997	  (Cth),	  sections	  50–1	  and	  50–5;	  Fringe	  Benefits	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1986	  
(Cth),	  section	  65J(1)(baa);	  and	  A	  New	  Tax	  System	  (Goods	  and	  Services	  Tax)	  Act	  1999	  (Cth),	  
section	  176–1).	  The	  absence	  of	  this	  distinction	  was	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  
Australia	  in	  reaching	  its	  decision	  in	  Aid/Watch	  (at	  [26]).	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  held	  that	  any	  changes	  to	  the	  law	  in	  relation	  to	  lifting	  the	  prohibition	  on	  
political	  purposes	  were	  a	  matter	  for	  parliament.	  The	  Court	  said	  (at	  [59]–[60]	  [emphasis	  
added]):	  
...while	  there	  have	  been	  significant	  developments	  in	  the	  law	  since	  the	  prohibition	  on	  
political	  purposes	  was	  adopted,	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  prohibition	  has	  not	  necessarily	  
been	  undermined.	  There	  is	  little	  doubt	  that,	  like	  Australia	  and	  Canada,	  New	  Zealand	  
may	  now	  be	  described	  as	  a	  modern	  participatory	  democracy	  with	  well-­‐developed	  
constitutional	  arrangements	  for	  public	  involvement.	  It	  also	  has	  a	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  
protecting	  freedoms	  of	  thought,	  conscience,	  religion	  and	  expression.	  It	  is	  consequently	  
far	  removed	  from	  the	  position	  in	  England	  a	  hundred	  years	  ago	  when	  the	  prohibition	  on	  
primary	  political	  purposes	  was	  adopted.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  it	  remains	  
important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  exercising	  those	  rights	  to	  support	  purposes	  which	  
are	  recognised	  as	  primarily	  charitable	  and	  pursuing	  purely	  political	  purposes....	  Having	  
reached	  this	  view,	  we	  proceed	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Parliament	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  alter	  the	  
well-­‐established	  principles	  of	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  expression	  
‘charitable	  purpose’	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  This	  means	  in	  particular	  that	  we	  are	  not	  
prepared	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  decision	  of	  this	  Court	  in	  Molloy	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  
Inland	  Revenue,	  which	  has	  effectively	  been	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Act	  and	  which	  
established	  that	  a	  society	  established	  for	  contentious	  political	  purposes	  could	  not	  be	  
said	  to	  be	  established	  principally	  for	  charitable	  purposes.	  	  
The	  Court	  continued	  (at	  [63]	  [emphasis	  added]):	  
As	  the	  decision	  in	  Molloy	  indicates,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  political	  objects	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
inability	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  determine	  where	  the	  public	  good	  lies	  as	  between	  competing	  
views	  of	  a	  contentious	  political	  nature....	  [T]here	  is	  also	  no	  doubt	  an	  underlying	  
concern	  that	  taxation	  benefits	  should	  not	  be	  available	  to	  a	  society	  pursuing	  one	  side	  of	  
a	  political	  debate.	  In	  National	  Anti-­‐Vivisection	  Society	  v	  Inland	  Revenue	  Commissioners	  
Lord	  Wright	  pointed	  out	  that	  to	  enable	  a	  society	  to	  pursue	  a	  controversial	  purpose	  as	  a	  
charitable	  purpose	  and	  to	  claim	  the	  benefit	  of	  being	  immune	  from	  income	  tax	  ‘would	  
amount	  to	  receiving	  a	  subsidy	  from	  the	  state	  to	  that	  extent’.	  While	  the	  prohibition	  has	  
produced	  some	  continuing	  and	  anomalous	  results,	  which	  have	  led	  to	  criticism	  and	  
suggestions	  for	  reform,	  and	  no	  longer	  applies	  in	  Australia,	  it	  remains	  part	  of	  the	  
current	  law	  of	  New	  Zealand	  and	  we	  were	  not	  persuaded	  that	  there	  are	  good	  grounds	  
for	  overriding	  it.	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However,	  the	  Court	  emphasised	  (at	  [64])	  that	  the	  prohibition	  applied	  to	  contentious	  or	  
controversial	  objects.	  Purely	  ancillary	  political	  objects	  were	  permissible.	  Moreover,	  the	  law	  of	  
charity	  was	  not	  static	  (at	  [66]).	  The	  Court	  said	  (at	  [67]	  [emphasis	  added]):	  
In	  Aid/Watch	  Inc	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  said	  that	  the	  statutory	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
‘charitable’	  was	  to	  be	  understood	  by	  reference	  to	  its	  source	  in	  the	  general	  law	  as	  it	  
was	  developed	  in	  Australia	  ‘from	  time	  to	  time’.	  In	  our	  view	  a	  similar	  approach	  should	  
be	  adopted	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  while	  bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  law	  
here	  must	  be	  consistent	  with	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  
On	  the	  amendment	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  object	  2.2	  relating	  to	  peace,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  (at	  [72]):	  
It	  is	  uncontroversial	  and	  uncontentious	  today	  that	  in	  itself	  the	  promotion	  of	  peace	  is	  
both	  for	  the	  public	  benefit	  and	  within	  the	  spirit	  and	  intendment	  of	  the	  preamble,	  
either	  by	  way	  of	  analogy	  or	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  charitable	  status.	  It	  is	  
therefore	  within	  the	  fourth	  head	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  charitable	  purpose	  under	  the	  Act.	  
However,	  the	  means	  of	  achieving	  peace	  were	  contentious.	  Greenpeace	  had	  originally	  
mentioned	  only	  disarmament	  in	  object	  2.2.	  This	  would	  not	  be	  appropriate	  since	  it	  represented	  
only	  one	  side	  of	  the	  debate.	  Therefore,	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  High	  Court	  were	  correct	  to	  say	  
that	  the	  object	  as	  originally	  expressed	  was	  not	  charitable.	  	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  amendment	  of	  object	  2.2	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘nuclear	  
disarmament	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  all	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction’	  would	  make	  a	  
‘significant	  difference’.	  The	  changed	  wording	  would	  remove	  ‘the	  element	  of	  political	  
contention	  and	  controversy’	  (at	  [76]),	  and	  be	  widely	  accepted	  in	  New	  Zealand	  as	  an	  
uncontroversial	  public	  benefit	  purpose.	  It	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  government	  treaty	  obligations,	  
and	  with	  overwhelming	  public	  opinion.	  In	  addition,	  it	  would	  be	  within	  the	  spirit	  and	  
intendment	  of	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  Statute	  of	  Elizabeth	  because	  of	  its	  analogy	  with	  the	  
promotion	  of	  peace,	  which	  had	  long	  been	  accepted	  as	  a	  charitable	  purpose.	  
Therefore,	  the	  change	  of	  object	  2.2	  would	  make	  the	  object	  charitable.	  
The	  issue	  of	  change	  of	  political	  activities	  to	  be	  merely	  ancillary	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  held	  that	  the	  change	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  object	  2.7	  proposed	  by	  
Greenpeace	  would	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  political	  purposes	  it	  had	  were	  ancillary	  purposes.	  
There	  were	  three	  significant	  consequences	  (at	  [86]–[90]):	  
First,	  the	  amendments	  to	  objects	  2.2	  and	  2.7	  when	  taken	  together	  answer	  the	  
concerns	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  High	  Court	  that	  object	  2.7	  was	  not	  ancillary	  to	  a	  
charitable	  purpose.	  Our	  decision	  that	  Greenpeace’s	  amended	  ‘peace	  and	  nuclear	  
disarmament’	  object	  will	  be	  charitable	  means	  that	  the	  amended	  ‘political	  advocacy’	  
object	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  ancillary	  to	  a	  non-­‐charitable	  purpose.	  Second,	  the	  
amendments	  to	  object	  2.7	  record	  an	  intention	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Greenpeace	  that	  its	  
‘political	  advocacy’	  object	  will	  be	  truly	  ancillary	  to	  its	  principal	  objects	  and	  not	  an	  
independent	  stand-­‐alone	  object.	  For	  present	  purposes,	  we	  should	  assume	  that	  once	  
this	  object	  is	  amended,	  Greenpeace	  as	  both	  an	  incorporated	  society	  and	  a	  registered	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  20	  
	  
charitable	  entity	  will	  take	  steps	  to	  comply	  with	  it....	  As	  a	  registered	  charitable	  entity,	  
Greenpeace	  would	  also	  be	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  carried	  out	  its	  activities	  in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  in	  its	  objects	  and	  did	  not	  elevate	  its	  ancillary	  
‘political	  advocacy’	  object	  to	  independent	  status.	  Failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Greenpeace	  to	  
take	  these	  steps	  would	  mean	  that	  it	  was	  not	  ‘maintained’	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  
purposes	  as	  required	  by	  the	  Act.	  This	  would	  put	  its	  charitable	  status	  at	  risk....	  Third,	  on	  
the	  basis	  that	  once	  Greenpeace	  has	  amended	  its	  objects	  it	  will	  take	  steps	  to	  ensure	  
that	  through	  its	  activities	  it	  complies	  at	  all	  times	  with	  its	  new	  objects,	  we	  do	  not	  
consider	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  focus	  attention	  entirely	  on	  the	  past	  activities	  of	  
Greenpeace	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  High	  Court	  were	  required	  to.	  
In	  our	  view	  the	  focus	  should	  now	  be	  on	  Greenpeace’s	  new	  objects	  and	  its	  proposed	  
activities	  in	  light	  of	  those	  objects.	  The	  question	  is	  whether	  Greenpeace	  is	  now	  
‘established	  and	  maintained’	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  purposes.	  	  
This	  last	  point	  meant	  that	  the	  Board	  should	  now	  reconsider	  the	  application	  by	  Greenpeace	  for	  
registration	  as	  a	  charitable	  entity.	  The	  Court	  said	  (at	  [103])	  that	  the	  Board	  will	  need	  to	  decide:	  	  
(a)	  whether	  in	  light	  of	  relevant	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information	  relating	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  
proposed	  activities	  its	  new	  ‘political	  advocacy’	  object	  is	  truly	  ancillary	  to	  its	  principal	  
charitable	  purposes	  and	  is	  not	  an	  independent	  stand-­‐alone	  object;	  and	  	  
(b)	  whether	  Greenpeace	  is	  involved	  in	  illegal	  activities	  that	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  not	  entitled	  
to	  registration	  as	  a	  charitable	  entity.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/2012/533.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  dealt	  with	  a	  very	  important	  issue	  in	  charity	  law	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  Whilst	  the	  Court	  of	  
Appeal	  of	  New	  Zealand	  did	  not	  overturn	  any	  of	  the	  established	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  
charity	  or	  political	  advocacy	  and	  charitable	  purposes	  per	  se,	  they	  held	  that	  changes	  proposed	  
by	  Greenpeace	  of	  New	  Zealand	  to	  its	  objects	  were	  sufficient	  for	  it	  to	  fall	  within	  the	  definition	  
of	  a	  charitable	  entity.	  	  
Moreover,	  they	  implied	  that	  since	  the	  law	  of	  charity	  was	  not	  static,	  it	  should	  be	  changed	  from	  
time	  to	  time	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  to	  that	  adopted	  in	  the	  Aid/Watch	  case	  in	  Australia.	  This	  was	  
entirely	  a	  matter	  for	  the	  parliament.	  
However,	  the	  Court	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  decision	  was	  based	  on	  the	  altered	  objects	  and	  
activities	  put	  forward	  by	  Greenpeace,	  and	  that	  Greenpeace	  would	  be	  obliged	  to	  conform	  to	  
those	  changes	  or	  face	  losing	  its	  charitable	  status.	  This	  meant	  avoiding	  making	  its	  political	  
advocacy	  or	  activities	  more	  than	  ‘ancillary’,	  and	  engaging	  in	  illegal	  activities.	  The	  Court	  said	  (at	  
[91]):	  
...Greenpeace	  should	  be	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  the	  chief	  executive	  with	  
relevant	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information	  relating	  to	  its	  proposed	  activities	  in	  light	  of	  its	  new	  
ancillary	  ‘political	  advocacy’	  object.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  Greenpeace	  should	  be	  given	  
this	  opportunity	  because	  we	  share	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  High	  Court	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that	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  Greenpeace	  to	  date	  does	  suggest	  that	  its	  ‘political	  
advocacy’	  activities	  when	  assessed	  qualitatively	  were	  being	  pursued	  by	  Greenpeace	  as	  
an	  independent	  object	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  Those	  concerns	  were	  reinforced	  for	  us	  by	  the	  
material	  obtained	  from	  Greenpeace’s	  website	  set	  out	  in	  the	  submissions	  for	  the	  Board	  
which	  we	  summarised	  earlier	  in	  this	  judgment.	  If,	  notwithstanding	  the	  amendments	  to	  
object	  2.7,	  Greenpeace	  intends	  to	  pursue	  its	  ‘political	  advocacy’	  role	  to	  the	  same	  
extent	  as	  that	  material	  would	  indicate,	  then	  in	  our	  view	  the	  Board	  could	  well	  be	  
justified	  in	  reaching	  the	  same	  conclusion	  as	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  High	  Court	  
reached.	  
This	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  fair	  warning	  to	  Greenpeace.	  
	  
2.1.3  CHARITY COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES: REPORT RELATING TO THE 
CANCER CARE FOUNDATION (13 NOVEMBER 2012) 
The	  Cancer	  Care	  Foundation	  (CCF)	  is	  a	  registered	  charitable	  company	  in	  England,	  established	  in	  
1995.	  The	  Charity	  Commission	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  (the	  Commission)	  investigated	  its	  
operations,	  particularly	  relating	  to	  its	  fundraising,	  in	  a	  long-­‐running	  Inquiry	  commencing	  in	  
2002,	  which	  culminated	  in	  this	  report.	  The	  Commission	  was	  concerned	  in	  2002	  to	  note	  the	  
CCF's	  high	  level	  of	  fundraising	  costs	  and	  the	  low	  level	  of	  direct	  charitable	  expenditure.	  A	  
particular	  concern	  was	  the	  arrangement	  that	  CCF	  had	  with	  a	  professional	  fundraising	  
company,	  Fundraising	  Initiatives	  Ltd	  (FIL).	  
The	  charity’s	  charitable	  purposes	  were:	  	  
• the	  relief,	  support	  and	  assistance	  (whether	  financial	  or	  otherwise)	  of	  people	  and	  their	  
families	  who	  suffer	  or	  have	  suffered	  from	  any	  form	  of	  cancer,	  cancer-­‐related	  or	  similar	  
illness;	  
• the	  acceptance,	  payment	  or	  application	  of	  funds	  or	  property	  of	  any	  kind	  to	  or	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  such	  charitable	  institutions	  or	  for	  such	  charitable	  purposes	  (wheresoever	  in	  
the	  world	  the	  same	  shall	  be	  established	  and	  carried	  on)	  on	  such	  terms	  as	  the	  charity	  
shall	  think	  fit.	  
The	  CCF	  had	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  earlier	  inquiries	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  1999	  (relating	  to	  payroll	  
giving	  schemes)	  and	  2000	  (relating	  to	  CCF’s	  fundraising	  methods).	  The	  1999	  inquiry	  showed	  
that	  large	  amounts	  of	  expenditure	  were	  going	  to	  fundraising	  bodies,	  and	  very	  little	  to	  any	  
actual	  charity	  (e.g.	  in	  1998	  over	  £71,000	  was	  paid	  to	  fundraising	  agencies,	  and	  only	  £5000	  to	  
charity).	  The	  2000	  inquiry	  found	  that	  Caring	  Together	  Ltd	  (CTL),	  which	  was	  being	  used	  as	  a	  
fundraising	  body	  for	  CCF	  was	  being	  mistaken	  for	  a	  charity,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  was	  merely	  a	  
fundraising	  body.	  In	  addition,	  members	  of	  the	  public	  complained	  that	  CTL	  had	  misrepresented	  
that	  100%	  of	  donations	  from	  the	  public	  were	  to	  go	  to	  charity,	  without	  disclosing	  substantial	  
fees	  payable	  to	  CTL.	  This	  inquiry	  resulted	  in	  CTL	  becoming	  a	  wholly	  owned	  subsidiary	  of	  CCF	  
with	  two	  trustees.	  A	  new	  fundraising	  body	  was	  then	  set	  up,	  Fundraising	  Initiatives	  Ltd,	  which	  
was	  contracted	  to	  CTL.	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In	  2001,	  further	  concerns	  were	  raised	  by	  the	  Commission.	  These	  were	  in	  relation	  to:	  
• the	  continuing	  high	  fundraising	  costs	  of	  CCF;	  
• its	  relationship	  with	  its	  subsidiary	  (fundraising)	  companies;	  
• substantial	   income	   (£15.8	   million)	   which	   was	   not	   reflected	   accurately	   in	   CCF’s	  
accounts;	  
• the	  fact	  that	  CCF	  had	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  targets	  for	  its	  charitable	  donations	  set	  by	  the	  
Commission	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   1999	   inquiry	   (e.g.	   in	   2000	   a	   target	   of	   £200,000	   in	  
donations	  to	  hospices	  had	  been	  set,	  and	  the	  actual	  amount	  donated	  was	  £20,000);	  
• the	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  the	  trustees	  had	  resigned	  as	  a	  trustee	  to	  take	  up	  a	  paid	  position	  
with	  CCF	  as	  its	  CEO.	  This	  was	  expressly	  prohibited	  by	  CCF’s	  governing	  document.	  	  
The	  latest	  Inquiry	  examined	  the	  following	  issues:	  	  
• whether	   the	   acquisition	   by	   CCF	   of	   a	   subsidiary	   company,	   Caring	   Together	   Ltd	   (CTL),	  
and	  subsequent	  fundraising	  agreements	  were	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  charity;	  
• whether	  there	  were	  unauthorised	  trustee	  benefits;	  and	  
• whether	   some	   of	   the	   charity’s	   funds	   were	   held	   on	   special	   trusts	   for	   particular	  
children’s	  hospices.	  
The	  Inquiry	  concluded	  that:	  	  
• in	  the	  acquisition	  by	  CCF	  of	  Cancer	  Care	  Foundation	  Trading	  Ltd	  (CCFTL)	  and	  Caring	  
Together	  Ltd	  (CTL)	  and	  in	  subsequently	  entering	  into	  the	  fundraising	  agreements	  
outlined	  in	  the	  Inquiry	  report,	  the	  trustees	  of	  the	  charity	  did	  not	  act	  in	  the	  best	  
interests	  of	  the	  charity	  (this	  had	  resulted	  in	  litigation	  which	  was	  settled	  out	  of	  court);	  
• there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  instances	  of	  unauthorised	  trustee	  benefits	  being	  received	  by	  
former	  trustees	  and	  members	  of	  their	  families.	  For	  example,	  it	  was	  found	  that:	  
o 	  a	  total	  of	  £308,500	  had	  been	  paid	  (without	  reason)	  to	  former	  trustees	  or	  
persons	  connected	  with	  them	  between	  1999	  and	  2003;	  
o 	  the	  former	  trustee	  who	  had	  taken	  up	  the	  CEO	  position	  had	  been	  provided	  
with	  a	  Jaguar	  motor	  vehicle	  by	  the	  charity	  for	  his	  exclusive	  personal	  use,	  and	  
had	  had	  his	  private	  health	  benefits	  paid	  for;	  
o the	  CEO	  role	  had	  no	  apparent	  work	  attached	  to	  it;	  
o several	  other	  former	  trustees	  had	  resigned	  to	  take	  up	  paid	  positions	  with	  CCF;	  
o one	  former	  trustee	  and	  a	  current	  director	  were	  paid	  ‘bonuses’	  by	  CCFTL;	  
o the	  spouses	  and	  children	  of	  a	  former	  trustee,	  and	  a	  director	  of	  CCFTL,	  were	  
paid	  amounts	  for	  no	  apparent	  reason,	  and	  received	  benefits	  such	  as	  private	  
health	  cover.	  
These	  were	  made	  in	  breach	  of	  trust	  and,	  given	  the	  extent	  and	  nature	  of the	  
unauthorised	  benefits,	  the	  Inquiry	  was	  critical	  of	  the	  former	  trustees;	  
• there	  was	  insufficient	  information	  available	  to	  conclusively	  determine	  whether	  any	  
funds,	  and	  if	  so	  what	  amount,	  had	  been	  raised	  from	  donors	  on	  the	  understanding	  that	  
they	  would	  be	  used	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  specific	  hospices.	  Therefore	  no	  conclusions	  could	  
be	  reached	  by	  the	  Inquiry	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  any	  of	  the	  charity’s	  funds	  were	  held	  on	  
special	  trusts.	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The	  CCF	  has	  continued	  as	  a	  charity.	  An	  interim	  manager	  was	  appointed	  in	  2003	  to	  thoroughly	  
restructure	  the	  fundraising	  practices	  of	  the	  CCF,	  and	  new	  trustees	  were	  appointed	  
subsequently.	  Since	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  new	  trustees	  the	  charity	  has	  made	  charitable	  
donations	  of	  £3,555,384	  to	  a	  number	  of	  children’s	  hospices.	  	  




2.1.4  ALISS AND HESKITH V CHARITY COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 
LYTHAM SCHOOLS TRUSTEE LTD, AND THE UNITED CHURCH SCHOOLS TRUST 
(FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL, GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER (CHARITY), 
HINCHCLIFFE J, KAHN, DUGGAL (MEMBERS), 31 AUGUST 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  against	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  (the	  
Commission).	  A	  preliminary	  decision	  had	  previously	  been	  made	  in	  May	  2012:	  see	  casenote;	  or	  
decision	  of	  the	  tribunal	  at	  
http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/Lytham_Prelim_Decision_170512.p
df	  
On	  11	  November	  2011	  the	  Commission	  established	  a	  scheme	  (the	  Scheme)	  for	  the	  charities	  
formerly	  known	  as	  The	  Lytham	  Schools	  (TLS)	  and	  the	  King	  Edward	  VII	  and	  Queen	  Mary	  School	  
(KEQMS)	  Prize	  Fund.	  The	  scheme	  established	  The	  Lytham	  Schools	  Foundation	  (the	  Charity).	  
The	  second	  respondent	  in	  this	  appeal	  is	  the	  trustee	  of	  the	  Charity	  and	  is	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  
guarantee.	  The	  third	  respondent	  is	  a	  registered	  charity	  founded	  in	  1883	  which	  operates	  a	  
number	  of	  schools	  in	  the	  area	  of	  England	  in	  question,	  including	  the	  Arnold	  School	  only	  four	  
miles	  from	  KEQMS.	  
The	  Scheme	  was	  established	  under	  the	  power	  given	  to	  the	  Commission	  by	  sections	  13	  and	  16	  
of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993	  (the	  Act).	  The	  Scheme	  merged	  the	  two	  former	  charities,	  with	  the	  
objects	  of	  the	  new	  Charity	  being	  (at	  [1.1]):	  
...for	  the	  public	  benefit	  to	  advance	  education	  in	  or	  near	  Lytham	  St.	  Annes	  including	  by,	  
but	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  provision	  of	  land,	  buildings	  and	  other	  facilities	  for	  the	  purposes	  
of	  a	  school	  or	  schools	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  means-­‐tested	  bursaries	  and	  other	  financial	  
awards	  to	  children	  and	  young	  people	  in	  need	  of	  financial	  assistance	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
assisting	  with	  the	  cost	  of	  their	  education	  (including	  extra-­‐curricular	  activities	  
undertaken	  for	  educational	  purposes).	  
On	  9	  December	  2011	  the	  appellants	  submitted	  a	  notice	  of	  appeal	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  decision	  of	  
the	  Commission	  that	  established	  the	  Scheme.	  The	  appellants	  acted	  as	  representatives	  of	  a	  
group	  of	  parents	  of	  pupils	  attending	  KEQMS.	  The	  grounds	  of	  appeal	  were	  that	  the	  Commission	  
had	  incorrectly	  made	  the	  Scheme,	  and	  had	  not	  properly	  taken	  into	  account	  various	  factors	  
which	  militated	  against	  the	  Scheme.	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  24	  
	  
Prior	  to	  the	  Scheme,	  TLS	  had	  always	  provided	  funds	  for	  the	  education	  of	  children	  in	  or	  around	  
Lytham	  St	  Anne’s	  whose	  parents	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  education	  of	  their	  children.	  
TLS	  had	  established	  the	  KEQMS	  with	  means-­‐tested	  bursaries	  available	  for	  children	  attending	  
the	  school.	  
During	  the	  course	  of	  2011,	  negotiations	  took	  place	  between	  TLS	  and	  the	  UCST	  regarding	  the	  
possible	  merger	  of	  KEQMS	  and	  the	  Arnold	  School.	  TLS	  had	  substantial	  assets,	  but	  pupil	  
numbers	  were	  low	  and	  falling.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  negotiations	  was	  that	  a	  transfer	  and	  lease	  
of	  land	  and	  buildings	  belonging	  to	  KEQMS	  was	  made	  to	  the	  UCST.	  
Section	  13	  of	  the	  Act	  deals	  with	  the	  application	  of	  property	  of	  charities	  in	  a	  cy-­‐près	  scheme.	  
The	  appellants	  took	  exception	  to	  the	  Scheme	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  KEQMS	  and	  UCST	  did	  not	  
have	  similar	  aims.	  Moreover,	  the	  lease	  was	  for	  999	  years	  which	  they	  felt	  was	  excessive,	  and	  
illustrative	  of	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  process	  which	  led	  to	  the	  merger	  of	  the	  charities	  and	  the	  
Scheme.	  
The	  Commission	  submitted	  that	  section	  13(1)(c)	  of	  the	  Act	  applied	  where	  there	  was	  a	  cy-­‐près	  
occasion	  in	  which	  two	  or	  more	  items	  of	  charity	  property	  held	  for	  similar	  purposes	  could	  be	  
used	  more	  effectively	  for	  a	  common	  purpose.	  The	  Commission	  stated	  that	  the	  charitable	  
purposes	  of	  TLS	  and	  UCST	  were	  similar,	  but	  not	  identical,	  and	  that	  the	  property	  of	  TLS	  and	  
UCST	  could	  be	  used	  more	  effectively	  in	  conjunction	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  running	  of	  the	  two	  
schools	  on	  one	  site	  could	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  result	  in	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  a	  saving	  
in	  administrative	  costs.	  The	  sale	  of	  the	  Arnold	  School	  site	  would	  free	  up	  substantial	  sums	  for	  
charitable	  educational	  purposes.	  	  
The	  Commission	  argued	  that	  the	  'spirit	  of	  the	  gift'	  in	  respect	  of	  TLS	  was	  the	  provision	  of	  
schooling	  for	  children	  (including	  schooling	  in	  accordance	  with	  Christian	  doctrine)	  in	  the	  Lytham	  
area.	  The	  economic	  and	  social	  circumstances	  that	  were	  relevant	  were	  primarily	  those	  relating	  
to	  the	  current	  and	  future	  demand	  for	  private	  education	  in	  the	  Lytham	  area.	  The	  common	  
purpose	  to	  be	  pursued	  by	  the	  new	  charity	  and	  UCST	  was	  the	  use	  of	  the	  KEQMS	  site	  as	  a	  school.	  
Overall,	  the	  Commission	  regarded	  the	  common	  purpose	  of	  the	  Charity	  and	  UCST	  in	  providing	  
and	  operating	  the	  merged	  school	  as	  being	  virtually	  identical	  to	  the	  original	  purpose	  of	  TLS	  and	  
falling	  squarely	  within	  the	  ‘sprit	  of	  the	  gift’	  of	  TLS	  and	  being	  suitable	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  
prevailing	  social	  and	  economic	  circumstances.	  
In	  the	  preliminary	  hearing,	  the	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  section	  13	  of	  the	  Act	  applied	  in	  this	  situation	  
to	  make	  the	  Scheme	  permissible.	  The	  Tribunal	  then	  looked	  at	  the	  factors	  favouring	  the	  
Scheme,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  which	  were	  not	  in	  its	  favour	  and	  those	  which	  were	  neutral.	  The	  
overall	  conclusion	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  that,	  on	  balance,	  the	  factors	  that	  would	  cause	  the	  
property	  of	  TLS	  and	  UCST	  affected	  by	  the	  Scheme	  to	  be	  more	  effectively	  used	  in	  conjunction,	  
regard	  being	  had	  to	  the	  ‘appropriate	  considerations’	  (as	  discussed	  in	  the	  preliminary	  hearing),	  
outweighed	  the	  factors	  that	  would	  cause	  such	  use	  to	  be	  less	  effective.	  	  
However,	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  concerned	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Scheme	  created	  unnecessary,	  and	  
possibly	  unintended,	  risks	  and	  restrictions	  that	  reduced	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  property	  of	  the	  
new	  charity	  being	  applied	  more	  effectively	  in	  achieving	  its	  charitable	  purpose.	  This	  appeal	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decision	  dealt	  with	  these	  matters.	  The	  Tribunal	  decided	  that	  a	  modified	  scheme	  would	  be	  
more	  suitable,	  using	  its	  powers	  to	  substitute	  an	  order	  under	  Schedule	  6	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  
2011.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [4.1]):	  
The	  Tribunal	  is	  concerned	  that	  the	  misinterpretation	  by	  the	  Commission	  of	  certain	  
aspects	  of	  s.	  13(1)(c)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993	  led	  to	  the	  Scheme	  placing	  too	  much	  
emphasis	  on	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Charity	  to	  provide	  support	  to	  the	  merged	  school	  that	  is	  
to	  be	  run	  by	  UCST	  and	  created	  some	  avoidable	  risks	  or	  obstacles	  to	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  
the	  property	  in	  achieving	  the	  Charity’s	  purpose.	  The	  Tribunal	  accepts	  the	  view	  of	  the	  
Appellants	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Lease	  create	  an	  unnecessary	  risk	  of	  conflict	  with	  the	  
objects	  of	  the	  Charity.	  For	  example,	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  KEQMS	  could	  be	  used	  for	  
purposes	  other	  than	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  school	  that	  will	  benefit	  local	  residents	  and	  UCST	  
could	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  gain	  a	  financial	  advantage	  from	  some	  changes	  of	  use.	  
The	  modified	  scheme	  set	  out	  to	  overcome	  the	  perceived	  risks	  in	  the	  earlier	  cy-­‐près	  Scheme	  
relating	  to	  governance	  of	  the	  Charity,	  use	  of	  the	  land	  and	  buildings,	  the	  length	  of	  the	  lease	  
(reduced	  by	  agreement	  to	  150	  years),	  and	  various	  revenue	  and	  expenditure	  matters.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: 
http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/ca_2011_0007_decision_aug2012.
pdf	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  underlying	  issue	  in	  this	  case	  was	  that	  the	  Scheme	  of	  merging	  the	  two	  original	  charities	  had	  
been	  undertaken	  in	  haste	  by	  the	  Commission,	  the	  Charity	  and	  the	  UCST.	  Some	  criticism	  
(particularly	  of	  the	  Commission)	  was	  made	  of	  the	  process	  involved	  which	  the	  Tribunal	  found	  
had	  ‘unnecessary	  risk’.	  However,	  the	  Scheme	  survived	  with	  modifications,	  such	  that	  the	  
merged	  school	  was	  able	  to	  continue	  to	  operate	  ‘more	  effectively	  for	  the...	  public	  benefit	  in	  
providing	  education	  in	  or	  near	  Lytham	  St.	  Anne’s’	  (at	  [4.1]).	  
 
2.1.5 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA INC V 
COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2012] WASAT 146 (WA STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (COMMERCIAL AND CIVIL), CHANEY J (PRESIDENT), 
18 JULY 2012) 
This	  case	  concerned	  liability	  for	  payroll	  tax	  in	  Western	  Australia.	  The	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  
and	  Industry	  of	  Western	  Australia	  (CCI)	  is	  a	  nonprofit	  association	  incorporated	  under	  the	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1987	  (WA).	  It	  was	  established	  in	  January	  1992	  through	  an	  
amalgamation	  of	  the	  Confederation	  of	  Western	  Australia	  Industry	  (CWAI)	  and	  the	  Western	  
Australian	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  and	  Industry	  (WACCI).	  The	  CCI	  sought	  exemption	  from	  the	  
payment	  of	  state	  payroll	  tax	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  came	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  ‘charitable	  
body	  or	  organisation’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Pay-­‐roll	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  2002	  (WA)	  (the	  Act).	  	  
The	  Commissioner	  of	  State	  Revenue	  (the	  Commissioner)	  rejected	  the	  application	  for	  
exemption,	  arguing	  that	  the	  main	  (or	  at	  least	  equally	  important)	  purpose	  for	  which	  the	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Chamber	  carried	  on	  its	  operations	  was	  to	  provide	  services	  to	  its	  members	  rather	  than	  any	  
purpose	  which	  was	  directed	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  public	  generally.	  
The	  CCI	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  exempt	  from	  payroll	  tax	  under	  section	  40(2)(c)	  of	  the	  Act	  because	  it	  
was	  an	  exempt	  public	  benevolent	  institution	  and	  the	  wages	  it	  paid	  were	  paid	  for	  work	  of	  a	  
public	  benevolent	  nature.	  In	  the	  alternative,	  the	  CCI	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  exempt	  from	  payroll	  
tax	  under	  section	  41	  of	  the	  Act	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  was	  a	  charitable	  body	  or	  organisation.	  
The	  application	  for	  exemption	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  Commissioner	  on	  10	  June	  2010	  on	  the	  
grounds	  that	  the	  CCI	  was	  neither	  a	  public	  benevolent	  institution	  nor	  a	  charitable	  organisation.	  
An	  objection	  to	  this	  ruling	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  Commissioner	  on	  10	  June	  2011.	  The	  CCI	  then	  
sought	  a	  review	  by	  the	  Tribunal	  of	  the	  Commissioner's	  decision	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  charitable	  
organisation.	  It	  did	  not	  seek	  a	  review	  of	  the	  Commissioner's	  conclusion	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  public	  
benevolent	  institution.	  
Thus	  the	  issue	  for	  determination	  in	  this	  case	  was	  whether	  the	  CCI	  was	  a	  ‘charitable	  body	  or	  
organisation’	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  section	  41	  of	  the	  Act.	  Subsidiary	  issues	  arising	  were	  
whether	  all	  the	  wages	  paid	  by	  the	  CCI	  were	  exempt,	  and	  whether	  the	  exemption	  (if	  granted)	  
should	  be	  applied	  retrospectively.	  
The	  definition	  of	  ‘charitable	  body	  or	  organisation’	  in	  the	  Act	  is:	  
charitable	  body	  or	  organisation	  means	  a	  body	  or	  organisation	  established	  or	  carried	  
on	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  except—	  
(a)	  a	  body	  or	  organisation	  whose	  sole	  or	  principal	  purpose	  is	  the	  provision	  of	  tertiary	  
education;	  or	  
(b)	  a	  college	  or	  other	  vocational	  education	  and	  training	  institution	  under	  the	  
Vocational	  Education	  and	  Training	  Act	  1996[.] 
It	  was	  agreed	  that	  neither	  of	  the	  exceptions	  in	  the	  definition	  applied	  to	  the	  CCI.	  Therefore,	  the	  
question	  became	  whether	  the	  CCI	  was	  ‘established	  or	  carried	  on	  for	  charitable	  purposes’.	  This	  
required	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  general	  law	  as	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘charitable	  purposes’.	  	  
The	  leading	  case	  is	  Aid/Watch	  Inc	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  (2010)	  272	  ALR	  417,	  particularly	  
at	  [23]–[24].	  The	  majority	  in	  Aid/Watch	  described	  the	  speech	  of	  Lord	  Macnaghten	  in	  
Commissioners	  for	  Special	  Purposes	  of	  Income	  Tax	  v	  Pemsel	  [1891]	  AC	  531	  (Pemsel)	  as	  ‘the	  
source	  of	  the	  modern	  classification	  of	  charitable	  trusts	  in	  four	  principal	  divisions,	  namely,	  
trusts	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty,	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  education,	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  
religion	  and	  for	  other	  purposes	  beneficial	  to	  the	  community’.	  Their	  Honours	  observed	  (at	  [18])	  
that	  the	  case	  law	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  continue	  to	  develop	  in	  response	  to	  changed	  
circumstances.	  They	  also	  made	  it	  clear	  (at	  [48])	  that	  there	  is	  no	  general	  doctrine	  in	  Australian	  
law	  that	  excludes	  'political	  objects'	  from	  charitable	  purposes.	  
The	  CCI	  submitted	  that	  the	  fourth	  division	  of	  charitable	  purposes,	  namely,	  'other	  purposes	  
beneficial	  to	  the	  community'	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  it.	  It	  was	  agreed	  by	  the	  parties	  that	  the	  word	  
‘charitable’	  should	  be	  given	  its	  technical	  legal	  meaning	  in	  this	  case.	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  meaning	  
defined	  by	  Lord	  Macnaghten	  in	  Pemsel	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  spirit	  and	  intendment	  of	  the	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  27	  
	  
Preamble	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  Charitable	  Uses	  1601:	  see	  Central	  Bayside	  General	  Practice	  
Association	  Ltd	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  State	  Revenue	  (2006)	  228	  CLR	  168	  at	  [18].	  
The	  list	  of	  possible	  charitable	  purposes	  in	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  1601	  Act	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  
exhaustive:	  see	  Incorporated	  Council	  of	  Law	  Reporting	  of	  Queensland	  v	  Federal	  Commissioner	  
of	  Taxation	  (1971)	  125	  CLR	  659	  at	  [667].	  The	  Tribunal	  in	  this	  case	  said	  that	  the	  circumstances	  
existing	  at	  the	  time	  of	  incorporation,	  and	  the	  activities	  undertaken	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  case	  both	  
needed	  to	  be	  considered.	  A	  body	  may	  still	  be	  charitable	  even	  if	  it	  has	  purposes	  which	  are	  not	  
charitable,	  but	  which	  are	  incidental	  or	  ancillary	  to	  its	  main	  charitable	  purpose.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  then	  considered	  whether	  the	  promotion	  of	  commerce	  could	  be	  a	  charitable	  
purpose.	  The	  CCI	  described	  its	  central	  and	  dominant	  purpose	  as	  being	  ‘to	  make	  it	  easier	  to	  do	  
business’	  through	  pursuing	  a	  competitive	  and	  responsible	  free	  enterprise	  economy.	  This	  was	  
re-­‐phrased	  in	  its	  submissions	  to	  read	  ‘the	  charitable	  purpose	  of	  promotion	  of	  industry	  and	  
commerce	  in	  Western	  Australia	  and	  Australia’.	  
The	  Commissioner	  acknowledged	  that	  it	  had	  been	  recognised	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  industry	  
or	  commerce	  in	  general	  can	  be	  a	  public	  purpose	  of	  a	  charitable	  nature,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  the	  public	  or	  a	  considerable	  section	  of	  the	  public	  and	  not	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
furthering	  the	  interests	  of	  individuals	  engaged	  in	  trade,	  industry	  or	  commerce.	  However,	  the	  
Commissioner	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  CCI	  existed	  to	  help	  individual	  members	  to	  carry	  on	  their	  
businesses.	  Its	  object	  was	  not	  to	  support	  business	  generally.	  That	  is,	  there	  was	  no	  true	  ‘public	  
benefit’.	  
The	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  in	  dispute	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  promotion	  of	  industry	  or	  
commerce	  generally	  could	  be	  a	  charitable	  purpose.	  There	  were	  a	  number	  of	  decided	  cases	  in	  
support	  of	  this	  contention.	  In	  addition,	  the	  fact	  that	  benefit	  may	  accrue	  to	  the	  members	  of	  an	  
organisation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  organisation	  is	  not	  being	  carried	  on	  for	  a	  
charitable	  purpose;	  nor	  does	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  organisation	  derives	  profit	  from	  its	  operations.	  
The	  Tribunal	  considered	  in	  detail	  the	  CCI’s	  history,	  constitution	  and	  current	  activities.	  The	  
objects	  clause	  which	  applied	  in	  the	  current	  proceedings	  was	  established	  in	  2003	  as	  follows:	  
(a)	  to	  promote	  Western	  Australian	  industry	  and	  the	  trade	  and	  commerce	  and	  
economic	  development	  of	  Western	  Australia	  and	  in	  particular	  to	  promote	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  agricultural,	  pastoral,	  horticultural,	  viticultural,	  manufacturing	  or	  
industrial	  resources	  of	  Australia,	  particularly	  those	  of	  Western	  Australia;	  
(b)	  to	  provide	  for	  Western	  Australian	  industry	  trade	  and	  commerce	  the	  means	  of	  
formulating	  and	  making	  known	  its	  common	  purposes	  and	  of	  action	  in	  regard	  to	  
industrial,	  commercial,	  economic,	  fiscal,	  labour,	  social,	  educational,	  legal	  and	  technical	  
matters;	  
(c)	  to	  promote,	  develop	  and	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  or	  any	  persons,	  firms,	  
partnerships,	  companies,	  corporations,	  joint	  ventures	  and	  associations	  engaged	  in	  
industry	  and	  commerce;	  
(d)	  to	  secure	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Chamber	  all	  the	  advantages	  of	  unity	  of	  action;	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(e)	  to	  form	  and	  encourage	  the	  formation	  of	  Associations	  of	  employers	  or	  persons,	  
firms,	  companies	  and	  corporations	  within	  industries	  or	  groups	  of	  industries;	  
(f)	  to	  foster	  the	  maximum	  development	  of	  the	  free	  enterprise	  system;	  
(g)	  to	  promote	  and	  develop	  high	  standards	  in	  education	  and	  training	  in	  Western	  
Australia,	  and	  for	  such	  purposes	  to	  institute	  lectures	  and	  classes,	  to	  hold	  examinations	  
and	  to	  award	  scholarships	  and	  prizes;	  
(h)	  to	  consider,	  promote	  or	  oppose	  Commonwealth	  or	  State	  legislation,	  regulations	  
and	  policies	  and	  the	  by-­‐laws,	  regulations	  and	  policies	  of	  local	  governing	  bodies	  and	  
other	  corporations	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  affecting	  commercial	  interests	  and	  for	  such	  
purposes	  to	  take	  such	  steps	  or	  proceedings	  as	  may	  be	  expedient;	  
(i)	  to	  undertake	  by	  arbitration	  or	  otherwise	  the	  settlement	  of	  disputes	  between	  parties	  
willing	  to	  refer	  to,	  and	  abide	  by,	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Chamber;	  and	  
(j)	  to	  receive	  and	  decide	  references	  on	  matters	  of	  usage	  and	  custom	  dispute.	  
The	  CCI’s	  activities	  included	  ‘policy	  forums’,	  which	  took	  on	  a	  policy	  and	  advocacy	  role.	  It	  also	  
maintained	  a	  number	  of	  specialist	  committees	  which	  were	  both	  advisory	  and	  advocates	  for	  
industry.	  It	  provided	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  services	  to	  members	  on	  a	  fee-­‐for-­‐service	  basis.	  Its	  income	  
from	  service	  fees	  (in	  2011,	  about	  $80	  million)	  were	  much	  larger	  than	  its	  income	  from	  
subscription	  fees	  (2011:	  about	  $7	  million),	  but	  as	  the	  Tribunal	  observed,	  much	  of	  its	  service	  
income	  derived	  from	  the	  government,	  through	  funding	  of	  the	  CCI’s	  apprenticeship	  training	  
scheme.	  
The	  Tribunal	  also	  considered	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  documents	  relating	  to	  the	  CCI’s	  activities,	  
including	  its	  strategic	  plan,	  mission	  statement,	  and	  annual	  reports.	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  CCI’s	  
purpose,	  the	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [90],	  [93]–[94]):	  
The	  critical	  question	  for	  present	  purposes	  is	  not	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  activities,	  but	  
rather	  as	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  which	  those	  activities	  are	  carried	  on.	  Are	  the	  activities	  of	  
CCI	  directed	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  promotion	  and	  industry,	  generally	  in	  Western	  Australia,	  
as	  the	  applicant	  contends,	  or	  rather	  are	  the	  activities	  directed	  to	  serving	  the	  private	  
interests	  of	  members	  or	  other	  businesses,	  as	  the	  Commissioner	  contends?	  	  
....	  
....	  The	  activities	  ...	  including	  the	  numerous	  discussion	  and	  policy	  papers,	  the	  activities	  
of	  various	  committees	  and	  the	  advocacy	  and	  lobbying	  role	  played	  by	  CCI,	  are	  all	  
suggestive	  of	  an	  organisation	  being	  carried	  on	  for	  a	  public	  benefit	  (in	  the	  sense	  that	  
promotion	  of	  industry	  and	  commerce	  has	  been	  recognised	  as	  being	  directed	  to	  public	  
benefit).	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  role	  played	  by	  CCI	  may	  be	  driven	  from	  a	  particular	  political	  
or	  philosophical	  perspective	  does	  not	  disqualify	  its	  purpose	  from	  being	  characterised	  
as	  charitable....	  	  
This	  suggests	  that	  the	  principal	  purpose	  of	  CCI	  is	  a	  public	  purpose	  of	  a	  charitable	  
nature	  within	  the	  fourth	  class	  of	  charitable	  purposes	  referred	  to	  in	  Pemsel.	  
Therefore,	  the	  Tribunal	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  CCI’s	  main	  purpose	  was	  charitable,	  and	  that	  it	  
should	  be	  exempt	  from	  payroll	  tax.	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On	  the	  subsidiary	  issues,	  the	  tribunal	  referred	  the	  consideration	  of	  which	  wages	  should	  be	  
exempt	  back	  to	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  assessment	  ‘in	  accordance	  with	  the	  conclusions	  reached	  
as	  to	  the	  charitable	  status	  of	  [the]	  CCI	  in	  these	  reasons’	  (at	  [104]).	  As	  to	  retrospectivity,	  the	  
Tribunal	  found	  that	  a	  refund	  of	  payroll	  tax	  should	  be	  made	  which	  covered	  ‘the	  whole	  period	  in	  
respect	  of	  which	  the	  exemption	  [is]	  sought’	  (at	  [106]).	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASAT/2012/146.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  follows	  a	  line	  of	  cases	  which	  have	  considered	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘charitable	  purpose’.	  
Although	  the	  law	  on	  this	  matter	  in	  Australia	  is	  still	  based	  on	  very	  old	  common	  law,	  courts	  and	  
tribunals	  are	  willing	  to	  consider	  the	  need	  to	  extend	  the	  meaning	  over	  time.	  The	  Commissioner	  
acknowledged	  in	  this	  case	  that	  it	  has	  been	  recognised	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  industry	  or	  
commerce	  in	  general	  can	  be	  a	  public	  purpose	  of	  a	  charitable	  nature,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  the	  public	  or	  a	  considerable	  section	  of	  the	  public	  and	  not	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
furthering	  the	  interests	  of	  individuals	  engaged	  in	  trade,	  industry	  or	  commerce.	  An	  examination	  
of	  the	  constitution	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  CCI	  showed	  that,	  in	  the	  Tribunal’s	  opinion,	  the	  services	  
provided	  to	  individual	  members	  of	  the	  CCI	  were	  not	  such	  as	  to	  outweigh	  its	  more	  dominant	  
purpose	  of	  promoting	  industry	  and	  commerce	  generally.	  Therefore,	  based	  on	  the	  older	  case	  
law,	  the	  CCI	  was	  charitable.	  
	  
2.1.6  THE SOUTHLAND CHRISTMAS PARADE CHARITABLE TRUST (NEW ZEALAND 
CHARITIES COMMISSION REGISTRATION DECISION, DECISION NO 2012–06, 24 
MAY 2012)  
The	  Southland	  Christmas	  Parade	  Charitable	  Trust	  (the	  applicant)	  was	  originally	  incorporated	  as	  
a	  charitable	  trust	  under	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1957	  (NZ)	  in	  1999,	  and	  subsequently	  
registered	  as	  a	  charity	  by	  the	  Charities	  Commission	  (the	  Commission)	  in	  2009.	  It	  was	  removed	  
from	  the	  Register	  in	  2010	  for	  failing	  to	  file	  its	  2009	  Annual	  Return	  and	  financial	  statements.	  
The	  applicant	  reapplied	  for	  registration	  as	  a	  charitable	  entity	  on	  14	  September	  2011,	  but	  on	  8	  
February	  2012	  the	  Commission	  sent	  the	  applicant	  a	  letter	  stating	  that	  its	  purposes	  were	  not	  
exclusively	  charitable.	  The	  Commission	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  purposes	  were	  
mainly	  to	  provide	  entertainment.	  The	  matter	  then	  came	  before	  the	  Commission	  for	  this	  formal	  
decision.	  
Under	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2005	  (NZ)	  (the	  Act),	  section	  13	  requires	  that	  a	  trust	  requesting	  
registration	  as	  a	  charity	  must	  be	  able	  to	  show	  that	  it	  is	  of	  a	  kind	  which	  generates	  an	  amount	  of	  
income	  in	  trust	  for	  charitable	  purposes.	  Charitable	  purposes	  are	  defined	  in	  section	  5(1).	  In	  
addition	  to	  having	  a	  charitable	  purpose,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  public	  benefit	  involved.	  
New	  Zealand	  case	  law	  follows	  the	  older	  English	  line	  of	  authority	  which	  holds	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
charitable	  an	  entity	  must	  have	  exclusively	  charitable	  purposes:	  McGovern	  v	  Attorney-­‐General	  
[1982]	  1	  Ch.	  321	  at	  341;	  Molloy	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  [1981]	  1	  NZLR	  688	  at	  691.	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The	  purposes	  of	  the	  applicant	  were	  contained	  in	  clause	  3	  of	  its	  Trust	  Deed,	  and	  followed	  the	  
wording	  of	  section	  38	  of	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1957.	  
The	  Commissioner	  rejected	  the	  view	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  objects	  were	  entirely	  charitable,	  
despite	  clause	  3.12	  excluding	  ‘non-­‐charitable’	  objects	  from	  the	  applicant’s	  activities.	  On	  this	  
point,	  the	  Commission	  followed	  Canterbury	  Development	  Corporation	  v	  Charities	  Commission	  
[2010]	  NZHC	  331	  where	  Young	  J	  said	  that	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  an	  entity’s	  constitution	  states	  that	  
its	  objects	  are	  charitable	  does	  not	  make	  them	  charitable	  in	  reality	  (at	  [56]	  of	  that	  decision).	  	  
One	  of	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  under	  the	  Act	  is	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty,	  but	  the	  Commission	  said	  
that	  the	  applicant’s	  activities	  were	  not	  directed	  at	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty.	  They	  were	  directed	  at	  
the	  provision	  of	  amusement.	  Although	  the	  parade	  conducted	  by	  the	  applicant	  was	  the	  means	  
by	  which	  it	  collected	  money	  for	  charity,	  including	  for	  ‘less	  privileged	  children’,	  the	  Commission	  
found	  that	  the	  parade	  was	  not	  aimed	  only	  at	  ‘the	  underprivileged’	  but	  at	  ‘the	  whole	  
community’	  (at	  [28]).	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  charitable	  purpose	  of	  the	  advancement	  of	  education,	  the	  Commission	  said	  
that	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  education	  the	  applicant	  would	  have	  to	  provide	  some	  form	  of	  
education	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  learning	  was	  advanced.	  It	  took	  the	  view	  that	  ‘education	  does	  not	  
include	  advertisements	  for	  particular	  goods	  or	  services	  or	  promotion	  of	  a	  particular	  point	  of	  
view’	  (at	  [30]).	  The	  Commission	  concluded	  that	  education	  was	  not	  a	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  
parade,	  although	  there	  may	  have	  been	  some	  secondary	  educational	  benefits	  (making	  floats,	  
volunteering,	  children’s	  activities)	  which	  were	  incidental	  to	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  
entertainment.	  
The	  Commission	  gave	  short	  shrift	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  advancement	  of	  religion	  purpose.	  A	  
purpose	  to	  advance	  religion	  must	  be	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  religion.	  Despite	  clause	  3	  of	  the	  
applicant’s	  Trust	  Deed	  referring	  to	  a	  ‘religious	  instruction’	  purpose,	  the	  Commission	  found	  that	  
the	  applicant’s	  own	  financial	  statements	  revealed	  that	  the	  topics	  covered	  in	  the	  parade	  in	  
2010–2011	  were	  reindeer,	  Santa	  Claus,	  pirates,	  castles,	  Mary	  Poppins,	  Spiderman,	  Angels,	  the	  
Flintstones	  and	  birthday	  cakes.	  The	  Commission	  stated	  that	  this	  showed	  ‘insufficient	  evidence’	  
of	  religious	  instruction	  (at	  [36]).	  
Charitable	  purposes	  can	  also	  include	  other	  matters	  beneficial	  to	  the	  community.	  The	  
Commission	  said	  that	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  under	  this	  head	  of	  charity,	  the	  purpose	  must	  be	  
‘beneficial	  to	  the	  community	  and	  must	  be	  within	  the	  spirit	  and	  intendment	  of	  the	  purposes	  set	  
out	  in	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  Charitable	  Uses	  Act	  1601	  (the	  Statute	  of	  Elizabeth)’	  (at	  [37]).	  Clause	  
3	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  Trust	  Deed	  referred	  to	  objects	  intended	  to	  benefit	  Southland	  and	  its	  
community.	  The	  Commission	  agreed	  that	  this	  was	  a	  sufficient	  section	  of	  the	  community	  for	  the	  
applicant’s	  purposes	  to	  be	  of	  public	  benefit.	  However,	  this	  did	  not	  advance	  the	  applicant’s	  
cause	  if	  its	  objects	  were	  not	  charitable	  as	  a	  whole.	  
Organisations	  can	  benefit	  the	  community	  without	  being	  charitable.	  The	  Commission	  noted	  
that	  charitable	  purposes	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Statute	  of	  Elizabeth	  have	  been	  added	  to	  over	  time,	  
since	  charitable	  purposes	  ‘must	  change	  to	  reflect	  current	  social	  and	  economic	  circumstances’	  
(at	  [42]).	  The	  wording	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  charitable	  purposes	  clauses	  came	  from	  section	  38	  of	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the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1957.	  The	  Commission	  took	  the	  view,	  based	  on	  case	  law,	  that	  not	  all	  
these	  purposes	  were	  charitable.	  Purposes	  such	  as	  those	  relating	  to	  athletic	  sports,	  supporting	  
individual	  losses	  from	  fires	  (no	  public	  benefit),	  and	  giving	  rewards	  for	  acts	  of	  courage	  (no	  
public	  benefit)	  were	  not	  necessarily	  charitable.	  Base	  on	  this	  analysis,	  the	  Commission	  found	  
that	  clauses	  3.8	  (encouragement	  of	  skills,	  industry	  and	  thrift)	  and	  3.10	  (rewards	  for	  acts	  of	  
courage)	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  purposes	  were	  not	  charitable	  (at	  [45]).	  
Turning	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  activities,	  there	  was	  found	  to	  be	  only	  one,	  the	  holding	  of	  a	  Christmas	  
Parade.	  New	  Zealand	  case	  law	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  sporting,	  entertainment,	  and	  social	  
activities	  are	  not	  charitable	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  The	  Commission	  state	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  main	  
purpose	  was	  to	  provide	  entertainment	  and	  that	  any	  link	  to	  an	  ‘underlying,	  deeper	  purpose	  
that	  may	  be	  charitable’	  was	  ‘too	  tenuous	  to	  be	  recognised’	  (at	  [48]).	  Moreover,	  the	  applicant’s	  
actual	  fundraising	  was	  ‘a	  minor	  activity’	  (around	  4%	  of	  its	  expenditure:	  $3338	  in	  2011,	  $2353	  in	  
2010	  and	  $2782	  in	  2009),	  and	  the	  parade	  itself	  ‘an	  independent	  purpose’	  (at	  [52]).	  
Therefore	  the	  applicant’s	  purposes	  were	  not	  charitable.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  valid	  charitable	  trust	  
under	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1957	  either,	  since	  its	  objects	  were	  not	  exclusively	  charitable.	  
Nor	  could	  it	  be	  saved	  under	  section	  61B	  of	  that	  Act	  since	  its	  objects	  did	  not	  evince	  ‘a	  
substantially	  charitable	  mind’	  with	  an	  intention	  to	  create	  a	  charitable	  trust.	  The	  applicant	  was	  
denied	  registration	  as	  a	  charity.	  
The	  decision	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.charities.govt.nz/assets/docs/registration/declined/southland-­‐christmas-­‐parade-­‐
charitable-­‐trust.pdf 
Implications	  of	  this	  decision	  
Charitable	  purpose	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2005	  (NZ)	  (the	  Act)	  as	  relating	  to	  the	  relief	  of	  
poverty,	  the	  advancement	  of	  education	  or	  religion,	  or	  any	  other	  matter	  beneficial	  to	  the	  
community:	  section	  5(1).	  This	  is	  the	  same	  definition	  as	  in	  the	  common	  law.	  Sections	  5(3)	  and	  
5(4)	  provide	  that	  despite	  the	  requirement	  to	  be	  exclusively	  charitable,	  ancillary,	  non-­‐charitable	  
purposes	  may	  be	  present.	  Recognition	  as	  a	  charity	  is	  still	  possible	  under	  the	  Act	  if	  any	  non-­‐
charitable	  purposes	  are	  ‘merely	  ancillary	  to	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  of	  the...	  society’	  (section	  5(3)	  
of	  the	  Act,	  emphasis	  added).	  Ancillary	  is	  defined	  as	  ‘ancillary,	  secondary,	  subordinate,	  or	  
incidental	  to	  a	  charitable	  purpose’	  and	  ‘not	  an	  independent	  purpose’:	  section	  5(4).	  In	  this	  case,	  
the	  applicant	  failed	  to	  show	  that	  it	  had	  any	  charitable	  purposes	  as	  defined.	  Although	  its	  
activities	  had	  some	  public	  benefit,	  this	  was	  no	  help	  to	  its	  application	  if	  its	  purposes	  were	  not	  
charitable.	  
	  
2.1.7  ALISS AND HESKITH V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES, 
THE LYTHAM SCHOOLS TRUSTEE LTD AND THE UNITED CHURCH SCHOOLS 
TRUST (FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL, GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER (CHARITY), 
HINCHCLIFFE J, KHAN, DUGGAL (MEMBERS), 17 MAY 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  preliminary	  decision	  as	  part	  of	  an	  appeal	  from	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  
for	  England	  and	  Wales	  (the	  Commission)	  to	  the	  First	  Tier	  Tribunal	  (Charity)	  (the	  Tribunal).	  The	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question	  before	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  whether	  a	  scheme	  (the	  Scheme)	  established	  by	  the	  
Commission	  on	  11	  November	  2011	  to	  govern	  the	  charities	  formerly	  known	  as	  The	  Lytham	  
Schools	  and	  King	  Edward	  VII	  and	  Queen	  Mary	  School	  Prize	  Fund	  was	  valid.	  
The	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  the	  circumstances	  set	  out	  in	  section	  13(1)(c)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2006	  
(UK)	  (the	  Act)	  existed	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  property	  of	  The	  Lytham	  Schools	  at	  the	  time	  that	  the	  
Scheme	  of	  11	  November	  2011	  was	  ordered.	  The	  Tribunal	  also	  held	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
Scheme	  created	  unnecessary	  risks	  and	  restrictions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  the	  
property	  of	  the	  charity.	  
The	  Scheme	  was	  established	  under	  the	  power	  given	  to	  the	  Commission	  under	  sections	  13	  and	  
16	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993.	  The	  Scheme	  merged	  the	  two	  charities	  formerly	  known	  as	  The	  
Lytham	  Schools	  (TLS)	  and	  King	  Edward	  VII	  and	  Queen	  Mary	  School	  Prize	  Fund	  into	  a	  charity	  
called	  The	  Lytham	  Schools	  Foundation.	  The	  objects	  of	  the	  new	  charity	  were:	  
...for	  the	  public	  benefit	  to	  advance	  education	  in	  or	  near	  Lytham	  St	  Ann’s	  [sic]	  including	  
by,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  provision	  of	  land,	  buildings	  and	  other	  facilities	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  a	  school	  or	  schools	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  means-­‐tested	  bursaries	  and	  other	  
financial	  awards	  to	  children	  and	  young	  people	  in	  need	  of	  financial	  assistance	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  assisting	  with	  the	  cost	  of	  their	  education	  (including	  extra-­‐curricular	  
activities	  undertaken	  for	  educational	  purposes).	  
On	  9	  December	  2011	  the	  appellants	  submitted	  a	  notice	  of	  appeal	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  decision	  of	  
the	  Commission	  that	  established	  the	  Scheme.	  The	  appellants	  acted	  as	  representatives	  of	  a	  
group	  of	  parents	  of	  pupils	  attending	  the	  King	  Edward	  and	  Queen	  Mary	  School	  in	  Lytham	  St	  
Annes	  (KEQMS).	  The	  grounds	  of	  appeal	  were	  that	  the	  Commission	  had	  incorrectly	  made	  the	  
Scheme,	  and	  had	  not	  properly	  taken	  into	  account	  various	  factors	  which	  militated	  against	  the	  
Scheme.	  
The	  respondent	  Trustee	  was	  established	  under	  the	  Scheme,	  and	  the	  third	  respondent	  the	  
United	  Church	  Schools	  Trust	  (UCST)	  had	  the	  right	  under	  the	  scheme	  to	  the	  use	  of	  land	  and	  
buildings	  formerly	  occupied	  by	  the	  KEQMS.	  The	  objects	  of	  the	  UCST	  are:	  
...to	  provide	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  by	  the	  establishment	  and	  maintenance	  of	  schools,	  
a	  liberal,	  practical,	  and	  general	  education	  for	  children	  and	  adults	  of	  all	  ages	  and	  both	  
sexes,	  such	  education	  to	  include	  religious	  instruction	  in	  the	  doctrine	  and	  duty	  of	  
Christianity	  principally	  as	  the	  same	  are	  taught	  by	  the	  Church	  of	  England,	  and	  otherwise	  
to	  promote	  the	  establishment	  and	  maintenance	  of	  schools	  conducted,	  or	  to	  be	  
conducted,	  by	  any	  charitable	  institution.	  
Prior	  to	  the	  Scheme	  the	  TLS	  had	  always	  provided	  funds	  for	  the	  education	  of	  children	  in	  or	  
around	  Lytham	  St	  Anne’s	  whose	  parents	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  education	  of	  their	  
children.	  The	  TLS	  had	  established	  the	  KEQMS	  with	  means-­‐tested	  bursaries	  available	  for	  
children	  attending	  the	  school.	  
The	  UCST	  operated	  a	  school	  called	  the	  Arnold	  School	  about	  4	  miles	  from	  KEQMS.	  During	  the	  
course	  of	  2011,	  negotiations	  took	  place	  between	  TLS	  and	  the	  UCST	  regarding	  the	  possible	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merger	  of	  KEQMS	  and	  the	  Arnold	  School.	  The	  TLS	  had	  substantial	  assets,	  but	  pupil	  numbers	  
were	  low	  and	  falling.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  negotiations	  was	  that	  a	  transfer	  and	  lease	  of	  land	  
and	  buildings	  belonging	  to	  KEQMS	  was	  made	  to	  the	  UCST.	  
Section	  13	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993	  dealt	  with	  the	  application	  of	  property	  of	  charities	  in	  a	  cy-­‐
près	  scheme.	  The	  appellants	  took	  exception	  to	  the	  Scheme	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  KEQMS	  and	  
UCST	  did	  not	  have	  similar	  aims.	  Moreover,	  the	  lease	  was	  for	  999	  years	  which	  they	  felt	  was	  
excessive,	  and	  illustrative	  of	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  process	  which	  led	  to	  the	  merger	  of	  the	  
charities	  and	  the	  Scheme.	  
The	  Commission	  submitted	  that	  section	  13(1)(c)	  applied	  where	  there	  was	  a	  cy-­‐près	  occasion	  in	  
which	  two	  or	  more	  items	  of	  charity	  property	  held	  for	  similar	  purposes	  could	  be	  used	  more	  
effectively	  for	  a	  common	  purpose.	  The	  Commission	  was	  of	  the	  view	  that	  charity	  law	  seeks	  to	  
encourage	  the	  merger	  of	  charities	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  sector.	  The	  
Commission	  argued	  that	  sections	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2011	  are	  evidence	  of	  this	  underlying	  
intention:	  see	  sections	  14,	  267–274	  and	  305–314.	  	  
The	  Commission	  stated	  that	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  of	  TLS	  and	  UCST	  were	  similar,	  but	  not	  
identical,	  and	  that	  the	  property	  of	  TLS	  and	  UCST	  could	  be	  used	  more	  effectively	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  each	  other.	  The	  running	  of	  the	  two	  schools	  on	  one	  site	  could	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  
result	  in	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  a	  saving	  in	  administrative	  costs.	  The	  sale	  of	  the	  Arnold	  School	  
site	  would	  free	  up	  substantial	  sums	  for	  charitable	  educational	  purposes.	  The	  Commission	  
argued	  that	  the	  'spirit	  of	  the	  gift'	  in	  respect	  of	  TLS	  was	  the	  provision	  of	  schooling	  for	  children	  
(including	  schooling	  in	  accordance	  with	  Christian	  doctrine)	  in	  the	  Lytham	  area.	  The	  economic	  
and	  social	  circumstances	  that	  were	  relevant	  were	  primarily	  those	  relating	  to	  the	  current	  and	  
future	  demand	  for	  private	  education	  in	  the	  Lytham	  area.	  The	  common	  purpose	  to	  be	  pursued	  
by	  the	  new	  charity	  and	  UCST	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  KEQMS	  site	  as	  a	  school.	  Overall,	  the	  Commission	  
regarded	  the	  common	  purpose	  of	  the	  Charity	  and	  UCST	  in	  providing	  and	  operating	  the	  merged	  
school	  as	  being	  virtually	  identical	  to	  the	  original	  purpose	  of	  TLS	  and	  falling	  squarely	  within	  the	  
‘sprit	  of	  the	  gift’	  of	  TLS	  and	  being	  suitable	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  prevailing	  social	  and	  economic	  
circumstances.	  
To	  determine	  whether	  the	  circumstances	  existed	  which	  were	  provided	  for	  in	  section	  13	  of	  the	  
Act,	  the	  Tribunal	  considered	  it	  necessary	  to	  form	  a	  view	  on	  the	  following	  matters:	  	  
1. Whether	  the	  charitable	  assets	  employed	  in	  KEQMS	  and	  the	  Arnold	  School	  were	  being	  
applied	  for	  similar	  purposes?	  
2. What	  was	  meant	  by	  the	  ‘spirit	  of	  the	  gift’	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  new	  charity?	  
3. What	  were	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  circumstances	  prevailing	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
Scheme?	  
4. Whether	  the	  site	  and	  the	  undertaking	  of	  KEQMS	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  used	  more	  
effectively	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  Arnold	  School	  for	  a	  common	  purpose?	  
The	  Tribunal’s	  findings	  on	  each	  were:	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1. The	  Tribunal	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  two	  merged	  charities	  were	  similar,	  
though	  not	  exactly	  identical.	  They	  accepted	  the	  Commission’s	  submission	  that	  section	  
13	  of	  the	  Act	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  purposes	  had	  to	  be	  identical,	  and	  held	  that	  the	  
purposes	  of	  the	  two	  charities	  were	  sufficiently	  similar	  (at	  [8.2.3]).	  
2. As	  to	  section	  13’s	  requirement	  of	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  ‘spirit	  of	  the	  gift’,	  the	  Tribunal	  
could	  discern	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  parties	  on	  the	  issue.	  The	  spirit	  of	  the	  gift	  was	  
accepted	  as	  being	  the	  provision	  of	  education	  for	  poor	  children	  in	  the	  Lytham	  area	  (at	  
[8.3.2]).	  
3. The	  Tribunal	  took	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  circumstances	  which	  were	  
relevant	  to	  the	  Scheme.	  In	  particular,	  the	  Tribunal	  noted	  that	  circumstances	  were	  now	  
very	  different	  from	  those	  which	  pertained	  when	  the	  original	  gifts	  were	  first	  made.	  The	  
most	  notable	  change	  was	  the	  provision	  of	  universal	  free	  education	  in	  Britain.	  In	  
addition,	  there	  was	  a	  surplus	  of	  places	  in	  fee-­‐paying	  schools	  in	  the	  area	  served	  by	  the	  
two	  schools,	  which	  was	  a	  relevant	  factor	  (at	  [8.4.1]–[8.4.2])	  	  
4. The	  Tribunal	  concluded	  that	  the	  property	  used	  by	  the	  TLS	  to	  operate	  the	  KEQMS	  could	  
be	  used	  more	  effectively	  by	  combining	  resources	  with	  the	  Arnold	  school	  for	  the	  
common	  purpose	  of	  providing	  a	  merged	  secondary	  school	  in	  Lytham	  St	  Annes.	  The	  
Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [8.5.3])	  that:	  
This	  use	  was	  capable	  of	  increasing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  [new	  charity]	  in	  
advancing	  education	  for	  the	  public	  benefit	  in	  the	  area	  over	  the	  longer	  term,	  
both	  through	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  new	  merged	  school	  and	  through	  the	  increase	  
in	  charitable	  funds	  available	  for	  other	  purposes	  that	  could	  advance	  education	  
in	  the	  area.	  
Therefore,	  section	  13	  applied	  in	  this	  situation	  to	  make	  the	  Scheme	  permissible.	  The	  Tribunal	  
then	  looked	  at	  the	  factors	  favouring	  the	  Scheme,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  which	  were	  not	  in	  its	  favour	  
and	  those	  which	  were	  neutral.	  The	  overall	  conclusion	  of	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  that,	  on	  balance,	  the	  
factors	  that	  would	  cause	  the	  property	  of	  TLS	  and	  UCST	  affected	  by	  the	  Scheme	  to	  be	  used	  
more	  effectively	  in	  conjunction	  with	  each	  other,	  regard	  being	  had	  to	  the	  ‘appropriate	  
considerations’,	  outweighed	  the	  factors	  that	  would	  cause	  such	  use	  to	  be	  less	  effective.	  	  
However,	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  concerned	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Scheme	  created	  unnecessary,	  and	  
possibly	  unintended	  risks	  and	  restrictions	  that	  reduced	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  property	  of	  the	  
new	  charity	  being	  applied	  more	  effectively	  in	  achieving	  its	  charitable	  purpose.	  In	  addition,	  
there	  were	  concerns	  about	  the	  process	  employed	  by	  the	  Commission.	  The	  Tribunal	  stated	  (at	  
[11])	  that:	  
The	  Tribunal’s	  decision	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Preliminary	  Issue	  is	  that	  the	  circumstances	  
provided	  for	  in	  s.	  13(1)(c)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993	  did	  exist	  at	  the	  time	  that	  the	  
Scheme	  was	  established	  by	  the	  Commission.	  However,	  the	  Tribunal	  finds	  that	  the	  
terms	  of	  the	  Scheme	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Charity	  and	  UCST	  had	  already	  
agreed	  to	  implement	  it	  creates	  an	  unnecessary	  risk	  that	  such	  effective	  use	  may	  be	  
jeopardised	  or	  lost.	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Therefore,	  although	  the	  Scheme	  was	  permissible	  under	  the	  Act,	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  concerned	  
that	  there	  should	  have	  been	  a	  better	  process	  from	  the	  Commission.	  The	  Tribunal	  made	  
substitutions	  to	  the	  Scheme	  and	  invited	  the	  parties	  to	  make	  submissions	  on	  those	  
substitutions.	  The	  new	  ‘modified’	  draft	  Scheme	  reflected	  the	  Tribunal’s	  view	  that	  the	  
substitutions	  might	  increase	  the	  prospects	  for	  the	  property	  of	  the	  Charity	  being	  put	  to	  more	  
effective	  use	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  goodwill	  and	  assets	  (other	  than	  the	  site)	  of	  the	  Arnold	  
School.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/Lytham_Prelim_Decision_170512.p
df	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  a	  cy-­‐près	  scheme	  which	  was	  introduced	  after	  only	  a	  brief	  period	  of	  consultation	  and	  
as	  a	  ‘matter	  of	  urgency’	  by	  the	  Charities	  Commission	  of	  England	  and	  Wales.	  The	  First	  Tier	  
Tribunal	  was	  concerned	  that	  the	  scheme	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  proper	  process,	  and	  that	  the	  
haste	  with	  which	  it	  was	  put	  together	  might	  result	  in	  unforeseen	  detriment	  to	  the	  charities.	  This	  
case	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  heard	  in	  full.	  
	  
2.1.8  HELENA PARTNERSHIPS LTD V HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS [2012] EWCA CIV 
569 (ENGLAND AND WALES COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION), LLOYD, 
BLACK, LEWISON LJJ, 9 MAY 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  from	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  (Tax	  and	  Chancery	  Chamber):	  see	  
[2011]	  UKUT	  271	  (TCC).	  Helena	  Partnerships	  Ltd	  (Helena)	  is	  a	  registered	  social	  landlord,	  which	  
was	  incorporated	  in	  January	  2001.	  In	  October	  2001	  it	  adopted	  a	  new	  memorandum	  and	  
articles	  of	  association.	  Its	  objects	  were	  providing	  housing,	  accommodation,	  assistance	  to	  help	  
house	  people,	  and	  associated	  facilities	  and	  amenities,	  and	  any	  other	  object	  that	  could	  be	  
carried	  out	  by	  a	  company	  registered	  as	  a	  social	  landlord	  with	  the	  Housing	  Corporation,	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  the	  community.	  It	  was	  not	  to	  trade	  for	  profit.	  Later,	  in	  November	  2004,	  it	  changed	  
its	  memorandum	  and	  articles	  of	  association	  again.	  The	  issue	  on	  this	  appeal	  was	  whether,	  in	  the	  
period	  from	  October	  2001	  to	  November	  2004,	  Helena	  was	  established	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  
only,	  so	  that	  its	  funds	  were	  applicable	  for	  those	  purposes.	  If	  Helena	  was	  not	  established	  for	  
charitable	  purposes	  only	  in	  that	  period,	  then	  it	  was	  liable	  for	  £6	  million	  of	  corporation	  tax	  on	  
the	  rents	  that	  it	  received.	  	  
Lloyd	  LJ	  in	  his	  judgement	  (with	  which	  the	  other	  judges	  agreed)	  said	  that	  the	  appeal	  ‘raised	  
issues	  of	  charity	  law	  of	  some	  importance	  and	  difficulty,	  some	  of	  which	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  
of	  debate	  for	  years’	  (at	  [6]).	  The	  most	  important	  of	  these	  was	  whether	  the	  promotion	  of	  
objects	  of	  general	  public	  utility	  is	  a	  charitable	  purpose.	  The	  general	  view	  has	  been	  that	  the	  
provision	  and	  enhancement	  of	  a	  stock	  of	  housing	  accommodation,	  available	  for	  occupation	  by	  
tenants,	  and	  carried	  out	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  community,	  is	  a	  charitable	  object	  because	  it	  is	  of	  
general	  public	  utility.	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Helena	  is	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee,	  not	  having	  a	  share	  capital.	  In	  July	  2002	  Helena	  took	  
a	  transfer	  from	  St	  Helen's	  Metropolitan	  Borough	  Council	  (the	  Council)	  of	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  
Council's	  housing	  stock,	  under	  the	  UK	  Government's	  Large	  Scale	  Voluntary	  Transfer	  
Programme	  (designed	  to	  move	  former	  public	  housing	  to	  privatisation).	  The	  Council	  area,	  in	  
north-­‐west	  England,	  was	  an	  area	  of	  poor	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions.	  
As	  from	  1	  July	  2002,	  Helena	  was	  registered	  with	  the	  Housing	  Corporation	  (a	  government	  
regulatory	  body)	  as	  a	  social	  landlord.	  Under	  the	  agreement	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  housing	  
stock	  Helena	  took	  on	  various	  obligations	  owed	  to	  the	  Council,	  including	  a	  housing	  agency	  
agreement,	  and	  a	  nomination	  rights	  deed	  which	  gave	  the	  Council	  the	  right	  to	  nominate	  
tenants	  to	  75%	  of	  vacant	  properties	  held	  by	  Helena.	  Helena	  adopted	  the	  Council's	  pre-­‐existing	  
housing	  allocation	  policy,	  under	  which	  housing	  need	  was	  determined	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  points	  
system,	  with	  points	  acting	  cumulatively	  as	  indicators	  of	  the	  eligibility	  for	  housing	  of	  any	  given	  
applicant.	  	  
This	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  housing	  was	  restricted	  to	  the	  category	  of	  charitable	  purpose	  consisting	  
of	  the	  relief	  of	  the	  poor,	  the	  elderly	  and	  the	  infirm.	  It	  was	  agreed	  between	  the	  parties	  that	  
some	  of	  the	  Council's	  housing	  was	  to	  be	  rented	  to	  persons	  who	  were	  in	  need	  (and	  therefore	  in	  
the	  ‘charity’	  category),	  but	  some	  of	  it	  was	  to	  be	  rented	  to	  persons	  not	  in	  such	  need.	  	  
Lloyd	  LJ	  surveyed	  the	  development	  of	  charity	  law	  in	  England.	  He	  said	  (at	  [22]	  and	  [66]):	  
The	  law	  as	  to	  the	  purposes	  that	  are	  charitable	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  and	  
unsatisfactory,	  partly	  because	  of	  its	  historical	  development.	  It	  is	  strange	  enough	  to	  find	  
that	  reference	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  in	  the	  21st	  century,	  well	  into	  the	  reign	  of	  Queen	  
Elizabeth	  II,	  to	  the	  text	  of	  the	  preamble	  to	  a	  statute	  passed	  in	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  
reign	  of	  Queen	  Elizabeth	  I,	  the	  Statute	  of	  Charitable	  Uses	  1601,	  in	  order	  to	  find	  what	  
categories	  of	  purpose	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  charitable.	  It	  is	  all	  the	  more	  odd	  to	  do	  so	  
when	  one	  realises	  that	  the	  1601	  statute	  was	  passed	  in	  order	  to	  reform	  the	  procedure	  
for	  enforcing	  certain	  kinds	  of	  charitable	  uses,	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  others	  which,	  
accordingly,	  although	  charitable	  were	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  statute	  or	  in	  the	  
preamble...Thus,	  for	  the	  appeal	  to	  succeed,	  Helena's	  purposes	  must	  be	  found	  to	  be	  
within	  the	  spirit	  and	  intendment	  of	  the	  preamble,	  directly	  or	  by	  analogy,	  but	  the	  
statement	  that	  its	  purposes	  are	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  community	  is	  
not	  sufficient	  for	  this	  purpose.	  
Helena’s	  objects	  at	  the	  relevant	  time	  were	  listed	  at	  clause	  4	  of	  its	  memorandum.	  These	  were:	  
4.1	  housing;	  	  
4.2	  accommodation;	  	  
4.3	  assistance	  to	  help	  house	  people;	  	  
4.4	  associated	  facilities	  and	  amenities;	  and	  	  
4.5	  any	  other	  object	  that	  can	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  company	  registered	  as	  a	  social	  
landlord	  with	  the	  Housing	  Corporation	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  community.	  	  
The	  Company	  shall	  not	  trade	  for	  profit.	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Lloyd	  LJ	  said	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  objects	  (at	  [74]–[76],	  [78],	  [81]):	  
The	  real	  issue	  is	  as	  to	  the	  balance	  between	  public	  benefit	  and	  benefit	  to	  individuals	  
arising	  from	  the	  undertaking	  of	  all	  or	  any	  of	  Helena's	  objects.	  This	  type	  of	  issue	  has	  
arisen	  in	  numerous	  previous	  cases,	  of	  which	  we	  were	  shown	  several.	  The	  argument	  
was	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  benefits	  afforded	  to	  individuals	  (often	  referred	  to	  as	  
private	  benefits)	  were	  subordinate	  to	  the	  public	  benefit,	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  was	  to	  be	  
seen	  as	  the	  real	  object	  of	  the	  relevant	  body.	  Most	  charitable	  purposes	  provide	  
particular	  benefits	  to	  individuals,	  whether	  to	  the	  poor	  person	  in	  need	  of	  support,	  the	  
student	  in	  need	  of	  education,	  or	  the	  patient	  in	  need	  of	  treatment,	  to	  take	  a	  few	  
obvious	  examples.	  That	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  public	  benefit	  is	  provided...public	  
benefit	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  of	  charity,	  but	  the	  provision	  of	  particular	  benefits	  to	  particular	  
individuals	  is	  justified	  as	  a	  way	  of	  providing	  benefits	  to	  the	  public	  by	  virtue	  of,	  first,	  the	  
availability	  of	  the	  provision	  and,	  secondly,	  the	  selection	  of	  those	  who	  are	  to	  benefit	  on	  
an	  objective	  basis	  which	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  any	  private	  or	  particular	  nexus	  of	  the	  
beneficiary	  with	  the	  trust,	  the	  founder,	  the	  other	  beneficiaries	  or	  any	  given	  
individual...So,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Helena,	  the	  identification	  of	  those	  who	  were	  to	  occupy	  its	  
accommodation	  would	  be	  decided	  (in	  many	  cases)	  according	  to	  the	  allocation	  policy	  
previously	  used	  by	  the	  Council.	  This	  would	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  those	  in	  particular	  need,	  
but	  there	  would	  be	  objective	  criteria	  of	  selection	  involving	  no	  private	  or	  personal	  
element...	  Without	  attempting	  to	  lay	  down	  any	  rigid	  distinctions,	  there	  are	  charities	  
which	  provide	  direct	  benefits	  to	  individuals,	  whether	  by	  way	  (for	  example)	  of	  the	  relief	  
of	  the	  poor,	  the	  elderly	  or	  the	  infirm,	  education	  of	  students	  at	  schools	  or	  universities,	  
or	  medical	  treatment	  in	  hospitals.	  These	  are	  the	  charities	  that	  provide	  direct	  
benefits...They	  are	  justified	  as	  being	  for	  the	  public	  benefit	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  is	  
desirable	  that	  there	  should	  be	  such	  provision	  for	  those	  in	  particular	  need	  or,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  education,	  that	  it	  is	  a	  good	  thing	  that	  the	  population	  should	  receive	  education.	  
There	  are	  other	  charities	  which	  provide	  less,	  or	  nothing,	  in	  the	  way	  of	  identifiable	  
benefits	  to	  individuals,	  where	  the	  benefit	  is	  either	  entirely	  general	  (animal	  welfare,	  as	  
instanced	  above,	  which	  is	  justified	  as	  promoting	  the	  moral	  improvement	  of	  the	  public	  
generally)	  –	  these	  are	  cases	  of	  wider	  benefit	  as	  classified	  above	  –	  or	  the	  benefit	  is	  
general	  although	  some	  individuals	  may	  obtain	  more	  benefit	  than	  others,	  such	  as	  
bridges,	  sea-­‐walls	  or	  fire	  brigades,	  again	  only	  by	  way	  of	  example	  –	  these	  provide	  
indirect	  benefits	  as	  classified	  above.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  first	  category	  of	  charities,	  it	  is	  
seen	  as	  for	  the	  public	  benefit	  that	  the	  direct	  benefit	  to	  individuals	  should	  be	  available	  
for,	  and	  provided	  to,	  those	  in	  need.	  In	  the	  latter	  cases,	  which	  include	  various	  examples	  
of	  public	  works,	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  the	  works	  is	  seen	  as	  for	  the	  public	  benefit,	  because	  
of	  the	  public	  or	  general	  need,	  and	  the	  indirect	  benefit	  to	  individuals	  is	  incidental	  to	  
that	  of	  the	  public,	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  operations	  in	  question	  and	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  their	  benefits	  are	  experienced...	  In	  any	  given	  case,	  whether	  any	  benefit	  obtained	  
by	  an	  individual	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  body	  in	  question	  is	  
subordinate	  to	  public	  benefit	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  objects,	  the	  terms	  of	  
the	  constituent	  document,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  benefits	  accruing	  from	  the	  carrying	  
out	  of	  the	  objects.	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His	  Lordship	  held	  that	  Helena’s	  objects	  could	  not	  be	  charitable.	  There	  were	  two	  reasons	  for	  
this.	  First,	  the	  provision	  of	  housing	  (other	  to	  those	  in	  real	  charitable	  need)	  was	  not	  within	  the	  
intendment	  of	  the	  Preamble	  of	  Elizabeth	  either	  on	  its	  own	  or	  by	  analogy	  with	  other	  heads	  of	  
charity.	  In	  particular,	  there	  was	  no	  analogy	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  works	  of	  the	  kind	  
envisaged	  in	  the	  Preamble,	  such	  as	  bridges	  and	  sea-­‐walls.	  The	  provision	  of	  housing	  had	  too	  
much	  individual	  private	  benefit	  –	  the	  direct	  benefit	  to	  individuals	  far	  outweighed	  the	  indirect	  
public	  benefit	  of	  a	  provision	  of	  suitable	  housing	  stock.	  The	  private	  benefit	  accruing	  to	  the	  
individual	  occupiers	  was	  not	  merely	  incidental	  or	  subsidiary	  to	  any	  public	  benefit	  in	  having	  
housing	  stock	  available.	  It	  was	  ‘benefit	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  not	  incompatible	  with	  benefit	  to	  the	  
community,	  but	  not	  subordinate	  to	  it’	  (at	  [108]).	  
His	  Lordship	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  housing	  was	  a	  right	  recognised	  under	  Article	  8	  of	  
the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights.	  He	  took	  the	  view	  that	  this	  confirmed	  that	  housing	  
brought	  with	  it	  a	  significant	  private	  benefit	  that	  went	  far	  beyond	  the	  benefit	  that	  individuals	  
obtained	  from	  charitable	  operations	  which	  might	  fall	  within	  the	  fourth	  head	  of	  charity	  (from	  
Pemsel’s	  case)	  under	  the	  general	  law.	  He	  concluded	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  housing	  could	  only	  
be	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  if	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  benefit	  attached	  to	  it	  which	  was	  otherwise	  
charitable.	  
Therefore,	  the	  appeal	  was	  dismissed	  because:	  
1. The	  objects	  of	  Helena	  were	  not	  sufficiently	  for	  the	  public	  benefit.	  
2. The	  provision	  of	  housing	  stock	  for	  occupation	  of	  tenants	  generally	  is	  not	  a	  charitable	  
purpose	  because	  it	  did	  not	  come	  within	  the	  fourth	  head	  of	  charity	  in	  Pemsel’s	  case.	  	  
3. The	  reason	  it	  did	  not	  come	  within	  the	  fourth	  head	  of	  charity	  was	  that	  it	  was	  not	  within	  
the	  spirit	  and	  intendment	  of	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Statute	  of	  Elizabeth	  1601,	  either	  
directly	  or	  by	  analogy	  with	  the	  public	  works	  listed	  in	  the	  Preamble.	  There	  was	  no	  
general	  public	  utility	  involved.	  
4. There	  was	  no	  general	  public	  utility	  because	  the	  degree	  of	  individual	  benefit	  afforded	  
by	  the	  provision	  of	  housing	  was	  so	  substantial	  that	  it	  could	  not	  properly	  be	  regarded	  as	  
subordinate	  to	  the	  public	  benefit	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  a	  stock	  of	  suitable	  housing.	  	  
5. It	  was	  not	  sufficient	  that	  the	  operations	  of	  Helena	  should	  be	  required	  to	  be	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  the	  community.	  They	  could	  qualify	  as	  such	  without	  being	  charitable.	  In	  order	  
to	  be	  charitable	  the	  benefit	  provided	  must	  be	  of	  an	  appropriate	  kind,	  which	  was	  not	  so	  
in	  this	  case.	  
Therefore,	  as	  its	  purposes	  were	  not	  charitable,	  Helena	  Partnerships	  Ltd	  would	  be	  liable	  for	  
corporate	  taxation	  on	  the	  rents	  collected	  within	  the	  nominated	  period.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/569.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  four	  heads	  of	  charity	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  case	  were	  established	  in	  Commissioners	  for	  the	  
Special	  Purposes	  of	  Income	  Tax	  v	  Pemsel	  [1891]	  AC	  531.	  In	  that	  case,	  it	  was	  said	  that	  charity	  ‘in	  
its	  legal	  sense	  comprises	  four	  principal	  divisions:	  trusts	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty;	  trusts	  for	  the	  
advancement	  of	  education;	  trusts	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion;	  and	  trusts	  for	  other	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  39	  
	  
purposes	  beneficial	  to	  the	  community,	  not	  falling	  under	  any	  of	  the	  preceding	  heads’	  (at	  583-­‐4).	  
In	  this	  case,	  Lloyd	  LJ	  referred	  to	  the	  fourth	  head	  of	  charity:	  other	  purposes	  beneficial	  to	  the	  
community.	  The	  provision	  of	  housing	  was	  not	  such	  a	  purpose,	  unless	  it	  was	  for	  the	  truly	  needy,	  
such	  as	  the	  poor,	  disabled,	  or	  the	  elderly.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  no	  public	  benefit	  in	  the	  
provision	  of	  housing	  to	  a	  mixed	  group	  of	  individuals.	  All	  the	  benefit	  was	  private	  (benefiting	  
those	  individuals),	  so	  there	  was	  no	  charity	  involved.	  
	  
2.1.9  SHELDON INWENTASH AND LYNN FACTOR CHARITABLE FOUNDATION V THE 
QUEEN [2012] FCA 136 (CANADIAN FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL, DAWSON, 
TRUDEL, STRATAS JJA, 4 MAY 2012) 
Under	  Canadian	  law,	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Act,	  RSC	  1985,	  c	  1	  (5th	  Supp)	  (the	  Act)	  divides	  registered	  
charities	  into	  two	  categories:	  charitable	  organisations	  and	  charitable	  foundations.	  A	  charitable	  
organisation	  is	  an	  organisation	  that	  devotes	  all	  of	  its	  resources	  to	  charitable	  activities	  that	  it	  
carries	  on	  itself	  (section	  149.1(1)).	  	  
A	  charitable	  foundation	  is	  a	  trust	  or	  corporation	  that	  operates	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  
(section	  149.1(1)).	  Charitable	  purposes	  include	  the	  disbursement	  of	  funds	  to	  qualified	  donees	  
(section	  149.1(1)).	  Charitable	  foundations	  are	  divided	  into	  two	  categories:	  public	  foundations	  and	  
private	  foundations,	  with	  private	  foundations	  being	  subject	  to	  more	  detailed	  and	  restrictive	  rules	  
than	  public	  foundations.	  This	  case	  arose	  because	  the	  Minister	  of	  National	  Revenue	  (the	  Minister)	  
designated	  the	  appellant’s	  foundation	  as	  a	  private	  foundation.	  
The	  appellant,	  The	  Sheldon	  Inwentash	  and	  Lynn	  Factor	  Charitable	  Foundation	  (the	  Foundation),	  is	  
an	  inter	  vivos	  trust	  that	  was	  settled	  by	  Mr	  Sheldon	  Inwentash	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  gifts	  to	  
Canadian	  registered	  charities.	  It	  is	  a	  charitable	  foundation	  as	  defined	  in	  section	  149.1(1)	  of	  the	  
Act,	  and	  a	  registered	  charity	  as	  defined	  in	  section	  248(1).	  	  
The	  appellant	  has	  a	  single	  trustee,	  Cidel	  Trust	  Company	  Ltd	  (the	  Trustee).	  The	  Trustee	  is	  registered	  
under	  the	  Alberta	  Loan	  and	  Trust	  Corporations	  Act,	  RSA	  2000,	  c	  L-­‐20.	  All,	  or	  substantially	  all,	  of	  the	  
capital	  contributed	  to	  the	  Foundation	  was	  contributed	  by	  Mr	  Sheldon	  Inwentash,	  his	  wife	  Ms	  
Lynn	  Factor,	  and/or	  entities	  controlled	  by	  them.	  
Section	  149(1)(f)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  no	  tax	  is	  payable	  under	  Part	  I	  of	  the	  Act	  on	  the	  taxable	  
income	  of	  an	  entity	  when	  that	  entity	  is	  a	  registered	  charity.	  The	  term	  ‘registered	  charity’	  is	  
defined	  to	  include	  ‘a	  charitable	  organization,	  private	  foundation	  or	  public	  foundation	  […]	  that	  is	  
resident	  in	  Canada	  and	  was	  either	  created	  or	  established	  in	  Canada’	  and	  has	  applied	  for	  and	  
received	  registration	  as	  a	  charity	  (sub-­‐section	  248(1)).	  
‘Private	  foundation’	  is	  defined	  in	  section	  149.1	  of	  the	  Act	  to	  mean	  ‘a	  charitable	  foundation	  that	  is	  
not	  a	  public	  foundation’.	  ‘Public	  foundation’	  is	  also	  defined	  in	  section	  149.1	  of	  the	  Act.	  However,	  
that	  definition	  is	  subject	  to	  alteration	  by	  the	  federal	  Parliament	  of	  Canada	  under	  amending	  Bill	  C-­‐
33	  Income	  Tax	  Amendments	  Act,	  2006	  which	  would	  make	  it	  a	  requirement	  that	  50%	  or	  more	  of	  
directors,	  trustees	  or	  similar	  officials	  of	  a	  public	  foundation	  must	  deal	  with	  each	  other	  at	  arm’s	  
length;	  and	  that	  a	  public	  foundation	  cannot	  receive	  a	  majority	  of	  its	  funding	  from	  a	  person	  or	  a	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group	  of	  persons	  who	  control	  the	  foundation	  in	  any	  way;	  or	  make	  up	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  
directors,	  trustees	  or	  other	  official	  of	  the	  foundation.	  The	  object	  of	  the	  amendments	  to	  the	  
definition	  of	  public	  foundation	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  public	  foundation	  self-­‐dealing	  with	  its	  
donors.	  	  
These	  amendments	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  enacted	  into	  law.	  However,	  on	  11	  July	  2007,	  the	  Canada	  
Revenue	  Agency	  (CRA)	  announced	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  amendments	  not	  yet	  having	  passed	  the	  
parliament,	  the	  CRA	  would	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  changed	  definition	  of	  public	  foundation.	  This	  would	  
imply	  that	  there	  should	  be	  more	  than	  one	  trustee	  for	  a	  public	  foundation,	  so	  that	  the	  appellant	  
foundation	  could	  not	  be	  a	  public	  foundation.	  
On	  29	  July	  2008,	  the	  Minister	  notified	  the	  appellant	  that	  it	  qualified	  for	  tax-­‐exempt	  status	  as	  a	  
registered	  charity	  and	  was	  designated	  as	  a	  private	  foundation.	  The	  appellant	  objected	  to	  its	  
designation	  as	  a	  private	  foundation	  and	  filed	  submissions	  in	  support	  of	  that	  objection.	  By	  letter	  
dated	  10	  March	  2011,	  the	  CRA	  advised	  the	  appellant	  that,	  for	  the	  reasons	  given	  in	  the	  letter,	  it	  
intended	  to	  confirm	  the	  decision	  to	  designate	  the	  appellant	  as	  a	  private	  foundation.	  
The	  CRA	  afforded	  the	  appellant	  a	  further	  opportunity	  to	  make	  further	  representations.	  The	  
reasons	  given	  by	  the	  CRA	  were:	  
1.	   The	  appellant	  had	  only	  one	  trustee.	  Therefore	  it	  could	  not	  meet	  the	  first	  requirement	  in	  
the	  definition	  of	  public	  foundation	  that	  ‘more	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  directors,	  trustees	  officers	  
and	  like	  officials	  must	  deal	  at	  arm’s	  length	  with	  each	  other	  and	  with	  each	  of	  the	  other	  
directors,	  trustees,	  officers	  and	  like	  officials’.	  
2.	   The	  appellant	  could	  not	  meet	  the	  second	  requirement	  in	  the	  current	  definition	  because	  
more	  than	  50%	  of	  its	  capital	  was	  contributed	  by	  persons	  who	  do	  not	  deal	  with	  each	  other	  
at	  arm’s	  length.	  
3.	   The	  appellant	  could	  not	  meet	  the	  second	  requirement	  in	  the	  proposed	  definition	  because	  
Mr	  Inwentash	  and	  Ms	  Factor	  have	  de	  facto	  control	  of	  their	  Foundation.	  
The	  question	  on	  appeal	  was	  whether	  a	  public	  foundation	  could	  have	  one	  trustee.	  
On	  the	  basis	  of	  statutory	  interpretation,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  intention	  of	  
parliament	  that	  there	  should	  be	  more	  than	  one	  trustee.	  The	  court	  also	  looked	  at	  the	  statutory	  
context	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  public	  foundation.	  	  
The	  definition	  referred	  to	  ‘more	  than	  50%’	  of	  trustees,	  and	  their	  dealings	  with	  ‘each	  other’	  at	  
‘arm’s	  length’.	  All	  of	  these	  words	  pointed	  to	  the	  intention	  that	  there	  should	  be	  more	  than	  one	  
trustee.	  Her	  Honour	  Dawson	  JA	  said	  (at	  [33]–[34],	  and	  [42]):	  
In	  my	  view,	  by	  the	  use	  of	  this	  language	  Parliament	  has	  precisely	  and	  unequivocally	  
evidenced	  its	  intent	  that	  public	  foundations	  must	  have	  more	  than	  one	  trustee	  (or	  
director,	  officer	  or	  like	  official).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  ordinary	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  used	  
should	  play	  the	  dominant	  role	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  definition.	  For	  completeness,	  
however,	  I	  will	  review	  the	  statutory	  context	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  definition.	  As	  stated	  
above,	  a	  registered	  charity	  receives	  an	  important	  tax	  benefit	  under	  the	  Act	  in	  that	  it	  is	  not	  
taxed	  on	  its	  income.	  Further,	  a	  registered	  charity	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  tax	  relief	  to	  its	  donors	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by	  issuing	  a	  charitable	  receipt	  which	  an	  individual	  donor	  may	  use	  to	  obtain	  a	  tax	  credit	  
(section	  118.1	  of	  the	  Act)	  and	  a	  corporate	  donor	  may	  use	  to	  obtain	  a	  tax	  deduction	  
(section	  110.1	  of	  the	  Act).	  This	  regime	  creates	  a	  potential	  for	  abuse	  if	  the	  registered	  
charity	  and	  the	  donor	  are	  not	  at	  arm’s	  length....	  	  
By	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  arm’s	  length	  trustees	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  public	  foundation	  self-­‐
dealing	  with	  its	  donors	  is	  reduced.	  Put	  another	  way,	  the	  requirement	  that	  there	  be	  more	  
than	  one	  arm’s	  length	  trustee	  provides	  greater	  assurance	  that	  a	  public	  foundation	  will	  not	  
be	  used	  for	  tax	  avoidance	  purposes.	  
Although	  there	  was	  some	  commentary	  from	  the	  court	  concerning	  the	  confusing	  approach	  
adopted	  by	  the	  CRA	  to	  this	  definitional	  issue,	  this	  was	  found	  to	  be	  not	  determinative	  of	  the	  
meaning	  of	  a	  provision	  of	  the	  Act.	  Therefore,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  a	  public	  foundation	  in	  Canada	  
cannot	  have	  only	  one	  trustee,	  and	  that	  the	  Minister’s	  designation	  of	  the	  appellant	  Foundation	  as	  
a	  private	  foundation	  was	  correct.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2012/2012fca136/2012fca136.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
By	  creating	  public	  and	  private	  foundations	  as	  different	  entities,	  the	  Canadian	  government	  was	  
attempting	  to	  promote	  philanthropy,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  trying	  to	  limit	  the	  potential	  for	  tax	  
avoidance	  schemes.	  Public	  foundations	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  restrictive	  rules	  as	  private	  
foundations	  because	  the	  Canadian	  government	  made	  a	  policy	  decision	  that	  public	  foundations	  
(i.e.	  foundations	  which	  receive	  donations	  from	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  persons)	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  
enter	  into	  avoidance	  transactions	  with	  their	  donors.	  
 
2.1.10  PHILIPPE V CAMERON [2012] EWHC 1040 (CH) (HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
CHANCERY DIVISION, ARNOLD J, 2 MAY 2012) 
See	  Trusts	  and	  Wills	  case	  note	  2.9.16	  below	  
	  
2.1.11  UTURN UK CIC V CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES (FIRST 
TIER TRIBUNAL (CHARITY), GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER, HOLBROOK J, 
DUGGAN, KHAN, 27 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  from	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  (the	  
Commission)	  denying	  charitable	  status	  to	  Uturn	  UK	  CIC	  (formerly	  Uturn	  UK	  Limited)	  (the	  
company).	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  decision	  was	  that	  the	  company	  was	  not	  a	  charity	  at	  law,	  because	  
it	  was	  not	  established	  for	  exclusively	  charitable	  purposes	  (as	  defined	  in	  section	  2(2)	  of	  the	  
Charities	  Act	  2006	  (the	  Act))	  and	  did	  not	  demonstrate	  the	  requisite	  public	  interest.	  	  
The	  company	  had	  as	  its	  first	  object	  the	  promotion	  of	  ‘street	  associations’.	  The	  Commission	  
determined	  that	  this	  was	  not	  an	  object	  for	  exclusively	  charitable	  purposes.	  Having	  determined	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this,	  the	  Commission	  declined	  to	  consider	  any	  further	  objects	  of	  the	  company.	  On	  appeal,	  the	  
company	  contended	  that	  this	  decision	  was	  wrong	  in	  law.	  
Section	  2(1)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  for	  a	  charity	  to	  be	  registered	  by	  the	  Commission	  it	  must	  
be	  for	  a	  purpose	  set	  out	  in	  section	  2(2),	  and	  be	  for	  the	  public	  benefit.	  Section	  2(2)	  lists	  twelve	  
heads	  of	  charity	  which	  include,	  relevantly	  to	  the	  company,	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion,	  and	  
the	  advancement	  of	  citizenship	  or	  community	  development.	  The	  latter	  purpose	  includes	  rural	  
or	  urban	  regeneration,	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  civic	  responsibility,	  volunteering,	  the	  voluntary	  
sector,	  or	  the	  effectiveness	  or	  efficiency	  of	  charities.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  twelve	  specific	  heads	  of	  
purpose,	  the	  purposes	  listed	  in	  section	  2(2)	  include	  ‘any	  other	  purposes	  within	  subsection	  (4)’.	  
Those	  purposes	  are:	  
(a)	  any	  purposes	  not	  within	  paragraphs	  (a)	  to	  (l)	  of	  subsection	  (2)	  but	  recognised	  as	  
charitable	  purposes	  under	  existing	  charity	  law	  or	  by	  virtue	  of	  section	  1	  of	  the	  
Recreational	  Charities	  Act	  1958;	  
(b)	  any	  purposes	  that	  may	  reasonably	  be	  regarded	  as	  analogous	  to,	  or	  within	  the	  spirit	  
of,	  any	  purposes	  falling	  within	  any	  of	  those	  paragraphs	  or	  paragraph	  (a)	  above;	  and	  
(c)	  any	  purpose	  that	  may	  reasonably	  be	  regarded	  as	  analogous	  to,	  or	  within	  the	  spirit	  
of,	  any	  purposes	  which	  have	  been	  recognised	  under	  charity	  law	  as	  falling	  within	  
paragraph	  (b)	  above	  of	  this	  paragraph.	  
 
The	  company’s	  position	  was	  that	  it	  had	  been	  established	  to	  confront	  the	  perceived	  breakdown	  
of	  society	  in	  the	  UK.	  It	  sought	  to	  rebuild	  ‘true	  communities’	  street	  by	  street,	  and	  to	  ‘re-­‐
establish	  values’.	  In	  terms	  of	  its	  legal	  constitution,	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  company’s	  Articles	  of	  
Association	  defined	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Company	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  
3.1	  The	  Objects	  of	  the	  Charity	  are:	  
3.1.1	  to	  advance	  citizenship	  and	  community	  development	  by	  the	  promotion	  and	  
activation	  of	  the	  Street	  Associations	  initiative,	  which	  will	  seek	  to	  being	  [sic]	  the	  
residents	  of	  streets	  together	  in	  local	  groupings	  with	  a	  framework	  that	  will	  engender	  
civic	  responsibility	  and	  volunteering,	  and	  
3.1.2	  to	  promote	  the	  Christian	  faith	  and	  Christian	  values,	  with	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  
the	  Christian	  faith	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  and	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  Christian	  values	  to	  the	  
restoration	  of	  well-­‐functioning	  community.	  
It	  was	  accepted	  by	  all	  parties	  that	  there	  were	  two	  separate	  purposes,	  and	  to	  be	  a	  registered	  
charity,	  both	  the	  purposes	  had	  to	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  exclusively	  charitable.	  Was	  the	  promotion	  of	  
street	  associations	  a	  charitable	  purpose?	  The	  term	  ‘street	  association’	  was	  not	  defined.	  The	  
company’s	  promotional	  literature	  referred	  to	  it	  as	  a	  group	  of	  about	  70	  households	  (about	  200	  
people),	  who	  would	  form	  a	  supportive	  network,	  offering	  mutual	  help,	  activities	  and	  events	  
which	  would	  be	  non-­‐profit-­‐making.	  The	  company	  would	  have	  no	  control	  over	  the	  setting	  up	  or	  
workings	  of	  any	  street	  association	  established.	  There	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  initiative	  was	  
worthwhile,	  but	  was	  it	  charitable?	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It	  appeared	  to	  fall	  within	  section	  2(2)(e),	  the	  advancement	  of	  citizenship	  or	  community	  
development.	  This	  head	  of	  charity	  had	  not	  been	  fully	  defined.	  The	  definition	  of	  charitable	  
purposes	  in	  the	  Act	  seems	  broad.	  Could	  ‘new’	  purposes	  be	  charitable?	  Guidance	  from	  the	  
Commission	  in	  1999	  stated	  that	  the	  section	  2(2)(e)	  purpose	  dealt	  with:	  
...a	  set	  of	  methods	  that	  can	  broaden	  vision	  and	  capacity	  for	  social	  change,	  and	  
approaches,	  including	  consultation,	  advocacy	  and	  relationships	  with	  local	  groups.	  It	  is	  
a	  way	  of	  working	  which	  is	  informed	  by	  certain	  principles	  which	  seek	  to	  encourage	  
communities	  –	  people	  who	  live	  in	  the	  same	  areas	  or	  who	  have	  something	  else	  in	  
common	  –	  to	  tackle	  for	  themselves	  the	  problems	  which	  they	  face	  and	  identify	  to	  be	  
important,	  and	  which	  aim	  to	  empower	  them	  to	  change	  things	  by	  developing	  their	  own	  
skills,	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  and,	  also	  by	  working	  in	  partnership	  with	  other	  groups	  
and	  with	  statutory	  agencies.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  such	  change	  is	  achieved	  is	  crucial	  and	  so	  
both	  the	  task	  and	  the	  process	  [are]	  important.	  
On	  this	  basis,	  the	  Commission	  agreed	  that	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  company’s	  activities	  would	  be	  
charitable.	  However,	  the	  Commission	  did	  not	  agree	  that	  the	  company’s	  activities	  would	  be	  
exclusively	  charitable.	  Some	  of	  the	  activities	  might	  confer	  a	  private	  benefit	  to	  participants.	  In	  
particular,	  there	  was	  no	  mechanism	  for	  control	  over	  the	  activities	  of	  individual	  street	  
associations.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [34]	  and	  [35]):	  
This	  lack	  of	  control	  seems	  to	  us	  to	  be	  a	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  the	  street	  associations	  
initiative,	  as	  presently	  conceived	  by	  the	  Company,	  and	  is	  one	  which	  makes	  it	  markedly	  
different	  from	  more	  traditional	  membership	  organisations.	  For	  these	  reasons	  we	  find	  
that	  the	  purpose	  stated	  in	  Article	  3.1.1	  is	  not	  an	  exclusively	  charitable	  purpose.	  
The	  second	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  Christian	  values	  was	  regarded	  by	  the	  Commission	  as	  
unclear.	  Was	  it	  to	  promote	  Christianity	  generally,	  or	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  well-­‐functioning	  
communities?	  The	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  it	  was	  a	  general	  promotion	  of	  Christian	  values,	  and	  was	  
therefore	  charitable.	  However,	  as	  the	  first	  purpose	  was	  not	  exclusively	  charitable,	  the	  Tribunal	  
did	  not	  have	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  second	  purpose.	  
Since	  the	  company	  did	  not	  have	  purposes	  which	  were	  exclusively	  charitable,	  it	  could	  not	  be	  
registered	  as	  a	  charity.	  However,	  the	  Tribunal	  went	  on	  to	  also	  consider	  the	  public	  benefit	  
requirement.	  The	  benefit	  in	  question	  must	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  public	  or	  a	  sufficient	  section	  of	  
the	  public.	  It	  must	  be	  clearly	  identifiable	  and	  not	  vague	  or	  remote.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  company’s	  activities,	  the	  Commission	  had	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  street	  
association’s	  activities	  could	  have	  public	  benefit	  including	  assistance	  to	  the	  elderly,	  relief	  for	  
carers,	  relief	  from	  loneliness,	  teaching	  English	  to	  migrants,	  and	  providing	  guidance,	  education	  
and	  training	  to	  young	  people.	  However,	  the	  question	  considered	  by	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  not	  
whether	  the	  company	  could	  confer	  a	  public	  benefit	  but	  whether	  it	  would	  do	  so	  in	  fact.	  Could	  
the	  public	  benefit	  be	  demonstrated	  by	  evidence?	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There	  were	  currently	  five	  street	  associations	  established.	  It	  was	  possible	  that	  there	  was	  some	  
evidence	  of	  public	  benefit	  to	  be	  discerned,	  but	  none	  of	  this	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  Tribunal,	  and	  
therefore	  the	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  public	  benefit	  had	  not	  been	  shown.	  
The	  company’s	  appeal	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/Uturn_UK_Decision.pdf	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  2006	  Act	  has	  now	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2011,	  which	  commenced	  operation	  
in	  England	  and	  Wales	  on	  14	  March	  2012.	  The	  2011	  Act	  replaces	  most	  of	  the	  Charities	  Acts	  of	  
1992,	  1993	  and	  2006,	  and	  completely	  replaces	  the	  Recreational	  Charities	  Act	  1958.	  The	  parts	  
not	  replaced	  yet	  relate	  to	  fundraising,	  particularly	  charitable	  collections	  in	  public	  places.	  
However,	  although	  the	  four	  Acts	  are	  now	  replaced	  by	  one	  Act,	  the	  law	  remains	  the	  same.	  
Therefore,	  charities	  still	  need	  to	  have	  purposes	  which	  are	  exclusively	  charitable	  and	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  demonstrate	  public	  benefit.	  
One	  of	  the	  subsidiary	  points	  considered	  by	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  the	  status	  of	  its	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  
community	  interest	  company	  (CIC).	  Uturn	  UK	  is	  now	  a	  CIC,	  but	  had	  previously	  been	  a	  company	  
limited	  by	  guarantee.	  The	  Tribunal	  ruled	  that	  Uturn	  UK	  had	  been	  a	  company	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
Commission’s	  decision	  not	  to	  register	  it	  as	  a	  charity,	  so	  the	  Tribunal	  had	  jurisdiction	  in	  the	  
appeal.	  If	  Uturn	  UK	  had	  been	  a	  CIC	  at	  the	  time,	  it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  be	  registered	  as	  
a	  charity,	  even	  if	  its	  purposes	  were	  charitable:	  see	  Companies	  (Audit,	  Investigations	  and	  
Community	  Enterprises)	  Act	  2004	  section	  26(3).	  
	  
2.1.12  HER MAJESTY’S ATTORNEY-GENERAL V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR 
ENGLAND AND WALES (THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (TAX AND CHANCERY 
CHAMBER), WARREN AND MCKENZIE JJ, 20 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  determination	  of	  a	  reference	  from	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
regarding	  the	  meaning	  of	  paragraph	  2(1)(A)	  of	  Schedule	  1D	  to	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993	  as	  
amended	  by	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2006	  (Eng	  &	  W).	  The	  specific	  issue	  was	  whether	  charities	  for	  the	  
relief	  of	  poverty	  in	  which	  the	  potential	  beneficiaries	  are	  connected	  by	  family	  relationship,	  
common	  employment	  or	  membership	  of	  an	  unincorporated	  association,	  were	  in	  fact	  
charitable.	  The	  issue	  turned	  on	  whether	  charities	  directed	  to	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty	  of	  a	  
restricted	  group	  of	  persons	  were	  charitable,	  given	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  public	  
benefit	  for	  such	  charities	  in	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2006.	  Did	  such	  charities	  still	  meet	  the	  public	  
benefit	  test?	  
There	  were	  a	  lot	  of	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  hearing,	  including	  11	  charities	  which	  had	  restricted	  
groups	  of	  beneficiaries,	  and	  19	  interveners.	  Their	  Honours	  acknowledged	  the	  ‘evident	  concern’	  
that	  had	  been	  caused	  to	  an	  estimated	  1500	  benevolent	  charities	  affected	  by	  this	  reference.	  	  
It	  was	  common	  ground	  amongst	  the	  parties,	  with	  the	  important	  exception	  of	  the	  Charity	  
Commission,	  that	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2006	  (the	  2006	  Act)	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  charitable	  status	  of	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charities	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty.	  It	  was	  submitted	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  and	  the	  
charities	  that	  although	  the	  presumption	  of	  public	  benefit	  had	  been	  abolished	  by	  section	  3(2)	  of	  
the	  2006	  Act,	  there	  had	  been	  no	  impact	  on	  trusts	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty	  because	  their	  
charitable	  status	  had	  never	  rested	  on	  a	  presumption.	  It	  was	  clear	  from	  the	  case	  law	  that	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  charitable,	  a	  trust	  must	  be	  established	  for	  the	  public	  benefit.	  The	  2006	  Act	  made	  it	  
clear	  in	  section	  2(2)	  that	  ‘the	  prevention	  or	  relief	  of	  poverty’	  was	  a	  charitable	  purpose.	  The	  
public	  benefit	  aspect	  of	  such	  charities	  was	  provided	  by	  either	  the	  potential	  beneficiaries	  
constituting	  a	  sufficient	  section	  of	  the	  public	  (even	  if	  a	  narrow	  class),	  or	  by	  a	  significant	  indirect	  
benefit	  to	  the	  public	  as	  a	  whole	  arising	  from	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty.	  
The	  Charity	  Commission	  argued	  that	  trusts	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty	  did	  not	  have	  to	  meet	  a	  
public	  benefit	  test	  before	  the	  2006	  Act,	  but	  that	  this	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  case,	  and	  such	  trusts	  
were	  therefore	  no	  longer	  charitable.	  This	  was	  particularly	  so	  where	  the	  potential	  beneficiaries	  
were	  defined	  by	  reference	  to	  their	  relationship.	  
Their	  Honours	  said	  that	  there	  were	  three	  issues	  to	  be	  discussed:	  
• the	  law	  of	  public	  benefit	  as	  it	  applied	  to	  trusts	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty	  prior	  to	  
the	  coming	  into	  force	  of	  the	  2006	  Act;	  
• the	   basis	   on	   which	   charities	   for	   the	   relief	   of	   poverty	   amongst	   a	   beneficiary	  
class	  were	   said	   to	   be	   ‘anomalous’	   or	   at	   least	   different	   from	  other	   classes	   of	  
charity	  under	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  law;	  and	  
• the	  effect	  (if	  any)	  that	  the	  coming	   into	  force	  of	  the	  2006	  Act	  had	  on	  the	  pre-­‐
existing	  law	  and	  consequently	  on	  the	  charities	  affected	  by	  this	  reference.	  
Their	  Honours	  considered	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘public	  benefit’	  in	  the	  case	  law.	  The	  meaning	  of	  
‘public	  benefit’	  varied	  with	  the	  type	  of	  charitable	  purpose.	  It	  had	  two	  senses.	  In	  the	  first	  sense,	  
it	  meant	  merely	  a	  requirement	  of	  any	  charity	  that	  it	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  community.	  In	  the	  
second	  sense,	  it	  meant	  that	  it	  should	  benefit	  a	  ‘sufficient	  section’	  of	  the	  public.	  Trusts	  for	  the	  
relief	  of	  poverty	  only	  needed	  to	  meet	  the	  meaning	  in	  the	  first	  sense,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  second	  
sense.	  Thus,	  relief	  of	  poverty	  charities	  were	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  requirement	  in	  the	  second	  
sense,	  and	  it	  did	  not	  matter	  that	  they	  benefited	  only	  a	  narrow	  class	  of	  persons.	  	  
Before	  the	  2006	  Act	  became	  law,	  a	  charitable	  trust	  had	  to	  meet	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  within	  
the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Statute	  of	  Elizabeth.	  After	  the	  2006	  Act	  became	  law,	  the	  charitable	  
purposes	  allowable	  were	  expressed	  in	  section	  2(2)	  of	  the	  2006	  Act.	  In	  both	  timeframes,	  there	  
was	  a	  requirement	  of	  public	  benefit.	  Counsel	  for	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  submitted	  that	  all	  
charities	  had	  to	  meet	  the	  requirement	  of	  public	  benefit	  in	  both	  senses	  of	  the	  word	  since	  the	  
2006	  Act.	  This	  was	  emphatically	  rejected	  by	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal.	  Their	  Honours	  said:	  
It	  is	  clear,	  we	  consider,	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  institution	  satisfies	  the	  public	  benefit	  
requirement	  must	  be	  assessed	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  criteria	  which	  are	  relevant	  to	  its	  
purposes.	  For	  instance,	  as	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  cases,	  what	  is	  or	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  section	  
of	  the	  public	  to	  satisfy	  the	  second	  aspect	  of	  public	  benefit	  varies	  depending	  on	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  charity:	  a	  sufficient	  section	  of	  the	  public	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  educational	  
institution	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  religious	  institution	  and	  vice	  versa.	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Accordingly,	  it	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  address	  in	  abstract	  the	  public	  benefit	  
requirement	  under	  the	  2006	  Act.	  Rather,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  asked	  what	  that	  requirement	  is	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  particular	  institution	  under	  consideration.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  trust	  for	  the	  
relief	  of	  poverty	  which	  had	  a	  narrow	  class	  of	  direct	  beneficiary,	  the	  trust	  was	  
nonetheless	  charitable	  under	  the	  law	  prior	  to	  the	  2006	  Act	  even	  though	  the	  class	  was	  
not	  wide	  enough	  to	  establish	  public	  benefit	  in	  the	  second	  sense	  as	  applied	  to	  poverty	  
trusts.	  In	  order	  that	  a	  trust	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty	  with	  a	  narrow	  class	  of	  beneficiary	  
should	  be	  charitable,	  the	  public	  benefit	  requirement	  as	  applied	  to	  such	  a	  trust	  
required	  only	  that	  public	  benefit	  in	  the	  first	  sense	  be	  established.	  The	  2006	  Act	  has	  
not	  in	  our	  judgement,	  changed	  that.	  [emphasis	  added]	  
The	  2006	  Act	  refers	  to	  trusts	  for	  the	  prevention	  or	  relief	  of	  poverty.	  Either	  of	  these	  purposes	  
will	  be	  charitable	  if	  it	  fulfils	  the	  public	  benefit	  requirement.	  But	  is	  there	  a	  difference	  if	  the	  trust	  
is	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  poverty	  alone,	  or	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty?	  Their	  
Honours	  said	  that	  ‘logic	  and	  coherence’	  required	  that	  the	  principle	  relating	  to	  trusts	  for	  the	  
relief	  of	  poverty	  should	  equally	  apply	  to	  trusts	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  poverty	  or	  for	  those	  with	  a	  
combined	  purpose	  of	  prevention	  and	  relief.	  Their	  Honours	  held	  that	  ‘public	  benefit’	  in	  the	  first	  
sense	  applies	  to	  trusts	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  poverty	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  those	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  
poverty.	  
Their	  Honours	  stated	  that	  it	  hardly	  seemed	  necessary	  that	  the	  reference	  should	  have	  been	  
made.	  The	  law	  seemed	  clear,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  2006	  Act,	  that	  trusts	  for	  the	  relief	  (and	  
prevention,	  under	  the	  2006	  Act)	  of	  poverty	  were	  both	  charitable	  and	  for	  the	  public	  benefit.	  
The	  same	  sense	  attached	  to	  the	  words	  ‘public	  benefit’	  as	  had	  always	  attached	  to	  them	  in	  
relation	  to	  relief	  of	  poverty	  charities.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/CharityCommission_v_HM
Attorney.pdf	  	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  meaning	  of	  public	  benefit	  can	  vary	  with	  the	  type	  of	  charity	  that	  is	  being	  considered.	  The	  
Upper	  Tribunal	  had	  previously	  looked	  at	  the	  case	  of	  independent	  schools	  and	  held	  that	  ‘public	  
benefit’	  in	  both	  senses	  applied	  to	  trusts	  for	  education	  –	  that	  is,	  that	  it	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  
community	  and	  that	  it	  should	  benefit	  a	  ‘sufficient	  section’	  of	  the	  public:	  see	  The	  Independent	  
Schools	  Council	  v	  The	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  England	  and	  Wales	  at	  
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/Summary1_%20ISC_v_Char
ity_2_HM_AGref_v_TheCharityComm.pdf	  (summary	  of	  case).	  
However,	  this	  had	  been	  the	  case	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  2006	  Act	  came	  into	  force.	  In	  the	  
schools	  case,	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  benefiting	  a	  sufficient	  section	  of	  the	  public	  was	  and	  
always	  had	  been	  a	  requirement	  for	  education	  charities,	  but	  that	  it	  could	  be	  met	  by	  
independent	  schools	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  that	  were	  within	  their	  own	  choice,	  such	  as	  
scholarships	  or	  remission	  of	  fees.	  The	  Charity	  Commission	  had	  been	  making	  findings	  of	  non-­‐
charitable	  status	  for	  some	  schools,	  but	  this	  was	  ruled	  erroneous	  in	  law.	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The	  ruling	  on	  this	  reference	  to	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  under	  the	  2006	  UK	  Act,	  
as	  previously,	  relief	  of	  poverty	  charities	  are	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  ‘two	  meanings’	  of	  public	  
benefit	  rule.	  However,	  apart	  from	  the	  extension	  to	  prevention	  of	  poverty	  charities,	  the	  Upper	  
Tribunal	  stated	  that	  this	  exception	  was	  not	  to	  be	  extended	  further.	  
	  
2.1.12  RE CANDY KIDS APPEAL TRUST (OFFICE OF THE SCOTTISH CHARITY 
REGULATOR, 16 FEBRUARY 2012) 
See	  Dissolution	  Insolvency	  and	  Winding	  Up	  case	  note	  2.4.6	  below	  
 
2.2 DISCRIMINATION 
2.2.1  X V MID-SUSSEX CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU [2012] UKSC 59 (SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, LORD NEUBERGER, LORD WALKER, LADY HALE, 
LORD MANCE, LORD WILSON, 12 DECEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  UK’s	  highest	  court	  in	  a	  disability	  discrimination	  case.	  The	  issue	  was	  
whether,	  under	  European	  and	  UK	  domestic	  law,	  discrimination	  against	  volunteers	  on	  the	  
ground	  of	  disability	  was	  unlawful.	  It	  was	  held	  that	  it	  was	  not	  unlawful	  under	  the	  current	  
applicable	  law.	  
The	  appellant	  was	  a	  volunteer	  adviser	  for	  the	  respondent,	  the	  Mid-­‐Sussex	  Citizens’	  Advice	  
Bureau	  (CAB).	  She	  had	  no	  binding	  legal	  contract	  of	  employment	  (or	  indeed	  contract	  of	  any	  
kind)	  between	  her	  and	  the	  CAB.	  Rather	  she	  had	  signed	  a	  volunteer	  agreement	  which	  indicated	  
that	  it	  was	  ‘binding	  in	  honour	  only’.	  
However,	  the	  appellant	  was	  a	  qualified	  lawyer,	  and	  in	  her	  volunteer	  work	  did	  quite	  detailed	  
legal	  work	  such	  as	  writing	  submissions	  and	  case	  notes,	  undertaking	  specialist	  research,	  writing	  
letters	  to	  third	  parties	  and	  giving	  legal	  advice	  to	  CAB	  clients.	  	  
The	  appellant	  was	  supposed	  to	  volunteer	  on	  Tuesdays,	  Thursdays	  and	  Fridays,	  but	  because	  of	  
health	  problems	  did	  not	  always	  attend	  on	  her	  allocated	  days,	  and	  sometimes	  changed	  days.	  In	  
all,	  she	  was	  absent	  about	  25%	  to	  30%	  of	  the	  allocated	  times,	  and	  attended	  between	  one	  and	  
three	  days	  a	  week.	  
On	  21	  May	  2007,	  the	  applicant	  was	  asked	  by	  the	  CAB	  to	  cease	  being	  a	  volunteer	  in	  
circumstances	  that	  she	  claimed	  amounted	  to	  discrimination	  against	  her	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  
disability.	  Her	  case	  before	  the	  Employment	  Tribunal,	  the	  Employment	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  and	  the	  
Court	  of	  Appeal	  resulted	  in	  the	  finding	  that,	  as	  a	  volunteer,	  she	  was	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  
protection	  against	  discrimination	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  disability	  under	  both	  the	  Disability	  
Discrimination	  Act	  1995	  (UK)	  (the	  1995	  Act)	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  Council	  Directive	  
2000/78/EC.	  The	  latter	  document,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Framework	  Directive’,	  established	  a	  
general	  framework	  for	  equal	  treatment	  in	  employment	  and	  occupation	  within	  the	  EU.	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The	  Supreme	  Court	  exhaustively	  examined	  the	  relevant	  legislation	  and	  EU	  documentation,	  but	  
could	  find	  no	  assistance	  for	  the	  appellant	  in	  any	  of	  the	  material	  she	  proposed	  in	  her	  support.	  
Section	  4(2)(d)	  of	  the	  Act	  provided	  that	  it	  was	  unlawful	  for	  an	  employer	  to	  discriminate	  against	  
a	  disabled	  person	  by	  dismissing	  the	  person	  or	  subjecting	  him/her	  to	  any	  other	  detriment.	  
Section	  68(1)	  defined	  ‘employment’	  to	  mean	  ‘...employment...under	  a	  contract	  of	  service	  or	  of	  
apprenticeship	  or	  a	  contract	  personally	  to	  do	  any	  work...’.	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  agreed	  with	  the	  Employment	  Tribunal	  and	  the	  Employment	  Appeals	  
Tribunal	  that	  the	  appellant	  did	  not	  have	  a	  contract	  of	  work,	  so	  she	  could	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  1995	  Act.	  In	  2003,	  the	  1995	  Act	  was	  amended	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  
Framework	  Directive.	  One	  of	  the	  added	  sections	  was	  section	  4D,	  covering	  certain	  categories	  of	  
office-­‐holders,	  some	  of	  whom	  would	  not	  have	  contracts	  or	  remuneration.	  The	  Court	  stated	  
firmly	  that	  the	  appellant	  did	  not	  fall	  into	  this	  category	  either	  (at	  [10]).	  
The	  Court	  then	  turned	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  appellant’s	  case	  under	  the	  Framework	  
Directive	  itself.	  The	  appellant	  claimed	  that	  volunteers	  were	  covered	  under	  the	  Framework	  
Directive	  because	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  word	  ‘or	  occupation’	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  relevant	  
parts	  of	  the	  document.	  The	  appellant’s	  case	  was	  that	  the	  Framework	  Directive’s	  references	  to	  
‘occupation’,	  particularly	  in	  Article	  3(1)(a)	  was	  such	  as	  to	  cover	  her	  voluntary	  activity	  with	  the	  
CAB.	  
Alternatively,	  she	  said	  that	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  equality	  contained	  in	  Article	  13(1)	  of	  the	  
Treaty	  establishing	  the	  European	  Community	  (TEC)	  (now	  replaced	  by	  Article	  19(1)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (TFEU)),	  taken	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  Framework	  
Directive,	  gave	  her	  a	  direct	  claim.	  Article	  13(1)	  TEC	  and	  Article	  19(1)	  TFEU	  are	  in	  similar	  terms	  
and	  refer	  to	  ‘acting	  unanimously...	  to	  combat	  discrimination	  based	  on	  sex,	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  
origin,	  religion	  or	  belief,	  disability,	  age	  or	  sexual	  orientation’.	  	  
The	  Framework	  Directive	  commences	  with	  recitals,	  including	  recital	  (4)	  which	  refers	  to	  
‘Convention	  No	  111	  of	  the	  International	  Labour	  Organisation	  (ILO)	  [which]	  prohibits	  
discrimination	  in	  the	  field	  of	  employment	  and	  occupation’	  [emphasis	  added	  here	  and	  
subsequently].	  After	  the	  various	  recitals,	  the	  Framework	  Directive	  provides	  in	  Article	  1	  that	  its	  
purpose	  is	  to	  combat	  discrimination	  on	  multiple	  grounds	  including	  disability	  ‘as	  regards	  
employment	  and	  occupation’.	  Article	  3(1)	  says	  that	  the	  ‘...Directive	  shall	  apply	  to	  all	  persons,	  
as	  regards	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors	  including	  public	  bodies,	  in	  relation	  to:	  (a)	  
conditions	  for	  access	  to	  employment,	  to	  self-­‐employment	  or	  to	  occupation...’.	  
The	  Court	  noted	  that	  there	  was	  no	  single	  definition	  of	  ‘worker’	  under	  European	  law.	  Cases	  in	  
the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ECJ)	  (the	  Court	  to	  which	  cases	  under	  EU	  law	  are	  taken)	  on	  the	  
issue	  had	  said	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘worker’	  had	  a	  Community	  meaning	  and	  was	  not	  to	  be	  
interpreted	  restrictively.	  However,	  the	  general	  thrust	  of	  the	  cases	  was	  that	  a	  worker	  is	  a	  
person	  who	  performs	  services	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  another	  person	  and	  receives	  
remuneration	  in	  return.	  Self-­‐employment	  was	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  rendering	  of	  services	  for	  
remuneration.	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However,	  ‘occupation’	  had	  not	  been	  examined	  under	  European	  law	  in	  any	  context.	  Was	  the	  
appellant	  engaged	  in	  an	  ‘occupation’?	  The	  Court	  said	  (at	  [20]):	  
‘Occupation’	  is	  a	  protean	  word,	  which	  can,	  depending	  on	  context,	  cover	  a	  wide	  variety	  
of	  activities	  associated	  with	  work	  or	  leisure.	  Volunteers	  also	  come	  in	  many	  forms,	  
including	  the	  cheerful	  guide	  at	  the	  London	  Olympics,	  the	  charity	  shop	  attendant,	  the	  
intern	  hoping	  to	  learn	  and	  impress	  and	  the	  present	  appellant	  who	  provided	  specialist	  
legal	  services.	  The	  intern	  might	  well	  fall	  within	  article	  3(1)(b),	  but,	  for	  like	  reasons	  to	  
those	  which	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  in	  para	  8	  above	  [why	  she	  was	  not	  covered	  by	  section	  
4(1)(a)	  of	  the	  Disability	  Discrimination	  Act],	  the	  appellant	  did	  not.	  Hence,	  her	  
invocation	  of	  article	  3(1)(a).	  	  
The	  appellant	  and	  the	  [UK]	  Equality	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  (EHRC)	  (intervening)	  
argued	  for	  a	  multi-­‐factorial	  assessment	  of	  the	  issue.	  They	  submitted	  that	  the	  factors	  pointing	  
to	  a	  conclusion	  that	  the	  appellant	  had	  or	  was	  in	  an	  ‘occupation’	  included:	  
• the	  training	  requirements	  she	  had	  undertaken;	  
• the	  regulation	  of	  her	  activity	  by	  the	  non-­‐binding	  agreement	  and	  its	  general	  supervision	  
by	  the	  CAB;	  
• her	  expertise	  as	  a	  lawyer;	  	  
• the	  purpose	  of	  her	  activity	  (to	  give	  free	  high	  quality	  legal	  advice)	  and	  its	  key	  role	  in	  the	  
operations	  of	  the	  CAB;	  	  
• the	  number	  of	  hours	  and	  days	  she	  gave;	  	  
• the	  potential	  advantages	  of	  her	  activity	  in	  equipping	  her	  for	  remunerative	  employment	  
and	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  was	  providing	  her	  services	  alongside	  and,	  save	  for	  her	  
unremunerated	  volunteer	  status,	  in	  large	  measure	  indistinguishably	  from	  others	  who	  
were	  providing	  services	  on	  an	  employed	  basis.	  	  
The	  Court	  said	  that	  the	  Framework	  Directive	  did	  not	  cover	  all	  activities.	  Rather,	  its	  scope	  was	  
carefully	  confined,	  and	  did	  not	  embrace	  voluntary	  activities.	  The	  references	  to	  the	  word	  
‘occupation’	  had	  to	  be	  viewed	  in	  context.	  The	  context	  in	  Article	  3(1)(a)	  of	  the	  Framework	  
Directive	  was	  that	  of	  access	  to	  the	  market	  for	  employment,	  including	  self-­‐employment.	  This	  
was	  an	  ‘umbrella’	  concept,	  as	  was	  the	  reference	  to	  ‘occupational’	  in	  the	  recitals	  to	  the	  
Directive.	  On	  this	  point,	  the	  Court	  said	  (at	  [30]):	  
Once	  the	  word	  ‘occupation’	  is	  understood	  in	  this	  sense,	  there	  is	  no	  imperative,	  and	  it	  
would	  indeed	  be	  contradictory,	  to	  treat	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘occupation’	  as	  operating	  at	  the	  
same	  level	  as	  ‘employment’	  and	  ‘self-­‐employment’,	  or	  as	  envisaging	  voluntary	  activity.	  
The	  appellant	  and	  the	  EHRC	  submitted	  that	  it	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  consider	  only	  the	  English	  
version	  of	  the	  Framework	  Directive.	  Other	  authoritative	  language	  versions	  should	  also	  be	  
considered.	  The	  Court	  looked	  at	  the	  versions	  in	  French,	  Spanish,	  German,	  and	  Dutch.	  The	  
French	  version	  used	  the	  term	  ‘ou	  travail’	  for	  occupation	  which	  the	  Court	  said	  did	  not	  ‘in	  any	  
way’	  suggest	  that	  voluntary	  activity	  was	  to	  be	  covered	  (at	  [32]).	  Indeed,	  the	  French	  version	  
equated	  ‘travail’	  with	  ‘profession’	  in	  its	  explanatory	  document.	  The	  same	  conclusion	  could	  be	  
drawn	  from	  the	  Spanish	  version	  where	  occupation	  was	  equated	  with	  profession	  (y	  al	  ejercicio	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professional)	  and	  the	  Dutch	  version:	  professional	  activity	  (en	  tot	  een	  bereop).	  The	  German	  
version	  (beruflicher	  Position)	  made	  clear	  that	  voluntary	  activity	  was	  not	  contemplated	  in	  the	  
coverage	  of	  Article	  3(1)(a).	  
The	  Court	  held	  that	  several	  other	  points	  could	  be	  made	  in	  support	  of	  the	  position	  that	  
voluntary	  activity	  was	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  Framework	  Directive:	  
• There	  was	  no	  attempt	  in	  any	  part	  of	  Article	  3	  to	  use	  the	  term	  ‘occupation’	  to	  refer	  to	  
voluntary	  activity,	  as	  would	  be	  expected	  for	  consistency	  if	  it	  had	  that	  meaning	  in	  
Article	  3(1)(a);	  
• The	  term	  ‘employment	  and	  occupation’	  is	  used	  consistently	  in	  both	  the	  title	  and	  
recitals	  of	  the	  Framework	  Directive;	  
• The	  reference	  to	  the	  ILO	  convention	  in	  recital	  4	  was	  also	  consistent	  with	  ‘employment	  
and	  occupation’	  being	  terms	  meaning	  paid	  activity	  (except	  for	  the	  mention	  of	  ‘unpaid	  
family	  worker’	  in	  the	  latest	  ILO	  commentary	  on	  the	  convention,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  specific,	  
very	  limited,	  extension	  to	  unpaid	  workers,	  where	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  intention	  not	  to	  
embrace	  volunteers	  generally);	  
• The	  original	  proposal	  and	  impact	  assessment	  for	  the	  Framework	  Directive	  were	  
‘focused	  exclusively	  on	  situations	  of	  employment	  or	  self-­‐employment	  and	  did	  not	  
consider...	  voluntary	  activity	  in	  any	  shape	  or	  form’	  (at	  [37]);	  
• The	  European	  Parliament	  had	  proposed	  amendments	  to	  Framework	  Directive	  Article	  
3(1)(a)	  which	  would	  have	  included	  ‘unpaid	  and	  voluntary	  work’	  but	  these	  had	  not	  
proceeded	  when	  the	  proposals	  were	  forwarded	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  Council	  (which	  
issues	  Directives);	  
• It	  had	  never	  been	  suggested	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  that	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  or	  
any	  other	  member	  state	  of	  the	  EU	  had	  not	  properly	  implemented	  the	  Framework	  
Directive	  by	  failing	  to	  include	  voluntary	  activity	  in	  their	  respective	  coverage	  against	  
discrimination;	  
• Persons	  in	  remunerated	  work	  and	  volunteers	  are	  not	  in	  comparable	  positions,	  ‘and	  it	  
would	  contradict	  the	  European	  Union	  legislature’s	  intention	  to	  treat	  the	  Directive	  as	  
intended	  to	  cover	  volunteers’	  (at	  [44]).	  
For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  Framework	  Directive	  did	  not	  cover	  
voluntary	  activity.	  Since	  the	  appellant	  was	  not	  covered	  by	  either	  domestic	  legislation	  or	  the	  EU	  
Framework	  Directive,	  her	  appeal	  failed.	  
A	  request	  for	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  for	  a	  ruling	  on	  the	  matter	  was	  
denied	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  there	  was	  no	  reasonable	  doubt	  about	  the	  conclusion	  reached	  by	  the	  
Supreme	  Court.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-­‐
cases/docs/UKSC_2011_0112_Judgment.pdf	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  	  
This	  was	  an	  important	  decision	  relating	  to	  volunteers	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  CAB’s	  case	  was	  supported	  
by	  interventions	  from	  the	  Association	  of	  Chief	  Executives	  of	  Voluntary	  Organisations	  (ACEVO),	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Groundwork	  UK	  and	  Volunteering	  England.	  Their	  position	  was	  that	  a	  finding	  that	  volunteers	  
were	  covered	  by	  disability	  discrimination	  legislation	  or	  EU	  Directives	  would	  undermine	  the	  
nature	  of	  volunteering,	  create	  practical	  barriers	  and	  additional	  costs	  for	  charities	  and	  other	  
nonprofits	  and	  result	  in	  a	  formalisation	  which	  they	  asserted	  was	  unwanted	  by	  most	  
volunteers.	  
The	  unanimous	  judgement,	  written	  by	  Lord	  Mance,	  concluded	  somewhat	  wistfully	  with	  the	  
point	  that	  (at	  [57]–[58]):	  
...I	  would	  dismiss	  this	  appeal	  from	  the	  concurrent	  decisions	  below	  on	  the	  ground	  that,	  
leaving	  aside	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  guidance,	  training	  and	  work	  experience	  covered	  by	  
article	  3(1)(b)	  [he	  had	  earlier	  made	  the	  point	  that	  unpaid	  interns	  might	  be	  covered],	  
article	  3	  is	  not	  directed	  to	  voluntary	  activity.	  	  
It	  is	  in	  these	  circumstances	  unnecessary	  to	  go	  into	  the	  interesting	  questions	  which	  
would	  have	  arisen,	  had	  I	  concluded	  that	  article	  3(1)	  did	  generally	  cover	  voluntary	  
activity.	  Assuming	  (without	  expressing	  any	  view)	  that	  the	  principle	  in	  [Marleasing	  SA	  v	  
La	  Comercial	  Internacional	  de	  Alimentación	  SA	  (Case	  C-­‐106/89)	  [1990]	  ECR	  I-­‐4135]	  
would	  not	  have	  assisted	  the	  appellant,	  because	  of	  the	  unequivocal	  stance	  taken	  by	  
Parliament	  in	  section	  68	  of	  the	  Disability	  Discrimination	  Act	  1995	  [in	  which	  work	  under	  
a	  contract	  of	  service	  is	  covered],	  the	  question	  would	  still	  have	  arisen	  whether	  the	  
principle	  in	  [Mangold	  v	  Helm	  (Case	  C-­‐144/04)	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐9981]	  [the	  general	  principle	  
of	  equality,	  contained	  in	  the	  TEC	  and	  TFEU]	  might	  not	  have	  been	  extended	  to	  protect	  
the	  appellant....	  That	  question	  might	  well	  have	  required	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice.	  That	  need	  does	  not	  however,	  in	  the	  event,	  arise.	  	  
	  
2.2.2  TREVANION V WYANGALA COUNTRY CLUB LTD [2012] NSWADT 257 
(ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, MAGISTRATE 
HENNESSY DEPUTY PRESIDENT, 30 NOVEMBER 2012)  
This	  was	  a	  discrimination	  case,	  which	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  heard	  in	  full.	  The	  applicant	  had	  operated	  the	  
bistro	  at	  the	  Wyangala	  Country	  Club	  Ltd	  (the	  Club)	  under	  licence.	  The	  licence	  was	  terminated	  
on	  the	  ground	  that	  there	  had	  been	  complaints	  about	  the	  food.	  The	  applicant	  contended	  that	  
the	  true	  reason	  for	  the	  termination	  was	  his	  homosexuality.	  
The	  applicant	  said	  that	  he	  had	  endured	  homosexual	  discrimination	  by	  two	  people	  employed	  by	  
the	  Club	  as	  bar	  staff,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  group	  of	  about	  13	  other	  persons.	  He	  contended	  that	  the	  two	  
bar	  staff	  had	  encouraged	  people	  to	  sign	  a	  petition	  about	  the	  food	  and	  service	  offered	  at	  the	  
bistro.	  This	  was	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  survey	  he	  conducted	  in	  May	  2012	  showed	  98%	  of	  
patrons	  were	  satisfied	  with	  the	  food	  and	  service	  offered	  at	  the	  bistro.	  
The	  Board	  of	  the	  Club	  terminated	  the	  bistro	  licence	  on	  26	  October	  2012.	  
The	  applicant	  sought	  an	  interim	  order	  to	  be	  permitted	  to	  continue	  to	  operate	  the	  bistro	  until	  
the	  full	  hearing	  was	  concluded.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  this	  should	  be	  granted	  ‘because	  the	  loss	  
to	  him	  in	  the	  short	  term	  outweighs	  any	  loss	  or	  prejudice	  to	  the	  Club’	  (at	  [1]).	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An	  interim	  order	  can	  be	  made	  to	  preserve	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  parties	  prior	  to	  hearing:	  Anti-­‐
Discrimination	  Act	  1977	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act),	  section	  105.	  The	  threshold	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  
is	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  question	  to	  be	  tried	  or,	  (in	  alternative	  terms)	  whether	  the	  
applicant	  has	  made	  out	  a	  prima	  facie	  case.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  question	  to	  be	  tried,	  the	  
Tribunal	  must	  then	  balance	  the	  inconvenience	  or	  injury	  which	  the	  applicant	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  
suffer	  if	  an	  interim	  order	  is	  refused	  with	  the	  injury	  or	  inconvenience	  which	  the	  respondent	  
would	  be	  likely	  to	  suffer	  if	  an	  interim	  order	  is	  granted.	  
Was	  there	  a	  serious	  question	  to	  be	  tried	  in	  this	  case?	  It	  is	  unlawful	  for	  a	  person,	  including	  a	  
corporation,	  to	  discriminate	  against	  another	  person	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  homosexuality	  by	  
evicting	  the	  person	  from	  business	  accommodation	  or	  subjecting	  the	  person	  to	  any	  other	  
detriment:	  section	  49ZQ(2)(b)	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  applicant	  alleged	  that	  by	  terminating	  the	  licence	  
agreement	  the	  Club	  had	  subjected	  him	  to	  a	  detriment.	  The	  termination	  is	  not	  unlawful	  unless	  
it	  meets	  the	  definition	  of	  discrimination	  in	  section	  49ZG.	  	  
The	  applicant	  complained	  of	  discrimination	  under	  section	  49ZG(1)(a)	  which	  provides:	  
1)	  A	  person	  (‘the	  perpetrator’)	  discriminates	  against	  another	  person	  (‘the	  aggrieved	  
person’)	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  homosexuality	  if,	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  aggrieved	  person's	  
homosexuality	  or	  the	  homosexuality	  of	  a	  relative	  or	  associate	  of	  the	  aggrieved	  person,	  
the	  perpetrator:	  	  
(a) treats	  the	  aggrieved	  person	  less	  favourably	  than	  in	  the	  same	  circumstances,	  or	  in	  
circumstances	  which	  are	  not	  materially	  different,	  the	  perpetrator	  treats	  or	  would	  
treat	  a	  person	  who	  he	  or	  she	  did	  not	  think	  was	  a	  homosexual	  person	  or	  who	  does	  
not	  have	  such	  a	  relative	  or	  associate	  who	  he	  or	  she	  thinks	  was	  a	  homosexual	  
person.	  
Therefore,	  to	  substantiate	  a	  complaint	  of	  direct	  discrimination	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  
homosexuality,	  the	  applicant	  had	  to	  prove	  two	  things:	  differential	  treatment	  and	  causation.	  
Differential	  treatment	  is	  treatment	  that	  is	  less	  favourable	  than,	  in	  the	  same	  circumstances	  or	  
in	  circumstances	  which	  are	  not	  materially	  different,	  the	  treatment	  that	  was	  or	  would	  have	  
been	  afforded	  to	  a	  real	  or	  hypothetical	  person	  who	  is	  not	  homosexual.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  
in	  this	  case	  the	  comparator	  would	  probably	  have	  to	  be	  a	  hypothetical	  person.	  	  
To	  prove	  causation	  the	  applicant	  had	  to	  prove	  that	  there	  was	  a	  relationship	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  
between	  his	  homosexuality	  and	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  bistro	  licence.	  At	  least	  one	  of	  the	  
reasons	  for	  the	  termination	  must	  have	  been	  his	  homosexuality,	  even	  if	  that	  reason	  was	  not	  the	  
dominant	  or	  a	  substantial	  reason	  for	  the	  treatment:	  section	  4A	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  
The	  applicant’s	  case	  was	  that	  the	  harassment	  and	  discrimination,	  by	  the	  group	  of	  people	  led	  by	  
the	  two	  bar	  staff,	  led	  directly	  to	  his	  loss	  of	  the	  bistro	  licence.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  was	  satisfied	  that	  there	  was	  a	  serious	  question	  to	  be	  tried,	  although	  the	  case	  had	  
yet	  to	  be	  proved	  by	  the	  applicant.	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  balance	  of	  convenience,	  the	  Tribunal	  said	  
that	  this	  favoured	  the	  applicant	  because,	  although	  relations	  had	  broken	  down	  between	  the	  
parties,	  he	  had	  no	  other	  job	  prospects,	  and	  ran	  the	  bistro	  independently	  of	  the	  Club,	  and	  with	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his	  own	  staff.	  If	  an	  interim	  order	  were	  not	  granted,	  the	  Club	  would	  most	  likely	  replace	  the	  
applicant.	  Therefore,	  the	  licence	  termination	  was	  stayed	  pending	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  
proper.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWADT/2012/257.html	  	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Nonprofit	  organisations	  must	  be	  careful	  of	  possible	  discrimination	  issues	  in	  the	  workplace.	  
Proper	  training	  in	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  relevant	  legislation	  is	  essential.	  This	  case	  is	  still	  to	  be	  
heard	  in	  full,	  so	  the	  existence	  of	  actual	  discrimination	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  proved.	  The	  order	  merely	  
maintains	  the	  status	  quo	  by	  stopping	  the	  cancellation	  of	  his	  licence	  until	  the	  matter	  is	  
determined.	  The	  balance	  of	  convenience	  test	  in	  this	  case	  was	  a	  fine	  one	  because	  relations	  had	  
broken	  down	  between	  the	  parties,	  so	  that	  continuing	  tension	  in	  forcing	  the	  club	  to	  engage	  the	  
applicant	  would	  weigh	  against	  granting	  the	  order;	  however	  the	  hardship	  on	  the	  applicant	  if	  he	  
were	  put	  out	  of	  work,	  outweighed	  those	  difficulties.	  
 
2.2.3  BROWN V BOURKE BOWLING CLUB [2012] NSWADT 248 (ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, CONLEY J, J NEWMAN, P SMITH, 
29 NOVEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  discrimination	  case.	  The	  applicant	  complained	  of	  discrimination	  by	  the	  Bourke	  
Bowling	  Club	  (the	  Club)	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  her	  Aboriginality.	  
The	  applicant	  had	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Club	  for	  16	  years.	  She	  had	  previously	  commenced	  
proceedings	  in	  the	  Tribunal	  against	  the	  Club	  claiming	  discrimination	  and	  victimisation;	  and	  
those	  proceedings	  were	  resolved	  by	  way	  of	  a	  settlement	  dated	  30	  March	  2007.	  The	  Tribunal	  
determined	  that	  the	  Deed	  of	  Release	  precluded	  the	  respondent	  relying	  upon	  incidents	  
involving	  the	  applicant	  prior	  to	  30	  March	  2007.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  incidents	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  
claim,	  the	  applicant	  alleged	  that	  the	  Club	  discriminated	  against	  her	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  her	  race	  
when	  the	  Club	  Board	  of	  Directors	  (the	  Board)	  imposed	  a	  two	  year	  suspension	  of	  her	  Club	  
membership.	  	  
The	  suspension	  was	  in	  respect	  of	  events	  occurring	  on	  4	  March	  2009,	  and	  involved	  an	  incident	  
where	  the	  applicant	  was	  on	  her	  mobile	  phone	  to	  a	  family	  member	  and	  was	  swearing	  audibly.	  A	  
staff	  member	  told	  her	  to	  stop	  swearing.	  She	  alleged	  that	  there	  was	  no	  one	  else	  in	  hearing	  
distance,	  except	  her	  companion,	  and	  that	  this	  was	  an	  example	  of	  the	  club	  staff	  member	  
treating	  ‘the	  blackfellas’	  differently.	  Later	  there	  was	  an	  incident	  where	  she	  was	  asked	  to	  leave	  
by	  the	  same	  staff	  member	  for	  having	  drunk	  too	  much,	  and	  then	  a	  minor	  altercation	  took	  place	  
in	  the	  carpark.	  
The	  Board	  of	  the	  Club	  suspended	  her	  the	  next	  day,	  pending	  disciplinary	  proceedings.	  She	  
wrote	  to	  the	  Board	  in	  her	  own	  defence,	  explaining	  the	  circumstances	  as	  she	  saw	  them,	  but	  she	  
was	  suspended	  for	  two	  years.	  Part	  of	  her	  defence	  was	  to	  set	  out	  detailed	  instances	  of	  
differential	  treatment	  (in	  her	  view)	  in	  incidents	  involving	  drunken	  and	  abusive	  behaviour	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(including	  swearing)	  by	  non-­‐Aboriginal	  and	  Aboriginal	  people.	  Differences	  in	  treatment	  and	  
penalties	  were	  set	  out.	  
The	  relevant	  legislation	  was	  the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Act	  1977	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act).	  Section	  7	  of	  the	  
Act	  provides:	  	  
(1)	  A	  person	  discriminates	  against	  another	  person	  (the	  aggrieved	  person)	  on	  the	  
ground	  of	  race	  if,	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  aggrieved	  person's	  race,	  or	  the	  race	  of	  a	  
relative	  or	  associate	  of	  the	  aggrieved	  person,	  the	  perpetrator:	  	  
(a)	  the	  perpetrator	  treats	  the	  aggrieved	  person	  less	  favourably	  than	  in	  the	  same	  
circumstances,	  or	  in	  circumstances	  which	  are	  not	  materially	  different,	  the	  
perpetrator	  treats	  or	  would	  treat	  a	  person	  of	  a	  different	  race.	  
In	  relation	  to	  clubs,	  section	  20A	  (2)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides:	  	  
It	  is	  unlawful	  for	  a	  registered	  club	  to	  discriminate	  against	  a	  person	  who	  is	  a	  member	  of	  
the	  registered	  club	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  race:	  	  
(a)	  by	  denying	  the	  person	  access,	  or	  limiting	  the	  person's	  access,	  to	  any	  benefit	  
provided	  by	  the	  registered	  club,	  
(b)	  by	  depriving	  the	  person	  of	  membership	  or	  varying	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  person's	  
membership,	  or	  	  
(c)	  by	  subjecting	  the	  person	  to	  any	  other	  detriment...	  
Since	  the	  acts	  complained	  of	  were	  by	  an	  employee	  of	  the	  Club,	  sections	  52	  and	  53	  on	  
inducement	  and	  vicarious	  liability	  for	  the	  acts	  of	  employees	  were	  also	  relevant.	  
The	  Tribunal	  found	  that:	  
• The	  applicant	  was	  an	  Aboriginal	  person	  
• Aboriginality	  was	  a	  race	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  section	  7	  of	  the	  Act	  
• To	  establish	  direct	  discrimination	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  race,	  differential	  treatment	  and	  
causation	  had	  to	  be	  shown	  by	  the	  applicant	  
• The	  applicant	  received	  ‘a	  very	  harsh	  penalty	  for	  a	  relatively	  trivial	  matter	  for	  which	  no	  
prescribed	  penalty	  exists’	  (at	  [94])	  
• Therefore,	  the	  applicant	  received	  less	  favourable	  (differential)	  treatment	  	  
• There	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  direct	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  
• Therefore	  the	  applicant	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  inference,	  which	  involved	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  
whole	  of	  the	  circumstances	  before	  the	  Tribunal	  in	  evidence	  
• There	  was	  a	  clear	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  applicant's	  complaints	  to	  the	  Club	  employee	  
that	  she	  was	  receiving	  differential	  treatment	  because	  of	  her	  Aboriginality	  and	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  the	  disciplinary	  complaints	  against	  her	  were	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Club	  (at	  
[119])	  
• It	  was	  therefore	  ‘reasonable	  and	  logical	  to	  draw	  an	  inference	  that	  the	  Board	  as	  it	  was	  
constituted	  on	  17	  March	  2009	  imposed	  the	  suspension	  of	  [the	  applicant’s]	  
membership	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  [the	  applicant’s]	  Aboriginality’	  (at	  [120]).	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In	  view	  of	  these	  findings,	  the	  Tribunal	  agreed	  that	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  
membership	  should	  be	  lifted.	  However,	  it	  had	  already	  expired	  by	  the	  time	  of	  this	  decision.	  	  
The	  applicant	  had	  also	  sought	  $100,000	  damages	  for	  injury	  to	  feelings,	  distress,	  insult	  and	  
mental	  suffering	  pursuant	  to	  section	  108(2)(a)	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  this	  amount	  
was	  excessive,	  and	  awarded	  an	  amount	  of	  $8000.	  Additionally,	  the	  applicant	  sought	  and	  
received	  an	  order	  for	  a	  written	  apology	  for	  the	  discrimination	  against	  her	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  her	  
Aboriginality.	  
The	  Club	  was	  liable	  for	  the	  acts	  of	  its	  employee,	  and	  ordered	  to	  pay	  the	  damages	  and	  issue	  the	  
apology	  within	  28	  days	  of	  the	  decision.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWADT/2012/248.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  relied	  on	  inference	  to	  establish	  the	  discrimination,	  since	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  
before	  the	  Tribunal	  to	  support	  direct	  discrimination.	  An	  inference	  of	  discrimination	  cannot	  be	  
drawn	  if	  there	  is	  a	  more	  probable	  and	  innocent	  explanation	  of	  the	  conduct	  in	  question.	  This	  
involved	  a	  consideration	  of	  all	  the	  surrounding	  circumstances,	  in	  which	  the	  Tribunal	  did	  not	  
discern	  any	  more	  probable	  or	  innocent	  explanation.	  
	  
2.2.4  DAVID YOHAN ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS MEMBERS OF PROVIDING 
AWARENESS WITH EDUCATION AND SPORT INCORPORATED (PAWES) V 
BASKETBALL QUEENSLAND INC & BASKETBALL BRISBANE INC [2012] FMCA 
1024 (FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA, JARRETT FM, 9 
NOVEMBER 2012)  
This	  was	  an	  application	  by	  the	  respondents	  for	  costs.	  The	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  case	  had	  
already	  been	  dealt	  with	  (at	  [2010]	  QCAT	  471;	  see	  casenote).	  The	  original	  complaint	  was	  based	  
on	  the	  alleged	  exclusion	  of	  certain	  basketball	  teams	  from	  the	  Brisbane	  basketball	  competition	  
in	  2009.	  The	  allegation	  was	  that	  this	  discrimination	  was	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race.	  The	  applicant	  
Yohan,	  representing	  PAWES,	  was	  the	  coach	  of	  basketball	  teams	  formed	  under	  the	  PAWES	  
umbrella.	  The	  first	  respondent	  was	  the	  overseeing	  body	  of	  the	  sport	  of	  basketball	  in	  
Queensland,	  and	  the	  second	  respondent	  ran	  the	  basketball	  competition	  in	  Brisbane	  in	  2009.	  
Yohan	  alleged	  that	  the	  respondents	  unlawfully	  excluded	  PAWES	  teams	  from	  the	  2009	  
basketball	  competition.	  
The	  two	  questions	  for	  determination	  in	  the	  QCAT	  hearing	  were:	  
1. Whether	  provisions	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Act	  1991	  (Qld)	  (the	  Act)	  which	  prohibit	  
discrimination	  in	  club	  membership	  and	  affairs	  (chapter	  2	  of	  division	  9	  of	  the	  Act)	  did	  
not	  apply	  to	  the	  respondents	  because	  they	  were	  not	  ‘clubs’	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  Act;	  and	  
2. Whether	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  which	  prohibit	  discrimination	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  
goods	  and	  services	  (chapter	  2	  of	  division	  4	  of	  the	  Act)	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  respondents	  
because	  they	  were	  not	  entities	  formed	  for	  social,	  literary,	  cultural,	  political,	  sporting,	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athletic,	  recreational,	  community	  service	  or	  any	  other	  similar	  purposes	  but	  which	  do	  
not	  carry	  out	  their	  purposes	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  a	  profit.	  
On	  the	  first	  issue,	  sections	  93–95	  of	  the	  Act	  had	  applied.	  The	  definition	  of	  a	  club	  is	  contained	  in	  
the	  dictionary	  to	  the	  Act	  as	  follows:	  
club	  means	  an	  association	  that—	  	  
(a) is	  established	  for	  social,	  literary,	  cultural,	  political,	  sporting,	  athletic,	  recreational,	  
community	  service	  or	  any	  other	  lawful	  purposes;	  and	  
(b) carries	  out	  its	  purposes	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  making	  a	  profit.	  
On	  the	  latter	  point,	  section	  46	  of	  the	  Act	  had	  applied,	  and	  again	  referred	  to	  organisations	  
which	  were	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  a	  profit.	  In	  both	  cases,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  would	  not	  apply	  to	  an	  organisation	  which	  was	  not	  for	  
profit.	  
It	  was	  common	  ground	  before	  QCAT	  that	  both	  respondents	  were	  formed	  for	  sporting	  purposes	  
and	  were	  associations,	  a	  term	  which	  was	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  Act.	  But	  were	  they	  formed	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  making	  a	  profit?	  The	  constitutions	  of	  both	  associations	  provided	  that	  they	  were	  
formed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  the	  sport	  of	  basketball.	  Neither	  constitution	  provided	  for	  
profit	  –	  income	  and	  property	  were	  to	  be	  used	  solely	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  
associations,	  and	  in	  the	  event	  of	  winding	  up,	  any	  surplus	  was	  to	  be	  distributed	  to	  an	  
association	  with	  similar	  objects.	  
The	  financial	  reports	  of	  the	  respondent	  associations	  had	  shown	  that	  each	  was	  of	  ‘some	  
considerable	  substance’	  with	  significant	  income	  and	  assets.	  Both	  had	  income	  and	  assets	  in	  
excess	  of	  $1	  million	  for	  the	  2009	  financial	  year,	  but	  each	  had	  operated	  at	  a	  loss	  for	  the	  year.	  	  
An	  examination	  of	  the	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  parliamentary	  debates,	  and	  previous	  
Queensland	  decisions	  on	  the	  Act	  provided	  no	  guidance	  as	  to	  the	  legislative	  policy	  which	  led	  to	  
the	  exclusion	  of	  nonprofit	  organisations	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  Act.	  After	  wider	  
consideration	  of	  a	  decision	  from	  New	  South	  Wales	  and	  decisions	  from	  England,	  the	  Tribunal	  
concluded	  that	  the	  two	  basketball	  associations	  were	  not	  established	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  
a	  profit	  and	  were	  therefore	  exempt	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  fact	  that	  they	  derived	  
substantial	  income	  and	  sometimes	  might	  make	  a	  surplus	  was	  not	  the	  issue,	  since	  that	  was	  
clearly	  not	  the	  purpose	  for	  which	  they	  were	  established.	  Therefore,	  the	  applicant’s	  case	  failed	  
before	  QCAT.	  
Following	  the	  QCAT	  proceedings,	  a	  complaint	  was	  made	  on	  30	  May	  2011	  under	  the	  Racial	  
Discrimination	  Act	  1975	  (Cth)	  to	  the	  Australian	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  (AHRC)	  by	  the	  
applicant,	  on	  behalf	  of	  PAWES.	  On	  20	  March	  2012	  the	  AHRC	  gave	  a	  notice	  of	  termination	  of	  
the	  dispute	  pursuant	  to	  section	  46PH(2)	  of	  the	  Australian	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  Act	  1986	  
(Cth).	  	  
The	  proceedings	  then	  moved	  to	  the	  Federal	  Magistrates	  Court	  (FMCA).	  In	  his	  application	  to	  the	  
FMCA,	  Yohan	  sought	  to	  institute	  proceedings	  on	  behalf	  of	  members	  of	  a	  class	  which	  he	  
describes	  as	  the	  members	  of	  PAWES.	  He	  sought	  orders:	  declaring	  that	  the	  respondents	  had	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committed	  unlawful	  discrimination;	  for	  an	  apology;	  requiring	  them	  not	  to	  repeat	  that	  unlawful	  
discrimination;	  requiring	  them	  to	  provide	  cultural	  awareness	  training	  to	  staff	  and	  volunteers;	  
and	  requiring	  them	  to	  assist	  the	  body	  he	  represented	  with	  setting	  up	  its	  own	  affiliated	  
basketball	  association;	  and	  certain	  other	  relief	  including	  compensation.	  	  
However,	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  proceedings	  in	  the	  FMCA	  would	  be	  barred	  by	  the	  decision	  
in	  the	  earlier	  QCAT	  proceedings	  by	  operation	  of	  section	  6A(2)	  of	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act.	  
Under	  that	  provision,	  the	  applicant	  would	  be	  deemed	  never	  to	  have	  been	  entitled	  to	  make	  a	  
complaint	  or	  institute	  a	  proceeding	  under	  the	  Australian	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  Act.	  The	  
respondent	  associations	  sought	  their	  costs.	  
Were	  costs	  available	  to	  the	  respondents?	  Jarrett	  FM	  rejected	  the	  notion	  that	  this	  application	  
involved	  a	  ‘no	  costs’	  jurisdiction.	  He	  said	  (at	  [15]):	  
In	  my	  view	  the	  respondents	  should	  have	  their	  costs	  of	  these	  proceedings.	  There	  is	  no	  
reason	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  usual	  rule	  that	  costs	  should	  follow	  the	  event	  should	  not	  be	  
applied.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  Mr	  Yohan	  suggests	  that	  this	  application	  was	  taken	  for	  
altruistic	  reasons,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  was	  aware	  that	  s.6A	  of	  the	  Racial	  Discrimination	  
Act	  1975	  operated	  to	  bar	  these	  proceedings,	  both	  here	  and	  in	  the	  AHRC	  –	  the	  
Commission’s	  termination	  letter	  set	  that	  out.	  
The	  question	  then	  was:	  were	  costs	  available	  to	  the	  respondents	  on	  an	  indemnity	  or	  party	  and	  
party	  basis?	  Jarrett	  FM	  said	  on	  this	  point	  (at	  [18]):	  
I	  am	  satisfied	  that	  there	  was	  no	  public	  interest	  element	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  complaint.	  
The	  applicant	  was	  aware	  that	  his	  claim	  was	  unsustainable	  but	  pursued	  it	  anyway.	  He	  
failed	  to	  appear	  at	  the	  first	  Court	  date,	  he	  failed	  to	  amend	  his	  claim	  despite	  indulgence	  
from	  the	  Court	  and	  he	  has	  caused	  the	  respondents	  to	  incur	  significant	  costs	  in	  these	  
proceedings...	  an	  order	  for	  indemnity	  costs	  is	  appropriate.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FMCA/2012/1024.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Considerable	  costs	  were	  incurred	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  dispute	  which	  was	  entirely	  
misconceived	  from	  the	  outset,	  and	  doomed	  to	  failure.	  As	  the	  applicant	  was	  a	  small	  nonprofit	  
incorporated	  association,	  this	  was	  scarcely	  a	  wise	  course	  of	  action.	  In	  addition,	  the	  way	  the	  
applicant	  conducted	  the	  case	  caused	  additional	  costs,	  leading	  to	  an	  order	  for	  indemnity	  costs	  
against	  it	  (indemnity	  costs	  are	  higher	  than	  the	  usual	  party	  and	  party	  costs).	  As	  Jarrett	  FM	  
pointed	  out,	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  applicant	  ‘was	  less	  than	  satisfactory’	  (at	  [17]).	  
	  
2.2.5  CATHOLIC CARE (DIOCESE OF LEEDS) V CHARITY COMMISSION OF ENGLAND 
AND WALES [2012] UKUT 395 (UPPER TRIBUNAL (TAX AND CHANCERY), SALES 
J, 2 NOVEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  from	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  General	  Regulatory	  Chamber	  of	  the	  First	  Tier	  
Tribunal	  (FTT)	  dealing	  with	  charity	  matters:	  see	  [2011]	  UKFTT	  B1	  (GRC).	  The	  FTT	  dismissed	  an	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appeal	  by	  Catholic	  Care	  (Diocese	  of	  Leeds)	  (the	  appellant)	  against	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Charity	  
Commission	  (the	  Commission)	  which	  refused	  consent,	  as	  required	  by	  section	  64	  of	  the	  
Charities	  Act	  1993,	  for	  the	  appellant	  to	  amend	  the	  objects	  clause	  in	  its	  Memorandum	  of	  
Association.	  The	  appellant	  had	  sought	  permission	  to	  make	  the	  amendment	  so	  as	  to	  permit	  it	  to	  
continue	  its	  previous	  practice	  of	  refusing	  to	  offer	  its	  adoption	  services	  to	  same	  sex	  couples.	  
The	  appellant	  offered	  adoption	  services	  which	  consisted	  of	  identifying	  and	  screening	  potential	  
parents	  willing	  to	  adopt	  children,	  placing	  children	  for	  adoption	  and	  providing	  some	  support	  for	  
the	  parents	  after	  adoption.	  Up	  until	  2008	  the	  appellant	  had	  operated	  a	  practice	  of	  only	  
screening	  potential	  adoptive	  parents	  and	  placing	  children	  with	  adoptive	  parents	  who	  were	  
heterosexual	  and	  would	  constitute	  what	  was	  termed	  in	  this	  appeal	  a	  ‘Nazarene	  family’	  of	  
mother,	  father	  and	  child.	  Same	  sex	  couples	  who	  were	  potential	  adoptive	  parents	  were	  
excluded	  from	  consideration.	  This	  was	  said	  to	  be	  for	  reasons	  of	  Roman	  Catholic	  religious	  
doctrine.	  However,	  the	  appellant	  has	  been	  willing	  in	  the	  past	  to	  consider	  adoptive	  parents	  
from	  other	  denominations	  and	  other	  faiths,	  provided	  they	  would	  constitute	  a	  Nazarene	  family.	  
Changes	  in	  the	  law	  meant	  that	  this	  practice	  became	  illegal	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2008:	  see	  the	  Equality	  
Act	  (Sexual	  Orientation)	  Regulations	  2007	  (the	  Regulations).	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  limited	  
exception	  for	  charities,	  from	  the	  general	  law	  which	  prohibited	  discrimination	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  
sexual	  orientation.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  also	  provided	  a	  limited	  exception	  for	  
charities	  under	  sub-­‐sections	  193(1)	  and	  (2),	  where	  the	  charity	  is	  following	  the	  provisions	  of	  a	  
‘charitable	  instrument’.	  Thus,	  the	  appellant	  needed	  to	  make	  alterations	  to	  its	  Memorandum	  of	  
Association	  (the	  relevant	  ‘charitable	  instrument’)	  to	  make	  explicit	  that	  its	  adoptive	  services	  
were	  only	  to	  be	  offered	  to	  heterosexual	  adoptive	  parents.	  
The	  proposed	  alteration	  was	  to	  read:	  	  
The	  Charity	  shall	  only	  provide	  adoption	  services	  to	  heterosexuals	  and	  such	  services	  to	  
heterosexuals	  shall	  only	  be	  provided	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  Church.	  For	  
the	  avoidance	  of	  doubt	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Bishop	  of	  Leeds	  from	  time	  to	  time	  shall	  be	  
the	  arbiter	  of	  whether	  such	  services	  and	  the	  manner	  of	  their	  provision	  fall	  within	  the	  
tenets	  of	  the	  Church.	  
The	  Commission	  originally	  rejected	  the	  appellant’s	  application	  to	  amend	  its	  Memorandum	  of	  
Association	  and	  the	  appellant	  appealed	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  under	  the	  provisions	  set	  out	  in	  the	  
Regulations.	  Briggs	  J	  allowed	  the	  appeal	  and	  remitted	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Commission	  in	  March	  
2010:	  see	  [2010]	  EWHC	  520	  (Ch).	  The	  Commission	  again	  rejected	  the	  application	  in	  July	  2010.	  
In	  the	  interim,	  the	  form	  of	  Tribunal	  to	  hear	  the	  matter	  had	  changed	  and	  the	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  
had	  been	  introduced.	  	  
In	  his	  judgment	  of	  2010,	  Briggs	  J	  interpreted	  Regulation	  18	  of	  the	  Regulations	  as	  a	  provision	  
which	  implemented	  Article	  14	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (prohibition	  of	  
discrimination).	  This	  allowed	  differential	  treatment	  of	  heterosexuals	  and	  homosexuals	  if	  
undertaken	  for	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  where	  the	  means	  employed	  were	  
proportionate	  to	  the	  aim	  sought	  to	  be	  realised	  (at	  [72]–[74],	  [78],	  [84]	  and	  [104]).	  Briggs	  J	  
considered	  that	  at	  that	  stage	  the	  appellant	  had	  made	  out	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  of	  justification	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which	  required	  further	  detailed	  examination	  and	  consideration	  by	  the	  Commission	  (at	  [107]–
[111]).	  	  
The	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  (the	  Act)	  was	  then	  passed.	  Section	  29	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  a	  person	  
providing	  a	  service	  to	  the	  public	  (such	  as	  adoption	  services)	  must	  not	  discriminate	  against	  a	  
person	  requiring	  the	  service	  by	  not	  providing	  the	  person	  with	  that	  service.	  Section	  13	  defines	  
direct	  discrimination	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Act	  as	  including	  a	  case	  where	  the	  service	  provider	  
treats	  a	  person	  seeking	  to	  use	  the	  service	  less	  favourably	  than	  he	  would	  treat	  others	  ‘because	  
of	  a	  protected	  characteristic’.	  Section	  4	  of	  the	  Act	  sets	  out	  a	  list	  of	  relevant	  ‘protected	  
characteristics’,	  which	  include	  ‘sexual	  orientation’.	  	  
A	  defence	  of	  objective	  justification	  can	  be	  made	  out	  under	  section	  193.	  It	  was	  the	  agreed	  
position	  of	  both	  parties	  to	  this	  appeal	  that	  section	  193	  of	  the	  Act	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  
same	  way	  as	  section	  18	  of	  the	  Regulations	  had	  been	  in	  the	  original	  hearings.	  This	  meant	  that	  
Article	  14	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  was	  analogous	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  
section	  193	  of	  the	  Act.	  
Before	  the	  FTT,	  the	  appellant	  argued	  that	  the	  discrimination	  proposed	  was	  proportionate	  to	  a	  
legitimate	  aim.	  If	  it	  could	  not	  limit	  its	  services	  as	  it	  proposed,	  it	  would	  lose	  much	  of	  its	  funding	  
and	  would	  need	  to	  close.	  This	  would	  be	  particularly	  difficult	  because	  it	  dealt	  with	  many	  hard	  to	  
place	  children	  in	  its	  service.	  The	  evidence	  showed	  that	  the	  appellant	  placed	  about	  10	  children	  
a	  year	  with	  approved	  adoptive	  parents.	  These	  children	  were	  in	  care	  with	  local	  authorities,	  and	  
the	  appellants’	  contention	  was	  that	  children	  would	  remain	  unadopted	  if	  it	  had	  to	  close	  its	  
service.	  	  
However,	  the	  few	  local	  authorities	  who	  responded	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  query	  about	  this	  issue	  
said	  that	  this	  was	  not	  so.	  The	  children	  could	  be	  adopted	  through	  other	  agencies.	  Moreover,	  
there	  was	  an	  oversupply	  of	  potential	  adoptive	  parents,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  adoptions.	  This	  was	  
because	  of	  cost	  rather	  than	  anything	  else.	  The	  fees	  charged	  by	  voluntary	  adoption	  agencies	  for	  
placements	  were	  high,	  and	  few	  local	  authorities	  could,	  or	  would,	  pay	  them.	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  a	  
problem	  for	  the	  appellant	  too,	  which	  had	  to	  raise	  at	  least	  £130,000	  just	  to	  place	  10	  children.	  
The	  FTT	  held	  that	  the	  appellant’s	  aims	  were	  definitely	  legitimate,	  particularly	  where	  children’s	  
interests	  were	  taken	  into	  account.	  However,	  its	  position	  that	  its	  funding	  would	  only	  be	  
maintained	  or	  increased	  with	  the	  proposed	  limitation	  of	  its	  services	  was	  not	  a	  true	  position.	  
Nor	  would	  more	  children	  necessarily	  be	  placed,	  because	  of	  the	  nationwide	  difficulty	  with	  
‘matching’	  and	  the	  fees	  payable.	  The	  Upper	  Tribunal	  agreed	  with	  both	  these	  propositions	  (at	  
[24]–[25]).	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  proportionality,	  the	  FTT	  had	  rejected	  the	  appellant’s	  argument	  that	  adoption	  
services	  from	  local	  authorities	  and	  other	  voluntary	  agencies	  filled	  the	  gap	  for	  same	  sex	  
adopting	  parents.	  The	  Upper	  Tribunal	  agreed	  that	  this	  availability	  could	  not	  justify	  the	  
discrimination	  of	  the	  appellant.	  Nor	  could	  the	  private	  prejudices	  of	  third	  parties,	  who	  might	  
withhold	  funding	  from	  the	  appellant	  if	  it	  allowed	  adoptions	  by	  same	  sex	  couples.	  On	  this	  point,	  
the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [38]):	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The	  basic	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  FTT	  is	  correct.	  The	  mere	  fact	  that	  some	  people	  may	  
feel	  upset	  if	  homosexuals	  are	  accorded	  equal	  treatment	  in	  some	  area	  of	  life	  cannot,	  of	  
itself,	  provide	  objective	  justification	  for	  discrimination	  on	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  
orientation...	  This	  is	  the	  point	  made	  by	  the	  FTT	  at	  para.	  [57]	  of	  the	  decision.	  However,	  
if,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  some	  people	  having	  prejudices	  about	  or	  negative	  attitudes	  
towards	  homosexuals,	  some	  real	  detriment	  to	  the	  general	  public	  interest	  (of	  sufficient	  
weight)	  might	  arise	  unless	  a	  practice	  discriminating	  against	  them	  were	  adopted,	  then	  
in	  principle	  it	  is	  possible	  under	  Article	  14	  and	  under	  section	  193	  of	  the	  Equality	  Act	  for	  
such	  a	  practice	  to	  be	  found	  to	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  legitimate	  aim	  of	  preventing	  
that	  detriment	  or	  harm	  and	  hence	  objectively	  justified.	  The	  FTT	  was	  therefore	  right	  to	  
go	  on	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  justification	  as	  it	  did.	  
While	  the	  sincerely	  held	  views	  of	  a	  ‘major	  tradition	  in	  European	  society’	  had	  ‘a	  legitimate	  place	  
in	  pluralist,	  tolerant	  and	  broadminded	  society’	  (at	  [45]),	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  took	  the	  view	  that	  
(at	  [47]):	  
The	  legal	  context	  in	  which	  the	  Charity	  comes	  before	  the	  Tribunal	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  
national	  authorities,	  in	  particular	  Parliament,	  have	  established	  a	  very	  clear	  framework	  
of	  equality	  law	  which	  makes	  discrimination	  on	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  unlawful.	  
That	  is	  the	  basic	  ground	  rule	  of	  public	  policy	  established	  by	  the	  national	  authorities	  in	  
their	  assessment	  of	  and	  responding	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  society.	  The	  Charity	  seeks	  to	  rely	  
on	  section	  193	  and	  the	  objective	  justification	  argument	  it	  puts	  forward	  to	  derogate	  
from	  that	  basic	  position.	  The	  interest	  of	  promoting	  the	  traditional	  family	  on	  which	  the	  
Charity	  relies	  has	  not	  been	  endorsed	  by	  the	  national	  authorities.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  assessing	  whether	  the	  Charity	  has	  made	  out	  a	  case	  of	  objective	  justification,	  
I	  think	  that	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Charity	  that	  the	  traditional	  family	  should	  be	  promoted	  is	  
not	  entitled	  to	  be	  given	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  weight	  as	  if	  it	  had	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  
national	  authorities....	  
Children’s	  interests	  were	  paramount	  in	  this	  case.	  The	  Upper	  Tribunal	  could	  not	  agree	  that	  the	  
appellant’s	  position	  would	  offer	  a	  greater	  benefit	  to	  children.	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  entirely	  possible	  
that	  more	  children	  might	  be	  placed	  if	  the	  appellant’s	  services	  were	  offered	  to	  a	  broader	  range	  
of	  parents.	  Expert	  evidence	  was	  certainly	  offered	  to	  this	  effect.	  The	  Upper	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  
(at	  [55]):	  	  
The	  FTT	  was	  therefore	  right	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  Charity	  could	  not	  show	  that	  there	  
were	  weighty	  and	  convincing	  reasons	  why	  it	  should	  be	  permitted	  to	  change	  its	  
Memorandum	  of	  Association	  to	  enable	  it	  to	  discriminate	  against	  homosexuals	  as	  it	  
proposed.	  
Although	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  did	  criticise	  some	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  FTT’s	  decision,	  these	  were	  
held	  not	  to	  be	  material	  to	  the	  outcome,	  or	  not	  to	  be	  such	  as	  would	  change	  the	  outcome.	  
Therefore,	  the	  appeal	  was	  dismissed.	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The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/cc_Leeds_v_charity_commi
ssion.pdf	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Catholic	  Care	  had	  taken	  the	  position	  that	  if	  it	  could	  not	  restrict	  its	  adoption	  services	  as	  it	  
proposed,	  then	  it	  would	  not	  offer	  adoption	  services	  at	  all.	  It	  had	  not	  done	  so	  since	  2008.	  
Alternatively,	  it	  said	  that	  third	  parties	  would	  withdraw	  funding	  if	  it	  allowed	  adoption	  to	  same	  
sex	  parents,	  so	  that	  it	  would	  need	  to	  close	  its	  adoption	  service	  in	  any	  case.	  The	  Upper	  Tribunal	  
said	  that	  these	  contentions	  were	  unproven,	  and	  in	  any	  event,	  it	  was	  not	  permitted	  to	  offer	  
adoption	  services	  only	  to	  heterosexual	  parents.	  Although	  the	  charity	  had	  legitimate	  aims,	  its	  
response	  to	  the	  legal	  restrictions	  in	  the	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  was	  not	  proportionate	  to	  those	  aims	  
and	  therefore	  could	  not	  warrant	  an	  exemption.	  
	  
2.2.6  AGIUS V ST VINCENT’S HEALTH [2012] FMCA 840 (FEDERAL MAGISTRATES 
COURT OF AUSTRALIA, TURNER FM, 14 SEPTEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  discrimination	  case	  brought	  against	  the	  defendant	  hospital,	  St	  Vincent’s	  Hospital	  
(Melbourne)	  Ltd	  (St	  Vincent’s),	  by	  the	  plaintiff,	  Agius,	  who	  is	  deaf.	  She	  brought	  the	  action	  
pursuant	  to	  sections	  5,	  6	  and	  24	  of	  the	  Disability	  Discrimination	  Act	  1992	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act),	  as	  it	  
was	  in	  2008,	  when	  the	  alleged	  discrimination	  occurred.	  Section	  5	  deals	  with	  direct	  disability	  
discrimination,	  section	  6	  with	  indirect	  disability	  discrimination	  and	  section	  24	  establishes	  the	  
meaning	  of	  ‘provision	  of	  goods,	  services	  and	  facilities’.	  
St	  Vincent’s	  is	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  hospital	  that	  was	  established	  by	  the	  Sisters	  of	  Charity	  to	  provide	  
general	  health	  and	  medical	  services	  to	  the	  public.	  Agius	  attended	  the	  emergency	  department	  
of	  the	  hospital	  on	  three	  occasions	  in	  August	  and	  September	  2008.	  Agius	  alleged	  that	  St	  
Vincent’s	  imposed	  a	  ‘requirement	  or	  condition’	  on	  her	  that	  she	  access	  and/or	  receive	  medical	  
treatment	  without	  the	  assistance	  of	  an	  Auslan	  interpreter.	  	  
Agius	  made	  a	  complaint	  to	  the	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Equal	  Opportunity	  Commission	  (HREOC)	  on	  
24	  February	  2009.	  A	  Notice	  of	  Termination	  of	  that	  complaint	  was	  given	  on	  11	  January	  2010.	  As	  
a	  consequence	  of	  that	  Notice,	  Agius	  made	  application	  to	  the	  Federal	  Magistrates	  Court	  
pursuant	  to	  section	  46PH(1)(i)	  of	  the	  Australian	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  Act	  1986	  (Cth).	  	  
For	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  succeed	  in	  her	  claim	  she	  had	  to	  establish:	  	  
• That	  St	  Vincent’s	  imposed	  a	  ‘requirement	  or	  condition’	  (taken	  from	  section	  6	  of	  the	  
Act)	  that	  she	  access	  and/or	  receive	  medical	  treatment	  without	  the	  assistance	  of	  an	  
Auslan	  interpreter;	  	  
• That	  the	  system	  at	  St	  Vincent’s	  for	  providing	  Auslan	  interpreters	  was	  unreasonable	  in	  
the	  circumstances;	  	  
• That	  the	  staff	  indirectly	  discriminated	  against	  her	  by	  examining	  and	  treating	  her,	  and	  
providing	  health	  services	  to	  her,	  without	  allowing	  her	  the	  assistance	  of	  an	  Auslan	  
interpreter.	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• That	  she	  suffered	  serious	  disadvantage	  by	  not	  being	  provided	  with	  an	  Auslan	  
interpreter;	  and	  	  
• That	  if	  a	  ‘requirement	  or	  condition’	  was	  imposed	  on	  her	  by	  St	  Vincent’s,	  it	  was	  not	  
reasonable	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case.	  
On	  each	  occasion	  of	  attendance	  at	  the	  emergency	  department,	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  
produced	  that	  the	  illness	  she	  presented	  with	  was	  not	  treated	  properly.	  Nor	  was	  there	  any	  
evidence	  given	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  suffered	  humiliation	  or	  upset	  at	  these	  attendances.	  However,	  
the	  plaintiff	  complained	  that	  because	  the	  emergency	  department	  did	  not	  ensure	  that	  an	  
accredited	  external	  Auslan	  interpreter	  was	  present	  at	  each	  attendance	  by	  her,	  it	  had	  indirectly	  
discriminated	  against	  her	  in	  breach	  of	  section	  6	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  this	  did	  not	  fit	  within	  section	  6	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  meaning	  of	  ‘requirement	  or	  
condition’	  in	  the	  Act	  implied	  some	  form	  of	  compulsion	  or	  obligation.	  There	  was	  no	  such	  
compulsion	  or	  obligation	  in	  this	  case.	  He	  said	  (at	  [17]	  and	  [26]):	  
The	  Court	  finds	  that	  St	  Vincent’s	  did	  not	  impose	  ‘a	  requirement	  or	  condition’	  that	  
Agius	  access	  and/or	  receive	  medical	  treatment	  without	  the	  assistance	  of	  an	  Auslan	  
interpreter.	  Agius	  had	  the	  assistance	  of	  [a	  friend	  who	  was	  an	  Auslan	  student],	  and	  St	  
Vincent’s	  was	  able	  to	  book	  an	  Auslan	  interpreter	  for	  Agius	  for	  the	  attendance	  on	  14	  
September	  2008,	  but	  due	  to	  illness	  that	  interpreter	  was	  unable	  to	  attend.	  At	  no	  time	  
did	  St	  Vincent’s	  impose	  a	  ‘requirement	  or	  condition’	  that	  Agius	  access	  and/or	  receive	  
treatment	  without	  the	  assistance	  of	  an	  Auslan	  interpreter.	  Agius	  had	  an	  Auslan	  
student	  with	  her	  and	  could	  have	  arranged	  for	  an	  Auslan	  interpreter....	  The	  Court	  finds	  
that	  Agius	  did	  not	  suffer	  any	  serious	  disadvantage.	  She	  was	  able	  to	  communicate	  with	  
staff	  at	  St	  Vincent’s	  through	  written	  English	  and	  through	  her	  friend,	  an	  Auslan	  student.	  
His	  Honour	  followed	  Devers	  v	  Kindilan	  Society	  [2012]	  FCAFC	  72.	  That	  case	  established	  that	  to	  
show	  indirect	  discrimination,	  a	  plaintiff	  had	  to	  show	  that:	  
1. The	  defendant	  imposed	  a	  requirement	  or	  condition	  on	  her;	  
2. With	  which	  a	  substantially	  higher	  proportion	  of	  persons	  without	  her	  disability	  (	  a	  
base	  group)	  are	  able	  to	  comply;	  and	  
3. With	  which	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  not	  able	  to	  comply;	  so	  that	  
4. The	  requirement	  or	  condition	  is	  therefore	  not	  reasonable	  having	  regard	  to	  all	  the	  
circumstances.	  
Turner	  FM	  held	  further	  that,	  even	  if	  there	  had	  been	  a	  finding	  that	  the	  hospital	  had	  imposed	  a	  
requirement	  or	  condition	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  plaintiff,	  its	  system	  for	  supplying	  Auslan	  
interpreters	  was	  reasonable	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  The	  circumstances	  in	  question	  included:	  
• That	  St	  Vincent’s	  was	  called	  on	  to	  provide	  interpreters	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  languages;	  	  
• Only	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  patients	  required	  Auslan	  interpreters	  (in	  the	  relevant	  year,	  
there	  were	  57	  out	  of	  38,956);	  	  
• It	  would	  be	  very	  expensive	  and	  inefficient	  to	  employ	  Auslan	  interpreters	  on	  a	  full	  time	  
basis,	  and	  the	  emergency	  department	  at	  St	  Vincent’s	  already	  operated	  at	  a	  loss;	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• Auslan	  interpreters	  were	  in	  short	  supply	  in	  Victoria	  at	  all	  times,	  and	  particularly	  
outside	  of	  normal	  business	  hours;	  and	  	  
• Agius	  did	  not	  give	  St	  Vincent’s	  any	  notice	  that	  she	  required	  an	  Auslan	  interpreter,	  since	  
she	  arrived	  at	  the	  emergency	  department	  unannounced	  and	  after	  normal	  business	  
hours.	  
It	  was	  also	  held	  that	  St	  Vincent’s	  did	  not	  breach	  section	  24	  of	  the	  Act	  in	  that:	  	  
• St	  Vincent’s	  did	  not	  deny	  Agius	  any	  health	  service	  or	  refuse	  to	  make	  available	  to	  Agius	  
any	  health	  service	  [section	  24(1)(a)];	  	  
• St	  Vincent’s	  did	  not	  discriminate	  against	  Agius	  in	  the	  terms	  or	  conditions	  upon	  which	  it	  
provided	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  Agius	  [section	  24(1)(b)];	  and	  
• St	  Vincent’s	  did	  not	  discriminate	  against	  Agius	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  provided	  
goods	  or	  services	  to	  Agius	  [section	  24(1)(c)].	  
The	  plaintiff	  was	  held	  to	  have	  suffered	  no	  disadvantage	  in	  her	  treatment,	  and	  as	  there	  was	  no	  
discrimination,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  damages	  payable.	  The	  application	  for	  damages	  of	  $30,000	  
was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FMCA/2012/840.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  Federal	  Magistrate	  in	  this	  case	  followed	  the	  case	  of	  Devers	  v	  Kindilan	  Society	  [2010]	  FCAFC	  
72.	  There	  was	  no	  discrimination	  present	  because	  the	  court	  accepted	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  received	  
proper	  medical	  treatment	  on	  each	  attendance	  at	  the	  hospital.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  any	  
adverse	  consequences	  to	  the	  plaintiff’s	  health,	  or	  indeed	  of	  any	  kind,	  resulting	  from	  that	  
treatment.	  This	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  no	  discrimination	  present	  on	  the	  facts.	  
	  
2.2.7  HUGHES V NARRABRI BOWLING CLUB LTD [2012] NSWADT 161 
(ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, G FURNESS 
SC, JUDICIAL MEMBER, A LOWE, NON JUDICIAL MEMBER, M NASIR, NON 
JUDICIAL MEMBER, 9 AUGUST 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  case	  involving	  vicarious	  liability	  of	  a	  club	  for	  sexual	  harassment.	  The	  applicant,	  
Hughes,	  was	  employed	  in	  July	  2008	  as	  a	  casual	  housemaid,	  by	  the	  Narrabri	  Bowling	  Motor	  Inn	  
(the	  motel),	  which	  was	  operated	  by	  the	  first	  respondent,	  the	  Narrabri	  Bowling	  Club	  Limited	  
(the	  Club).	  In	  June	  2010,	  Mr	  and	  Mrs	  Welsh,	  the	  second	  and	  third	  respondents,	  took	  over	  the	  
management	  of	  the	  motel.	  On	  10	  January	  2011,	  the	  applicant	  complained	  to	  the	  Anti-­‐
Discrimination	  Board	  that	  she	  had	  been	  subject	  to	  three	  acts	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  by	  Mr	  
Welsh	  between	  June	  2010	  and	  August	  2010.	  The	  applicant	  also	  complained	  to	  the	  Anti-­‐
Discrimination	  Board	  that	  after	  making	  the	  complaint	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  against	  Mr	  Welsh	  
she	  was	  victimised	  by	  Mrs	  Welsh	  by	  being	  given	  extra	  work	  as	  a	  housemaid	  and	  then	  given	  no	  
work	  at	  all.	  The	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Board	  referred	  the	  complaints	  to	  the	  Tribunal	  on	  21	  July	  
2011.	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The	  Club	  had	  established	  a	  committee	  of	  three	  board	  members	  to	  oversee	  the	  management	  of	  
the	  motel	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Club.	  The	  question	  was	  whether	  the	  Board	  of	  the	  Club	  was	  
vicariously	  liable	  for	  the	  sexual	  harassment	  of	  their	  employee,	  because	  they	  employed	  Mr	  
Welsh	  when	  they	  knew	  there	  had	  been	  previous	  complaints	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  against	  him.	  
In	  addition	  were	  they	  also	  liable	  for	  the	  victimisation	  of	  the	  applicant	  by	  Mrs	  Welsh,	  in	  
circumstances	  where	  the	  Board	  did	  not	  take	  any	  effective	  action	  when	  the	  applicant	  reported	  
the	  sexual	  harassment.	  
The	  relevant	  legislation	  was	  the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Act	  1977	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act),	  at	  section	  22A	  
(definition	  of	  sexual	  harassment).	  The	  test	  for	  whether	  conduct	  constitutes	  sexual	  harassment	  
is	  not	  whether	  the	  complainant	  feels	  it	  is	  sexual	  harassment	  or	  whether	  the	  respondent	  
intends	  it	  to	  be	  sexual	  harassment.	  The	  test	  is	  an	  objective	  one	  that	  requires	  the	  finder	  of	  fact	  
to	  ask	  whether	  a	  reasonable	  person	  would	  consider	  that	  the	  conduct	  in	  question	  would	  be	  
likely	  to	  offend,	  humiliate	  or	  intimidate.	  
The	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  a	  reasonable	  person,	  having	  regard	  to	  all	  the	  circumstances	  would	  
have	  anticipated	  that	  the	  applicant	  would	  have	  been	  offended,	  humiliated	  or	  intimidated	  by	  
the	  words	  used	  by	  Mr	  Welsh.	  Mr	  Welsh	  was	  in	  a	  position	  of	  power	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  applicant,	  
in	  that	  he	  and	  his	  wife	  had	  the	  power	  to	  offer	  or	  not	  offer	  her	  work.	  
However,	  the	  tribunal	  rejected	  the	  contention	  that	  brushing	  up	  against	  the	  applicant	  on	  two	  
occasions	  constituted	  sexual	  harassment.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  presented	  that	  it	  was	  
conduct	  of	  a	  sexual	  nature	  or	  that	  it	  was	  unwelcome.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  a	  reasonable	  
person	  would	  not	  have	  anticipated	  a	  response	  of	  feeling	  offended,	  intimidated	  or	  humiliated.	  
Did	  the	  club	  have	  vicarious	  liability	  for	  the	  words	  found	  to	  amount	  to	  unlawful	  sexual	  
harassment?	  Vicarious	  liability	  for	  sexual	  harassment	  extends	  to	  employers	  under	  section	  
53(1)	  of	  the	  Act.	  It	  states:	  	  
An	  act	  done	  by	  a	  person	  as	  the	  agent	  or	  employee	  of	  the	  person’s	  principal	  or	  
employer	  which	  if	  done	  by	  the	  principal	  or	  employer	  would	  be	  a	  contravention	  of	  this	  
Act	  is	  taken	  to	  have	  been	  done	  by	  the	  principal	  or	  employer	  also	  unless	  the	  principal	  or	  
employer	  did	  not,	  either	  before	  or	  after	  the	  doing	  of	  the	  act,	  authorise	  the	  agent	  or	  
employee,	  either	  expressly	  or	  by	  implication,	  to	  do	  the	  act.	  	  
Section	  53(3)	  provides	  a	  defence	  to	  vicarious	  liability.	  It	  states:	  
Despite	  subsection	  (1),	  a	  principal	  or	  an	  employer	  is	  not	  liable	  under	  that	  subsection	  if	  
the	  principal	  or	  employer	  took	  all	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  prevent	  the	  agent	  or	  employee	  
from	  contravening	  the	  Act.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  there	  was	  no	  vicarious	  liability.	  The	  applicant	  had	  contacted	  a	  board	  
member	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  incident	  complained	  of,	  and	  the	  next	  day	  three	  board	  members	  had	  
attended	  the	  motel	  and	  attempted	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  matter	  by	  interviewing	  various	  staff	  
members,	  and	  investigating	  the	  issues	  raised.	  This	  was	  enough	  to	  show	  an	  appropriate	  
response.	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On	  the	  issue	  of	  victimisation,	  section	  50	  of	  the	  Act	  applied.	  Victimisation	  is	  unlawful	  under	  the	  
Act.	  However,	  the	  Tribunal	  could	  find	  no	  evidence	  of	  victimisation	  of	  the	  applicant	  by	  Mrs	  
Welsh	  on	  the	  facts.	  
The	  applicant	  claimed	  $60,000	  in	  damages.	  The	  question	  for	  the	  Tribunal	  was	  whether	  the	  
sexual	  harassment	  by	  Mr	  Welsh	  materially	  contributed	  to	  the	  loss	  or	  damage	  the	  applicant	  
suffered.	  The	  applicant	  stated	  that	  her	  husband	  had	  to	  leave	  his	  permanent	  job	  and	  take	  a	  
significant	  pay	  cut,	  she	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  assist	  her	  son	  with	  his	  university	  expenses,	  and	  she	  
had	  been	  taking	  anti-­‐depressant	  medication	  and	  had	  lost	  confidence	  and	  self-­‐esteem.	  
However,	  the	  Tribunal	  did	  not	  accept	  that	  the	  sexual	  harassment	  by	  Mr	  Welsh	  materially	  
contributed	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  wages	  suffered	  by	  the	  applicant	  after	  she	  was	  not	  offered	  work	  by	  
Mr	  and	  Mrs	  Welsh	  after	  December	  2010.	  She	  worked	  as	  a	  housemaid	  for	  four	  months	  after	  the	  
incident	  of	  sexual	  harassment.	  The	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  her	  not	  being	  offered	  work	  was	  not	  
related	  to	  her	  having	  made	  a	  complaint	  of	  sexual	  harassment,	  since	  there	  was	  no	  victimisation.	  
The	  evidence	  was	  that	  the	  applicant	  would	  willingly	  have	  returned	  to	  work	  in	  December	  and	  
thereafter	  if	  she	  had	  been	  asked	  to.	  Hence,	  her	  loss	  of	  wages	  arose	  from	  her	  not	  being	  offered	  
work,	  not	  from	  the	  sexual	  harassment	  by	  Mr	  Welsh.	  Moreover,	  the	  evidence	  showed	  that	  
there	  was	  an	  eight	  month	  gap	  between	  her	  loss	  of	  work	  and	  the	  incidence	  of	  her	  depression.	  
The	  Tribunal	  did	  accept	  that	  the	  applicant	  suffered	  injury	  to	  her	  feelings	  and	  distress	  because	  
of	  the	  sexual	  harassment	  by	  Mr	  Welsh.	  These	  sorts	  of	  injuries	  were	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  
Tribunal	  to	  be	  difficult	  to	  quantify,	  but	  damages	  were	  awarded	  in	  the	  sum	  of	  $7,500.	  The	  
Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [104]–[105]):	  
...the	  task	  of	  determining	  the	  appropriate	  level	  of	  damages	  in	  a	  case	  of	  unlawful	  
discrimination	  is	  not	  without	  difficulty....	  The	  Tribunal	  is	  mindful	  that	  awards	  should	  
not	  be	  minimal,	  because	  this	  would	  tend	  to	  trivialise	  or	  diminish	  respect	  for	  the	  public	  
policy	  to	  which	  the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Act	  gives	  effect...	  the	  Tribunal	  is	  satisfied	  that	  
the	  injury	  to	  Mrs	  Hughes	  was	  not	  of	  a	  lengthy	  duration	  and	  further,	  that	  this	  matter	  
does	  not	  fall	  towards	  the	  more	  serious	  instances	  of	  sexual	  harassment.	  
Therefore,	  although	  there	  was	  sexual	  harassment	  by	  the	  employee	  of	  the	  Club	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  
Club	  was	  not	  vicariously	  liable	  for	  it.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWADT/2012/161.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
In	  New	  South	  Wales,	  case	  law	  has	  shown	  that	  there	  are	  four	  ways	  in	  which	  vicarious	  liability	  
for	  discriminatory	  acts	  can	  come	  about	  (though	  this	  is	  not	  an	  exhaustive	  list):	  
(1)	  Where	  the	  relevant	  discriminatory	  act	  or	  conduct	  is	  personally	  performed	  by	  the	  
employer.	  	  
(2)	  Where,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  incorporated	  entity,	  the	  relevant	  discriminatory	  act	  or	  
conduct	  is	  performed	  by	  a	  senior	  official	  whose	  conduct	  is	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  being	  
that	  of	  the	  incorporated	  entity	  because	  he	  or	  she	  represents	  the	  ‘mind	  or	  will’	  of	  that	  
entity.	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(3)	  Where	  the	  relevant	  discriminatory	  act	  is	  that	  of	  a	  person	  or	  persons	  whose	  duty	  it	  
is	  to,	  or	  who	  customarily	  or	  usually	  has	  the	  function	  of,	  afford(ing)	  terms	  and	  
conditions	  of	  employment	  to	  the	  employee	  alleging	  discrimination.	  Examples	  of	  this	  
include	  dismissal	  or	  transfer,	  or	  the	  supervision	  and	  /	  or	  provision	  of	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  
working	  environment.	  
(4)	  Where	  the	  relevant	  discriminatory	  act	  or	  conduct	  is	  that	  of	  employees	  not	  in	  any	  of	  
the	  three	  earlier	  categories,	  but	  whose	  conduct	  is	  known	  to	  any	  of	  the	  persons	  in	  
those	  categories	  and,	  by	  active	  condonation	  or	  inactivity,	  no	  prompt	  or	  adequate	  steps	  
are	  taken	  by	  or	  on	  behalf	  of	  those	  in	  any	  of	  the	  first	  three	  categories	  to	  rectify	  the	  
adverse	  working	  conditions	  thus	  afforded	  to	  the	  employee.	  
Clubs	  and	  associations	  must	  be	  mindful	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  vicarious	  liability	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  
their	  employees.	  They	  need	  to	  be	  proactive	  in	  demonstrating	  awareness	  of	  discrimination	  
issues,	  and	  have	  appropriate	  policies	  and	  training	  for	  all	  employees.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  employer	  
club	  was	  found	  not	  to	  be	  vicariously	  liable	  because	  the	  club’s	  officers	  had	  responded	  quickly	  
and,	  the	  Tribunal	  found,	  appropriately.	  However,	  the	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  sexual	  harassment	  by	  
a	  club	  employee	  did	  take	  place,	  and	  this	  can	  have	  very	  serious	  consequences	  for	  all	  parties,	  
particularly	  the	  victim.	  
	  
2.2.8 HERBERT V FIVE DOCK DOCKERS RSL RUGBY LEAGUE FOOTBALL CLUB [2012] 
NSWADT 110 (ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
MAGISTRATE HENNESSY DEPUTY PRESIDENT, 6 JUNE 2012) 
This	  was	  part	  of	  a	  proceeding	  relating	  to	  discrimination.	  The	  complaints	  of	  race	  and	  age	  
discrimination	  were	  brought	  against	  two	  respondents,	  the	  Five	  Dock	  Dockers	  RSL	  Rugby	  
League	  Football	  Club	  (the	  Five	  Dock	  Club)	  and	  the	  Balmain	  District	  Junior	  Rugby	  League	  
Football	  Club	  Inc.	  (the	  Balmain	  Club).	  The	  complaint	  was	  that	  the	  son	  of	  the	  applicants	  (Mr	  and	  
Ms	  Herbert)	  was	  registered	  to	  play	  rugby	  league	  with	  the	  Five	  Dock	  Club’s	  Under	  9s	  team	  in	  
2011.	  The	  Five	  Dock	  Club	  participates	  in	  the	  Balmain	  District	  Junior	  Rugby	  League	  competition	  
which	  is	  administered	  by	  the	  Balmain	  Club.	  The	  Club	  denied	  the	  applicants’	  request	  for	  their	  
son	  to	  play	  permanently	  with	  the	  Under	  10s	  team.	  The	  applicants	  claimed	  that	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  the	  Five	  Dock	  Club	  banned	  their	  son	  from	  playing	  rugby	  league	  in	  either	  the	  Under	  9s	  or	  
the	  Under	  10s.	  The	  Five	  Dock	  Club	  denied	  that	  it	  banned	  their	  son	  from	  playing	  Rugby	  League	  
in	  the	  Under	  9s	  team.	  
The	  issue	  in	  these	  proceedings	  was	  whether	  the	  Administrative	  Decisions	  Tribunal	  (the	  
Tribunal)	  should	  give	  the	  applicants	  permission	  for	  their	  complaints	  of	  discrimination	  under	  
the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Act	  1977	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act)	  to	  proceed.	  The	  complaints,	  which	  were	  
made	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  son	  who	  was	  9	  years	  old	  at	  the	  time,	  alleged	  that	  he	  was	  banned	  from	  
playing	  rugby	  league	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  his	  age	  and	  his	  race	  (Pacific	  Islander).	  The	  President	  of	  
the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Board	  declined	  the	  complaints	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  they	  lacked	  
substance.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  has	  discretion	  to	  grant	  or	  refuse	  leave	  for	  complaints	  to	  go	  ahead	  and	  is	  guided	  
by	  what	  is	  fair	  and	  just	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  In	  deciding	  whether	  to	  grant	  leave,	  the	  Tribunal	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may	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  grounds	  on	  which	  the	  President	  may	  decline	  a	  complaint	  under	  section	  
92(1)	  of	  the	  Act,	  including	  that	  the	  conduct,	  if	  proven,	  would	  not	  disclose	  a	  contravention	  of	  
the	  Act.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Tribunal	  decided	  to	  refuse	  leave	  for	  the	  complaints	  to	  proceed	  
because	  it	  was	  likely	  that	  if	  the	  complaints	  went	  ahead	  they	  would	  be	  dismissed.	  
The	  proceeding	  dealt	  firstly	  with	  the	  situation	  relating	  to	  registered	  clubs	  under	  the	  Act.	  Two	  
sections	  were	  particularly	  pertinent	  –	  sections	  20A	  (race	  discrimination	  in	  relation	  to	  
membership	  of	  a	  registered	  club)	  and	  49ZYP	  (age	  discrimination	  in	  relation	  to	  registered	  
clubs).	  Registered	  clubs	  are	  clubs	  registered	  under	  the	  Registered	  Clubs	  Act	  1976	  (NSW).	  
Section	  4	  defines	  a	  registered	  club	  as	  ‘a	  club	  that	  holds	  a	  club	  licence’.	  Club	  licences	  are	  
granted	  under	  the	  Liquor	  Act	  2007	  (NSW).	  Clubs	  NSW	  (the	  Registered	  Clubs	  Association	  of	  New	  
South	  Wales)	  maintains	  a	  website	  containing	  a	  complete	  list	  of	  registered	  clubs.	  Neither	  the	  
Five	  Dock	  Club	  nor	  the	  Balmain	  Club	  is	  on	  this	  list.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  registered	  club	  was	  straightforward.	  On	  this	  basis,	  
neither	  of	  the	  clubs	  was	  a	  registered	  club.	  It	  was	  held	  that	  it	  was	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  status	  of	  the	  
respondents	  as	  registered	  clubs	  whether	  either	  club	  was	  incorporated	  or	  what	  it	  did	  with	  the	  
fees	  it	  collected.	  While	  the	  Five	  Dock	  Club	  was	  an	  auxiliary	  body	  to	  Club	  Five	  Dock	  RSL,	  which	  is	  
a	  registered	  club,	  that	  fact	  did	  not	  make	  the	  Five	  Dock	  Club	  itself	  a	  registered	  club.	  The	  
Tribunal	  also	  held	  that	  it	  was	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  status	  of	  the	  respondents	  as	  registered	  clubs	  
whether	  they	  were	  engaged	  in	  trade	  or	  commerce.	  	  
The	  applicants	  in	  this	  case	  also	  relied	  on	  sections	  19	  (race	  discrimination	  in	  relation	  to	  goods	  
and	  services)	  and	  49ZYN	  (age	  discrimination	  in	  relation	  to	  goods	  and	  services).	  However,	  even	  
if	  those	  sections	  had	  applied,	  there	  is	  an	  exception	  in	  the	  Act	  for	  voluntary	  bodies.	  Section	  57	  
provides:	  
(1)	  In	  this	  section,	  ‘body’	  means	  a	  body,	  the	  activities	  of	  which	  are	  carried	  on	  
otherwise	  than	  for	  profit	  and	  which	  is	  not	  established	  by	  an	  Act,	  but	  does	  not	  include:	  	  
(a)	  a	  co-­‐operative	  registered	  under	  the	  Co-­‐operatives	  Act	  1992	  or	  a	  society	  
under	  the	  Friendly	  Societies	  Act	  1989,	  or	  	  
(b)	  a	  friendly	  society	  registered	  under	  the	  Friendly	  Societies	  Act	  1989,	  or	  	  
(c)	  a	  building	  society	  or	  credit	  union	  registered	  under	  the	  Financial	  Institutions	  
(NSW)	  Code,	  or	  	  
(d)	  a	  co-­‐operative	  housing	  society	  registered	  under	  the	  Co-­‐operative	  Housing	  
and	  Starr-­‐Bowkett	  Societies	  Act	  1998,	  or	  	  
(e)	  a	  registered	  club.	  	  
(2)	  Nothing	  in	  this	  Act	  affects:	  	  
(a)	  any	  rule	  or	  practice	  of	  a	  body	  which	  restricts	  admission	  to	  membership	  of	  
that	  body,	  or	  	  
(b)	  the	  provision	  of	  benefits,	  facilities	  or	  services	  to	  members	  of	  that	  body.	  
The	  tribunal	  considered	  this	  definition	  and	  held	  that	  for	  section	  57	  to	  apply,	  three	  things	  were	  
necessary:	  
(1) A	  voluntary	  body	  must	  not	  be	  established	  by	  an	  Act;	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(2) it	  must	  not	  be	  one	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  bodies	  listed	  in	  (a)	  to	  (e);	  
(3) its	  activities	  must	  be	  carried	  on	  ‘otherwise	  than	  for	  profit’.	  	  
There	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  items	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  applied	  to	  the	  respondents.	  As	  to	  item	  (3),	  the	  
Tribunal	  said	  that	  the	  character	  of	  the	  clubs	  had	  to	  be	  considered.	  Were	  they	  small	  bodies	  
carried	  on	  by	  persons	  with	  a	  common	  interest?	  On	  the	  evidence	  before	  the	  Tribunal	  they	  were	  
entirely	  voluntary	  in	  nature,	  so	  that	  section	  57	  applied	  to	  them.	  Being	  voluntary	  bodies,	  
nothing	  in	  the	  Act	  affected	  the	  provision	  of	  benefits,	  facilities	  or	  services	  to	  members	  of	  those	  
bodies.	  	  
Therefore,	  even	  if	  there	  had	  been	  any	  age	  or	  racial	  discrimination	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  two	  
respondent	  clubs	  were	  not	  liable	  because	  they	  fell	  within	  the	  section	  57	  exception	  to	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Act.	  
This	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-­‐
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/nsw/NSWADT/2012/110.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=five%20do
ckers	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
In	  this	  case,	  one	  club	  was	  an	  unincorporated	  body	  and	  one	  was	  an	  incorporated	  association.	  
However,	  both	  fell	  within	  the	  section	  57	  exception	  in	  the	  NSW	  Act	  because	  they	  were	  
‘voluntary’	  in	  nature.	  Their	  ‘character’	  was	  what	  mattered	  in	  determining	  whether	  they	  were	  
voluntary	  bodies	  under	  the	  Act.	  Their	  character	  was	  held	  to	  be	  that	  of	  a	  relatively	  small	  
organisation	  the	  activities	  of	  which	  could	  be	  carried	  on	  by	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  of	  
people	  for	  purposes	  of	  pursuing	  a	  common	  interest.	  Actual	  surpluses	  or	  deficits	  made	  had	  no	  
bearing	  on	  this	  characterisation.	  Nor	  did	  the	  Five	  Dock	  Club’s	  connection	  to	  a	  large	  
incorporated	  RSL	  club	  have	  any	  bearing	  on	  the	  issue.	  
	  
2.2.9  ROTA V MANLY 16FT SAILING CLUB AND SAFECORP SECURITY PTY LTD [2012] 
NSWADT 88 (ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
FURNESS, G SC, JUDICIAL MEMBER, NEWMAN, J, NON-JUDICIAL MEMBER, 
MCCLELLAND, J, NON-JUDICIAL MEMBER, 11 MAY 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  case	  concerning	  complaints	  of	  race	  discrimination	  against	  the	  respondents.	  The	  
applicant,	  Rota,	  is	  a	  Maori	  and	  a	  member	  of	  a	  Rugby	  Club.	  He	  complained	  that	  on	  18	  
September	  2010	  he	  attended	  the	  Manly	  16	  ft	  Sailing	  Club	  (the	  Sailing	  Club)	  for	  end	  of	  season	  
drinks	  for	  his	  Rugby	  Club.	  Most	  players	  arrived	  at	  12	  noon	  and	  he	  arrived	  at	  about	  3.30pm.	  He	  
had	  a	  meal	  during	  the	  afternoon.	  His	  wife	  arrived	  at	  about	  6.30pm.	  Shortly	  after	  she	  arrived,	  
he	  went	  to	  the	  men's	  toilet	  and	  was	  confronted	  by	  a	  security	  guard	  (employed	  as	  a	  bouncer)	  
who	  said	  that	  he	  was	  drunk	  and	  had	  to	  stop	  drinking.	  While	  he	  disagreed	  with	  that	  
assessment,	  he	  did	  stop	  drinking.	  He	  returned	  to	  his	  table	  where	  his	  wife	  and	  coach	  were	  
sitting	  and	  continued	  their	  discussion.	  He	  said	  that	  ‘the	  others	  around	  me,	  who	  had	  been	  there	  
since	  the	  beginning,	  were	  quite	  loud	  and	  were	  drunk	  and	  I	  was	  actually	  surprised	  that	  they	  
hadn't	  been	  asked	  to	  leave	  earlier’.	  His	  team	  mates	  were	  all	  white.	  He	  said	  that	  no	  one	  else	  
was	  asked	  to	  leave	  or	  was	  cautioned.	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At	  about	  7pm,	  the	  bouncer	  came	  looking	  for	  him	  and	  pointed	  at	  him	  and	  asked	  him	  to	  go	  with	  
him.	  Mrs	  Rota	  intervened	  and	  asked	  the	  bouncer	  to	  come	  to	  them	  and	  told	  the	  bouncer	  that	  
her	  husband	  had	  not	  had	  a	  further	  drink.	  The	  bouncer	  said	  he	  didn't	  care	  and	  told	  him	  to	  get	  
out.	  The	  applicant	  told	  the	  bouncer	  to	  ‘come	  outside	  and	  sort	  it	  out’.	  The	  bouncer	  said	  he	  was	  
going	  to	  call	  the	  police.	  Mrs	  Rota	  told	  the	  bouncer	  he	  was	  discriminating	  against	  Mr	  Rota	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  his	  race.	  The	  bouncer	  then	  went	  over	  to	  the	  manager.	  He	  was	  followed	  by	  Mrs	  
Rota,	  who	  accused	  them	  of	  being	  racists	  and	  she	  gave	  evidence	  that	  ‘neither	  denied	  this	  was	  
the	  case’.	  The	  coach,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  approached	  the	  bouncer	  and	  the	  manager	  and	  accused	  
them	  of	  being	  racist,	  and,	  he	  said,	  there	  was	  no	  denial.	  He	  said	  the	  whole	  team	  then	  left	  
together	  in	  ‘absolute	  disgust’.	  
The	  applicant	  said	  that	  he,	  his	  wife	  and	  the	  coach	  then	  went	  to	  another	  hotel	  in	  Manly	  and	  
disclosed	  the	  events	  of	  the	  evening	  to	  the	  security	  people	  before	  entering.	  Those	  security	  
officers	  ‘did	  not	  agree	  that	  I	  was	  drunk	  at	  all	  and	  said	  it	  must	  have	  been	  the	  way	  I	  looked’.	  Mr	  
Rota	  gave	  evidence	  that	  by	  6.30pm	  he	  had	  had	  3	  or	  4	  middies	  or	  schooners	  of	  full	  strength	  
beer	  and	  that	  that	  was	  not	  more	  than	  what	  he	  usually	  had	  when	  drinking.	  He	  gave	  evidence	  of	  
a	  sporting	  injury	  to	  his	  toe	  some	  two	  weeks	  earlier	  when	  a	  ball	  had	  fallen	  on	  his	  toe	  and	  that	  
he	  had	  a	  limp.	  He	  otherwise	  denied	  that	  his	  gait	  was	  unsteady	  or	  that	  he	  was	  drunk.	  
Rota	  complained	  to	  the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Board	  on	  23	  September	  2010,	  and	  his	  complaints	  
were	  referred	  to	  the	  Tribunal.	  Rota's	  complaint	  against	  the	  Sailing	  Club	  was	  that	  he	  was	  
directly	  discriminated	  against	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  his	  race	  in	  the	  area	  of	  Registered	  Clubs	  (under	  
sections	  7,	  20A	  and	  53	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Act	  1977	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act)).	  Further,	  Rota's	  
complaint	  against	  Safe	  Corp	  Security	  Pty	  Ltd	  was	  that	  the	  security	  guard	  (bouncer)	  
discriminated	  against	  him	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  race	  in	  the	  area	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  (under	  
sections	  7,	  19	  and	  53	  of	  the	  Act).	  
Under	  section	  7	  of	  the	  Act,	  the	  applicant	  must	  first	  prove	  that	  each	  of	  the	  Sailing	  Club	  and	  Safe	  
Corp	  Security	  treated	  him	  less	  favourably	  than	  in	  the	  same	  circumstances	  or	  circumstances	  
which	  were	  not	  materially	  different,	  they	  treated	  a	  person	  of	  a	  different	  race.	  Secondly,	  the	  
applicant	  had	  to	  show	  that	  that	  different	  treatment	  was	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  his	  race.	  The	  
standard	  of	  proof	  is	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  probabilities.	  
Rota	  complained	  that	  the	  security	  guard	  discriminated	  against	  him	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  goods	  
and	  services.	  However,	  the	  Tribunal	  could	  not	  see	  that	  the	  security	  guard	  was	  providing	  any	  
services	  to	  the	  applicant.	  Rather	  the	  security	  guard	  was	  providing	  services	  to	  the	  Sailing	  Club.	  
Therefore,	  Rota	  failed	  in	  showing	  discrimination	  against	  him	  by	  the	  security	  guard	  under	  
section	  7	  of	  the	  Act.	  
However,	  the	  Sailing	  Club	  is	  a	  registered	  club.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  registered	  club,	  whether	  the	  act	  
complained	  of	  was	  unlawful	  depended	  on	  whether	  the	  applicant	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Sailing	  
Club,	  and	  then	  on	  the	  characterisation	  of	  the	  actions	  taken	  by	  the	  Sailing	  Club.	  Section	  20A	  of	  
the	  Act	  provides:	  
(1)	  It	  is	  unlawful	  for	  a	  registered	  club	  to	  discriminate	  against	  a	  person	  who	  is	  not	  a	  
member	  of	  the	  registered	  club	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  race:	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(a)	  by	  refusing	  or	  failing	  to	  accept	  the	  person's	  application	  for	  membership,	  or	  	  
(b)	  in	  the	  terms	  on	  which	  it	  is	  prepared	  to	  admit	  the	  person	  to	  membership.	  	  
(2)	  It	  is	  unlawful	  for	  a	  registered	  club	  to	  discriminate	  against	  a	  person	  who	  is	  a	  
member	  of	  the	  registered	  club	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  race:	  	  
(a)	  by	  denying	  the	  person	  access,	  or	  limiting	  the	  person's	  access,	  to	  any	  benefit	  
provided	  by	  the	  registered	  club,	  	  
(b)	  by	  depriving	  the	  person	  of	  membership	  or	  varying	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
person's	  membership,	  or	  	  
(c)	  by	  subjecting	  the	  person	  to	  any	  other	  detriment.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  dismissed	  the	  claim	  under	  section	  20A	  of	  the	  Act	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  there	  was	  no	  
evidence	  that	  Rota	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Sailing	  Club.	  However,	  the	  Tribunal	  went	  on	  to	  
consider	  whether	  section	  7	  of	  the	  Act	  would	  have	  applied	  if	  Rota	  had	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
Sailing	  Club.	  
The	  Tribunal	  considered	  the	  oral	  evidence	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  question.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  
[68]–[69]):	  
There	  is	  no	  direct	  evidence	  that	  his	  race	  was	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  being	  asked	  to	  
leave.	  No	  words	  were	  spoken	  by	  the	  Sailing	  Club	  that	  involved	  racial	  language.	  
However,	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  infrequently	  is	  the	  discrimination	  that	  overt.	  The	  question	  
then	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  Tribunal	  can	  and	  should	  infer	  that	  race	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
reasons....	  Racial	  discrimination	  is	  a	  serious	  matter	  which	  is	  not	  lightly	  to	  be	  inferred.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  considered	  the	  issues	  of	  inference,	  commenting	  that	  this	  was	  the	  usual	  way	  in	  
which	  discrimination	  was	  established,	  since	  direct	  (especially,	  racial)	  discrimination	  was	  
seldom	  found.	  The	  Tribunal	  summarised	  the	  position	  on	  drawing	  inferences	  in	  discrimination	  
cases	  (at	  [70]):	  
i.	  a	  causal	  link,	  such	  as	  that	  which	  is	  necessary	  in	  proving	  direct	  discrimination,	  can	  
be	  established	  by	  inference	  from	  primary	  facts;	  	  
ii.	  an	  inference	  must	  be	  reasonably	  drawn	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  primary	  facts;	  
iii.	  an	  inference	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  facts,	  none	  of	  which	  viewed	  
alone	  would	  support	  that	  inference;	  
iv.	  a	  fact	  relied	  on	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  inference	  need	  not	  be	  proved	  to	  the	  requisite	  
standard	  of	  proof;	  
v.	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  that	  the	  inference	  is	  a	  mere	  possibility:	  it	  must	  be	  one	  of	  
‘probable	  connection’;	  
vi.	  the	  inference	  must	  be	  a	  logical	  one,	  and	  not	  supposition;	  	  
vii.	  an	  inference	  cannot	  be	  made	  where	  more	  probable	  and	  innocent	  explanations	  
are	  available	  on	  the	  evidence.	  	  
On	  these	  considerations,	  and	  a	  survey	  of	  relevant	  case	  law,	  the	  Tribunal	  concluded	  that	  the	  
applicant	  would	  not	  have	  been	  discriminated	  against	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race	  if	  he	  had	  been	  a	  
member	  of	  the	  Sailing	  Club.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [74]):	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The	  Tribunal	  is	  not	  satisfied	  that	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  he	  was	  asked	  to	  
leave	  was	  his	  race.	  The	  evidence	  that	  a	  number	  of	  other	  people	  at	  the	  Sailing	  Club	  
were	  more	  intoxicated	  than	  he	  is	  relevant	  to	  whether	  he	  was	  treated	  less	  favourably	  
but	  does	  not	  support	  that	  he	  was	  not	  intoxicated.	  While	  the	  Tribunal	  has	  no	  evidence	  
from	  the	  bouncer,	  the	  applicant's	  evidence	  is	  that	  the	  bouncer	  relied	  initially	  on	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  he	  walked.	  The	  applicant	  said	  he	  was	  limping	  from	  a	  sporting	  injury.	  Thus	  
there	  was	  some	  basis	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  bouncer	  in	  telling	  him	  not	  to	  drink	  
anymore.	  The	  apparent	  acceptance	  by	  him	  and	  his	  wife	  that	  he	  was	  not	  to	  drink	  
anymore	  rather	  than	  challenging	  the	  bouncer	  that	  such	  a	  direction	  was	  not	  necessary	  
does	  not	  support	  an	  inference	  that	  he	  was	  not	  intoxicated.	  
Therefore,	  there	  were	  other	  reasons	  why	  the	  applicant	  might	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  stop	  drinking	  
and,	  later,	  to	  leave.	  The	  applicant’s	  complaints	  of	  racial	  discrimination	  against	  the	  respondents	  
were	  dismissed.	  
Despite	  the	  Tribunal’s	  finding,	  there	  was	  a	  minority	  decision	  by	  Tribunal	  member	  Newman.	  
The	  minority	  decision	  was	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  Rota	  was	  discriminated	  against	  was	  his	  
race.	  The	  member	  said	  (at	  [78]):	  
Mr	  Rota's	  evidence	  that	  he	  was	  the	  only	  person	  of	  colour,	  and	  the	  only	  person	  visibly	  
identifiable	  as	  Maori	  amongst	  the	  number	  of	  other	  people	  from	  Forest	  Rugby	  Club	  at	  
the	  Sailing	  Club,	  all	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  at	  the	  Sailing	  Club	  for	  longer	  and	  were	  more	  
intoxicated	  than	  he,	  is	  relevant	  to	  whether	  he	  was	  treated	  less	  favourably.	  I	  do	  not	  
agree	  that	  this	  does	  not	  support	  that	  he	  was	  not	  intoxicated.	  Mr	  Rota	  does	  not	  deny	  
that	  he	  had	  consumed	  alcohol	  during	  his	  time	  at	  the	  Sailing	  Club....	  Having	  had	  the	  
benefit	  of	  meeting	  Mr	  Rota	  in	  the	  Hearing,	  his	  appearance	  confirms	  to	  this	  Tribunal	  
Member	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  element	  of	  race	  in	  his	  experience	  of	  being	  refused	  service	  
at	  the	  Sailing	  Club.	  
However,	  the	  majority	  ruling	  (in	  this	  case	  2/1)	  prevails	  in	  legal	  cases.	  
This	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/PJUDG?jgmtid=158518	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  applicant’s	  complaint	  against	  the	  registered	  club	  in	  this	  case	  was	  wholly	  circumstantial.	  
However,	  such	  cases	  are	  often	  proved	  by	  inference	  (since	  racial	  discrimination	  is	  rarely	  overt),	  
something	  of	  which	  clubs	  and	  other	  nonprofits	  should	  be	  aware.	  Anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  
acknowledges	  the	  existence	  of	  racism	  in	  the	  community.	  The	  possibility	  can	  arise,	  in	  a	  given	  
case,	  that	  it	  may	  explain	  a	  choice	  made	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  a	  person.	  Whether	  that	  possibility	  
can	  then	  be	  converted	  into	  a	  more	  substantial	  finding,	  of	  an	  inference	  that	  racism	  did	  in	  fact	  
operate	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  so	  as	  to	  satisfy	  the	  requisite	  standard	  of	  proof,	  is	  a	  question	  of	  
fact	  in	  each	  case.	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2.2.10  MULCAHY V MINCHINTON [2012] FMCA 380 (FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF 
AUSTRALIA, JARRETT FM, 4 MAY 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  disability	  discrimination	  case	  for	  which	  summary	  dismissal	  was	  sought	  in	  the	  Federal	  
Magistrates	  Court.	  Both	  parties	  were	  members	  of	  the	  Industrial	  Relations	  Society	  of	  
Queensland	  Inc	  (the	  IRSQ),	  an	  incorporated	  association.	  The	  defendant	  (Minchinton)	  was	  the	  
Vice-­‐President	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  management	  committee	  of	  the	  IRSQ	  at	  the	  relevant	  time.	  
The	  plaintiff	  (Mulcahy)	  was	  a	  member.	  
The	  principal	  action	  alleging	  discrimination	  under	  the	  Disability	  Discrimination	  Act	  1992	  (Cth)	  
(the	  Act)	  arose	  from	  circumstances	  surrounding	  a	  social	  function	  held	  by	  the	  IRSQ	  on	  8	  
October	  2010.	  This	  function	  was	  designated	  a	  ‘Women	  in	  IR	  High	  Tea’	  and	  was	  held	  at	  the	  
Royal	  on	  the	  Park	  Hotel	  in	  Brisbane.	  The	  price	  of	  the	  function	  was	  $50.	  
Mulcahy	  wished	  to	  attend	  the	  function	  but	  suffered	  from	  numerous	  life-­‐threatening	  food	  
allergies.	  The	  food	  and	  drink	  to	  be	  served	  at	  the	  function	  was	  unsuitable	  for	  her	  consumption,	  
except	  for	  orange	  juice,	  water	  and	  Sprite	  (a	  soft-­‐drink).	  Mulcahy	  therefore	  wished	  not	  to	  pay	  
the	  $50	  fee	  for	  the	  function,	  though	  she	  wished	  to	  attend.	  She	  stated	  that	  she	  would	  organise	  
her	  food	  and	  drink	  consumption	  directly	  with	  the	  hotel.	  
The	  defendant,	  as	  coordinator	  of	  the	  event,	  refused	  Mulcahy’s	  request.	  Her	  contention	  was	  
that	  the	  $50	  fee	  covered	  not	  only	  food	  and	  drink	  but	  also	  room	  and	  equipment	  hire.	  There	  was	  
also	  a	  fund-­‐raising	  component.	  
The	  plaintiff	  was	  dissatisfied	  with	  this	  response	  and	  directly	  approached	  the	  president	  of	  the	  
IRSQ,	  Mr	  Himstedt.	  He	  suggested	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  pay	  $25	  to	  attend	  the	  event,	  and	  make	  her	  
own	  arrangements	  as	  to	  food	  and	  drink	  with	  the	  hotel.	  The	  plaintiff	  accepted	  this	  proposal,	  
paid	  $25,	  attended	  the	  function,	  but	  was	  unable	  to	  eat	  or	  drink	  anything	  as	  the	  hotel	  did	  not	  
comply	  with	  her	  request	  as	  to	  non-­‐allergenic	  food	  and	  drink.	  
On	  30	  August	  2011,	  the	  plaintiff	  lodged	  a	  complaint	  with	  the	  Australian	  Human	  Rights	  
Commission	  (AHRC)	  alleging	  unlawful	  discrimination	  against	  her	  by	  the	  defendant.	  The	  
defendant	  and	  the	  IRSQ	  responded	  to	  the	  complaint.	  On	  22	  November	  2011,	  the	  AHRC	  advised	  
that	  it	  was	  terminating	  the	  complaint	  under	  section	  46H(1)(i)	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Equal	  
Opportunity	  Act	  1986	  (Cth)	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  there	  was	  no	  reasonable	  prospect	  of	  the	  claim	  
being	  settled	  by	  conciliation.	  	  
The	  plaintiff	  subsequently	  commenced	  the	  principal	  action	  in	  this	  case	  on	  23	  January	  2012.	  
Minchinton	  and	  the	  IRSQ	  sought	  to	  have	  the	  principal	  action	  summarily	  dismissed	  under	  
section	  17A	  of	  the	  Federal	  Magistrates	  Act	  1999	  (Cth).	  	  
The	  basis	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  case	  was	  that	  she	  has	  a	  disability	  (severe	  food	  allergies	  leading	  to	  
anaphylaxis)	  which	  made	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  her	  to	  attend	  social	  functions.	  However,	  she	  
wanted	  to	  attend	  the	  function	  in	  question	  to	  mix	  with	  colleagues	  and	  network.	  As	  she	  could	  
not	  eat	  anything	  at	  the	  function,	  she	  wanted	  to	  attend	  at	  no	  cost.	  The	  plaintiff	  claimed	  that	  the	  
defendant	  and	  IRSQ	  should	  have	  let	  her	  attend	  on	  this	  basis,	  and	  not	  to	  do	  so	  was	  
discriminatory.	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This	  discrimination	  placed	  the	  plaintiff	  in	  a	  less	  advantageous	  position	  than	  others	  attending	  
the	  function	  who	  were	  able	  to	  eat	  and	  drink	  what	  was	  provided,	  and	  was	  detrimental	  to	  her.	  
This	  was	  alleged	  to	  be	  discrimination	  within	  section	  5	  of	  the	  Act	  (direct	  disability	  
discrimination).	  
His	  Honour	  was	  not	  persuaded	  by	  this	  argument,	  which	  he	  described	  as	  ‘problematical’	  (at	  
[20]):	  
Ms	  Mulcahy	  was	  not	  treated	  differently	  to	  any	  other	  person	  who	  attended	  the	  
function.	  She	  was	  not	  treated	  less	  favourably	  than	  persons	  without	  her	  disability	  were	  
treated	  in	  circumstances	  which	  were	  not	  materially	  different.	  The	  failure	  to	  make	  an	  
adjustment	  to	  the	  registration	  fee	  as	  requested	  by	  Ms	  Mulcahy	  did	  not,	  it	  seems	  to	  
me,	  have	  the	  effect	  that	  Ms	  Mulcahy	  was	  treated	  less	  favourably	  than	  a	  person	  
without	  the	  disability	  would	  have	  been	  treated	  in	  circumstances	  that	  were	  not	  
materially	  different.	  On	  the	  evidence	  from	  both	  Ms	  Mulcahy	  and	  Ms	  Minchinton,	  Ms	  
Mulcahy	  was	  treated	  as	  anybody	  else	  without	  her	  disability	  would	  have	  been	  treated.	  
The	  plaintiff’s	  claim	  under	  section	  6	  of	  the	  Act	  (indirect	  disability	  discrimination)	  also	  failed	  in	  
His	  Honour’s	  view,	  since	  there	  was	  no	  condition	  imposed	  on	  the	  plaintiff	  that	  she	  was	  not	  able	  
to	  comply	  with.	  Neither	  the	  $50	  fee	  nor	  the	  $25	  fee	  was	  such	  a	  condition.	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  
[25]):	  
Discrimination	  is	  only	  actionable	  under	  the	  Act	  if	  it	  occurs	  within	  an	  identifiable	  
environment	  or	  in	  identifiable	  circumstances	  that	  are	  stated	  by	  the	  Act	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  
liability	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  discriminator.	  I	  accept	  the	  respondent’s	  submission	  (as	  did	  Ms	  
Mulcahy	  in	  argument)	  that	  only	  two	  sections	  of	  the	  DDA	  might	  possibly	  be	  engaged	  so	  
as	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  liability	  on	  Ms	  Minchinton’s	  part.	  Those	  sections	  are	  ss.24	  and	  27.	  
Section	  24	  of	  the	  Act	  deals	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  goods,	  services	  and	  facilities,	  while	  section	  27	  
deals	  with	  clubs	  and	  incorporated	  associations.	  The	  defendant	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
management	  committee	  of	  the	  IRSQ	  which	  provided	  a	  service	  to	  its	  members	  for	  a	  payment	  of	  
a	  fee.	  The	  defendant	  herself	  did	  not	  supply	  the	  services,	  but	  rather	  was	  acting	  in	  a	  voluntary	  
capacity.	  She	  was	  not	  the	  person	  providing	  the	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  the	  plaintiff.	  Therefore,	  
section	  24	  had	  no	  application.	  
Section	  27(2)(e)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  it	  is	  unlawful	  for	  a	  member	  of	  the	  committee	  of	  
management	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association	  to	  discriminate	  against	  a	  person	  who	  is	  a	  member	  
of	  the	  incorporated	  association	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  disability	  by	  subjecting	  the	  member	  to	  
detriment.	  
Detriment	  is	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  Act,	  but	  has	  its	  ordinary	  meaning	  of	  ‘loss,	  damage	  or	  injury’	  (at	  
[29]).	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  not	  suffered	  any	  detriment.	  She	  had	  been	  granted	  
a	  substantial	  discount	  on	  the	  entry	  fee	  for	  the	  function,	  which	  she	  had	  accepted.	  
Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  action	  had	  no	  reasonable	  prospects	  of	  success,	  and	  it	  
was	  summarily	  dismissed.	  Costs	  were	  awarded	  against	  the	  plaintiff.	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The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FMCA/2012/380.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Incorporated	  associations	  must	  be	  mindful	  of	  disability	  discrimination.	  Section	  27	  of	  the	  
Disability	  Discrimination	  Act	  1992	  (Cth)	  applies	  directly	  to	  them.	  The	  provisions	  apply	  to	  non-­‐
members	  (section	  27(1))	  and	  members	  (section	  27(2)).	  Unlawful	  discrimination	  can	  embrace	  
refusing	  or	  failing	  to	  accept	  a	  person’s	  application	  for	  membership	  or	  class	  of	  membership,	  
terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  membership,	  denying	  access	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  membership,	  or	  
causing	  any	  other	  detriment.	  
	  
2.3 EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
2.3.1  SMITH V TRAFFORD HOUSING TRUST [2012] EWHC 3221 (CH) (HIGH COURT OF 
JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION, BRIGGS J, 16 NOVEMBER 2012) 
The	  Trafford	  Housing	  Trust	  Limited	  (the	  Trust)	  is	  a	  private	  housing	  trust,	  formed	  as	  a	  company	  
limited	  by	  guarantee	  for	  charitable	  purposes.	  It	  succeeded	  to	  the	  housing	  functions	  and	  
responsibilities	  of	  the	  Metropolitan	  Borough	  Council	  of	  Trafford	  (Trafford	  Council)	  in	  2004,	  and	  
now	  owns	  9,100	  homes	  across	  Trafford	  in	  England,	  with	  a	  rental	  turnover	  of	  £31m	  per	  annum.	  
The	  Trust's	  customer	  base	  (its	  residential	  tenants	  and	  their	  families)	  and	  its	  workforce	  display	  
wide	  diversity	  in	  terms	  of	  ethnic	  origin,	  sexual	  orientation,	  religion	  and	  gender.	  It	  has	  
approximately	  330	  employees,	  including	  Adrian	  Smith.	  
This	  case	  concerned	  two	  comments	  posted	  by	  Smith	  on	  his	  Facebook	  page	  which	  referred	  to	  
his	  disapproval	  of	  gay	  marriages	  taking	  place	  in	  churches.	  The	  comments	  led	  to	  his	  suspension	  
from	  work	  at	  the	  Trust	  on	  full	  pay.	  Subsequently,	  there	  was	  a	  disciplinary	  hearing	  which	  
resulted	  in	  a	  finding	  of	  gross	  misconduct	  against	  Smith.	  It	  was	  recommended	  that	  he	  be	  
dismissed.	  Instead,	  due	  to	  his	  long	  record	  of	  loyal	  service,	  he	  was	  demoted,	  with	  immediate	  
effect,	  to	  a	  non-­‐managerial	  position	  with	  the	  Trust;	  consequently	  suffering	  a	  40%	  reduction	  in	  
his	  pay,	  phased	  over	  12	  months.	  Smith	  appealed	  internally,	  but	  the	  appeal	  was	  dismissed,	  
although	  the	  phasing-­‐in	  of	  his	  salary	  reduction	  was	  extended	  from	  one	  to	  two	  years.	  
In	  this	  hearing,	  Smith	  claimed	  damages	  for	  breach	  of	  contract,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  there	  was	  no	  
gross	  misconduct	  in	  posting	  two	  comments	  on	  his	  private	  Facebook	  page.	  The	  Trust’s	  position	  
was	  that	  by	  making	  the	  two	  postings	  on	  a	  Facebook	  page	  which	  identified	  him	  as	  one	  of	  its	  
managers,	  Smith	  committed	  breaches	  of	  the	  Trust's	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  its	  employees,	  and	  
acted	  contrary	  to	  the	  Trust's	  Equal	  Opportunities	  Policy.	  Alternatively,	  the	  Trust	  claimed	  that	  if	  
it	  was	  a	  breach	  of	  contract	  to	  demote	  him,	  Smith	  waived	  the	  breach	  by	  taking	  up	  his	  non-­‐
managerial	  post.	  In	  the	  further	  alternative,	  the	  Trust	  said	  that	  its	  liability	  for	  damages	  was	  
limited	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  his	  original	  and	  reduced	  pay	  for	  his	  twelve	  week	  notice	  
period,	  a	  net	  amount	  of	  £98.	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  case	  concerning	  rights	  of	  free	  speech	  or	  religious	  freedom	  
as	  such,	  though	  these	  matters	  provided	  some	  context.	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  there	  were	  three	  
main	  issues,	  all	  concerning	  the	  interpretation	  of	  his	  employment	  contract	  (at	  [9]):	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1. The	  first	  was	  centred	  upon	  questions	  as	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Trust's	  code	  of	  
conduct	  and	  equal	  opportunities	  policy	  to	  Smith's	  use	  of	  his	  Facebook	  account.	  	  
2. The	  second	  was	  whether,	  if	  applicable,	  the	  code	  of	  conduct	  or	  equal	  opportunities	  
policy	  were	  contravened	  by	  his	  making	  the	  two	  postings	  on	  his	  Facebook	  page.	  	  
3. The	  third	  was	  the	  appropriate	  measure	  of	  damages,	  if	  the	  Trust	  had	  acted	  in	  breach	  of	  
contract	  by	  demoting	  Mr	  Smith.	  
Smith	  had	  worked	  for	  the	  Trust	  since	  1993,	  and	  was	  now	  aged	  55.	  He	  had	  signed	  a	  contract	  
with	  the	  Trust	  in	  2006	  which	  designated	  him	  as	  a	  ‘Housing	  Manager’.	  Clause	  D	  of	  that	  contract,	  
headed	  ‘Employee	  Duties	  And	  Obligations’,	  provided	  (in	  part)	  as	  follows:	  	  
(a)	  You	  are	  required	  to	  perform	  the	  duties	  and	  activities	  as	  may	  be	  reasonably	  
associated	  with	  your	  job	  role	  in	  an	  efficient	  and	  acceptable	  manner	  taking	  into	  account	  
the	  stated	  values	  of	  the	  Trust	  and	  the	  attached	  Code	  of	  Conduct.	  
(b)	  You	  may	  also	  be	  required	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  employment	  to	  undertake	  duties	  not	  
indicated	  by	  the	  job	  title	  or	  in	  the	  job	  description	  which	  may	  reasonably	  be	  required	  by	  
the	  Trust.	  
(c)	  You	  must	  ensure	  that	  you	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  law	  and	  regulation	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  
your	  duties	  and	  that	  you	  comply	  at	  all	  times.	  You	  should	  also	  familiarise	  yourself	  with,	  
and	  adhere	  to,	  all	  Trust	  policies	  and	  procedures	  and	  standards	  of	  performance	  asking	  
for	  clarification	  if	  required.	  
Disciplinary	  matters	  were	  dealt	  with	  in	  clause	  L(c).	  ‘Gross	  misconduct’	  was	  defined	  as:	  
...any	  deliberate	  act	  committed	  by	  a	  member	  of	  staff	  which	  is	  severely	  detrimental	  to	  
the	  good	  conduct	  of	  the	  business	  or	  harmful	  to	  other	  members	  of	  staff.	  Such	  acts	  by	  
their	  very	  nature	  are	  extremely	  serious	  and	  will	  normally	  warrant	  summary	  dismissal	  
(i.e.	  without	  notice	  or	  payment	  in	  lieu	  of	  notice)	  possibly	  following	  a	  period	  of	  paid	  
suspension	  pending	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  investigation.	  
Examples	  followed	  this	  definition	  which	  included	  violence,	  drug	  abuse,	  fraud	  and	  corruption,	  
misuse	  of	  confidential	  information,	  serious	  breaches	  of	  Trust	  procedures	  and	  gross	  
insubordination.	  
The	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  was	  an	  11	  page	  document	  which	  required	  the	  Trust’s	  staff	  to	  be:	  
• honest,	  open	  and	  approachable;	  
• responsive	  to	  people's	  needs	  and	  aspirations;	  
• responsible	  for	  the	  Trust's	  activities	  and	  outcomes	  and	  respectful	  of	  individuals	  and	  
communities;	  
• caring;	  
• motivational	  to	  staff,	  communities	  and	  others	  to	  achieve	  the	  Trust's	  vision;	  
• fair	  in	  all	  dealings;	  
• innovative,	  finding	  new	  ways	  of	  achieving	  customers'	  aspirations;	  
• committed	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  Trust;	  
• responsible	  for	  promoting	  a	  positive	  image	  of	  the	  Trust	  and	  of	  Trafford.	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The	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  also	  required	  employees	  to:	  
• maintain	  the	  highest	  standards	  of	  personal/professional	  conduct	  and	  integrity	  at	  all	  
times	  and	  to	  be	  courteous	  and	  considerate	  with	  all	  customers,	  their	  family	  and	  friends,	  
colleagues	  and	  members	  of	  the	  public;	  
• act	  in	  a	  non-­‐confrontational,	  non-­‐judgmental	  manner	  with	  all	  customers,	  with	  their	  
family/friends	  and	  colleagues;	  	  
• treat	  customers,	  their	  friends	  and	  family	  and	  colleagues	  with	  dignity	  and	  respect.	  
The	  document	  further	  stated	  (at	  separate	  places)	  that:	  
• the	  Trust	  ‘is	  a	  non-­‐political,	  non-­‐denominational	  organisation	  and	  employees	  should	  
not	  attempt	  to	  promote	  their	  political	  or	  religious	  views.	  Employees	  are	  expected	  to	  
respect	  the	  customs	  and	  culture	  of	  any	  customers,	  their	  friends	  and	  family	  and	  
colleagues’;	  
• ‘Employees	  should	  not	  engage	  in	  any	  activities	  which	  may	  bring	  the	  Trust	  into	  
disrepute,	  either	  at	  work	  or	  outside	  work.	  This	  includes	  not	  engaging	  in	  any	  unruly	  or	  
unlawful	  conduct	  where	  you	  are	  or	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  an	  employee,	  making	  
derogatory	  comment	  about	  the	  Trust,	  its	  customers,	  clients	  or	  partners	  or	  services,	  in	  
person,	  in	  writing	  or	  via	  any	  web-­‐based	  media	  such	  as	  a	  personal	  blog,	  Facebook,	  
YouTube	  or	  other	  such	  site.’	  
The	  Trust’s	  Equal	  Opportunities	  Policy	  referred	  to	  matters	  such	  as	  ‘Employees	  have	  a	  
responsibility	  to	  treat	  their	  colleagues,	  tenants,	  third	  party	  suppliers	  and	  members	  of	  the	  
public	  with	  dignity	  and	  respect	  being	  non	  judgemental	  in	  approach	  and	  not	  engaging	  in	  any	  
conduct	  which	  may	  make	  another	  person	  feel	  uncomfortable,	  embarrassed	  or	  upset’.	  
Smith	  had	  201	  Facebook	  ‘friends’,	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  fellow	  charismatic	  Christians,	  many	  in	  
Africa,	  where	  Smith	  had	  connections	  through	  his	  church,	  where	  he	  was	  a	  lay-­‐preacher.	  Fellow	  
employees	  who	  were	  ‘friends’	  numbered	  45.	  His	  Facebook	  profile	  stated	  his	  position	  as	  a	  
manager	  at	  the	  Trust,	  which	  he	  described	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  ‘What	  can	  I	  say.	  It’s	  a	  job	  and	  
it	  pays	  the	  bills’.	  Smith’s	  comments	  about	  gay	  marriage	  were	  based	  on	  a	  BBC	  article	  and	  were	  
placed	  on	  his	  Facebook	  wall	  among	  comments	  on	  sport,	  toast	  and	  jam,	  washing	  his	  
motorcycle,	  and	  the	  TV	  program	  ‘Top	  Gear’.	  
The	  disciplinary	  proceedings	  at	  the	  Trust	  were	  commenced	  after	  a	  complaint	  from	  a	  fellow	  
employee,	  who	  was	  not	  one	  of	  Smith’s	  Facebook	  ‘friends’,	  but	  who	  had	  seen	  the	  two	  
comments	  when	  they	  came	  through	  a	  newsfeed	  site	  he	  administered	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  
Trust.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  the	  facts	  were	  not	  in	  dispute,	  but	  that	  (at	  [49]):	  
The	  Trust	  did	  not	  have	  a	  general	  right	  to	  'demote'	  Mr	  Smith,	  by	  assigning	  him	  to	  a	  
more	  junior	  or	  non-­‐managerial	  role	  with	  a	  substantial	  reduction	  in	  salary.	  Under	  his	  
employment	  contract	  the	  Trust	  could	  demote	  him	  under	  section	  B(2)(e)	  of	  the	  
Disciplinary	  Policy	  only	  as	  a	  disciplinary	  sanction	  for	  misconduct	  which,	  in	  the	  context,	  
meant	  a	  breach	  of	  Company	  rules	  or	  failure	  to	  reach	  the	  required	  standards	  in	  regard	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to	  conduct,	  performance	  and/or	  attendance...	  [I]t	  eventually	  became	  common	  ground	  
between	  counsel	  that	  Mr	  Smith's	  demotion	  was	  a	  breach	  of	  contract	  unless	  it	  could	  be	  
shown	  that	  his	  Facebook	  postings	  amounted	  to	  misconduct.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  whether	  the	  postings	  were	  gross	  misconduct,	  or	  misconduct	  of	  any	  kind	  
was	  not	  the	  issue	  (at	  [50]).	  Rather	  (at	  [50]–[51]):	  
The	  only	  question...	  was	  whether	  his	  postings	  amounted	  to	  a	  breach,	  either	  of	  the	  
Code	  of	  Conduct	  or	  of	  the	  Equal	  Opportunities	  Policy.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  Trust's	  case	  
may	  loosely	  be	  categorised	  under	  three	  headings.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  allegation	  that	  the	  
postings	  were	  ‘activities	  which	  may	  bring	  the	  Trust	  into	  disrepute’	  contrary	  to	  the	  
Code	  of	  Conduct.	  The	  second	  was	  that	  Mr	  Smith	  was	  by	  his	  postings	  promoting	  his	  
religious	  views	  contrary	  to	  that	  part	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  dealing	  with	  relationships	  
with	  customers,	  members	  of	  the	  public	  and	  colleagues.	  The	  third	  was	  that	  Mr	  Smith	  
was	  failing	  to	  treat	  fellow	  employees	  with	  dignity	  and	  respect,	  including	  being	  non-­‐
judgmental	  in	  approach	  and	  that	  he	  was	  engaging	  in	  conduct	  which	  may	  make	  another	  
person	  feel	  uncomfortable,	  embarrassed	  or	  upset,	  contrary	  to	  section	  B(b)	  of	  the	  Equal	  
Opportunities	  Policy	  as	  well	  as	  contrary	  to	  the	  Code	  of	  Conduct.	  
His	  Honour	  dealt	  with	  each	  of	  these	  issues	  in	  turn.	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  bringing	  the	  Trust	  into	  
disrepute,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [57]–[59],	  [62]):	  
I	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  any	  reasonable	  reader	  of	  Mr	  Smith's	  Facebook	  wall	  page	  could	  
rationally	  conclude	  that	  his	  two	  postings	  about	  gay	  marriage	  in	  church	  were	  made	  in	  
any	  relevant	  sense	  on	  the	  Trust's	  behalf.	  I	  have	  two	  main	  reasons	  for	  that	  conclusion.	  
The	  first	  is	  that	  Mr	  Smith's	  brief	  mention	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  page	  that	  he	  was	  employed	  
as	  a	  manager	  by	  the	  Trust	  (as	  part	  of	  a	  note	  form	  CV	  which	  also	  identified	  his	  school,	  
his	  place	  of	  residence,	  his	  marital	  status	  and	  his	  date	  of	  birth)	  could	  not	  possibly	  lead	  a	  
reasonable	  reader	  to	  think	  that	  his	  wall	  page	  consisted	  of,	  or	  even	  included,	  
statements	  made	  on	  his	  employer's	  behalf.	  A	  brief	  mention	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  his	  
employer	  was	  in	  no	  way	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  general	  impression	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  
his	  Facebook	  wall,	  that	  it	  was	  a	  medium	  for	  personal	  or	  social,	  rather	  than	  work	  
related,	  information	  and	  views.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Facebook	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
medium	  for	  work	  related	  communications....	  But	  Mr	  Smith's	  Facebook	  wall	  did	  nothing	  
of	  the	  sort,	  and	  any	  reader	  of	  his	  profile	  page	  would	  be	  left	  in	  no	  doubt	  that	  he	  
regarded	  his	  employment	  merely	  as	  a	  fact,	  and	  not	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  fact,	  
about	  himself.	  My	  second	  reason	  is	  that,	  viewing	  the	  entries	  on	  Mr	  Smith's	  wall	  for	  the	  
period	  in	  question	  as	  a	  whole,	  it	  is	  obvious,	  and	  would	  be	  obvious	  even	  to	  a	  casual	  
reader,	  that	  he	  used	  Facebook	  for	  personal	  and	  social	  rather	  than	  work	  related	  
purposes.	  As	  I	  have	  said,	  the	  other	  entries	  made	  on	  the	  same	  page	  during	  that	  short	  
period	  related	  to	  sport,	  food,	  motorcycles	  and	  cars,	  none	  of	  which	  could	  have	  any	  
relevance	  to	  his	  work	  and	  all	  of	  which	  were	  about	  his	  personal	  and	  social	  life.	  Nor	  were	  
his	  postings	  about	  gay	  marriage	  in	  church	  themselves	  work	  related....	  The	  Trust	  prides	  
itself	  on	  encouraging	  diversity	  both	  among	  its	  customers	  and	  its	  employees,	  and	  that	  
encouragement	  of	  diversity	  forms	  part	  of	  its	  no	  doubt	  well-­‐deserved	  reputation.	  But	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the	  encouragement	  of	  diversity	  in	  the	  recruitment	  of	  employees	  inevitably	  involves	  
employing	  persons	  with	  widely	  different	  religious	  and	  political	  beliefs	  and	  views,	  some	  
of	  which,	  however	  moderately	  expressed,	  may	  cause	  distress	  among	  the	  holders	  of	  
deeply	  felt	  opposite	  views.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  promoting	  religious	  views	  among	  customers	  and	  colleagues,	  His	  Honour	  held	  
that	  the	  central	  point	  was	  the	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  of	  the	  Trust	  referred	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  such	  
views.	  This	  meant	  that	  there	  had	  to	  be	  an	  element	  of	  ‘proselytising’,	  ‘canvassing’	  or	  
‘advancing’	  religious	  views.	  The	  Code	  could	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  discussion	  of	  
religion	  or	  politics	  in	  the	  workplace.	  Moreover,	  would	  a	  reasonable	  employee	  think	  that	  the	  
prohibition	  extended	  to	  outside	  the	  workplace?	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [66]):	  
The	  right	  of	  individuals	  to	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  freedom	  of	  belief,	  taken	  
together,	  means	  that	  they	  are	  in	  general	  entitled	  to	  promote	  their	  religious	  or	  political	  
beliefs,	  providing	  they	  do	  so	  lawfully.	  Of	  course,	  an	  employer	  may	  legitimately	  restrict	  
or	  prohibit	  such	  activities	  at	  work,	  or	  in	  a	  work	  related	  context,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  prima	  
facie	  surprising	  to	  find	  that	  an	  employer	  had,	  by	  the	  incorporation	  of	  a	  code	  of	  
conduct	  into	  the	  employee’s	  contract,	  extended	  that	  prohibition	  to	  his	  personal	  or	  
social	  life.	  
His	  Honour	  also	  considered	  whether	  Smith’s	  Facebook	  page	  had	  come	  to	  be	  an	  extension	  of	  
his	  work	  life,	  with	  45	  of	  his	  colleagues	  being	  ‘friends’.	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  it	  was	  still	  not	  
sufficiently	  work-­‐related.	  He	  said	  (at	  [75]–[78]):	  	  
First,	  Mr	  Smith's	  Facebook	  wall	  was	  inherently	  non-­‐work	  related.	  That	  is	  because,	  
while	  identifying	  himself	  as	  a	  manager	  at	  the	  Trust,	  he	  plainly	  and	  visibly	  used	  it	  for	  the	  
expression	  of	  personal	  views	  about	  matters	  which	  had	  nothing	  whatsoever	  to	  do	  with	  
his	  work.	  His	  Facebook	  (often	  described	  as	  a	  social	  medium)	  was	  an	  aspect	  of	  his	  social	  
life	  outside	  work,	  no	  less	  than	  a	  pub,	  a	  club,	  a	  sports	  ground	  or	  any	  other	  physical	  (or	  
virtual)	  place	  where	  individuals	  meet	  and	  converse.	  Secondly,	  although	  Mr	  Smith's	  
Facebook	  wall	  was	  not	  purely	  private,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  available	  only	  to	  his	  
invitees	  (due	  to	  its	  'friends	  of	  friends'	  extension)	  it	  was	  not	  in	  any	  sense	  a	  medium	  by	  
which	  Mr	  Smith	  could	  or	  did	  thrust	  his	  views	  upon	  his	  work	  colleagues,	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  
which	  a	  promotional	  email	  sent	  to	  all	  their	  addresses	  might	  fairly	  be	  regarded.	  His	  
Facebook	  wall	  was	  primarily	  a	  virtual	  meeting	  place	  at	  which	  those	  who	  knew	  of	  him,	  
whether	  his	  work	  colleagues	  or	  not,	  could	  at	  their	  own	  choice	  attend	  to	  find	  out	  what	  
he	  had	  to	  say	  about	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  non-­‐work	  related	  subjects.	  Even	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  his	  Facebook	  wall	  was	  accessible	  to	  friends	  of	  friends,	  actual	  access	  would	  still	  
depend	  upon	  the	  persons	  in	  that	  wider	  circle	  taking	  the	  trouble	  to	  access	  it...	  it	  makes	  
no	  difference	  to	  that	  analysis	  that	  postings	  on	  Mr	  Smith's	  wall	  would	  appear	  
automatically	  on	  the	  newsfeed	  pages	  of	  his	  friends'	  Facebooks.	  Again,	  whether	  to	  
allow	  Mr	  Smith's	  postings	  to	  appear	  there	  would	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  choice	  for	  them,	  in	  
making	  him	  one	  of	  their	  Facebook	  friends.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  choice	  made	  wholly	  otherwise	  
than	  in	  a	  work	  related	  context	  even	  if	  (as	  may	  well	  have	  been	  the	  case)	  those	  friends	  
chose	  to	  do	  so	  as	  a	  result	  of	  coming	  into	  contact	  with	  Mr	  Smith	  at	  work,	  and	  forming	  a	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  79	  
	  
wish	  to	  learn	  about,	  and	  be	  posted	  about,	  his	  personal	  views.	  Finally,	  the	  critical	  
difference	  between	  a	  targeted	  email	  (or	  for	  that	  matter	  inviting	  his	  workplace	  
colleagues	  for	  a	  drink	  at	  the	  local	  pub	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  enabling	  religious	  or	  political	  
promotion	  outside	  work)	  and	  Mr	  Smith's	  Facebook	  is	  that	  it	  was	  his	  colleagues'	  choice,	  
rather	  than	  his,	  to	  become	  his	  friends,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  the	  mere	  happenstance	  of	  their	  
having	  become	  aware	  of	  him	  at	  work	  that	  led	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  He	  was	  in	  principle	  free	  
to	  express	  his	  religious	  and	  political	  views	  on	  his	  Facebook,	  provided	  he	  acted	  lawfully,	  
and	  it	  was	  for	  the	  recipients	  to	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  receive	  them.	  	  
On	  the	  third	  issue	  of	  mistreatment	  of	  fellow	  employees,	  His	  Honour	  took	  the	  view	  that	  (at	  
[82]):	  
The	  frank	  but	  lawful	  expression	  of	  religious	  or	  political	  views	  may	  frequently	  cause	  a	  
degree	  of	  upset,	  and	  even	  offence,	  to	  those	  with	  deeply	  held	  contrary	  views,	  even	  
where	  none	  is	  intended	  by	  the	  speaker.	  This	  is	  a	  necessary	  price	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  
freedom	  of	  speech.	  To	  construe	  this	  provision	  as	  having	  application	  to	  every	  situation	  
outside	  work	  where	  an	  employee	  comes	  into	  contact	  with	  one	  or	  more	  work	  
colleagues	  would	  be	  to	  impose	  a	  fetter	  on	  the	  employee's	  freedom	  of	  speech	  in	  
circumstances	  beyond	  those	  to	  which	  a	  reasonable	  reader	  of	  the	  Code	  and	  Policy	  
would	  think	  they	  applied.	  On	  any	  view	  their	  main	  application	  is	  to	  circumstances	  
where	  the	  employee	  is	  working	  for	  the	  Trust.	  For	  the	  reasons	  already	  given,	  Mr	  Smith's	  
use	  of	  his	  Facebook	  involved	  his	  work	  colleagues	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  sought	  
his	  views	  by	  becoming	  his	  Facebook	  friends,	  and	  that	  did	  not	  detract	  to	  any	  significant	  
extent	  from	  the	  essentially	  personal	  and	  social	  nature	  of	  his	  use	  of	  it	  as	  a	  medium	  for	  
communication.	  
His	  Honour	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  was	  an	  element	  of	  degree	  in	  these	  matters,	  but	  held	  that	  
Smith’s	  postings	  were	  not,	  ‘viewed	  objectively,	  judgmental,	  disrespectful	  or	  liable	  to	  cause	  
upset	  or	  offence’.	  They	  were	  views	  which	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  mass	  media,	  and	  were	  
expressed	  moderately.	  They	  were	  not	  homophobic	  on	  any	  reasonably	  objective	  basis,	  and	  this	  
had	  been	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  Trust.	  
Therefore,	  all	  three	  grounds	  the	  Trust	  had	  relied	  on	  to	  dispute	  breach	  of	  contract	  failed.	  The	  
Trust	  did	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  demote	  Smith	  because	  of	  his	  Facebook	  postings,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  
was	  a	  breach	  of	  his	  contract.	  Moreover,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  Smith’s	  purported	  demotion,	  in	  
breach	  of	  his	  contract,	  amounted	  to	  a	  wrongful	  dismissal.	  Damages	  of	  the	  small	  difference	  in	  
salary	  (£98)	  for	  the	  twelve	  weeks	  of	  the	  demotion	  were	  awarded	  on	  that	  basis.	  His	  Honour	  
said	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  amount	  awarded	  (at	  [106]):	  
I	  must	  admit	  to	  real	  disquiet	  about	  the	  financial	  outcome	  of	  this	  case.	  Mr	  Smith	  was	  
taken	  to	  task	  for	  doing	  nothing	  wrong,	  suspended	  and	  subjected	  to	  a	  disciplinary	  
procedure	  which	  wrongly	  found	  him	  guilty	  of	  gross	  misconduct,	  and	  then	  demoted	  to	  
a	  non-­‐managerial	  post	  with	  an	  eventual	  40	  per	  cent	  reduction	  in	  salary.	  The	  breach	  of	  
contract	  which	  the	  Trust	  thereby	  committed	  was	  serious	  and	  repudiatory.	  A	  conclusion	  
that	  his	  damages	  are	  limited	  to	  less	  than	  £100	  leaves	  the	  uncomfortable	  feeling	  that	  
justice	  has	  not	  been	  done	  to	  him	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  All	  that	  can	  be	  said	  is	  that,	  had	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he	  applied	  in	  time,	  there	  is	  every	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  Employment	  Tribunal	  
would	  have	  been	  able	  (if	  it	  thought	  fit)	  to	  award	  him	  substantial	  compensation	  for	  the	  
unfair	  way	  in	  which	  I	  consider	  that	  he	  was	  treated.	  If,	  about	  which	  I	  can	  make	  no	  
finding	  of	  fact	  (since	  I	  was	  merely	  informed	  about	  it	  on	  counsel's	  instructions),	  
financial	  stringency	  made	  it	  practically	  impossible	  for	  Mr	  Smith	  to	  bring	  proceedings	  in	  
the	  Employment	  Tribunal	  in	  time,	  then	  the	  injustice	  he	  has	  suffered,	  although	  very	  
real,	  is	  unfortunately	  something	  which	  this	  court	  is	  unable	  to	  alleviate	  by	  an	  award	  of	  
substantial	  damages.	  
The	  damages	  were	  paid,	  but	  Smith	  was	  not	  reinstated.	   	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2012/3221.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  use	  of	  Facebook,	  or	  other	  social	  media,	  by	  employees	  is	  an	  issue	  which	  has	  become	  
controversial.	  This	  decision	  found	  that	  the	  comments	  made	  were	  not	  in	  contravention	  of	  the	  
Trust’s	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  or	  other	  employment	  policies,	  which	  had	  to	  be	  viewed	  ‘objectively’	  
(meaning	  viewed	  as	  a	  reasonable	  person	  would).	  However,	  the	  comments	  in	  this	  case	  were	  
mild,	  made	  in	  answer	  to	  another	  employee’s	  query,	  and	  mixed	  in	  with	  harmless	  postings	  about	  
quite	  unrelated	  (and	  not	  work-­‐related)	  issues.	  As	  His	  Honour	  pointed	  out,	  context	  was	  crucial.	  
	  
2.3.2  GRAHAM V BANKSTOWN DISTRICT SPORTS CLUB LTD [2012] FWA 7977 (FAIR 
WORK AUSTRALIA, DEPUTY PRESIDENT BOOTH, 21 SEPTEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  unfair	  dismissal	  case.	  The	  applicant	  had	  been	  dismissed	  from	  the	  Bankstown	  
District	  Sports	  Club	  Ltd	  (the	  club)	  for	  alleged	  serious	  misconduct	  under	  its	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  
provisions.	  He	  sought	  reinstatement	  to	  his	  position	  under	  section	  394	  of	  the	  Fair	  Work	  Act	  
2009	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act).	  
The	  club	  is	  comprised	  of	  five	  venues	  and	  employs	  460	  employees	  and	  800	  contractors.	  The	  
applicant	  was	  employed	  by	  the	  club	  on	  24	  June	  2009	  as	  a	  part-­‐time	  sommelier	  in	  the	  Cellar	  
Wine	  Bar	  at	  the	  club’s	  main	  venue	  in	  Bankstown.	  It	  was	  a	  term	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  Individual	  
Transitional	  Employment	  Agreement	  (ITEA)	  with	  the	  club	  that	  he	  complied	  with	  the	  club’s	  
policies	  and	  procedures,	  which	  included	  its	  Code	  of	  Conduct.	  The	  applicant	  had	  attended	  
annual	  training	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  on	  26	  August	  2011.	  	  
He	  was	  dismissed	  on	  9	  March	  2012	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  serious	  misconduct,	  alleged	  to	  be	  in	  
contravention	  of	  the	  club’s	  Code	  of	  Conduct.	  The	  applicant	  was	  provided	  with	  3	  weeks	  pay	  in	  
lieu	  of	  notice	  which	  corresponded	  to	  his	  entitlement	  to	  notice	  upon	  termination	  for	  other	  than	  
serious	  misconduct	  pursuant	  to	  his	  ITEA.	  The	  dismissal	  followed	  an	  investigation	  undertaken	  
by	  the	  club	  into	  the	  applicant’s	  conduct.	  The	  allegations	  that	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  
investigation	  were	  based	  on	  complaints	  made	  by	  another	  employee	  about	  the	  applicant’s	  
behaviour	  towards	  him.	  
The	  behaviour	  alleged	  was	  that	  the	  other	  employee	  had	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  sexually	  
inappropriate	  comments	  from	  the	  applicant,	  and	  bullying	  by	  him.	  The	  club’s	  investigation	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found	  that	  four	  out	  of	  five	  allegations	  were	  supported	  by	  evidence,	  and	  that	  those	  findings	  
founded	  dismissal	  for	  serious	  misconduct.	  The	  tribunal	  agreed.	  
The	  Act	  requires	  that	  the	  tribunal	  should	  exercise	  its	  discretion	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  application	  for	  
an	  unfair	  dismissal	  remedy	  pursuant	  to	  Part	  3-­‐2	  (Unfair	  Dismissal)	  of	  the	  Act.	  Under	  the	  Act’s	  
provisions,	  the	  applicant	  was	  a	  person	  who	  was	  protected	  from	  unfair	  dismissal	  pursuant	  to	  
section	  382	  of	  the	  Act.	  This	  required	  the	  tribunal	  to	  consider	  sections	  385	  (definition	  of	  unfair	  
dismissal),	  386	  (meaning	  of	  dismissed),	  and	  387	  (meaning	  of	  harsh	  etc)	  of	  the	  Act.	  
There	  was	  no	  dispute	  that	  the	  applicant	  had	  been	  dismissed	  so	  section	  385(a)	  of	  the	  Act	  was	  
satisfied.	  The	  tribunal	  therefore	  had	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  applicant’s	  dismissal	  was	  harsh,	  
unjust	  or	  unreasonable,	  and	  whether	  there	  had	  been	  a	  valid	  reason	  for	  dismissal	  under	  section	  
387	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  
The	  affected	  employee’s	  evidence	  was	  that	  the	  applicant	  singled	  him	  out	  for	  attention,	  that	  
the	  attention	  was	  unwanted	  and	  unwelcome,	  that	  he	  found	  the	  comments	  offensive	  and	  very	  
rude	  and	  the	  experience	  gave	  rise	  to	  feelings	  of	  discomfort,	  embarrassment	  and	  anger.	  The	  
applicant’s	  evidence	  was	  that	  he	  did	  not	  single	  out	  the	  affected	  employee,	  that	  he	  and	  the	  
other	  employee	  engaged	  in	  light-­‐hearted	  banter,	  and	  that	  the	  other	  employee	  did	  not	  resist	  
him	  or	  complain	  about	  him.	  	  
However,	  the	  club’s	  policies,	  procedures	  and	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  contained	  in	  its	  Employee	  
Handbook	  described	  the	  kind	  of	  behaviour	  exhibited	  by	  the	  applicant	  as	  bullying	  and	  
harassment.	  The	  tribunal	  found	  that,	  balancing	  the	  two	  versions	  of	  events,	  the	  applicant	  had	  
made	  inappropriate	  comments	  to	  the	  other	  employee,	  and	  conducted	  himself	  in	  an	  
inappropriate	  manner.	  The	  tribunal	  said	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  conduct	  had	  been	  damaging	  and	  
had	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  safety	  and	  welfare	  of	  the	  affected	  employee.	  Therefore,	  his	  
conduct	  contravened	  the	  club’s	  Code	  of	  Conduct,	  and	  was	  a	  valid	  ground	  for	  dismissal.	  
The	  applicant	  was	  aged	  62,	  and	  perhaps	  unlikely	  to	  obtain	  another	  position.	  However,	  against	  
those	  facts	  was	  the	  clear	  evidence	  of	  his	  inability	  to	  understand	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  club’s	  
Code	  of	  Conduct,	  despite	  training.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  tribunal	  said	  (at	  [63]–[64]):	  
...the	  evidence...disclosed	  a	  mismatch	  between	  [the	  applicant’s]	  values	  and	  
contemporary	  norms	  about	  what	  is	  acceptable	  in	  the	  workplace.	  Although	  he	  attended	  
training	  he	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  comprehend	  this	  training.	  He	  displayed	  no	  contrition,	  no	  
remorse,	  nor	  any	  indication	  that	  the	  ‘penny	  had	  dropped’.	  Indeed,	  he	  continued	  to	  
deny	  the	  conduct	  and	  where	  he	  acknowledged	  it	  he	  passed	  it	  off	  as	  a	  joke.	  The	  Club’s	  
concern	  that	  he	  presented	  a	  risk	  of	  reoffending	  is	  reasonable	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  a	  
warning,	  even	  a	  final	  warning,	  would	  have	  been	  insufficient	  to	  discharge	  their	  
obligations	  to	  other	  employees,	  and	  indeed	  patrons,	  to	  provide	  a	  safe	  place	  of	  work	  
and	  entertainment.	  The	  Club	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  is	  aware	  of	  its	  responsibility	  in	  that	  
it	  has	  adopted	  policies	  and	  conducted	  regular	  training	  concerning	  them.	  However	  the	  
evidence	  disclosed	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  policies	  
and	  procedures	  by	  leaders	  in	  the	  workplace	  and	  a	  review	  of	  the	  content	  and	  form	  of	  
delivery	  of	  training	  is	  recommended.	  Until	  policy	  and	  procedure	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	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culture	  of	  an	  organisation,	  leaders	  will	  apply	  their	  own	  values	  and	  norms	  and	  mistakes	  
will	  happen.	  
Despite	  this	  mild	  criticism	  of	  the	  club’s	  procedures,	  the	  tribunal	  held	  that	  the	  dismissal	  was	  not	  
harsh,	  unjust	  or	  unreasonable,	  and	  therefore	  not	  unfair.	  This	  being	  the	  case,	  there	  was	  no	  
need	  to	  consider	  a	  remedy	  for	  the	  applicant	  under	  Division	  4	  of	  the	  Act.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FWA/2012/7977.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  need	  for	  proper	  procedures	  relating	  to	  bullying,	  harassment	  and	  inappropriate	  conduct	  in	  
the	  workplace	  is	  a	  serious	  matter	  for	  clubs	  and	  associations	  in	  the	  nonprofit	  sector,	  particularly	  
if	  they	  are	  classified	  as	  ‘large’	  employers.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  club	  had	  such	  procedures	  in	  place,	  
and	  they	  formed	  the	  basis	  to	  support	  its	  contentions.	  Orders	  can	  be	  made	  for	  reinstatement	  or	  
compensation	  for	  loss,	  where	  unfair	  dismissal	  is	  found.	  	  
For	  information	  about	  dismissal	  under	  the	  Fair	  Work	  Act	  2009,	  see	  at	  
http://www.fwa.gov.au/index.cfm?pagename=dismissalsabout	  
	  
2.3.3  CINI V PLENTY VALLEY SERVICES ASSOCIATION INC [2012] FWA 6918 (FAIR 
WORK AUSTRALIA TRIBUNAL, COMMISSIONER RYAN, 17 AUGUST 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  unfair	  dismissal	  application.	  The	  applicant,	  Cini,	  was	  dismissed	  from	  his	  
employment	  with	  the	  Plenty	  Valley	  Services	  Association	  Inc	  (the	  association)	  on	  10	  April	  2012,	  
after	  two	  years	  of	  work.	  He	  filed	  an	  application	  alleging	  unfair	  dismissal	  under	  section	  394	  of	  
the	  Fair	  Work	  Act	  2009	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act).	  
The	  Tribunal	  reviewed	  the	  requirements	  of	  section	  396	  of	  the	  Act	  in	  considering	  Cini’s	  
application.	  These	  were:	  
• Section	  396(a):	  Was	  the	  application	  within	  time?	  It	  was.	  
• Section	  396(b):	  Was	  the	  applicant	  a	  person	  protected	  from	  unfair	  dismissal	  (within	  
section	  382)?	  He	  was.	  
• Section	  396(c):	  Was	  the	  business	  a	  small	  business	  to	  which	  the	  Small	  Business	  Fair	  
Dismissal	  Code	  applied?	  It	  was	  not,	  therefore	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  applied.	  
• Section	  396(d):	  Was	  this	  a	  case	  of	  genuine	  redundancy?	  It	  was	  not.	  
A	  consideration	  of	  section	  385	  was	  then	  required:	  
• Section	  385(a):	  Was	  the	  person	  dismissed	  from	  his	  employment?	  He	  was.	  
• Section	  385(b):	  Was	  the	  dismissal	  harsh,	  unjust	  or	  unreasonable?	  This	  required	  
investigation	  under	  section	  387	  of	  the	  Act.	  
Section	  387	  lists	  eight	  matters	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  dismissal	  
was	  harsh,	  unjust	  or	  unreasonable.	  The	  Tribunal	  reviewed	  these	  matters	  in	  turn	  as	  they	  
applied	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  case.	  The	  applicant	  had	  been	  dismissed	  from	  his	  employment	  for	  a	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breach	  of	  his	  employment	  contract	  relating	  to	  the	  handling	  of	  cash.	  There	  was	  no	  imputation	  
of	  dishonesty,	  but	  rather	  a	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  procedure.	  The	  Tribunal	  found	  the	  evidence	  
revealed	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  applicant’s	  dismissal	  was	  valid.	  It	  was	  not	  ‘capricious,	  fanciful,	  
spiteful	  or	  prejudiced’.	  The	  applicant	  had	  been	  properly	  notified	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  his	  dismissal	  
and	  had	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  reply.	  
However,	  the	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  both	  the	  size	  of	  the	  association	  and	  its	  lack	  of	  dedicated	  
human	  resource	  management	  specialists	  or	  expertise	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  procedures	  
followed	  in	  effecting	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  applicant.	  There	  were	  defects	  in	  the	  internal	  
processes	  relating	  to	  disciplinary	  matters	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  applicant	  
had	  been	  unfairly	  dismissed	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  section	  387	  of	  the	  Act.	  
Section	  390	  of	  the	  Act	  deals	  with	  remedies.	  The	  remedies	  provided	  for	  are	  reinstatement	  and	  
compensation.	  The	  award	  of	  a	  remedy	  is	  entirely	  discretionary,	  and	  the	  Tribunal	  in	  this	  case	  
did	  not	  give	  a	  remedy	  to	  the	  applicant.	  Although	  the	  applicant	  had	  acted	  with	  the	  best	  of	  
intentions	  in	  carrying	  out	  his	  work	  duties,	  the	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  ‘good	  intentions	  are	  not	  
enough’	  (at	  [41]).	  The	  cash	  handling	  procedures	  he	  had	  used	  were	  inappropriate,	  and	  although	  
he	  did	  not	  profit	  by	  using	  them,	  they	  were	  ‘incorrect	  or	  failed	  processes’	  (at	  [43]).	  
In	  addition,	  the	  association	  was	  not	  a	  static	  body.	  There	  had	  been	  frequent	  changes	  of	  
chairperson	  and	  committee	  members	  on	  the	  Committee	  of	  Management.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  in	  
this	  respect	  (at	  [44]):	  
The	  fact	  that	  an	  organisation	  such	  as	  the	  Plenty	  Valley	  Services	  Association	  Inc	  is	  a	  
dynamic	  body	  whose	  constitution	  may	  change	  from	  time	  to	  time	  means	  that	  there	  is	  
not,	  and	  could	  never	  have	  been,	  any	  certainty	  that	  Mr	  Cini	  would	  have	  continued	  in	  his	  
employment,	  given	  that	  the	  Committee	  could	  change	  and	  therefore	  could	  change	  its	  
mind	  as	  to	  how	  it	  wanted	  to	  do	  things,	  and	  that	  if	  it	  acted	  properly	  it	  could	  have	  
terminated	  his	  employment	  in	  any	  event.	  
Thus,	  although	  the	  applicant	  was	  found	  to	  be	  unfairly	  dismissed,	  he	  received	  no	  remedy	  
because	  of	  his	  dismissal.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FWA/2012/6918.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Unfair	  dismissal	  can	  be	  a	  very	  difficult	  area	  for	  nonprofit	  associations.	  The	  reason	  for	  
termination	  of	  an	  employee	  must	  be	  defensible	  or	  justifiable	  on	  an	  objective	  analysis	  of	  the	  
relevant	  facts.	  It	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  an	  employer	  to	  simply	  show	  that	  he	  or	  she	  acted	  in	  the	  
belief	  that	  the	  termination	  was	  for	  a	  valid	  reason.	  The	  adjective	  ‘valid’	  should	  be	  given	  the	  
meaning	  of	  sound,	  defensible	  or	  well-­‐founded.	  A	  reason	  for	  dismissal	  which	  is	  capricious,	  
fanciful,	  spiteful	  or	  prejudiced	  could	  never	  be	  a	  valid	  reason	  under	  the	  Act.	  	  
This	  decision	  points	  to	  the	  difficulties	  which	  may	  be	  encountered	  in	  these	  cases.	  The	  reason	  for	  
the	  applicant’s	  dismissal	  was	  found	  to	  be	  ‘valid’,	  but	  then	  he	  was	  found	  to	  have	  been	  unfairly	  
dismissed	  because	  of	  defective	  human	  resource	  management	  processes.	  Despite	  the	  finding	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  84	  
	  
that	  he	  was	  unfairly	  dismissed,	  he	  received	  no	  remedy	  from	  the	  Tribunal	  because	  his	  actions,	  
though	  honest,	  had	  been	  inappropriate	  in	  the	  work	  context.	  
	  
2.3.4  HUGHES V NARRABRI BOWLING CLUB LTD [2012] NSWADT 161 
(ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, G FURNESS 
SC, JUDICIAL MEMBER, A LOWE, NON JUDICIAL MEMBER, M NASIR, NON 
JUDICIAL MEMBER, 9 AUGUST 2012) 
See	  Discrimination	  case	  note	  2.2.7	  above	  
	  
2.3.5  STURT AND LAWRENCE V RIGHT REVEREND DR BRIAN FARRAN, BISHOP OF 
NEWCASTLE [2012] NSWSC 400 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
SACKAR J, 27 APRIL 2012) 
The	  plaintiffs	  are	  priests	  of	  the	  Anglican	  Church	  of	  Australia.	  These	  proceedings	  arose	  out	  of	  
disciplinary	  processes	  brought	  against	  Fathers	  Sturt	  and	  Lawrence	  purportedly	  pursuant	  to	  
internal	  legislation	  made	  by	  the	  Synod	  of	  the	  Diocese	  of	  Newcastle	  entitled	  the	  Professional	  
Standards	  Ordinance	  2005	  (PS	  Ordinance).	  The	  plaintiffs	  brought	  the	  proceedings	  against	  the	  
Bishop	  of	  Newcastle,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Professional	  Standards	  Board	  (PSB)	  convened	  to	  
hear	  their	  case,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Professional	  Standards	  Committee	  (PSC)	  of	  the	  Diocese	  of	  
Newcastle,	  and	  the	  Anglican	  Primate	  of	  Australia.	  The	  PSB	  had	  made	  a	  determination	  in	  
respect	  of	  the	  priests	  that	  they	  be	  deposed	  from	  Holy	  Orders	  (defrocked).	  
Although	  the	  background	  to	  the	  case	  involved	  allegations	  of	  sexual	  misconduct	  by	  the	  priests	  
and	  others,	  this	  hearing	  dealt	  with:	  	  
• how	  the	  plaintiffs	  came	  to	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  those	  hearings	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  
processes	  that	  were	  or	  were	  not	  followed	  before	  and	  during	  the	  proceedings;	  
• whether	   the	   plaintiffs	   were	   subjected	   to	   illegitimate,	   unfair,	   harsh	   and	   oppressive	  
procedures	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   proceedings	   before	   the	   PSB	   and	   whether	   the	   PSB's	  
recommendations	  ought	  or	  ought	  not	  stand.	  	  
The	  following	  relief	  was	  sought:	  
• an	  order	  quashing	  the	  determinations	  and	  recommendations	  made	  by	   the	  second	  to	  
fourth	  defendants	  on	  15	  December	  2010	  sitting	  as	  the	  PSB.	  Alternatively	  a	  declaration	  
that	  their	  determinations	  and	  recommendations	  were	  invalid	  or	  void.	  
• an	  order	  that	  the	  first	  defendant	  be	  permanently	  restrained	  from	  giving	  effect	  to	  the	  
determinations	  and	  recommendations.	  
• an	  order	  that	  the	  first	  defendant	  or	  any	  properly	  constituted	  tribunal	  of	  the	  Anglican	  
Diocese	   of	   Newcastle	   be	   permanently	   restrained	   from	   hearing	   or	   deciding	   the	  
complaints	  against	  the	  plaintiffs	  heard	  by	  the	  PSB	  on	  13	  and	  15	  December	  2010.	  	  
Following	  a	  complaint	  made	  on	  3	  October	  2009	  about	  certain	  conduct	  by	  Fathers	  Sturt	  and	  
Lawrence	  at	  a	  clergy	  conference	  in	  the	  1980s,	  action	  was	  initiated	  by	  the	  Bishop	  of	  Newcastle.	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On	  9	  October	  2009,	  Father	  Sturt’s	  licence	  was	  suspended	  (Father	  Lawrence	  had	  already	  
retired).	  On	  28	  October	  2009,	  the	  PSC	  referred	  the	  matter	  concerning	  the	  priests	  to	  the	  PSB	  
pursuant	  to	  the	  PS	  Ordinance.	  A	  directions	  hearing	  was	  held	  on	  24	  November	  2010	  before	  the	  
President	  of	  the	  PSB	  at	  which	  a	  solicitor	  appeared	  on	  behalf	  of	  both	  Fathers	  Sturt	  and	  
Lawrence.	  He	  informed	  the	  President	  that	  Father	  Lawrence	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  appear	  or	  make	  
responses	  before	  the	  PSB	  and	  that	  he	  would	  no	  longer	  represent	  Father	  Lawrence	  before	  the	  
PSB.	  However	  the	  solicitor	  made	  an	  application	  for	  the	  hearing	  concerning	  Father	  Sturt	  to	  be	  
held	  in	  camera.	  The	  application	  was	  refused.	  
On	  13	  December	  2010	  the	  PSB	  commenced	  the	  hearing.	  It	  rejected	  a	  renewed	  application	  by	  
the	  solicitor	  that	  the	  proceedings	  concerning	  Father	  Sturt	  be	  held	  in	  camera.	  A	  short	  
adjournment	  then	  took	  place.	  The	  solicitor	  then	  indicated	  that	  he	  had	  instructions	  to	  take	  no	  
further	  part	  in	  the	  proceedings	  on	  behalf	  of	  Father	  Sturt	  and	  withdrew	  from	  the	  hearing.	  
Neither	  Fathers	  Sturt	  nor	  Lawrence	  attended	  the	  hearing.	  The	  hearing	  then	  took	  place.	  
On	  15	  December	  2010	  the	  PSB	  convened	  a	  second	  day	  of	  hearing	  at	  which	  again	  neither	  
Fathers	  Sturt	  nor	  Lawrence	  appeared.	  The	  PSB	  made	  determinations	  and	  recommendations	  in	  
respect	  of	  both	  priests.	  The	  determinations	  and	  recommendations	  were	  then	  transmitted	  to	  
Bishop	  Farran	  for	  his	  consideration	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  PS	  Ordinance.	  
On	  16	  December	  2010	  a	  summons	  was	  filed	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  commencing	  the	  
proceedings	  in	  this	  court.	  The	  issues	  for	  determination	  were:	  
(a)	  Justiciability;	  
(b)	  Constitutional	  ground;	  
(c)	  Permanent	  stay;	  
(d)	  Claims	  for	  judicial	  review;	  
(e)	  Discretionary	  considerations.	  
The	  issue	  of	  justiciability	  was	  of	  course	  a	  threshold	  question:	  was	  the	  court	  able	  to	  adjudicate	  
on	  this	  matter?	  The	  Anglican	  Church	  is	  a	  voluntary	  association,	  and	  courts	  have	  routinely	  not	  
interfered	  in	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  voluntary	  associations,	  especially	  religious	  organisations.	  
With	  a	  voluntary	  association	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  the	  court	  to	  identify	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  civil	  or	  
proprietary	  right	  that	  has	  been	  infringed,	  which	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law	  requires	  enforcement,	  
before	  intervening	  in	  such	  an	  organisation’s	  affairs.	  	  
His	  Honour	  went	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  contract	  of	  employment	  in	  the	  situation	  of	  
Holy	  Orders.	  Father	  Sturt	  was	  a	  Rector	  of	  a	  parish,	  lived	  in	  a	  rectory	  and	  received	  a	  stipend.	  
The	  stipend	  was	  paid	  just	  like	  any	  salary,	  via	  a	  pay	  slip	  from	  the	  Diocese	  of	  Newcastle	  (which	  
has	  an	  ABN),	  with	  superannuation	  deducted.	  He	  had	  several	  previous	  postings	  as	  a	  priest.	  
Father	  Lawrence	  had	  been	  Dean	  of	  Newcastle	  before	  his	  retirement,	  receiving	  a	  stipend,	  living	  
in	  the	  Deanery	  and	  having	  a	  car	  provided.	  
His	  Honour	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  long	  held	  view	  that	  priests	  ‘hold	  office	  and	  are	  
not	  employees’.	  His	  Honour	  considered	  Ermogenous	  v	  Greek	  Orthodox	  Community	  of	  SA	  Inc	  
[2002]	  HCA	  8	  in	  which	  the	  High	  Court	  had	  to	  consider	  whether	  a	  person	  who	  had	  assumed	  the	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position	  of	  Archbishop	  of	  the	  Autocephalous	  Greek	  Orthodox	  Church	  in	  Australia	  had	  formed	  a	  
legally	  binding	  contract	  with	  the	  respondent	  incorporated	  association.	  The	  High	  Court	  found	  
on	  the	  facts	  that	  the	  appellant	  had	  been	  employed	  under	  a	  contract	  of	  employment	  because	  
there	  was	  a	  clear	  intention	  to	  create	  legal	  relations	  between	  the	  parties.	  However,	  this	  was	  a	  
case	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association.	  The	  High	  Court	  had	  said	  with	  respect	  to	  unincorporated	  
associations	  that	  (at	  [32]–[33]):	  	  
No	  doubt...	  there	  is	  an	  agreement	  between	  the	  members	  of	  an	  unincorporated	  body	  
to	  perform	  and	  observe	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  body,	  but	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  agreement	  
is	  enforceable	  at	  law,	  other	  than	  in	  respect	  of	  property	  rights	  to	  which	  a	  member	  is	  
entitled	  under	  the	  rules	  is	  at	  least	  open	  to	  question.	  As	  was	  pointed	  out	  in	  Cameron	  v	  
Hogan,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  two	  difficulties	  that	  arise	  if	  action	  is	  brought	  to	  enforce	  a	  
contract	  said	  to	  have	  been	  made	  with	  an	  unincorporated	  body.	  First,	  there	  is	  difficulty	  
in	  properly	  constituting	  the	  action	  by	  sufficiently	  identifying	  all	  the	  proper	  parties	  to	  
the	  suit	  (difficulties	  that	  may	  not	  always	  be	  met	  by	  constituting	  the	  action	  as	  a	  
representative	  proceeding).	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  further	  difficulty	  of	  identifying	  who	  
it	  is	  who	  is	  said	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  breach	  which	  is	  alleged.	  Are	  all	  members	  of	  
the	  body	  to	  be	  said	  to	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  contract;	  are	  only	  some	  to	  be	  said	  to	  be	  in	  
breach?	  These	  are	  not	  mere	  formal	  difficulties.	  They	  invite	  close	  attention	  to	  
identifying	  the	  contract	  that	  is	  alleged	  to	  have	  been	  made	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  
identification	  of	  its	  parties.	  
His	  Honour	  then	  referred	  to	  the	  element	  of	  control	  over	  employees	  in	  contracts	  of	  
employment.	  He	  said	  that	  the	  English	  case	  of	  JGE	  v	  The	  English	  Province	  of	  Our	  Lady	  of	  Charity	  
[2011]	  EWHC	  2871	  was	  instructive.	  There,	  in	  a	  case	  also	  involving	  sexual	  misconduct,	  it	  was	  
held	  that	  the	  Church	  trust	  was	  vicariously	  liable,	  but	  that	  there	  was	  no	  contract	  of	  employment	  
as	  such.	  This	  was	  because	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  control	  over	  priests	  in	  the	  work	  that	  they	  did.	  
His	  Honour	  concluded	  that	  there	  was	  no	  contract	  of	  employment	  in	  this	  case.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  
say	  (at	  [87]):	  
It	  is	  important	  however	  in	  examining	  the	  issue	  of	  justiciability	  to	  observe	  as	  I	  have	  
already	  that	  the	  Anglican	  Church	  of	  Australia	  is	  a	  voluntary	  association	  of	  a	  religious	  
character.	  The	  rules	  of	  the	  church	  are	  no	  more	  or	  less	  enforceable	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  
other	  voluntary	  associations.	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  many	  authorities	  that	  courts	  have	  shown	  
a	  marked	  disinclination	  to	  adjudicate	  upon	  religious	  or	  political	  controversies	  except	  to	  
the	  extent	  necessary	  to	  decide	  disputes	  about	  property.	  That	  does	  not	  turn	  upon	  any	  
presumptions,	  it	  turns	  upon	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  such	  bodies	  and	  generally	  an	  analysis	  of	  
their	  rules.	  
Were	  there	  any	  other	  rights	  available	  on	  which	  the	  plaintiffs	  could	  rely?	  His	  Honour	  considered	  
the	  matter	  in	  considerable	  detail,	  but	  could	  find	  little	  to	  assist	  the	  plaintiffs.	  He	  turned	  to	  the	  
PS	  Ordinance	  itself.	  He	  said	  (at	  [142]):	  
There	  is	  little	  doubt	  in	  my	  mind	  that	  the	  PS	  Ordinance	  is	  drafted	  in	  language	  that	  
manifests	  an	  intention	  to	  affect	  legal	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  Given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	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conduct	  which	  is	  sought	  to	  be	  examined	  and	  what	  is	  potentially	  at	  stake	  it	  seems	  to	  
me	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  gainsaid	  that	  that	  is	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  PS	  Ordinance.	  It	  has	  been	  
put	  by	  the	  Primate,	  and	  I	  agree,	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  each	  have	  an	  accrued	  right	  to	  hold	  
and	  to	  hold	  themselves	  out	  as	  entitled	  to	  hold,	  Holy	  Orders	  in	  the	  Anglican	  Church	  of	  
Australia	  which	  right	  is	  clearly	  at	  risk	  as	  a	  result	  of	  steps	  undertaken	  or	  purportedly	  
taken	  under	  the	  PS	  Ordinance.	  There	  is	  also	  equally	  little	  doubt	  that	  a	  priest	  enjoys	  
certain	  rights,	  privileges	  or	  advantages	  attached	  to	  the	  office	  (so	  described).	  These	  
would	  include	  the	  actuality	  or	  prospect	  of	  receiving	  emoluments	  of	  the	  office	  of	  a	  
priest.	  
Therefore,	  his	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  matters	  complained	  of	  by	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  justiciable.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  constitutionality,	  His	  Honour	  reviewed	  the	  constitutional	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  
Anglican	  Church	  of	  Australia.	  He	  concluded	  (at	  [211])	  that	  the	  PS	  Ordinance	  was	  a	  valid	  
legislative	  enactment	  of	  the	  Synod	  of	  the	  Anglican	  Diocese	  of	  Newcastle	  by	  virtue	  of	  section	  
2(1)	  of	  the	  Amended	  1902	  Constitution	  under	  the	  Anglican	  Church	  of	  Australia	  Constitution	  Act	  
1902	  (NSW).	  It	  was	  also	  found	  to	  be	  a	  valid	  enactment	  pursuant	  to	  section	  3(4)	  of	  the	  
Amended	  1902	  Constitution.	  
His	  Honour	  refused	  a	  permanent	  stay	  of	  the	  proceedings	  against	  the	  plaintiffs,	  and	  refused	  a	  
judicial	  review	  of	  the	  proceedings.	  In	  this	  respect,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [349]–[350],	  [384],	  and	  
[396]):	  
It	  is	  well	  established	  that	  insofar	  as	  the	  court	  has	  jurisdiction	  to	  entertain	  judicial	  
review	  of	  determinations	  of	  statutory	  bodies,	  jurisdiction	  is	  confined	  to	  judicial	  review	  
of	  legal	  error	  and	  it	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  merits	  review.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  stated	  generally	  
that	  absent	  some	  civil	  right	  prerogative	  procedures	  are	  inappropriate.	  I	  regard	  the	  
matters	  pleaded	  in	  Review	  Ground	  2	  (denial	  of	  procedural	  fairness)	  and	  Review	  
Ground	  3	  (irrationality	  and	  unreasonableness),	  as	  involving	  attempts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
plaintiffs	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  merits	  review	  of	  the	  proceedings....	  	  
...I	  see	  nothing	  wrong	  here	  with	  what	  the	  PSB	  did	  or	  said	  at	  any	  point	  (including	  24	  
November	  direction	  hearing).	  It	  was	  entitled	  in	  evaluating	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  
complainant	  ultimately	  to	  consider	  for	  example	  that	  apart	  from	  bare	  denials	  there	  was	  
no	  opposing	  version,	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  ample	  opportunity	  had	  been	  
afforded	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  to	  provide	  one	  had	  they	  wished.	  The	  plaintiffs	  did	  precisely	  I	  
assume	  what	  they	  were	  advised	  to	  do,	  and	  that	  was	  to	  take	  no	  part	  in	  the	  proceedings.	  
They	  exercised	  their	  informed	  freedom	  of	  choice.	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  s	  34	  [of	  the	  PS	  
Ordinance]	  to	  be	  invalid	  nor	  the	  instrument	  of	  unfairness	  or	  oppression.	  
In	  circumstances	  where	  both	  Father	  Sturt	  and	  Father	  Lawrence	  declined	  to	  take	  up	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  appear	  before	  the	  PSB	  and	  even	  at	  a	  minimum	  make	  submissions,	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  see	  how	  there	  was	  denial	  of	  procedural	  fairness.	  ....	  
As	  to	  discretionary	  remedies,	  His	  Honour	  stated	  (at	  [419]–[420]):	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Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  I	  have	  rejected	  various	  grounds	  for	  relief	  noted	  above,	  and	  the	  
question	  of	  remedy	  does	  not	  arise,	  I	  should	  say	  something	  about	  the	  exercise	  of	  
discretion.	  First	  certiorari	  does	  not	  lie	  to	  a	  decision	  of	  a	  private	  or	  domestic	  
tribunal...The	  only	  remedies	  thus	  claimed	  by	  the	  plaintiff	  which	  I	  could	  have	  granted	  
were	  declaration	  (order	  3),	  injunction	  (order	  4),	  and	  a	  stay	  (order	  5).	  Each	  of	  these	  
remedies	  of	  course	  [is]	  by	  [its]	  nature	  discretionary	  and	  not	  [a	  matter]	  of	  right.	  If	  I	  had	  
been	  left	  to	  exercise	  a	  discretion,	  I	  would	  exercise	  my	  discretion	  against	  granting	  any	  
relief.	  
Therefore,	  although	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  plaintiffs’	  case	  was	  justiciable,	  he	  rejected	  the	  
plaintiffs’	  claims,	  and	  dismissed	  the	  proceedings.	  Costs	  were	  reserved.	  
This	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/PJUDG?jgmtid=158179	  	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  again	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  the	  justiciability	  of	  issues	  within	  a	  voluntary	  association.	  
This	  matter	  continues	  to	  vex	  the	  courts,	  owing	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  unincorporated	  associations.	  
They	  are	  not	  recognised	  legal	  entities,	  so	  that	  finding	  grounds	  for	  bringing	  actions	  against	  
them	  can	  be	  fraught	  with	  difficulty,	  as	  His	  Honour	  acknowledged	  in	  this	  case.	  His	  Honour	  cited	  
with	  approval	  the	  High	  Court	  case	  of	  Ermogenous	  on	  this	  point,	  even	  though	  it	  concerned	  an	  
incorporated	  association.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  High	  Court	  had	  said	  that	  each	  case	  must	  be	  
considered	  on	  its	  own	  facts,	  and	  just	  because	  the	  case	  involved	  priests	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  
decide	  that	  there	  could	  not	  be	  a	  contract	  of	  employment.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  an	  
unincorporated	  association,	  since	  there	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  justiciability	  without	  some	  
contract	  or	  other	  issue	  that	  involves	  rights	  upon	  which	  to	  sue.	  
	  
2.4 DISSOLUTION, INSOLVENCY AND WINDING UP 
2.4.1 RAY V EASTERN SUBURBS MOTOR CYCLE CLUB INC [2012] NSWSC 1151 
(SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BALL J, 26 SEPTEMBER 2012) 
The	  Eastern	  Suburbs	  Motor	  Cycle	  Club	  Inc	  (the	  Club)	  was	  incorporated	  in	  1988	  under	  the	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1984	  (NSW)	  (now	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  
(NSW).	  The	  beneficial	  ownership	  of	  certain	  land	  at	  Arcadia	  in	  Sydney	  was	  in	  issue	  in	  this	  case.	  
The	  Arcadia	  land	  was	  originally	  acquired	  in	  1959	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  motorcycle	  racing	  by	  John	  
Hazelbrook	  Shaw,	  James	  Herbert	  Taylor	  and	  Alfred	  Derbyshire.	  They	  held	  the	  land	  on	  trust	  for	  
the	  then	  unincorporated	  Eastern	  Suburbs	  Motor	  Cycle	  Club.	  The	  unincorporated	  Club	  had	  
been	  formed	  on	  6	  November	  1924	  as	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  whose	  objectives	  included	  
the	  promotion	  and	  encouragement	  of	  motorcycling	  and	  the	  cooperation	  with	  kindred	  bodies	  
in	  fostering	  and	  maintaining	  motorcycling	  as	  a	  sport.	  	  
A	  copy	  of	  the	  original	  deed	  establishing	  the	  trust	  was	  not	  able	  to	  be	  located.	  However,	  a	  deed	  
dated	  19	  December	  1982	  was	  in	  existence.	  In	  that	  deed,	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  appointed	  as	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trustees	  in	  place	  of	  the	  former	  surviving	  trustees	  on	  terms	  which	  provided,	  among	  other	  
things,	  that	  the	  trustees:	  
...	  hereby	  jointly	  and	  severally	  covenant	  and	  agree	  that	  they	  shall	  hold	  the	  said	  land	  
and	  any	  other	  property	  vested	  in	  them	  pursuant	  to	  the	  trust	  hereby	  declared	  UPON	  
TRUST	  for	  the	  members	  for	  the	  time	  being	  of	  the	  ...	  Club	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  terms	  
of	  the	  Constitution	  Rules	  and	  Regulations	  for	  the	  time	  being	  of	  such	  Club.	  
and	  
...	  acknowledge	  that	  they	  shall	  mortgage	  lease	  assign	  or	  otherwise	  deal	  with	  the	  said	  
property	  as	  they	  may	  be	  directed	  from	  time	  to	  time	  by	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  of	  the	  
Club	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Constitution	  Rules	  and	  Regulations	  for	  the	  time	  being	  of	  
the	  said	  Club.	  
The	  Arcadia	  land	  was	  sold	  on	  28	  November	  2008	  for	  $1,185,000.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  competing	  
claims	  to	  these	  proceeds,	  the	  plaintiffs	  placed	  the	  sale	  proceeds	  into	  a	  trust	  account	  and	  
commenced	  these	  proceedings.	  The	  plaintiffs	  sought	  judicial	  advice	  under	  section	  63	  of	  the	  
Trustee	  Act	  1925	  (NSW)	  as	  to	  whether	  they	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  distributing	  the	  proceeds	  of	  
sale	  of	  the	  Arcadia	  land	  to	  the	  incorporated	  Club	  or	  whether	  they	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  
distributing	  the	  proceeds	  of	  sale	  in	  some	  other	  way.	  They	  also	  sought	  a	  determination	  
concerning	  the	  correct	  construction	  of	  the	  trust	  deed	  and,	  if	  the	  land	  was	  sold	  contrary	  to	  the	  
terms	  of	  trust	  upon	  which	  it	  was	  held,	  that	  they	  be	  excused	  pursuant	  to	  section	  85	  of	  the	  Act	  
for	  the	  breach	  of	  trust.	  
In	  relation	  to	  former	  associations	  which	  later	  become	  associated,	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act	  1984	  (NSW)	  provided	  in	  Schedule	  2:	  
2.1	  On	  the	  incorporation	  of	  an	  association	  or	  other	  body	  
(a)	  the	  assets	  of	  a	  former	  association	  of	  the	  incorporated	  association	  vest	  in	  the	  
incorporated	  association	  without	  the	  need	  for	  any	  conveyance,	  transfer,	  assignment	  or	  
assurance;...	  
‘former	  association’,	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  incorporated	  association,	  means	  
(a) the	  association	  or	  other	  body	  corporate	  which	  was	  incorporated	  under	  this	  Act	  to	  
form	  the	  incorporated	  association;	  
...and	  includes	  any	  or	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  former	  association	  as	  members;	  
Schedule	  3	  provides:	  
6.	  The	  amendments	  to	  Schedule	  2	  made	  by	  Schedule	  1	  (22)	  of	  the	  amending	  Act	  apply	  
to	  the	  incorporation	  of	  an	  association	  or	  other	  body	  under	  this	  Act	  whether	  before	  or	  
after	  the	  commencement	  of	  those	  amendments.	  
This	  provision	  in	  Schedule	  3	  makes	  the	  amendments	  made	  relating	  to	  former	  associations	  
retrospective.	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Had	  the	  Club	  been	  properly	  incorporated?	  As	  at	  1985,	  there	  were	  35	  life	  members.	  At	  the	  time	  
these	  proceedings	  were	  commenced,	  18	  of	  those	  were	  identified	  and	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  
representative	  order	  made	  by	  Hallen	  AsJ.	  
The	  process	  of	  incorporation	  was	  reviewed	  by	  His	  Honour.	  An	  application	  to	  incorporate,	  in	  
the	  prescribed	  form,	  had	  apparently	  been	  lodged	  with	  the	  Corporate	  Affairs	  Commission	  on	  13	  
May	  1988.	  However,	  the	  Club	  was	  described	  in	  the	  form	  as	  a	  proposed	  body	  rather	  than	  a	  
formerly	  unincorporated	  body	  which	  was	  seeking	  incorporation.	  Moreover,	  the	  persons	  
named	  in	  the	  form	  as	  committee	  members	  were	  not	  in	  fact	  current	  members	  of	  the	  executive	  
committee.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  certificate	  of	  incorporation	  was	  issued	  on	  13	  May	  1988.	  
A	  resolution	  supporting	  the	  incorporation	  was	  taken	  at	  a	  general	  meeting	  of	  15	  June	  1988.	  In	  
July	  of	  that	  year,	  a	  form	  was	  lodged	  to	  show	  that	  the	  ‘committee	  members’	  nominated	  on	  the	  
application	  form	  had	  resigned	  and	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  actual	  committee	  members.	  The	  
proceedings	  of	  the	  Club	  then	  continued	  in	  the	  usual	  way,	  except	  that	  there	  was	  some	  
discussion	  as	  to	  the	  rules	  which	  should	  apply.	  
An	  extraordinary	  general	  meeting	  was	  held	  on	  1	  March	  1989.	  According	  to	  handwritten	  
minutes	  of	  that	  meeting,	  it	  was	  resolved	  with	  28	  votes	  in	  favour,	  none	  against	  and	  one	  
abstention	  to	  adopt	  the	  model	  rules	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1984	  (NSW).	  
The	  minutes	  also	  record	  that	  it	  was	  resolved,	  by	  21	  votes	  for	  and	  8	  against,	  ‘that	  in	  the	  event	  
of	  the	  club	  winding	  up	  the	  surplus	  assets	  are	  to	  be	  left	  to	  the	  Ryde	  MCC’.	  Subsequently,	  on	  29	  
March	  1989,	  a	  notice	  was	  filed	  with	  the	  Corporate	  Affairs	  Commission	  amending	  the	  model	  
rules	  in	  a	  number	  of	  respects.	  In	  subsequent	  years,	  the	  Arcadia	  land	  was	  listed	  in	  the	  Club’s	  
returns	  to	  the	  Commission	  as	  an	  asset	  of	  the	  Club.	  
There	  were	  no	  proper	  general	  meetings	  of	  the	  Club	  after	  this	  date,	  although	  the	  Club	  
continued	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  somewhat	  random	  manner,	  more	  akin	  to	  an	  unincorporated	  
voluntary	  association.	  Tensions	  between	  members	  of	  the	  Club	  developed	  between	  1999	  and	  
2001.	  As	  a	  result,	  only	  the	  president,	  secretary	  and	  treasurer	  attended	  ‘general	  meetings’	  and	  
the	  association	  slowly	  lost	  ordinary	  members.	  	  
During	  the	  period	  from	  2002	  to	  2007	  there	  were	  many	  meetings	  at	  which	  the	  proposal	  to	  sell	  
the	  Arcadia	  land	  was	  discussed	  and	  at	  which	  various	  proposals	  were	  put	  forward	  for	  dividing	  
the	  proceeds	  among	  existing	  members.	  On	  26	  April	  2006,	  a	  resolution	  was	  put	  at	  an	  
extraordinary	  meeting	  of	  the	  Club	  to	  sell	  the	  Arcadia	  land	  and	  distribute	  the	  surplus	  to	  the	  18	  
present	  members.	  However,	  that	  motion	  was	  declared	  invalid	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1984	  (NSW)	  prevented	  club	  funds	  from	  being	  distributed	  to	  
members	  whilst	  the	  club	  was	  an	  incorporated	  association.	  It	  was	  then	  put	  to	  the	  meeting	  that	  
the	  Club’s	  incorporation	  should	  be	  cancelled	  and	  the	  land	  then	  be	  sold.	  This	  motion	  was	  not	  
carried.	  
The	  notion	  that	  the	  Club	  had	  not	  in	  fact	  been	  properly	  incorporated	  was	  first	  raised	  some	  time	  
in	  March	  2008.	  The	  idea	  was	  that	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  unincorporated	  club	  had	  continued	  in	  
existence,	  and	  that	  the	  life	  members	  should	  benefit	  from	  this.	  A	  meeting	  of	  those	  members	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  91	  
	  
was	  held	  on	  18	  April	  2008	  and	  a	  motion	  carried	  that	  the	  Arcadia	  land	  should	  be	  sold	  and	  the	  
proceeds	  divided	  between	  the	  life	  members	  only.	  
A	  general	  meeting	  of	  the	  Club	  on	  24	  September	  2008	  also	  resolved	  to	  sell	  the	  land.	  This	  was	  
the	  first	  properly	  convened	  general	  meeting	  of	  the	  Club	  since	  1988.	  The	  land	  was	  then	  sold	  in	  
November	  2008	  and	  the	  proceeds	  held	  in	  trust.	  Who	  was	  entitled	  to	  the	  proceeds?	  
His	  Honour	  took	  the	  view	  that	  at	  least	  from	  the	  time	  of	  the	  extraordinary	  general	  meeting	  held	  
on	  1	  March	  1989,	  when	  the	  members	  resolved	  to	  adopt	  the	  model	  rules,	  the	  Club	  ceased	  to	  
exist	  as	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  an	  incorporated	  association.	  His	  
Honour	  said	  (at	  [43]):	  
Any	  agreement	  that	  existed	  between	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Club	  to	  conduct	  their	  affairs	  
as	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  was	  abandoned	  by	  that	  time.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  from	  
that	  time	  that	  the	  members	  thought	  that	  they	  were	  conducting	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  
association	  through	  one	  entity.	  There	  was	  only	  one	  executive	  committee	  and	  one	  set	  
of	  elections	  for	  members	  of	  that	  committee	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  There	  was	  only	  one	  set	  
of	  general	  meetings.	  There	  was	  only	  one	  membership	  book	  and	  the	  ordinary	  members	  
paid	  only	  one	  lot	  of	  annual	  fees	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  membership.	  Only	  one	  entity	  
maintained	  bank	  accounts.	  There	  was	  no	  attempt	  to	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  [unincorporated	  and	  incorporated	  Clubs].	  It	  is	  equally	  clear	  that	  the	  
entity	  through	  which	  those	  activities	  were	  carried	  on	  was	  [the	  incorporated	  Club].	  The	  
members	  of	  the	  Club	  had	  intended	  to	  incorporate...	  they	  must	  have	  intended	  that	  [the	  
incorporated	  Club]	  would	  be	  the	  corporate	  vehicle	  through	  which	  they	  would	  continue	  
to	  operate	  as	  a	  club.	  They	  adopted	  a	  new	  constitution	  and	  lodged	  annual	  returns	  
consistently	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act.	  Existing	  members	  of	  the	  Club	  continued	  as	  
members	  of	  [the	  incorporated	  Club].	  New	  members	  applied	  to	  become	  members	  of	  
the	  incorporated	  association....	  Taking	  those	  matters	  into	  account,	  in	  my	  opinion	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  Club	  impliedly	  agreed	  that	  the	  Club	  would	  be	  dissolved	  and	  its	  
activities	  would	  be	  taken	  over	  by	  [the	  incorporated	  Club].	  
It	  was	  not	  necessary	  that	  the	  procedure	  for	  incorporation	  be	  followed	  exactly.	  His	  Honour	  held	  
that	  (at	  [45]):	  
However,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  to	  have	  followed	  all	  the	  
procedures	  under	  s	  8(1)	  of	  the	  Act	  for	  it	  to	  have	  become	  incorporated	  under	  the	  Act.	  
The	  facts	  may	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  members	  of	  an	  association	  intended	  to	  
incorporate	  the	  association	  notwithstanding	  that	  they	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  procedures	  
set	  out	  in	  s	  8(1)	  and	  that	  is	  sufficient...	  
His	  Honour	  concluded	  that	  the	  Club	  was	  a	  ’former	  association’	  under	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act	  1984	  (NSW).	  Thus,	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  unincorporated	  Club	  vested	  in	  the	  
incorporated	  association	  which	  followed	  it.	  Therefore,	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  Arcadia	  
land	  were	  properly	  to	  be	  distributed	  to	  the	  Club	  as	  an	  incorporated	  body	  for	  its	  future	  use.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/1151.html	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  an	  incorporated	  association	  is	  a	  separate	  legal	  entity.	  This	  
case	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  procedure	  for	  incorporating	  a	  former	  unincorporated	  association	  
does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  exactly	  as	  per	  the	  statute.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  association’s	  procedures	  had	  
been	  lax	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  incorporation,	  and	  the	  association	  was	  not	  really	  functional	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  the	  hearing.	  However,	  the	  incorporated	  association	  was	  still	  in	  existence	  and	  had	  been	  
incorporated	  in	  a	  ‘sufficient’	  manner,	  so	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  former	  unincorporated	  association	  
had	  vested	  in	  the	  incorporated	  body	  at	  the	  time	  of	  incorporation.	  The	  sale	  of	  one	  of	  these	  
assets	  meant	  that	  the	  proceeds	  of	  sale	  properly	  belonged	  to	  the	  incorporated	  association.	  If	  an	  
incorporated	  association	  is	  wound	  up,	  distribution	  of	  its	  assets	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  Act	  –	  enjoying	  
nonprofit	  status	  means	  that	  assets	  cannot	  be	  distributed	  to	  members.	  
	  
2.4.2 RE MOWBRAY COLLEGE [2012] VSC 300 (SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, 
ROBSON J, 6 JUNE 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  case	  concerning	  the	  insolvency	  of	  a	  private	  educational	  institution	  in	  Victoria.	  
Mowbray	  College	  (the	  College)	  was	  a	  nonprofit	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee,	  which	  carried	  
on	  business	  as	  the	  operator	  of	  a	  multi-­‐campus,	  independent,	  non-­‐denominational,	  co-­‐
educational	  private	  college.	  An	  administrator	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	  college	  at	  the	  request	  of	  
the	  directors	  on	  28	  May	  2012.	  	  
This	  was	  an	  application	  to	  the	  Court	  for	  orders	  under	  section	  447A	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  
2001	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act)	  seeking	  to	  limit	  the	  administrator’s	  personal	  liability	  in	  respect	  of	  $1	  
million	  advanced	  by	  the	  State	  of	  Victoria	  to	  keep	  the	  College	  open	  for	  year	  12	  students	  until	  
the	  end	  of	  June	  2012.	  The	  college	  has	  now	  closed.	  
Mowbray	  College	  operated	  three	  campuses	  in	  Victoria:	  Patterson	  campus	  at	  Centenary	  
Avenue	  in	  Melton	  which	  catered	  for	  students	  in	  Prep	  to	  Year	  12;	  Brookside	  campus	  at	  
Federation	  Way	  in	  Caroline	  Springs	  which	  catered	  for	  students	  in	  kindergarten	  to	  Year	  6;	  and	  
Town	  Centre	  campus	  on	  the	  corner	  of	  Lake	  Street	  and	  Caroline	  Springs	  Boulevard	  in	  Caroline	  
Springs	  which	  catered	  for	  students	  in	  Years	  7	  to	  12.	  The	  College	  held	  a	  licence	  from	  the	  
Victorian	  Registration	  and	  Qualifications	  Authority	  and	  was	  authorised	  by	  that	  body	  to	  provide	  
a	  co-­‐educational	  primary	  and	  secondary	  school,	  a	  preschool	  for	  three	  to	  four	  year	  olds	  at	  the	  
Brookside	  campus,	  and	  an	  overseas	  secondary	  student	  exchange	  for	  international	  students.	  	  
In	  May	  2012	  there	  were	  a	  total	  of	  1276	  students	  enrolled	  across	  the	  schools.	  As	  at	  the	  date	  of	  
the	  administrator’s	  appointment,	  the	  College	  employed	  a	  total	  of	  220	  fulltime	  employees,	  
most	  of	  whom	  were	  teachers	  at	  the	  College.	  The	  College	  derived	  its	  income	  from	  tuition	  fees	  
(48	  per	  cent),	  government	  funding	  (46.7	  per	  cent),	  and	  other	  miscellaneous	  funds	  (5.3	  per	  
cent).	  	  
The	  administrator	  found,	  upon	  examination	  of	  the	  books	  of	  the	  College,	  that	  it	  was	  insolvent.	  
The	  definition	  of	  insolvency	  in	  the	  Act	  is	  that	  a	  company	  is	  unable	  to	  pay	  its	  debts	  as	  they	  fall	  
due	  and	  payable.	  This	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  cash	  flow	  insolvency.	  However,	  the	  College	  had	  a	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purported	  surplus	  of	  assets	  over	  liabilities	  of	  some	  $19	  million,	  due	  to	  the	  valuation	  of	  its	  real	  
property	  holdings	  at	  $41	  million.	  It	  was	  an	  open	  question	  whether	  this	  valuation	  was	  valid.	  
The	  College	  owed	  the	  National	  Australia	  Bank	  about	  $16.1	  million,	  and	  owed	  staff	  accrued	  long	  
service	  leave	  and	  annual	  leave	  of	  about	  $2.2	  million.	  Its	  other	  liabilities	  were	  about	  $557,000.	  
Although	  there	  were	  some	  cash	  holdings,	  these	  were	  not	  available	  to	  the	  administrator,	  in	  his	  
view,	  because	  they	  were	  ear-­‐marked	  funds	  from	  government	  sources,	  or	  pre-­‐paid	  fees	  from	  
parents	  of	  children	  attending	  the	  College.	  The	  cost	  of	  keeping	  the	  College	  open	  between	  28	  
May	  2012	  (the	  day	  of	  the	  administrator’s	  appointment)	  and	  30	  June	  was	  calculated	  at	  
$976,000.	  Therefore,	  the	  administrator	  formed	  the	  view	  that	  he	  should	  seek	  a	  loan	  from	  the	  
Victorian	  government	  of	  $1	  million	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  the	  College	  open	  until	  the	  end	  of	  term	  2	  
(30	  June	  2012).	  This	  was	  mainly	  to	  benefit	  the	  year	  12	  students	  who	  would	  otherwise	  be	  
unable	  to	  take	  their	  mid-­‐year	  examinations.	  
Section	  443A(1)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  an	  administrator	  is	  personally	  liable	  for	  any	  loans	  
taken	  out	  during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  administration.	  Normally,	  this	  liability	  cannot	  be	  contracted	  
out	  of:	  section	  443A(2).	  However,	  this	  may	  be	  modified	  by	  an	  application	  under	  section	  
447A(1)	  of	  the	  Act,	  which	  for	  variation	  of	  any	  other	  provision	  of	  Part	  5.3A	  of	  the	  Act	  (relating	  
to	  administration	  of	  companies).	  	  
The	  Victorian	  government	  was	  prepared	  to	  lend	  the	  $1	  million	  and	  agreed	  not	  to	  hold	  the	  
administrator	  liable	  for	  the	  moneys	  lent	  by	  it	  under	  the	  loan	  agreement.	  The	  proviso	  was	  that	  
the	  advance	  was	  repayable	  to	  the	  State	  of	  Victoria	  as	  an	  expense	  of	  the	  administration.	  
However,	  this	  was	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  the	  College’s	  available	  assets	  were	  sufficient	  to	  meet	  the	  
repayment	  after	  all	  the	  administrator’s	  costs,	  remuneration	  and	  expenses	  were	  paid,	  and	  after	  
payment	  of	  all	  other	  claims	  which	  are	  afforded	  a	  priority	  under	  section	  556(1)	  of	  the	  Act.	  
Section	  556(1)	  gives	  priority	  to	  administrator's	  expenses,	  winding	  up	  costs,	  and	  employee	  
entitlements	  before	  unsecured	  creditors.	  	  
Although	  the	  administrator	  considered	  that	  the	  loan	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  all	  the	  
stakeholders,	  His	  Honour	  felt	  that	  the	  position	  of	  the	  unsecured	  creditors	  might	  be	  perilous	  if	  
he	  made	  the	  order	  sought.	  This	  was	  overcome	  by	  the	  Victorian	  government	  acknowledging	  
that	  it	  might	  not	  expect	  repayment	  of	  the	  loan,	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  unsecured	  creditors.	  On	  this	  
point,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [37]–[38]):	  
Under	  the	  Act,	  any	  order	  I	  make	  under	  s	  447	  must	  be	  made	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
furthering	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  administration	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act.	  In	  substance,	  the	  
objects	  of	  these	  provisions	  are	  to	  improve	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  insolvency	  position	  for	  
creditors	  and	  shareholders.	  Those	  are	  essentially	  commercial	  objectives.	  They	  look	  to	  
the	  financial	  position	  of	  shareholders	  and	  creditors.	  The	  provisions	  have	  been	  
designed	  for	  commercial	  ventures	  and	  unfortunately	  do	  not	  give	  much	  weight	  to	  
issues	  such	  as	  whether	  or	  not	  students	  would	  be	  disadvantaged	  in	  their	  exams.	  
Therefore,	  even	  though	  the	  objectives	  of	  this	  agreement	  are	  extremely	  desirable	  to	  
the	  parents	  and	  the	  students	  and	  no	  doubt	  the	  people	  of	  Victoria,	  I	  was	  concerned	  
that	  I	  may	  not	  have	  had	  the	  power	  to	  make	  the	  orders	  sought,	  despite	  the	  submissions	  
of	  the	  administrator	  on	  the	  benefits	  that	  would	  otherwise	  flow	  from	  the	  College	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receiving	  the	  loan.	  To	  overcome	  that	  problem,	  the	  State	  of	  Victoria	  has	  kindly	  agreed	  
to	  stand	  behind	  the	  unsecured	  creditors.	  In	  those	  circumstances,	  in	  my	  view,	  the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  Act	  are	  being	  advanced	  by	  the	  borrowing	  of	  the	  moneys.	  It	  will	  allow	  
staff	  to	  be	  let	  go	  on	  better	  terms,	  and	  in	  a	  more	  orderly	  fashion.	  It	  will	  potentially	  
reduce	  claims	  for	  damages	  against	  the	  school.	  It	  does	  not	  disadvantage,	  in	  my	  view,	  
the	  other	  creditors.	  In	  fact,	  as	  I	  said,	  there	  are	  advantages	  to	  the	  creditors.	  The	  
agreement	  is	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  College.	  
Therefore,	  the	  order	  sought	  by	  the	  administrator	  was	  granted,	  and	  he	  was	  relieved	  from	  
personal	  liability	  for	  the	  loan.	  The	  loan	  kept	  the	  College	  operating	  until	  its	  closure	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
June.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2012/300.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Mowbray	  College,	  a	  nonprofit	  company,	  could	  not	  continue	  operating	  in	  an	  insolvent	  
environment.	  Section	  95A(2)	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  provides	  that	  a	  company	  is	  
insolvent	  if	  it	  is	  not	  solvent.	  Solvency	  means	  that	  a	  company	  can	  pay	  all	  its	  debts	  as	  and	  when	  
they	  fall	  due:	  section	  95(1).	  This	  definition	  relies	  heavily	  on	  cash	  flow	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  solvency.	  
In	  this	  case,	  the	  College	  had	  very	  little	  cash,	  and	  debts	  of	  around	  $19	  million.	  Even	  though	  it	  
has	  property	  assets	  (the	  value	  of	  which	  might	  be	  substantial),	  and	  some	  smaller	  assets	  such	  as	  
school	  equipment,	  its	  intangible	  assets	  (reputation	  etc),	  which	  might	  have	  been	  quite	  valuable	  
on	  a	  going-­‐concern	  basis,	  evaporated	  on	  its	  closure.	  
	  
2.4.3 DOLORES CORREA AND THE SPANISH CLUB LTD V WHITTINGHAM (NO 3) [2012] 
NSWSC 526 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BLACK J, 21 MAY 2012) 
This	  case	  was	  part	  of	  extensive	  litigation	  relating	  to	  the	  external	  administration	  of	  the	  Spanish	  
Club	  Ltd	  (the	  Club).	  The	  Club	  was	  at	  all	  relevant	  times	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee,	  and	  a	  
registered	  club	  under	  the	  Registered	  Clubs	  Act	  1976	  (NSW).	  At	  some	  time	  between	  14	  
November	  2008	  and	  17	  November	  2008,	  Mr	  Whittingham	  was	  appointed,	  or	  purportedly	  
appointed,	  as	  voluntary	  administrator	  of	  the	  Club	  by	  a	  resolution	  passed,	  or	  purportedly	  
passed,	  by	  the	  Club's	  directors	  under	  section	  436A	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act).	  
The	  date	  on	  which	  that	  appointment	  took	  effect	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  appointment	  were	  in	  
issue	  in	  these	  proceedings.	  
Although	  there	  was	  contention	  surrounding	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	  administrator	  from	  the	  
point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  company,	  the	  voluntary	  administration	  went	  ahead.	  Because	  voluntary	  
administration	  is	  a	  process	  controlled	  by	  the	  creditors,	  Mr	  Whittingham	  went	  on	  to	  formulate	  
a	  deed	  of	  company	  arrangement	  under	  the	  Act,	  and	  to	  become	  the	  deed	  administrator.	  
The	  plaintiffs	  sought	  a	  declaration	  that	  Mr	  Whittingham	  was	  not	  validly	  appointed	  as	  voluntary	  
administrator	  and	  consequently,	  was	  not	  validly	  appointed	  as	  deed	  administrator	  of	  the	  Club	  
and	  was	  a	  trespasser	  to	  the	  Club's	  property	  and	  assets.	  That	  declaration	  was	  sought	  at	  general	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law	  and	  not	  under	  section	  447G	  of	  the	  Act	  which	  confers	  power	  on	  the	  Court	  to	  make	  such	  
declarations	  in	  respect	  of	  an	  administration.	  	  
As	  the	  administrator	  had	  allegedly	  not	  been	  validly	  appointed	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  
administration	  process,	  the	  plaintiffs	  contended	  that	  Mr	  Whittingham	  should	  not	  be	  entitled	  
to	  recover	  his	  fees	  and	  expenses	  of	  acting	  as	  administrator	  and	  deed	  administrator	  and	  should	  
be	  required	  to	  disgorge	  the	  fees	  and	  expenses	  which	  have	  already	  been	  paid	  to	  him.	  The	  
plaintiffs'	  submissions	  indicated	  that	  the	  primary	  foundation	  for	  that	  claim	  was	  their	  
contention	  that	  Mr	  Whittingham	  was	  not	  validly	  appointed	  and	  that	  any	  defect	  in	  his	  
appointment	  should	  not	  be	  cured	  under	  section	  447A	  or	  section	  1322	  of	  the	  Act.	  
Prior	  to	  the	  purported	  appointment	  of	  the	  administrator	  there	  had	  been	  dissension	  among	  
club	  members	  and	  directors.	  Mr	  Whittingham	  had	  a	  meeting	  with	  one	  director	  at	  which	  
various	  matters	  were	  disclosed	  to	  him,	  including	  that	  the	  club	  was	  trading	  at	  a	  loss,	  and	  that	  
creditors	  were	  unpaid.	  He	  recommended	  voluntary	  administration.	  Documents	  were	  
exchanged	  which	  purported	  to	  appoint	  the	  administrator,	  but	  there	  was	  some	  uncertainty	  
whether	  these	  were	  in	  fact	  representing	  a	  resolution	  of	  all	  four	  of	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  club.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  club’s	  constitution	  required	  seven	  directors,	  with	  a	  quorum	  of	  four.	  The	  
appointment	  of	  an	  administrator	  under	  section	  436A	  of	  the	  Act	  requires	  the	  board	  to	  have	  
resolved	  to	  the	  effect	  that,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  directors	  voting	  for	  the	  resolution,	  the	  
company	  is	  insolvent	  or	  likely	  to	  become	  insolvent	  at	  a	  future	  time.	  The	  formation	  of	  such	  an	  
opinion	  is	  a	  precondition	  to	  the	  valid	  exercise	  of	  the	  power	  to	  appoint	  an	  administrator.	  Was	  
there	  a	  valid	  quorum	  in	  this	  case?	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  was	  not,	  but	  that	  the	  
administrator’s	  appointment	  could	  nevertheless	  be	  validated.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  administrator	  relied	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  ‘indoor	  management	  rule’,	  a	  
legal	  principle	  that	  a	  person	  dealing	  with	  a	  company	  is	  entitled	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  internal	  
arrangements	  in	  the	  company	  having	  been	  properly	  constituted.	  This	  rule	  is	  now	  contained	  in	  
section	  128	  and	  129	  of	  the	  Act.	  On	  this	  issue,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [59]–[60]):	  
In	  summary,	  Mr	  Whittingham	  could	  and	  probably	  should	  have	  made	  further	  inquiries	  
of	  the	  Club's	  other	  directors	  as	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  his	  appointment.	  However,	  Mr	  
Whittingham	  had	  at	  least	  sought	  to	  confirm	  the	  circumstances	  surrounding	  his	  
appointment	  with	  Ms	  Sanchez	  [the	  director	  he	  first	  dealt	  with]	  and	  had	  been	  advised	  
by	  an	  experienced	  firm	  of	  solicitors	  that	  his	  appointment	  was	  valid.	  Even	  if	  the	  matters	  
to	  which	  I	  have	  referred	  were	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  that	  Mr	  Whittingham	  was	  on	  
inquiry	  as	  to	  whether	  his	  appointment	  had	  complied	  with	  the	  Club's	  constitution,	  they	  
do	  not,	  in	  my	  view,	  establish	  that	  he	  suspected,	  still	  less	  that	  he	  knew,	  that	  his	  
appointment	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  that	  constitution.	  Had	  Mr	  Whittingham	  known	  or	  
suspected	  that	  matter,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  a	  simple	  matter	  for	  him	  to	  seek	  validation	  
of	  his	  appointment	  by	  the	  Court	  and	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  reason	  why	  he	  would	  not	  
have	  done	  so.	  Even	  if	  Mr	  Whittingham	  was	  on	  inquiry	  as	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  his	  
appointment,	  this	  is	  not	  sufficient,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  requisite	  knowledge	  or	  
suspicion,	  to	  deprive	  Mr	  Whittingham	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  statutory	  
assumptions	  under	  ss	  128–129	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act.	  Accordingly,	  I	  have	  concluded	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that	  it	  is	  not	  open	  to	  the	  Club	  (or	  to	  Ms	  Correa,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  she	  seeks	  to	  
establish	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Club)	  to	  rely	  on	  any	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  
requirements	  of	  its	  constitution	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  minimum	  number	  of	  directors	  or	  the	  
quorum	  requirement	  for	  directors’	  meetings	  to	  invalidate	  Mr	  Whittingham's	  
appointment	  as	  administrator.	  
The	  other	  bases	  raised	  by	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  also	  dismissed	  by	  His	  Honour.	  Although	  His	  
Honour	  found	  that	  the	  administrator	  had	  not	  obtained	  consent	  to	  his	  appointment	  under	  
section	  41	  of	  the	  Registered	  Clubs	  Act	  1976	  (NSW)	  until	  11	  days	  after	  his	  appointment,	  that	  
section	  did	  not	  invalidate	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	  administrator	  where	  such	  consent	  was	  in	  fact	  
given,	  albeit	  not	  prior	  to	  the	  appointment.	  Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that,	  pursuant	  to	  a	  
resolution	  made	  under	  section	  436A	  of	  the	  Act,	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  administrator	  was	  
valid	  from	  the	  day	  he	  consented	  to	  act	  as	  an	  administrator,	  which	  was	  17	  November	  2008.	  
Accordingly,	  Mr	  Whittingham	  was	  entitled	  to	  his	  remuneration	  determined	  under	  section	  449E	  
of	  the	  Act.	  
The	  issue	  of	  costs	  was	  dealt	  with	  in	  Dolores	  Correa	  and	  Spanish	  Club	  Ltd	  (subject	  to	  a	  deed	  of	  
company	  arrangement)	  v	  Whittingham	  (No	  4)	  [2012]	  NSWSC	  677.	  The	  court	  ordered	  that	  the	  
administrator	  was	  entitled	  to	  be	  reimbursed	  and	  indemnified	  in	  respect	  of	  his	  remuneration,	  
legal	  costs	  and	  disbursements	  as	  administrator	  and	  deed	  administrator,	  including	  in	  
connection	  with	  the	  proceedings	  above,	  out	  of	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  club;	  and	  that	  the	  
administrator	  had	  a	  right	  to	  exercise	  a	  lien	  over	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  club	  to	  secure	  this	  right	  of	  
reimbursement	  and	  indemnity	  pursuant	  to	  clauses	  19.4,	  20.1	  and	  20.5	  of	  the	  deed	  of	  company	  
arrangement	  executed	  by	  the	  club	  and	  the	  administrator	  and	  sections	  443D	  and	  443F	  of	  the	  
Act.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/526.html	  
The	  costs	  decision	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/677.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  plaintiffs	  in	  this	  case	  have	  reserved	  the	  right	  to	  appeal,	  so	  the	  litigation	  may	  be	  re-­‐visited.	  
His	  Honour	  found	  in	  this	  case	  that	  the	  administration	  and	  the	  deed	  of	  company	  arrangement	  
which	  followed	  it	  were	  valid.	  In	  addition,	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  on	  the	  available	  evidence	  the	  
club	  was	  insolvent.	  Insolvent	  trading	  is	  a	  serious	  matter	  of	  liability	  for	  directors	  under	  section	  
588G	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth),	  and	  the	  correct	  course	  is	  to	  enter	  into	  some	  form	  of	  
external	  administration,	  such	  as	  voluntary	  administration.	  	  
	  
2.4.4 STEVENSON V REGENTS PARK SPORTING AND COMMUNITY CLUB LTD [2012] 
NSWSC 424 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, FULLERTON J, 4 MAY 
2012) 
Between	  March	  2009	  and	  October	  2010	  the	  plaintiff	  operated	  a	  bistro	  from	  a	  licensed	  club	  at	  
Regent's	  Park	  operated	  by	  the	  defendant	  company	  (the	  Club).	  The	  plaintiff	  operated	  the	  bistro	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pursuant	  to	  a	  written	  contract	  entitled	  ‘Independent	  Contractor	  Agreement’	  (the	  agreement),	  
under	  which	  he	  was	  obliged	  to	  work	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  Club's	  trading	  hours	  and	  to	  ‘order,	  
prepare	  and	  cook	  in	  the	  Club's	  Bistro’.	  The	  contract	  was	  executed	  on	  30	  May	  2009	  for	  a	  term	  
of	  three	  years.	  	  
In	  April	  2010	  the	  defendant	  company	  entered	  voluntary	  administration.	  An	  administrator	  
assumed	  control	  of	  the	  Club's	  business	  under	  a	  Deed	  of	  Company	  Arrangement	  in	  May	  2010.	  
The	  Club	  continued	  to	  trade	  while	  the	  administrator	  attempted	  (as	  is	  usual)	  to	  obtain	  a	  better	  
financial	  outcome	  for	  the	  company's	  creditors	  than	  that	  which	  might	  have	  been	  obtained	  by	  
liquidation.	  	  
By	  letter	  dated	  21	  October	  2010,	  the	  administrator	  notified	  the	  plaintiff	  that	  the	  agreement	  
was	  terminated	  effective	  from	  that	  date.	  A	  number	  of	  bases	  were	  nominated	  as	  grounds	  for	  
the	  exercise	  of	  the	  company's	  right	  to	  terminate,	  including	  breaches	  of	  the	  plaintiff's	  
obligations	  under	  the	  agreement	  to	  deliver	  dining	  services	  in	  accordance	  with	  specified	  
standards.	  Reference	  was	  also	  made	  to	  previous	  correspondence	  where	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  
breaches	  were	  identified	  as	  requiring	  rectification	  and	  which	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  said	  to	  have	  
persistently	  failed	  to	  address.	  	  
The	  plaintiff	  sued	  for	  breach	  of	  contract	  and	  damages.	  He	  submitted	  that	  the	  agreement	  was	  
terminated	  without	  proper	  cause	  and	  even	  if	  he	  was	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  agreement,	  which	  he	  
refuted,	  he	  was	  entitled	  to	  a	  reasonable	  notice	  which	  was	  denied	  him.	  	  
The	  single	  issue	  arising	  in	  these	  proceedings	  was	  whether	  the	  defendant	  company's	  exercise	  of	  
the	  contractual	  right	  to	  terminate	  under	  Clause	  8.1.3	  of	  the	  agreement	  was	  justified.	  The	  
resolution	  of	  that	  question	  was	  determinative	  of	  the	  plaintiff's	  case	  on	  liability.	  The	  plaintiff	  
failed	  in	  his	  claim.	  
Issues	  arose	  under	  the	  agreement	  as	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  food,	  menu	  selection	  and	  hours	  of	  
operation	  of	  the	  bistro.	  These	  issues	  were	  raised	  in	  the	  termination	  letter	  sent	  to	  the	  plaintiff.	  
The	  administrator	  gave	  evidence	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  food	  services	  were	  fundamental	  to	  the	  
operation	  of	  the	  business,	  and	  to	  his	  ability	  to	  obtain	  some	  outcome	  from	  the	  administration.	  
The	  bistro	  was	  required	  to	  operate	  seven	  days	  a	  week	  for	  lunch	  and	  dinner.	  The	  plaintiff	  did	  
not	  do	  this	  because	  trading	  on	  some	  of	  the	  seven	  days	  was	  not	  profitable.	  Her	  Honour	  did	  not	  
think	  that	  it	  was	  unreasonable	  to	  require	  the	  bistro’s	  operation	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  Club’s	  
opening	  hours.	  On	  this	  point,	  she	  said	  (at	  [56]):	  
Even	  if	  that	  were	  not	  an	  express	  contractual	  obligation,	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  applying	  
an	  objective	  assessment	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  written	  agreement	  it	  was	  unreasonable	  
for	  the	  Administrator	  to	  require	  that	  the	  Bistro	  be	  open	  for	  lunch	  and	  dinner	  seven	  
days	  a	  week,	  both	  as	  a	  service	  to	  its	  existing	  patrons	  and	  to	  attract	  patronage	  to	  
improve	  the	  Club's	  revenue	  during	  the	  period	  of	  administration.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  
Sunday	  and	  Monday	  trade	  was	  not	  immediately	  profitable,	  and	  that	  to	  open	  the	  Bistro	  
on	  both	  days	  necessitated	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  restructure	  his	  operations,	  perhaps	  by	  a	  
modest	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  of	  some	  food	  items,	  that	  was	  an	  option	  open	  to	  him	  
under	  the	  contract.	  Clause	  2.1	  provided	  that	  he	  was	  to	  have	  full	  control	  over	  the	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delivery	  of	  services	  (subject	  only	  to	  meeting	  reasonable	  standards)	  which	  must	  be	  
taken	  to	  include	  the	  price	  of	  meals	  at	  the	  plaintiff's	  discretion.	  
Her	  Honour	  did	  not	  feel	  it	  necessary	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  other	  issues	  raised	  in	  the	  termination	  
letter.	  The	  plaintiff	  had	  not	  complied	  with	  the	  agreement	  by	  not	  operating	  the	  bistro	  over	  the	  
same	  hours	  as	  the	  opening	  hours	  of	  the	  Club.	  Therefore,	  the	  plaintiff	  failed	  in	  his	  claim	  that	  the	  
agreement	  had	  been	  wrongly	  terminated.	  Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [61]-­‐[62]):	  
...the	  plaintiff	  has	  not	  proved	  that	  the	  company	  was	  in	  breach	  of	  contract	  in	  issuing	  
and	  acting	  upon	  the	  letter	  of	  termination	  and	  accordingly	  he	  has	  no	  entitlement	  to	  
damages	  for	  breach	  of	  contract.	  Even	  were	  I	  satisfied	  that	  it	  was	  unreasonable	  for	  the	  
defendant	  company	  to	  require	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  operate	  the	  Bistro	  in	  conjunction	  with	  
the	  Club's	  trading	  hours,	  and	  that	  termination	  of	  the	  agreement	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  
refusal	  to	  do	  so	  was	  unjustified,	  the	  defendant	  submitted	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  has	  
suffered	  no	  loss	  from	  which	  he	  would	  be	  entitled	  to	  an	  award	  of	  damages,	  having	  fully	  
mitigated	  any	  loss	  that	  he	  suffered	  by	  returning	  to	  paid	  employment....	  
The	  defendant	  company	  was	  also	  awarded	  costs.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/424.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  plaintiff	  in	  this	  case	  said	  that	  the	  Club	  had	  breached	  its	  contract	  with	  him.	  Breaches	  of	  
contract	  can	  be	  very	  serious	  and	  lead	  to	  damages	  being	  payable	  for	  any	  loss	  that	  is	  suffered.	  In	  
this	  case,	  the	  judge	  held	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  breach	  by	  the	  defendant	  Club.	  Rather,	  the	  
Club	  had	  the	  right	  to	  terminate	  the	  contract	  with	  the	  plaintiff	  because	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  
breached	  its	  terms.	  Even	  if	  the	  breach	  by	  the	  Club	  had	  been	  proven,	  Her	  Honour	  said	  that	  the	  
plaintiff	  suffered	  no	  loss	  because	  he	  earned	  more	  in	  other	  employment	  than	  he	  had	  from	  
operating	  the	  bistro.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  loss	  in	  a	  breach	  of	  contract	  case,	  then	  no	  damages	  are	  
payable.	  
2.4.5 PHOENIX LACQUERS & PAINTS PTY LIMITED V FREE WESLEYAN CHURCH OF 
TONGA IN AUSTRALIA INC (ADMINISTRATORS APPOINTED) [2012] NSWSC 214 
(SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BLACK J, 13 MARCH 2012) 
The	  Free	  Wesleyan	  Church	  of	  Tonga	  in	  Australia	  Inc	  (the	  Church)	  is	  incorporated	  under	  the	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act).	  It	  is	  in	  voluntary	  administration	  under	  
Part	  5.3A	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  (Corporations	  Act).	  Although	  it	  is	  an	  incorporated	  
association	  rather	  than	  a	  corporation,	  Part	  5.3A	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  
Church	  by	  section	  54	  of	  the	  Act	  and	  the	  Corporations	  (Ancillary	  Provisions)	  Act	  2001	  (NSW).	  
The	  plaintiff,	  Phoenix	  Lacquers	  &	  Paints	  Pty	  Limited	  (Phoenix),	  objected	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  
resolution	  of	  creditors	  at	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  creditors	  after	  the	  administration	  commenced.	  A	  
resolution	  to	  remove	  and	  replace	  Messrs	  Parbery	  and	  Robinson	  (the	  administrators)	  was	  
rejected	  at	  that	  meeting.	  Phoenix	  applied	  under	  section	  54	  of	  the	  Act,	  sections	  449B	  and	  600C	  
of	  the	  Corporations	  Act,	  regulation	  5.6.26(3)	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Regulations	  2001	  (Cth)	  (the	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Corporations	  Regulations),	  and	  under	  the	  court's	  inherent	  power	  for	  declarations,	  for	  a	  ruling	  
as	  to	  validity	  of	  the	  resolution.	  
The	  Church	  had	  entered	  a	  loan	  agreement	  with	  Phoenix	  on	  29	  August	  2008	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  
$550,000.	  Subsequent	  variations	  of	  that	  loan	  agreement	  to	  increase	  the	  loan	  by	  a	  further	  
$400,000	  were	  made	  on	  26	  September	  2008	  and	  19	  November	  2008,	  for	  a	  total	  principal	  of	  
$950,000.	  The	  loans	  were	  supported	  by	  second	  ranking	  securities	  over	  property	  and	  by	  
guarantees	  given	  by	  several	  persons	  associated	  with	  the	  Church.	  	  
The	  loan	  agreement	  provided	  for	  interest	  at	  between	  5%	  and	  7%	  per	  month,	  compounding	  
monthly.	  Between	  August	  2008	  and	  January	  2012,	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  loan	  and	  interest	  
increased	  to	  $8,845,217.27.	  It	  appears	  that	  interest	  rate	  was	  equivalent	  to	  a	  simple	  interest	  
rate	  of	  22%	  per	  month,	  or	  142%	  per	  annum.	  	  
On	  10	  October	  2009,	  the	  Church	  commenced	  proceedings	  seeking	  relief	  under	  the	  Contracts	  
Review	  Act	  1980	  (NSW)	  (the	  Contracts	  Review	  Act)	  and	  under	  sections	  12CA,	  12CB	  and	  12GM	  
of	  the	  Australian	  Securities	  and	  Investments	  Commission	  Act	  2001	  (Cth).	  This	  relief	  was	  in	  
respect	  of	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  loan,	  including	  declarations	  that	  the	  rates	  of	  interest	  in	  respect	  of	  
each	  of	  the	  transactions	  was	  excessive,	  harsh	  and	  unconscionable.	  The	  Church	  sought	  an	  order	  
that	  the	  transaction	  be	  voided	  or	  varied	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  reasonable	  commercial	  rate	  of	  
interest.	  A	  little	  over	  two	  weeks	  later,	  Phoenix	  brought	  proceedings	  to	  wind	  up	  the	  Church	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  insolvency	  and	  for	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  liquidator	  (Mr	  Riad	  Tayeh).	  	  
On	  12	  January	  2012,	  Westpac	  Banking	  Corporation	  (Westpac)	  appointed	  administrators	  to	  the	  
Church	  under	  section	  436C	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  and	  section	  54	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  
administrators	  were	  also	  appointed	  as	  administrators	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  Tongan	  Arts	  and	  
Culture	  Incorporated	  on	  the	  same	  date.	  Notice	  was	  given	  on	  that	  date	  of	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  
creditors	  of	  the	  Church	  to	  be	  held	  on	  20	  January	  2012.	  	  
Phoenix	  submitted	  a	  proof	  of	  debt	  to	  the	  administrators	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $9,795,217.27	  
(made	  up	  of	  the	  principal	  of	  $950,000	  and	  interest	  of	  $8,845,217.27).	  Phoenix	  also	  appointed	  a	  
proxy	  to	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  creditors,	  and	  approved	  Messrs	  Tayeh	  and	  de	  Vries	  as	  
replacement	  administrators	  if	  the	  administrators	  were	  to	  be	  replaced	  at	  the	  meeting.	  
The	  administrators	  sought	  an	  opinion	  from	  their	  legal	  advisors	  as	  to	  the	  proof	  of	  debt	  
submitted	  by	  Phoenix.	  The	  advice	  was	  that	  only	  $1,234,601.37,	  made	  up	  of	  the	  principal	  of	  
$950,000	  and	  interest	  of	  $284,601.37	  calculated	  at	  Supreme	  Court	  interest	  rates,	  should	  be	  
admitted	  to	  proof.	  The	  solicitors	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  ‘the	  interest	  rate	  charged	  is	  clearly	  
far	  in	  excess	  of	  any	  rate	  that	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  reasonable	  commercial	  rate	  and	  is	  
oppressive’	  and	  drew	  attention	  to	  case	  law	  as	  to	  the	  level	  of	  interest	  which	  had	  been	  
permitted	  in	  cases	  brought	  under	  the	  Contracts	  Review	  Act.	  The	  administrators	  also	  sought	  
other	  advice	  and	  ultimately	  admitted	  an	  amount	  of	  $1,480,504.11	  to	  proof	  as	  a	  just	  amount	  
owing	  to	  Phoenix,	  based	  on	  a	  simple	  interest	  rate	  of	  15%	  per	  annum.	  	  
A	  motion	  to	  remove	  the	  administrators	  and	  appoint	  Messrs	  Tayeh	  and	  de	  Vries	  as	  
administrators	  was	  moved	  at	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  creditors	  of	  the	  Church	  on	  20	  January	  2012.	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A	  majority	  in	  number	  of	  the	  creditors	  voted	  for	  the	  resolution.	  However,	  a	  majority	  in	  value,	  
calculated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  lower	  amount	  for	  which	  Phoenix's	  proof	  of	  debt	  had	  been	  
admitted,	  voted	  against	  it.	  Mr	  Parbery	  exercised	  his	  casting	  vote	  against	  it,	  under	  regulation	  
5.6.21(4)(c)	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Regulations.	  Mr	  Parbery,	  who	  was	  the	  chairperson	  of	  the	  
meeting,	  gave	  short	  reasons	  for	  his	  decision	  to	  exercise	  his	  casting	  vote	  against	  the	  resolution,	  
noting	  that	  it	  was	  based	  on	  legal	  advice	  and	  that	  he	  believed	  it	  to	  be	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  
creditors.	  	  
In	  this	  application,	  Phoenix	  sought	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  motion	  to	  remove	  the	  administrators	  
had	  been	  carried	  at	  the	  meeting,	  and	  that	  therefore	  the	  administrators	  had	  been	  removed,	  
with	  Messrs	  Tayeh	  and	  de	  Vries	  replacing	  them.	  Phoenix	  contended	  that	  the	  value	  of	  its	  debt	  
should	  not	  have	  been	  reduced.	  Its	  value	  was	  established	  by	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  loan	  and	  Mr	  
Parbery	  was	  not	  entitled	  to	  admit	  Phoenix	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  ‘just	  estimate’	  of	  the	  value	  
of	  that	  debt	  under	  regulation	  5.6.23	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Regulations.	  Phoenix	  also	  contended	  
that	  the	  prospects	  of	  any	  legal	  challenge	  to	  its	  debt	  were	  not	  such	  that	  it	  could	  be	  admitted	  
other	  than	  in	  full.	  	  
His	  Honour	  firmly	  rejected	  all	  these	  contentions.	  His	  Honour	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  Church	  had	  
at	  least	  some	  prospect	  of	  success	  under	  section	  12C	  of	  the	  Australian	  Securities	  and	  
Investments	  Commission	  Act	  2001	  (Cth),	  which	  deals	  with	  unconscionability	  in	  transactions	  
(including	  loans).	  He	  also	  held	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  irregularity	  in	  the	  meeting	  procedure,	  
and	  that	  there	  was	  no	  basis	  to	  support	  the	  removal	  and	  replacement	  of	  the	  administrators.	  
The	  application	  was	  dismissed	  with	  costs	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  plaintiff.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-­‐
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/214.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Some	  parts	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  apply	  to	  incorporated	  associations,	  particularly	  those	  
relating	  to	  insolvency.	  In	  this	  case,	  Westpac	  Banking	  Corporation	  exercised	  its	  right	  as	  a	  
creditor	  to	  appoint	  administrators	  to	  the	  Church	  under	  part	  5.3A	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act.	  The	  
other	  aspect	  of	  the	  case	  deals	  with	  the	  obtaining	  of	  loans.	  Although	  this	  was	  a	  loan	  secured	  by	  
second	  ranking	  securities	  which	  would	  normally	  lead	  to	  higher	  interest	  rates	  being	  applied,	  the	  
Church	  in	  this	  case	  had	  not	  looked	  carefully	  at	  the	  actual	  interest	  rates	  which	  were	  applicable	  
and	  so	  found	  itself	  in	  financial	  difficulty.	  Clearly	  this	  type	  of	  transaction	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  
serious	  financial	  consequences.	  A	  board	  or	  management	  committee	  of	  a	  nonprofit	  
organisation	  has	  to	  take	  great	  care	  in	  committing	  their	  organisation	  to	  this	  type	  of	  loan.	  Board	  
and	  management	  committee	  members	  have	  obligations	  to	  ensure	  they	  read	  carefully	  and	  
understand	  financial	  and	  other	  documents	  relating	  to	  decisions	  before	  the	  board	  or	  
committee,	  including	  asking	  question	  s	  where	  necessary.	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2.4.6  RE CANDY KIDS APPEAL TRUST (OFFICE OF THE SCOTTISH CHARITY 
REGULATOR, 16 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  decision	  taken	  under	  section	  28	  of	  the	  Charities	  and	  Trustee	  Investment	  (Scotland)	  
Act	  2005	  (the	  Act),	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Charity	  Regulator	  (OSCR).	  The	  outcome	  was	  a	  
protection	  order	  for	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  Candy	  Kids	  Appeal	  Trust	  (the	  charity).	  
The	  charity	  was	  set	  up	  under	  a	  Trust	  Deed	  and	  was	  recognised	  as	  a	  Scottish	  charity	  on	  1	  
October	  1997.	  The	  charity’s	  purposes	  were:	  
The	  relief	  of	  poverty	  and	  the	  advancement	  of	  education	  by	  inter	  alia	  advising	  and	  
assisting	  members	  of	  the	  community	  who	  are,	  or	  may	  be	  entitled	  to,	  be	  in	  receipt	  of	  
state	  benefits	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  their	  entitlement	  to	  such	  benefits	  and	  to	  help	  such	  
people	  with	  their	  claims	  wherever	  possible	  and	  to	  do	  all	  things	  as	  will	  properly	  attain	  
the	  above	  purposes.	  	  
The	  charity	  was	  first	  brought	  to	  OSCR’s	  attention	  in	  June	  2007	  when	  a	  complaint	  was	  received	  
alleging	  that	  the	  charity’s	  collectors	  were	  misrepresenting	  the	  charity’s	  purposes	  to	  the	  public	  
while	  carrying	  out	  street	  collections	  using	  collection	  cans.	  OSCR	  established	  that	  the	  
allegations	  were	  broadly	  correct.	  	  
The	  charity’s	  only	  means	  of	  raising	  funds	  was	  through	  ‘can	  collections’,	  but	  the	  charity	  trustees	  
exercised	  little	  control	  over	  their	  collectors	  and	  had	  no	  written	  agreements	  or	  guidance	  in	  
place	  with	  respect	  to	  them.	  It	  was	  OSCR’s	  view	  that	  collectors	  could	  be	  misleading	  the	  public	  
as	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  charity.	  The	  labels	  on	  the	  collection	  cans	  carried	  the	  name	  of	  the	  
charity	  ‘Candy	  Kids	  Appeal	  Trust’,	  along	  with	  the	  charity’s	  logo	  which	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  teddy	  
bear	  holding	  a	  bunch	  of	  balloons.	  Both	  of	  these	  clearly	  suggested	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  
charity	  was	  linked	  to	  children	  and	  both	  were	  thought	  likely	  to	  mislead	  the	  public	  as	  to	  the	  true	  
nature	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  charity	  and	  the	  activities	  it	  was	  engaged	  in.	  
On	  3	  December	  2007,	  the	  OSCR	  issued	  an	  order	  under	  section	  12(3)	  of	  the	  Act	  for	  the	  charity	  
to	  change	  its	  name.	  The	  OSCR	  was	  never	  notified	  if	  this	  had	  been	  done.	  Then,	  in	  July	  2008,	  the	  
charity	  trustees	  submitted	  an	  application	  to	  OSCR	  for	  consent	  to	  wind	  up	  the	  charity	  and	  to	  
transfer	  the	  £30,000	  held	  in	  its	  bank	  account	  to	  a	  nominated	  charity	  with	  similar	  purposes.	  
While	  OSCR	  engaged	  with	  the	  charity,	  the	  charity	  did	  not	  complete	  the	  winding	  up	  process.	  
Since	  then,	  despite	  repeated	  attempts,	  the	  OSCR	  was	  unable	  to	  contact	  the	  last	  known	  charity	  
trustees.	  Moreover,	  the	  charity	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  completely	  inactive.	  
The	  OSCR	  considered	  that	  the	  charity	  trustees’	  failure	  to	  complete	  the	  winding	  up	  process	  and	  
failure	  to	  ensure	  the	  proper	  application	  of	  the	  charity’s	  assets	  to	  be	  breaches	  of	  charity	  
trustees’	  duties,	  and	  serious	  misconduct	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  charity.	  Therefore,	  
perceiving	  a	  need	  to	  protect	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  charity,	  on	  13	  February	  2012	  OSCR	  served	  a	  
notice	  directing	  the	  Clydesdale	  Bank	  (the	  charity’s	  bank)	  under	  section	  31(7)	  of	  the	  Act	  not	  to	  
part	  with	  property	  it	  was	  holding	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  charity	  without	  OSCR’s	  consent.	  	  
The	  decision	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.oscr.org.uk/media/300131/2012-­‐02-­‐
16_section_33_report_candy_kids.pdf	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
There	  were	  several	  issues	  of	  importance	  in	  this	  situation:	  
• Misleading	  the	  public	  in	  street	  collections;	  
• Failure	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  street	  collectors	  and	  the	  moneys	  they	  collected;	  
• Failure	  to	  adopt	  a	  suitable	  name	  for	  the	  charity,	  which	  would	  not	  mislead	  the	  public;	  
• Failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  regulator’s	  directions;	  
• Failure	  to	  complete	  the	  winding	  up	  process,	  which	  resulted	  in	  wasting	  of	  the	  charity’s	  
funds	  in	  paying	  rent	  etc	  without	  any	  charitable	  purpose	  being	  served.	  
Failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  winding	  up	  process	  will	  result	  in	  OSCR	  applying	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  
Session	  to	  take	  action	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  misconduct	  and	  to	  appoint	  a	  Judicial	  Factor	  to	  transfer	  
the	  charitable	  funds	  to	  another	  charity	  with	  similar	  purposes.	  	  
	  
2.4.7 YOUNG V HER MAJESTY’S ATTORNEY-GENERAL, WEDGWOOD PLAN TRUSTEE 
LIMITED AND THE PENSION PROTECTION FUND [2011] EWHC 3782 (HIGH COURT 
OF JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION, PURLE J, 19 DECEMBER 2011) 
This	  case	  dealt	  with	  matters	  subsequent	  to	  the	  insolvency	  of	  Waterford	  Wedgwood	  Limited	  
(the	  company)	  in	  2009.	  The	  insolvency	  of	  the	  company	  left	  an	  unfunded	  pension	  liability	  of	  
£134	  million.	  Under	  section	  75	  of	  the	  Pension	  Act	  1995	  (UK),	  the	  last	  remaining	  solvent	  
company	  in	  a	  group	  carries	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  pension	  liability	  of	  the	  group.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
Wedgwood	  Museum	  Trust	  Limited	  (the	  museum	  company)	  was	  the	  last	  remaining	  solvent	  
company	  in	  the	  Wedgwood	  group.	  The	  museum	  company	  held	  a	  valuable	  collection	  of	  
Wedgwood	  artefacts	  and	  paintings.	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  there	  were	  two	  points	  to	  be	  decided.	  The	  first	  was	  whether	  the	  collection	  
was	  property	  beneficially	  owned	  by	  the	  museum	  company	  or	  whether	  it	  was	  held	  by	  the	  
museum	  company	  as	  a	  charitable	  trust.	  If	  the	  collection	  was	  charitable	  trust	  property	  it	  would	  
not	  be	  available	  for	  distribution	  to	  creditors,	  but	  if	  it	  was	  merely	  beneficial	  property	  of	  the	  
museum	  company	  it	  would	  be	  available.	  The	  second	  point	  for	  decision	  concerned	  availability	  
of	  the	  collection	  in	  any	  event	  via	  a	  trustee’s	  right	  of	  indemnity.	  Since	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  
collection	  was	  not	  a	  charitable	  trust,	  the	  second	  point	  did	  not	  need	  to	  be	  considered.	  
The	  collection	  was	  originally	  the	  beneficial	  property	  of	  the	  company.	  The	  museum	  company	  
had	  been	  incorporated	  in	  1962	  and	  took	  the	  collection	  from	  the	  company	  as	  a	  gift	  in	  1964.	  A	  
separate	  charitable	  company	  was	  set	  up	  in	  order	  to	  insulate	  the	  collection	  from	  any	  adverse	  
trading	  situations	  occurring	  in	  the	  company.	  The	  intention	  was	  apparently	  to	  set	  up	  the	  
collection	  in	  perpetuity	  with	  the	  property	  totally	  inalienable.	  However,	  the	  deed	  of	  gift	  did	  not	  
reflect	  those	  intentions,	  because	  it	  did	  not	  set	  up	  a	  separate	  charitable	  trust	  which	  put	  the	  
collection	  outside	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  museum	  company.	  
By	  2009,	  when	  the	  Wedgwood	  group	  of	  companies	  became	  insolvent,	  the	  small	  group	  of	  
employees	  managing	  the	  museum	  had	  been	  moved	  to	  the	  separate	  employment	  of	  the	  
museum	  company,	  but	  were	  still	  participants	  in	  the	  Wedgwood	  group	  pension	  plan.	  The	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Pension	  Act	  1995	  (UK)	  (the	  Act)	  employs	  a	  ‘last	  man	  standing’	  rule,	  so	  that	  the	  entire	  pension	  
plan	  debt	  of	  the	  Wedgwood	  group	  fell	  to	  the	  museum	  company	  as	  the	  last	  remaining	  solvent	  
member	  of	  the	  group.	  
The	  collection	  was	  valued	  at	  between	  £11.6	  million	  and	  £18	  million.	  The	  liability	  due	  to	  the	  
museum’s	  own	  employees	  was	  about	  £100,000,	  but	  the	  whole	  group	  pension	  debt	  was	  £134	  
million.	  Thus,	  the	  museum	  company	  also	  became	  insolvent	  and	  was	  placed	  into	  
administration.	  Its	  assets	  then	  became	  available	  for	  distribution	  to	  the	  pension	  creditors.	  	  
Was	  the	  collection	  held	  as	  a	  charitable	  trust?	  His	  Honour	  could	  find	  no	  evidence	  that	  this	  was	  
the	  case.	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  deed	  of	  gift	  of	  1964	  indicated	  a	  trust	  with	  the	  museum	  
company	  as	  the	  beneficiary	  but	  no	  charitable	  sub-­‐trust.	  There	  was	  nothing	  to	  indicate	  any	  
trust	  purposes	  within	  the	  general	  purposes	  of	  the	  charitable	  company.	  Thus,	  the	  museum	  
company	  became	  the	  beneficial	  owner	  of	  the	  collection	  at	  that	  point.	  The	  collection	  was	  not	  
held	  under	  a	  charitable	  trust.	  
The	  nature	  of	  the	  collection	  holding	  was	  not	  altered	  by	  two	  gifts	  given	  to	  the	  collection,	  one	  
from	  Dr	  Ralph	  Vaughan	  Williams	  (related	  by	  marriage	  to	  the	  Wedgwoods)	  in	  1944,	  and	  one	  
from	  Miss	  Phoebe	  Wedgwood	  in	  1967.	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  on	  the	  available	  evidence	  both	  
gifts	  were	  unconditional	  gifts	  to	  the	  company	  which	  passed	  subsequently	  to	  the	  museum	  
company.	  
Thus,	  the	  collection	  was	  held	  to	  be	  available	  in	  the	  insolvency	  to	  meet	  the	  liabilities	  owed	  to	  
creditors	  of	  the	  museum	  company,	  which	  were	  small	  and	  well	  within	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  
museum	  company	  to	  meet.	  However,	  these	  liabilities	  also	  included	  the	  substantial	  pension	  
deficit	  liability	  across	  the	  whole	  Wedgwood	  group.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2011/3782.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  Attorney-­‐General	  in	  this	  case	  argued	  for	  a	  charitable	  trust	  to	  be	  found,	  but	  announced	  on	  
23	  March	  2012	  that	  the	  decision	  would	  not	  be	  appealed	  because	  there	  was	  no	  basis	  in	  law	  for	  
an	  appeal.	  Both	  the	  Pension	  Protection	  Fund	  and	  the	  insolvency	  firm	  dealing	  with	  the	  matter	  
have	  publicly	  stated	  that	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  the	  collection	  needlessly	  sold	  off,	  but	  the	  
combination	  of	  legislative	  provisions	  at	  work	  in	  this	  situation	  means	  that	  there	  are	  few	  
options.	  
The	  museum	  employed	  only	  five	  of	  the	  total	  7,000	  employees	  of	  the	  group,	  yet	  it	  had	  to	  bear	  
the	  entire	  liability	  of	  the	  pensions	  owing.	  This	  illustrated	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  charitable	  
company	  and	  a	  charitable	  trust	  in	  English	  law.	  Under	  insolvency	  law,	  the	  property	  of	  a	  
charitable	  company	  becomes	  available	  to	  creditors	  in	  an	  insolvency,	  but	  not	  that	  of	  a	  
charitable	  trust	  (because	  property	  of	  a	  trust	  is	  held	  for	  the	  object	  of	  the	  trust	  –	  the	  
beneficiaries	  or	  a	  charitable	  purpose).	  If	  the	  Wedgwood	  Museum	  had	  been	  created	  as	  a	  
charitable	  trust	  the	  outcome	  would	  have	  been	  different.	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2.5 MEMBERSHIP AND OFFICE 
2.5.1  PLENTY V ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA [2012] SASC 218 
(SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, VANSTONE J, 4 DECEMBER 2012) 
This	  case	  arose	  from	  the	  hearing	  of	  Plenty	  v	  Seventh	  Day	  Adventist	  Church	  of	  Port	  Pirie	  [2009]	  
SASC	  10	  (the	  2009	  judgement;	  see	  casenote).	  That	  case	  concerned	  the	  ‘disfellowshipping’	  of	  
Mr	  and	  Mrs	  Plenty	  from	  the	  Seventh	  Day	  Adventist	  Church	  (the	  Church).	  The	  Church	  is	  an	  
unincorporated	  body.	  
The	  2009	  judgement	  arose	  from	  a	  long-­‐standing	  dispute	  between	  the	  Church	  and	  Mr	  and	  Mrs	  
Plenty,	  dating	  from	  the	  1970s,	  which	  culminated	  in	  the	  expulsion	  of	  the	  Plentys	  from	  
membership	  of	  the	  Church	  (referred	  to	  as	  disfellowshipment)	  on	  1	  December	  1979.	  In	  March	  
2003,	  Justice	  Duggan	  had	  granted	  the	  Plentys	  a	  declaration	  that	  their	  disfellowshipment	  was	  
null	  and	  void,	  based	  on	  denial	  of	  natural	  justice:	  Plenty	  &	  Plenty	  v	  Seventh-­‐Day	  Adventist	  
Church	  of	  Port	  Pirie	  [2003]	  SASC	  68.	  In	  a	  subsequent	  action,	  the	  Plentys	  claimed	  damages	  in	  
both	  contract	  and	  tort.	  Both	  remedies	  were	  denied	  by	  Justice	  Duggan	  in	  November	  2006:	  
Plenty	  &	  Plenty	  v	  Seventh-­‐Day	  Adventist	  Church	  of	  Port	  Pirie	  [2006]	  SASC	  361.	  The	  Plentys	  
appealed	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  damages	  in	  contract,	  damages	  in	  tort,	  denial	  of	  natural	  justice,	  loss	  
of	  proprietary	  rights	  and	  damage	  to	  reputation.	  The	  church	  cross-­‐appealed.	  The	  Full	  Court	  of	  
the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  South	  Australia	  allowed	  the	  cross-­‐appeal,	  set	  aside	  the	  declaration,	  and	  
found	  no	  basis	  for	  damages	  on	  any	  of	  the	  grounds	  advanced.	  Damages	  for	  breach	  of	  an	  
unincorporated	  association’s	  rules	  cannot	  give	  rise	  to	  damages	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  contract.	  
Subsequent	  to	  that	  hearing,	  the	  Plentys	  engaged	  in	  much	  other	  related	  litigation,	  and	  in	  this	  
case	  asserted	  an	  allegation	  of	  bias	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  judge.	  They	  requested	  that	  she	  remove	  
herself	  from	  the	  case.	  	  
The	  Plentys’	  allegation	  of	  bias	  was	  based	  on	  certain	  matters	  arising	  from	  the	  2009	  judgement.	  
In	  that	  case,	  a	  letter	  was	  in	  evidence	  which	  was	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  decision.	  The	  Plentys	  also	  
asserted	  that	  in	  the	  2009	  judgement	  the	  judges	  in	  that	  matter	  (one	  of	  whom	  was	  Vanstone	  J)	  
had	  ‘made	  serious	  judgments	  of	  the	  most	  wounding	  to	  our	  characters	  and	  reputation’.	  It	  was	  
further	  contended	  that	  the	  Plentys’	  character	  and	  reputation	  was	  a	  substantial	  issue	  in	  this	  
action.	  
The	  test	  for	  bias	  in	  a	  civil	  case	  was	  set	  out	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Ebner	  v	  Official	  Trustee	  in	  
Bankruptcy	  [2000]	  HCA	  63.	  It	  is	  whether	  (at	  [6]):	  
...a	  fair-­‐minded	  lay	  observer	  might	  reasonably	  apprehend	  that	  the	  judge	  might	  not	  
bring	  an	  impartial	  mind	  to	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  question	  the	  judge	  is	  required	  to	  
decide.	  That	  principle	  gives	  effect	  to	  the	  requirement	  that	  justice	  should	  both	  be	  done	  
and	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  done,	  the	  requirement	  which	  reflects	  the	  fundamental	  importance	  
of	  the	  principle	  that	  the	  tribunal	  be	  independent	  and	  impartial.	  It	  is	  convenient	  to	  
refer	  to	  it	  as	  the	  apprehension	  of	  bias	  principle.	  
In	  the	  2009	  decision,	  the	  primary	  judgement	  on	  appeal	  was	  made	  by	  Gray	  J,	  and	  his	  reasons	  
were	  concurred	  with	  by	  Anderson	  and	  Vanstone	  JJ.	  Vanstone	  J	  made	  a	  short	  separate	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judgement	  on	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  the	  appeal,	  concerning	  the	  admissibility	  and	  use	  of	  a	  letter	  
written	  by	  the	  plaintiffs	  to	  the	  Deputy	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation.	  At	  trial,	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  
cross-­‐examined	  on	  the	  letter	  by	  counsel	  for	  the	  defendant,	  and	  the	  letter	  was	  tendered.	  
Counsel’s	  cross-­‐examination	  revealed	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  plaintiffs’	  credibility	  and	  
objectivity.	  
Vanstone	  J	  had	  made	  the	  following	  comment	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  point	  of	  the	  appeal	  (at	  [117]):	  	  
The	  letter	  was	  admitted	  and,	  in	  my	  view,	  correctly	  so.	  The	  judge	  made	  no	  remark	  as	  to	  
any	  limitation	  on	  use	  of	  the	  exhibit.	  I	  consider	  it	  was	  relevant,	  not	  only	  to	  the	  other	  
battles	  which	  Mr	  and	  Mrs	  Plenty	  were	  waging	  on	  various	  fronts	  over	  an	  extended	  
period	  of	  time,	  but	  also	  to	  their	  credibility,	  their	  perception	  of	  events,	  and	  to	  their	  
habit	  of	  imputing	  malice	  to	  others.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  assertion	  in	  the	  ground	  of	  appeal,	  it	  
was	  not	  sought	  to	  be	  used	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  truthfulness	  of	  the	  assertions	  made	  by	  
Mr	  and	  Mrs	  Plenty	  within	  it	  but,	  rather,	  to	  demonstrate	  an	  attitude	  of	  mind	  which	  
pervaded	  their	  dealings	  with	  numerous	  public	  office	  holders.	  
Her	  Honour	  agreed	  to	  remove	  herself	  from	  the	  case.	  She	  said	  (at	  [9]–[10]):	  
I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  I	  would	  have	  disqualified	  myself	  purely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  joining	  in	  
the	  decision	  and	  agreeing	  with	  the	  reasons	  of	  Gray	  J.	  However,	  I	  accept	  that	  my	  
observations	  about	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  letter	  and	  the	  potential	  use	  of	  the	  letter	  could	  
cause	  a	  fair-­‐minded	  observer	  to	  apprehend	  that	  I	  might	  not	  bring	  an	  impartial	  mind	  to	  
bear	  on	  the	  plaintiffs’	  application.	  In	  what	  I	  then	  said,	  I	  was	  discussing	  the	  possible	  
evidentiary	  uses	  of	  the	  letter	  and	  refuting	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  decisions	  of	  Duggan	  J	  to	  
admit	  the	  letter.	  I	  was	  not	  expressing	  a	  view	  of	  my	  own	  as	  to	  what	  the	  letter	  actually	  
demonstrated	  about	  the	  character	  of	  its	  authors.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  accept	  that	  the	  
language	  I	  used	  and	  the	  way	  I	  dealt	  with	  this	  issue	  might	  suggest	  to	  the	  reasonable	  
observer	  that	  I	  found	  the	  letter	  to	  be	  telling	  in	  a	  number	  of	  respects	  and	  in	  a	  way	  
adverse	  to	  the	  plaintiffs’	  credibility.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/2012/218.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  2009	  appeal	  decision	  dealt	  with	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  an	  unincorporated	  association.	  No	  
damages	  were	  held	  to	  be	  payable	  on	  any	  basis.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  unincorporated	  
associations	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  formed	  without	  property	  and	  without	  giving	  their	  members	  any	  
civil	  right	  of	  a	  proprietary	  nature.	  In	  addition,	  bring	  an	  action	  in	  contract	  presents	  a	  problem	  as	  
it	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  join	  all	  the	  association	  members,	  including	  the	  plaintiff,	  as	  defendants	  
to	  the	  action	  (since	  the	  association	  itself	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  person	  or	  entity).	  Whilst	  representative	  
actions	  are	  possible,	  where	  the	  members	  represent	  the	  ‘association’	  as	  defendant,	  there	  are	  
technical	  difficulties	  still	  present	  in	  such	  actions.	  Actions	  against	  other	  members	  which	  exclude	  
the	  plaintiff	  as	  a	  member	  result	  in	  personal	  liability	  of	  the	  other	  members.	  Where	  there	  has	  
been	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  association’s	  rules,	  any	  resolution	  to	  that	  effect	  would	  simply	  be	  void,	  
and	  no	  breach	  of	  contract	  would	  be	  found.	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The	  decided	  cases	  tend	  to	  show	  that	  the	  most	  that	  can	  be	  said	  of	  the	  arrangements	  between	  
members	  and	  the	  association	  in	  the	  case	  of	  unincorporated	  associations	  where	  there	  is	  no	  
proprietary	  right	  involved	  (which	  can	  include	  rights	  of	  property,	  livelihood	  or	  trade),	  is	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  ‘consensual	  compact’	  present.	  Such	  a	  compact	  does	  not	  embrace	  any	  intention	  to	  
create	  enforceable	  legal	  relations.	  
	  
2.5.2  RANA V SURVERY [2012] NSWCA 394 (NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL, 
BEAZLEY JA, 3 DECEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  arising	  out	  of	  a	  previous	  hearing	  (see	  casenote	  for	  Rana	  v	  Survery	  (No	  2)	  
[2012]	  NSWSC	  905).	  The	  appellants	  had	  brought	  proceedings	  against,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  third	  
respondent,	  the	  Islamic	  Association	  of	  Western	  Suburbs	  Sydney	  Inc	  (the	  Association),	  seeking	  a	  
declaration	  that	  the	  expulsion	  or	  suspension	  of	  116	  named	  persons	  from	  membership	  of	  the	  
Association	  as	  from	  2	  January	  2012	  was	  invalid	  and	  of	  no	  effect.	  The	  respondents	  brought	  a	  
cross-­‐claim	  seeking	  a	  declaration	  as	  to	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  Association.	  Various	  orders	  
were	  made	  by	  Pembroke	  J	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  that	  hearing.	  
The	  appellants	  filed	  a	  notice	  of	  appeal	  on	  3	  October	  2012	  in	  which	  they	  sought	  the	  judgment	  
and	  orders	  made	  by	  Pembroke	  J	  to	  be	  set	  aside.	  The	  appellants	  sought,	  in	  lieu	  of	  those	  orders,	  
the	  declarations	  they	  claimed	  at	  first	  instance	  as	  to	  the	  invalidity	  of	  the	  expulsion	  or	  
suspension	  of	  certain	  members	  of	  the	  Association	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  School	  Board.	  
There	  was	  no	  possibility	  of	  a	  stay	  of	  the	  court’s	  orders,	  so	  Her	  Honour	  in	  this	  appeal	  treated	  
the	  application	  as	  one	  for	  an	  injunction.	  
The	  dispute	  as	  to	  membership	  dates	  back	  to	  at	  least	  2010,	  and	  possibly	  earlier.	  There	  was	  also	  
a	  dispute	  between	  the	  parties	  as	  to	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  the	  fourth	  respondent,	  
The	  Australian	  Islamic	  College	  of	  Sydney	  Limited.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  dispute	  is	  that	  the	  current	  
board	  is	  split	  6/5	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  respondents	  to	  this	  appeal.	  However,	  a	  quorum	  consists	  of	  
seven	  members.	  Therefore,	  since	  no	  members	  of	  the	  appellant	  camp	  have	  attended	  the	  last	  
six	  meetings,	  no	  business	  has	  been	  able	  to	  be	  conducted.	  Nor	  has	  an	  AGM	  been	  able	  to	  be	  
held	  since	  October	  2010.	  
The	  second	  appellant,	  Mr	  Sami,	  is	  the	  Vice	  President	  of	  the	  Association,	  having	  been	  elected	  to	  
the	  current	  Executive	  Council	  at	  the	  last	  election	  held	  on	  10	  October	  2010.	  Mr	  Sami	  deposed	  in	  
an	  affidavit	  to	  there	  having	  been	  550	  members	  of	  the	  Association	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  October	  
2010	  election;	  and	  approximately	  300	  members	  participated	  in	  the	  election.	  However,	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  orders	  made	  by	  Pembroke	  J,	  202	  of	  those	  550	  members	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  vote	  or	  
to	  stand	  for	  election	  or	  re-­‐election	  to	  the	  Executive	  Council	  at	  future	  elections.	  	  
Mr	  Sami	  deposed	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  his	  Honour's	  declaration	  was	  that	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  
membership	  is	  now	  only	  35	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  membership	  that	  voted	  in	  2010.	  Mr	  Sami	  also	  
said	  that,	  should	  the	  elections	  proceed	  and	  this	  appeal	  succeed,	  the	  appellants	  would	  
challenge	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Executive	  Council	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  was	  invalid,	  in	  that	  65	  per	  
cent	  of	  the	  active	  membership	  was	  unable	  to	  vote.	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The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Association	  requires	  that	  an	  AGM	  be	  held	  at	  least	  once	  in	  each	  
calendar	  year	  and	  within	  eight	  weeks	  after	  the	  expiration	  of	  each	  financial	  year	  of	  the	  
Association:	  Constitution,	  clause	  24.	  As	  there	  has	  not	  been	  an	  AGM	  for	  a	  period	  of	  more	  than	  
two	  years,	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  Association	  have	  continued	  to	  be	  ‘run’	  by	  the	  current	  board.	  
However,	  the	  Board	  continues	  to	  be	  deadlocked.	  Moreover,	  the	  appellants	  have	  said	  that	  they	  
will	  continue	  to	  appeal	  the	  matters	  in	  dispute	  until	  they	  achieve	  the	  outcome	  they	  seek.	  
Her	  Honour	  had	  little	  sympathy	  with	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  appellants.	  She	  said	  (at	  [23]–[25]):	  
In	  my	  opinion,	  the	  appellants	  have	  not	  made	  out	  a	  case	  for	  the	  grant	  of	  the	  injunction.	  
Within	  barely	  a	  month	  of	  entering	  into	  an	  agreement	  as	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  affairs	  of	  
the	  Association,	  the	  appellants	  sought	  to	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  the	  very	  matter	  to	  which	  they	  
had	  agreed.	  When	  pressed	  as	  to	  what	  had	  occurred	  since	  the	  agreement	  was	  made	  
that	  had	  changed	  the	  position,	  the	  appellants’	  only	  response	  was	  that	  an	  appeal	  had	  
been	  filed.	  That	  is	  hardly	  any	  response	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  appeal	  was	  filed	  
within	  a	  week	  of	  the	  agreement	  being	  made	  and	  where	  Pembroke	  J's	  judgment	  had	  
been	  available	  to	  the	  parties	  for	  approximately	  seven	  weeks	  before	  the	  agreement	  
was	  entered	  into.	  If	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  for	  the	  appellants	  to	  challenge	  the	  validity	  of	  
any	  election,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  protected	  as	  to	  their	  costs.	  Even	  if	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  the	  
appellants	  will	  not	  be	  so	  protected,	  I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  that	  it	  is	  just	  and	  convenient	  to	  
grant	  the	  injunction,	  for	  the	  reasons	  I	  have	  expressed...Whilst	  there	  may	  be	  a	  
significant	  inconvenience	  to	  the	  appellants	  and	  to	  the	  Association	  if	  fresh	  elections	  
have	  to	  be	  held,	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  itself	  is	  sufficient	  to	  warrant	  the	  exercise	  of	  
discretion	  to	  grant	  the	  injunction.	  In	  this	  regard,	  I	  will	  assume	  for	  present	  purposes	  the	  
Corporations	  Act,	  s	  1322	  as	  to	  procedural	  irregularities	  does	  not	  apply.	  I	  am	  of	  the	  
opinion	  that	  the	  matter	  should	  be	  granted	  expedition.	  The	  affairs	  of	  the	  Association	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  be	  managed	  without	  the	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  election	  
of	  the	  governing	  body.	  
Her	  Honour	  ordered	  that	  the	  matter	  be	  expedited	  by	  limiting	  the	  steps	  required	  for	  an	  appeal,	  
and	  that	  it	  be	  listed	  for	  further	  directions.	  She	  dismissed	  the	  appellants’	  application	  for	  an	  
injunction	  with	  costs.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2012/394.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  is	  another	  case	  of	  an	  association	  becoming	  deadlocked	  in	  internecine	  rivalries	  which	  have	  
caused	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  association	  to	  be	  impossible	  to	  conduct.	  The	  appeal	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  heard	  
in	  full	  and	  Her	  Honour	  was	  concerned	  to	  ensure	  that,	  with	  the	  association	  unable	  to	  function	  
effectively,	  the	  appeal	  should	  be	  expedited	  to	  an	  early	  hearing.	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2.5.3  DE VARDA AND TOV-LEV V THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STRATHFIELD 
AND DISTRICT HEBREW CONGREGATION LTD [2012] NSWSC 1377 (SUPREME 
COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BLACK J, 15 NOVEMBER 2012) 
See	  Nonprofit	  Structure	  and	  Governance,	  case	  note	  2.7.3	  below	  
	  
2.5.4  TSOUKARIS V ROYAL MOTOR YACHT CLUB OF NEW SOUTH WALES LIMITED 
[2012] NSWSC 1190 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, MCCALLUM J, 8 
OCTOBER 2012) 
This	  case	  dealt	  with	  the	  procedure	  underlying	  the	  expulsion	  of	  a	  member	  from	  the	  Royal	  
Motor	  Yacht	  Club	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  Limited	  (the	  Club).	  The	  Club	  is	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  
guarantee.	  The	  plaintiff,	  Tsoukaris,	  had	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Club	  since	  1995,	  and	  held	  a	  
yacht	  berth	  at	  the	  Club’s	  marina	  at	  Point	  Piper	  in	  Sydney	  from	  2000.	  The	  yacht	  berth	  cost	  
$9000,	  and	  involved	  the	  payment	  of	  monthly	  fees.	  
On	  23	  August	  2010,	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  expelled	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Club	  and	  required	  to	  remove	  
his	  vessel	  from	  its	  berth.	  The	  decision	  was	  made	  because	  of	  a	  finding	  that	  guests	  in	  the	  
company	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  boarded	  a	  fellow	  member's	  vessel	  from	  the	  marina	  and	  removed	  
property	  (two	  bags	  of	  ice)	  belonging	  to	  that	  member.	  The	  plaintiff	  contended	  that	  the	  
disciplinary	  process	  against	  him	  was	  flawed	  in	  that	  he	  was	  denied	  procedural	  fairness.	  The	  
Club	  denied	  any	  failure	  to	  afford	  procedural	  fairness	  to	  the	  plaintiff.	  	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  invoking	  the	  common	  law	  in	  such	  situations,	  Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [4]–[5]):	  
The	  existence	  of	  the	  court's	  discretionary	  power	  at	  common	  law	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  
affairs	  of	  a	  voluntary	  tribunal	  has	  long	  been	  recognized,	  notwithstanding	  an	  absence	  of	  
consensus	  as	  to	  the	  source	  of	  that	  jurisdiction....	  At	  times	  identified	  as	  having	  its	  
foundation	  in	  contract,	  the	  jurisdiction	  has	  equally	  been	  characterised	  by	  reference	  to	  
broader	  notions	  of	  justice	  and	  fair	  process	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  private	  rights	  or	  
interests....	  
The	  basic	  issue	  was	  procedural	  fairness.	  Her	  Honour	  explained	  that	  (at	  [9]–[10]):	  
A	  member	  of	  a	  sporting	  or	  social	  club	  charged	  with	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  
club	  and	  facing	  expulsion	  or	  other	  detriment,	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  
club	  permit	  him	  to	  attend	  a	  meeting	  and	  answer	  charges	  against	  him,	  is	  entitled	  to	  
procedural	  fairness	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  natural	  justice	  attach	  to	  the	  misconduct	  
proceedings....	  It	  is	  important,	  however,	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  authority	  of	  such	  
proceedings	  over	  members	  has	  its	  juridical	  foundation	  in	  contract.	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  domestic	  forum	  has	  a	  consensual	  basis,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  no	  rules	  of	  
evidence	  in	  play.	  
The	  plaintiff	  said	  that	  he	  had	  been	  denied	  procedural	  fairness	  in	  two	  ways:	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1. A	  breach	  of	  the	  hearing	  rule,	  in	  that	  he	  was	  not	  given	  sufficient	  notice	  of	  the	  hearing	  at	  
which	  he	  was	  expelled.	  
2. A	  breach	  of	  the	  bias	  rule,	  in	  that	  persons	  voting	  on	  his	  expulsion	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  
the	  original	  incident	  and	  in	  the	  instigation	  of	  the	  disciplinary	  process.	  
Prior	  to	  the	  hearing	  on	  4	  August	  2010,	  it	  was	  alleged	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  circulated	  (at	  a	  
meeting	  on	  9	  June	  2010)	  a	  forged	  email	  from	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  neighbouring	  yacht	  stating	  that	  
the	  plaintiff	  had	  access	  to	  this	  yacht	  at	  any	  time	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  storing	  his	  ice.	  This	  had	  
emerged	  when	  the	  neighbouring	  yacht	  owner	  denied	  that	  he	  had	  sent	  any	  such	  email.	  	  
Her	  Honour	  said	  that	  this	  incident	  was	  not	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  overall	  issue,	  particularly	  since	  the	  
Club	  contended	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  did	  not	  attend	  the	  meeting	  of	  4	  August	  because	  his	  forgery	  
had	  been	  discovered.	  Thus,	  the	  Club’s	  contention	  was	  that	  there	  was	  no	  question	  of	  lack	  of	  
notice.	  Her	  Honour	  agreed.	  The	  plaintiff	  had	  been	  heard	  on	  9	  June	  2010	  when	  he	  distributed	  
to	  the	  board	  a	  forged	  email.	  He	  had	  received	  appropriate	  notice	  of	  the	  later	  hearings	  that	  led	  
to	  his	  expulsion	  from	  the	  Club.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  bias,	  Her	  Honour	  stated	  that	  (at	  [111]–[112]):	  
In	  the	  application	  of	  the	  bias	  rule,	  it	  is	  recognised	  that	  a	  distinction	  is	  to	  be	  drawn	  
between	  domestic,	  consensual	  or	  private	  tribunals	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  statutory	  or	  
public	  tribunals	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  public	  or	  statutory	  tribunal,	  it	  is	  
accepted	  as	  a	  fundamental	  requirement	  that	  justice	  should	  not	  only	  be	  done	  (in	  that	  
the	  matter	  should	  be	  heard	  by	  a	  person	  who	  is	  free	  of	  actual	  bias),	  but	  should	  be	  seen	  
to	  be	  done	  (in	  that	  a	  reasonable	  observer	  would	  not	  have	  apprehended	  bias	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  decision-­‐maker).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  consensual	  tribunal	  such	  as	  the	  board	  of	  
the	  Club	  (exercising	  its	  disciplinary	  powers),	  apprehended	  bias	  as	  distinct	  from	  actual	  
bias	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  disqualify	  a	  member	  from	  participating	  in	  a	  decision....	  
Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  evidence	  disclosed	  no	  question	  of	  bias,	  even	  given	  that	  the	  Club’s	  
Commodore	  and	  Rear	  Commodore	  were	  involved	  in	  both	  the	  initial	  ‘charge’	  and	  its	  
‘prosecution’.	  Her	  Honour	  felt	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  cross-­‐over	  was	  an	  ‘inescapable	  feature’	  of	  
procedure	  in	  clubs	  (at	  [121],	  and	  not	  ‘axiomatically	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  actual	  bias’	  (at	  [122]).	  
Therefore,	  there	  was	  no	  procedural	  unfairness	  involved	  in	  the	  plaintiff’s	  expulsion	  from	  the	  
Club.	  In	  particular,	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  forged	  email	  was	  one	  which	  should	  have	  precluded	  the	  
plaintiff	  from	  any	  relief	  either	  under	  the	  common	  law	  or	  under	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  
(if	  it	  had	  been	  applied,	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  oppression	  provision,	  section	  232).	  Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  
[131])	  ‘To	  grant	  the	  relief	  sought	  would	  aid	  Mr	  Tsoukaris	  to	  derive	  advantage	  from	  his	  own	  
wrong	  (in	  putting	  forward	  a	  false	  denial	  so	  as	  to	  sustain	  the	  relief	  sought)...’.	  
This	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/1190.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  jurisdictional	  basis	  for	  intervening	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  a	  voluntary	  association	  remains	  
contentious.	  In	  this	  case,	  Her	  Honour	  took	  the	  wide	  view	  and	  quoted	  with	  approval	  the	  words	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of	  Tadgell	  JA	  in	  Australian	  Football	  League	  v	  Carlton	  Football	  Club	  Limited	  [1998]	  2	  VR	  546	  at	  
550:	  
Statutes	  aside,	  the	  courts	  have	  been	  disposed	  to	  interfere	  in	  a	  limited	  way	  with	  
decisions	  of	  private	  or	  domestic	  tribunals	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  private	  rights	  that	  have	  
been	  adjudged	  to	  deserve	  protection,	  including	  rights	  in	  property.	  The	  concept	  of	  
property	  has	  been	  broadly	  interpreted	  for	  this	  purpose	  and,	  in	  cases	  within	  that	  
category,	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  no	  decision	  of	  a	  private	  or	  domestic	  tribunal	  with	  
which	  the	  courts	  will	  refuse	  to	  interfere	  if	  interference	  be	  considered	  necessary	  for	  the	  
attainment	  of	  justice.	  
Because	  the	  Club	  is	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee,	  the	  basis	  for	  intervention	  which	  might	  
have	  arisen	  under	  section	  232	  (relating	  to	  oppressive	  conduct)	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  
(Cth)	  could	  have	  applied,	  but	  was	  not	  pursued	  in	  this	  case.	  
	  
2.5.5  RANA V SURVERY (NO 2) [2012] NSWSC 905 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH 
WALES, PEMBROKE J, 10 AUGUST 2012) 
This	  case	  concerned	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Association	  Western	  Suburbs	  Sydney	  Inc	  (the	  
Association).	  The	  principal	  objectives	  of	  the	  Association	  are	  to	  foster	  and	  promote	  Islam	  and	  to	  
assist	  Muslims	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  Islam	  in	  their	  social,	  moral	  and	  spiritual	  lives.	  In	  
particular,	  the	  case	  dealt	  with	  the	  admission	  of	  new	  members	  to	  the	  Association,	  which	  in	  turn	  
necessitated	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  rules	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Association,	  and	  of	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  governing	  statute.	  
On	  21	  November	  2008,	  a	  block	  of	  183	  new	  members	  was	  admitted	  to	  membership	  of	  the	  
Association	  by	  the	  Executive	  Council.	  In	  2008	  the	  statute	  which	  regulated	  the	  Association's	  
affairs	  was	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1984	  (NSW)	  (the	  1984	  Act).	  Its	  successor,	  the	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  (NSW)	  did	  not	  commence	  until	  1	  July	  2010.	  	  
Section	  11(1)	  of	  the	  1984	  Act	  provided	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association	  comply	  
with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  section	  if	  they	  make	  provision	  ‘whether	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  
model	  rules	  or	  otherwise’	  for	  the	  matters	  specified	  in	  Schedule	  1,	  ‘Matters	  to	  be	  provided	  for	  
in	  rules	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association	  and	  in	  model	  rules’,	  and	  any	  other	  matters	  that	  may	  be	  
prescribed.	  There	  were	  no	  matters	  prescribed	  in	  relation	  to	  that	  Act.	  	  
The	  only	  relevant	  matter	  in	  Schedule	  1	  was	  Item	  1,	  ‘Membership	  Qualifications’.	  Section	  19	  of	  
the	  1984	  Act	  was	  of	  particular	  importance	  in	  this	  case.	  Section	  19(2)	  provided	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  
an	  incorporated	  association	  are	  either	  its	  own	  rules,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  comply	  with	  section	  11,	  or	  
the	  model	  rules	  in	  force	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  However,	  the	  model	  rules	  could	  still	  have	  a	  role	  to	  
play	  even	  where	  an	  incorporated	  association	  had	  its	  own	  rules	  that	  comply	  with	  section	  11.	  
Thus	  section	  19(3)	  provided:	  
Where	  in	  relation	  to	  any	  matter	  the	  model	  rules	  make	  provision	  but	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  
incorporated	  association	  do	  not	  make	  provision,	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  model	  rules	  shall,	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in	  relation	  to	  that	  matter,	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  incorporated	  
association.	  
The	  Executive	  Council	  of	  the	  Association	  is	  the	  ‘committee’	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  1984	  Act,	  
regulations	  and	  rules.	  It	  controls	  and	  manages	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  Association	  and	  exercises	  all	  of	  
the	  functions	  and	  powers	  of	  the	  Association	  other	  than	  those	  that	  are	  required	  to	  be	  exercised	  
by	  the	  members	  in	  general	  meeting.	  The	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Association	  provides	  that	  the	  
Executive	  Council	  shall	  consist	  of	  a	  maximum	  of	  11	  members	  and	  a	  minimum	  of	  9	  members	  
elected	  by	  the	  full	  financial	  members	  of	  the	  Association.	  It	  states	  that	  the	  maximum	  of	  11	  and	  
the	  minimum	  of	  9	  shall	  ‘include’	  President,	  Vice-­‐President,	  Secretary,	  Assistant	  Secretary,	  
Treasurer	  and	  six	  Executive	  Council	  Members	  (that	  is,	  11	  persons).	  	  
His	  Honour	  commented	  that	  nothing	  turned	  on	  the	  arithmetical	  ambiguity	  of	  this	  provision.	  He	  
said	  (at	  [5])	  that:	  
...the	  real	  point	  is	  that	  the	  Executive	  Council	  is	  a	  representative	  body	  consisting	  of	  
current	  office	  bearers	  and	  elected	  members,	  which	  has	  wide-­‐ranging	  responsibilities.	  
Those	  responsibilities	  cannot	  be	  delegated	  except	  by	  instrument	  in	  writing.	  The	  
consequence	  is	  that,	  absent	  lawful	  delegation,	  decisions	  about	  the	  management	  of	  the	  
affairs	  of	  the	  Association,	  including	  a	  decision	  about	  the	  approval	  of	  candidates	  for	  
membership,	  will	  not	  be	  effective	  unless	  the	  decision	  has	  been	  made	  by	  the	  Executive	  
Council.	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  a	  threshold	  issue	  as	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  in	  section	  19(3)	  ‘any	  
matter	  [for	  which]	  the	  model	  rules	  make	  provision	  but	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association	  
do	  not’.	  In	  particular,	  the	  question	  was	  whether	  the	  effect	  of	  section	  19(3)	  was	  to	  require	  
comparison	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  model	  rules	  with	  the	  content	  of	  the	  equivalent	  rule	  of	  the	  
incorporated	  association.	  	  
In	  a	  given	  case,	  both	  sets	  of	  rules	  may	  cover	  a	  general	  topic	  such	  as	  membership	  qualifications,	  
but	  they	  may	  do	  so	  differently	  and	  the	  model	  rules	  may	  impose	  more	  detailed	  and	  more	  
extensive	  requirements.	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  model	  rules	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  
an	  incorporated	  association	  was	  thrown	  into	  sharp	  relief	  in	  the	  circumstances	  of	  this	  case	  by	  
the	  marked	  difference	  between	  the	  provisions	  dealing	  with	  membership	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  
Association	  and	  those	  in	  the	  model	  rules.	  	  
His	  Honour	  explained	  that	  section	  11	  of	  the	  1984	  Act	  referred	  to	  the	  ‘several	  matters’	  specified	  
in	  Schedule	  1	  and	  section	  19(3)	  referred	  to	  ‘any	  matter’	  for	  which	  the	  model	  rules	  made	  
provision,	  and	  that	  these	  did	  not	  refer	  to	  ‘quite	  the	  same	  thing’.	  He	  said	  (at	  [10])	  that:	  
It	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	  context	  and	  the	  language	  that	  the	  words	  ‘several	  matters’	  in	  
Section	  11	  refer	  to	  the	  sixteen	  topics	  set	  out	  in	  Schedule	  1	  to	  the	  1984	  Act.	  These	  are	  
general	  topics.	  Section	  19(3)	  has	  a	  different	  purpose.	  It	  is	  concerned,	  as	  I	  have	  
explained,	  with	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  content	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  
incorporated	  association	  with	  those	  of	  the	  model	  rules.	  It	  may	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  
that	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  incorporated	  association	  already	  deal	  with	  each	  of	  the	  general	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topics	  which	  constitute	  the	  ‘several	  matters’	  set	  out	  in	  Schedule	  1.	  If	  they	  did	  not	  do	  
so,	  they	  would	  not	  comply	  with	  Section	  11(1).	  The	  question	  raised	  by	  Section	  19(3)	  
addresses	  a	  different	  matter.	  It	  is	  in	  effect	  whether,	  given	  that	  both	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  
incorporated	  association	  and	  the	  model	  rules	  must	  necessarily	  cover	  the	  topics	  in	  
Schedule	  1,	  do	  the	  model	  rules	  ‘make	  provision’	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  particular	  matter	  in	  
circumstances	  where	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  incorporated	  association	  do	  not?’	  
In	  response	  to	  that	  difference,	  the	  plaintiffs'	  counsel	  submitted	  that	  in	  order	  to	  preclude	  the	  
operation	  of	  section	  19(3),	  the	  Constitution	  ‘only	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  matter,	  not	  the	  content	  
of	  the	  [model]	  rules’.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  approach,	  he	  submitted	  that	  the	  model	  rules	  should	  
not	  be	  included	  in	  the	  Association's	  rules	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  requirements	  for	  membership.	  His	  
Honour	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  this	  submission.	  
His	  Honour	  went	  on	  to	  compare	  Clause	  4	  of	  the	  Association’s	  rules,	  which	  dealt	  with	  
membership	  matters,	  and	  Model	  Rule	  3	  which	  dealt	  with	  the	  same	  issues.	  There	  was	  a	  
‘substantial	  and	  stark’	  difference	  (at	  [14]).	  Clause	  4	  of	  the	  Association's	  rules	  addressed	  the	  
topic	  of	  membership	  of	  the	  Association,	  but	  there	  were	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  membership	  
process	  on	  which	  it	  was	  silent.	  In	  particular,	  Clause	  4	  contained	  no	  provisions	  dealing	  with:	  
• the	  form	  of	  nomination	  for	  membership;	  
• whether	  a	  nomination	  must	  be	  in	  writing;	  
• whether	  it	  must	  be	  signed	  by	  any	  person,	  or	  by	  whom	  the	  nomination	  for	  membership	  
must	  be	  determined;	  
• whether	  that	  determination	  must	  be	  formal	  or	  may	  be	  informal.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  on	  this	  point	  (at	  [12]–[13]):	  
Indeed,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  said	  that	  Clause	  4	  of	  the	  Association's	  rules	  is	  loosely	  drawn	  and	  
leaves	  more	  things	  unsaid	  that	  it	  makes	  clear.	  Among	  other	  things,	  it	  seems	  to	  
contemplate	  implicitly	  that	  the	  Executive	  Council	  should	  have	  the	  power	  to	  determine	  
the	  nomination	  of	  a	  person	  for	  membership,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  say	  so	  expressly.	  In	  fact,	  
all	  that	  it	  says	  expressly	  on	  that	  issue	  is	  that	  the	  Executive	  Council	  has	  the	  right	  to	  
refuse	  membership	  to	  any	  person	  without	  giving	  reasons.	  Model	  Rule	  3	  is	  far	  more	  
comprehensive	  and	  more	  orderly.	  It	  prescribes	  a	  written	  nomination	  in	  the	  form	  set	  
out	  in	  the	  appendix	  to	  the	  model	  rules.	  The	  appendix	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  form	  must	  
be	  signed	  by	  the	  candidate	  and	  the	  proposer	  and	  seconder,	  to	  whom	  the	  candidate	  
must	  be	  known	  personally.	  The	  nomination	  form	  must	  be	  lodged	  with	  the	  secretary	  of	  
the	  association.	  The	  secretary	  must	  refer	  the	  nomination	  to	  the	  committee,	  which	  
must	  approve	  or	  reject	  the	  nomination.	  The	  nominee	  must	  be	  notified	  in	  writing	  of	  his	  
or	  her	  approval	  or	  rejection.	  If	  the	  nomination	  is	  approved,	  time	  limits	  are	  specified	  for	  
the	  payment	  of	  the	  annual	  subscription.	  
In	  this	  case,	  Clause	  4	  of	  the	  Association's	  rules	  did	  not	  make	  any	  provision	  at	  all	  for	  a	  number	  
of	  the	  matters	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  model	  rules.	  His	  Honour	  went	  on	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  model	  
rules	  provided	  clearly	  and	  expressly	  for	  a	  ‘matter’,	  namely	  the	  process	  of	  nomination	  and	  
approval	  for	  membership,	  while	  the	  Association's	  rules	  did	  not.	  Therefore,	  section	  19(3)	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applied	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  and	  Model	  Rule	  3	  was	  included	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  incorporated	  
association.	  	  
Since	  Model	  Rule	  3	  applied	  to	  membership	  applications	  to	  the	  Association,	  then	  the	  183	  new	  
members	  purportedly	  added	  to	  the	  membership	  at	  the	  Executive	  Council	  meeting	  of	  21	  
November	  2008	  were	  invalid	  memberships.	  The	  membership	  forms	  were	  submitted	  en	  masse,	  
there	  were	  no	  appropriate	  resolutions	  by	  the	  Executive	  Council,	  there	  were	  no	  proper	  written	  
records,	  and	  no	  membership	  register.	  
A	  further	  attempt	  at	  adding	  members	  at	  a	  meeting	  held	  on	  16	  July	  2010	  was	  also	  held	  to	  be	  
invalid.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/905.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  Model	  Rules	  in	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Acts	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  used,	  but	  all	  jurisdictions	  
provide	  for	  the	  situation	  where	  there	  are	  ‘gaps’	  in	  an	  association’s	  rules,	  by	  providing	  that	  the	  
Model	  Rules	  will	  apply	  to	  fill	  the	  gaps.	  The	  interaction	  between	  the	  model	  rules	  and	  the	  rules	  
of	  an	  association	  was	  considered	  in	  Young	  v	  Cotter	  [1996]	  NSWCA	  573,	  using	  an	  approach	  
which	  His	  Honour	  followed	  in	  this	  case.	  Sheller	  JA,	  with	  whom	  Meagher	  and	  Handley	  JJA	  
agreed,	  said	  in	  Young	  v	  Cotter	  that:	  
The	  interaction	  of	  the	  model	  rules	  and	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  association	  must	  be	  governed,	  in	  
the	  first	  instance,	  by	  consideration	  of	  the	  matters	  with	  which	  they	  expressly	  deal	  in	  
direct	  terms,	  rather	  than	  by	  consideration	  of	  whether	  clauses	  in	  the	  rules,	  which	  do	  
not	  directly	  deal	  with	  a	  matter	  the	  express	  subject	  of	  the	  model	  rules,	  could	  be	  said	  in	  
some	  general	  sense	  to	  cover	  the	  field.	  
	  
2.5.6  CAMPOLONGO V CLUB MARCONI OF BOSSLEY PARK SOCIAL RECREATION 
AND SPORTING CENTRE LTD [2012] NSWSC 750 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW 
SOUTH WALES, WARD J, 4 JULY 2012) 
The	  plaintiff,	  Campolongo,	  was	  suspended	  from	  membership	  of	  the	  defendant	  club	  (the	  club)	  
in	  November	  2010.	  He	  had	  previously	  succeeded	  in	  action	  to	  stop	  disciplinary	  proceedings	  
against	  him	  by	  the	  club.	  In	  these	  proceedings,	  he	  sought	  declaratory	  relief	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  his	  
suspension	  was	  ‘legally	  ineffectual’,	  and/or	  that	  his	  membership	  of	  the	  club	  remained	  in	  force.	  
Her	  Honour	  dismissed	  his	  claim	  for	  declaratory	  relief	  in	  these	  proceedings.	  
Club	  Marconi	  was	  incorporated	  as	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee	  on	  18	  March	  1957	  under	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Companies	  Act	  1936	  (NSW).	  Its	  objects	  (set	  out	  in	  clause	  10	  of	  its	  
constitution)	  include	  the	  provision	  of	  facilities	  for	  the	  social	  intercourse	  of	  its	  members	  and	  
their	  families	  and	  for	  their	  educational,	  recreational	  and	  sporting	  needs	  and	  the	  promotion	  in	  
general	  of	  the	  social,	  intellectual	  and	  physical	  welfare	  of	  the	  company's	  members	  and	  families.	  
Disciplinary	  proceedings	  are	  brought	  under	  rule	  47	  of	  the	  club’s	  constitution.	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The	  plaintiff	  had	  been	  elected	  to	  the	  board	  of	  the	  club	  in	  1999	  and	  had	  been	  its	  president	  from	  
2000	  until	  2010.	  During	  2010	  an	  investigation	  of	  certain	  financial	  matters	  was	  undertaken	  
within	  the	  club.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  police	  investigation.	  Those	  investigations	  (for	  which	  no	  
charges	  had	  been	  laid)	  precipitated	  the	  action	  taken	  by	  the	  club	  in	  suspending	  the	  plaintiff’s	  
membership.	  
Various	  procedural	  steps	  were	  taken	  by	  the	  club	  board	  in	  suspending	  the	  plaintiff.	  The	  crucial	  
flaw	  which	  emerged	  in	  these	  procedural	  steps	  was	  that	  no	  notice	  was	  given	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  of	  
the	  board’s	  deliberations	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  suspension.	  A	  written	  notice	  of	  his	  suspension	  was	  
given	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  on	  29	  November	  2010.	  	  
The	  plaintiff	  did	  not	  take	  issue	  with	  this	  suspension	  notice	  until	  14	  December	  2011.	  He	  alleged	  
denial	  of	  natural	  justice.	  The	  reason	  given	  for	  his	  delay	  was	  lack	  of	  funds.	  Her	  Honour	  
ultimately	  did	  not	  deal	  with	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  letter	  of	  suspension	  or	  the	  reasons	  given	  for	  the	  
plaintiff’s	  delay	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  letter.	  She	  found	  that	  the	  issues	  were	  as	  follows	  (at	  [42]):	  
first,	  whether	  the	  present	  dispute	  is	  justiciable	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  evidence	  of	  
reputational	  damage	  suffered	  by	  Mr	  Campolongo	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2010	  suspension	  
(on	  the	  basis	  that	  Club	  Marconi	  is	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee,	  whose	  members	  
have	  no	  proprietary	  rights	  as	  a	  result	  of	  membership	  of	  the	  Club).	  It	  is	  submitted	  by	  
[counsel	  for	  the	  club]	  there	  is	  no	  more	  than	  a	  consensual	  compact	  between	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  Club	  that	  is	  not	  enforceable	  at	  law....	  In	  this	  regard,	  [counsel	  for	  the	  
plaintiff]	  submits	  that,	  by	  analogy	  with	  the	  incorporated	  association	  cases...a	  claim	  for	  
declaratory	  relief	  in	  the	  present	  instance	  is	  justiciable	  with	  or	  without	  evidence	  of	  
reputational	  damage....	  [S]econd,	  if	  the	  present	  dispute	  is	  justiciable,	  whether	  as	  a	  
matter	  of	  discretion	  the	  relief	  sought	  should	  be	  granted	  (noting	  that	  it	  is	  conceded	  by	  
Club	  Marconi	  that	  the	  2010	  suspension	  was	  not	  imposed	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
procedure	  outlined	  in	  the	  Club's	  constitution).	  	  
The	  matters	  raised	  by	  Club	  Marconi	  as	  relevant	  to	  the	  Court's	  exercise	  of	  discretion	  in	  
this	  regard	  are	  threefold:	  delay;	  lack	  of	  utility;	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  available	  and	  
appropriate	  alternative	  procedure	  by	  which	  the	  question	  in	  issue	  (as	  to	  whether	  Mr	  
Campolongo's	  Club	  membership	  should	  be	  suspended)	  should	  be	  determined.	  
Her	  Honour	  exhaustively	  reviewed	  the	  many	  cases	  related	  to	  the	  issues.	  She	  noted	  that	  the	  
club	  was	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee,	  saying	  (at	  [74]–[75]):	  
Here,	  the	  status	  of	  Club	  Marconi's	  constitution	  derives	  not	  from	  the	  incorporated	  
associations	  legislation	  (which	  is	  inapplicable	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  
club	  was	  incorporated)	  but,	  rather,	  from	  the	  relevant	  companies	  legislation.	  As	  noted	  
earlier,	  under	  the	  1936	  companies	  legislation,	  an	  incorporated	  company's	  
memorandum	  and	  articles	  have	  contractual	  force.	  It	  is	  apparent	  from	  the	  content	  of	  
the	  Constitution	  of	  Club	  Marconi	  (on	  the	  fore	  page	  headed	  Memorandum	  and	  Rules)	  
that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  original	  constituent	  document	  of	  the	  club	  (since	  it	  refers	  in	  the	  
definitions	  section	  to	  the	  2001	  Corporations	  Act	  and	  there	  are	  references	  to	  that	  Act	  in	  
the	  Rules).	  The	  copy	  of	  the	  Constitution	  in	  evidence	  before	  me	  also	  includes	  reference	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to	  it	  having	  been	  approved	  by	  special	  resolution	  at	  a	  general	  meeting	  on	  20	  May	  2007.	  
Relevantly,	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Club	  Marconi	  (namely	  whether	  it	  
constitutes	  a	  binding	  contract	  between	  the	  Club	  and	  its	  members)	  is	  to	  be	  determined	  
by	  reference	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  successive	  iterations	  of	  company	  legislation.	  
In	  the	  current	  legislation,	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act),	  the	  relevant	  definitions	  are	  
contained	  in	  section	  9	  (definition	  of	  constitution),	  and	  section	  140	  (effect	  of	  constitution).	  In	  
particular	  section	  140(1)	  of	  the	  Act	  makes	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  company	  a	  contract	  as	  
between:	  
(a)	  the	  company	  and	  each	  member;	  and	  
(b)	  the	  company	  and	  each	  director	  and	  company	  secretary;	  and	  
(c)	  a	  member	  and	  each	  other	  member;	  under	  which	  each	  person	  agrees	  to	  observe	  
and	  perform	  the	  constitution	  and	  rules	  so	  far	  as	  they	  apply	  to	  that	  person.	  	  
Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  these	  provisions	  made	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  club	  that	  was	  approved	  by	  
special	  resolution	  in	  2007	  a	  contract	  between	  each	  of	  the	  members	  and	  between	  the	  company	  
and	  each	  member.	  Thus,	  the	  issues	  in	  the	  case	  were	  justiciable.	  	  
Her	  Honour	  said	  that	  had	  that	  not	  been	  the	  case,	  she	  would	  have	  declined	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  
dispute	  because	  there	  was	  no	  proprietary	  right	  or	  other	  identifiable	  interest	  (such	  as	  
reputation	  or	  livelihood)	  involved	  concerning	  the	  plaintiff.	  Courts	  traditionally	  do	  not	  interfere	  
in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  voluntary	  associations	  where	  there	  are	  no	  such	  interests	  involved.	  
As	  the	  constitution	  was	  a	  contract	  between	  the	  plaintiff	  and	  the	  club,	  the	  plaintiff	  contended	  
that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  breach	  of	  that	  contract	  when	  the	  club	  did	  not	  adhere	  to	  the	  correct	  
procedure	  for	  suspension	  of	  membership.	  Her	  Honour	  agreed,	  but	  said	  that	  as	  the	  club	  had	  
admitted	  that	  its	  procedure	  was	  at	  fault,	  there	  was	  no	  point	  to	  these	  proceedings	  (at	  [14]):	  
In	  summary,	  therefore,	  I	  have	  concluded	  that	  there	  is	  no	  utility	  in	  the	  declaratory	  relief	  
sought	  in	  these	  proceedings	  in	  circumstances	  where	  Club	  Marconi	  concedes	  that	  the	  
Board	  did	  not	  correctly	  follow	  the	  procedure	  set	  out	  in	  Rule	  47	  of	  its	  constitution	  when	  
issuing	  the	  notice	  of	  suspension	  in	  2010	  and	  hence	  does	  not	  contend	  that	  the	  
suspension	  in	  2010	  was	  validly	  imposed	  and	  where	  all	  that	  is	  now	  sought	  by	  Mr	  
Campolongo	  is	  declaratory	  relief	  as	  to	  the	  validity	  and	  effect	  of	  that	  2010	  suspension.	  
The	  import	  of	  that	  concession	  is	  not	  lessened	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Club	  Marconi	  maintains,	  
through	  its	  Counsel,	  that	  there	  was	  a	  basis	  on	  which	  it	  was	  at	  the	  time	  entitled	  
unilaterally	  to	  suspend	  Mr	  Campolongo's	  membership	  pending	  the	  hearing	  of	  
disciplinary	  proceedings	  under	  Rule	  47(h)	  of	  the	  constitution.	  What	  Club	  Marconi,	  
relevantly,	  concedes	  is	  that	  it	  did	  not	  validly	  invoke	  that	  procedure.	  
If	  there	  had	  been	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  declaration,	  the	  plaintiff	  would	  still	  not	  have	  succeeded	  because	  
of	  his	  delay	  of	  more	  than	  one	  year	  in	  objecting	  to	  the	  club’s	  decision.	  Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  this	  
delay	  would	  have	  been	  disentitling.	  
Her	  Honour’s	  overall	  decision	  was	  based	  on	  lack	  of	  utility.	  There	  was	  actually	  no	  dispute	  
between	  the	  parties	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  hearing.	  The	  club	  had	  admitted	  that	  it	  did	  not	  follow	  its	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own	  constitution’s	  procedure	  in	  suspending	  the	  plaintiff.	  There	  was	  nothing	  to	  be	  gained	  by	  a	  
declaration	  for	  the	  plaintiff.	  As	  Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [125]):	  
It	  is	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  statutory	  objective	  of	  the	  just,	  quick	  and	  cheap	  resolution	  
of	  the	  real	  issues	  in	  dispute	  between	  parties	  that	  the	  time	  of	  this	  Court	  be	  taken	  up	  in	  
determining	  matters	  that	  are	  not	  (at	  least	  by	  the	  time	  of	  hearing)	  actually	  in	  dispute	  
between	  the	  parties.	  
The	  plaintiff’s	  application	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/750.html	  
A	  costs	  decision	  is	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/815.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  decision	  
This	  decision	  is	  in	  line	  with	  many	  cases	  which	  support	  the	  notion	  of	  judicial	  non-­‐interference	  in 
the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  a	  voluntary	  association	  unless	  there	  is	  a	  contract	  present,	  or	  some	  other	  
recognised	  basis	  for	  intervention.	  The	  aspect	  of	  interest	  here	  was	  that	  the	  club	  was	  a	  company	  
limited	  by	   guarantee.	  However,	   the	   same	  principles	   applied	   as	   in	   cases	  where	   organisations	  
are	   unincorporated	   bodies	   or	   incorporated	   associations.	   The	   constitution	   of	   the	   club	   was	   a	  
contract	  between	  the	  company	  and	  the	  plaintiff	  in	  this	  case,	  but	  although	  there	  was	  a	  breach	  
of	  the	  rules,	  no	  remedy	  was	  given.	  If	  cases	  such	  as	  these	  are	  justiciable,	  the	  usual	  outcome	  is	  a	  
declaration	  from	  the	  court.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  no	  declaration	  made	  because	  a	  declaration	  
would	  have	  served	  no	  purpose.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  a	  broad	  inherent	  jurisdiction	  to	  make	  
declarations	  as	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  parties	  but	  will	  not	  exercise	  the	  jurisdiction	  where	  there	  is	  no	  
matter	  in	  contention	  or	  if	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  futile.	  
	  
2.5.7  OVCHINNOKOV V RUSSIAN SPORTS AND SOCIAL CLUB INC [2012] NSWSC 828 
(SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, WHITE J, 3 JULY 2012) 
The	  Russian	  Sports	  and	  Social	  Club	  Inc	  (the	  club)	  is	  an	  incorporated	  association	  governed	  by	  
the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act).	  The	  plaintiffs	  complained	  that	  the	  
first	  plaintiff’s	  membership	  of	  the	  club	  was	  wrongfully	  suspended	  and	  that	  the	  second	  plaintiff	  
was	  wrongfully	  dismissed	  as	  president	  of	  the	  club	  and	  as	  a	  committee	  member.	  The	  plaintiffs	  
allege	  breaches	  of	  fiduciary	  duty	  and	  oppressive	  conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  second	  to	  ninth	  
defendants,	  who	  were	  officers	  of	  the	  club.	  
The	  club	  minutes	  and	  other	  documents	  had	  been	  prepared	  in	  the	  Russian	  language	  only.	  This	  
proceeding	  was	  to	  request	  that	  the	  court	  order	  that	  documents	  concerning	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  
club	  be	  translated	  into	  English.	  The	  plaintiffs	  contended	  that	  pursuant	  to	  section	  50(3)	  of	  the	  
Act,	  the	  books	  and	  records	  of	  the	  club	  were	  required	  to	  be	  translated	  into	  English	  or	  English	  
translations	  kept.	  Section	  50(3)	  provides:	  	  
If	  any	  document	  required	  to	  be	  kept	  under	  this	  section	  is,	  either	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  in	  
a	  language	  other	  than	  the	  English	  language,	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  document	  wholly	  in	  the	  
English	  language	  must	  be	  kept	  with	  the	  document.	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The	  plaintiffs	  requested	  that	  they	  should	  be	  provided	  with	  an	  English	  translation	  of	  a	  wide	  
variety	  of	  documents.	  These	  included	  not	  only	  minutes	  of	  meetings	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  
Management	  and	  all	  annual	  general	  meetings	  or	  special	  general	  meetings	  of	  the	  club,	  but	  also	  
agendas,	  notices	  of	  meetings,	  correspondence	  between	  the	  club	  and	  the	  Russian	  government	  
concerning	  provision	  of	  moneys	  to	  the	  Club,	  correspondence	  and	  other	  documents	  between	  
the	  club	  and	  the	  Russian	  Orthodox	  Church	  concerning	  a	  proposed	  sale	  or	  transfer	  of	  the	  club	  
or	  some	  of	  its	  assets	  to	  that	  body,	  correspondence	  concerning	  the	  present	  proceedings,	  and	  all	  
applications	  that	  the	  club	  had	  received	  for	  membership	  and	  its	  response	  to	  those	  applications.	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  two	  questions	  arose	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  plaintiffs'	  reliance	  on	  section	  50(3)	  
of	  the	  Act.	  First,	  what	  documents	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  section’s	  requirements?	  Second,	  was	  
the	  plaintiff	  entitled	  to	  a	  mandatory	  injunction	  to	  require	  the	  provision	  or	  keeping	  of	  such	  
documents?	  
Prior	  to	  the	  commencement	  of	  the	  Act	  in	  2010,	  there	  had	  been	  no	  requirement	  to	  keep	  
documents	  in	  English	  translations.	  His	  Honour	  commented	  that	  section	  50(3)	  of	  the	  Act	  did	  not	  
require	  all	  of	  the	  documents	  which	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  plaintiffs'	  application	  to	  be	  
translated	  into	  English.	  However,	  it	  did	  require	  particular	  documents	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  English	  
translation.	  These	  documents	  were	  specified	  in	  section	  50(1)	  of	  the	  Act:	  a	  limited	  class	  of	  
books	  and	  records	  for	  recording	  and	  explaining	  the	  association's	  financial	  transactions	  and	  
financial	  position;	  and	  the	  minutes	  of	  proceedings	  of	  its	  committee	  and	  all	  general	  meetings.	  
The	  section	  did	  not	  have	  retrospective	  operation.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  club	  was	  required	  to	  
keep	  at	  least	  a	  translation	  into	  English	  of	  its	  financial	  records,	  and	  all	  minutes	  of	  proceedings	  of	  
its	  committee	  and	  all	  general	  meetings	  of	  members.	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  was	  a	  mandatory	  injunction	  requiring	  translation	  available	  to	  the	  plaintiffs?	  
Section	  95(3)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  section	  95(1)	  does	  not	  operate	  to	  exclude	  the	  operation	  
of	  section	  1324	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth).	  Section	  1324	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  
empowers	  a	  court,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  to	  grant	  prohibitory	  or	  mandatory	  injunctions	  where	  
a	  person	  has	  engaged,	  is	  engaged,	  or	  is	  proposing	  to	  engage,	  in	  conduct	  that	  constitutes	  a	  
contravention	  of	  that	  Act.	  	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  argument	  to	  the	  contrary	  (which	  was	  not	  
advanced	  in	  this	  case),	  he	  did	  not	  think	  that	  the	  section	  conferred	  power	  to	  grant	  an	  injunction	  
requiring	  the	  remedying	  of	  a	  contravention	  of	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act.	  He	  
expressed	  no	  view	  on	  whether	  the	  Act	  conferred	  a	  private	  right	  on	  an	  individual	  to	  enforce	  the	  
statutory	  obligation.	  	  
Whether	  or	  not	  it	  does,	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  had	  a	  special	  
interest	  to	  enforce	  the	  obligation	  under	  section	  50(3).	  This	  was	  because	  members	  of	  the	  club	  
were	  the	  persons	  for	  whose	  benefit	  the	  Association	  was	  required	  to	  keep	  the	  specified	  
documents	  in	  the	  English	  language,	  or	  to	  keep	  a	  translation	  in	  the	  English	  language.	  He	  said	  (at	  
[18]–[19]):	  
The	  plaintiffs	  do	  not	  seek	  an	  order	  requiring	  the	  defendants	  to	  keep	  records	  in	  the	  
English	  language	  but	  rather	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  copies	  in	  the	  English	  language.	  Had	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records	  been	  kept,	  as	  they	  should	  have	  been	  from	  1	  July	  2010,	  then	  the	  plaintiffs	  
would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  inspect	  them	  in	  the	  course	  of	  carrying	  out	  the	  interlocutory	  
steps	  that	  have	  been	  taken	  in	  these	  proceedings	  and	  to	  obtain	  copies	  of	  the	  
documents	  in	  the	  English	  language.	  In	  my	  view,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  s	  50(3)	  of	  the	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  the	  plaintiffs	  are	  entitled	  to	  an	  order	  requiring	  the	  
provision	  to	  them	  of	  an	  English	  translation	  of	  documents	  of	  the	  Association	  brought	  
into	  existence	  after	  1	  July	  2010	  that:	  (a)	  correctly	  record	  and	  explain	  the	  first	  
defendant's	  financial	  transactions	  and	  financial	  position	  and	  (b)	  minutes	  of	  the	  
proceedings	  of	  its	  committee	  meetings	  and	  general	  meetings,	  insofar	  as	  such	  
documents	  otherwise	  fall	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  plaintiffs'	  request....	  
The	  plaintiffs	  had	  requested	  a	  translation	  ‘with	  a	  proper	  certificate	  by	  a	  duly	  accredited	  
translator’,	  but	  His	  Honour	  declined	  to	  order	  an	  accredited	  translation,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  
plaintiffs	  could	  understand	  Russian,	  and	  could	  translate	  the	  relevant	  documents	  themselves,	  
and	  accredited	  translation	  was	  not	  necessary	  under	  the	  Act.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/828.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  a	  case	  in	  which,	  as	  His	  Honour	  put	  it,	  ‘emotions...are	  running	  high’	  (and	  it	  has	  not	  yet	  
come	  to	  court).	  His	  decision	  on	  ‘accredited’	  translation	  was	  a	  pragmatic	  one,	  to	  expedite	  
matters	  to	  a	  court-­‐based	  conclusion.	  His	  Honour	  also	  refused	  to	  order	  mediation,	  since	  the	  
parties	  had	  attempted	  mediation	  and	  failed,	  and	  he	  considered	  court-­‐appointed	  mediation	  
unlikely	  to	  succeed.	  	  
His	  Honour	  pointed	  out	  that	  negotiation	  was	  to	  be	  encouraged,	  but	  in	  this	  case,	  ‘...if	  the	  
parties'	  positions	  are	  so	  entrenched	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  and	  that	  negotiation	  is	  unfruitful,	  
then	  I	  think	  it	  better	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  interests	  of	  the	  Association	  that	  the	  present	  allegations	  
be	  aired	  and	  determined’	  (para	  [27]).	  Court	  cases	  are	  expensive	  and	  the	  outcome	  not	  
necessarily	  predictable.	  The	  parties	  in	  this	  case	  have	  chosen	  the	  most	  expensive	  option	  for	  
settlement	  of	  their	  dispute.	  
 
2.5.8  HUMPHRIES V SOUTHERN CROSS SKI CLUB [2012] VSC 232 (SUPREME COURT 
OF VICTORIA, JUDD J, 25 JUNE 2012) 
The	  plaintiff	  was	  expelled	  from	  the	  defendant	  unincorporated	  club	  (the	  club)	  for	  alleged	  
‘unbecoming	  conduct’	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  club	  on	  14	  December	  2011.	  He	  was	  informed	  of	  the	  
club’s	  decision	  by	  a	  letter	  dated	  22	  December	  2011.	  Mr	  Humphries	  sought	  a	  declaration	  that	  
his	  expulsion	  from	  the	  club	  was	  invalid	  and	  of	  no	  legal	  effect,	  and	  a	  permanent	  injunction	  
requiring	  the	  club	  to	  re-­‐enter	  his	  name	  on	  the	  register	  of	  members.	  	  
The	  club	  counterclaimed	  for	  a	  declaration	  that	  an	  agreement	  with	  Mr	  Humphries	  under	  which	  
he	  enjoyed	  exclusive	  occupation	  of	  a	  family	  apartment	  at	  the	  club’s	  lodge	  on	  Mt	  Buller	  in	  
Victoria	  had	  been	  terminated.	  In	  the	  alternative,	  the	  club	  sought	  injunctions	  to	  restrain	  alleged	  
breaches	  by	  Mr	  Humphries	  of	  the	  agreement,	  and	  damages.	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Mr	  Humphries	  is	  an	  architect	  and,	  prior	  to	  his	  purported	  expulsion	  from	  the	  club,	  had	  been	  a	  
longstanding	  member.	  In	  around	  1977	  and	  1978	  the	  club	  built	  a	  ski	  lodge	  at	  Mt	  Buller.	  At	  that	  
time,	  Mr	  Humphries	  was	  a	  partner	  in	  a	  firm	  of	  architects	  and	  builders,	  CC	  &	  RH	  Humphries.	  
The	  firm	  performed	  building	  works	  for	  which	  the	  club	  became	  indebted	  to	  the	  firm.	  	  
Mr	  Humphries	  and	  the	  club	  agreed	  that	  $40,000	  of	  the	  construction	  cost	  incurred	  by	  the	  club	  
and	  due	  to	  the	  firm	  would	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  advance	  by	  Mr	  Humphries	  in	  return	  for	  a	  right	  of	  
exclusive	  occupation	  of	  an	  apartment	  in	  the	  lodge.	  The	  agreement	  between	  Mr	  Humphries	  
and	  the	  club	  was	  recorded	  in	  writing	  and	  dated	  24	  April	  1978.	  
Mr	  Humphries’s	  right	  of	  exclusive	  occupation	  continued	  for	  so	  long	  as	  he	  remained	  a	  full	  
member	  of	  the	  club	  and	  complied	  with	  his	  duties	  and	  obligations	  under	  the	  agreement,	  and	  
did	  not	  demand	  repayment	  of	  any	  part	  of	  the	  advance.	  His	  expulsion	  from	  the	  club	  exposed	  
Mr	  Humphries	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  his	  right	  of	  occupation.	  While	  Mr	  Humphries	  had	  not	  made	  
any	  demand	  for	  repayment,	  the	  club	  contended	  that	  it	  had	  the	  right	  to	  terminate	  the	  
agreement	  following	  Mr	  Humphries’s	  expulsion,	  or	  upon	  repayment	  of	  the	  loan,	  or	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  alleged	  breaches	  of	  the	  agreement.	  The	  club	  tendered	  repayment	  of	  the	  
additional	  loan.	  
The	  rights	  granted	  under	  clause	  4	  of	  the	  agreement	  extended	  to	  Mr	  Humphries,	  his	  family	  and	  
guests,	  and	  gave	  to	  them	  the	  right	  to	  use	  and	  enjoy	  the	  apartment	  as	  well	  as	  the	  common	  
areas	  available	  to	  other	  members.	  His	  obligation	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  operating	  expenses	  of	  
the	  lodge	  was	  confined	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  services	  consumed	  within	  the	  apartment.	  Mr	  Humphries	  
was	  not	  required	  to	  pay	  lodge	  fees.	  He	  did	  not	  contribute	  towards	  the	  operating	  costs	  of	  the	  
lodge	  even	  though	  the	  club	  was	  obliged	  to	  maintain	  his	  apartment,	  and	  he	  was	  entitled	  to	  
enjoy	  the	  common	  facilities	  without	  contribution,	  as	  were	  his	  family	  and	  guests.	  	  
The	  club	  had	  for	  some	  time	  wanted	  to	  terminate	  the	  agreement,	  and	  the	  matter	  came	  to	  a	  
head	  in	  August	  2010	  when	  Mr	  Humphries’s	  son	  and	  some	  friends	  were	  refused	  admission	  to	  
the	  apartment	  when	  the	  lodge	  was	  occupied	  by	  a	  school	  group	  on	  an	  ‘exclusive’	  basis.	  
Humphries	  claimed	  that	  the	  expulsion	  was	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  club’s	  constitution,	  and	  was	  
designed	  to	  bring	  the	  agreement	  to	  an	  end,	  and	  thus	  to	  deny	  him	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  contract	  
contained	  in	  the	  agreement.	  The	  club	  contended	  that	  the	  agreement	  was	  prejudicial	  to	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  club.	  	  
Article	  15	  of	  the	  Club’s	  constitution	  provided:	  
If	  any	  member	  shall	  wilfully	  refuse	  or	  neglect	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
memorandum	  or	  articles	  of	  association	  of	  the	  Club	  or	  shall	  be	  guilty	  of	  any	  conduct	  
which	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  committee	  is	  un-­‐becoming	  of	  a	  member	  or	  prejudicial	  to	  
the	  interest	  of	  the	  Club	  the	  committee	  shall	  have	  power	  to	  expel	  the	  member	  from	  the	  
Club....	  
Conduct	  of	  Mr	  Humphries	  said	  to	  be	  unbecoming	  of	  a	  member	  and	  prejudicial	  to	  the	  interests	  
of	  the	  Club	  included	  his	  refusal	  to	  abandon	  rights	  under	  the	  agreement;	  an	  allegation	  that	  Mr	  
Humphries’s	  use	  of	  the	  apartment	  was	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  irritation	  and	  disharmony	  within	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the	  Club;	  that	  there	  were	  unauthorised	  additions	  to	  the	  apartment,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  additional	  
beds	  that	  put	  the	  Club’s	  lease	  in	  jeopardy;	  that	  guests,	  who	  were	  not	  members,	  used	  Club	  
facilities	  when	  a	  member	  was	  not	  present;	  and	  that	  Humphries	  did	  not	  pay	  his	  fair	  share	  of	  
charges,	  thus	  placing	  an	  unfair	  burden	  on	  the	  club.	  His	  Honour	  found	  no	  basis	  for	  these	  
allegations.	  
His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [22])	  that	  it	  had	  long	  been	  held	  that	  a	  member	  unjustly	  expelled	  from	  an	  
unincorporated	  association	  may	  obtain	  an	  injunction	  to	  restrain	  the	  association’s	  committee	  
from	  treating	  him	  as	  validly	  expelled,	  if	  the	  member	  could	  establish	  that	  the	  purported	  
expulsion	  was	  contrary	  to	  natural	  justice,	  contravened	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  association	  or	  was	  not	  
bona	  fide.	  There	  was	  an	  additional	  requirement	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  establish	  a	  proprietary	  right.	  	  
The	  requirement	  for	  a	  proprietary	  interest	  has	  become	  less	  rigid	  in	  recent	  times,	  with	  the	  
recognition	  of	  an	  implied	  negative	  stipulation	  in	  a	  contract	  as	  a	  sufficient	  basis	  to	  support	  
injunctive	  relief.	  His	  Honour	  held	  (at	  [23])	  that	  whether	  the	  search	  for	  a	  sufficient	  interest	  is	  
defined	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  member’s	  proprietary	  interest	  or	  by	  implying	  a	  negative	  
contractual	  stipulation,	  Mr	  Humphries	  had	  a	  sufficient	  interest	  to	  support	  a	  remedy	  in	  equity	  
to	  restrain	  the	  Club	  and	  its	  committee	  from	  treating	  him	  as	  validly	  expelled.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [25]–[27]):	  
In	  my	  opinion	  it	  is	  manifestly	  clear	  that	  the	  resolution	  by	  the	  Club	  expelling	  Mr	  
Humphries	  was	  made	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  inducing	  him	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Club	  to	  
diminish	  his	  rights	  under	  the	  agreement.	  Such	  an	  objective	  was	  not	  a	  purpose	  for	  
which	  the	  power	  conferred	  under	  art	  15	  might	  properly	  have	  been	  exercised.	  The	  
purpose	  was	  to	  force	  Mr	  Humphries	  to	  give	  up	  contractual	  rights	  granted	  by	  the	  Club.	  
It	  was	  an	  attempt	  at	  commercial	  extortion,	  or	  at	  least	  an	  attempt	  to	  bully	  Mr	  
Humphries	  into	  submission.	  Further,	  the	  conduct	  identified	  by	  the	  committee	  in	  its	  
letter	  dated	  6	  December	  2011	  as	  ‘unbecoming	  of	  a	  member	  or	  prejudicial	  to	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  Club’	  was,	  according	  to	  the	  ordinary	  and	  natural	  meaning	  of	  those	  
words,	  incapable	  of	  constituting	  such	  conduct.	  Having	  entered	  into	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
agreement,	  it	  is	  simply	  not	  open	  to	  the	  Club	  to	  attribute	  to	  Mr	  Humphries’	  assertion	  of	  
his	  rights,	  the	  character	  of	  ‘conduct...	  unbecoming	  of	  a	  member	  or	  prejudicial	  to	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  club’.	  The	  other	  grounds	  relied	  upon	  by	  the	  committee,	  which	  overlap	  
with	  the	  alleged	  breaches	  of	  the	  agreement	  were	  without	  substance,	  whether	  
characterised	  as	  breaches	  to	  justify	  termination,	  grounds	  to	  support	  injunctive	  relief,	  
or	  a	  claim	  for	  damages;	  or	  as	  conduct	  which	  might	  justify	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  power	  by	  
a	  committee,	  acting	  reasonably,	  to	  expel	  Mr	  Humphries	  under	  art	  15.	  By	  advancing	  
those	  so-­‐called	  breaches	  as	  justifications	  for	  the	  resolution,	  and	  as	  contractual	  
breaches	  in	  aid	  of	  remedies	  on	  its	  counterclaim,	  the	  committee,	  and	  thus	  the	  Club,	  
further	  evidenced	  the	  absence	  of	  good	  faith	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  power.	  I	  find	  that	  
the	  resolution	  of	  the	  committee	  made	  on	  14	  December	  2011	  to	  expel	  Mr	  Humphries	  
from	  the	  Club	  was	  and	  is	  invalid	  and	  of	  no	  force	  and	  effect.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  being	  able	  to	  terminate	  the	  agreement	  on	  full	  payment	  of	  the	  amount	  owing,	  
His	  Honour	  found	  (at	  [31])	  that	  the	  agreement,	  by	  its	  express	  terms,	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  this.	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On	  the	  question	  of	  remedy,	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  (at	  [65]-­‐[68]):	  
The	  positive	  formulation	  of	  a	  permanent	  injunction	  proposed	  by	  Mr	  Humphries,	  
requiring	  specific	  performance	  of	  the	  licence	  agreement,	  is	  unnecessary	  to	  protect	  his	  
rights	  as	  a	  member,	  or	  his	  rights	  under	  the	  licence	  agreement.	  An	  injunction	  
supporting	  the	  more	  confined	  negative	  covenant,	  protecting	  Mr	  Humphries’	  right	  to	  a	  
proper	  decision,	  coupled	  with	  a	  declaration	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  Club	  has	  not	  
terminated	  the	  agreement,	  is	  the	  minimum	  equity	  required.	  The	  most	  suitable	  
injunction	  is	  one	  to	  restrain	  the	  Club	  and	  its	  committee	  from	  acting	  upon	  or	  giving	  
effect	  to	  the	  purported	  expulsion	  made	  by	  resolution	  of	  the	  committee	  on	  14	  
December	  2011.	  The	  basis	  for	  that	  injunction	  is	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  committee	  to	  act	  
with	  sufficient	  reason	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  constitution,	  and	  its	  failure	  to	  act	  bona	  
fide.	  When	  considering	  the	  suitability	  of	  injunctive	  relief	  as	  a	  remedy	  to	  protect	  Mr	  
Humphries	  rights,	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  look	  only	  to	  his	  right	  to	  a	  proper	  decision	  under	  
art	  15.	  While	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  right	  alone	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  an	  injunction,	  
because	  Mr	  Humphries	  has	  a	  real	  and	  tangible	  interest	  in	  the	  lodge	  and	  its	  facilities,	  
his	  rights	  also	  extend	  to	  his	  entitlements	  under	  the	  agreement,	  because	  of	  the	  
consequences	  of	  expulsion	  under	  cl	  11.	  Accordingly,	  I	  propose	  to	  make	  a	  declaration	  to	  
the	  effect	  that	  the	  purported	  expulsion	  was	  invalid	  and	  of	  no	  legal	  force	  and	  effect;	  a	  
declaration	  that	  the	  agreement	  between	  the	  Club	  and	  Mr	  Humphries	  dated	  24	  April	  
1978	  has	  not	  been	  terminated	  by	  the	  Club,	  and	  remains	  in	  full	  force	  and	  effect;	  and	  an	  
order	  restraining	  the	  Club	  and	  its	  committee	  from	  acting	  upon	  or	  giving	  effect	  to	  the	  
purported	  expulsion	  made	  by	  resolution	  of	  the	  committee	  on	  14	  December	  2011.	  
Therefore,	  the	  club	  failed	  in	  all	  its	  contentions,	  including	  its	  counterclaim.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2012/232.html	  	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  club	  in	  this	  case	  is	  an	  unincorporated	  association.	  Unincorporated	  associations	  are	  formed	  
on	  a	  consensual	  basis	  and	  not	  a	  contractual	  one.	  Legally,	  this	  has	  meant	  that	  there	  is	  no	  basis	  
for	  a	  member	  to	  bring	  an	  action	  against	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  unless	  some	  
proprietary	  right	  can	  be	  shown.	  In	  showing	  a	  true	  proprietary	  right,	  the	  existential	  problem	  of	  
whether	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  is	  ‘real’	  in	  any	  legal	  sense	  is	  an	  obstacle.	  An	  
unincorporated	  association,	  which	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  entity	  under	  common	  law,	  cannot	  hold	  
property	  in	  its	  own	  name.	  Therefore,	  a	  member	  could	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  rights	  attached	  to	  
that	  property,	  and	  so	  there	  could	  never	  be	  a	  proprietary	  right	  demonstrated.	  	  
However,	  the	  test	  for	  showing	  a	  proprietary	  right	  is	  rather	  flexible	  in	  Australia.	  It	  is	  whether	  a	  
member	  derives	  a	  tangible	  or	  intangible	  benefit	  from	  being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  association	  in	  
question.	  Tangible	  benefits	  can	  include	  the	  right	  to	  use	  and	  enjoy	  an	  association’s	  social	  
facilities,	  playing	  fields	  or	  equipment.	  Intangible	  benefits	  might	  apply	  to	  an	  association	  which	  
has	  no	  actual	  facilities	  or	  equipment,	  such	  as	  a	  book	  club	  conducted	  in	  members’	  homes,	  or	  an	  
environmental	  group	  which	  conducts	  all	  its	  activities	  ‘on-­‐site’	  at	  contested	  areas.	  Benefits	  
which	  are	  merely	  collateral,	  however,	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient.	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In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  spent	  very	  little	  time	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  establishing	  a	  right,	  and	  found	  
that	  whatever	  the	  appropriate	  basis,	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  a	  sufficient	  right	  on	  which	  he	  could	  seek	  
an	  injunction	  as	  a	  remedy.	  
	  
2.5.9  GIBSON V NEW ZEALAND LAND SEARCH AND RESCUE DOGS INCORPORATED 
[2012] NZHC 1320 (HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, COLLINS J, 12 JUNE 2012)  
The	  plaintiff	  (Mr	  Gibson)	  sought	  judicial	  review	  of	  a	  decision	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Land	  Search	  and	  
Rescue	  Dogs	  Incorporated	  (SAR	  Dogs)	  expelling	  him	  from	  its	  organisation.	  The	  decision	  by	  SAR	  
Dogs	  to	  expel	  the	  plaintiff	  arose	  primarily	  from	  events	  that	  occurred	  at	  an	  evaluation	  camp	  
held	  in	  late	  August	  2010.	  
SAR	  Dogs	  is	  a	  voluntary	  organisation	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  Its	  members	  provide	  rescue	  services	  in	  
both	  alpine	  and	  wilderness	  environments.	  This	  entirely	  voluntary	  work	  is	  extremely	  dangerous.	  
The	  focus	  of	  this	  proceeding	  was	  on	  search	  and	  rescue	  dogs	  and	  their	  handlers	  who	  perform	  in	  
alpine	  terrain.	  
The	  plaintiff	  was	  instrumental	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  SAR	  Dogs	  in	  New	  Zealand	  in	  1988.	  He	  
played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  setting	  up	  the	  protocols	  for	  the	  training,	  assessment	  and	  
development	  of	  SAR	  Dog	  handlers.	  
SAR	  Dogs	  organised	  an	  avalanche	  training	  and	  assessment	  camp	  from	  27	  to	  30	  August	  2010.	  
The	  Annual	  General	  Meeting	  (AGM)	  of	  SAR	  Dogs	  was	  also	  held	  during	  the	  course	  of	  this	  camp.	  
Mr	  Gibson	  was	  one	  of	  the	  assessors	  at	  the	  camp.	  During	  the	  camp,	  several	  issues	  relating	  to	  
the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  arose,	  which	  led	  to	  his	  expulsion.	  These	  included	  his	  behaviour	  
during	  assessments,	  his	  behaviour	  at	  the	  AGM,	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  he	  left	  the	  camp.	  
Correspondence	  ensued	  between	  the	  parties,	  and	  then	  the	  committee	  of	  SAR	  Dogs,	  consisting	  
of	  6	  persons,	  met	  on	  27	  November	  2010	  to	  consider	  the	  matter.	  The	  committee	  unanimously	  
resolved	  that	  Mr	  Gibson’s	  behaviour	  rendered	  him	  unfit	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  SAR	  Dogs.	  This	  
decision	  was	  conveyed	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  by	  letter	  on	  4	  December	  2010.	  
The	  plaintiff	  exercised	  a	  right	  of	  reply	  to	  the	  findings	  against	  him	  at	  a	  committee	  meeting	  held	  
on	  19	  March	  2011.	  However,	  on	  2	  April	  2011,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  SAR	  Dogs	  wrote	  to	  Mr	  Gibson,	  
saying	  that	  the	  committee	  was	  unanimously	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  original	  decision	  to	  expel	  him	  
would	  be	  upheld.	  
His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [39])	  that	  the	  key	  principles	  of	  natural	  justice	  engaged	  by	  this	  case	  were:	  
1. The	  need	  for	  an	  accused	  person	  to	  know	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  accusations	  against	  
him;	  
2. The	  need	  for	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  disregard	  irrelevant	  considerations;	  
3. The	  need	  for	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  act	  impartially.	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  not	  all	  the	  allegations	  against	  the	  plaintiff	  were	  made	  known	  to	  him	  
before	  the	  decision	  was	  taken	  to	  expel	  him.	  This	  was	  enough	  of	  itself	  to	  quash	  the	  decision	  on	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judicial	  review.	  There	  had	  also	  been	  some	  consideration	  of	  irrelevant	  matters	  which	  was	  also	  
enough	  of	  itself	  to	  justify	  quashing	  the	  decision.	  
As	  to	  the	  need	  to	  act	  impartially,	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  committee	  members	  who	  had	  
expelled	  the	  plaintiff	  were	  also	  those	  who	  heard	  his	  ‘appeal’	  against	  that	  decision.	  This	  was	  a	  
constitutional	  flaw	  in	  SAR	  Dog’s	  proceedings.	  Mr	  Gibson’s	  ‘appeal’	  needed	  to	  be	  considered	  by	  
persons	  who	  had	  not	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  expel	  him	  from	  SAR	  Dogs.	  Usually,	  small	  
organisations	  like	  SAR	  Dogs	  can	  achieve	  compliance	  with	  this	  requirement	  of	  natural	  justice	  by	  
providing	  for	  a	  small	  independent	  body	  to	  hear	  appeals	  on	  disciplinary	  decisions	  from	  an	  
administrative	  committee.	  	  
Therefore,	  despite	  His	  Honour	  being	  unimpressed	  with	  the	  plaintiff	  as	  a	  witness,	  the	  decision	  
to	  expel	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  held	  to	  have	  breached	  the	  requirements	  of	  natural	  justice	  in	  several	  
respects.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  contractual	  basis	  underlying	  membership	  of	  a	  voluntary	  body,	  in	  New	  
Zealand	  law	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  an	  incorporated	  society	  can	  constitute	  a	  contract	  
between	  the	  society	  and	  its	  members:	  Henderson	  v	  Kane	  and	  Pioneer	  Club	  [1924]	  NZLR	  1073	  
(SC).	  In	  this	  case	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  (with	  one	  exception),	  the	  defendant’s	  breaches	  of	  the	  
principles	  of	  natural	  justice	  also	  implicitly	  breached	  the	  terms	  of	  its	  own	  constitution.	  In	  terms	  
of	  the	  ‘appeal’	  process,	  this	  was	  explicitly	  a	  breach	  of	  clause	  5(ii)(b)	  of	  SAR	  Dogs’s	  constitution.	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  breaches,	  were	  damages	  payable?	  Case	  law	  certainly	  indicated	  that	  damages	  
were	  a	  possible	  remedy	  for	  this	  type	  of	  breach	  of	  contract:	  Henderson	  v	  Kane	  and	  Pioneer	  Club	  
[1924]	  NZLR	  1073	  (SC)	  at	  1076.	  However,	  on	  this	  point	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [56]):	  
The	  defendant	  is	  a	  voluntary	  body	  with	  limited	  financial	  resources.	  Any	  award	  of	  
damages	  will	  dilute	  the	  defendant’s	  ability	  to	  carry	  on	  its	  invaluable	  search	  and	  rescue	  
activities.	  
In	  fact,	  His	  Honour	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  he	  doubted	  ‘whether	  or	  not	  awarding	  general	  
damages	  for	  breach	  of	  contract	  is	  truly	  a	  matter	  for	  the	  Court’s	  discretion’.	  He	  said	  (at	  [60]–
[62])	  that:	  
In	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  exact	  scope	  of	  a	  Court’s	  ability	  to	  award	  general	  damages	  for	  
distress	  and	  anxiety	  arising	  from	  a	  breach	  of	  contract	  is	  not	  completely	  clear.	  In	  Byrne	  
v	  Auckland	  Irish	  Society	  Inc	  [1979]	  1	  NZLR	  351	  (SC)	  at	  362	  Vautier	  J	  was	  willing	  to	  give	  
the	  plaintiffs	  a	  modest	  award	  of	  damages	  for	  the	  ‘minor	  degree’	  of	  distress	  they	  
suffered	  from	  having	  been	  unlawfully	  expelled	  from	  the	  defendant	  society.	  It	  is	  
questionable	  whether	  that	  decision	  would	  be	  made	  today	  in	  light	  of	  the	  decision	  of	  a	  
majority	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Bloxham	  v	  Robinson	  (1996)	  7	  TCLR	  122.	  In	  that	  case	  
the	  majority	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  aligned	  themselves	  with	  the	  English	  authorities	  
and	  held	  that	  those	  who	  breach	  contracts	  are	  only	  likely	  to	  be	  liable	  to	  pay	  general	  
damages	  for	  distress	  suffered	  by	  a	  plaintiff	  when	  one	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  contract	  is	  
to	  safeguard	  the	  innocent	  party	  from	  losses	  of	  that	  kind....	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
confirmed	  in	  that	  case	  that	  as	  a	  general	  rule	  damages	  for	  mental	  distress	  are	  not	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recoverable	  for	  breach	  of	  contract....	  In	  this	  case	  the	  constitution	  of	  SAR	  Dogs	  did	  not	  
include	  the	  objective	  of	  protecting	  members	  from	  distress	  and	  emotional	  harm	  if	  they	  
were	  unlawfully	  expelled.	  Accordingly,	  SAR	  Dogs’	  breaches	  of	  its	  implied	  obligation	  to	  
adhere	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  natural	  justice	  could	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  award	  of	  damages	  
for	  distress	  and	  emotional	  harm,	  even	  though	  such	  harm	  was	  probably	  foreseeable	  in	  
this	  case.	  
Therefore,	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  successful	  in	  having	  the	  decision	  to	  expel	  him	  from	  SAR	  Dogs	  
quashed	  (with	  costs).	  He	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  a	  claim	  for	  damages.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2012/1320.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  illustrates	  the	  need	  for	  even	  small	  voluntary	  organisations	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  
matters	  of	  constitutional	  propriety	  and	  procedural	  fairness.	  As	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [53]):	  
The	  Court	  has	  some	  sympathy	  for	  the	  difficulties	  which	  the	  defendant	  has	  become	  
embroiled	  in.	  It	  is	  a	  small	  organisation	  that	  is	  dependent	  upon	  volunteers.	  It	  has	  
limited	  access	  to	  legal	  advice	  and	  assistance.	  Its	  members’	  natural	  environment	  is	  far	  
removed	  from	  the	  Wellington	  High	  Court.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  defendant	  needed	  to	  
ensure	  that	  Mr	  Gibson	  was	  treated	  fairly	  when	  initiating	  and	  considering	  the	  
disciplinary	  case	  against	  Mr	  Gibson....	  [T]he	  defendant	  failed	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  basic	  
principles	  of	  natural	  justice	  in	  multiple	  ways.	  
In	  simple	  terms,	  natural	  justice	  requires	  that:	  	  
• a	  person	  subject	  to	  disciplinary	  proceedings:	  
o must	  be	  given	  details	  of	  the	  breach	  or	  what	  he	  or	  she	  is	  accused	  of;	  and	  
o must	  be	  given	  an	  opportunity	  to	  be	  heard	  (put	  his	  or	  her	  side	  of	  the	  case);	  and	  	  
• the	  person	  or	  tribunal	  making	  the	  decision:	  	  
o must	  act	  impartially	  (including	  that	  those	  making	  the	  review	  decision	  must	  not	  
be	  the	  same	  as	  those	  who	  made	  the	  original	  decision);	  and	  	  
o must	  not	  take	  irrelevant	  matters	  into	  account.	  
	  
2.5.10  BAGGA V THE SIKH ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA INC [2012] WASC 
193 (SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, LE MIERE J, 12 JUNE 2012) 
The	  first	  defendant,	  The	  Sikh	  Association	  of	  Western	  Australia	  Inc	  (SAWA),	  is	  an	  association	  
incorporated	  under	  the	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  1987	  (WA)	  (the	  Act).	  The	  second	  
defendants	  are	  the	  members	  of	  the	  executive	  committee	  of	  SAWA.	  The	  plaintiffs	  are	  members	  
of	  SAWA.	  	  
On	  25	  February	  2012	  the	  plaintiffs	  delivered	  to	  SAWA	  a	  notice	  to	  convene	  a	  Special	  General	  
Meeting	  (SGM)	  of	  SAWA	  within	  45	  days	  to	  consider	  four	  matters	  (the	  Requisition	  Notice).	  On	  
22	  March	  2012	  the	  first	  named	  second	  defendant	  who	  is	  the	  president	  of	  SAWA	  wrote	  to	  the	  
first	  named	  plaintiff	  (Bagga)	  stating	  that	  the	  Requisition	  Notice	  was	  not	  in	  order,	  that	  it	  did	  not	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conform	  to	  SAWA	  Constitution	  rules	  10.4	  and	  13.1,	  and	  that	  the	  first	  named	  plaintiff	  could	  
submit	  a	  notice	  which	  fulfilled	  the	  SAWA	  Constitution	  requirements.	  	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  this	  hearing,	  a	  SGM	  had	  not	  been	  convened	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Requisition	  
Notice.	  The	  plaintiffs	  sought	  relief	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  second	  defendants	  
were	  in	  breach	  of	  their	  duties	  and	  the	  SAWA	  Constitution	  by	  failing	  to	  convene	  a	  SGM	  and	  an	  
order	  requiring	  the	  second	  defendants	  to	  issue	  a	  notice	  convening	  a	  SGM.	  
The	  principal	  reason	  that	  the	  Requisition	  Notice	  was	  issued	  related	  to	  the	  priest	  at	  the	  Canning	  
Vale	  Sikh	  Temple.	  The	  incumbent	  priest	  had	  served	  as	  priest	  at	  the	  temple	  for	  about	  10	  years.	  
His	  engagement	  was	  under	  a	  contract	  of	  employment	  that	  was	  due	  to	  expire	  on	  30	  June	  2012.	  
The	  plaintiffs	  claimed	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  members	  of	  SAWA	  would	  prefer	  the	  incumbent	  
priest's	  contract	  of	  employment	  to	  be	  extended	  for	  at	  least	  another	  year	  and	  for	  no	  
replacement	  priest	  to	  be	  appointed.	  However,	  the	  executive	  committee	  had	  taken	  steps	  to	  
appoint	  a	  new	  priest	  from	  overseas	  to	  replace	  the	  incumbent	  priest	  when	  his	  contract	  expired.	  
There	  were	  two	  principal	  issues:	  
1. whether	  the	  plaintiffs	  had	  any	  rights	  that	  entitled	  them	  to	  a	  declaration	  or	  an	  
injunction	  to	  enforce	  the	  SAWA	  Constitution;	  	  
2. whether	  the	  Requisition	  Notice	  conformed	  with	  the	  SAWA	  Constitution	  and,	  upon	  the	  
proper	  construction	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  required	  a	  SGM	  to	  be	  called.	  
The	  first	  issue	  required	  a	  consideration	  of	  whether	  the	  plaintiffs’	  action	  was	  justiciable.	  There	  
were	  two	  relevant	  cases.	  The	  defendants	  relied	  on	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan	  (1934)	  51	  CLR	  358	  to	  say	  
that	  the	  action	  was	  not	  justiciable.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  ex-­‐Premier	  of	  Victoria	  was	  expelled	  from	  
the	  Labor	  Party.	  His	  claim	  was	  that	  his	  expulsion	  amounted	  to	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  contract	  
between	  the	  members	  and	  officers	  of	  the	  Party	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  association.	  The	  
High	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  Party's	  rules	  were	  a	  social	  agreement	  and	  not	  an	  enforceable	  contract	  
because	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  members	  of	  the	  Party	  intended	  to	  make	  their	  rules	  legally	  
enforceable.	  The	  case	  remains	  the	  law	  in	  Australia	  relating	  to	  voluntary	  (i.e.	  unincorporated)	  
associations.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  said	  in	  that	  case	  (at	  370-­‐371):	  
There	  are,	  however,	  reasons	  which	  justify	  the	  statement	  that,	  at	  common	  law	  as	  well	  
as	  in	  equity,	  no	  actionable	  breach	  of	  contract	  was	  committed	  by	  an	  unauthorized	  
resolution	  expelling	  a	  member	  of	  a	  voluntary	  association,	  or	  by	  the	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  
of	  its	  officers	  to	  observe	  the	  rules	  regulating	  its	  affairs,	  unless	  the	  members	  enjoyed	  
under	  them	  some	  civil	  right	  of	  a	  proprietary	  nature...One	  reason	  which	  must	  
contribute	  in	  a	  great	  degree	  to	  produce	  the	  result	  is	  the	  general	  character	  of	  the	  
voluntary	  associations	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  formed	  without	  property	  and	  without	  
giving	  to	  their	  members	  any	  civil	  right	  of	  a	  proprietary	  nature.	  They	  are	  for	  the	  most	  
part	  bodies	  of	  persons	  who	  have	  combined	  to	  further	  some	  common	  end	  or	  interest,	  
which	  is	  social,	  sporting,	  political,	  scientific,	  religious,	  artistic	  or	  humanitarian	  in	  
character,	  or	  otherwise	  stands	  apart	  from	  private	  gain	  and	  material	  advantage.	  Such	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associations	  are	  established	  upon	  a	  consensual	  basis,	  but,	  unless	  there	  were	  some	  
clear	  positive	  indication	  that	  the	  members	  contemplated	  the	  creation	  of	  legal	  relations	  
inter	  se,	  the	  rules	  adopted	  for	  their	  governance	  would	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  amounting	  to	  
an	  enforceable	  contract.	  
His	  Honour	  also	  discussed	  the	  Western	  Australian	  case	  of	  Rush	  v	  WA	  Amateur	  Football	  League	  
(Inc)	  [2007]	  WASCA	  190.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  appellant	  had	  claimed	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  decision	  
of	  the	  WA	  Amateur	  Football	  League	  (WAAFL)	  to	  suspend	  him	  from	  playing,	  coaching	  or	  
officiating	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  season	  and	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  following	  season	  was	  void	  and	  
of	  no	  effect.	  Pullin	  JA,	  with	  whom	  Wheeler	  JA	  agreed,	  confirmed	  that	  the	  court	  was	  bound	  to	  
follow	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan.	  Pullin	  JA	  upheld	  the	  finding	  of	  the	  trial	  judge	  that	  there	  was	  no	  
contract	  between	  the	  appellant	  and	  the	  WAAFL	  because,	  although	  there	  had	  been	  mutual	  
promises,	  there	  was	  no	  intention	  to	  create	  contractual	  relations.	  Pullin	  JA	  held	  that	  in	  those	  
circumstances	  the	  court	  'has	  no	  jurisdiction	  to	  decide	  issues	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  consensual	  but	  
non-­‐contractual	  relationship	  between	  the	  parties'	  (at	  [37]).	  Buss	  JA	  said	  that	  the	  critical	  issue	  
in	  relation	  to	  jurisdiction	  was	  whether	  the	  appellant	  and	  the	  WAAFL	  had	  made	  an	  agreement	  
which	  embodied	  mutual	  promises	  to	  observe	  and	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  WAAFL's	  constitution	  and	  
bylaws	  and,	  if	  so,	  whether	  the	  parties	  intended	  to	  create	  legally	  enforceable	  contractual	  
relations.	  Buss	  JA	  went	  on	  to	  find	  that	  there	  was	  a	  'consensual	  compact'	  between	  the	  
appellant	  and	  the	  WAAFL	  but	  that	  the	  compact	  was	  not	  intended	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  legally	  
enforceable	  contractual	  relations.	  
SAWA	  is	  an	  incorporated	  association,	  unlike	  the	  association	  in	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan.	  Some	  States	  
have	  a	  section	  in	  their	  incorporated	  associations	  legislation	  which	  provides	  that	  the	  
constitution	  of	  an	  association	  binds	  the	  association	  and	  its	  members	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  contract	  
between	  them	  (e.g.	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  (NSW)	  section	  26;	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  (Vic)	  section	  14A;	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  (Qld)	  section	  71;	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1985	  (SA)	  section	  23;	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1991	  (ACT)	  
section	  48).	  Western	  Australia	  does	  not	  have	  such	  a	  provision.	  	  
Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [9])	  that	  the	  incorporation	  of	  the	  association	  is	  one	  factor	  to	  be	  
taken	  into	  account	  in	  determining	  objectively	  whether	  the	  association	  and	  its	  members	  
intended	  the	  Constitution	  to	  constitute	  a	  legally	  binding	  and	  enforceable	  contract	  between	  the	  
members	  and	  the	  association.	  However,	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  incorporation	  is	  insufficient	  in	  itself	  
to	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  Constitution	  has	  legal	  effect.	  His	  Honour	  cited	  Kovacic	  v	  
Australian	  Karting	  Association	  (Qld)	  Inc	  [2008]	  QSC	  344	  at	  [27]	  and	  [28]	  and	  Islamic	  Council	  of	  
South	  Australia	  Inc	  v	  Australian	  Federation	  of	  Islamic	  Councils	  Inc	  [2009]	  NSWSC	  211	  at	  [34]	  on	  
this	  point.	  	  
In	  determining	  whether	  the	  parties	  had	  voluntarily	  assumed	  a	  legally	  enforceable	  duty	  His	  
Honour	  said	  that	  the	  court	  should	  take	  account	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  agreement,	  the	  
status	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  it,	  their	  relationship	  to	  one	  another	  and	  other	  surrounding	  
circumstances	  (at	  [10]).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  priest,	  His	  Honour	  considered	  
Ermogenous	  v	  Greek	  Orthodox	  Community	  of	  SA	  Inc	  (2002)	  209	  CLR	  95.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  High	  
Court	  held	  that	  a	  minister	  of	  religion	  may	  be	  engaged	  under	  a	  contract	  of	  employment	  to	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perform	  spiritual	  duties	  and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  presumption	  of	  law	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  engagement	  
of	  a	  minister	  of	  religion	  that	  the	  parties	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  form	  contractual	  relations.	  The	  
majority	  said	  that	  because	  the	  search	  for	  the	  intention	  to	  create	  contractual	  relations	  requires	  
an	  objective	  assessment	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  between	  the	  parties	  the	  circumstances	  which	  
might	  properly	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  deciding	  whether	  what	  was	  a	  relevant	  intention	  are	  so	  
varied	  as	  to	  preclude	  the	  formation	  of	  any	  prescriptive	  rules	  (at	  [25]).	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [11]–[12]):	  
Having	  objectively	  assessed	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  between	  the	  Association	  and	  its	  
members	  I	  find	  that	  the	  Association	  and	  its	  members	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  legally	  
enforceable	  duty	  to	  abide	  by	  and	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  Association	  relating	  to	  
the	  calling	  and	  holding	  of	  a	  SGM.	  First,	  the	  Association	  is	  incorporated.	  That	  is	  relevant	  
to,	  although	  not	  determinative	  of,	  whether	  the	  members	  intended	  to	  create	  legal	  
relations	  between	  the	  Association	  and	  its	  members	  and	  between	  themselves.	  Second,	  
the	  Association	  is	  not	  a	  church	  nor	  is	  it	  concerned	  only	  with	  religious	  or	  spiritual	  
matters	  and	  with	  the	  relationship	  of	  members	  amongst	  themselves.	  The	  objects	  of	  the	  
Association	  include	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  promotion	  and	  advancement	  of	  the	  
aspirations	  of	  the	  Sikh	  community;	  to	  provide	  teaching	  and	  library	  facilities	  for	  the	  
promotion	  of	  the	  Punjabi	  language;	  to	  provide	  and	  organise	  recreational,	  sporting	  and	  
social	  activities	  for	  the	  Sikh	  community	  including	  incorporation	  of	  other	  bodies	  sharing	  
similar	  objectives;	  and	  to	  foster	  good	  will	  and	  understanding	  between	  the	  Sikh	  
community	  and	  the	  wider	  Australian	  community.	  Third,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  the	  
members	  have	  agreed	  to	  unconditionally	  accept	  the	  Association	  rules	  and	  undertaken	  
to	  abide	  by	  them...Fourth,	  the	  powers	  of	  SAWA	  set	  out	  in	  its	  Constitution	  show	  that	  
the	  members	  expect	  or	  intend	  that	  the	  Association	  will	  acquire	  and	  hold	  property	  and	  
members	  shall	  pay	  subscription	  fees.	  Fifth,	  the	  Constitution	  contains	  detailed	  
provisions	  relating	  to	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  Association,	  management	  of	  its	  affairs	  
and	  control	  of	  its	  funds	  and	  property.	  They	  are	  expressed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  consistent	  
with	  a	  document	  intended	  to	  have	  legal	  effect.	  
Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  Constitution	  of	  SAWA	  gave	  rise	  to	  ‘legally	  enforceable	  
duties	  under	  a	  contract	  or	  contracts	  between	  the	  Association	  and	  its	  members	  by	  which	  the	  
association	  and	  its	  members	  agreed	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  Constitution’	  (at	  [13]).	  He	  went	  on	  to	  hold	  
that	  the	  Requisition	  Notice	  was	  invalid,	  and	  that	  the	  executive	  committee	  was	  entitled	  to	  
decline	  to	  act	  on	  it.	  The	  plaintiffs’	  claim	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2012/193.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  is	  yet	  another	  case	  on	  the	  justiciability	  of	  internal	  disputes	  within	  an	  association.	  In	  this	  
case,	  the	  association	  was	  incorporated,	  but	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1987	  (WA)	  does	  
not	  provide	  that	  there	  is	  a	  statutory	  contract	  between	  an	  association	  and	  its	  members.	  
Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  had	  to	  consider	  various	  factors	  that	  together	  made	  the	  constitution	  and	  
rules	  of	  the	  association	  binding	  on	  its	  members.	  Will	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Cameron	  
v	  Hogan	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  barrier	  to	  association	  members	  seeking	  to	  obtain	  any	  judicial	  review	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of	  decisions	  by	  both	  unincorporated	  and	  (in	  some	  States)	  incorporated	  associations?	  Judges	  
seem	  able	  to	  find	  bases	  for	  justiciability	  despite	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan:	  for	  recent	  examples	  see	  
Miller	  v	  Australian	  Cycling	  Federation	  Inc	  [2012]	  WASC	  74	  (another	  Western	  Australian	  case	  
where	  a	  partial	  contract	  was	  found);	  Sturt	  v	  Farran	  [2012]	  NSWSC	  400	  (a	  case	  relating	  to	  an	  
unincorporated	  association).	  	  
	  
2.5.11 RANA V SURVERY [2012] NSWSC 439 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH 
WALES, PEMBROKE J, 4 MAY 2012) 
This	  case	  involved	  expulsion	  from	  membership	  of	  an	  association,	  the	  Islamic	  Association	  
Western	  Suburbs	  Sydney	  Inc	  (the	  association).	  On	  18	  December	  2011	  the	  Foundation	  
Members	  of	  the	  association	  resolved	  to	  expel	  the	  plaintiffs	  from	  the	  association	  for	  a	  period	  of	  
five	  years.	  This	  resolution	  was	  confirmed	  on	  22	  January	  2012.	  
Section	  26(1)	  of	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act)	  applied.	  This	  made	  
the	  Constitution	  and	  rules	  of	  an	  association	  binding	  as	  between	  the	  association	  and	  its	  
members	  as	  if	  they	  were	  a	  contract.	  Rule	  11	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  association	  was	  
applicable.	  It	  provided	  that:	  
The	  Foundation	  Members	  may	  by	  resolution:	  	  
1.	  Expel	  the	  member	  from	  the	  Association;	  or	  
2.	  Suspend	  the	  member	  from	  membership	  of	  the	  Association	  for	  a	  specified	  period.	  
This	  rule	  does	  not	  recognise	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  expulsion	  for	  a	  specified	  period.	  It	  allows	  for	  
‘suspension’	  for	  a	  specified	  period,	  but	  not	  expulsion.	  If	  a	  member	  was	  expelled,	  the	  rules	  
provided	  that	  he	  or	  she	  was	  entitled	  to	  re-­‐apply	  for	  membership	  at	  any	  time,	  so	  that	  an	  
expulsion	  could,	  effectively,	  be	  for	  a	  very	  short	  period.	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  rules	  should	  be	  complied	  with	  strictly.	  Therefore,	  the	  resolutions	  of	  
the	  Foundation	  Members	  were	  invalid,	  and	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  successful.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/439.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [8]):	  
Powers	  of	  expulsion	  prescribed	  in	  the	  constitutions	  of	  unincorporated	  associations	  
should	  be	  construed	  carefully,	  with	  circumspection,	  and	  certainly	  no	  more	  broadly	  
than	  the	  ordinary	  and	  natural	  meaning	  of	  the	  language	  necessitates.	  That	  is	  because	  
rights	  of	  membership	  of	  unincorporated	  associations	  are	  often	  of	  unique	  value	  to	  the	  
member	  concerned.	  Sometimes	  they	  are	  of	  cultural	  and	  social	  significance.	  Sometimes	  
their	  importance	  to	  a	  particular	  member	  is	  intangible	  but	  nonetheless	  of	  considerable	  
value	  for	  that	  member's	  identity,	  wellbeing	  and	  social	  status.	  For	  those	  reasons,	  when	  
a	  person	  joins	  an	  unincorporated	  association,	  he	  or	  she	  is	  entitled	  to	  expect	  that	  the	  
provisions	  of	  its	  constitution,	  particularly	  those	  relating	  to	  expulsion,	  will	  be	  faithfully	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and	  scrupulously	  adhered	  to.	  And	  this	  is	  more	  than	  a	  legitimate	  expectation.	  It	  is	  a	  
contractual	  right	  which	  a	  member	  is	  entitled	  to	  have	  specifically	  performed.	  
This	  principle	  has	  been	  enshrined	  in	  the	  legislation	  which	  applies	  to	  incorporated	  associations	  
in	  New	  South	  Wales:	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  (NSW)	  section	  26.	  For	  other	  states	  
see:	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  (Vic)	  section	  14A;	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  
(Qld)	  section	  71;	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1985	  (SA)	  section	  23;	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act	  1991	  (ACT)	  section	  48.	  
	  
2.5.12 RAI V THE CHARITY COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES [2012] EWHC (CH) 
1111 (HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION, NORRIS J, 1 MAY 2012) 
This	  English	  case	  concerned	  a	  religion-­‐based	  unincorporated	  registered	  charitable	  association,	  
the	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Sabha	  (SGRS).	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  dispute	  was	  a	  doctrinal	  difference	  
within	  the	  religious	  group.	  
The	  association	  based	  its	  activities	  around	  a	  temple	  in	  Southall,	  London.	  ‘Ravidassias’	  are	  
followers	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Ji	  (born	  1377	  CE).	  They	  believe	  that	  he	  spearheaded	  the	  fight	  
against	  manmade	  discrimination	  based	  on	  caste,	  colour	  or	  creed	  and	  preached	  the	  lofty	  ideals	  
of	  socialism,	  secularism,	  equality	  and	  fraternity,	  and	  that	  he	  taught	  the	  lessons	  of	  universal	  
brotherhood,	  tolerance	  and	  ‘love	  your	  neighbour’.	  These	  teachings	  have	  a	  particular	  
resonance	  for	  his	  followers,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  Hindu	  caste	  of	  Untouchables.	  
Some	  of	  the	  teachings	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Ji	  (40	  hymns	  and	  1	  verse)	  were	  incorporated	  into	  
the	  Sikh	  Holy	  Book,	  the	  Shri	  Guru	  Granth	  Sahib	  (the	  Granth).	  
According	  to	  its	  constitution,	  there	  are	  two	  separate	  bodies	  responsible	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  
the	  SGRS:	  
1. an	  elected	  Executive	  Committee;	  and	  	  
2. eleven	  appointed	  trustees	  (who	  cannot	  be	  members	  of	  the	  Executive	  Committee)	  and	  
who	  elect	  a	  chairman	  from	  amongst	  their	  number.	  
In	  April	  2011	  elections	  for	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  were	  overdue.	  On	  5	  April	  2011	  the	  existing	  
Executive	  Committee	  placed	  an	  advertisement	  in	  a	  Sikh	  newspaper	  setting	  out	  the	  proposed	  
membership	  registration	  timetable.	  It	  included	  the	  following	  statement:	  	  
PLEASE	  NOTE:	  According	  to	  constitution	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Sabha	  Southall	  our	  
relegious	  (sic)	  Guru	  is	  Shri	  Guru	  Granth	  Sahib	  Ji	  and	  we	  do	  not	  endorse	  any	  other	  holy	  
book.	  To	  become	  member	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Sabha	  you	  must	  belong	  to	  Ravidassia	  
Community	  and	  belive	  (sic)	  in	  Shri	  Guru	  Granth	  Shib	  Ji…..	  
This	  Note	  was	  indicative	  of	  an	  emerging	  doctrinal	  dispute	  about	  the	  results	  of	  the	  ‘research	  of	  
Holy	  Scriptures	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Ji’	  referred	  to	  in	  Clause	  2(a)	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  Clause	  
2(a)	  provided	  that	  one	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  association	  was:	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To	  worship	  almighty	  God	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  teachings	  and	  philosophy,	  mission	  and	  
principles	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Ji	  from	  the	  Holy	  Book	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Granth	  Sahib	  and	  research	  
of	  Holy	  Scriptures	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Ji.	  
The	  research	  referred	  to	  in	  clause	  2(a)	  led	  to	  the	  compilation	  of	  what	  was	  suggested	  to	  be	  a	  
new	  Holy	  Book	  of	  the	  Ravidassias	  known	  as	  ‘Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Amrit	  Bani’	  (the	  Amrit	  Bani),	  
promulgated	  on	  the	  birthday	  celebration	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  Ji	  on	  30	  January	  2010.	  Some	  
Ravidassias	  accept	  the	  Amrit	  Bani,	  while	  some	  Ravidassias	  (particularly	  those	  originating	  in	  the	  
Sikh	  communities	  of	  the	  Punjab)	  do	  not.	  Thus,	  there	  were	  disputing	  claims	  about	  one	  holy	  
book,	  the	  Granth,	  and	  another,	  the	  Amrit	  Bani.	  
The	  claimants	  protested	  by	  letter	  about	  the	  requirement	  of	  belief	  only	  in	  the	  Granth,	  since	  
there	  were	  members	  of	  the	  association	  who	  were	  Buddhists,	  Christians,	  followers	  of	  Swami,	  or	  
other	  groups,	  and	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  was	  now	  a	  dedicated	  text	  for	  the	  Ravidassias,	  namely	  
the	  Amrit	  Bani.	  
There	  was	  no	  response	  to	  this	  letter	  from	  the	  Executive	  Council,	  so	  the	  claimants	  appealed	  to	  
the	  appointed	  trustees.	  The	  trustees	  allegedly	  met	  and	  considered	  the	  matter	  on	  8	  May	  2011,	  
but	  this	  was	  not	  communicated	  to	  the	  claimants.	  Therefore,	  the	  claimants	  applied	  for	  an	  
injunction	  to	  restrain	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  from	  requiring	  persons	  seeking	  registration	  as	  
members	  of	  the	  SGRS	  to	  affirm	  belief	  in	  the	  Granth.	  	  
However,	  although	  the	  action	  clearly	  constituted	  ‘charity	  proceedings’,	  no	  application	  had	  
been	  made	  to	  the	  Charity	  Commission,	  as	  was	  required	  under	  what	  was	  then	  Section	  33(2)	  of	  
the	  Charities	  Act	  1993.	  A	  written	  application	  was	  subsequently	  made	  to	  the	  Charity	  
Commission	  on	  12	  May	  2011.	  Consent	  for	  the	  injunction	  proceedings	  was	  refused	  on	  the	  
grounds	  that	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Trustees	  had	  indicated	  a	  willingness	  to	  postpone	  or	  cancel	  
the	  registration	  of	  members,	  which	  was	  due	  to	  commence	  on	  the	  15	  May	  2011;	  and	  to	  
proceed	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  constitution	  to	  resolve	  the	  dispute	  under	  Clause	  8(d),	  or	  if	  the	  
internal	  resolution	  mechanism	  should	  fail,	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  mediation	  process.	  	  
A	  meeting	  with	  the	  appointed	  trustees,	  which	  proceeded	  without	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  
claimants,	  who	  had	  refused	  to	  attend,	  resulted	  in	  an	  amended	  notice	  being	  published,	  making	  
clear	  that	  ‘the	  [original]	  notice	  was	  not	  intended	  to	  restrict	  membership’.	  The	  claimants	  would	  
not	  accept	  this	  outcome.	  As	  His	  Honour	  commented	  (at	  [14]):	  
This	  was	  partly	  because	  they	  could	  not	  accept	  that	  the	  publication	  of	  a	  Notice	  (in	  the	  
original	  or	  a	  revised	  form)	  was	  constitutional.	  It	  was	  partly	  because	  they	  wanted	  to	  
advance	  their	  own	  cause	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Amrit	  Bani	  –	  an	  issue	  that	  they	  wanted	  
referred	  to	  mediation.	  The	  Claimants	  indicated	  that	  they	  would	  only	  consider	  
withdrawal	  of	  their	  claim	  ‘provided	  that	  they	  are	  also	  given	  use	  of	  one	  of	  the	  halls	  for	  
worship	  according	  to	  the	  Amrit	  Bani’.	  The	  Solicitors	  for	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  
pointed	  out	  that	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Amrit	  Bani	  was	  not	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  proceedings	  that	  
had	  been	  commenced.	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Another	  application	  was	  then	  made	  to	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  to	  commence	  proceedings,	  but	  
was	  again	  refused.	  The	  reason	  given	  by	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  was	  that	  the	  matter	  in	  dispute	  
was	  a	  doctrinal	  one,	  and	  was	  not	  capable	  of	  resolution	  in	  the	  courts.	  In	  addition,	  proceedings	  
would	  not	  be	  proportional	  to	  the	  question	  to	  be	  resolved,	  and	  charitable	  funds	  would	  be	  
wasted	  on	  litigation	  which	  should	  be	  spent	  on	  charitable	  purposes.	  Moreover,	  no	  issues	  of	  
mismanagement	  or	  improper	  procedure	  were	  involved.	  
This	  case	  arose	  when	  the	  claimants	  sought	  to	  obtain	  permission	  for	  the	  main	  proceedings	  to	  
go	  ahead,	  under	  section	  115(5)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2011.	  Section	  115(5)	  provides	  that:	  	  
Where	  subsections	  (1)	  to	  (4)	  require	  the	  taking	  of	  charity	  proceedings	  to	  be	  authorised	  
by	  an	  order	  of	  the	  Commission,	  the	  proceedings	  may	  nevertheless	  be	  entertained	  or	  
proceeded	  with	  if,	  after	  the	  order	  had	  been	  applied	  for	  and	  refused,	  leave	  to	  take	  the	  
proceedings	  was	  obtained	  from	  one	  of	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  attached	  to	  the	  
Chancery	  Division.	  
This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  original	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  court,	  and	  not	  an	  appellate	  jurisdiction	  from	  
decisions	  of	  the	  Charity	  Commission.	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [28])	  that	  the	  approach	  taken	  should	  
be:	  
...if	  the	  Applicants	  have	  a	  legally	  sustainable	  dispute,	  is	  the	  commencement	  of	  
litigation	  the	  best	  (or	  the	  least	  worst)	  course	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  charity	  as	  a	  whole	  
to	  deal	  with	  that	  dispute?	  Litigation	  may	  be	  the	  best	  course	  for	  the	  Applicants	  to	  
pursue	  to	  achieve	  their	  objective.	  But	  it	  is	  the	  charity's	  interest	  (not	  that	  of	  the	  
Applicants	  or	  proposed	  Respondents)	  that	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  inquiry.	  
A	  number	  of	  steps	  were	  involved	  in	  taking	  this	  approach:	  
1. Is	  there	  a	  relevant	  dispute?	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  there	  was,	  relating	  solely	  to	  the	  terms	  
of	  the	  Notice	  placed	  in	  the	  newspaper.	  The	  dispute	  about	  the	  proper	  place	  of	  the	  
Amrit	  Bani	  was	  irrelevant.	  
2. Do	  the	  claimants	  have	  a	  legally	  sustainable	  case?	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  they	  had.	  
3. Is	  the	  legally	  sustainable	  case	  presented	  in	  a	  proper	  manner?	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  answer	  
was	  yes.	  
4. What	  impact	  will	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  dispute	  have	  on	  the	  charity’s	  funds?	  The	  
claimants	  estimated	  their	  costs	  at	  £120,000,	  and	  Executive	  Committee	  estimated	  their	  
costs	  at	  £25,000.	  Assuming	  these	  costs	  could	  be	  met	  by	  the	  association,	  there	  was	  a	  
considerable	  amount	  to	  be	  met	  from	  the	  charity’s	  funds.	  
Therefore,	  was	  litigation	  the	  charity’s	  best	  (or	  least	  worst)	  option?	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  
questions	  for	  resolution	  were	  (at	  [34]):	  
...whether	  the	  revised	  form	  of	  advertisement	  is	  lawfully	  consistent	  with	  the	  
Constitution,	  and	  whether	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  ought	  to	  insist	  upon	  publication	  in	  
that	  form	  even	  though	  there	  is	  a	  sustainable	  argument	  that	  it	  will	  erroneously	  deter	  
some	  people	  from	  applying	  for	  membership.	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Was	  there	  a	  significant	  chance	  that	  an	  accommodation	  could	  be	  reached	  which	  did	  not	  involve	  
expensive	  court	  proceedings’?	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [35])	  that	  there	  was:	  
It	  must	  first	  be	  realised	  that	  the	  litigation	  cannot	  possibly	  settle	  any	  doctrinal	  question	  
as	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Granth	  and	  the	  ‘Holy	  Scriptures	  of	  Shri	  Guru	  Ravidass	  
Ji’	  or	  as	  to	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Amrit	  Bani.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  dispute	  about	  whether	  the	  Public	  
Notice	  faithfully	  reflects	  Clause	  2(a)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  the	  Court	  will	  decide	  that	  not	  
by	  reference	  to	  doctrinal	  arguments	  but	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  Ravidass	  
Sabha....	  It	  must	  next	  be	  appreciated	  that	  neither	  the	  Claimants	  nor	  the	  Executive	  
Committee	  (or	  even	  the	  Trustees)	  can	  be	  assured	  [of]	  being	  able	  to	  look	  to	  the	  
charity's	  funds	  for	  reimbursement	  of	  their	  legal	  expenses	  (particularly	  if	  those	  with	  a	  
prospective	  claim	  to	  indemnity	  deliberately	  embark	  upon	  a	  course	  known	  to	  be	  
controversial	  and	  acknowledged	  not	  to	  be	  intended	  to	  restrict	  membership).	  Litigation	  
may	  prove	  necessary	  to	  secure	  that	  those	  entitled	  and	  wishing	  to	  be	  members	  of	  the	  
Ravidass	  Sabha	  have	  a	  fair	  opportunity	  to	  register	  as	  such.	  But	  if	  the	  contending	  
parties	  undertake	  a	  realistic	  appraisal	  of	  their	  respective	  positions	  in	  the	  light	  of	  this	  
judgment	  then	  in	  my	  view	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  possible	  to	  prepare	  a	  membership	  book	  and	  
formulate	  an	  electoral	  procedure	  (having	  regard	  to	  past	  usage)	  which	  will	  enable	  the	  
practice	  of	  the	  Ravidass	  Sabha	  to	  reflect	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  members	  
(and	  not	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  Claimants	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  or	  the	  Executive	  Committee	  on	  
the	  other).	  
His	  Honour	  was	  thus	  giving	  a	  heavy	  hint	  to	  the	  parties	  to	  resolve	  their	  differences	  outside	  the	  
court,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  might	  end	  up	  bearing	  the	  costs.	  He	  
deferred	  the	  application	  for	  permission	  to	  proceed	  for	  two	  months,	  so	  that	  an	  accommodation	  
could	  be	  reached,	  but	  allowed	  the	  claimants	  to	  reintroduce	  it	  ‘as	  a	  last	  resort’	  if	  no	  agreement	  
could	  be	  reached	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  two	  month	  period.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2012/1111.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  illustrates	  that	  the	  courts	  could	  never	  be	  concerned	  with	  settling	  a	  doctrinal	  dispute.	  
However,	  His	  Honour	  characterised	  the	  case	  as	  one	  not	  about	  doctrine,	  but	  rather	  about	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  Public	  Notice	  which	  had	  been	  published,	  and	  appeared	  to	  restrict	  
membership	  of	  the	  association.	  The	  case	  also	  points	  to	  the	  costs	  issue	  which	  is	  so	  important	  
for	  associations	  pursuing	  litigation.	  In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  if	  the	  parties	  
proceeded,	  none	  of	  them	  might	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  an	  indemnity	  for	  costs	  from	  the	  charity.	  	  
	  
2.5.13  FITZPATRICK V LITHGOW AND DISTRICT WORKMENS CLUB LIMITED [2012] 
NSWSC 265 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, HALLEN ASJ, 23 MARCH 
2012) 
This	  case	  involved	  suspension	  of	  membership	  from	  the	  defendant	  Lithgow	  and	  District	  
Workmens	  Club	  Limited	  (the	  club).	  The	  plaintiff,	  Fitzpatrick,	  was	  suspended	  from	  his	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membership	  of	  the	  club	  on	  29	  August	  2011.	  He	  sought	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  suspension	  was	  
ultra	  vires	  (beyond	  the	  power	  of	  the	  club)	  and	  void.	  
The	  club	  contended	  that:	  
• The	  plaintiff's	  relationship	  with	  the	  club	  was	  consensual,	  and	  not	  contractual,	  and	  that	  
his	  removal	  and	  suspension	  involved	  no	  diminution	  of,	  or	  damage	  to,	  rights	  of	  
property,	  livelihood,	  or	  trade.	  	  
• His	  removal	  and	  suspension	  from	  membership,	  whether	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  club's	  
constitution	  or	  not,	  did	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  legally	  enforceable	  right.	  	  
• The	  plaintiff	  was	  only	  temporarily	  suspended,	  pending	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  club's	  
Disciplinary	  Committee,	  which	  determination	  the	  plaintiff	  did	  not	  allow	  to	  proceed,	  
because	  he	  commenced	  these	  proceedings.	  	  
• The	  plaintiff	  had	  acted	  precipitately	  in	  commencing	  these	  proceedings	  without	  first	  
having	  participated	  in	  the	  process	  for	  determining	  such	  issues	  prescribed	  by	  the	  club's	  
constitution.	  	  
The	  club	  is	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee	  formed	  under	  the	  then	  Companies	  Act	  1961	  
(NSW).	  It	  does	  not	  have	  a	  share	  capital.	  It	  is	  a	  registered	  club	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  
Registered	  Clubs	  Act	  1976	  (NSW).	  The	  rules	  of	  the	  club	  are	  contained	  in	  the	  club's	  constitution,	  
which,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  governs	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  club's	  members	  and	  
between	  the	  members	  and	  the	  club.	  Under	  the	  terms	  of	  its	  constitution,	  it	  is	  a	  ‘non-­‐
proprietary	  club’.	  
The	  objects	  for	  which	  the	  club	  was	  established	  include	  ‘to	  promote	  and	  conduct	  such	  sports	  
games	  amusements	  and	  entertainments	  pastimes	  and	  recreation	  indoor	  and	  outdoor	  as	  the	  
Club	  may	  deem	  expedient	  for	  the	  recreation	  of	  members	  and	  guests’	  and	  ‘to	  construct	  
establish	  provide	  maintain	  and	  conduct	  playing	  areas	  and	  grounds	  as	  the	  Club	  may	  determine	  
...’.	  
The	  constitution	  also	  provides	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  sections	  and	  committees	  for	  the	  conduct,	  
management	  and	  control	  of	  all	  or	  any	  games	  or	  sporting	  activities,	  in	  which	  the	  club	  is	  engaged	  
and	  to	  define	  and	  limit	  the	  persons	  (being	  members	  of	  the	  club)	  eligible	  for	  membership	  of	  all	  
or	  any	  of	  such	  sections	  or	  committees.	  One	  of	  these	  sections	  is	  the	  ‘Bowling	  Club’.	  
The	  plaintiff	  joined	  the	  club	  in	  1967.	  In	  2008,	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  made	  a	  'Life	  Member'	  of	  the	  club	  
pursuant	  to	  Article	  26(b)	  of	  the	  club's	  constitution,	  in	  that	  he	  was	  a	  member	  of	  an	  ordinary	  
class	  of	  membership	  of	  the	  club,	  who	  had	  attained	  25	  consecutive	  years	  of	  continuous	  
financial	  membership	  and	  had	  attained	  the	  age	  of	  60	  years.	  As	  a	  club	  Life	  Member	  the	  plaintiff	  
was	  relieved	  of	  any	  levies	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  club,	  and	  had	  certain	  other	  privileges.	  	  
The	  plaintiff	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Bowling	  Club	  between	  1988	  and	  1993	  and	  had	  become	  a	  
member	  again	  in	  2008.	  As	  a	  club	  Life	  Member,	  he	  was	  eligible	  for	  membership	  of	  the	  Bowling	  
Club	  on	  payment	  of	  the	  prescribed	  annual	  subscription	  fee.	  The	  plaintiff	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
Bowling	  Club	  for	  the	  year	  commencing	  1	  July	  2010	  and	  ending	  30	  June	  2011.	  He	  did	  not	  pay	  
the	  annual	  subscription	  fee	  for	  Bowling	  Club	  membership	  for	  the	  financial	  year	  commencing	  1	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July	  2011	  (which	  should	  have	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  Treasurer	  of	  the	  Club	  by	  30	  June	  2011).	  A	  later	  
application	  to	  become	  a	  ‘multi-­‐member’	  of	  the	  Bowling	  Club	  in	  August	  2011	  failed	  for	  want	  of	  
a	  seconder.	  Therefore,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  relevant	  events,	  he	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Bowling	  
Club.	  
However,	  members	  of	  the	  club,	  including	  the	  club	  Life	  Members,	  were	  entitled	  to	  use	  the	  
sporting	  and	  other	  facilities.	  There	  was	  no	  rule,	  in	  either	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  club	  or	  the	  
Rules	  of	  the	  Bowling	  Club,	  which	  required	  a	  member	  of	  the	  club	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
Bowling	  Club	  in	  order	  to	  use	  the	  bowling	  greens.	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  plaintiff	  and	  the	  club	  and	  its	  members	  had	  been	  contentious	  
over	  many	  years.	  There	  had	  been	  incidents	  of	  abusive	  conduct,	  and	  a	  previous	  suspension.	  In	  
this	  case,	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  removed	  from	  membership	  of	  the	  club	  on	  29	  August	  2011	  under	  the	  
authority	  of	  the	  general	  manager.	  This	  followed	  an	  incident	  which	  took	  place	  at	  the	  bowling	  
green.	  A	  letter	  to	  this	  effect	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  on	  30	  August	  2011.	  There	  was	  no	  reply	  to	  
this	  letter.	  Disciplinary	  proceedings	  followed	  in	  September	  2011.	  
There	  were	  two	  questions	  for	  determination:	  
• whether	  the	  plaintiff's	  removal	  and	  suspension	  from	  membership	  was	  justiciable;	  
• whether	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  entitled,	  as	  of	  right	  or	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  discretion,	  to	  the	  relief	  
he	  sought.	  
On	  the	  justiciability	  issue,	  His	  Honour	  stated	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  evidence	  given	  that	  the	  
club’s	  constitution	  was	  intended	  to	  be	  legally	  binding.	  Neither	  were	  there	  any	  clear	  positive	  
indications	  that	  the	  members	  contemplated	  the	  creation	  of	  legal	  relations	  inter	  se.	  Rather,	  it	  
had	  been	  submitted	  that	  entering	  into	  club	  membership	  was	  fundamentally	  social	  and	  
directed	  to	  engaging	  in	  social	  and	  sporting	  activities.	  	  
However,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  right	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  to	  use	  the	  sporting	  and	  other	  
facilities	  of	  the	  club,	  whilst	  he	  was	  a	  club	  Life	  Member,	  whether	  or	  not	  that	  right	  included	  the	  
use	  of	  the	  bowling	  greens	  whilst	  he	  was	  disqualified	  from	  the	  Bowling	  Club,	  was	  a	  right	  of	  
property,	  or	  sufficiently	  related	  to	  his	  property	  rights,	  to	  justify	  the	  court's	  power	  to	  hear	  and	  
determine	  the	  proceedings.	  The	  removal	  and	  suspension	  also	  affected	  the	  plaintiff’s	  
‘reputational	  interests’.	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [108]):	  
Thus,	  even	  if	  the	  Constitution	  provided	  consensual,	  rather	  than	  contractual,	  rights,	  I	  
am	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  decision	  on	  29	  August	  2011	  to	  remove	  and	  suspend	  did	  have,	  
or	  may	  have	  had,	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  Plaintiff's	  property	  rights,	  or	  reputation,	  albeit	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  suspension	  it	  was	  an	  interim,	  or	  temporary,	  one,	  pending	  him	  being	  given	  
the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  full	  and	  fair	  hearing,	  is	  sufficient	  to	  warrant	  the	  Court	  hearing	  
and	  determining	  the	  matter.	  
Thus,	  the	  removal	  and	  suspension	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  membership	  was	  justiciable.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  relief,	  having	  considered	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  plaintiff’s	  suspension,	  His	  
Honour	  held	  that	  the	  suspension	  was	  not	  ultra	  vires	  or	  void,	  or	  wrongful,	  or	  without	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reasonable	  cause.	  The	  plaintiff	  had	  been	  suspended	  for	  his	  ‘quarrelsome’	  behaviour.	  His	  
Honour	  accepted	  the	  facts	  supporting	  this	  contention,	  which	  were	  given	  in	  some	  detail.	  Nor	  
had	  the	  disciplinary	  process	  been	  flawed.	  Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  was	  not	  prepared	  to	  give	  the	  
declaratory	  relief	  sought.	  
The	  case	  was	  dismissed,	  with	  the	  plaintiff	  later	  ordered	  to	  pay	  half	  the	  club’s	  costs.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/265.html	  
The	  costs	  decision	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/374.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  again	  raises	  the	  issue	  of	  justiciability	  of	  issues	  which	  concern	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  a	  
club	  or	  association.	  Unless	  a	  member's	  ‘proprietary	  rights’	  are	  involved,	  or	  the	  circumstances	  
show	  clearly	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  association	  are	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  legally	  enforceable	  
contractual	  relationship	  among	  the	  members	  inter	  se,	  the	  traditional	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  
courts	  has	  been	  to	  refuse	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  voluntary	  nonprofit	  
associations	  to	  review	  alleged	  breaches	  of	  the	  consensual	  relationship	  between	  the	  members.	  	  
However,	  the	  test	  for	  showing	  a	  proprietary	  right	  is	  rather	  flexible	  in	  Australia.	  It	  is	  whether	  a	  
member	  derives	  a	  tangible	  or	  intangible	  benefit	  from	  being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  club	  or	  
association	  in	  question.	  Tangible	  benefits	  can	  include	  the	  right	  to	  use	  and	  enjoy	  an	  
association’s	  social	  facilities,	  playing	  fields	  or	  equipment,	  as	  in	  this	  case.	  Intangible	  benefits	  
might	  apply	  to	  an	  association	  which	  has	  no	  actual	  facilities	  or	  equipment,	  such	  as	  a	  book	  club	  
conducted	  in	  members’	  homes,	  or	  an	  environmental	  group	  which	  conducts	  all	  its	  activities	  ‘on-­‐
site’	  at	  contested	  areas.	  Benefits	  which	  are	  merely	  collateral,	  however,	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient.	  
	  
2.5.14  MILLER V AUSTRALIAN CYCLING FEDERATION INC [2012] WASC 74 (SUPREME 
COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, MARTIN J, 6 MARCH 2012) 
The	  Australian	  Cycling	  Association	  (ACF)	  is	  an	  association	  incorporated	  under	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act	  1991	  (ACT)	  (the	  Act).	  This	  case	  concerned	  disciplinary	  proceedings	  brought	  
against	  Miller	  under	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  ACF.	  	  
The	  ACF	  had	  adopted	  customised	  rules	  under	  the	  Act,	  rather	  than	  the	  model	  rules.	  Rule	  11	  of	  
the	  ACF’s	  constitution	  deals	  with	  membership.	  It	  provides	  that	  membership	  comprised	  
constituent	  members,	  life	  members	  and	  individual	  members.	  By	  rule	  10.1	  constituent	  
members	  are	  bodies	  which	  are	  controlling	  bodies	  for	  cycling	  in	  each	  state.	  Of	  these	  classes	  of	  
membership,	  only	  constituent	  members	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote,	  debate,	  and	  move	  or	  second	  
motions	  at	  general	  meetings.	  
Miller	  was	  an	  individual	  member	  of	  the	  ACF	  for	  over	  50	  years,	  had	  held	  board	  and	  executive	  
roles	  within	  the	  ACF,	  was	  a	  Union	  Cycliste	  Internationale	  (UCI)	  commissionaire,	  was	  president	  
of	  the	  Melville	  Fremantle	  Cycling	  Club	  (a	  member	  of	  the	  West	  Australian	  Cycling	  Federation	  Inc	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(WACF),	  and	  had	  held	  executive	  roles	  within	  the	  WACF	  over	  many	  years	  until	  23	  April	  2010.	  
WACF	  is	  a	  constituent	  member	  of	  the	  ACF.	  
In	  November	  2009,	  various	  members	  of	  the	  board	  and	  staff	  of	  the	  WACF	  lodged	  complaints	  of	  
harassment	  against	  Miller.	  These	  allegations	  related	  to	  his	  overbearing	  manner,	  but	  there	  was	  
no	  suggestion	  of	  impropriety	  made	  against	  him.	  
The	  WACF	  board	  appointed	  a	  three	  person	  Investigation	  Panel	  (the	  Panel),	  chaired	  by	  a	  legal	  
practitioner.	  This	  was	  said	  to	  be	  in	  compliance	  with	  Rule	  17.1	  of	  the	  ACF’s	  constitution.	  The	  
Panel	  undertook	  its	  investigation	  during	  2010.	  Miller	  challenged	  the	  Panel’s	  terms	  of	  
reference,	  jurisdiction	  to	  make	  determinative	  findings	  and	  recommendations	  on	  penalty,	  and	  
the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  ACF	  board	  to	  act	  on	  the	  Panel’s	  report.	  The	  report	  was	  brought	  down	  on	  
16	  February	  2011,	  and	  contained	  adverse	  findings	  against	  Miller	  and	  other	  parties.	  
On	  13	  May	  2011,	  the	  board	  resolved	  on	  a	  second	  step	  in	  the	  disciplinary	  procedure.	  This	  was	  
to	  refer	  to	  a	  special	  disciplinary	  tribunal	  of	  one	  person	  certain	  allegations	  that	  Miller	  had	  
breached	  the	  constitution	  and	  bylaws,	  had	  acted	  in	  a	  manner	  unbecoming	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
ACF,	  prejudiced	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  ACF	  and	  brought	  cycling	  into	  disrepute.	  Miller	  sought	  
intervention	  by	  the	  court	  in	  these	  proceedings,	  which	  were	  commenced	  on	  17	  August	  2011.	  
Miller’s	  contention	  was	  that,	  having	  been	  subject	  to	  an	  Investigation	  Panel,	  he	  should	  not	  be	  
further	  subject	  to	  a	  special	  disciplinary	  tribunal.	  His	  submission	  was	  that	  this	  was	  a	  second	  
disciplinary	  process	  under	  Rule	  17.1	  of	  the	  ACF’s	  constitution.	  He	  sought	  a	  permanent	  
injunction	  restraining	  the	  ACF	  from	  proceeding,	  but	  this	  was	  rejected	  by	  His	  Honour	  in	  favour	  
of	  declaratory	  relief.	  
His	  Honour	  considered	  important	  that	  he	  was	  being	  asked	  to	  adjudicate	  on	  a	  controversy	  
relating	  to	  an	  incorporated	  association	  governed	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  ACT,	  when	  the	  events	  
occurred	  in	  Western	  Australia.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  was	  satisfied	  that	  section	  4(3)	  of	  the	  
Jurisdiction	  of	  Court	  (Crossvesting)	  Act	  1993	  (ACT)	  and	  section	  9	  of	  the	  Jurisdiction	  of	  Courts	  
(Crossvesting)	  Act	  1987	  (WA)	  allowed	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Western	  Australia	  to	  exercise	  
jurisdiction	  in	  respect	  of	  ‘ACT	  matters’	  (para	  [34]).	  
Central	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  parties	  was	  the	  wording	  of	  Rule	  17.1	  of	  the	  ACF’s	  
constitution.	  This	  permitted	  the	  board	  discretion	  to	  determine	  a	  disciplinary	  matter	  ‘either	  
under	  the	  procedures	  set	  down	  in	  the	  ByLaws	  or	  by	  such	  other	  procedure	  and/or	  persons	  as	  
the	  Board	  considers	  appropriate’.	  His	  Honour	  accepted	  the	  ACF’s	  submission	  that	  this	  was	  
‘clearly	  expressed	  disjunctive	  terminology’	  which	  allowed	  the	  ACF	  ‘secondary	  recourse’	  to	  an	  
alternative	  disciplinary	  procedure	  as	  it	  saw	  fit	  (para	  [42]).	  
There	  was	  also	  a	  contractual	  issue	  to	  be	  considered.	  Miller’s	  fundamental	  grievance	  was	  that	  
he	  had	  a	  contractual	  right	  not	  to	  be	  subject	  twice	  to	  a	  determinative	  process.	  Section	  48	  of	  the	  
Act	  provides	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association	  bind	  the	  association	  and	  its	  
members	  as	  if	  the	  rules	  had	  been	  signed	  and	  sealed	  by	  each	  member	  and	  contained	  covenants	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  each	  member	  to	  observe	  the	  rules.	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  
distinction	  between	  the	  ACF’s	  constitution	  (which	  were	  its	  rules)	  and	  its	  bylaws	  (which	  were	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not	  its	  rules):	  cf.	  Rush	  v	  WA	  Amateur	  Football	  League	  Inc	  [2007]	  WASCA	  190.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
Rush,	  Buss	  JA	  concluded	  that,	  under	  the	  WA	  legislation,	  the	  association’s	  bylaws	  were	  part	  of	  
its	  ‘rules	  and	  regulations’	  (at	  [96],	  [98],	  [104],	  [117]	  and	  [119],)	  but	  this	  case	  was	  governed	  by	  
the	  ACT	  legislation,	  which	  provided	  for	  a	  different	  regime.	  
Although	  Rule	  15.1	  of	  the	  ACF’s	  constitution	  provided	  that	  the	  constitution	  formed	  a	  contract	  
between	  each	  member	  and	  that	  they	  were	  bound	  by	  the	  rules	  and	  bylaws,	  His	  Honour	  was	  
firm	  that	  only	  the	  constitution	  formed	  a	  contract	  between	  each	  member	  and	  the	  ACF.	  This	  was	  
because	  of	  provisions	  in	  the	  Act.	  Even	  though	  the	  ACF	  had	  its	  own	  rules,	  section	  32	  of	  the	  Act	  
provided	  that	  these	  rules	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  model	  rules	  for	  the	  ACT	  (found	  in	  Schedule	  1	  
to	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Regulations	  1991	  (ACT)).	  One	  of	  the	  matters	  which	  must	  be	  
complied	  with	  relates	  to	  discipline	  of	  members.	  
Section	  31(2)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  if	  the	  model	  rules	  make	  provision	  for	  any	  matter	  not	  
provided	  for	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association,	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  association	  are	  taken	  
to	  include	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  model	  rules	  in	  relation	  to	  that	  matter.	  Model	  rules	  9	  and	  10	  
provide,	  respectively,	  for	  disciplining	  of	  members,	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  appeal	  of	  a	  disciplined	  
member.	  These	  are	  explicit	  procedures	  relating	  to	  disciplinary	  action	  against	  members,	  with	  a	  
requirement	  of	  natural	  justice	  and	  appeal.	  This	  level	  of	  detail	  was	  not	  provided	  in	  Rule	  17.1	  of	  
the	  ACF’s	  constitution.	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  consequence	  was	  that	  the	  ACF’s	  constitution	  
(rules)	  would	  be	  taken	  to	  include	  the	  model	  rules	  relating	  to	  discipline,	  which	  contained	  
detailed	  procedures.	  While	  Rule	  17.1	  established	  ‘a	  viable	  alternative	  disciplinary	  path’,	  there	  
was	  also	  ‘a	  vacuum	  as	  to	  the	  required	  procedures	  to	  be	  followed	  along	  that	  alternative	  path’.	  
The	  procedures	  of	  the	  model	  rules	  became	  applicable	  to	  fill	  the	  identified	  vacuum	  (para	  [81]).	  
The	  ACF	  had	  engaged	  in	  a	  two-­‐stage	  process	  –	  an	  Investigation	  Panel	  and	  a	  special	  disciplinary	  
tribunal.	  The	  ACF	  did	  not	  self-­‐assess	  the	  Investigation	  Panel’s	  report	  to	  be	  deficient,	  rather	  
quite	  the	  reverse.	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  was	  nothing	  in	  the	  ACF’s	  rules	  to	  suggest	  that	  
there	  was	  ‘legitimacy	  in	  a	  further	  exercise	  of	  the	  ACF’s	  board’s	  power	  to	  refer	  the	  same	  
complaints	  against	  Miller	  for	  further	  determination’	  (at	  [133]).	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [134]–
[137]):	  
The	  conclusion	  may	  well	  have	  been	  different	  had	  the	  Investigation	  Panel’s	  terms	  of	  
reference	  been	  confined	  just	  to	  investigation.	  Plainly	  they	  were	  not.	  The	  second	  term	  
of	  reference,	  as	  has	  been	  seen,	  goes	  significantly	  beyond	  investigation,	  encompassing	  
outright	  determinations	  by	  the	  Panel.	  Such	  determinations	  were	  made	  in	  the	  Panel’s	  
report.	  There	  having	  been	  an	  investigation	  conducted	  with	  determinations	  already	  
made	  by	  the	  ACF’s	  Investigation	  Panel,	  in	  my	  view,	  there	  is	  now	  no	  legitimate	  basis	  for	  
a	  second	  reference	  to	  the	  ‘special	  disciplinary	  tribunal’....	  [F]inality	  for	  me	  is	  a	  powerful	  
consideration	  as	  regards	  the	  referral	  to	  a	  body	  to	  ‘investigate	  and	  determine’.	  In	  my	  
assessment...[there	  is]	  no	  express,	  inferred	  or	  implied	  foundation...within	  the	  ACF’s	  
Constitution	  to	  support	  what,	  in	  substance,	  amounts	  to	  a	  second	  referral	  to	  a	  
disciplinary	  body	  of	  the	  ACF	  for	  determination	  of	  the	  same	  misconduct	  allegations	  
against	  Mr	  Miller.	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Therefore,	  having	  once	  exercised	  its	  rights	  under	  Rule	  17.1	  of	  its	  constitution	  to	  consider	  the	  
complaints	  against	  Miller,	  the	  ACF	  could	  not	  do	  so	  again.	  Whilst	  it	  was	  open	  for	  the	  ACF	  board	  
to	  refer	  the	  Panel’s	  report	  on,	  there	  was	  no	  disciplinary	  procedure	  or	  appeal	  procedure	  for	  the	  
alternative	  process	  specified	  in	  its	  own	  rules.	  In	  that	  situation,	  model	  rules	  9	  and	  10	  applied	  
pursuant	  to	  section	  31(2)	  of	  the	  Act.	  Miller	  was	  successful	  and	  was	  awarded	  costs.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-­‐
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/wa/WASC/2012/74.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
There	  were	  several	  complications	  in	  this	  case.	  Firstly,	  the	  case,	  in	  Western	  Australia,	  dealt	  with	  
an	  incorporated	  association	  from	  the	  ACT.	  Under	  Australia’s	  Constitutional	  arrangements,	  
incorporated	  association	  legislation	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  the	  states.	  Thus,	  each	  Australian	  state	  and	  
territory	  has	  its	  own	  incorporated	  associations	  legislation.	  Jurisdiction	  over	  an	  association	  
incorporated	  in	  another	  state	  would	  be	  impossible	  but	  for	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  various	  cross-­‐
vesting	  Acts	  in	  each	  of	  the	  states	  and	  territories.	  	  
Secondly,	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  constitution	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association	  is	  a	  contract	  
between	  the	  members	  and	  the	  association	  can	  be	  complex.	  Most,	  but	  not	  all,	  states	  and	  the	  
ACT	  explicitly	  provide	  that	  there	  is	  a	  contract	  in	  place:	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  
(NSW)	  section	  26;	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  (Vic)	  section	  14A;	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  (Qld)	  section	  71;	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1985	  (SA)	  section	  23;	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1991	  (ACT)	  section	  48.	  	  
However,	  in	  some	  jurisdictions	  the	  contract	  is	  perhaps	  better	  regarded	  as	  implicit:	  Associations	  
Incorporations	  Act	  1987	  (WA);	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1964	  (Tas);	  Associations	  Act	  2003	  
(NT).	  In	  Rush	  v	  WA	  Amateur	  Football	  League,	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  though	  
the	   respondent	   football	   league	  was	  an	   incorporated	  association,	  no	  contractual	  basis	  was	   to	  
be	   found	   in	   the	   actions	   of	   members	   signing	   application	   forms	   by	   which	   they	   undertook	   to	  
abide	  by	   the	  constitution	  and	  by-­‐laws	  of	   the	  association,	  even	  though	  both	  were	  part	  of	   the	  
‘rules	  and	  regulations’	  of	  the	  association.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  constitution	  
was	   a	   contract	   between	   the	  members	   and	   the	   ACF,	   but	   His	   Honour	  made	   it	   clear	   that	   the	  
bylaws	  were	  not	  part	  of	  that	  contract.	  
Thirdly,	  the	  ACF	  had	  its	  own	  form	  of	  rules,	  and	  had	  not	  adopted	  the	  model	  rules.	  His	  Honour	  
had	   to	   wrestle	   considerably	   with	   the	   interlocking	   of	   the	   two	   sets	   of	   rules	   to	   arrive	   at	   his	  
conclusion.	  The	  adoption	  of	  model	   rules	   (even	  with	  modifications)	  would	  make	  that	  exercise	  
redundant.	  
	  
2.5.15  GRIMALDI V CHAMELEON MINING NL [2012] FCAFC 6 (FULL COURT OF THE 
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, FINN, STONE AND PERRAM JJ, 21 FEBRUARY 
2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  against	  the	  finding	  that	  Grimaldi	  (G),	  a	  former	  director	  and	  consultant	  to	  
Chameleon	  Mining	  NL	  (Chameleon),	  had	  improperly	  used	  funds	  from	  Chameleon	  for	  the	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purposes	  of	  another	  company	  of	  which	  he	  was	  a	  director	  and	  shareholder,	  Murchison	  Metals	  
Ltd	  (Murchison):	  see	  Chameleon	  Mining	  NL	  v	  Murchison	  Mining	  Ltd	  [2010]	  FCA	  1129.	  
Chameleon	  claimed	  that	  G	  was	  a	  ‘de	  facto’	  director	  of	  Chameleon,	  and	  had	  breached	  his	  duties	  
as	  director	  by	  favouring	  Murchison	  over	  Chameleon.	  The	  Federal	  Court	  held	  that	  G,	  by	  his	  
actions,	  had	  behaved	  as	  an	  actual	  director	  of	  Chameleon	  would,	  and	  that	  he	  was	  consequently	  
guilty	  of	  breaches	  of	  his	  duties	  as	  a	  director	  to	  that	  company.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  at	  first	  
instance	  pointed	  to	  the	  need	  for	  consultants	  and	  corporate	  advisors	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  delineation	  
of	  their	  roles,	  so	  that	  they	  were	  not	  held	  out	  as	  directors	  of	  any	  company	  they	  were	  advising.	  
This	  appeal	  upheld	  that	  finding.	  
The	  Full	  Court	  held	  that	  a	  person	  acting	  as	  a	  ‘consultant’	  can	  still	  be	  found	  to	  be	  a	  director	  of	  a	  
company,	  either	  de	  jure	  (properly	  appointed)	  or	  de	  facto	  (acting	  as	  if	  properly	  appointed).	  This	  
is	  particularly	  so	  if	  their	  appointment	  as	  consultant	  is	  ‘unconstrained’.	  Their	  Honours	  held	  that:	  
even	  though	  he	  was	  not	  authorised	  to	  be	  a	  director,	  Mr	  Grimaldi	  was	  either	  given,	  or	  
had	  arrogated	  to	  himself	  with	  the	  acquiescence	  of	  at	  least	  the	  two	  executive	  
directors...functions	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  Chameleon	  which	  would	  properly	  be	  expected	  to	  
be	  performed	  by	  a	  director	  of	  that	  corporation	  given	  its	  circumstances.	  Given	  the	  
extent	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  those	  functions,	  he	  so	  acted	  in	  the	  position	  of	  a	  director	  
as	  to	  warrant	  the	  imposition	  on	  him	  of	  the	  liabilities,	  statutory	  and	  fiduciary,	  of	  a	  
director.	  
They	  further	  held	  that	  this	  finding	  brought	  G	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  an	  ‘officer’	  in	  section	  
9(b)(i)	  and	  (ii)	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act).	  The	  section	  9	  definition	  of	  an	  officer	  
of	  a	  corporation	  is	  deliberately	  broad,	  going	  beyond	  just	  directors.	  In	  reality	  this	  was	  all	  that	  
was	  needed	  to	  find	  possible	  liability	  under	  sections	  181(1)	  and	  182(1)	  of	  the	  Act,	  rather	  than	  
the	  more	  complex	  inquiry	  as	  to	  whether	  G	  was	  a	  de	  facto	  or	  ‘shadow’	  director.	  Sections	  181(1)	  
and	  182(1)	  refer	  to	  the	  liability	  of	  a	  ‘director	  or	  other	  officer’	  of	  a	  company	  for	  not	  acting	  in	  
good	  faith	  and	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  company,	  or	  in	  using	  their	  position	  as	  director	  for	  
their	  personal	  advantage.	  	  
The	  trial	  judge	  had	  also	  found	  that	  G	  owed	  fiduciary	  duties	  under	  the	  general	  law	  (outside	  the	  
Act)	  to	  Chameleon	  in	  his	  role,	  whether	  as	  consultant	  or	  director.	  In	  this	  appeal,	  Their	  Honours	  
agreed	  that	  this	  conclusion	  was	  ‘unassailable’.	  On	  the	  facts,	  there	  had	  been	  a	  clear	  breach	  of	  
fiduciary	  duty	  by	  G.	  This	  included	  the	  obtaining	  of	  an	  advantage	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  gift	  of	  shares.	  
Such	  a	  gift	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  clear	  conflict	  of	  duty	  and	  interest.	  Their	  Honours	  also	  agreed	  that	  
there	  would	  have	  been	  a	  fiduciary	  duty	  owing	  by	  G	  in	  any	  event,	  even	  if	  he	  had	  not	  been	  found	  
to	  be	  a	  de	  facto	  director.	  This	  was	  because	  of	  his	  role	  in	  certain	  transactions	  on	  behalf	  of	  
Chameleon.	  
The	  case	  also	  dealt	  with	  third	  party	  liability	  for	  a	  breach	  of	  trust	  (or	  breach	  of	  fiduciary	  duty)	  as	  
first	  outlined	  in	  Barnes	  v	  Addy,	  and	  adopted	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Farah	  Constructions	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  
Say-­‐Dee	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2007]	  HCA	  22.	  Their	  Honours	  had	  no	  doubt	  that	  G	  was	  liable	  for	  breach	  of	  
fiduciary	  duty,	  and	  that	  Murchison	  was	  liable	  as	  an	  accessory	  under	  the	  so-­‐called	  first	  and	  
second	  limbs	  (knowing	  assistance	  and	  knowing	  receipt)	  of	  Barnes	  v	  Addy.	  Moneys	  properly	  
belonging	  to	  Chameleon	  had	  been	  diverted	  to	  Murchison,	  and	  the	  knowledge	  of	  G	  was	  clearly	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imputed	  to	  Murchison.	  Although	  there	  had	  been	  an	  attempt	  to	  characterise	  these	  funds	  as	  
loans,	  this	  was	  rejected	  both	  by	  the	  trial	  judge	  and	  in	  this	  appeal.	  Funds	  of	  a	  company,	  
although	  the	  company	  is	  the	  beneficial	  owner	  of	  them,	  are	  treated	  as	  trust	  property	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  the	  rule	  in	  Barnes	  v	  Addy,	  and	  these	  had	  been	  clearly	  misappropriated.	  Their	  
Honours	  said	  that	  G	  and	  the	  other	  director	  of	  Murchison	  involved	  were	  ‘not	  thieves’,	  but	  the	  
money	  had	  nevertheless	  been	  misappropriated,	  and	  G	  and	  the	  other	  director	  had	  acted	  
‘dishonestly’.	  They	  stated	  that:	  ‘The	  case	  was	  a	  plain	  one,	  not	  simply	  of	  a	  bare	  conflict	  of	  duty	  
and	  interest,	  but	  of	  a	  blatant	  self-­‐interested	  misappropriation	  of	  Chameleon’s	  funds	  which	  
provided	  no	  benefit	  to	  it,	  which	  funds	  Grimaldi	  well	  knew	  had	  been	  raised	  for	  quite	  different	  
corporate	  purposes’.	  
The	  trial	  judge	  held	  that	  G	  was	  liable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  profits	  he	  had	  obtained	  from	  the	  
various	  impugned	  transactions.	  Their	  Honours	  did	  not	  interfere	  with	  this	  finding.	  Orders	  for	  
compensation	  under	  section	  1317H	  of	  the	  Act	  had	  also	  been	  made	  against	  G	  and	  Murchison.	  
These	  orders	  related	  to	  the	  contraventions	  of	  sections	  181(1)	  and	  182(1)	  of	  the	  Act	  referred	  to	  
above.	  Again	  the	  appeal	  judges	  did	  not	  interfere	  with	  this	  finding.	  G	  was	  liable	  in	  both	  equity	  
and	  under	  the	  Act,	  and	  both	  forms	  of	  relief	  were	  appropriate.	  No	  indemnity	  was	  available	  from	  
Murchison	  because	  of	  G’s	  lack	  of	  good	  faith.	  
All	  grounds	  of	  G’s	  appeal	  failed	  and	  the	  appeal	  was	  dismissed	  with	  costs.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-­‐
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2012/6.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  officers	  of	  corporations,	  and	  those	  acting	  as	  officers,	  
including	  directors	  of	  nonprofit	  companies	  and	  incorporated	  associations.	  Use	  by	  these	  
entities	  of	  consultants	  and	  business	  advisers	  should	  have	  a	  clearly	  delineated	  (and	  perhaps	  
limited)	  ambit,	  so	  that	  these	  persons	  are	  not	  caught	  in	  the	  net	  of	  ‘officer	  of	  a	  corporation’,	  and	  
made	  liable	  for	  duties	  relating	  to	  officers	  under	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act).	  
However,	  liability	  also	  arose	  in	  this	  case	  in	  equity	  (part	  of	  the	  general	  law	  outside	  the	  law	  
contained	  in	  the	  Act).	  Directors,	  those	  acting	  as	  directors	  (even	  if	  this	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  them),	  or	  
persons	  held	  out	  to	  be	  directors,	  can	  owe	  fiduciary	  duties	  to	  corporate	  entities,	  breach	  of	  
which	  will	  give	  rise	  to	  remedies	  such	  as	  orders	  to	  account	  for	  any	  profits	  made,	  or	  equitable	  
compensation	  for	  loss	  caused.	  
	  
2.6 NEGLIGENCE 
2.6.1  CARSWELL V CORPORATION OF THE TRUSTEES OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC 
ARCHDIOCESE OF BRISBANE [2012] QSC 253 (SUPREME COURT OF 
QUEENSLAND, M WILSON J, 7 SEPTEMBER 2012) 
This	  case	  involved	  an	  allegation	  of	  negligence	  by	  an	  employer.	  The	  defendant,	  trading	  under	  
the	  name	  Centacare,	  provided	  social	  support	  services	  including	  ‘CHARM	  Support	  Services’,	  a	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supported	  accommodation	  program	  for	  children	  subject	  to	  child	  protection	  orders.	  The	  
children	  had	  behavioural	  problems	  and/or	  intellectual	  disabilities,	  and	  required	  individual	  care.	  	  
The	  plaintiff	  was	  employed	  by	  the	  defendant	  as	  a	  disability	  support	  worker	  within	  the	  CHARM	  
program.	  She	  was	  a	  53	  year	  old	  woman,	  with	  lengthy	  experience	  as	  a	  carer	  of	  children,	  the	  
elderly,	  young	  adults	  with	  physical	  and	  intellectual	  disabilities,	  and,	  since	  2004,	  children	  and	  
adolescents	  within	  the	  CHARM	  program.	  	  
Between	  16	  and	  20	  January	  2006,	  some	  25	  or	  26	  children	  within	  the	  CHARM	  program	  were	  
taken	  on	  a	  camp	  at	  the	  Currimundi	  Active	  Recreation	  Centre	  on	  the	  Sunshine	  Coast.	  On	  the	  
first	  day	  of	  the	  camp,	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  injured	  when	  one	  of	  the	  children	  hit	  her	  on	  the	  left	  side	  
of	  the	  head	  with	  a	  soccer	  ball.	  
The	  issues	  for	  determination	  on	  liability	  were:	  
(a)	  Was	  there	  a	  breach	  of	  duty	  –	  that	  is,	  was	  the	  child	  under	  his	  carer’s	  supervision	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  the	  incident?	  And,	  	  
(b)	  If	  there	  was	  a	  breach	  of	  duty,	  was	  that	  breach	  a	  material	  cause	  of	  the	  soccer	  ball	  
striking	  the	  plaintiff’s	  head?	  
The	  evidence	  revealed	  that	  the	  child	  in	  question	  was	  a	  very	  troubled	  13	  year	  old	  boy.	  The	  
defendant	  knew	  that	  he	  had	  been	  diagnosed	  as	  having	  severe	  conduct	  disorder,	  oppositional	  
defiance	  disorder,	  ADHD,	  attachment	  disorder,	  and	  special	  behavioural	  education	  needs.	  It	  
knew	  that	  he	  had	  a	  documented	  history	  of	  poor	  impulse	  control,	  short	  attention	  span,	  little	  
respect	  for	  others,	  limited	  capacity	  for	  remorse	  and	  limited	  understanding	  of	  social	  values.	  It	  
knew	  that	  his	  high	  school	  had	  identified	  him	  as	  a	  safety	  risk	  to	  himself	  and	  others,	  and	  had	  
expressed	  the	  view	  that	  his	  uncontrollable	  behaviour	  had	  escalated	  throughout	  the	  school	  
year.	  It	  knew	  that	  on	  one	  occasion	  the	  school	  had	  found	  it	  necessary	  to	  call	  the	  police	  in	  
respect	  of	  his	  dangerous	  behaviour,	  and	  it	  knew	  that	  he	  had	  exhibited	  violent	  outbursts	  
towards	  teachers,	  staff	  and	  students.	  CHARM	  had	  reported	  that	  the	  behaviours	  he	  had	  been	  
displaying	  had	  resulted	  in	  police	  intervention	  on	  multiple	  occasions,	  major	  property	  damage,	  
risk	  of	  self-­‐harm,	  risk	  of	  injury	  to	  CHARM	  staff,	  and	  that	  he	  did	  not	  deal	  well	  with	  change.	  
The	  child	  was	  playing	  soccer,	  at	  first	  supervised,	  then	  after	  the	  game	  had	  ended,	  on	  his	  own.	  
The	  plaintiff	  was	  struck	  with	  some	  force	  by	  the	  ball	  at	  the	  time	  the	  child	  was	  playing	  on	  his	  
own.	  The	  child	  apologised	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  described	  the	  incident	  as	  an	  
accident.	  The	  plaintiff	  subsequently	  filled	  in	  an	  incident	  report,	  describing	  the	  incident	  as	  
‘accidental’.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  breach	  of	  duty,	  Her	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  breach	  of	  duty,	  
because	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  child	  was	  being	  supervised	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  incident.	  
Therefore,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  child,	  the	  defendant	  breached	  its	  duty	  to	  take	  all	  reasonable	  
precautions	  for	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  plaintiff.	  
As	  to	  causation,	  Her	  Honour	  commented	  (at	  [70])	  that	  it	  was	  a	  question	  of	  fact	  on	  which	  the	  
plaintiff	  bore	  the	  onus	  of	  proof.	  The	  plaintiff	  needed	  to	  persuade	  the	  Court,	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  
probabilities,	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  supervise	  the	  child	  was	  a	  cause	  of	  her	  being	  struck	  and	  injured.	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What	  was	  the	  risk,	  or	  added	  risk,	  arising	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  supervision?	  It	  was	  that	  the	  child	  
was	  more	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  anti-­‐social	  behaviour,	  or	  that	  there	  would	  be	  an	  escalation	  in	  any	  
inappropriate	  and	  potentially	  anti-­‐social	  behaviour	  on	  his	  part.	  But	  did	  this	  occur?	  On	  this	  
point	  Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [80]–[81]:	  
There	  is	  a	  dearth	  of	  evidence	  about	  [the	  child’s]	  behaviour	  at	  the	  time	  he	  kicked	  the	  
ball.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  anti-­‐social	  behaviour,	  or	  of	  escalation	  in	  misbehaviour.	  
There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  in	  kicking	  the	  ball	  he	  deliberately	  aimed	  at	  the	  plaintiff.	  
There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  he	  acted	  recklessly	  in	  kicking	  the	  ball:	  he	  may	  well	  have	  
simply	  made	  a	  miscalculation.	  In	  short,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  identified	  risk	  
eventuated.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  plaintiff	  has	  not	  discharged	  her	  onus	  of	  proving	  
that	  breach	  of	  duty	  for	  which	  the	  defendant	  is	  responsible	  was	  a	  material	  cause	  of	  the	  
harm	  she	  suffered.	  Her	  claim	  should	  be	  dismissed.	  	  
In	  discussing	  quantum	  of	  possible	  damages,	  Her	  Honour	  noted	  that	  at	  trial,	  the	  plaintiff	  had	  a	  
permanent	  impairment	  of	  function	  and	  psychiatric	  problems	  relating	  to	  her	  pain	  experience,	  at	  
least	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  adjustment	  disorder.	  She	  had	  not	  returned	  to	  work	  since	  October	  
2006,	  apart	  from	  a	  very	  short	  period	  of	  part-­‐time	  light	  clerical	  work	  a	  couple	  of	  months	  after	  
the	  surgery.	  	  
The	  plaintiff	  had	  had	  considerable	  medical	  intervention,	  including	  physiotherapy,	  and	  an	  
operation	  to	  her	  neck.	  However,	  Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  medical	  treatment	  was	  not	  causally	  
related	  to	  the	  kicking	  of	  the	  soccer	  ball.	  In	  addition,	  as	  the	  damages	  recoverable	  by	  the	  plaintiff	  
would	  not	  exceed	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  WorkCover	  refund	  which	  the	  plaintiff	  received,	  Her	  
Honour	  held	  that,	  even	  if	  the	  plaintiff	  succeeded	  on	  liability,	  the	  claim	  should	  be	  dismissed.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2012/253.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  a	  case	  involving	  common	  law	  negligence.	  The	  person	  seeking	  compensation needs	  to	  
show	  that	  the	  negligent	  act	  or	  omission	  (breach	  of	  a	  duty	  of	  care)	  caused	  the	  loss	  or	  injury	  
constituting	  the	  damage.	  For	  this,	  all	  that	  is	  necessary	  is	  that	  the	  more	  probable	  inference	  
appearing	  from	  the	  evidence	  is	  that	  a	  defendant’s	  negligence	  caused	  the	  injury	  or	  harm.	  ‘More	  
probable’	  means	  no	  more	  than	  that,	  on	  a	  balance	  of	  probabilities,	  such	  an	  inference	  might	  
reasonably	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  some	  greater	  degree	  of	  likelihood.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  
show	  certainty.	  In	  this	  case,	  Her	  Honour	  declined	  to	  draw	  any	  inferences	  from	  the	  facts	  
because	  they	  could	  not	  be	  proven	  to	  the	  requisite	  standard.	  
	  
2.6.2 GARZO V LIVERPOOL/CAMPBELLTOWN CHRISTIAN SCHOOL [2012] NSWCA 151 
(NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL, BASTEN JA, MEAGHER JA, TOBIAS 
AJA, 25 MAY 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  from	  a	  decision	  of	  Garling	  J	  that	  found	  that	  the	  school	  and	  its	  maintenance	  
contractor	  (the	  respondents)	  were	  not	  liable	  for	  a	  slip	  and	  fall	  injury	  suffered	  by	  Ms	  Garzo	  (the	  
appellant)	  while	  crossing	  a	  road	  in	  the	  school	  grounds:	  see	  Garzo	  v	  Liverpool/Campbelltown	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Christian	  School	  Limited	  &	  Anor	  [2011]	  NSWSC	  292	  (or	  casenote	  
https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Garzo+v+Liverpool+Campbelltown+Christian+School+Lt
d).	  The	  appeal	  was	  unanimously	  dismissed	  with	  costs.	  
On	  27	  November	  2007,	  the	  appellant	  fell	  and	  suffered	  severe	  injuries	  to	  her	  face,	  teeth	  and	  
right	  elbow,	  whilst	  crossing	  a	  road	  within	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  respondent	  school.	  Her	  
uncontested	  evidence	  was	  that	  she	  slipped	  when	  approaching	  the	  kerb,	  having	  successfully	  
navigated	  the	  pedestrian	  crossing	  to	  that	  point.	  The	  crossing	  was	  a	  typical	  'zebra'	  crossing,	  
with	  broad	  white	  painted	  and	  unpainted	  bitumen.	  The	  crossing	  had	  been	  repainted	  in	  July	  
2007,	  five	  months	  before	  the	  appellant's	  fall.	  
The	  case	  in	  negligence	  turned	  on	  three	  factual	  propositions:	  
(1)	  the	  Handbook	  published	  by	  Standards	  Australia,	  current	  in	  2007,	  recommended	  
that	  the	  slip	  resistance	  for	  a	  pedestrian	  crossing	  should	  be	  class	  ‘W’,	  rated	  ‘low’,	  with	  a	  
British	  Pendulum	  Number	  (BPN)	  reading	  of	  between	  45	  and	  54;	  
(2)	  the	  paint	  used	  by	  the	  School	  on	  the	  pedestrian	  crossing,	  when	  new,	  had	  a	  BPN	  
reading	  of	  40,	  and	  
(3)	  the	  School,	  and	  the	  second	  respondent,	  its	  maintenance	  contractor,	  should	  have	  
known	  of	  the	  recommended	  standard	  and	  should	  have	  obtained	  a	  paint	  having	  a	  
minimum	  slip	  resistance	  within	  the	  recommended	  range.	  The	  respondents	  failed	  to	  do	  
so	  and	  were	  therefore	  in	  breach	  of	  their	  duty	  of	  care	  to	  the	  appellant.	  
Section	  5B	  of	  the	  Civil	  Liability	  Act	  2002	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act)	  was	  applicable.	  It	  provides:	  
(1)	  A	  person	  is	  not	  negligent	  in	  failing	  to	  take	  precautions	  against	  a	  risk	  of	  harm	  unless:	  	  
(a)	  the	  risk	  was	  foreseeable	  (that	  is,	  it	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  which	  the	  person	  knew	  or	  
ought	  to	  have	  known),	  and	  	  
(b)	  the	  risk	  was	  not	  insignificant,	  and	  	  
(c)	  in	  the	  circumstances,	  a	  reasonable	  person	  in	  the	  person’s	  position	  would	  
have	  taken	  those	  precautions.	  	  
(2)	  In	  determining	  whether	  a	  reasonable	  person	  would	  have	  taken	  precautions	  against	  
a	  risk	  of	  harm,	  the	  court	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  following	  (amongst	  other	  relevant	  things):	  	  
(a)	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  harm	  would	  occur	  if	  care	  were	  not	  taken,	  	  
(b)	  the	  likely	  seriousness	  of	  the	  harm,	  	  
(c)	  the	  burden	  of	  taking	  precautions	  to	  avoid	  the	  risk	  of	  harm,	  	  
(d)	  the	  social	  utility	  of	  the	  activity	  that	  creates	  the	  risk	  of	  harm.	  
Thus,	  the	  appellant	  had	  to	  show	  that	  the	  respondents	  knew	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  known	  that	  the	  
crossing	  was	  unduly	  slippery	  on	  the	  date	  that	  she	  fell,	  and	  should	  have	  taken	  some	  action.	  
Basten	  JA	  held	  (at	  [19])	  that:	  
However,	  pedestrian	  crossings	  are	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  built	  environments.	  In	  the	  
absence	  of	  a	  sound	  basis	  for	  thinking	  the	  crossing	  was	  at	  that	  time	  unduly	  slippery,	  a	  
reasonable	  person	  would	  have	  been	  justified	  in	  doing	  nothing.	  Thus,	  the	  appellant	  can	  
only	  succeed	  if	  she	  established	  that	  professional	  testing	  should	  have	  been	  undertaken	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shortly	  before	  the	  accident	  and,	  if	  done,	  would	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  condition	  
of	  the	  crossing	  was	  such	  that	  a	  reasonable	  person	  should	  have	  taken	  steps	  to	  decrease	  
its	  slipperiness.	  Such	  a	  case	  should	  have	  failed	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  there	  was	  no	  
event	  or	  circumstance	  which	  indicated	  a	  need	  for	  testing.	  Secondly,	  it	  was	  not	  shown	  
that	  testing	  would	  have	  revealed	  a	  need	  for	  resurfacing...the	  evidence	  did	  not	  
establish	  a	  basis	  for	  finding	  that	  that	  spot	  had	  been	  in	  a	  markedly	  different	  condition	  
from	  the	  places	  tested	  on	  the	  ‘better	  quality’	  paint.	  Even	  the	  testing	  with	  fresh	  paint,	  
and	  assuming	  that	  the	  place	  of	  the	  slip	  enjoyed	  limited	  wear,	  did	  not	  establish	  a	  risk	  
which,	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  required	  action	  from	  the	  reasonable	  occupier.	  
In	  my	  view,	  to	  have	  a	  small	  patch	  of	  paint	  work	  marginally	  more	  slippery	  than	  the	  
guidance	  provided	  in	  the	  Handbook,	  given	  the	  other	  considerations	  noted	  above,	  did	  
not	  demonstrate	  a	  breach	  of	  duty	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  respondents.	  
While	  Meagher	  JA	  agreed	  with	  Tobias	  AJA	  that	  the	  respondents	  were	  negligent	  in	  not	  painting	  
the	  crossing	  in	  July	  2007	  in	  a	  recommended	  standard	  of	  paint,	  he	  held	  (at	  [21])	  that:	  
However,	  the	  evidence	  indicated	  that	  by	  November	  2007,	  when	  the	  appellant	  slipped	  
and	  injured	  herself,	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  painted	  surface	  had	  weathered	  and	  worn	  to	  
the	  point	  where	  either	  it	  complied	  with	  that	  recommendation	  or	  any	  non-­‐compliance	  
with	  that	  recommendation	  was	  insignificant	  and	  did	  not	  contribute	  to	  the	  appellant’s	  
fall.	  For	  that	  reason	  the	  appellant’s	  claim	  must	  fail.	  The	  respondents’	  earlier	  breach	  of	  
duty	  did	  not	  cause	  or	  contribute	  to	  her	  slip	  and	  fall.	  
Tobias	  AJA	  in	  the	  leading	  judgement	  considered	  the	  factual	  evidence	  and	  the	  primary	  judge’s	  
findings	  in	  great	  detail.	  He	  disagreed	  with	  the	  primary	  judge	  and	  held	  that	  there	  was	  a	  
foreseeable	  risk	  of	  harm,	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  technical	  factors	  relating	  to	  the	  paint	  used	  on	  
the	  crossing,	  which	  were	  either	  known	  to	  or	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  known	  by	  the	  respondents.	  
He	  said	  (at	  [150]–[151]	  and	  [164]–[165]):	  
Once	  one	  accepts	  that	  the	  relevant	  risk	  of	  harm	  was	  foreseeable,	  it	  is	  but	  a	  short	  step	  
to	  find	  in	  a	  case	  such	  as	  the	  present	  that	  that	  risk	  was	  not	  insignificant.	  As	  I	  have	  
indicated,	  according	  to	  the	  Ipp	  Report	  [a	  report	  which	  preceded	  the	  introduction	  of	  
the	  uniform	  Civil	  Liability	  Acts],	  the	  phrase	  ‘not	  insignificant’	  was	  intended	  to	  indicate	  
a	  risk	  that	  is	  of	  a	  higher	  probability	  than	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  phrase	  ‘not	  far-­‐fetched	  and	  
fanciful’	  but	  not	  so	  high	  as	  to	  be	  indicated	  by	  a	  phrase	  such	  as	  a	  ‘substantial’	  or	  
‘significant	  risk’.	  In	  the	  present	  case	  the	  risk	  of	  harm	  was	  foreseeable	  because	  the	  
respondents	  utilised	  an	  inappropriate	  paint	  upon	  the	  crossing	  which	  had	  a	  slip	  
resistance	  (until	  it	  became	  worn	  and	  weathered)	  less	  than	  that	  recommended...The	  
risk	  of	  slipping	  on	  the	  painted	  sections	  of	  a	  pedestrian	  crossing,	  particularly	  when	  the	  
surface	  is	  wet	  and	  where	  the	  slip	  resistance	  of	  the	  painted	  surface	  may	  be	  less	  than	  
the	  recommended	  minimum	  standard	  must,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  commonsense,	  give	  rise	  to	  
a	  ‘not	  insignificant’	  probability	  of	  that	  risk	  occurring.	  It	  may	  be	  low	  but	  it	  is	  more	  than	  
far-­‐fetched	  and	  fanciful.	  It	  may	  be	  less	  than	  significant	  but	  it	  is	  only	  required	  to	  be	  ‘not	  
insignificant’.	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  risk	  in	  the	  present	  case	  satisfied	  that	  test...	  the	  
conclusion	  is	  inescapable	  that	  the	  respondents	  failed	  to	  take	  the	  basic	  precaution	  in	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July	  2007...of	  ascertaining	  whether	  the	  [paint	  used]	  was	  sufficiently	  slip	  resistant	  to	  be	  
appropriate	  for	  painting	  or	  repainting	  the	  crossing	  in	  circumstances	  where	  they	  knew	  
that	  the	  painted	  surfaces	  would	  not	  wear	  uniformly.	  Accordingly,	  s	  5B(1)(c)	  was	  
satisfied	  in	  that	  a	  reasonable	  person	  in	  the	  position	  of	  the	  respondents	  would	  have	  
taken	  the	  precautions	  to	  which	  I	  have	  referred.	  It	  follows	  from	  the	  foregoing	  that	  in	  
my	  opinion	  the	  respondents	  breached	  their	  duty	  of	  care	  to	  those	  who	  would	  use	  the	  
crossing	  including	  the	  appellant.	  
His	  Honour	  then	  considered	  section	  5D	  of	  the	  Act,	  which	  provides:	  
(1)	  A	  determination	  that	  negligence	  caused	  particular	  harm	  comprises	  the	  following	  
elements:	  	  
(a)	  that	  the	  negligence	  was	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  harm	  
(factual	  causation),	  and	  	  
(b)	  that	  it	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  negligent	  person’s	  liability	  to	  extend	  to	  
the	  harm	  so	  caused	  (scope	  of	  liability).	  	  
On	  this	  issue	  of	  causation,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  was	  none	  present,	  so	  there	  was	  no	  
liability	  owing	  to	  the	  appellant	  by	  the	  respondents.	  This	  was	  because	  (at	  [187]):	  
...there	  must	  have	  been	  other	  factors	  or	  conditions	  present	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  
appellant's	  fall	  because	  the	  painted	  surface	  most	  probably	  exceeded	  a	  BPN	  of	  40	  and	  
thus	  provided	  sufficient	  friction	  for	  the	  appellant	  to	  walk	  safely	  at	  a	  normal	  stride	  and	  
pace.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  identification	  of	  those	  other	  factors	  or	  conditions,	  it	  is	  not	  
possible	  to	  do	  more	  than	  speculate	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  appellant	  may	  have	  
been	  walking	  on	  a	  part	  of	  the	  painted	  surface	  with	  a	  slightly	  higher	  BPN	  would	  more	  
likely	  than	  not	  have	  prevented	  her	  slip	  and	  fall.	  The	  area	  on	  which	  she	  fell	  was	  a	  
pedestrian	  crossing	  on	  a	  roadway	  in	  school	  grounds.	  The	  realistic	  possibilities	  included	  
some	  contaminant	  or	  other	  substance	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  crossing	  or	  the	  sole	  of	  the	  
appellant's	  left	  shoe	  which	  made	  a	  contribution	  to	  her	  slipping	  and	  which	  would	  have	  
continued	  to	  do	  so	  with	  the	  same	  result	  even	  if	  the	  painted	  surface	  had	  a	  slightly	  
higher	  BPN.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2012/151.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Liability	  as	  an	  occupier	  can	  arise	  in	  a	  large	  number	  of	  circumstances,	  so	  that	  each	  case	  turns	  
very	  much	  on	  its	  facts,	  as	  in	  this	  appeal.	  There	  is	  a	  Civil	  Liability	  Act	  in	  each	  state	  which	  (along	  
with	  the	  caselaw)	  governs	  negligence	  in	  such	  cases.	  Negligence	  by	  an	  occupier	  involves	  a	  
breach	  of	  the	  duty	  of	  care	  which	  all	  occupiers	  owe	  to	  persons	  coming	  onto	  their	  property.	  
Breach	  of	  a	  duty	  of	  care	  means	  that	  there	  was	  a	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  risk	  of	  harm	  against	  
which	  the	  defendant	  occupier	  has	  failed	  to	  take	  reasonable	  precautions.	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2.6.3  SYMONS V CEDAR COLLEGE INC [2012] SAIRC 1 (MAGISTRATES COURT OF 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA (INDUSTRIAL OFFENCES JURISDICTION), INDUSTRIAL 
MAGISTRATE ARDLIE, 19 JANUARY 2012) 
Cedar	  College	  Inc	  is	  a	  nonprofit	  religious	  and	  educational	  incorporated	  association	  in	  South	  
Australia,	  established	  as	  an	  outreach	  ministry	  of	  the	  Baptist	  Church.	  The	  school	  held	  a	  junior	  
sports	  day	  on	  11	  September	  2009	  during	  which	  a	  large	  tree	  fell	  on	  some	  spectators	  who	  were	  
standing	  near	  the	  school	  administration	  building.	  Three	  people	  were	  injured,	  one	  of	  whom	  was	  
rendered	  a	  paraplegic.	  The	  school	  pleaded	  guilty	  to	  a	  breach	  of	  section	  22(2)(a)	  of	  the	  
Occupational	  Health,	  Safety	  and	  Welfare	  Act	  1986	  (SA)	  (the	  Act).	  
The	  relevant	  particulars	  of	  the	  offence	  included	  the	  facts	  that	  the	  defendant	  school	  failed	  to	  
remove	  the	  tree	  in	  question	  prior	  to	  the	  school	  sports	  day,	  and	  that	  the	  wind	  conditions	  on	  the	  
day	  were	  severe,	  but	  the	  school	  did	  not	  ensure	  that	  activities	  were	  not	  conducted	  under	  or	  
near	  the	  tree.	  	  
The	  tree	  had	  been	  surveyed	  by	  an	  arborist	  in	  2005,	  and	  designated	  as	  a	  tree	  needing	  high	  
priority	  pruning,	  at	  an	  estimated	  cost	  of	  $690.	  The	  pruning	  had	  not	  been	  carried	  out.	  A	  further	  
arboricultural	  survey	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  2007	  which	  recommended	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  tree	  in	  
question	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  $1,950.	  The	  tree	  was	  recommended	  for	  removal	  within	  6-­‐18	  months,	  and	  
the	  life	  of	  the	  tree	  was	  estimated	  at	  less	  than	  5	  years.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  incident,	  21	  months	  had	  
passed	  since	  this	  survey.	  The	  tree	  was	  finally	  removed	  on	  the	  day	  after	  the	  incident.	  
Since	  the	  incident	  was	  reasonably	  foreseeable,	  and	  the	  injuries	  had	  been	  potentially	  fatal,	  the	  
school	  pleaded	  guilty	  to	  an	  offence.	  In	  sentencing,	  His	  Honour	  took	  into	  account	  the	  early	  plea	  
of	  guilty,	  and	  the	  school’s	  willing	  cooperation	  with	  the	  relevant	  authorities.	  However,	  although	  
the	  school	  had	  shown	  foresight	  in	  having	  the	  large	  number	  of	  trees	  on	  the	  property	  assessed	  
by	  an	  arborist,	  it	  had	  not	  acted	  upon	  the	  arborist’s	  recommendations.	  	  
The	  defendant	  school	  sought	  a	  non-­‐pecuniary	  penalty,	  arguing	  that	  it	  was	  a	  nonprofit	  
enterprise	  and	  a	  heavy	  penalty	  was	  therefore	  not	  in	  the	  public	  interest.	  Moreover,	  the	  school	  
had	  very	  little	  money,	  and	  significant	  borrowings	  to	  fund	  its	  infrastructure	  plan.	  	  
His	  Honour	  found,	  however,	  that	  general	  and	  specific	  deterrence	  would	  be	  better	  served	  by	  a	  
conviction	  and	  pecuniary	  penalty.	  The	  maximum	  penalty	  for	  a	  body	  corporate	  under	  the	  Act	  is	  
$300,000.	  Taking	  into	  account	  a	  discount	  of	  25%	  for	  the	  early	  plea	  and	  cooperation,	  His	  
Honour	  recorded	  a	  conviction	  and	  imposed	  a	  fine	  of	  $108,750	  plus	  costs,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  
$109,917.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-­‐
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/sa/SAIRC/2012/1.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  illustrates	  the	  need	  for	  nonprofits,	  just	  as	  much	  as	  for-­‐profits,	  to	  have	  a	  high	  level	  of	  
vigilance	  in	  matters	  of	  safety	  on	  their	  properties.	  His	  Honour	  was	  not	  persuaded	  that	  nonprofit	  
organisations	  had	  any	  particular	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  plead	  a	  special	  case.	  Although	  the	  
defendant	  school	  argued	  that	  a	  pecuniary	  penalty	  would	  affect	  its	  ability	  to	  serve	  the	  local	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  147	  
	  
community	  by	  reducing	  the	  resources	  needed	  to	  pursue	  its	  objectives,	  His	  Honour	  accepted	  
that	  it	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  pay	  a	  substantial	  fine.	  	  
	  
2.7 NONPROFIT STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 
2.7.1  BARTLEY V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES (FIRST TIER 
TRIBUNAL (CHARITY), GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER, RULING BY 
MCKENNA J, 7 DECEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  ruling	  on	  extension	  of	  time	  (not	  the	  final	  decision)	  for	  an	  appeal	  against	  a	  decision	  
of	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  England	  and	  Wales	  (the	  Commission).	  
Earlier	  in	  2012,	  the	  Commission	  was	  asked	  to	  grant	  consent	  to	  The	  Prayer	  Book	  Society	  (the	  
Charity),	  an	  incorporated	  charity	  (as	  a	  charitable	  company),	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  change	  its	  objects	  if	  
its	  members	  voted	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  Charity	  trustees	  told	  the	  Commission	  that	  it	  wanted	  to	  change	  
its	  objects	  because	  it	  would	  be	  undertaking	  a	  number	  of	  new	  activities	  closely	  related	  to	  its	  
existing	  activities,	  and	  rather	  than	  amend	  the	  objects	  to	  include	  these	  activities	  it	  had	  decided	  
to	  simplify	  them.	  On	  30	  August	  2012,	  the	  Commission	  granted	  consent	  to	  the	  Charity	  to	  alter	  
its	  objects	  under	  section	  198(1)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2011	  (the	  Act).	  	  
Bartley,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Charity,	  requested	  administrative	  review	  of	  the	  Commission's	  
decision	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  Charity’s	  object	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  to	  promote	  the	  Book	  of	  
Common	  Prayer	  as	  the	  norm	  in	  all	  principal	  services	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  England	  and	  other	  
Churches	  in	  the	  Anglican	  tradition.	  The	  member	  considered	  that	  the	  revised	  object	  would	  
allow	  the	  charity	  to	  promote	  other	  forms	  of	  service	  and	  undermine	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  
Charity.	  He	  also	  submitted	  that	  the	  trustees’	  decision	  to	  seek	  the	  change	  was	  not	  made	  in	  
good	  faith.	  	  
The	  review	  at	  the	  Commission	  level	  was	  conducted	  by	  a	  senior	  manager	  in	  the	  Commission's	  
operations	  team.	  The	  review	  concluded	  that	  the	  consent	  to	  the	  change	  of	  objects	  was	  lawful	  
and	  within	  the	  Commission’s	  policy.	  It	  concluded	  that	  the	  proposed	  change	  did	  not	  go	  to	  the	  
foundation	  of	  the	  charity	  and	  disagreed	  with	  the	  member's	  analysis	  of	  the	  existing	  object	  of	  
the	  charity.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Commission	  gave	  consent	  in	  bad	  faith	  
or	  in	  any	  other	  way	  that	  would	  be	  a	  breach	  of	  its	  public	  law	  duties.	  Nor	  was	  there	  any	  evidence	  
that	  the	  trustees	  acted	  in	  bad	  faith	  in	  applying	  for	  such	  consent.	  	  
The	  member	  moved	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  First	  Tier	  Tribunal	  for	  appeal	  against	  the	  Commission’s	  
decision	  under	  Schedule	  6	  of	  the	  Act.	  Her	  Honour	  was	  satisfied	  that	  Bartley	  was	  a	  ‘person	  who	  
is	  or	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  decision’.	  Bartley	  was	  not	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  
decision,	  however,	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  charitable	  company,	  Bartley	  had	  standing	  to	  appeal	  the	  
decision.	  	  
The	  Commission’s	  decision	  was	  communicated	  to	  the	  Charity	  by	  email	  on	  30	  August	  2012.	  It	  
was	  not	  otherwise	  published	  (although	  there	  is	  now	  a	  short	  summary	  of	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  
Commission’s	  website).	  Bartley	  only	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  decision	  after	  a	  Freedom	  of	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Information	  request	  was	  granted	  to	  him.	  He	  received	  the	  information	  requested	  from	  the	  
Commission	  on	  6	  October	  2012.	  
Her	  Honour	  seemed	  surprised	  that	  the	  decision	  was	  communicated	  in	  this	  way,	  and	  queried	  
the	  Commission	  on	  the	  matter.	  The	  Commission	  submitted	  that,	  as	  the	  Charity	  was	  a	  
company,	  it	  would	  need	  to	  notify	  its	  members	  of	  the	  alteration	  to	  its	  Memorandum	  so	  that	  
there	  could	  be	  a	  vote	  on	  it	  at	  its	  next	  general	  meeting.	  Members	  would	  find	  out	  about	  it	  at	  
that	  point.	  Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [7]):	  
It	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  such	  a	  system	  of	  notification	  relies	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Charity	  
itself	  and	  cannot	  therefore	  be	  said	  to	  constitute	  ‘publication’	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
Act.	  The	  statutory	  scheme	  clearly	  envisages	  that	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  itself	  will	  
‘publish’	  decisions	  so	  as	  to	  make	  persons	  with	  standing	  to	  appeal	  aware	  that	  an	  
appealable	  decision	  has	  been	  made.	  The	  Charity	  Commission	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  
adopted	  this	  practice	  in	  relation	  to	  decisions	  under	  s.198(1)	  of	  the	  Act.	  
Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  time	  for	  lodging	  an	  appeal	  did	  not	  commence	  until	  the	  applicant	  
became	  aware	  of	  the	  decision	  (i.e.	  on	  6	  October	  2012),	  and	  she	  accordingly	  extended	  the	  time	  
for	  the	  lodging	  of	  his	  appeal.	  The	  case	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  decided.	  
This	  ruling	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: 
http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/decisions/ruling-­‐7-­‐Dec-­‐2012.PDF	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  




These	  case	  summaries	  give	  very	  little	  detail,	  and	  do	  not	  generally	  link	  to	  further	  information.	  
This	  ruling	  may	  cause	  a	  change	  in	  that	  practice.	  
	  
2.7.2  AHMED V CHOWDHURY [2012] NSWSC 1452 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH 
WALES, LINDSAY J, 28 NOVEMBER 2012) 
These	  proceedings	  dealt	  with	  the	  internal	  management	  of	  the	  fifth	  defendant,	  the	  Bangladesh	  
Islamic	  Centre	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  Incorporated	  (BIC),	  an	  association	  incorporated	  under	  the	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1984	  (NSW),	  and	  now	  governed	  by	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act).	  
There	  were	  two	  factions	  within	  BIC,	  one	  led	  by	  Ahmed	  (the	  first	  plaintiff),	  who	  had	  been	  
General	  Secretary	  of	  BIC,	  and	  the	  other	  by	  Chowdhury	  (the	  first	  defendant),	  who	  had	  been	  
President.	  Between	  24	  April	  2011	  and	  11	  June	  2011,	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  was	  removed	  as	  General	  
Secretary.	  An	  election,	  which	  was	  boycotted	  by	  the	  first	  plaintiff,	  was	  held	  on	  17	  June	  2012	  to	  
elect	  new	  officers	  of	  BIC.	  The	  first	  defendant	  was	  elected	  President	  and	  others	  elected	  
unopposed	  as	  the	  executive	  council.	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In	  this	  action,	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  sought:	  	  
• a	  declaration	  that	  his	  purported	  removal	  from	  the	  office	  of	  General	  Secretary	  was	  
invalid;	  	  
• an	  order	  that	  a	  new	  annual	  general	  meeting	  be	  convened;	  	  
• an	  order	  that	  a	  mutually	  agreed	  person	  be	  appointed	  as	  returning	  officer	  for	  the	  
conduct	  of	  a	  fresh	  election	  for	  membership	  of	  the	  Executive	  Council	  to	  be	  conducted	  
at	  the	  new	  annual	  general	  meeting;	  	  
• an	  order	  that,	  in	  default	  of	  agreement	  as	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  returning	  officer,	  the	  
Court	  appoint	  an	  independent	  person	  to	  conduct	  the	  election;	  
• an	  order	  that	  the	  first	  and	  third	  defendants	  (or	  alternatively,	  BIC)	  pay	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  
proceedings.	  
The	  background	  to	  the	  case	  was	  an	  endemic	  dispute	  within	  the	  community	  served	  by	  BIC	  
which	  arose	  from	  a	  fundamental	  disagreement	  between	  factions	  as	  to	  the	  respective	  powers	  
of	  the	  President	  and	  the	  General	  Secretary	  on	  a	  proper	  construction	  of	  the	  association’s	  
constitution.	  	  
His	  Honour	  began	  by	  considering	  what	  he	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  first	  plaintiff’s	  ‘standing	  for	  curial	  
relief’,	  and	  the	  ‘justiciability’	  of	  the	  issue	  before	  him.	  He	  said	  (at	  [60]–[61],	  [63],	  and	  [67]):	  
From	  a	  number	  of	  different	  perspectives,	  at	  law	  and	  in	  equity,	  courts	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐
Australian	  tradition	  have	  exhibited	  a	  reluctance	  to	  entertain	  litigation	  about	  the	  
governance,	  or	  internal	  management,	  of	  a	  voluntary	  association	  unless	  there	  is	  
necessity	  for	  adjudication	  of	  a	  dispute	  of	  a	  ‘civil	  right	  of	  a	  proprietary	  nature’	  or	  
resolution	  of	  the	  dispute	  is	  governed	  by	  legislation.	  The	  predisposition	  of	  courts	  
against	  entertaining	  such	  litigation	  is	  sometimes	  addressed	  by	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  
‘standing’	  of	  a	  claimant	  for	  curial	  relief,	  at	  other	  times	  the	  ‘justiciability’	  of	  the	  claim...	  
The	  concept	  of	  ‘justiciability’	  is	  directed	  to	  whether	  a	  claim	  for	  relief	  is	  capable	  of,	  or	  
suitable	  for,	  determination	  by	  a	  Court...	  
Ultimately,	  a	  court	  must	  make	  a	  judgement	  about	  the	  existence	  or	  otherwise	  of	  a	  
question	  ripe	  for	  determination,	  according	  to	  legal	  criteria	  and	  via	  legal	  processes,	  
bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  importance	  of	  allowing	  members	  of	  a	  community	  to	  govern	  their	  
own	  affairs	  in	  an	  orderly	  and	  peaceful	  manner	  without	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  proceedings.	  
He	  held	  that	  the	  first	  plaintiff’s	  issue	  was	  justiciable	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  proceedings	  within	  
BIC	  bore	  ‘the	  hallmarks	  of	  oppression’	  (at	  [75]).	  He	  said	  (at	  [81]):	  
I	  find	  that	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  does	  have	  standing	  to	  bring	  these	  proceedings	  and	  that	  his	  
claims	  for	  relief	  are	  justiciable,	  not	  merely	  because	  he	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  BIC	  who	  has	  
ostensibly	  been	  displaced	  as	  its	  General	  Secretary,	  but	  because	  the	  parties'	  disputes	  
about	  governance	  of	  the	  BIC,	  more	  generally,	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  disputes	  relating	  
to	  ‘civil	  rights	  of	  a	  proprietary	  nature’,	  unattended	  by	  any	  need	  to	  determine	  non-­‐legal	  
questions,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  BIC	  that	  disputes	  in	  its	  membership	  about	  
the	  identity	  of	  its	  General	  Secretary	  and	  Executive	  Council	  be	  determined.	  Unless	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these	  questions	  are	  determined,	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  association	  to	  function	  may	  
continue	  to	  be	  impeded,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  paralysis,	  with	  competing	  claims	  to	  office	  
within	  the	  association	  and	  competing	  claims,	  in	  dealings	  with	  outsiders,	  to	  represent	  
the	  association.	  
His	  Honour	  noted	  the	  statutory	  contract	  contained	  in	  section	  26(1)	  of	  the	  Act,	  which	  makes	  a	  
binding	  contract	  between	  the	  association	  and	  its	  members,	  and	  also	  that	  provision	  is	  made	  in	  
the	  Act	  for	  the	  application	  of	  section	  1322	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  in	  order	  to	  
validate	  irregularities	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  affairs	  of	  registered	  associations.	  The	  extent	  to	  
which	  section	  1322	  is	  applicable	  to	  an	  association	  registered	  under	  the	  Act	  is	  governed	  by	  
sections	  95,	  96	  and	  97	  of	  the	  Act,	  section	  5F	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth),	  Part	  3	  of	  the	  
Corporations	  (Ancillary	  Provisions)	  Act	  2001	  (NSW);	  and	  clause	  16	  of	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Regulation	  2010	  (NSW).	  
Apart	  from	  the	  clash	  of	  factions	  in	  BIC,	  the	  issues	  within	  the	  association	  seemed	  to	  have	  arisen	  
from	  ambiguities	  in	  its	  constitution	  as	  to	  the	  respective	  powers	  of	  the	  General	  Secretary	  and	  
the	  President.	  There	  had	  been	  previous	  litigation	  (see	  Ahmed	  v	  Chowdhury	  [2011]	  NSWSC	  893)	  
and	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  referee	  (see	  Ahmed	  v	  Chowdhury	  [2011]	  NSWSC	  954),	  but	  the	  issues	  
between	  the	  parties	  remained	  unresolved.	  The	  referee’s	  report	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  court	  (see	  
Ahmed	  v	  Chowdhury	  [2012]	  NSWSC	  348),	  but	  failed	  to	  make	  inroads	  into	  the	  situation.	  The	  net	  
effect	  of	  the	  parties'	  dysfunctional	  behaviour	  was	  that	  the	  annual	  general	  meeting	  of	  the	  BIC	  
required	  to	  be	  held	  by	  31	  August	  2011	  still	  had	  not	  been	  held	  by	  mid-­‐2012.	  
On	  2	  May	  2012	  the	  first	  defendant	  applied	  to	  the	  NSW	  Department	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  for	  an	  
extension	  of	  time	  within	  which	  to	  hold	  the	  BIC's	  AGM.	  By	  a	  letter	  dated	  24	  May	  2012,	  
addressed	  to	  the	  first	  defendant,	  the	  Department	  approved	  that	  request,	  and	  required	  the	  
association	  to	  hold	  its	  AGM	  on	  or	  before	  30	  June	  2012.	  On	  or	  about	  31	  May	  2012	  the	  first	  
defendant	  arranged	  for	  a	  notice	  of	  meeting	  to	  be	  issued,	  convening	  an	  annual	  general	  meeting	  
of	  the	  association	  for	  17	  June	  2012.	  It	  was	  issued	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  person	  purportedly	  
appointed	  assistant	  General	  Secretary	  on	  24	  April	  2011	  (when	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  was	  deposed).	  
He	  signed	  the	  notice	  as	  ‘General	  Secretary’.	  
On	  14	  June	  2012	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  applied	  for	  an	  interlocutory	  injunction	  to	  restrain	  the	  
conduct	  of	  the	  meeting	  scheduled	  for	  17	  June	  2012.	  On	  15	  June	  2012	  that	  application	  was	  
dismissed.	  The	  meeting,	  and	  the	  election,	  scheduled	  for	  17	  June	  2012	  took	  place.	  The	  first	  
plaintiff	  and	  his	  supporters	  boycotted	  that	  meeting,	  and	  held	  their	  own	  meeting	  and	  election	  
on	  30	  June	  2012.	  On	  28	  June	  2012	  the	  first	  defendant	  applied	  to	  the	  Court	  for	  an	  interlocutory	  
injunction	  to	  restrain	  the	  plaintiffs	  from	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  BIC	  and	  to	  stop	  the	  meeting	  
proposed	  for	  30	  June	  2012.	  That	  application	  was	  unsuccessful.	  
The	  various	  roles	  within	  the	  association	  are	  described	  in	  the	  constitution	  with,	  as	  His	  Honour	  
pointed	  out,	  ‘subtle	  differences’	  in	  wording.	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  these	  subtle	  differences	  were	  
important	  (at	  [209]).	  He	  held	  that	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  made	  a	  ‘fundamental	  miscalculation’	  in	  
interpreting	  his	  role	  as	  General	  Secretary	  (at	  [214]).	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [211]–[212]):	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The	  President	  is	  not	  a	  ceremonial	  figurehead.	  By	  clause	  21,	  he	  is	  recognised	  as	  the	  
executive	  head	  of	  the	  BIC	  and	  as	  the	  chief	  office	  bearer	  of	  the	  Executive	  Council.	  He	  is	  
called	  upon	  to	  preside	  over	  all	  meetings	  of	  the	  association.	  He	  is	  bound	  to	  endeavour	  
to	  see	  that	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Executive	  Council	  carry	  out	  their	  duties	  diligently.	  He	  
is	  required	  to	  represent	  the	  association,	  or	  to	  appointment	  a	  nominee	  to	  represent	  it,	  
in	  all	  external	  affairs.	  He	  is	  empowered,	  subject	  to	  review	  by	  the	  Executive	  Council,	  to	  
make	  emergency	  decisions	  which	  would	  normally	  be	  made	  by	  the	  Executive	  Council,	  
notwithstanding	  any	  rule	  contained	  ‘in	  the	  constitution’.	  Clause	  23	  defines	  the	  powers,	  
duties	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  General	  Secretary	  at	  a	  lower,	  more	  administrative	  level	  of	  
abstraction.	  The	  General	  Secretary	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  ‘coordinate’	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  Executive	  Council;	  to	  ‘keep	  the	  President	  informed’;	  to	  ‘arrange’	  
meetings	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  association	  ‘with	  the	  concurrence	  of	  the	  President’;	  to	  
attend	  to	  correspondence;	  to	  keep	  minutes	  of	  meetings;	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  minutes	  of	  
meetings	  are	  signed	  by	  a	  chairperson.	  
Thus,	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  General	  Secretary	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  BIC	  were	  subordinate	  to	  those	  
of	  the	  President.	  The	  first	  plaintiff	  should	  not	  have	  refused	  to	  attend	  meetings,	  boycotted	  
meetings	  or	  held	  ‘shadow’	  executive	  meetings.	  These	  were	  all	  mistakes	  in	  his	  reading	  of	  the	  
constitution	  of	  BIC.	  
However,	  the	  President	  had	  also	  erred	  in	  the	  use	  of	  his	  powers.	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  (at	  
[221]–[224]):	  
First,	  it	  was	  not	  open	  to	  the	  President,	  acting	  unilaterally	  or	  the	  Executive	  Council	  
acting	  at	  his	  invitation,	  to	  displace	  the	  first	  defendant	  as	  General	  Secretary	  between	  24	  
April	  2011	  and	  9	  May	  2011	  merely	  through	  an	  exercise	  of	  ‘emergency’	  powers.	  To	  
permit	  that	  to	  occur	  would	  be	  to	  subvert	  the	  procedural	  safeguards	  for	  which	  clauses	  
16–17	  and	  31	  of	  the	  constitution	  provide.	  Secondly,	  clause	  29(g)	  could	  not	  operate	  
against	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  unless	  his	  absence	  from	  three	  consecutive	  meetings	  of	  the	  
Executive	  Council	  was	  ‘subsequently	  accepted’	  by	  the	  Executive	  Council.	  The	  
purported	  declaration	  of	  a	  casual	  vacancy	  was,	  at	  least,	  premature	  in	  being	  made	  at,	  
and	  not	  after,	  the	  third	  of	  the	  meetings	  from	  which	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  was	  absent.	  
Thirdly,	  if	  clause	  29(g)	  operated	  at	  all,	  it	  operated	  to	  displace	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  from	  
membership	  of	  the	  Executive	  Council,	  not	  merely	  from	  the	  office	  of	  General	  Secretary.	  
The	  first	  defendant's	  contrary	  advice	  to	  the	  first	  plaintiff,	  and	  the	  Executive	  Council,	  
was	  incorrect.	  Fourthly,	  any	  resolution	  passed	  at	  the	  general	  meeting	  of	  11	  June	  2011	  
designed,	  in	  effect,	  to	  ratify	  steps	  taken	  against	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  at	  or	  following	  the	  
meeting	  of	  24	  April	  2011	  could	  not	  be	  effective	  against	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
circumventing	  the	  procedural	  safeguards	  for	  which	  clauses	  16–17	  and	  31	  provide.	  
Therefore,	  both	  parties	  had	  misconstrued	  the	  constitution	  of	  BIC	  relating	  to	  their	  powers.	  
Could	  section	  1322	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  be	  used	  to	  mend	  the	  irregularities	  which	  
were	  so	  abundant	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  affairs	  of	  BIC	  since	  24	  April	  2011?	  The	  removal	  of	  the	  
first	  plaintiff	  as	  General	  Secretary	  was	  irregular.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  meeting	  held	  on	  17	  June	  
2012	  was,	  however,	  not	  invalid,	  because	  its	  procedural	  irregularities	  could	  be	  mended	  by	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section	  1322(6)(a)(i).	  All	  the	  parties	  had	  acted	  honestly,	  and	  His	  Honour	  was	  satisfied	  that	  the	  
removal	  of	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  as	  General	  Secretary	  at	  that	  point	  was	  confirmed.	  His	  Honour	  said	  
(at	  [253]–[255]):	  
The	  first	  plaintiff	  deliberately	  absented	  himself	  from	  the	  2011	  meetings	  that	  displaced	  
him	  from	  the	  office	  of	  General	  Secretary,	  and	  he	  made	  a	  conscious	  decision	  to	  boycott	  
the	  election	  held	  on	  17	  June	  2012.	  He	  is,	  himself,	  in	  that	  sense,	  the	  author	  of	  any	  
misfortune	  he	  may	  now,	  or	  in	  the	  future,	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  suffered.	  The	  election	  
was	  held	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  it	  was	  considered	  highly	  desirable,	  if	  not	  
imperative,	  that	  an	  election	  be	  held	  to	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act.	  It	  was	  held	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  an	  independent	  referee's	  report	  on	  
the	  membership	  of	  the	  BIC,	  and	  with	  the	  services	  of	  a	  professional	  person	  acting	  as	  
returning	  officer.	  The	  election	  resulted	  in	  a	  clear	  outcome.	  If	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  BIC	  are	  
to	  be	  put	  on	  a	  firm	  foundation,	  going	  forward,	  there	  is	  need	  of	  certainty,	  stability	  and	  
continuity	  in	  its	  management.	  That	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  confirmation	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  
the	  election	  on	  17	  June	  2012.	  It	  might	  not	  be	  achieved,	  or	  readily	  achieved,	  otherwise.	  
I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  that	  an	  order	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  a	  fresh	  election	  for	  the	  Executive	  
Council,	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  would	  do	  anything	  other	  than	  to	  provide	  an	  occasion	  for	  
agitation	  of	  factional	  grievances	  and	  the	  prolongation	  of	  bitter	  rivalries.	  
The	  first	  plaintiff	  was	  therefore	  unsuccessful	  in	  all	  his	  claims	  for	  relief.	  Costs	  were	  ordered	  to	  
be	  paid	  by	  BIC.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/1452.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  again	  highlights	  how	  internal	  disputes	  in	  incorporated	  associations	  can	  paralyse	  the	  
ongoing	  activity	  of	  an	  association,	  and	  lead	  to	  costly	  outcomes.	  This	  case	  involved	  a	  power	  
struggle	  between	  the	  General	  Secretary	  and	  the	  President,	  around	  whom	  factions	  developed.	  
After	  an	  exhaustive	  survey	  of	  the	  relevant	  events,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  various	  
irregularities	  in	  meeting	  procedure	  could	  be	  ‘cured’	  by	  the	  application	  of	  section	  1322	  of	  the	  
Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  which	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  affairs	  of	  an	  association	  under	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  (NSW).	  
	  
2.7.3  DE VARDA AND TOV-LEV V THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STRATHFIELD 
AND DISTRICT HEBREW CONGREGATION LTD [2012] NSWSC 1377 (SUPREME 
COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BLACK J, 15 NOVEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  application	  to	  have	  pleadings	  struck	  out	  and	  a	  case	  dismissed.	  The	  plaintiffs	  and	  
were	  the	  ex-­‐Rabbi	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Strathfield	  and	  District	  Hebrew	  Congregation	  Ltd	  (the	  
Congregation)	  and	  the	  defendants	  were	  the	  board	  members	  and	  the	  Congregation	  itself.	  The	  
parties	  were	  engaged	  in	  an	  internal	  dispute	  about	  the	  positions	  they	  occupied.	  
In	  late	  2010,	  the	  persons	  claiming	  to	  be	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors	  of	  the	  Congregation	  (first	  
defendant)	  advised	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev	  of	  the	  termination	  of	  his	  role	  as	  Rabbi	  of	  a	  Synagogue	  at	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  153	  
	  
Strathfield	  conducted	  by	  the	  Congregation	  and,	  in	  October	  2011,	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev	  was	  served	  
with	  a	  notice	  of	  termination	  of	  tenancy	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  occupancy	  of	  a	  house	  associated	  with	  
the	  Synagogue.	  
This	  led	  to	  proceedings	  being	  commenced	  by	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐lev	  and	  several	  members	  of	  the	  
Congregation	  in	  June	  2011.	  After	  some	  preliminary	  pleadings	  an	  amended	  Statement	  of	  Claim	  
was	  filed	  in	  October	  2011.	  The	  central	  claim	  was	  that	  a	  purported	  election	  on	  1	  May	  2011	  was	  
contrary	  to	  the	  articles	  of	  association	  of	  the	  Congregation	  and	  there	  were	  various	  other	  
deficiencies	  with	  an	  annual	  general	  meeting	  on	  that	  date.	  The	  plaintiffs	  sought	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
relief	  in	  the	  proceedings,	  including	  that	  the	  Congregation	  and	  its	  accountant	  produce	  financial	  
accounts	  and	  records	  for	  forensic	  examination;	  a	  mandatory	  order	  that	  the	  Synagogue	  at	  
Strathfield	  be	  preserved	  against	  sale	  and/or	  destruction	  and	  remain	  open	  for	  religious	  
services;	  an	  order	  that	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev	  have	  the	  rights	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  duties	  under	  the	  
jurisdiction	  of	  Jewish	  religious	  law;	  and	  relief	  for	  oppression.	  	  
On	  4	  November	  2011,	  Hallen	  AsJ	  ordered	  that	  the	  amended	  Statement	  of	  Claim	  be	  struck	  out	  
(being	  bad	  in	  form)	  and	  directed	  that	  no	  further	  Statement	  of	  Claim	  be	  filed	  without	  the	  
consent	  of	  each	  defendant	  or	  the	  leave	  of	  the	  Court,	  and	  that	  any	  application	  for	  leave	  be	  filed	  
on	  or	  before	  1	  December	  2011.	  His	  Honour	  also	  ordered	  the	  plaintiffs	  to	  pay	  the	  defendants'	  
costs	  of	  the	  motion.	  On	  1	  December	  2011,	  the	  plaintiffs	  filed	  a	  Notice	  of	  Motion	  seeking	  to	  set	  
aside	  the	  orders	  of	  Hallen	  AsJ.	  On	  9	  December	  2011,	  Bergin	  CJ	  in	  Equity	  directed	  that	  that	  
Notice	  of	  Motion	  not	  proceed	  until	  the	  plaintiffs	  had	  obtained	  the	  services	  of	  a	  lawyer	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  assisting	  them	  in	  the	  future	  conduct	  of	  the	  proceedings.	  	  
On	  15	  February	  2012,	  Nicholas	  J	  dismissed	  the	  Notice	  of	  Motion	  seeking	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  order	  
of	  Hallen	  AsJ	  striking	  out	  the	  amended	  Statement	  of	  Claim.	  On	  16	  February	  2012,	  Nicholas	  J	  
dismissed	  a	  motion	  filed	  by	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev	  seeking	  referral	  of	  the	  proceedings	  to	  the	  Director	  of	  
Public	  Prosecutions	  and	  ordered	  the	  payment	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  motion	  on	  an	  ordinary	  basis.	  
That	  costs	  order	  was	  not	  met	  by	  the	  plaintiffs.	  
Nicholas	  J	  had	  also	  made	  orders	  that	  the	  proceedings	  be	  dismissed	  because	  of	  (inter	  alia)	  the	  
failure	  by	  the	  nine	  persons	  constituting	  the	  first	  plaintiff	  to	  obtain	  and	  continue	  to	  retain	  legal	  
representation.	  Therefore,	  at	  that	  point,	  the	  action	  had	  been	  dismissed.	  
Proceedings	  were	  then	  brought	  by	  the	  Congregation	  in	  the	  Consumer,	  Trader	  &	  Tenancy	  
Tribunal	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  (CTTT)	  seeking	  to	  terminate	  a	  tenancy	  under	  which	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev	  
occupied	  the	  house	  associated	  with	  the	  Synagogue.	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev	  appears	  to	  have	  contested	  
the	  validity	  of	  various	  decisions	  made	  or	  allegedly	  made	  by	  the	  Congregation	  in	  the	  
proceedings	  before	  the	  CTTT.	  On	  3	  September	  2012,	  the	  CTTT	  issued	  its	  decision	  terminating	  
Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev's	  tenancy.	  On	  12	  September	  2012,	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev	  applied	  for	  a	  rehearing	  under	  
section	  68	  of	  the	  Consumer,	  Trader	  &	  Tenancy	  Tribunal	  Act	  2001	  (NSW).	  On	  13	  September	  
2012,	  the	  Chairperson	  of	  the	  CTTT	  stayed	  the	  order	  for	  possession	  of	  the	  premises,	  but	  on	  28	  
September	  2012,	  lifted	  that	  stay,	  and	  dismissed	  the	  application	  for	  a	  rehearing.	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In	  this	  hearing,	  the	  remaining	  plaintiffs	  were	  Mr	  De	  Varda	  and	  Rabbi	  Tov-­‐Lev.	  They	  were	  not	  
represented	  by	  solicitors.	  The	  plaintiffs	  sought	  to	  amend	  pleadings	  and	  to	  bring	  documents	  
into	  evidence.	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [23]):	  
The	  issue	  before	  me	  is	  not,	  ultimately,	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  the	  Plaintiffs	  
in	  the	  proceedings,	  or	  whether	  the	  Plaintiffs	  or	  some	  of	  them	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  
pursue	  those	  claims,	  but	  whether	  they	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  reopen	  these	  
proceedings,	  and	  file	  amended	  pleadings	  in	  them,	  so	  as	  to	  pursue	  those	  claims	  in	  these	  
proceedings	  without	  meeting	  the	  costs	  orders	  already	  made	  against	  them	  in	  these	  
proceedings.	  
After	  detailed	  consideration	  of	  the	  issues,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  any	  further	  amended	  pleadings	  
should	  be	  struck	  out,	  and	  that	  the	  proceedings	  had	  been	  formally	  dismissed	  by	  Nicholas	  J,	  so	  
the	  matter	  did	  not	  need	  to	  be	  dismissed	  again.	  
The	  costs	  relating	  to	  this	  application	  were	  awarded	  against	  the	  plaintiffs	  in	  De	  Varda	  and	  Tov-­‐
Lev	  v	  The	  Board	  of	  Directors	  of	  the	  Strathfield	  and	  District	  Hebrew	  Congregation	  Ltd	  (No.	  2)	  
[2012]	  NSWSC	  1442.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/1377.html	  
The	  costs	  decision	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/1442.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  again	  illustrates	  the	  costs	  implications	  of	  pursuing	  internal	  disputes	  of	  nonprofit	  
entities.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  court	  made	  it	  perfectly	  clear	  from	  very	  early	  in	  the	  proceedings	  that	  
the	  defendants	  were	  in	  the	  right,	  and	  that	  the	  plaintiffs’	  claims	  were	  both	  improper	  in	  
themselves,	  and	  improperly	  presented	  to	  the	  court.	  This	  was	  particularly	  so	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  
plaintiffs’	  apparent	  inability	  to	  retain	  legal	  advisers,	  and	  their	  insistence	  on	  representing	  
themselves,	  after	  each	  failure	  to	  keep	  their	  legal	  advisers	  on	  side.	  
	  
2.7.4 CIFCI V ERBIL [2012] ALL ER (D) 142 (NOV); [2012] EWHC 3170 (CH) (HIGH 
COURT, CHANCERY DIVISION, 12 NOVEMBER 2012) 
The	  London	  Alevi	  Cultural	  Centre	  and	  Cemevi	  holds	  religious	  services	  and	  provides	  education	  
for	  the	  Alevi	  community	  (an	  ethnic/religious	  minority	  community	  of	  the	  Turkish	  diaspora)	  in	  
Hackney,	  London.	  This	  case	  concerned	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  the	  London	  Alevi	  Cultural	  Centre	  
and	  Cemevi	  (the	  charity),	  a	  charitable	  unincorporated	  association.	  
The	  charity	  had	  developed	  two	  factions:	  a	  traditionalist	  group	  (the	  claimants	  in	  this	  case)	  and	  a	  
secular	  humanist	  group	  (the	  defendants	  in	  this	  case).	  	  
The	  charity	  had	  a	  constitution	  which	  had	  been	  adopted	  in	  September	  1994	  (the	  1994	  
constitution).	  Under	  this	  constitution	  membership	  of	  the	  charity	  was	  open	  to	  residents	  of	  
London	  over	  18	  who	  accepted	  the	  charity’s	  objects.	  A	  new	  draft	  constitution	  was	  prepared	  in	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2006	  (the	  2006	  constitution);	  this	  restricted	  membership	  to	  persons	  who	  had	  obtained	  two	  
references	  from	  existing	  members.	  The	  turning	  point	  was	  the	  annual	  general	  meeting	  (AGM)	  
held	  in	  May	  2009.	  At	  that	  meeting,	  the	  first	  claimant	  (Cifci)	  and	  the	  first	  defendant	  (Erbil)	  were	  
both	  elected	  to	  the	  charity’s	  management	  committee.	  The	  first	  defendant	  became	  
chairperson.	  
At	  the	  subsequent	  first	  meeting	  of	  this	  management	  committee,	  the	  first	  defendant	  
announced	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  requirement	  to	  have	  two	  referees	  for	  membership.	  This	  
provoked	  the	  entire	  claimant	  group	  on	  the	  management	  committee	  to	  resign,	  with	  the	  object	  
of	  triggering	  a	  new	  AGM.	  
The	  question	  then	  was,	  had	  the	  2006	  constitution	  actually	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  charity?	  If	  so,	  a	  
new	  AGM	  would	  be	  required.	  The	  claimant	  group	  wrote	  to	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  on	  the	  
issue,	  claiming	  that	  the	  2006	  constitution	  had	  been	  adopted	  at	  an	  extraordinary	  general	  
meeting	  (EGM).	  The	  Charity	  Commission	  responded	  that	  the	  May	  2009	  meeting	  had	  been	  
properly	  conducted,	  since	  the	  2006	  constitution	  had	  not,	  in	  fact,	  been	  adopted.	  No	  copy	  of	  the	  
(allegedly	  new)	  2006	  constitution	  had	  been	  forwarded	  to	  the	  Charity	  Commission,	  as	  was	  
required.	  	  
In	  May	  2011	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  appointed	  interim	  charity	  trustees	  on	  the	  ground	  that,	  if	  
the	  1994	  constitution	  was	  the	  valid	  one,	  then	  the	  term	  of	  the	  management	  committee	  would	  
have	  expired	  at	  the	  end	  of	  August	  2010.	  The	  claimant	  group	  then	  commenced	  proceedings	  
under	  section	  33	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993,	  claiming	  that	  the	  2006	  constitution	  had	  been	  validly	  
adopted	  at	  a	  general	  meeting	  in	  2006.	  
The	  court	  held	  that	  the	  claimant	  group	  had	  failed	  to	  show	  (on	  the	  balance	  of	  probabilities)	  that	  
the	  2006	  constitution	  had	  been	  validly	  adopted	  at	  any	  AGM	  or	  EGM	  of	  the	  charity.	  The	  main	  
reason	  for	  this	  finding	  was	  that	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  2006	  constitution	  had	  not	  been	  submitted	  to	  the	  
Charity	  Commission.	  Not	  to	  do	  so	  was	  ‘inconceivable’	  (at	  [49]),	  and	  ‘surprising’	  (at	  [54]).	  
Moreover,	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  any	  decision	  at	  all	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  draft	  2006	  
constitution.	  It	  had	  not	  been	  adopted	  by	  acquiescence,	  nor	  by	  common	  assumption,	  nor	  was	  
there	  any	  form	  of	  estoppel	  by	  convention	  involved	  (at	  [57]–[60]).	  Therefore,	  the	  charity	  had	  at	  
all	  times	  been	  governed	  by	  the	  1994	  constitution	  (at	  [68]),	  and	  the	  first	  defendant	  had	  been	  
validly	  elected	  as	  chairperson	  in	  2009.	  
No	  issues	  relating	  to	  persons	  who	  had	  joined	  the	  charity	  between	  October	  2009	  and	  August	  
2010	  (when	  there	  was	  a	  disputed	  management	  committee),	  or	  after	  May	  2011	  (when	  the	  
Charity	  Commission’s	  interim	  trustees	  were	  in	  place),	  arose.	  These	  persons	  fulfilled	  the	  
membership	  requirement	  under	  the	  1994	  constitution,	  as	  they	  were	  persons	  who	  lived	  and	  
worked	  in	  London.	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  again	  deals	  with	  an	  internal	  dispute	  within	  a	  charity.	  The	  Charity	  Commission	  of	  
England	  and	  Wales	  had	  declined	  to	  interfere	  in	  the	  internal	  dispute,	  merely	  authorising	  the	  
charity	  to	  take	  the	  dispute	  to	  court.	  Since	  the	  court	  decision,	  new	  elections	  have	  been	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conducted,	  and	  a	  new	  management	  committee	  has	  been	  put	  in	  place	  in	  line	  with	  the	  court’s	  
decision.	  	  
	  
2.7.5  JOHNSON V COMMISSIONER FOR CONSUMER AFFAIRS NTA [2012] NTSC 82 
(SUPREME COURT OF NORTHERN TERRITORY, BLOKLAND J, 17 OCTOBER 
2012) 
This	  was	  an	  application	  concerning	  an	  incorporated	  association,	  the	  Nguiu	  Ullintjinni	  
Association	  Incorporated	  (the	  former	  Association)	  which	  was	  incorporated	  on	  20	  July	  1971	  
pursuant	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Associations	  Act	  (NT)	  (the	  Act).	  The	  former	  Association	  
remained	  incorporated	  under	  that	  Act	  until	  9	  July	  2010	  when	  it	  was	  deregistered	  as	  an	  
association	  after	  its	  successful	  application	  to	  be	  incorporated	  as	  an	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  
Islander	  Corporation.	  The	  new	  corporation,	  the	  Nguiu	  Ullintjinni	  Aboriginal	  Corporation	  (the	  
Corporation)	  was	  incorporated	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Corporations	  (Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  
Strait	  Islander)	  Act	  2006	  (Cth)	  (the	  CATSI	  Act).	  
Members	  of	  the	  former	  Association	  are	  almost	  exclusively	  from	  Nguiu	  in	  the	  Tiwi	  Islands,	  
which	  Her	  Honour	  described	  as	  ‘a	  relatively	  remote	  and	  in	  many	  respects	  a	  traditionally	  
oriented	  Aboriginal	  community’	  (at	  [12]).	  However,	  the	  former	  Association	  was	  a	  quite	  
substantial	  business	  operation.	  Through	  its	  members,	  the	  former	  Association	  ran	  a	  general	  
store,	  including	  an	  ATM	  facility,	  a	  fast	  food	  outlet,	  a	  mechanical	  workshop	  providing	  services	  
to	  residents	  of	  Nguiu	  and	  a	  fuel	  outlet	  utilising	  electronic	  fuel	  cards.	  Thirty	  five	  to	  forty	  
employees	  were	  employed,	  of	  whom	  most	  were	  residents	  of	  the	  Tiwi	  Islands.	  	  
The	  former	  Association	  attended	  to	  all	  its	  statutory	  obligations,	  had	  proper	  accounting	  advice	  
and	  records,	  and	  was	  not	  government	  funded.	  The	  former	  Association	  had	  an	  employed	  
general	  manager,	  and	  an	  elected	  executive	  committee.	  The	  executive	  committee	  relied	  on	  the	  
advice	  of	  both	  the	  general	  manager	  and	  a	  business	  adviser.	  During	  2010,	  discussion	  had	  
ensued	  about	  conversion	  to	  an	  Aboriginal	  corporation	  under	  the	  CATSI	  Act,	  but	  the	  members	  
of	  the	  community	  did	  not	  realise	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  requirements	  under	  that	  Act.	  
A	  meeting	  was	  held	  on	  23	  June	  2010,	  without	  any	  notice,	  and	  the	  members	  who	  were	  in	  
attendance	  were	  advised	  that	  changing	  to	  a	  corporation	  under	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  would	  enable	  
them	  to	  receive	  large	  amounts	  of	  Commonwealth	  government	  funding.	  Consultants	  who	  were	  
engaged	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  advised	  former	  Association	  members	  at	  the	  meeting	  it	  was	  in	  
their	  interests	  to	  become	  registered	  under	  the	  CATSI	  Act.	  	  
The	  resolutions	  made	  at	  the	  meeting	  included	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  former	  Association	  
agreed	  to:	  	  
• approve	  the	  Application	  to	  register	  the	  Association	  as	  an	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  
Islander	  Corporation	  under	  the	  CATSI	  Act;	  
• apply	  for	  a	  new	  name	  for	  the	  Association	  of	  Nguiu	  Ullintjinni	  Aboriginal	  Corporation;	  	  
• adopt	  a	  rule	  book	  (constitution)	  that	  met	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  CATSI	  Act.	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It	  was	  the	  plaintiffs’	  position	  in	  this	  case	  that	  these	  resolutions	  had	  been	  made	  in	  a	  manner	  
that	  was	  not	  free	  and	  informed,	  and	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  former	  Association	  did	  not	  fully	  
understand	  the	  legal	  consequences	  of	  the	  transfer	  from	  association	  to	  corporation.	  There	  was	  
also	  an	  allegation	  that	  the	  special	  meeting	  was	  not	  properly	  convened	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  
appropriate	  notice	  under	  section	  37	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  
Her	  Honour	  concluded	  that	  the	  ‘overwhelming	  evidence’	  showed	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  
notice	  of	  the	  meeting	  of	  23	  June	  2010,	  and	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  notice	  of	  the	  proposed	  
resolutions.	  Thus,	  section	  37	  of	  the	  Act	  had	  not	  been	  complied	  with.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  new	  Corporation’s	  business	  adviser	  soon	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  
the	  CATSI	  Act.	  It	  emerged	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Corporation	  did	  not	  appreciate	  the	  
consequences	  of	  the	  decisions	  they	  had	  taken	  at	  the	  meeting	  of	  23	  June	  2010.	  Therefore,	  the	  
plaintiffs,	  who	  were	  members	  of	  the	  former	  Association/Corporation,	  sought	  orders:	  
• declaring	  the	  proceedings	  of	  a	  special	  general	  meeting	  of	  the	  former	  Association	  held	  
23	  June	  2010	  void;	  	  
• that	  resolutions	  made	  at	  the	  same	  meeting	  be	  set	  aside;	  	  
• that	  the	  registration	  of	  the	  Association/Corporation	  as	  an	  Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  
Islander	  Corporation	  under	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  be	  declared	  void	  and	  set	  aside;	  and	  	  
• that	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  Consumer	  Affairs	  of	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  be	  directed	  to	  
reinstate	  the	  registration	  of	  the	  former	  Association	  as	  an	  incorporated	  association	  
pursuant	  to	  the	  Associations	  Act	  (NT).	  
The	  relief	  sought	  was	  not	  opposed	  by	  the	  Corporation	  so	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  Consumer	  
Affairs	  was	  joined	  as	  a	  defendant	  to	  provide	  a	  proper	  contradictor.	  
In	  granting	  the	  relief	  sought,	  Her	  Honour	  discussed	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  which	  allowed	  an	  
association	  to	  change	  to	  a	  corporation	  (including	  an	  Aboriginal	  corporation).	  These	  provisions	  
are	  contained	  in	  Part	  7	  of	  the	  Act,	  in	  particular	  section	  57.	  The	  requirements	  of	  section	  57	  are	  
reflected	  in	  similar	  provisions	  in	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  that	  deal	  with	  ‘Pre-­‐Transfer	  of	  registration	  
requirements’.	  Section	  29-­‐17(1)	  requires	  members	  to	  be	  given	  at	  least	  21	  days	  notice	  of	  the	  
meeting	  and	  the	  proposed	  resolution.	  Because	  in	  this	  case	  section	  57	  of	  the	  Act	  had	  not	  been	  
complied	  with,	  then	  section	  29-­‐17(1)	  of	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  was	  not	  complied	  with.	  Her	  Honour	  said	  
(at	  [50]–[51]):	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  s	  57(1)	  of	  the	  Associations	  Act	  (NT)	  and	  s	  29-­‐17	  
of	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  it	  is	  open	  to	  the	  Court	  to	  declare	  the	  purported	  special	  general	  
meeting	  void...In	  my	  view	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  
Associations	  Act	  (NT)	  and	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  are	  not	  matters	  of	  mere	  procedure	  in	  this	  
particular	  case.	  An	  overwhelming	  number	  of	  members	  of	  the	  former	  Association	  in	  
addition	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  did	  not	  have	  the	  opportunity	  of	  properly	  considering	  the	  
resolution	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  registration.	  The	  plaintiffs	  perceived	  their	  obligations	  
under	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  to	  be	  more	  onerous	  than	  those	  they	  were	  familiar	  with.	  Even	  if	  
their	  perspective	  is	  not	  correct,	  the	  plaintiffs	  and	  other	  member	  of	  the	  former	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Association	  deserved	  to	  be	  able	  to	  properly	  consider	  their	  position	  before	  transferring	  
the	  former	  Association	  to	  a	  new	  and	  unfamiliar	  legal	  regime.	  
The	  effect	  of	  Her	  Honour’s	  decision	  was	  to	  return	  the	  entity	  that	  was	  the	  former	  Association	  to	  
the	  way	  it	  was	  immediately	  before	  the	  meeting	  held	  on	  23	  June	  2010.	  She	  directed	  the	  
Commissioner	  to	  record	  this	  in	  the	  register	  of	  associations	  without	  delay.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nt/NTSC/2012/82.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  illustrates	  the	  need	  for	  association	  members	  to	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  
making	  a	  change	  to	  their	  corporate	  form.	  At	  issue	  here	  was	  an	  Aboriginal	  corporation.	  Division	  
22	  of	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  sets	  out	  the	  required	  information	  that	  must	  be	  provided	  when	  application	  
is	  made	  for	  registration	  under	  the	  Act.	  In	  particular,	  section	  22-­‐5(1)(h)	  of	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  
provides	  there	  must	  be	  evidence	  that	  under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  body’s	  place	  of	  origin:	  	  
(i)	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  body’s	  incorporation	  is	  authorised;	  and	  	  
(ii)	  the	  body	  has	  complied	  with	  the	  requirements	  (if	  any)	  of	  that	  law	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  
its	  incorporation	  
The	  effect	  of	  s	  22-­‐5(1)(h)(i)	  of	  the	  CATSI	  Act	  in	  this	  case	  was	  that	  evidence	  was	  required	  of	  a	  
special	  resolution	  of	  the	  former	  Association	  that	  complied	  with	  section	  57	  of	  the	  Associations	  
Act	  (NT).	  This	  could	  not	  be	  shown	  on	  the	  evidence,	  so	  the	  purported	  change	  from	  former	  
association	  to	  Aboriginal	  corporation	  was	  void.	  
	  
2.7.6 CONFRATERNITY OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT TO THE ORDINARIATE OF OUR 
LADY OF WALSINGHAM, DECISION ON A GRANT (CHARITY COMMISSION OF 
ENGLAND AND WALES, 15 MAY 2012) 
The	  Ordinariate	  of	  Our	  Lady	  of	  Walsingham	  (the	  Ordinariate)	  was	  established	  to	  ordain	  former	  
Anglican	  priests	  to	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  This	  enterprise	  has	  enjoyed	  some	  success	  in	  the	  UK.	  
The	  Ordinariate,	  a	  registered	  charity,	  launched	  an	  appeal	  for	  funds	  in	  2011	  to	  help	  defray	  the	  
annual	  running	  costs	  of	  around	  £1	  million,	  which	  arose	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  former	  Anglican	  
priests	  had	  families	  to	  support.	  The	  Confraternity	  of	  the	  Blessed	  Sacrament	  (the	  Confraternity),	  
an	  Anglo-­‐Catholic	  charity	  which	  has	  as	  its	  aim	  the	  ‘advancement	  of	  the	  Catholic	  faith	  in	  the	  
Anglican	  tradition’,	  gave	  £1	  million	  to	  the	  Ordinariate	  in	  May	  2011.	  	  
The	  Confraternity	  has	  existed	  for	  150	  years,	  but	  this	  gift	  represented	  almost	  half	  the	  charity’s	  
total	  assets.	  Moreover,	  five	  of	  its	  six	  trustees	  had	  been	  ordained	  in	  the	  Ordinariate,	  and	  were	  
now	  Catholic	  priests.	  The	  Confraternity	  had	  changed	  its	  rules	  in	  2011	  to	  allow	  Catholics	  to	  
become	  members,	  but	  this	  is	  now	  subject	  to	  review,	  as	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  charity	  itself	  and	  
whether	  it	  can	  remain	  as	  an	  Anglican	  charity.	  
The	  gift	  to	  the	  Ordinariate	  gave	  rise	  to	  considerable	  controversy	  within	  the	  Anglican	  Church	  
and	  complaints	  were	  made	  to	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  about	  this	  gift.	  The	  Charity	  Commission	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ruled	  on	  15	  May	  2012	  that	  the	  gift	  of	  £1	  million	  was	  invalid.	  The	  money	  was	  subsequently	  
returned,	  with	  interest,	  to	  the	  Confraternity.	  	  
The	  Charity	  Commission	  investigated	  the	  gift	  (referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘grant’)	  to	  ascertain:	  
• whether	  the	  trustees’	  decision	  to	  make	  the	  grant	  was	  made	  validly:	  in	  particular,	  
whether	  the	  trustee	  body	  was	  inquorate	  (lacking	  a	  proper	  quorum)	  because	  the	  
trustees	  were	  subject	  to	  a	  ‘personal	  interest’	  which	  meant	  they	  were	  not	  entitled	  to	  
act;	  
• whether	  the	  grant	  was	  wholly	  within	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  Confraternity.	  
The	  Charity	  Commission’s	  review	  concluded	  that:	  	  
• The	  decision	  to	  make	  a	  grant	  to	  the	  Ordinariate	  was	  taken	  at	  an	  inquorate	  meeting,	  
the	  majority	  of	  the	  trustees	  having	  a	  (financial)	  personal	  interest	  in	  the	  decision.	  	  
• The	  decision	  was	  also	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  charity’s	  governing	  document.	  
• The	  meeting	  being	  inquorate,	  the	  decision	  was	  invalid.	  There	  was	  no	  valid	  exercise	  of	  
the	  power	  to	  make	  a	  gift	  to	  the	  Ordinariate	  and	  the	  payment	  was	  unauthorised.	  
• The	  gift	  was	  therefore	  held	  upon	  constructive	  trust	  by	  the	  Ordinariate	  for	  the	  
Confraternity.	  
• The	  objects	  of	  the	  Ordinariate	  are	  wider	  than	  those	  of	  the	  Confraternity.	  A	  gift	  given	  to	  
the	  Ordinariate	  without	  restriction	  could	  be	  used	  for	  purposes	  which	  have	  no	  
connection	  with	  the	  Anglican	  tradition	  at	  all.	  
• The	  precise	  meaning	  of	  Anglican	  Tradition	  is	  unclear	  but	  there	  is	  substantial	  doubt	  
whether	  the	  Confraternity	  could	  make	  a	  grant	  to	  the	  Ordinariate	  (even	  with	  
restrictions)	  which	  could	  be	  applied	  by	  the	  Ordinariate	  consistently	  with	  the	  objects	  of	  
the	  Confraternity.	  
• The	  Commission	  therefore	  considered	  the	  trustees	  of	  both	  charities	  were	  under	  a	  duty	  
to	  take	  action	  to	  ensure	  the	  repayment	  of	  the	  money.	  
Implications	  of	  this	  decision	  
The	  Charity	  Commission	  saw	  this	  case	  as	  the	  proper	  exercise	  of	  its	  regulatory	  powers	  over	  
charities	  in	  England.	  Both	  charities	  had	  legal	  advice	  that	  the	  gift	  was	  valid,	  but	  have	  decided	  
not	  to	  appeal.	  
 
2.7.7  RE SHETLAND CHARITABLE TRUST (OFFICE OF THE SCOTTISH CHARITY 
REGULATOR (OSCR) DECISION, 30 APRIL 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  enquiry	  decision	  under	  section	  33	  of	  the	  Charities	  and	  Trustees	  Investment	  
(Scotland)	  Act	  2005	  (the	  Act).	  The	  Shetland	  Charitable	  Trust	  (the	  Trust)	  was	  given	  charitable	  
status	  on	  10	  September	  1997.	  It	  was	  established	  to	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Shetland	  Islands	  
community,	  but	  is	  intimately	  connected	  with	  the	  Shetland	  Islands	  council	  (local	  government).	  	  
From	  2008	  OSCR	  conducted	  inquiries	  into	  the	  Trust	  due	  to	  concerns	  relating	  to	  its	  governance	  
arrangements.	  In	  July	  2010,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  Trust’s	  governance	  model	  presented	  a	  high	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risk	  of	  both	  systemic	  and	  specific	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  which	  impacted	  on	  effective	  and	  
appropriate	  governance	  of	  the	  Trust,	  and	  that	  tailored	  monitoring	  by	  OSCR	  was	  required	  while	  
the	  charity	  addressed	  this	  matter.	  This	  monitoring	  continues	  to	  date.	  
The	  Trust	  had	  invested	  in	  the	  Viking	  Energy	  project	  (a	  wind	  farm)	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  
£3.42	  million.	  This	  project	  involves	  103	  wind	  turbines	  (permission	  for	  which	  was	  granted	  by	  
local	  government	  on	  4	  April	  2012)	  to	  be	  placed	  around	  the	  Shetland	  Islands	  community.	  
However,	  this	  investment	  was	  contentious	  within	  both	  the	  Trust	  itself,	  and	  within	  the	  island	  
community	  which	  was	  served	  by	  the	  Trust,	  and	  involved	  numerous	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  among	  
trustees	  of	  the	  Trust.	  Indeed,	  several	  2012	  meetings	  of	  the	  Trust	  were	  inquorate	  because	  of	  
these	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  
On	  27	  April	  2012	  the	  then	  charity	  trustees	  proposed	  to	  hold	  a	  meeting	  on	  30	  April	  2012	  to	  
consider	  a	  report	  that	  recommended	  that	  they	  agree	  to	  make	  a	  substantial	  additional	  
investment	  of	  £6.3	  million	  in	  the	  Viking	  Energy	  project	  on	  top	  of	  the	  amount	  already	  invested	  
by	  the	  Trust.	  This	  was	  within	  a	  few	  days	  of	  a	  new	  charity	  board	  of	  trustees	  taking	  office	  on	  4	  
May	  2012	  after	  local	  government	  elections	  on	  3	  May	  2012.	  
The	  OSCR	  said	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  invest	  further	  in	  the	  Viking	  Energy	  project	  was	  a	  decision	  
for	  the	  Trust’s	  charity	  trustees.	  However,	  the	  OSCR’s	  regulatory	  interest	  extended	  to	  whether	  
the	  charity	  trustees	  were	  fulfilling	  their	  duties	  as	  required	  by	  section	  66	  of	  the	  Act,	  which	  
included	  acting	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  charity	  and	  with	  appropriate	  care	  and	  diligence.	  It	  
seemed	  that	  this	  could	  not	  be	  the	  case	  where	  a	  decision	  of	  great	  importance	  was	  taking	  place	  
in	  a	  ‘last-­‐minute’	  fashion.	  Moreover,	  the	  investment	  was	  so	  contentious	  within	  the	  community	  
served	  by	  the	  charity	  that	  special	  attention	  needed	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  Trust	  to	  act	  with	  due	  care	  
and	  diligence,	  and	  to	  obtain	  proper	  legal	  and	  financial	  advice.	  
The	  OSCR	  therefore	  acted	  to	  prevent	  any	  decision	  on	  the	  Viking	  investment	  being	  taken.	  On	  27	  
April	  2012,	  OSCR	  served	  a	  formal	  direction	  notice	  directing	  the	  charity,	  under	  section	  28(3)	  of	  
the	  Act	  not	  to	  make	  a	  binding	  decision	  (whether	  in	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  trustees,	  by	  operation	  of	  
regulation	  9.5	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Regulations	  of	  the	  Shetland	  Charitable	  Trust,	  or	  otherwise)	  
in	  relation	  to	  any	  investment	  in	  the	  Viking	  Energy	  project	  beyond	  the	  £3.42	  million	  previously	  
invested	  by	  the	  Trust.	  This	  action	  was	  taken	  as	  a	  precautionary	  measure,	  and	  was	  valid	  until	  5	  
May	  2012	  when	  the	  new	  board	  of	  trustees	  would	  be	  in	  place.	  	  
This	  decision	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.oscr.org.uk/media/317655/2012-­‐04-­‐
30_section_33_report_-­‐_shetland_charitable_trust.pdf	  
Implications	  of	  this	  decision	  
Conflicts	  of	  interest	  can	  be	  a	  difficult	  matter	  for	  governing	  bodies	  to	  contend	  with,	  particularly	  
when	  significant	  matters	  such	  as	  investments	  or	  contracts	  involve	  members	  of	  the	  community	  
who	  may	  also	  be	  on	  the	  board.	  Members	  of	  governing	  bodies	  must	  understand	  what	  these	  are	  
and	  how	  to	  recognise	  their	  own	  potential	  conflicts;	  and	  sound	  procedures	  must	  be	  established	  
to	  ensure	  potential	  and	  actual	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  are	  recognised,	  disclosed	  and	  dealt	  with	  
properly.	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In	  this	  case	  there	  is	  the	  additional	  issue	  that	  a	  person	  who,	  without	  reasonable	  excuse,	  refuses	  
or	  fails	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  direction	  under	  section	  28(3)	  of	  the	  Charities	  and	  Trustees	  Investment	  
(Scotland)	  Act	  2005	  is	  guilty	  of	  an	  offence	  and	  is	  liable	  on	  summary	  conviction	  to	  a	  fine	  not	  
exceeding	  level	  4	  on	  the	  standard	  scale	  (currently	  £2,500)	  or	  imprisonment	  for	  a	  period	  not	  
exceeding	  3	  months,	  or	  both.	  	  
	  
2.7.8  RE CANDY KIDS APPEAL TRUST (OFFICE OF THE SCOTTISH CHARITY 
REGULATOR, 16 FEBRUARY 2012) 
See	  Dissolution	  Insolvency	  and	  Winding	  Up	  case	  note	  2.4.6	  above	  
	  
2.7.9  SRI GURU NANAK SIKH CENTRE BRAMPTON V DHADDA [2012] ONSC 716 
(ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, CORBETT J, 3 FEBRUARY 2012) 
The	  plaintiff	  in	  this	  Canadian	  case	  is	  a	  nonprofit	  corporation	  which	  conducts	  two	  Sikh	  
gurdwaras	  (places	  of	  worship)	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Brampton,	  Ontario.	  The	  corporation	  was	  
established	  by	  Letters	  Patent	  in	  1996,	  and	  was	  governed	  by	  the	  Letters	  Patent,	  its	  By-­‐Laws	  and	  
the	  Corporations	  Act	  (Canada).	  	  
The	  gurdwaras	  had	  a	  long	  history	  of	  internal	  conflict.	  Prior	  to	  this	  hearing,	  there	  had	  been	  
internal	  dissension	  within	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  gurdwaras	  which	  led	  to	  violence.	  The	  
defendants	  alleged	  that	  the	  gurdwaras	  were	  run	  by	  a	  small	  clique,	  and	  that	  moneys	  had	  been	  
misappropriated.	  They	  had	  attempted	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  gurdwaras	  and	  their	  board	  of	  
directors	  at	  the	  2010	  annual	  general	  meeting	  (AGM),	  but	  had	  ultimately	  been	  violently	  
repulsed.	  They	  also	  alleged	  that	  some	  1,049	  members	  had	  been	  illegally	  disenfranchised.	  
After	  the	  fracas	  at	  the	  AGM	  in	  2010,	  the	  plaintiff	  obtained	  an	  interim	  injunction	  to	  restrain	  the	  
defendants	  from	  further	  action.	  Litigation	  ensued,	  but	  did	  not	  resolve	  the	  matters	  between	  
the	  parties.	  
In	  this	  judgement,	  His	  Honour	  traced	  at	  some	  length	  the	  history	  of	  the	  gurdwaras,	  their	  
governance	  and	  philosophy,	  and	  the	  long-­‐standing	  dissension,	  including	  litigation,	  within	  them.	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  defendants’	  attempt	  to	  take	  over	  the	  temple	  was	  illegal.	  Moreover,	  
their	  contention	  that	  members	  had	  been	  disenfranchised	  held	  no	  merit.	  There	  had	  been	  an	  
attempt	  by	  the	  defendants	  to	  increase	  the	  membership	  which	  was	  not	  valid.	  There	  were	  38	  
valid	  members	  of	  the	  gurdwaras	  who	  were	  entitled	  to	  vote	  and	  the	  defendants’	  attempt	  to	  
allege	  that	  there	  were	  over	  700	  members	  (in	  order	  to	  assume	  control)	  was	  improper.	  
His	  Honour	  had	  little	  sympathy	  for	  the	  defendants.	  He	  said	  (at	  [4],	  [11]	  and	  [12]):	  
The	  plaintiff	  has	  a	  long	  sad	  history	  of	  conflict.	  And	  this	  just	  has	  to	  stop.	  It	  is	  an	  
embarrassment:	  the	  plaintiff	  is	  an	  important	  religious,	  social	  and	  cultural	  institution.	  
The	  conflicts	  have	  been	  riotous,	  often	  petty,	  and	  are	  concerned	  with	  issues	  of	  control,	  
and	  not	  the	  high-­‐minded	  principles	  cited	  as	  justifications	  for	  this	  lawless	  behaviour...	  
Some	  of	  the	  defendants	  have	  engaged	  in	  gross	  misconduct	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  this	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litigation.	  For	  them	  apparently,	  the	  ends	  justify	  the	  means.	  It	  is	  offensive	  that	  some	  
defendants	  should	  perjure	  themselves	  so	  blatantly	  in	  their	  evidence.	  The	  ends	  do	  not	  
justify	  the	  means.	  Through	  their	  misconduct,	  these	  defendants	  have,	  in	  the	  end,	  only	  
discredited	  themselves.	  Litigation	  is	  not	  some	  childish	  game.	  It	  is	  serious	  process	  of	  
conflict	  resolution.	  It	  is	  not	  acceptable	  to	  lie	  under	  oath	  or	  to	  falsify	  documents	  to	  try	  
to	  win	  a	  lawsuit	  for	  control	  of	  a	  temple.	  
There	  had	  also	  been	  evidence	  that	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  gurdwaras	  had	  tried	  to	  dispense	  with	  the	  
law	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  wisdom	  and	  tradition	  were	  preferable	  to	  the	  law	  of	  Canada.	  His	  Honour	  
was	  scathing	  (at	  [1]):	  
It	  is	  not	  open	  to	  anyone	  involved	  in	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  dispense	  with	  the	  law	  because	  they	  
think	  they	  are	  wise	  and	  know	  what	  is	  best.	  ‘Tradition’	  is	  not	  a	  basis	  for	  ignoring	  the	  
law.	  
Some	  of	  the	  defendants	  had	  been	  founders	  of	  the	  gurdwaras,	  but	  as	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [13]):	  
Some	  of	  the	  defendants	  have	  played	  key	  roles	  in	  founding	  and	  building	  the	  plaintiff.	  
Together	  with	  some	  of	  the	  plaintiffs,	  they	  have	  built	  a	  wonderful	  and	  vibrant	  
institution.	  But	  they	  do	  not	  own	  it.	  And	  these	  defendants’	  past	  good	  deeds	  and	  
leadership	  do	  not	  justify	  their	  misconduct.	  
His	  Honour	  also	  trenchantly	  criticised	  the	  defendants’	  legal	  team	  for	  presenting	  a	  case	  without	  
any	  factual	  basis	  (at	  [290]–[292]).	  The	  defendants	  were	  unsuccessful	  in	  all	  their	  contentions.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc716/2012onsc716.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
There	  is	  a	  large	  population	  of	  Sikhs	  in	  Brampton,	  and	  dissension	  within	  their	  ranks	  has	  been	  a	  
frequent	  local	  news	  story	  in	  that	  city.	  However,	  the	  circumstances	  of	  internal	  conflict,	  particularly	  
relating	  to	  governance	  and	  membership,	  are	  not	  uncommon	  within	  charitable	  and	  religious	  
nonprofits	  in	  Australia.	  Judicial	  intervention	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  unincorporated	  associations	  
is	  limited	  by	  legal	  precedent.	  However,	  this	  Canadian	  case	  involved	  a	  charitable	  corporation.	  
Corporate	  nonprofit	  entities	  now	  make	  up	  nearly	  half	  of	  all	  nonprofit	  organisations	  in	  Australia.	  
Since	  the	  introduction	  or	  reform	  of	  incorporated	  associations	  in	  the	  1980s,	  legislation	  has	  moved	  
towards	  giving	  members	  remedies	  for	  breach	  of	  the	  rules	  or	  of	  the	  constitution.	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2.8 TAXATION 
2.8.1  PG DUKES PTY LTD ATF PATRICIA DUKES FOUNDATION V CHIEF 
COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2012] NSWADT 238 (ADMINISTRATIVE 
TRIBUNAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, J BLOCK (MEMBER), 15 NOVEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  against	  a	  ruling	  of	  the	  Chief	  Commissioner	  of	  State	  Revenue	  (the	  Chief	  
Commissioner)	  relating	  to	  land	  tax	  payable	  on	  16	  parcels	  of	  land	  which	  was	  property	  of	  the	  
Patricia	  Dukes	  Foundation	  (the	  Foundation).	  
The	  Foundation	  was	  established	  under	  the	  will	  of	  Patricia	  Dukes	  who	  died	  on	  18	  October	  2010.	  
Under	  her	  Will,	  Ms	  Dukes	  established	  a	  ‘Trust	  Fund’	  as	  ‘a	  charitable	  trust	  to	  be	  called’	  the	  Patricia	  
Dukes	  Foundation	  which	  comprised	  the	  residue	  of	  her	  estate,	  to	  be	  held	  by	  the	  Trustees	  of	  her	  
estate.	  The	  Trust	  Fund	  was	  established	  for	  public	  charitable	  purposes.	  
PG	  Dukes	  Pty	  Ltd	  is	  the	  trustee	  for	  the	  Foundation	  (which	  is	  not	  itself	  a	  legal	  entity),	  and	  holds	  the	  
land	  in	  question	  as	  owner.	  The	  eligible	  beneficiaries	  are	  ‘eligible	  charities’	  under	  the	  will.	  ‘Eligible	  
Charities’	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  will	  as	  ‘a	  fund,	  authority	  or	  institution...	  which	  is	  charitable	  at	  law’	  and	  
a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient	  under	  Item	  1	  of	  the	  table	  in	  section	  30-­‐15	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  
Assessment	  Act	  1997	  (Cth)	  (ITAA	  1997).	  The	  trustees	  were	  given	  the	  power	  of	  choice	  over	  the	  
beneficiaries.	  
On	  23	  November	  2011,	  the	  Foundation	  lodged	  an	  application	  seeking	  an	  exemption	  from	  land	  tax	  
in	  accordance	  with	  section	  10(1)(d)	  of	  the	  Land	  Tax	  Management	  Act	  1956	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act).	  This	  
exemption	  is	  for	  charitable	  institutions.	  The	  application	  was	  refused.	  The	  Foundation	  lodged	  an	  
objection	  was	  also	  rejected	  based	  on	  the	  finding	  that	  that	  the	  Foundation	  was	  not	  an	  ‘institution’.	  
The	  ATO	  has	  issued	  a	  Taxation	  Ruling	  –	  TR	  2011/4	  –	  which	  includes	  its	  views	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  
‘institutions’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  ITAA	  1997.	  This	  Ruling	  states	  (in	  part)	  that:	  
23.	  Tax	  law	  distinguishes	  between	  charitable	  institutions	  and	  charitable	  funds.	  
Whether	  a	  charity	  has	  the	  character	  of	  an	  institution	  or	  a	  fund	  is	  a	  question	  of	  fact,	  
and	  regard	  must	  be	  had	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  circumstances	  at	  the	  relevant	  time.	  	  
24.	  An	  institution	  is	  an	  establishment,	  organisation	  or	  association,	  instituted	  for	  the	  
promotion	  of	  an	  object,	  especially	  one	  of	  public	  or	  general	  utility.	  It	  connotes	  a	  body	  
called	  into	  existence	  to	  translate	  a	  defined	  purpose	  into	  a	  living	  and	  active	  principle.	  It	  
may	  be	  constituted	  in	  different	  ways	  including	  as	  a	  corporation,	  unincorporated	  
association	  or	  trust.	  	  
However	  it	  involves	  more	  than	  mere	  incorporation.	  A	  structure	  with	  a	  small	  and	  
exclusive	  membership	  that	  is	  controlled	  and	  operated	  by	  family	  members	  and	  friends	  
and	  undertakes	  limited	  activities	  is	  not	  an	  institution.	  	  
25.	  Trustees	  whose	  only	  function	  is	  the	  management	  of	  a	  trust	  fund	  consistent	  with	  
the	  terms	  of	  a	  trust	  deed	  will	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  charitable	  institution.	  Some	  additional	  
quality	  or	  function	  that	  gives	  the	  trust,	  when	  regarded	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  character	  of	  an	  
establishment,	  organisation	  or	  association	  instituted	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  an	  object	  is	  
required	  –	  for	  example,	  the	  carrying	  on	  of	  activities	  or	  the	  provision	  of	  services	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relevant	  to	  the	  charitable	  purpose.	  However,	  a	  trust	  that	  does	  not	  qualify	  as	  an	  
institution	  could	  still	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  for	  a	  charitable	  fund.	  
The	  Chief	  Commissioner’s	  original	  ruling	  on	  land	  tax	  exemption	  for	  the	  Foundation	  indicated	  that:	  
For	  exemption	  to	  apply	  there	  must	  be	  an	  identifiable	  body,	  being	  either	  a	  society	  or	  
association	  operating	  not	  for	  profit	  and	  using	  the	  land	  to	  promote	  its	  objects	  or	  a	  
charitable	  institute	  which	  has	  been	  variously	  defined	  at	  law	  as	  being	  a	  body	  called	  into	  
existence	  to	  translate	  the	  charitable	  purpose	  conceived	  by	  its	  founders	  into	  reality.	  	  
It	  comprises	  of	  [sic]	  a	  system,	  scheme	  or	  arrangement	  by	  which	  the	  charitable	  purpose	  
is	  promoted.	  In	  implementing	  the	  trust	  purposes	  that	  body	  must	  possess	  a	  
permanency	  of	  existence	  and	  a	  continuing	  policy	  and	  function	  which	  cannot	  be	  
changed,	  be	  performing	  a	  public	  service	  to	  at	  least	  a	  recognised	  section	  of	  the	  
community	  and	  be	  active	  in	  promoting	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  specific	  trust	  purpose.	  
That	  ruling	  was	  therefore	  similar	  to	  the	  ATO’s	  view	  stated	  in	  TR	  2011/4.	  
The	  Chief	  Commissioner’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  appeal	  against	  that	  ruling	  stated:	  
In	  keeping	  with	  the	  decision	  of	  [relevant	  cases]	  the	  trustees	  of	  the	  Patricia	  Dukes	  
Foundation	  have	  the	  discretion	  to	  apply	  funds	  to	  any	  Eligible	  Charity/Charities	  as	  they	  
see	  fit,	  as	  such	  for	  land	  tax	  purposes	  the	  Patricia	  Dukes	  Foundation	  is	  not	  considered	  
to	  be	  an	  ‘institution’.	  As	  your	  clients	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  legislative	  requirements	  of	  s.	  
[10](1)(d)	  of	  the	  Act,	  we	  therefore	  consider	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  not	  exempt	  the	  client	  
under	  s.	  10(1)(d)	  of	  the	  Act	  is	  correct.	  
The	  applicant	  responded	  that	  it	  had	  not	  submitted	  to	  the	  Chief	  Commissioner	  that	  the	  trustee	  
owning	  the	  land	  was	  a	  charitable	  institution:	  ‘We	  have	  only	  submitted	  that	  PG	  Dukes	  Pty	  Ltd	  
owns	  land	  in	  trust	  for	  beneficiaries	  that	  are	  a	  charitable	  institution’.	  The	  point	  being	  made	  
here	  by	  the	  applicant	  was	  that	  the	  Chief	  Commissioner	  was	  not	  fully	  addressing	  the	  
implications	  of	  the	  second	  limb	  of	  section	  10(1)(d)	  of	  the	  Act,	  which	  provides	  an	  exemption	  
from	  land	  tax	  for	  ‘land	  owned	  by	  [this	  is	  the	  first	  limb]	  or	  in	  trust	  for	  [this	  is	  the	  second	  limb]	  a	  
charitable	  or	  educational	  institution	  if	  the	  institution,	  however	  formed	  or	  constituted,	  is	  
carried	  on	  solely	  for	  charitable	  or	  educational	  purposes	  and	  not	  for	  pecuniary	  profit...’	  
(emphasis	  added).	  	  
The	  Chief	  Commissioner	  replied	  to	  this	  point	  by	  saying	  that:	  
The	  Chief	  Commissioner	  agrees	  with	  your	  assertion	  that	  your	  client	  is	  not	  a	  charitable	  
or	  education	  institution.	  Therefore	  for	  the	  exemption	  to	  apply,	  the	  land	  must	  be	  in	  
trust	  for	  a	  charitable	  or	  education	  institution.	  	  
In	  your	  client's	  instance	  the	  land	  is	  owned	  by	  P	  G	  Dukes	  Pty	  Ltd	  and	  is	  in	  trust	  for	  the	  
Patricia	  Dukes	  Foundation.	  [Though]	  the	  Patricia	  Dukes	  Foundation	  has	  beneficiaries	  it	  
cannot	  be	  maintained	  that	  the	  land	  itself	  is	  in	  trust	  for	  such	  entities	  (even	  assuming	  
that	  such	  entities	  are	  charitable	  or	  education	  institutions,	  particularly	  given	  its	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  165	  
	  
discretionary	  nature	  pursuant	  to	  Schedule	  3).	  Accordingly	  the	  second	  limb	  of	  s.	  
10(1)(d)	  of	  the	  Act	  unfortunately	  cannot	  be	  satisfied.	  	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  Foundation,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  such	  
beneficiaries	  are	  not	  proven	  to	  be	  charitable	  or	  educational	  institutions.	  Schedule	  2	  
(Purposes	  of	  the	  Patricia	  Dukes	  Foundation)	  of	  the	  Will	  or	  Patricia	  Great	  Dukes	  states:	  
2.1	  The	  Trust	  fund	  is	  established	  and,	  subject	  to	  clause	  9,	  must	  be	  maintained	  
for	  public	  purposes	  which	  are	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  that	  expression	  in	  item	  
1.5B	  in	  the	  ITAA	  1997	  (Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1997),	  s50-­‐5	  and	  which	  are	  
charitable	  in	  the	  legal	  sense.	  	  
While	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  Patricia	  Dukes	  foundation	  must	  meet	  the	  requirements	  
of	  the	  Commonwealth	  Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1997	  (ITAA	  1997),	  the	  requirements	  
of	  Eligible	  Charities	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  ITAA	  97	  may	  not	  necessarily	  satisfy	  the	  same	  
requirements	  of	  a	  charitable	  or	  educational	  institution	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  Act.	  No	  
particular	  beneficiary	  is	  mentioned	  in	  by	  [sic]	  the	  Foundation.	  The	  beneficiaries	  are	  
general	  in	  nature.	  Accordingly	  the	  Chief	  Commissioner	  cannot	  be	  satisfied	  that	  any	  or	  
all	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  are	  acceptable	  institutions.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  disagreed	  and,	  in	  finding	  that	  the	  Foundation	  was	  a	  charitable	  institution,	  also	  
found	  that	  the	  second	  limb	  of	  section	  10(1)(d)	  was	  satisfied.	  	  
What	  indicia	  did	  the	  Tribunal	  view	  as	  decisive	  in	  finding	  that	  the	  Foundation	  was	  an	  
institution?	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  the	  term	  ‘institution’	  did	  not	  have	  a	  legal	  meaning,	  so	  that	  
its	  ordinary	  meaning	  was	  relevant.	  Reviewing	  the	  case	  authorities	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  
‘institution’,	  the	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  the	  Foundation	  was	  a	  charitable	  institution,	  and	  not	  a	  ‘mere	  
trust’.	  	  
The	  latter	  point	  was	  based	  on	  the	  evidence	  before	  the	  Tribunal	  of	  both	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
will	  which	  established	  the	  Foundation	  and	  the	  work	  involved	  in	  managing	  and	  administering	  
the	  Foundation’s	  assets.	  The	  will	  provisions	  which	  were	  relevant	  were	  (at	  [9]):	  
• 	  Clause	  5.3	  required	  that	  there	  had	  to	  be	  regular	  meetings	  of	  the	  trustees;	  	  
• Clauses	  5.4	  and	  5.5	  addressed	  quorum	  related	  matters	  and	  the	  circumstance	  
where	  there	  is	  disagreement;	  
• Clause	  7	  of	  the	  Schedule	  provided	  fairly	  detailed	  guidelines	  for	  the	  investment	  of	  
the	  Foundation's	  assets;	  
• Clause	  8	  of	  the	  Schedule	  conferred	  a	  range	  of	  powers	  on	  the	  Foundation's	  trustee	  
for	  the	  purposes	  of	  administering	  the	  Foundation,	  including	  powers	  to	  engage	  
employees/agents	  and	  powers	  to	  delegate	  the	  management	  of	  investments;	  	  
• Clause	  3.4	  of	  the	  Schedule	  provided	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  expenses/remuneration	  in	  
connection	  with	  the	  management	  and	  administration	  of	  the	  Foundation;	  
• Clause	  14.1	  of	  the	  Schedule	  required	  that	  the	  Foundation's	  financial	  statements	  
had	  to	  be	  audited.	  
The	  management	  and	  administrative	  tasks	  which	  the	  Tribunal	  identified	  as	  relevant	  were	  (at	  
[10]):	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• Managing	  the	  Foundation's	  assets;	  
• Liaising	  with	  real	  estate	  agents,	  sometimes	  several	  times	  a	  day,	  to	  deal	  with,	  inter	  
alia,	  repairs	  to	  the	  Foundation's	  properties,	  renovation/refurbishment	  work	  and	  
changes	  of	  tenancies	  and	  other	  issues	  with	  tenants	  (such	  as	  complaints	  or	  
requests);	  
• Travel	  associated	  with	  dealing	  with	  real	  estate	  agents;	  
• Renovating/refurbishing	  the	  Foundation's	  properties,	  including	  the	  hire	  of	  
tradesmen;	  	  
• Keeping	  records	  of	  the	  Foundation's	  income	  and	  expenses	  including	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  
bookkeeping	  of	  the	  properties	  on	  spreadsheets.	  The	  spreadsheets	  set	  out	  the	  
monthly	  rental	  income	  of	  each	  property.	  There	  is	  one	  spreadsheet	  per	  residence.	  
It	  records	  both	  income	  and	  expenses	  for	  the	  Foundation's	  properties.	  This	  also	  
involves	  checking	  rental	  statements	  from	  the	  real	  estate	  agents,	  which	  generally	  
arrive	  twice	  or	  three	  times	  a	  month;	  
• Carrying	  out	  research	  and	  selecting	  the	  charities	  which	  should	  receive	  income	  
from	  the	  Foundation,	  in	  accordance	  with	  cl.	  3.1	  of	  the	  Will;	  
• Preparing	  financial	  statements	  which	  involves,	  inter	  alia,	  reconciling	  the	  summary	  
of	  rentals	  received	  and	  outgoings	  paid	  by	  agents	  with	  the	  Foundation's	  bank	  
account	  statements,	  writing	  up	  a	  cash	  book	  to	  record	  payments	  by	  cheque,	  
preparing	  a	  Statement	  of	  Financial	  Affairs	  and	  cash	  receipts	  and	  payments	  
statements;	  	  
• Organising	  and	  maintaining	  insurance	  for	  the	  Foundation's	  properties	  and	  
insurance	  for	  the	  directors;	  
• Liaising	  with	  solicitors	  on	  income	  tax	  and	  land	  tax	  issues;	  
• Maintaining	  a	  bank	  account	  for	  the	  Foundation's	  money;	  
• Regular	  meetings	  between	  the	  directors.	  	  
All	  these	  indicia	  pointed	  to	  the	  Foundation	  being	  a	  charitable	  institution.	  The	  second	  limb	  of	  
section	  10(1)(d)	  applied	  to	  make	  the	  Foundation	  exempt	  from	  land	  tax	  because	  although	  the	  
land	  was	  not	  owned	  by	  the	  Foundation,	  it	  was	  owned	  by	  the	  trustee	  and	  held	  in	  trust	  for	  a	  
‘charitable...institution’.	  Therefore,	  the	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  it	  should	  be	  exempt	  from	  land	  tax.	  
On	  this	  point,	  the	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [28]):	  
...having	  regard	  to	  the	  case	  authority	  cited,	  the	  Foundation	  (which	  is	  not	  a	  mere	  trust)	  
can	  and	  should	  be	  characterised	  as	  an	  institution	  and	  moreover	  as	  a	  charitable	  
institution.	  The	  Applicant	  as	  the	  trustee	  of	  the	  Foundation	  is	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  land;	  it	  
is	  the	  Applicant	  who	  in	  that	  capacity	  must	  exercise	  any	  rights	  and	  perform	  any	  duties	  
in	  respect	  of	  the	  land.	  On	  the	  evidence	  before	  me	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Foundation	  
relate	  (apart	  from	  necessary	  administration	  activities)	  to	  the	  derivation	  of	  income	  
(exempt	  under	  ITAA	  1997)	  and	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  income	  and	  capital	  in	  accordance	  
with	  its	  discretionary	  powers	  to	  Eligible	  Charities.	  The	  definition	  of	  Eligible	  Charities	  
makes	  it	  clear	  that	  recipients	  of	  awards	  must	  be	  entities	  which	  are	  charitable	  and	  in	  
respect	  of	  whom	  donations	  are	  deductible.	  As	  noted	  previously	  in	  these	  reasons	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  Foundation	  did	  not	  obtain	  or	  seek	  an	  exemption	  for	  the	  makers	  of	  gifts	  to	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it	  is	  not	  to	  the	  point.	  The	  evidence	  establishes	  that	  the	  Foundation	  is	  carried	  on	  solely	  
for	  charitable	  purposes	  and	  not	  for	  pecuniary	  profit.	  
The	  applicant	  was	  thus	  successful	  in	  claiming	  exemption	  from	  land	  tax	  as	  a	  charitable	  
institution.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWADT/2012/238.html	  
Taxation	  Ruling	  TR	  2011/4	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?docid=TXR/TR20114/NAT/ATO/00001	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Section	  10(1)	  of	  the	  Land	  Tax	  Management	  Act	  1956	  (NSW)	  contains	  a	  large	  number	  of	  
possible	  exemptions	  from	  land	  tax	  in	  New	  South	  Wales.	  Section	  10(1)(d)	  refers	  to	  exemption	  
for	  charitable	  or	  educational	  ‘institutions’.	  The	  Chief	  Commissioner	  took	  the	  view	  that	  though	  
the	  Foundation	  had	  beneficiaries,	  the	  land	  itself	  was	  not	  held	  in	  trust	  for	  such	  entities,	  even	  
assuming	  that	  such	  entities	  were	  charitable	  or	  education	  institutions.	  Moreover,	  the	  choice	  of	  
beneficiary	  was	  entirely	  discretionary	  in	  nature.	  	  
In	  this	  application,	  the	  Foundation	  had	  to	  show	  that	  it	  was	  a	  charitable	  institution	  in	  order	  to	  
fall	  within	  the	  second	  limb	  of	  the	  section.	  The	  Tribunal	  agreed	  that	  it	  was,	  based	  on	  the	  various	  
will	  provisions	  and	  management	  and	  administrative	  activities	  involved	  in	  running	  the	  
Foundation.	  These	  elevated	  it	  from	  a	  ‘mere	  trust’	  to	  a	  charitable	  institution	  (i.e.	  a	  body	  doing	  
something	  more	  like	  ‘the	  carrying	  on	  of	  activities	  or	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  relevant	  to	  the	  
charitable	  purpose’	  as	  indicated	  in	  TR	  2011/14).	  
	  
2.8.2  THE HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN V THE MUNICIPAL PROPERTY 
ASSESSMENT CORPORATION 2012 ONSC 6112 (ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF 
JUSTICE, ASTON, LAX, SWINTON JJ, 9 NOVEMBER 2012) 
In	  this	  Canadian	  case,	  the	  Hospital	  for	  Sick	  Children	  (the	  Hospital)	  and	  the	  Hospital	  for	  Sick	  
Children	  Foundation	  (the	  Foundation)	  appealed	  a	  decision	  that	  the	  premises	  they	  occupied	  
were	  not	  exempt	  from	  municipal	  taxation.	  The	  appeal	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  relevant	  legislation	  was	  the	  Assessment	  Act,	  R.S.O.	  1990,	  c.	  A.31	  (the	  Act)	  which	  sets	  out	  a	  
detailed	  list	  of	  exemptions	  from	  municipal	  assessment	  and	  taxation.	  At	  issue	  in	  this	  appeal	  was	  
section	  3(1)6,	  which	  exempts	  ‘land	  used	  and	  occupied	  by	  a	  public	  hospital	  that	  receives	  
provincial	  aid	  under	  the	  Public	  Hospitals	  Act	  but	  not	  any	  portion	  of	  the	  land	  occupied	  by	  a	  
tenant	  of	  the	  hospital’.	  
A	  ‘hospital’	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  Public	  Hospitals	  Act,	  R.S.O.	  1990,	  c.	  P.40	  to	  mean	  ‘any	  institution,	  
building	  or	  other	  premises	  or	  place	  that	  is	  established	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  treatment	  of	  
patients	  and	  that	  is	  approved	  under	  this	  Act	  as	  a	  public	  hospital’.	  There	  was	  no	  question	  that	  
the	  Hospital	  for	  Sick	  Children	  is	  a	  public	  hospital	  that	  is	  funded	  under	  the	  Public	  Hospitals	  Act,	  
and	  any	  land	  ‘used	  and	  occupied’	  by	  it	  is	  exempt	  from	  taxation.	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At	  issue	  was	  a	  leased	  building	  in	  which	  the	  Foundation	  occupied	  three	  floors.	  The	  main	  point	  
of	  the	  case	  was	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Hospital	  and	  the	  Foundation.	  The	  two	  bodies	  are	  
separate	  legal	  entities.	  At	  trial,	  relevant	  considerations	  in	  the	  relationship	  were:	  
• The	  two	  bodies	  share	  five	  Board	  appointments	  and	  several	  reporting	  obligations.	  
• The	  Foundation	  is	  the	  main	  source	  of	  non-­‐government	  revenue	  for	  the	  Hospital,	  and	  is	  
responsible	  for	  all	  fundraising	  activities	  carried	  out	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Hospital.	  
• For	  the	  last	  three	  years	  grants	  to	  the	  Hospital	  have	  averaged	  95%	  of	  all	  grants	  made	  by	  
the	  Foundation.	  
• The	  Hospital	  and	  the	  Foundation	  have	  two	  ongoing,	  specific	  funding	  agreements	  that	  
provide	  that	  the	  Foundation’s	  funding	  commitment	  to	  the	  Hospital	  will	  be	  in	  excess	  of	  
$225	  million	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  	  
• Approximately	  80%	  of	  the	  funds	  that	  the	  Hospital	  receives	  from	  the	  Foundation	  go	  
towards	  medical	  research.	  A	  smaller	  percentage	  goes	  towards	  patient	  care.	  
• Although	  the	  Foundation	  raises	  considerable	  amounts	  of	  money	  for	  the	  Hospital,	  the	  
monies	  raised	  by	  the	  Foundation	  and	  given	  to	  the	  Hospital	  only	  constitute	  
approximately	  7%	  of	  the	  overall	  financing	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Hospital.	  The	  vast	  
majority	  of	  the	  Hospital’s	  funding	  comes	  from	  the	  provincial	  government	  pursuant	  to	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Public	  Hospitals	  Act.	  
• The	  Foundation,	  pursuant	  to	  its	  Letters	  Patent,	  can	  also	  raise	  funds	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  
any	  other	  hospital,	  university	  or	  medical	  association	  or	  any	  other	  association,	  
foundation	  or	  person	  in	  respect	  of	  activities	  related	  to	  the	  health	  of	  children.	  
Approximately	  10%	  of	  the	  monies	  raised	  by	  the	  Foundation	  are	  provided	  to	  
organizations	  other	  than	  HSC.	  	  
• Upon	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Foundation,	  its	  property	  would	  not	  become	  the	  property	  of	  
the	  Hospital.	  Its	  Letters	  Patent	  dictate	  that	  the	  Foundation’s	  remaining	  property	  after	  
payment	  of	  all	  debts	  and	  liabilities	  ‘shall	  be	  distributed	  or	  disposed	  of	  to	  charitable	  
organizations	  that	  carry	  out	  their	  work	  solely	  in	  Canada’.	  
The	  judge	  at	  first	  instance	  concluded	  that	  the	  premises	  used	  by	  the	  Foundation	  were	  not	  
exempt	  from	  municipal	  taxation	  for	  two	  reasons:	  	  
1. the	  premises	  were	  occupied	  by	  a	  tenant	  of	  the	  Hospital,	  not	  by	  the	  Hospital	  itself	  
2. the	  Hospital	  and	  Foundation	  did	  not	  share	  a	  patrimony	  such	  that	  they	  should	  be	  
treated	  as	  the	  same	  entity	  for	  purposes	  of	  the	  exemption.	  	  
The	  appeal	  court	  looked	  at	  the	  issues	  of	  tenancy	  and	  patrimony.	  Was	  the	  Foundation	  a	  tenant	  
of	  the	  Hospital?	  The	  court	  said	  that	  this	  was	  an	  issue	  of	  fact,	  and	  agreed	  that	  it	  was	  a	  tenant,	  
saying	  (at	  [10]–[12]):	  
Determination	  of	  occupancy	  depends	  on	  an	  entity’s	  right	  of	  regulation	  and	  control	  of	  
premises	  and	  requires	  consideration	  of	  actual	  occupation,	  exclusivity	  for	  the	  particular	  
purposes	  of	  the	  possessor,	  value	  or	  benefit	  to	  the	  possessor,	  and	  permanence....	  The	  
appellants	  argue	  that	  the	  application	  judge	  erred	  in	  finding	  the	  Foundation	  was	  a	  
tenant	  because	  the	  Foundation	  has	  no	  lease	  for	  the	  premises.	  While	  it	  has	  used	  the	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premises	  since	  2004,	  the	  appellants	  argue	  that	  it	  is,	  at	  most,	  a	  tenant	  at	  will.	  There	  is	  
no	  permanency	  to	  its	  possession,	  and	  it	  pays	  no	  rent.	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  application	  judge	  
made	  no	  error	  in	  finding	  that	  the	  Foundation	  was	  a	  tenant	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
Act.	  He	  found	  that	  the	  Foundation	  was	  in	  occupation	  and	  possession	  of	  the	  premises	  
because	  of	  its	  continuous	  use	  of	  the	  premises	  and	  its	  payment	  of	  the	  common	  
expenses	  attributed	  to	  the	  space	  ($300,000	  in	  2010	  and	  $1.3	  million	  in	  2009).	  This	  
evidence	  supports	  his	  conclusion,	  as	  does	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  Foundation	  has	  its	  
own	  sign	  on	  the	  premises	  and	  controls	  access	  through	  a	  pass	  system.	  Passes	  are	  only	  
available	  to	  its	  employees	  and	  not	  those	  of	  the	  Hospital.	  
Shared	  patrimony	  is	  a	  Canadian	  legal	  concept	  arising	  from	  two	  1994	  decisions	  of	  the	  Supreme	  
Court	  of	  Canada:	  Buanderie	  centrale	  de	  Montréal	  Inc.	  v	  Montreal	  (City),	  1994	  CanLII	  59	  (SCC),	  
[1994]	  3	  S.C.R.	  29	  and	  Partagec	  Inc.	  v	  Québec	  (Communauté	  urbaine),	  1994	  CanLII	  60	  (SCC),	  
[1994]	  3	  S.C.R.	  57.	  The	  notion	  of	  shared	  patrimony	  (which	  would	  make	  the	  two	  entities	  the	  
same	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  occupation	  of	  the	  premises)	  in	  previously	  decided	  cases	  had	  turned	  
on	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relevant	  legislation	  by	  the	  court	  to	  determine	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  
Legislature.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Court	  said	  (at	  [24]):	  
...in	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  question	  the	  application	  judge	  had	  to	  determine	  was	  
whether	  there	  was	  a	  legislative	  intent	  to	  give	  the	  Foundation,	  the	  charitable	  arm	  of	  
the	  Hospital,	  the	  same	  exemption	  as	  that	  provided	  to	  a	  public	  hospital	  by	  the	  
Assessment	  Act.	  More	  precisely,	  was	  there	  such	  an	  identity	  of	  patrimony	  that	  one	  
could	  conclude	  the	  Legislature	  intended	  to	  provide	  the	  same	  exemption	  to	  the	  
property	  used	  and	  occupied	  by	  the	  Foundation	  as	  it	  did	  to	  property	  used	  and	  occupied	  
by	  the	  Hospital?	  
The	  court	  concluded	  that	  there	  was	  not	  a	  sufficient	  identity	  or	  patrimony	  to	  allow	  the	  
Foundation	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  public	  hospital	  exemption.	  The	  trial	  judge	  had	  considered	  all	  
the	  relevant	  matters	  (see	  above)	  and	  had	  correctly	  held	  that	  there	  was	  not	  a	  sufficient	  identity	  
between	  the	  Hospital	  and	  the	  Foundation	  so	  as	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  Foundation	  could	  claim	  
the	  exemption	  in	  the	  Act	  for	  land	  used	  and	  occupied	  by	  a	  public	  hospital.	  
The	  appeal	  court	  said	  on	  this	  point	  (at	  [28])	  
The	  Foundation	  occupies	  the	  premises	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  fundraising.	  The	  Hospital’s	  
fulfillment	  of	  its	  main	  purpose,	  the	  provision	  of	  patient	  care	  and	  research,	  is	  not	  
dependent	  on	  the	  Foundation’s	  occupancy	  of	  the	  subject	  premises.	  
Therefore,	  the	  Foundation	  was	  not	  exempt	  from	  municipal	  taxation,	  and	  the	  appeal	  was	  
dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2012/2012onsc6112/2012onsc6112.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  a	  fundraising	  body	  and	  a	  related	  hospital	  body.	  The	  
Hospital	  was	  exempt	  from	  municipal	  taxation	  under	  the	  relevant	  legislation	  because	  it	  was	  a	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public	  hospital.	  The	  Foundation	  was	  held	  to	  be	  the	  Hospital’s	  tenant,	  and	  not	  a	  body	  which	  
shared	  a	  sufficient	  patrimony	  with	  the	  Hospital	  to	  benefit	  from	  its	  exemption	  from	  taxation.	  
The	  court	  identified	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  two	  bodies	  as	  different:	  one	  was	  for	  fundraising	  (not	  
exempt	  from	  taxation)	  and	  the	  other	  a	  hospital	  for	  patient	  care	  and	  research	  (exempt	  as	  a	  
public	  hospital).	  	  
	  
2.8.3  GUIDE DOGS FOR THE BLIND ASSOCIATION V THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER 
MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS [2012] FTT 687 (TC) (FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL 
TAX CHAMBER, SINFIELD J, AND H ADAMS, 8 NOVEMBER 2012) 
The	  Guide	  Dogs	  for	  the	  Blind	  Association	  (GDBA)	  is	  a	  charity	  which	  uses	  third-­‐party	  investment	  
management	  services	  for	  its	  substantial	  investments.	  Until	  2005,	  the	  GDBA	  had	  always	  treated	  
the	  input	  Value-­‐Added	  Tax	  (VAT)	  on	  investment	  management	  services	  as	  irrecoverable.	  
However,	  it	  had	  now	  claimed	  an	  amount	  of	  £4,879.19	  VAT	  incurred	  on	  investment	  
management	  services,	  from	  HRMC.	  GDBA	  claimed	  that	  it	  had	  incurred	  that	  amount	  of	  VAT	  on	  
investment	  management	  services	  during	  the	  period	  1	  April	  1973	  to	  31	  March	  1990.	  It	  was	  not	  
in	  dispute	  that	  it	  could	  have	  claimed	  at	  least	  some	  portion	  of	  this	  amount	  if	  it	  had	  been	  aware	  
of	  it,	  but	  it	  was	  disputed	  that	  the	  GDBA	  had	  in	  fact	  used	  investment	  management	  services	  in	  
the	  relevant	  period.	  	  
Following	  the	  High	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  The	  Church	  of	  England	  Children’s	  Society	  v	  HMRC	  [2005]	  
EWHC	  1692	  (Ch),	  HMRC	  issued	  Business	  Brief	  19/05	  on	  7	  October	  2005.	  The	  Business	  Brief	  
confirmed	  that	  VAT	  incurred	  by	  a	  charity	  on	  raising	  funds	  to	  support	  both	  the	  charitable	  and	  
the	  business	  activities	  of	  the	  charity	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  overhead	  costs	  of	  the	  charity	  as	  a	  
whole	  and	  were	  recoverable	  from	  HRMC	  to	  the	  extent	  they	  were	  attributable	  to	  taxable	  
supplies.	  	  
A	  2008	  House	  of	  Lords	  decision	  allowed	  that	  the	  usual	  time	  limits	  did	  not	  apply	  in	  such	  cases.	  
Following	  this	  case,	  the	  GDBA	  made	  a	  claim	  on	  25	  March	  2009	  for	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  input	  
VAT	  incurred	  on	  investment	  management	  fees	  which	  had	  been	  treated	  as	  irrecoverable	  in	  the	  
period	  1	  April	  1973	  to	  31	  March	  1997.	  	  
In	  a	  letter	  dated	  26	  July	  2010,	  HMRC	  approved	  the	  GDBA’s	  claim	  for	  the	  period	  1	  April	  1990	  to	  
30	  March	  1997,	  but	  rejected	  the	  claim	  for	  the	  period	  1	  April	  1973	  to	  31	  March	  1990.	  HMRC	  
refused	  the	  claim	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  GDBA	  had	  failed	  to	  establish	  that:	  
(1)	  it	  had	  paid	  investment	  management	  fees	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  the	  claim;	  
(2)	  it	  made	  taxable	  supplies	  throughout	  that	  period;	  and	  
(3)	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  input	  tax	  incurred	  on	  investment	  management	  fees	  was	  
attributable	  to	  taxable	  supplies	  by	  GBDA.	  
On	  the	  crucial	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  GDBA	  had	  in	  fact	  incurred	  investment	  management	  
fees	  in	  the	  relevant	  period,	  there	  was	  no	  direct	  documentary	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  
contention	  that	  the	  GDBA	  had	  paid	  management	  fees	  on	  its	  investments	  during	  that	  time,	  or,	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indeed,	  any	  evidence	  at	  all	  other	  than	  assertion.	  Could	  the	  matter	  be	  decided	  by	  some	  form	  of	  
extrapolation	  from	  the	  evidence	  that	  was	  available?	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  it	  could	  (at	  [17]):	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  GDBA,	  we	  consider	  that	  if	  GDBA	  paid	  investment	  managers	  to	  provide	  
investment	  management	  services	  in	  the	  years	  since	  [their	  witness]	  joined	  the	  
organisation	  then	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  likelihood	  that	  GDBA	  paid	  such	  fees	  in	  earlier	  years.	  
The	  investments	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  GDBA	  incurred	  investment	  management	  fees	  
were	  not	  one-­‐off	  events	  but	  carried	  on,	  no	  doubt	  with	  changes,	  from	  year	  to	  year.	  
Further	  evidence	  of	  some	  relationship	  with	  an	  investment	  manager	  or	  managers	  is	  
contained	  in	  the	  Financial	  Statements	  which,	  from	  1974	  to	  1980	  and	  in	  1987,	  refer	  to	  
Lazards	  [an	  investment	  bank]	  and,	  from	  1988	  to	  1990,	  refer	  to	  Lazards	  and	  Mercury	  
[investment	  institutions].	  We	  consider	  that	  those	  references	  strongly	  suggest	  a	  
professional	  relationship.	  In	  the	  later	  period	  of	  1987	  to	  1990,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  
companies	  were	  investment	  advisors	  to	  GDBA	  and	  we	  conclude,	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  
probabilities,	  that	  Lazards	  had	  a	  similar	  relationship	  with	  GDBA	  in	  the	  earlier	  years.	  
Based	  on	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  commercial	  dealings	  between	  investment	  managers	  
and	  their	  clients	  in	  general,	  we	  infer	  that	  such	  a	  professional	  relationship	  involved	  
GDBA	  paying	  fees	  for	  the	  services	  of	  the	  investment	  manager.	  There	  is	  a	  period	  
between	  1981	  and	  1986	  where	  the	  Financial	  Statements	  do	  not	  make	  any	  reference	  to	  
any	  investment	  manager	  but	  we	  consider	  that	  this	  was	  no	  more	  than	  a	  change	  in	  the	  
format	  of	  the	  statements.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Financial	  Statements	  for	  those	  years	  show	  
that	  GDBA	  still	  had	  investments	  and	  that	  Lazards	  are	  shown	  as	  investment	  advisors	  in	  
1987	  suggests	  that	  they	  never	  stopped	  providing	  investment	  management	  services	  
and,	  we	  infer,	  charging	  fees.	  In	  conclusion,	  we	  find	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  probabilities	  that	  
GDBA	  paid	  investment	  management	  fees	  throughout	  the	  period	  1973	  to	  1990.	  
Therefore,	  the	  appeal	  was	  allowed,	  and	  the	  GDBA	  could	  claim	  the	  VAT	  back	  from	  HRMC.	  
This	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2012/TC02358.html	  
A	  guide	  to	  VAT	  for	  charities	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/charities/vat/index.htm	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
VAT	  is	  a	  goods	  and	  services	  tax	  in	  the	  UK.	  Generally,	  an	  organisation	  can	  reclaim	  VAT	  that	  has	  
been	  paid	  on	  goods	  or	  services	  used	  within	  a	  business.	  This	  VAT	  is	  called	  input	  tax	  by	  HMRC.	  
Charities	  are	  generally	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  VAT	  rules	  as	  any	  other	  organisations.	  There	  are,	  
however,	  a	  number	  of	  VAT	  reliefs	  and	  exemptions	  available	  specifically	  for	  registered	  charities,	  
subject	  to	  certain	  conditions	  and	  restrictions.	  These	  are	  not	  available	  to	  other	  nonprofits.	  
In	  this	  case,	  although	  the	  GDBA	  is	  a	  registered	  charity	  in	  the	  UK,	  normal	  VAT	  rules	  applied	  to	  
the	  supplies	  (investment	  management	  services)	  in	  question.	  Since	  the	  supplies	  were	  normal	  
business	  supplies,	  an	  organisation	  must	  keep	  all	  financial	  records	  (such	  as	  VAT	  receipts)	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  reclaim	  VAT.	  This	  decision	  appears	  to	  indicate	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  
charities	  (unless	  the	  decision	  is	  appealed	  by	  HRMC).	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2.8.4  VALUER-GENERAL V NEW SOUTH WALES GOLF CLUB [2012] NSWCA 355 
(COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES, HOEBEN J, PRESTON CJ OF LEC, 
WARD J, 7 NOVEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  by	  the	  Valuer-­‐General	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  against	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Land	  
and	  Environment	  Court	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  (the	  LEC).	  	  
The	  New	  South	  Wales	  Golf	  Club	  is	  located	  on	  58.85	  ha	  of	  coastal	  land	  on	  the	  northern	  
headland	  of	  Botany	  Bay.	  The	  golf	  course	  is	  on	  Crown	  land	  and	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  lease	  granted	  
under	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  Crown	  Lands	  Act	  1989	  (NSW)	  (the	  CL	  Act).	  The	  lessor	  is	  stated	  to	  be	  the	  
State	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  being	  the	  Crown	  in	  right	  of	  New	  South	  Wales.	  The	  lessee	  is	  the	  New	  
South	  Wales	  Golf	  Club	  Company	  Limited	  (the	  Club).	  The	  lease	  is	  for	  a	  term	  of	  40	  years	  from	  25	  
July	  1996	  to	  24	  July	  2036.	  Under	  the	  lease	  the	  use	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  private	  purpose	  of	  
recreation	  (golf	  course).	  Local	  government	  rates	  and	  state	  land	  taxes	  are	  payable	  by	  the	  Club	  
as	  lessee.	  
Land	  value	  in	  New	  South	  Wales	  is	  determined	  under	  the	  Valuation	  of	  Land	  Act	  1916	  (NSW)	  
(the	  VL	  Act).	  The	  Valuer-­‐General	  valued	  the	  land,	  at	  the	  base	  date	  of	  1	  July	  2009,	  at	  
$6.01	  million.	  Notice	  of	  the	  valuation	  was	  given	  to	  the	  Club	  as	  the	  person	  who	  was	  liable	  to	  
pay	  rates	  and	  taxes	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  land.	  The	  Club	  lodged	  an	  objection	  with	  the	  Valuer-­‐
General.	  The	  Valuer-­‐General	  disallowed	  the	  Club's	  objection.	  The	  Club	  appealed	  to	  the	  LEC	  
against	  the	  disallowance,	  under	  s	  37	  of	  the	  VL	  Act.	  	  
On	  19	  June	  2012,	  Lloyd	  AJ	  of	  the	  LEC	  upheld	  the	  Club’s	  appeal	  and	  made	  a	  determination	  that	  
the	  land	  value	  of	  the	  land	  was	  nil	  in	  place	  of	  the	  Valuer-­‐General's	  determination	  that	  the	  land	  
value	  of	  the	  land	  was	  $6.01	  million:	  see	  New	  South	  Wales	  Golf	  Club	  v	  Valuer-­‐General	  New	  
South	  Wales	  [2012]	  NSWLEC	  137.	  	  
In	  this	  appeal,	  the	  Valuer-­‐General	  contended	  that	  the	  primary	  judge	  erred	  on	  two	  questions	  of	  
law:	  
1. The	  construction	  of	  section	  14I	  of	  the	  VL	  Act	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  words	  ‘the	  
restrictions	  on	  the	  disposition	  or	  manner	  of	  use	  that	  apply	  to	  the	  land	  by	  reason	  of	  its	  
being	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  lease	  concerned’,	  and	  in	  holding	  that	  clause	  90	  of	  the	  lease	  
was	  ‘a	  restriction	  on	  the	  disposition’	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  section	  14I	  of	  the	  Act.	  
2. In	  the	  alternative,	  if	  clause	  90	  of	  the	  lease	  was	  a	  restriction	  on	  disposition	  within	  
section	  14I	  of	  the	  VL	  Act,	  the	  judge	  erred	  in	  holding	  that	  the	  Club	  had	  discharged	  its	  
onus	  under	  section	  40(2)	  of	  the	  VL	  Act,	  to	  establish	  the	  Club's	  appeal	  against	  the	  
valuation	  of	  the	  Valuer-­‐General,	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  or	  
probative	  evidence	  of	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  Minister	  exercising	  the	  power	  under	  section	  136	  
of	  the	  CL	  Act	  and	  clause	  90	  of	  the	  lease,	  to	  withdraw	  any	  land	  from	  the	  lease,	  which	  
would	  cause	  the	  land	  value	  to	  be	  nil.	  
His	  Honour	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  LEC	  held	  that	  the	  primary	  judge	  did	  err	  in	  his construction	  
of	  section	  14I	  of	  the	  VL	  Act,	  and	  in	  his	  finding	  that	  clause	  90	  of	  the	  lease	  was	  a	  restriction	  on	  
disposition	  of	  the	  land.	  The	  second	  ground	  of	  appeal	  was	  therefore	  not	  considered,	  and	  the	  
appeal	  was	  allowed	  on	  the	  first	  ground.	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Where	  the	  land	  to	  be	  valued	  is	  Crown	  land	  subject	  to	  a	  lease,	  section	  14I	  of	  the	  VL	  Act	  requires	  
that	  the	  land	  value	  be	  determined	  taking	  into	  account	  certain	  restrictions.	  In	  particular,	  where	  
the	  land	  is	  ‘Crown	  lease	  restricted’	  its	  land	  value	  is	  determined	  by	  ‘taking	  into	  account	  the	  
restrictions	  on	  the	  disposition	  or	  manner	  of	  use	  that	  apply	  to	  the	  land	  by	  reason	  of	  its	  being	  
the	  subject	  of	  the	  lease	  concerned’.	  
In	  this	  case,	  the	  land	  was	  Crown	  lease	  restricted	  because	  it	  was	  leased	  under	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  CL	  
Act.	  The	  primary	  judge	  characterised	  certain	  requirements	  of	  the	  lease	  as	  ‘restrictions’.	  In	  
particular,	  clause	  90	  of	  the	  lease	  provided:	  
The	  Minister	  may	  (on	  giving	  the	  notice	  specified	  or	  referred	  to	  in	  Column	  2	  of	  Item	  110	  
of	  Schedule	  1)	  pursuant	  to	  section	  136	  of	  the	  CLA	  withdraw	  such	  parts	  of	  the	  land	  
comprised	  in	  this	  Lease	  as	  are	  specified	  or	  referred	  to	  in	  Column	  2	  of	  Item	  111	  of	  
Schedule	  1	  that	  is	  required	  for	  a	  public	  purpose	  and	  no	  compensation	  shall	  be	  payable	  
in	  respect	  of	  such	  a	  withdrawal.	  
The	  primary	  judge	  referred	  to	  clause	  90	  of	  the	  lease	  as	  a	  ‘restriction	  on	  the	  disposition’,	  which	  
would	  have	  such	  a	  depreciating	  effect	  on	  the	  price	  that	  a	  hypothetical	  purchaser	  would	  be	  
prepared	  to	  pay,	  that	  the	  land	  value	  for	  the	  land	  should	  be	  determined	  as	  nil.	  
Land	  value	  under	  the	  VL	  Act	  is	  determined	  as	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  value	  of	  ‘the	  fee-­‐simple	  of	  
the	  land’:	  section	  6A	  of	  the	  VL	  Act.	  The	  fee-­‐simple	  of	  the	  land	  means	  the	  fee	  simple	  as	  the	  
highest	  estate	  unencumbered	  and	  subject	  to	  no	  conditions.	  Under	  section	  14I,	  special	  
provision	  has	  been	  made	  for	  valuing	  Crown	  lease	  restricted	  land,	  such	  as	  Crown	  land	  subject	  to	  
a	  lease	  under	  Pt	  4	  of	  the	  CL	  Act	  (as	  in	  this	  case).	  	  
Section	  14I(1)	  requires	  the	  land	  value	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  fee	  simple	  of	  the	  land	  to	  be	  
determined	  taking	  into	  account	  restrictions	  of	  the	  kind	  described	  in	  s	  14I(1)	  which	  would	  not	  
otherwise	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  valuing	  the	  hypothetical	  fee	  simple	  of	  the	  land	  under	  
section	  6A	  of	  the	  VL	  Act.	  
On	  appeal,	  the	  Valuer-­‐General	  submitted	  that	  clause	  90	  was	  not	  a	  restriction	  on	  disposition.	  
Rather,	  it	  had	  two	  components:	  first,	  it	  referred	  to	  the	  statutory	  power	  of	  the	  Minister	  under	  
section	  136(1)	  of	  the	  CL	  Act	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  lease	  land	  required	  for	  a	  public	  purpose	  and,	  
secondly,	  it	  provided	  that	  no	  compensation	  would	  be	  payable	  in	  respect	  of	  such	  a	  withdrawal.	  
His	  Honour	  the	  Chief	  justice	  of	  the	  LEC	  agreed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  restriction	  on	  disposition	  
arising	  from	  clause	  90	  of	  the	  lease.	  Neither	  of	  the	  components	  of	  clause	  90	  (withdrawal	  of	  land	  
by	  the	  Minister	  or	  non-­‐payment	  of	  compensation	  for	  land	  withdrawn)	  were	  ‘restrictions’	  or	  
‘dispositions’.	  
The	  appeal	  was	  upheld	  and	  the	  matter	  remitted	  to	  the	  LEC	  for	  rehearing.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2012/355.html	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
As	  the	  lessee	  of	  Crown	  land	  for	  private	  purposes,	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Golf	  Club	  is	  liable	  to	  
pay	  rates	  under	  the	  Local	  Government	  Act	  1993	  (NSW),	  and	  land	  tax	  under	  the	  Land	  Tax	  
Management	  Act	  1956	  (NSW).	  Rates	  and	  land	  tax	  are	  based	  on	  the	  ‘land	  value’	  of	  the	  land.	  The	  
land	  value	  is	  determined	  under	  the	  VL	  Act.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  land	  value	  was	  assessed	  by	  the	  
Valuer-­‐General	  at	  $6.01	  million	  and	  then	  reduced	  to	  nil	  by	  the	  judge	  at	  first	  instance	  (a	  very	  
different	  outcome	  for	  rates	  and	  tax	  purposes).	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  remitted	  the	  case	  to	  the	  
LEC	  for	  rehearing	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  there	  was	  no	  restriction	  on	  the	  disposition	  of	  the	  land,	  so	  
no	  restriction	  on	  its	  valuation.	  Its	  full	  assessed	  value	  would	  then	  be	  reinstated	  for	  rates	  and	  tax	  
purposes.	  As	  the	  lessee,	  the	  Club	  will	  be	  liable	  for	  rates	  and	  taxes	  levied	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
valuation.	  
	  
2.8.5  CANNON V FUNDS FOR CANADA FOUNDATION 2012 ONSC 6101 (SUPERIOR 
COURT OF JUSTICE ONTARIO, DIVISIONAL COURT, SANDERSON J, 29 OCTOBER 
2012) 
This	  was	  an	  application	  for	  leave	  to	  appeal	  a	  preliminary	  decision	  on	  the	  same	  matter	  in	  
January	  2012	  (see	  2012	  ONSC	  399;	  or	  casenote).	  This	  case	  dealt	  with	  the	  Donations	  for	  Canada	  
gift	  program	  for	  charity	  (the	  gift	  program),	  which	  was	  allegedly	  a	  scam.	  The	  selling	  point	  of	  the	  
gift	  program	  was	  that	  a	  tax	  deduction	  of	  $10,000	  could	  be	  obtained	  for	  a	  ‘donation’	  of	  $2,500	  
to	  charity.	  Around	  $144	  million	  had	  been	  invested	  in	  the	  gift	  program	  in	  total.	  
The	  Canada	  Revenue	  Agency	  (CRA)	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  gift	  program	  was	  nothing	  more	  than	  
a	  fraudulent	  scheme,	  in	  which	  the	  funds	  of	  ‘donors’	  flowed	  ultimately	  into	  the	  pockets	  of	  the	  
promoters	  of	  the	  scheme.	  The	  CRA	  said	  that	  donors	  involved	  in	  the	  gift	  program	  lacked	  
‘donative	  intent’	  because	  there	  was	  no	  element	  of	  impoverishment	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  charitable	  
donation.	  Rather,	  the	  donor	  expected	  to	  be	  enriched	  by	  receiving	  a	  tax	  credit	  well	  in	  excess	  of	  
his	  or	  her	  donation.	  Thus,	  the	  ‘donation’	  could	  not	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  gift,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  
allowable	  tax	  deduction	  for	  tax	  purposes.	  The	  full	  amount	  deducted	  had	  to	  be	  repaid	  to	  the	  
CRA	  with	  interest.	  
Charities	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  gift	  program.	  In	  return	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  gift	  program,	  the	  
charities	  involved	  received	  1%	  of	  the	  total	  money	  donated	  and	  the	  promoters’	  promise	  of	  a	  
20-­‐year	  income	  stream	  from	  an	  investment	  that	  the	  promoters	  would	  make,	  using	  a	  fraction	  of	  
the	  gift	  program	  donations.	  The	  Funds	  for	  Canada	  Foundation	  (FFC	  Foundation)	  was	  
established	  in	  the	  second	  year	  of	  operation	  of	  the	  gift	  program	  as	  an	  umbrella	  organisation	  to	  
receive	  donations	  and	  to	  disburse	  them	  to	  qualified	  charities.	  	  
Cannon	  was	  the	  representative	  in	  a	  class	  action	  (the	  class	  comprised	  9,926	  persons)	  against	  
the	  gift	  program.	  His	  Honour	  certified	  the	  action	  as	  a	  class	  action	  at	  the	  January	  hearing,	  and	  
dismissed	  certain	  applications	  for	  summary	  judgement.	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  was	  a	  
sufficient	  common	  class	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  class	  action.	  This	  was	  the	  class	  of	  persons	  who	  
were	  participants	  (as	  Canadian	  residents)	  in	  the	  gift	  program	  between	  2005	  and	  2009.	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In	  the	  January	  hearing,	  Strathy	  J	  certified	  the	  class	  action	  with	  causes	  of	  action	  against	  some	  or	  
all	  of	  the	  defendants	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  negligence,	  negligent	  misrepresentation,	  fraud	  and	  
fraudulent	  misrepresentation,	  conspiracy,	  various	  breaches	  of	  the	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act	  
2002	  (Canada),	  breach	  of	  contract,	  and	  unjust	  enrichment	  and	  constructive	  trust.	  Some	  of	  the	  
matters	  were	  inadequately	  pleaded,	  but	  His	  Honour	  took	  the	  view	  that	  this	  was	  a	  matter	  for	  
the	  trial	  judge.	  His	  Honour	  dismissed	  applications	  for	  summary	  dismissal	  of	  the	  action	  by	  two	  
of	  the	  defendants.	  
In	  this	  case,	  the	  Court	  had	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  grant	  leave	  to	  appeal	  against	  that	  preliminary	  
decision.	  The	  test	  for	  granting	  leave	  to	  appeal	  from	  an	  interlocutory	  order	  of	  a	  judge	  was	  set	  
out	  in	  Rule	  62.02(4)	  of	  the	  relevant	  court	  rules.	  This	  permits	  leave	  to	  appeal	  where:	  
(a) there	  is	  a	  conflicting	  decision	  on	  the	  matter	  involved	  in	  the	  proposed	  appeal	  and	  it	  is,	  
in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  judge	  hearing	  the	  motion,	  desirable	  that	  leave	  to	  appeal	  be	  
granted;	  or	  
(b) there	  appears	  to	  the	  judge	  hearing	  the	  motion	  to	  be	  good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  
correctness	  of	  the	  order	  in	  question	  and	  the	  proposed	  appeal	  involves	  matters	  of	  such	  
importance	  that,	  in	  his	  or	  her	  opinion,	  leave	  to	  appeal	  should	  be	  granted.	  	  
The	  issues	  raised	  must	  be	  of	  general	  importance,	  relevant	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  law	  and	  
the	  administration	  of	  justice,	  warranting	  resolution	  by	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  judicial	  authority.	  They	  
must	  transcend	  the	  immediate	  interests	  of	  the	  parties.	  	  
His	  Honour	  engaged	  in	  an	  exhaustive	  review	  of	  the	  arguments	  raised	  by	  the	  defendants.	  He	  
held	  that	  all	  the	  conclusions	  reached	  by	  Strathy	  J	  in	  the	  January	  hearing	  were	  valid.	  He	  held	  
also	  that	  the	  public	  importance	  issues	  (negative	  effects	  on	  the	  charity	  sector	  and	  on	  the	  legal	  
profession)	  raised	  by	  the	  defendants	  were	  not	  sufficient	  to	  warrant	  leave	  to	  appeal.	  The	  
application	  for	  leave	  to	  appeal	  from	  the	  certification	  order	  and	  the	  summary	  judgments	  was	  
dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2012/2012onsc6101/2012onsc6101.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  has	  still	  to	  go	  to	  a	  full	  trial,	  but	  is	  of	  some	  importance	  to	  the	  charity	  sector	  in	  Canada.	  
There	  were	  several	  of	  these	  charity	  tax	  ‘scams’	  operating	  in	  Canada	  in	  recent	  years.	  All	  have	  
been	  uncovered	  by	  the	  CRA,	  and	  litigation	  has	  been	  proceeding.	  This	  case	  is	  a	  class	  action	  in	  
which	  the	  participating	  tax-­‐payers	  who	  have	  had	  to	  repay	  taxation	  and	  interest	  to	  the	  CRA	  are	  
seeking	  redress	  from	  the	  scheme	  operators.	  Since	  leave	  to	  appeal	  the	  preliminary	  points	  has	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2.8.6  GUINDON V THE QUEEN [2012] TCC 287 (TAX COURT OF CANADA, BÉDARD J, 16 
OCTOBER 2012) 
This	  Canadian	  case	  concerned	  another	  of	  the	  many	  fraudulent	  charity	  donation	  schemes	  which	  
have	  operated	  in	  Canada	  in	  recent	  years.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  participants	  in	  a	  donation	  program	  
were	  to	  acquire	  timeshare	  units	  as	  beneficiaries	  of	  a	  trust	  for	  a	  fraction	  of	  their	  value	  and	  then	  
donate	  them	  to	  a	  charity	  in	  exchange	  for	  tax	  receipts	  for	  the	  actual	  value	  of	  the	  units.	  No	  
donations	  ever	  took	  place	  as	  the	  timeshare	  units	  never	  existed,	  and	  no	  trust	  was	  ever	  settled.	  	  
The	  appellant	  (Guindon)	  made,	  participated	  in,	  assented	  to	  or	  acquiesced	  in	  the	  making	  of	  135	  
tax	  receipts	  that	  she	  knew,	  or	  would	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  known,	  constituted	  false	  
statements	  that	  could	  be	  used	  by	  the	  participants	  to	  claim	  an	  unwarranted	  tax	  credit	  under	  
the	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  (the	  Act).	  Penalties	  of	  $546,747	  in	  respect	  of	  false	  statements	  made	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  donation	  program	  were	  assessed	  under	  section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  appellant	  
appealed	  the	  assessment.	  
Section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  monetary	  penalties	  can	  be	  assessed	  against	  third	  parties	  
who	  knowingly,	  or	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  they	  should	  have	  known,	  make	  or	  participate	  in	  
making	  a	  false	  statement	  on	  an	  income	  tax	  return.	  The	  appellant,	  who	  was	  a	  lawyer,	  was	  
involved	  in	  the	  donation	  program	  as	  both	  the	  signatory	  of	  the	  charitable	  recipient	  of	  the	  
timeshare	  donations	  (Les	  Guides	  Franco-­‐Canadiennes	  District	  d’Ottawa	  (the	  Charity)),	  and	  as	  
legal	  advisor	  for	  the	  developers	  of	  the	  timeshare	  (and	  trust)	  program.	  The	  third	  party	  
assessment	  against	  the	  appellant	  resulted	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  tax	  receipts	  were	  issued	  by	  
the	  Charity	  involved,	  neither	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  trust	  nor	  the	  transfers	  of	  the	  timeshares	  
to	  the	  Charity	  were	  found	  actually	  to	  have	  occurred.	  	  
There	  were	  two	  main	  issues	  considered	  by	  His	  Honour	  (at	  [5]–[7]):	  
1. Whether	  the	  third	  party	  penalty	  imposed	  under	  section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act	  involved	  by	  its	  
very	  nature	  a	  criminal	  proceeding;	  	  
2. Whether	  the	  appellant	  should	  be	  found	  liable	  to	  a	  third	  party	  penalty	  pursuant	  to	  
subsection	  163.2(4)	  of	  the	  Act	  in	  respect	  of	  false	  statements	  (the	  tax	  receipts)	  made	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  program.	  
In	  respect	  of	  issue	  1,	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  (at	  [5]–[6]):	  
Such	  a	  finding	  would	  entail	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences.	  If	  it	  was	  found	  that	  section	  163.2	  
of	  the	  Act	  leads	  to	  a	  true	  penal	  consequence,	  then	  the	  protection	  of	  section	  11	  of	  the	  
Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  (the	  Charter)	  would	  apply	  to	  guarantee	  
fundamental	  substantive	  and	  procedural	  legal	  rights	  to	  any	  individual	  charged	  with	  an	  
offence	  under	  section	  163.2.	  Notably,	  the	  right	  to	  be	  presumed	  innocent	  would	  raise	  the	  
burden	  of	  proof	  from	  that	  of	  proof	  on	  a	  balance	  of	  probabilities	  to	  proof	  beyond	  a	  
reasonable	  doubt.	  Furthermore,	  if	  this	  Court	  finds	  that	  section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act	  creates	  an	  
offence,	  that	  offence	  would,	  pursuant	  to	  subsection	  34(2)	  of	  the	  Interpretation	  Act,	  need	  
to	  be	  prosecuted	  in	  provincial	  court	  under	  the	  criminal	  procedure	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  
Criminal	  Code.	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The	  respondent,	  the	  Minister	  of	  National	  Revenue	  (the	  Minister),	  argued	  that	  section	  163.2	  gave	  
rise	  to	  a	  civil	  penalty	  only.	  It	  was	  not	  designed	  to	  be	  penal	  in	  nature,	  but	  rather	  to	  uphold	  the	  
internal	  integrity	  of	  the	  taxation	  system.	  The	  appellant	  was	  liable	  for	  a	  third	  party	  penalty	  under	  
section	  13.2(4)	  of	  the	  Act	  because	  her	  conduct	  was	  ‘wilfully	  blind’,	  reckless	  and	  showed	  a	  wanton	  
disregard	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  appellant	  was	  not	  only	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Charity	  but	  also	  the	  lawyer	  
who	  signed	  a	  misleading	  opinion	  on	  the	  matters	  in	  contention.	  She	  knew	  that	  no	  supporting	  
documents	  were	  ever	  provided	  by	  the	  principals	  of	  the	  program	  and,	  thus,	  that	  she	  could	  not	  rely	  
on	  the	  legal	  opinion.	  Her	  responsibilities	  as	  an	  officer	  of	  a	  charity	  did	  not	  cease	  to	  exist	  at	  the	  time	  
the	  legal	  opinion	  was	  signed	  or	  the	  tax	  receipts	  issued.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  appellant	  had	  ongoing	  
responsibilities	  which	  required	  that	  proper	  actions	  be	  taken	  to	  disclose	  to	  the	  participants	  and	  to	  
the	  Canada	  Revenue	  Agency	  (CRA)	  any	  false	  statement	  those	  documents	  may	  have	  contained.	  
The	  appellant	  argued	  that	  section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act	  is	  a	  provision	  with	  true	  penal	  consequences,	  
and	  so	  comes	  within	  section	  11	  of	  the	  Charter.	  In	  support	  of	  this	  contention,	  she	  quoted	  R	  v	  
Wigglesworth,	  1987	  CanLII	  41	  (SCC)	  where	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  held	  that	  proceedings	  
will	  be	  subject	  to	  section	  11	  protection	  where	  the	  consequences	  include	  ‘imprisonment	  or	  a	  fine	  
which	  by	  its	  magnitude	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  imposed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  redressing	  the	  wrong	  
done	  to	  society	  at	  large	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  internal	  discipline	  within	  the	  limited	  
sphere	  of	  activity’.	  Following	  this	  rationale,	  the	  appellant	  argued	  that	  section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act	  
attracted	  the	  protection	  of	  section	  11	  by	  its	  unlimited	  terms	  as	  regards	  both	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  
punishment	  and	  the	  time	  limit	  in	  which	  it	  can	  be	  imposed.	  The	  appellant	  further	  argued	  that	  the	  
wrong	  done	  to	  society	  contemplated	  by	  the	  Wigglesworth	  test	  ‘does	  not	  require	  harm	  to	  the	  fisc’.	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act,	  the	  harm	  contemplated	  is	  aid	  given	  by	  one	  person	  to	  a	  
taxpayer	  which	  damages	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  Canadian	  system	  of	  ‘honest	  self-­‐reporting’.	  	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act	  does	  create	  a	  penal	  consequence	  and	  thus	  attracted	  
the	  protection	  of	  section	  11	  of	  the	  Charter.	  He	  relied	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  in	  R	  v	  
Wigglesworth.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  determined	  that	  a	  matter	  could	  fall	  within	  the	  
ambit	  of	  section	  11	  in	  two	  situations,	  namely,	  where	  the	  matter	  is	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  a	  criminal	  
proceeding,	  or	  where	  the	  offence	  involves	  a	  sanction	  that	  has	  a	  true	  penal	  consequence.	  His	  
Honour	  said	  that	  both	  these	  reasons	  applied	  in	  this	  case.	  He	  said	  (at	  [70]):	  
[A]pplying	  the	  rationale	  enunciated	  in	  Wigglesworth,	  section	  163.2	  of	  the	  Act	  should	  be	  
considered	  as	  creating	  a	  criminal	  offence	  because	  it	  is	  so	  far-­‐reaching	  and	  broad	  in	  scope	  
that	  its	  intent	  is	  to	  promote	  public	  order	  and	  protect	  the	  public	  at	  large	  rather	  than	  to	  
deter	  specific	  behaviour	  and	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  the	  regulatory	  scheme	  of	  the	  Act.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  substantial	  penalty	  imposed	  on	  the	  third	  party	  —	  a	  penalty	  which	  can	  
potentially	  be	  even	  greater	  than	  the	  fine	  imposed	  under	  the	  criminal	  provisions	  of	  section	  
239	  of	  the	  Act,	  without	  the	  third	  party	  even	  benefiting	  from	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  Charter	  
—	  qualifies	  as	  a	  true	  penal	  consequence.	  
Since	  this	  was	  a	  donation	  program	  case,	  there	  were	  many	  participants	  who	  would	  be	  found	  to	  
have	  avoided	  significant	  tax	  by	  virtue	  of	  donation	  receipts	  improperly	  claimed	  in	  their	  returns,	  so	  
that	  the	  third	  party	  penalties	  could	  be	  very	  substantial.	  He	  said	  (at	  [62]):	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[T]he	  Appellant	  was	  assessed	  a	  penalty	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $546,747.	  This	  amount	  was	  
calculated	  by	  adding	  up	  the	  amounts	  of	  the	  penalties	  under	  subsection	  163(2)	  of	  the	  Act	  
to	  which	  each	  of	  the	  134	  other	  donors	  would	  have	  been	  liable.	  The	  penalty	  under	  
subsection	  163.2(5)	  thus	  has	  the	  potential	  of	  increasing	  ad	  infinitum	  depending	  on	  the	  
number	  of	  ‘other	  persons’	  involved.	  As	  the	  Appellant	  submitted,	  where	  the	  penalty	  is	  
unlimited	  and	  is	  imposed	  on	  a	  third	  party,	  it	  seems	  evident	  that	  its	  purpose	  is	  to	  redress	  a	  
wrong	  done	  to	  society	  and	  consequently	  ceases	  to	  be	  a	  purely	  administrative	  matter	  or	  
one	  of	  internal	  discipline.	  
Thus,	  the	  section	  163.2	  penalty	  was	  held	  to	  be	  criminal	  in	  nature	  leading	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  all	  
the	  criminal	  protections	  of	  section	  11	  of	  the	  Charter	  applied:	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence,	  
protection	  from	  self-­‐incrimination,	  a	  trial	  to	  be	  held	  in	  provincial	  court	  in	  accordance	  with	  criminal	  
(rather	  than	  tax)	  procedure,	  and	  a	  burden	  of	  proof	  beyond	  a	  reasonable	  doubt.	  This	  meant	  that	  in	  
future	  there	  would	  be	  a	  higher	  burden	  imposed	  on	  the	  CRA	  in	  applying	  penalties	  in	  these	  sorts	  of	  
cases.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/tcc/doc/2012/2012tcc287/2012tcc287.html#_ftnref27 
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  will	  continue	  as	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  appeal	  by	  the	  Crown.	  The	  decision	  thus	  far	  is	  very	  
important	  in	  Canadian	  tax	  law	  as	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  third	  party	  penalties	  which	  were	  previously	  
thought	  to	  be	  civil	  in	  nature	  are	  in	  fact	  criminal.	  This	  means	  that	  they	  will	  be	  afforded	  the	  
constitutional	  protections	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms.	  The	  CRA	  will	  therefore	  
have	  a	  higher	  threshold	  to	  meet	  in	  future,	  when	  assessing	  and	  imposing	  third	  party	  penalties.	  
The	  case	  also	  points	  to	  the	  danger	  for	  lawyers,	  accountants	  and	  tax	  advisors	  in	  providing	  tax	  
advice	  to	  charities	  and	  others	  without	  the	  necessary	  expertise.	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  the	  appellant	  
would	  have	  been	  liable	  for	  the	  penalty	  even	  if	  he	  found	  it	  was	  a	  civil	  one.	  He	  commented	  that	  the	  
gravity	  of	  the	  penalty	  would	  impose	  a	  stigma	  on	  the	  person	  found	  liable	  and	  cause	  damage	  to	  her	  
reputation	  both	  professionally	  and	  personally.	  
	  
2.8.7  COMMISSIONER FOR INTERNAL REVENUE V ST LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER INC. 
G.R. NO. 195909 (2012) (SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, CARPIO, 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PEREZ, PERLAS-BERNABE JJ, 26 SEPTEMBER 
2012) 
St	  Luke’s	  Medical	  Center	  Inc.	  (St	  Luke’s)	  is	  a	  nonprofit	  hospital	  in	  Manila.	  On	  16	  December	  2002,	  
the	  Bureau	  of	  Internal	  Revenue	  (BIR)	  assessed	  St	  Luke’s	  deficiency	  taxes	  amounting	  to	  
 76,063,116.06	  for	  1998,	  comprising	  deficiency	  income	  tax,	  value-­‐added	  tax,	  withholding	  tax	  on	  
compensation	  and	  expanded	  withholding	  tax.	  The	  BIR	  reduced	  the	  amount	  to	   63,935,351.57	  
during	  trial	  in	  the	  First	  Division	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Tax	  Appeals	  (CTA).	  
This	  was	  a	  review	  on	  certiorari	  under	  Rule	  45	  of	  the	  Rules	  of	  Court	  of	  the	  Decision	  of	  19	  
November	  2010	  of	  the	  CTA	  and	  its	  Resolution	  of	  1	  March	  2011	  in	  CTA	  Case	  No.	  6746.	  The	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Supreme	  Court	  resolved	  this	  case	  on	  a	  pure	  question	  of	  law,	  which	  involved	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
sub-­‐section	  27(B)	  and	  its	  interaction	  with	  sub-­‐sections	  30(E)	  and	  (G)	  of	  the	  National	  Internal	  
Revenue	  Code	  of	  the	  Philippines	  (NIRC),	  on	  the	  income	  tax	  treatment	  of	  proprietary	  nonprofit	  
hospitals.	  
St	  Luke’s	  stated	  purposes	  were:	  
(a)	  To	  establish,	  equip,	  operate	  and	  maintain	  a	  non-­‐stock,	  non-­‐profit	  Christian,	  
benevolent,	  charitable	  and	  scientific	  hospital	  which	  shall	  give	  curative,	  rehabilitative	  
and	  spiritual	  care	  to	  the	  sick,	  diseased	  and	  disabled	  persons;	  provided	  that	  purely	  
medical	  and	  surgical	  services	  shall	  be	  performed	  by	  duly	  licensed	  physicians	  and	  
surgeons	  who	  may	  be	  freely	  and	  individually	  contracted	  by	  patients;	  
(b)	  To	  provide	  a	  career	  of	  health	  science	  education	  and	  provide	  medical	  services	  to	  the	  
community	  through	  organized	  clinics	  in	  such	  specialties	  as	  the	  facilities	  and	  resources	  
of	  the	  corporation	  make	  possible;	  
(c)	  To	  carry	  on	  educational	  activities	  related	  to	  the	  maintenance	  and	  promotion	  of	  
health	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  facilities	  for	  scientific	  and	  medical	  researches	  which,	  in	  the	  
opinion	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Trustees,	  may	  be	  justified	  by	  the	  facilities,	  personnel,	  funds,	  or	  
other	  requirements	  that	  are	  available;	  
(d)	  To	  cooperate	  with	  organized	  medical	  societies,	  agencies	  of	  both	  government	  and	  
private	  sector;	  establish	  rules	  and	  regulations	  consistent	  with	  the	  highest	  professional	  
ethics.	  
The	  BIR	  had	  argued	  before	  the	  CTA	  that	  section	  27(B)	  of	  the	  NIRC,	  which	  imposes	  a	  10%	  
preferential	  tax	  rate	  on	  the	  income	  of	  proprietary	  nonprofit	  hospitals,	  should	  be	  applicable	  to	  
St.	  Luke’s.	  According	  to	  the	  BIR,	  section	  27(B),	  introduced	  in	  1997,	  ‘is	  a	  new	  provision	  intended	  
to	  amend	  the	  exemption	  on	  non-­‐profit	  hospitals	  that	  were	  previously	  categorized	  as	  non-­‐
stock,	  non-­‐profit	  corporations	  under	  Section	  26	  of	  the	  1997	  Tax	  Code...’.	  It	  is	  a	  specific	  
provision	  which	  prevails	  over	  the	  general	  exemption	  on	  income	  tax	  granted	  under	  sub-­‐sections	  
30(E)	  and	  (G)	  for	  non-­‐stock,	  non-­‐profit	  charitable	  institutions	  and	  civic	  organisations	  promoting	  
social	  welfare.	  The	  BIR	  contended	  that	  St	  Luke’s	  was	  not	  really	  operating	  for	  charitable	  
purposes,	  but	  was	  for	  profit,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  only	  13%	  of	  its	  revenues	  came	  from	  its	  
charitable	  purposes.	  	  
St	  Luke’s	  took	  the	  position	  that	  the	  BIR	  should	  not	  consider	  its	  total	  revenues,	  because	  its	  free	  
services	  to	  patients	  amounted	  to	   218,187,498	  or	  65.20%	  of	  its	  1998	  operating	  income	  (i.e.	  
total	  revenues	  less	  operating	  expenses)	  of	   334,642,615.	  St	  Luke’s	  also	  claimed	  that	  its	  income	  
did	  not	  inure	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  any	  individual,	  and	  that	  its	  making	  a	  profit	  did	  not	  affect	  its	  
status	  as	  exempt	  from	  taxation	  under	  sub-­‐sections	  30(E)	  and	  (G)	  of	  the	  NIRC.	  
The	  CTA	  had	  held	  that	  section	  27(B)	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  St	  Luke’s.	  It	  was	  exempt	  from	  taxation	  on	  
income	  derived	  from	  all	  services	  to	  patients,	  whether	  paying	  or	  non-­‐paying.	  Thus,	  the	  sole	  
issue	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  whether	  that	  decision	  was	  correct,	  i.e.	  whether	  section	  
27(B)	  did	  or	  did	  not	  apply.	  If	  it	  did,	  then	  St	  Luke’s	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  10%	  reduced	  tax	  rate	  
on	  the	  income	  of	  proprietary	  nonprofit	  hospitals.	  The	  Court	  held	  that:	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Section	  27(B)	  of	  the	  NIRC	  does	  not	  remove	  the	  income	  tax	  exemption	  of	  proprietary	  
non-­‐profit	  hospitals	  under	  Section	  30(E)	  and	  (G).	  Section	  27(B)	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  
Section	  30(E)	  and	  (G)	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  be	  construed	  together	  without	  the	  
removal	  of	  such	  tax	  exemption.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  Section	  27(B)	  is	  to	  
subject	  the	  taxable	  income	  of	  two	  specific	  institutions,	  namely,	  proprietary	  non-­‐profit	  
educational	  institutions	  and	  proprietary	  non-­‐profit	  hospitals,	  among	  the	  institutions	  
covered	  by	  Section	  30,	  to	  the	  10%	  preferential	  rate	  under	  Section	  27(B)	  instead	  of	  the	  
ordinary	  30%	  corporate	  rate	  under	  the	  last	  paragraph	  of	  Section	  30	  in	  relation	  to	  
Section	  27(A)(1).	  Section	  27(B)	  of	  the	  NIRC	  imposes	  a	  10%	  preferential	  tax	  rate	  on	  the	  
income	  of	  (1)	  proprietary	  non-­‐profit	  educational	  institutions	  and	  (2)	  proprietary	  non-­‐
profit	  hospitals.	  The	  only	  qualifications	  for	  hospitals	  are	  that	  they	  must	  be	  proprietary	  
and	  non-­‐profit.	  ‘Proprietary’	  means	  private...	  ‘Non-­‐profit’	  means	  no	  net	  income	  or	  
asset	  accrues	  to	  or	  benefits	  any	  member	  or	  specific	  person,	  with	  all	  the	  net	  income	  or	  
asset	  devoted	  to	  the	  institution’s	  purposes	  and	  all	  its	  activities	  conducted	  not	  for	  
profit.	  ‘Non-­‐profit’	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  ‘charitable’.’	  
The	  Court	  said	  that	  charitable	  institutions	  were	  not	  automatically	  granted	  tax	  exemptions.	  Tax	  
exemptions	  are	  given	  by	  the	  Congress	  under	  specific	  laws	  (except	  for	  exemption	  from	  real	  
property	  taxation	  which	  was	  given	  by	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Philippines).	  Section	  30(E)	  of	  the	  
NIRC	  defines	  a	  charitable	  institution	  as:	  
(1)	  a	  non-­‐stock	  corporation	  or	  association;	  
(2)	  organised	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  purposes;	  
(3)	  operated	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  purposes;	  and	  
(4)	  with	  no	  part	  of	  its	  net	  income	  or	  assets	  belonging	  to	  or	  inuring	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  any	  
member,	  organiser,	  officer	  or	  any	  specific	  person.	  
There	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  St	  Luke’s	  was	  organised	  as	  a	  non-­‐stock,	  non-­‐profit	  charitable	  
institution.	  However,	  this	  did	  not	  automatically	  exempt	  it	  from	  paying	  taxes.	  The	  last	  
paragraph	  of	  section	  30	  of	  the	  NIRC	  stated	  that:	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  provisions	  in	  the	  preceding	  paragraphs,	  the	  income	  of	  whatever	  
kind	  and	  character	  of	  the	  foregoing	  organizations	  from	  any	  of	  their	  properties,	  real	  or	  
personal,	  or	  from	  any	  of	  their	  activities	  conducted	  for	  profit	  regardless	  of	  the	  
disposition	  made	  of	  such	  income,	  shall	  be	  subject	  to	  tax	  imposed	  under	  this	  Code.	  
(emphasis	  added)	  
Therefore,	  the	  Court	  said	  that	  ‘if	  a	  tax	  exempt	  charitable	  institution	  conducts	  ‘any’	  activity	  for	  
profit,	  such	  activity	  is	  not	  tax	  exempt	  even	  if	  its	  not-­‐for	  profit	  activities	  remain	  tax	  exempt’.	  
The	  Court	  added	  that:	  
The	  Court	  cannot	  expand	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  ‘operated	  exclusively’	  without	  
violating	  the	  NIRC.	  Services	  to	  paying	  patients	  are	  activities	  conducted	  for	  profit.	  
They	  cannot	  be	  considered	  any	  other	  way.	  There	  is	  a	  ‘purpose	  to	  make	  profit	  over	  
and	  above	  the	  cost’	  of	  services.	  The	   1.73	  billion	  total	  revenues	  from	  paying	  patients	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is	  not	  even	  incidental	  to	  St.	  Luke’s	  charity	  expenditure	  of	   218,187,498	  for	  non-­‐paying	  
patients.	  (emphasis	  in	  original)	  
The	  Court	  therefore	  held	  that	  St	  Luke’s	  was	  not	  operated	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  or	  social	  
welfare	  purposes.	  It	  received	  income	  from	  paying	  patients.	  This	  income	  was	  subject	  to	  10%	  
taxation	  under	  section	  27(B)	  of	  the	  NIRC.	  As	  the	  Court	  held:	  
St.	  Luke’s	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  under	  Section	  30(E)	  and	  (G)	  of	  the	  NIRC	  to	  be	  
completely	  tax	  exempt	  from	  all	  its	  income.	  However,	  it	  remains	  a	  proprietary	  non-­‐
profit	  hospital	  under	  Section	  27(B)	  of	  the	  NIRC	  as	  long	  as	  it	  does	  not	  distribute	  any	  of	  
its	  profits	  to	  its	  members	  and	  such	  profits	  are	  reinvested	  pursuant	  to	  its	  corporate	  
purposes.	  St.	  Luke’s,	  as	  a	  proprietary	  non-­‐profit	  hospital,	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  preferential	  
tax	  rate	  of	  10%	  on	  its	  net	  income	  from	  its	  for-­‐profit	  activities.	  
Thus,	  St	  Luke’s	  was	  liable	  for	  tax	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  10%	  in	  the	  1998	  year	  under	  section	  27(B)	  of	  the	  
NIRC.	  It	  was	  held	  not	  liable	  for	  surcharges	  or	  interest	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  tax	  owing.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/september2012/195909.pdf	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  illustrates	  the	  position	  in	  the	  Philippines	  that	  income	  from	  commercial	  (for-­‐profit)	  
activity	  (in	  this	  case,	  paying	  patients)	  is	  taxable,	  but	  the	  organisation	  remains	  tax-­‐exempt	  on	  
income	  from	  its	  actual	  charitable	  activities.	  The	  only	  question	  is	  whether	  an	  activity	  is	  for-­‐
profit	  (commercial)	  or	  not.	  	  
	  
2.8.8 HOPE IN THE COMMUNITY LTD V THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S 
REVENUE AND CUSTOMS [2012] UKFTT 499 (TC) (UNITED KINGDOM FIRST TIER 
TRIBUNAL (TAX CHAMBER), M S CONNELL J AND R WATTS-DAVIES, 8 AUGUST 
2012) 
This	  UK	  case	  concerned	  payment	  of	  Value-­‐Added-­‐Tax	  (VAT),	  a	  type	  of	  consumption	  tax	  payable	  
on	  goods	  and	  services	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  appellant	  nonprofit	  charity,	  Hope	  in	  the	  Community	  Ltd	  
(HCL),	  appealed	  against	  a	  ruling	  by	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Revenue	  and	  Customs	  (HMRC)	  that	  a	  certain	  
amount	  of	  VAT	  previously	  forwarded	  to	  HMRC	  should	  not	  be	  repaid	  to	  it.	  HCL	  contended	  that	  
the	  amount	  in	  question	  was	  incorrectly	  accounted	  for	  as	  output	  tax	  in	  accounting	  periods	  
between	  May	  2006	  and	  August	  2008.	  The	  tax	  paid	  was	  in	  relation	  to	  grant-­‐funded	  projects	  
where	  HCL	  said	  that	  the	  supplies	  to	  which	  the	  payment	  was	  attributable	  were	  outside	  the	  
scope	  of	  VAT.	  HMRC	  contended	  that	  the	  supplies	  were	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  VAT	  and	  therefore	  
the	  HCL	  was	  required	  to	  account	  for	  output	  tax	  on	  them	  at	  the	  standard	  rate.	  
The	  central	  question	  was	  whether	  the	  payments	  made	  to	  HCL,	  on	  which	  the	  tax	  had	  already	  
been	  paid,	  were	  grants	  or	  not.	  If	  the	  payments	  were	  grants,	  then	  they	  were	  outside	  the	  scope	  
of	  VAT,	  as	  charities	  are	  not	  required	  to	  pay	  VAT	  on	  grants.	  If	  they	  were	  not	  grants,	  but	  rather	  
contracts,	  then	  the	  VAT	  was	  payable,	  and	  could	  be	  retained	  by	  HMRC.	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HCL	  is	  a	  company	  registered	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  in	  England.	  Its	  aims	  and	  objectives	  are	  
stated	  in	  its	  literature	  to	  be	  the	  provision	  of	  ‘an	  umbrella	  of	  support	  for	  faith	  and	  voluntary	  
sector	  groups	  seeking	  to	  regenerate	  the	  communities	  which	  they	  serve’.	  HCL	  registered	  for	  
VAT	  with	  effect	  from	  31	  October	  2003.	  In	  its	  application	  for	  registration	  it	  described	  the	  nature	  
of	  its	  business	  as	  ‘not	  for	  profit	  consultancy	  and	  community	  regeneration	  projects’.	  
There	  were	  five	  supplies	  in	  contention,	  to	  which	  the	  VAT	  was	  applied	  in	  this	  case.	  The	  first	  
three	  were	  feasibility	  studies	  undertaken	  between	  January	  2004	  and	  March	  2005	  for	  Medway	  
Council,	  Chatham,	  Kent	  regarding	  a	  project	  known	  as	  ‘the	  Re-­‐use	  Thameswood	  Project’.	  
Medway	  Council	  was	  the	  accountable	  body	  for	  the	  Thames	  Gateway	  Kent	  Partnership	  (TGKP),	  
which	  had	  secured	  funding	  from	  the	  South	  East	  England	  Development	  Agency	  (SEEDA).	  SEEDA	  
is	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  regional	  development	  agencies	  in	  England	  set	  up	  as	  non-­‐departmental	  
public	  bodies	  to	  facilitate	  regeneration	  projects.	  The	  two	  other	  supplies	  related	  to	  
‘management	  fees’	  undertaken	  on	  behalf	  of	  South	  East	  England	  Faiths’	  Forum	  (SEEFF)	  
between	  January	  and	  March	  2004.	  The	  total	  feasibility	  study	  fees	  amounted	  to	  £73,000.00	  and	  
the	  management	  fees	  £845.00	  for	  a	  total	  of	  £73,845.00.	  An	  initial	  ruling	  by	  HMRC	  was	  that	  the	  
supplies	  were	  taxable	  at	  the	  standard	  rate	  of	  VAT.	  	  
Later,	  HCL	  sought	  a	  formal	  ruling	  in	  relation	  to	  further	  supplies	  relating	  to	  ‘grants’.	  These	  were:	  
• The	  ‘Championing	  Neighbourhoods	  Project’	  which	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  GROW	  
programme	  (Giving	  Real	  Opportunities	  for	  Work)	  through	  a	  European	  Regional	  
Development	  Funding	  (ERDF)	  initiative.	  In	  this	  project,	  HCL	  worked	  with	  other	  
voluntary	  groups	  regarding	  social	  and	  economic	  issues	  which	  adversely	  affected	  
communities	  and	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  their	  residents.	  HCL	  assisted	  the	  other	  groups	  in	  
developing	  a	  management	  framework	  to	  encourage	  and	  enable	  local	  residents	  to	  
establish	  projects	  designed	  to	  improve	  local	  regeneration,	  employment	  opportunities	  
and	  cohesion	  within	  community	  neighbourhoods.	  In	  particular,	  HCL	  provided	  a	  range	  
of	  services	  including	  case	  studies,	  a	  management	  framework	  to	  record	  and	  collate	  
information	  regarding	  the	  project,	  the	  production	  of	  a	  website	  and	  the	  holding	  of	  
meetings	  and	  conferences;	  
• The	  Guide	  Neighbourhood	  Project	  funded	  by	  the	  Home	  Office	  through	  ‘Housing	  
Justice’,	  a	  charity	  working	  in	  the	  area	  of	  social	  housing	  and	  homelessness;	  
• The	  Share	  First	  Project	  which	  involved	  a	  feasibility	  study	  relating	  to	  the	  potential	  
salvage	  and	  use	  of	  surplus	  supermarket	  foodstuffs.	  
HMRC	  ruled	  that	  all	  the	  projects	  involved	  taxable	  supplies	  because	  the	  parties	  assisted	  by	  HCL	  
obtained	  a	  benefit.	  HMRC	  said	  that	  whilst	  grant	  funding	  may	  pass	  down	  a	  chain	  and	  remain	  
outside	  the	  scope	  of	  VAT	  at	  each	  step,	  it	  would	  be	  rare	  for	  that	  to	  happen	  more	  than	  twice,	  
and	  where	  it	  did,	  in	  reality,	  the	  payment	  was	  consideration	  for	  the	  activities	  outsourced	  to	  
HCL.	  
There	  was	  considerable	  correspondence	  between	  the	  parties	  relating	  to	  the	  status	  of	  these	  
supplies,	  and	  others	  which	  were	  in	  contention.	  Eventually,	  on	  18	  August	  2010,	  pursuant	  to	  the	  
Tribunal’s	  direction,	  HCL	  provided	  details	  of	  the	  projects	  to	  which	  its	  claim	  for	  reimbursement	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of	  VAT	  related	  and	  the	  supplies	  which	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  its	  voluntary	  disclosure	  of	  VAT	  
liability.	  These	  were	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  	   Project	  Name	   Funder	   Documentation	  	   Amount	  
claimed	  
HCL’s	   description	  
of	  payment	  
1	   Guide	  Neighbourhood	  	   Housing	  
Justice	  
Grant	  letter;	  Grant	  
terms	  and	  conditions	  
MOU	  
£30,127.57	   Grant	  





£174.97	   Grant	  
3	   Sharefirst	   SEEDA	   Grant	  Letter	  	  
MOU	  
£1,806.59	   Grant	  






£70.00	   Educational	  




£2,174.24	   Grant	  
6	   Bromley-­‐by-­‐Bow	  	   SEEDA	   Grant	  Letter	  and	  
Schedules	  MOU	  
-­‐	  £60.88	   Grant	  
7	   Swanscombe	  Café	  	   Dartford	  BC	   Agreement	   and	  
Schedules	  MOU	  
-­‐	  £314.43	   Grant	  
8	   Championing	  
Neighbourhoods	  	  
GROW	   Grant	  letter	  and	  
Annexes;	  letter	  dated	  
20	  August	  2009.	  MOU	  
£4,286.63	   Grant	  
9	   Re-­‐use	  Thameswood	  	   	  	   Correspondence	  
MOU	  
£382.75	   Disbursement	  






£912.47	   Educational	  
11	   Global	  Grant	  Funding-­‐
Interfaith	  Project	  
TGKP	   Agreement	  
MOU	  
£2,304.96	   Disbursement	  
12	   Valuing	   Community	  
Experiences	  
URC	   Agreement	  
MOU	  
£553.86	   Educational	  
13	   Faiths	  Together	  
Conference	  
SEEFF	   Agreement	  
MOU	  
£636.65	   Educational	  
	  	  
HCL’s	  ground	  of	  appeal	  was	  that	  it	  should	  not	  have	  paid	  the	  VAT	  on	  these	  supplies	  since	  they	  
were	  grant-­‐based,	  and	  were	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  funding	  projects	  which	  were	  of	  benefit	  to	  local	  
community	  and	  voluntary	  groups.	  They	  were	  supplies	  which	  were	  not	  for	  consideration	  and	  so	  
were	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  VAT.	  	  
HMRC	  took	  the	  position	  that	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  an	  agreement	  constitutes	  a	  supply	  for	  
consideration	  (i.e.	  one	  which	  is	  taxable)	  is	  one	  of	  fact,	  and	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘supply’	  must	  be	  
given	  a	  broad	  definition	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  VAT.	  HMRC	  said	  that	  VAT	  liability	  is	  determined	  by	  
the	  substance	  of	  the	  agreement,	  and	  the	  parties	  cannot	  elect	  to	  remove	  a	  supply	  of	  services	  
for	  consideration	  from	  the	  VAT	  system	  simply	  by	  referring	  to	  it	  as	  a	  ‘grant’.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  said	  that	  the	  determination	  of	  whether	  the	  supplies	  were	  taxable	  required	  a	  close	  
examination	  of	  the	  underlying	  documentation.	  Were	  there	  contracts	  involved	  rather	  than	  
grants?	  Whether	  or	  not	  a	  legal	  relationship	  existed	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  funder	  was	  to	  
benefit	  from	  the	  services	  were	  only	  issues	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  this	  
examination.	  However,	  taking	  all	  the	  evidence	  into	  account,	  the	  arrangements	  in	  contention	  
were	  contractual.	  The	  Tribunal	  thus	  concluded	  that	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  HCL	  in	  return	  for	  
payments	  described	  as	  ‘grants’	  were	  supplies	  for	  consideration	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  section	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5(2)(a)	  of	  the	  VAT	  Act	  1994.	  Therefore,	  the	  appeal	  was	  dismissed	  and	  HCL	  was	  liable	  for	  
standard-­‐rate	  VAT	  on	  all	  the	  relevant	  projects.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/TC/2012/TC02175.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  charities	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  distinction	  between	  a	  contract	  
and	  a	  grant	  is	  crucial	  to	  VAT	  liability.	  The	  words	  are	  often	  used	  loosely	  or	  even	  interchangeably	  
in	  funding	  in	  the	  UK.	  Since	  a	  contract	  involves	  the	  exchange	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  for	  
consideration,	  VAT	  is	  payable.	  Charities	  which	  obtain	  funding	  for	  their	  own	  projects	  will	  be	  
using	  grants	  (which	  are	  not	  taxable).	  Charities	  which	  are	  paid	  by	  others	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  project,	  
even	  where	  the	  project	  aligns	  with	  the	  charity’s	  objectives,	  will	  be	  engaging	  in	  a	  contract,	  on	  
which	  VAT	  will	  be	  payable.	  
	  	  
2.8.9 SEA SHEPHERD AUSTRALIA LIMITED AND COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION [2012] 
AATA 520 (ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL OF AUSTRALIA, TAXATION 
APPEALS DIVISION, MIDDLETON J, FJ ALPINS DP, E FICE, 7 AUGUST 2012) 
The	  issue	  before	  the	  Tribunal	  in	  this	  case	  was	  whether	  the	  applicant,	  Sea	  Shepherd	  Australia	  
Limited,	  was	  entitled	  to	  be	  endorsed	  as	  a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  section	  
30-­‐125(1)	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1997	  (Cth)	  (ITAA).	  In	  particular,	  the	  proceeding	  
concerned	  the	  construction	  of	  Item	  4.1.6	  in	  section	  30-­‐45	  of	  the	  ITAA.	  	  
The	  applicant	  applied	  for	  endorsement	  as	  a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient	  pursuant	  to	  section	  30-­‐
120	  of	  the	  ITAA	  in	  February	  2010.	  The	  Commissioner	  refused	  to	  endorse	  the	  applicant;	  the	  
applicant	  objected	  and	  the	  Commissioner	  disallowed	  its	  objection.	  This	  proceeding	  was	  an	  
application	  for	  review	  of	  the	  Commissioner’s	  objection	  decision.	  The	  Tribunal	  upheld	  the	  
Commissioner’s	  decision	  for	  the	  following	  reasons.	  
The	  applicant	  was	  established	  by	  Sea	  Shepherd	  Conservation	  Society	  (SSCS),	  a	  company	  
incorporated	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  as	  an	  international	  nonprofit	  marine	  wildlife	  
conservation	  organisation.	  The	  founder	  and	  president	  of	  SSCS,	  Mr	  Paul	  Watson,	  is	  also	  a	  
director	  of	  the	  applicant.	  The	  applicant	  was	  incorporated	  in	  January	  2007,	  and	  is	  registered	  as	  
an	  unlisted	  public	  nonprofit	  company.	  At	  a	  meeting	  held	  in	  February	  2010,	  the	  applicant’s	  
board	  of	  directors	  resolved	  that	  the	  applicant	  would	  commence	  trading.	  	  
Clause	  3.1	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  constitution	  provides	  that	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  applicant	  are:	  
3.1.1	  to	  advance	  education	  in	  the	  field	  of	  marine	  and	  freshwater	  ecology;	  
3.1.2	  to	  promote	  the	  conservation	  and	  preservation	  of	  marine	  and	  freshwater	  living	  
organisms;	  
3.1.3	  to	  promote	  humane	  behaviour	  towards	  animals,	  particularly	  but	  not	  exclusively	  
marine	  animals,	  which	  are	  in	  need	  of	  care	  and	  attention	  by	  reason	  of	  sickness,	  
maltreatment,	  poor	  circumstances	  or	  ill-­‐usage;	  
3.1.4	  any	  other	  purposes	  deemed	  charitable.	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Clause	  10.2	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  constitution	  provides:	  
In	  the	  event	  of	  the	  organisation	  being	  dissolved,	  the	  amount	  that	  remains	  after	  such	  
dissolution	  and	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  all	  debts	  and	  liabilities	  shall	  be	  transferred	  to	  
another	  organisation	  with	  similar	  purposes	  which	  is	  not	  carried	  on	  for	  the	  profit	  or	  
gain	  of	  its	  individual	  members.	  
The	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  were	  not	  in	  dispute.	  Evidence	  was	  given	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  main	  activity	  
is	  the	  conduct	  of	  what	  it	  terms	  ‘campaigns’	  which	  are	  designed	  to	  protect	  marine	  wildlife	  from	  
being	  harmed	  or	  killed	  by	  humans.	  The	  applicant	  operates	  independently	  from	  SSCS,	  but	  the	  
two	  entities	  collaborate	  in	  the	  planning	  and	  carrying	  out	  of	  the	  campaigns.	  To	  date,	  the	  
applicant’s	  campaigns	  have	  been	  focused	  primarily	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  whales.	  The	  
campaigns	  involve	  intercepting	  whaling	  fleets	  and	  obstructing	  the	  whalers’	  activities	  so	  as	  to	  
prevent	  the	  killing	  and	  injuring	  of	  whales.	  	  
The	  applicant’s	  activities	  also	  encompass	  the	  protection	  of	  other	  marine	  wildlife,	  by	  
intervening	  so	  as	  to	  prevent	  the	  killing	  of	  sharks	  for	  their	  fins	  and	  the	  clubbing	  of	  seals.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  applicant	  tracks	  and	  removes	  dolphin	  drift	  nets.	  The	  applicant	  does	  engage	  
in	  activities	  other	  than	  campaigns.	  For	  example,	  it	  co-­‐ordinates	  the	  rescue,	  transport	  and	  
cleaning	  of	  affected	  wildlife	  during	  disasters,	  but	  these	  latter	  activities	  were	  found	  not	  to	  be	  its	  
primary	  purpose.	  	  
It	  was	  not	  in	  dispute	  that	  the	  applicant	  is	  a	  charitable	  institution.	  However,	  its	  entitlement	  to	  
deductible	  gift	  recipient	  status	  was	  in	  contention.	  
The	  relevant	  legislation	  is	  contained	  in	  Division	  30	  of	  the	  ITAA,	  which	  deals	  with	  deductions	  for	  
certain	  gifts	  or	  contributions	  made	  by	  taxpayers.	  Section	  30-­‐15	  makes	  available	  deductions	  for	  
gifts	  or	  contributions	  made	  to	  certain	  recipients,	  including	  a	  ‘fund,	  authority	  or	  institution	  
covered	  by	  an	  item	  in	  any	  of	  the	  tables	  in	  Subdivision	  30-­‐B’	  (Item	  1	  of	  the	  table	  in	  section	  30-­‐
15).	  Section	  30-­‐17	  requires	  that	  such	  a	  recipient	  be	  endorsed	  under	  Subdivision	  30-­‐BA	  as	  a	  
‘deductible	  gift	  recipient’.	  	  
Subdivision	  30-­‐B	  sets	  out	  tables	  of	  recipients	  for	  deductible	  gifts,	  including	  both	  general	  
categories	  of	  recipients	  and	  ‘specific’	  (named)	  recipients	  in	  various	  fields	  of	  endeavour	  such	  as	  
health,	  education,	  research	  and	  the	  environment.	  In	  particular,	  ‘welfare	  and	  rights	  recipients’	  
are	  set	  out	  in	  the	  tables	  in	  section	  30-­‐45.	  	  
The	  table	  in	  section	  30-­‐45(1)	  sets	  out	  general	  categories	  of	  welfare	  and	  rights	  recipients.	  Item	  
4.1.6	  of	  that	  table	  provides	  for	  the	  following	  category,	  upon	  which	  the	  applicant	  relied	  in	  this	  
case:	  
...a	  charitable	  institution	  whose	  principal	  activity	  is	  one	  or	  both	  of	  these:	  
(a)	  providing	  short-­‐term	  direct	  care	  to	  animals	  (but	  not	  only	  native	  wildlife)	  that	  have	  
been	  lost	  or	  mistreated	  or	  are	  without	  owners;	  
(b)	  rehabilitating	  orphaned,	  sick	  or	  injured	  animals	  (but	  not	  only	  native	  wildlife)	  that	  
have	  been	  lost	  or	  mistreated	  or	  are	  without	  owners.	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Section	  30-­‐120	  of	  Subdivision	  30-­‐BA	  provides	  that,	  upon	  application	  by	  an	  entity	  in	  accordance	  
with	  Division	  426	  in	  Schedule	  1	  to	  the	  Taxation	  Administration	  Act	  1953	  (Cth)	  (the	  TAA),	  the	  
Commissioner	  must	  endorse	  the	  entity	  as	  a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient	  if	  the	  entity	  is	  entitled	  to	  
be	  so	  endorsed.	  	  
Section	  30-­‐125(1)	  governs	  the	  entitlement	  to	  such	  endorsement.	  Relevantly	  to	  this	  case,	  the	  
provision	  provides:	  
An	  entity	  is	  entitled	  to	  be	  endorsed	  as	  a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient	  if:	  
.....	  
(b)	  the	  entity	  is	  a	  fund,	  authority	  or	  institution	  that:	  
(i)	  is	  described	  (but	  not	  by	  name)	  in	  item	  1	  ....	  of	  the	  table	  in	  section	  30-­‐15;	  and	  
...	  
(c)	  the	  entity	  meets	  the	  requirements	  of	  subsection	  (6)	  ....	  	  
Section	  30-­‐125(6)	  provides	  that	  (when	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  section	  30-­‐125(7))	  the	  entity	  
must	  be	  required	  by	  (amongst	  other	  things)	  a	  document	  constituting	  the	  entity	  or	  rules	  
governing	  the	  entity’s	  activities	  to	  transfer	  any	  surplus	  assets	  upon	  being	  wound	  up	  to	  another	  
fund,	  authority	  or	  institution	  that	  is	  a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient.	  The	  applicant’s	  winding	  up	  
provision	  did	  not	  meet	  this	  requirement.	  
The	  applicant	  applied	  for	  endorsement	  as	  a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  is	  a	  
fund,	  authority	  or	  institution	  that	  is	  described	  (but	  not	  by	  name)	  in	  Item	  1	  of	  the	  table	  in	  
section	  30-­‐15,	  being	  covered	  by	  Item	  4.1.6	  in	  the	  table	  in	  section	  30-­‐45(1)	  setting	  out	  general	  
categories	  of	  welfare	  and	  rights	  recipients.	  	  
The	  applicant	  contended	  that	  its	  activities	  fell	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  para	  (a)	  of	  Item	  4.1.6	  in	  the	  
ITAA	  because:	  
1. They	  constituted	  the	  provision	  of	  ‘short-­‐term	  direct	  care’	  to	  animals.	  The	  applicant	  
submitted	  that	  the	  word	  ‘care’,	  according	  to	  its	  ordinary	  meaning,	  encompassed	  
protection	  from	  harm	  or	  death,	  and	  accordingly,	  in	  undertaking	  its	  campaigns,	  the	  
applicant	  provided	  ‘care’	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  provision.	  	  
2. The	  care	  provided	  was	  both	  ‘direct’	  and	  ‘short-­‐term’	  as	  per	  the	  provision.	  	  
3. The	  whales	  and	  other	  marine	  life	  protected	  by	  the	  applicant’s	  campaigns	  were	  
‘animals	  ...	  that	  ...	  are	  without	  owners’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  that	  provision.	  
4. The	  animals	  protected	  were	  not	  ‘native	  wildlife’,	  which	  meant	  wildlife	  on	  the	  mainland	  
of	  Australia.	  	  
In	  response,	  the	  Commissioner	  submitted	  that:	  
1. The	  phrase	  ‘short-­‐term	  direct	  care’	  was	  to	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  composite	  phrase	  and	  
meant	  some	  form	  of	  direct	  physical	  assistance,	  such	  as	  shelter	  or	  medical	  care.	  The	  
Commissioner’s	  contention	  was	  that	  para	  (a)	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  such	  
care	  to	  categories	  of	  animals	  which	  have	  suffered	  some	  misfortune,	  and	  in	  that	  regard	  
that	  the	  phrase	  ‘without	  owners’	  was	  concerned	  with	  animals	  requiring	  care	  as	  a	  result	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of	  an	  event	  which	  had	  occurred,	  rather	  than	  being	  concerned	  with	  any	  unowned	  
animals	  (whether	  wild	  or	  otherwise)	  that	  might	  suffer	  some	  misfortune	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
2. Therefore,	  the	  applicant’s	  principal	  activity	  of	  preventing	  wild	  animals	  from	  being	  
killed	  or	  injured	  by	  humans	  did	  not	  satisfy	  the	  terms	  of	  para	  (a).	  	  
3. Further,	  the	  applicant’s	  activities	  did	  not	  satisfy	  the	  terms	  of	  para	  (a)	  in	  any	  event	  
because	  all	  the	  marine	  wildlife	  protected	  by	  the	  applicant	  were	  ‘native	  wildlife’.	  
Accordingly,	  the	  applicant’s	  activities	  were	  expressly	  excluded	  from	  Item	  4.1.6.	  The	  
Commissioner	  submitted	  that	  the	  phrase	  ‘native	  wildlife’	  in	  para	  (a)	  included	  migratory	  
species	  naturally	  found	  in	  Australian	  waters,	  and	  that	  all	  of	  the	  marine	  species	  
protected	  by	  the	  applicant	  fitted	  that	  description.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  embarked	  on	  a	  statutory	  interpretation	  exercise	  in	  response	  to	  these	  
submissions.	  It	  held	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘care’	  and	  ‘without	  
owners’	  was	  flawed	  because	  it	  was	  without	  context.	  The	  words	  had	  to	  be	  construed	  in	  their	  
wider	  context	  as	  composite	  terms.	  On	  this	  issue,	  the	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [48]–[49]):	  
We	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  applicant’s	  contention	  that	  legislature	  has	  employed	  the	  phrase	  
‘without	  owners’	  so	  as	  to	  encompass	  both	  abandoned	  animals	  and	  wild	  animals.	  On	  
the	  applicant’s	  contended	  construction,	  the	  provision	  of	  care	  to	  certain	  stray	  animals	  
(for	  example,	  a	  domesticated	  animal	  born	  stray)	  would	  be	  excluded,	  because	  they	  
were	  neither	  wild	  nor	  abandoned.	  In	  our	  view,	  the	  applicant’s	  contended	  construction	  
does	  not	  accord	  with	  the	  legislative	  intention	  evinced	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  provision.	  The	  
word	  ‘care’	  forms	  part	  of	  a	  composite	  phrase	  with	  the	  preceding	  adjectives	  ‘short-­‐
term’	  and	  ‘direct’	  and	  is	  to	  be	  construed	  accordingly.	  We	  reject	  the	  applicant’s	  
piecemeal	  approach	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  that	  phrase.	  In	  our	  view	  that	  phrase	  
confirms	  that	  para	  (a)	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  animals	  from	  anticipated	  
harm.	  Rather,	  it	  comprehends	  the	  provision	  of	  physical	  assistance,	  such	  as	  food,	  
shelter	  or	  veterinary	  care,	  to	  animals	  with	  unmet	  needs	  arising	  from	  specified	  
circumstances.	  	  
However,	  the	  Tribunal	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  Commissioner’s	  view	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘native	  
wildlife’	  as	  encompassing	  migratory	  species	  in	  Australian	  waters.	  Rather,	  the	  Tribunal	  agreed	  
that	  the	  term	  meant	  indigenous	  species	  within	  Australia.	  Therefore,	  the	  Tribunal	  did	  not	  find	  
that	  the	  applicant’s	  activities	  were	  confined	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  ‘native	  wildlife’	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  Item	  4.1.6.	  Nevertheless,	  its	  actual	  activities	  (protecting	  whales,	  dolphins	  etc)	  did	  
not	  fall	  within	  those	  described	  in	  para	  (a)	  of	  Item	  4.1.6	  of	  the	  ITAA.	  
As	  the	  applicant’s	  activities	  did	  not	  satisfy	  the	  terms	  of	  Item	  4.1.6,	  the	  applicant	  was	  not	  ‘a	  
fund,	  authority	  or	  institution’	  described	  in	  Item	  1	  of	  the	  table	  in	  section	  30-­‐15.	  Accordingly,	  the	  
applicant	  was	  not	  entitled	  to	  be	  endorsed	  as	  a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
section	  30-­‐125	  of	  the	  ITAA.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2012/520.html	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  illustrates	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  charity	  and	  a	  deductible	  gift	  recipient.	  An	  
organisation	  may	  be	  a	  charity,	  but	  still	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  deductible	  gift	  
recipient	  for	  taxation	  purposes.	  The	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  in	  this	  case	  accepted	  that	  Sea	  
Shepherd	  was	  a	  charity	  and	  also	  that	  its	  principal	  activity	  was	  the	  protection	  of	  whales	  and	  
other	  marine	  life	  by	  means	  of	  campaigns	  designed	  to	  prevent	  those	  animals	  being	  harmed	  or	  
killed	  by	  humans.	  The	  case	  arose	  because	  the	  parties	  differed	  in	  their	  construction	  of	  the	  
meaning	  of	  para	  (a)	  of	  Item	  4.1.6	  of	  the	  ITAA	  and	  the	  application	  of	  that	  provision	  to	  the	  facts	  
of	  the	  case.	  The	  type	  of	  ‘care’	  being	  offered	  to	  animals	  by	  Sea	  Shepherd	  was	  found	  not	  to	  be	  
that	  which	  was	  envisaged	  by	  the	  Act,	  which	  was	  more	  that	  of	  a	  short-­‐term	  ‘shelter’	  type	  of	  
care.	  
	  
2.8.10 THE POLLEN ESTATE TRUSTEE COMPANY AND KINGS COLLEGE LONDON V 
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS [2012] 
UKUT 277 (THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER), WARREN J 
AND HETHERINGTON J, 3 AUGUST 2012) 
This	  English	  case	  dealt	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  charities	  were	  exempt	  from	  stamp	  
duty	  land	  tax	  (SDLT)	  in	  the	  UK.	  SDLT	  is	  a	  tax	  on	  land	  transfers,	  which	  replaced	  stamp	  duty	  in	  
the	  UK	  in	  2003.	  
The	  appellants	  appealed	  a	  decision	  by	  the	  Commissioners	  of	  HMRC	  (HMRC)	  which	  denied	  
partial	  relief	  from	  SDLT	  in	  respect	  of	  certain	  property	  acquisitions.	  The	  relief	  had	  been	  claimed	  
on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  beneficial	  interest	  in	  the	  properties	  concerned	  was	  owned	  jointly	  (as	  
tenants	  in	  common)	  by	  persons,	  one	  or	  more	  of	  which	  were	  either	  a	  charity	  or	  a	  Minister	  of	  
the	  Crown	  and	  one	  or	  more	  others	  of	  whom	  did	  not	  fall	  into	  either	  of	  these	  categories,	  and	  
relief	  should	  therefore	  be	  allowed	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  interests	  attributable	  to	  the	  charities	  or	  
Minister	  of	  the	  Crown	  concerned.	  
The	  Pollen	  Estate	  Trustee	  Company	  (PETC)	  is	  the	  current	  trustee	  of	  the	  Pollen	  Estate,	  a	  trust	  
for	  sale	  (its	  shares	  are	  ‘fully	  alienable’	  i.e.	  able	  to	  be	  sold)	  established	  under	  the	  Will	  and	  
Codicils	  of	  the	  Reverend	  George	  Pollen	  who	  died	  on	  27	  March	  1812.	  The	  Pollen	  Estate	  has	  
large	  holdings	  of	  land	  and	  buildings	  in	  the	  West	  End	  of	  London,	  which	  are	  bought	  and	  sold	  as	  
needed.	  
The	  Pollen	  Estate	  has	  about	  100	  beneficiaries,	  some	  of	  whom	  are	  descendants	  of	  George	  
Pollen	  and	  some	  of	  whom	  have	  bought	  their	  interest.	  Two	  of	  the	  current	  beneficiaries	  are	  the	  
Church	  Commissioners	  for	  England	  (the	  Commissioners),	  a	  charity	  which	  holds	  a	  64.109601%	  
share	  of	  the	  Estate,	  and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Defence,	  Greenwich	  Hospital,	  a	  Crown	  
charity	  with	  its	  own	  governing	  Charter	  and	  statutes,	  which	  holds	  a	  10.2257%	  share.	  In	  the	  case	  
of	  the	  Greenwich	  Hospital	  (the	  Hospital),	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Defence	  is	  the	  sole	  trustee	  
and	  holds	  all	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  Hospital	  on	  trust	  for	  the	  Queen,	  and	  for	  the	  exclusive	  benefit	  of	  
the	  Hospital.	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The	  case	  related	  to	  purchases	  of	  land	  and	  buildings.	  The	  Pollen	  Estate	  acquired	  three	  estates	  in	  
fee	  simple	  and	  a	  leasehold,	  and	  Kings	  College	  London	  (KCL)	  purchased	  an	  existing	  leasehold	  
interest	  in	  a	  building.	  In	  both	  cases	  the	  trustees	  were	  bare	  trustees	  (a	  bare	  trustee	  is	  one	  who	  
holds	  property	  for	  beneficiaries	  who	  are	  absolutely	  entitled	  as	  against	  the	  trustee)	  for	  the	  
holdings	  which	  were	  for	  the	  beneficial	  interest	  of	  the	  trusts,	  and	  held	  by	  them	  each	  as	  tenants	  
in	  common.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Pollen	  Estate	  all	  the	  properties	  were	  purchased	  as	  investments,	  and	  were	  
not	  used	  at	  all	  by	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  trust.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  KCL	  property,	  it	  was	  
purchased	  as	  a	  home	  for	  a	  professor	  at	  KCL,	  who	  had	  an	  exclusive	  right	  to	  occupy	  the	  premises	  
and	  legal	  title,	  but	  the	  property	  was	  owned	  by	  the	  KCL	  trust	  as	  a	  tenant	  in	  common.	  
The	  issue	  in	  the	  appeal	  was	  whether	  relief	  from	  SDLT	  was	  available	  to	  a	  charity	  or	  a	  Minister	  of	  
the	  Crown	  where	  the	  purchaser	  acquires	  less	  than	  100%	  interest	  in	  the	  property	  in	  question.	  
The	  relevant	  legislation	  was	  the	  Finance	  Act	  2003,	  particularly	  in	  Schedule	  8.	  The	  Tribunal	  
observed	  that	  Parliament	  clearly	  intended	  that	  charities	  and	  government	  entities	  should	  be	  
exempt	  from	  SDLT	  where	  there	  was	  an	  ‘outright	  purchase’	  of	  land,	  the	  purchase	  of	  an	  ‘existing	  
undivided	  share’	  of	  land,	  the	  grant	  of	  a	  lease,	  or	  an	  existing	  undivided	  share	  in	  a	  lease.	  	  
Paragraph	  1(2)	  of	  Schedule	  8	  provides	  that	  the	  property	  acquired	  should	  be	  held	  for	  qualifying	  
charitable	  purposes	  viz.	  the	  furtherance	  of	  the	  charity’s	  purposes	  or	  for	  an	  investment.	  HMRC	  
contended	  that	  there	  was	  a	  joint	  purchase	  in	  these	  cases	  by	  a	  charity	  and	  a	  non-­‐charity,	  so	  the	  
exemption	  was	  not	  available	  for	  even	  the	  charity’s	  share.	  The	  trusts’	  position	  was	  that	  the	  
charities’	  shares	  could	  be	  divided	  from	  the	  whole	  interest	  in	  the	  property.	  
After	  considering	  answers	  provided	  by	  counsel	  for	  HMRC,	  the	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  there	  were	  no	  
policy	  reasons	  why	  the	  exemptions	  in	  this	  case	  should	  not	  be	  available.	  But	  who	  held	  100%	  of	  
the	  beneficial	  interest	  in	  the	  properties?	  The	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  KCL	  lease,	  
the	  relevant	  land	  transaction	  was	  the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  lease	  where	  two	  persons	  (the	  
professor	  and	  KCL)	  became	  jointly	  entitled	  to	  the	  interest	  acquired,	  that	  interest	  being	  the	  
entirety	  (100%)	  of	  the	  lease.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Pollen	  Estate	  properties,	  the	  relevant	  
land	  transactions	  were	  the	  acquisitions	  of	  each	  of	  those	  properties	  where	  more	  than	  two	  
persons	  (the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  Pollen	  Estate)	  became	  jointly	  entitled	  to	  100%	  of	  the	  
beneficial	  interest.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [43]):	  
Our	  analysis...	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  relevant	  land	  transaction	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  SDLT	  is	  the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  entire	  property	  and	  not	  each	  separate	  
acquisition	  of	  an	  undivided	  share	  by	  each	  tenant	  in	  common.	  It	  follows,	  we	  consider,	  
that	  the	  relevant	  land	  transaction	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  applying	  the	  charity	  relief	  is	  also	  
the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  entire	  property...	  Accordingly,	  references	  in	  paragraph	  1(2)	  to	  
‘the	  subject-­‐matter	  of	  the	  transaction’	  would	  have	  to	  be	  read	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  
charity’s	  undivided	  share	  in	  that	  subject-­‐matter.	  
This	  meant	  that	  the	  position	  of	  HMRC	  was	  vindicated	  in	  this	  appeal.	  Since	  the	  whole	  interests	  
were	  involved	  and	  not	  partial	  interests,	  there	  could	  no	  partial	  relief	  from	  SDLT.	  As	  the	  Tribunal	  
said	  (at	  [76]):	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Since	  the	  purchaser	  of	  the	  [Pollen	  Estate]	  Properties	  was	  not	  solely	  a	  charity	  or	  
charities	  or	  a	  Minister	  of	  the	  Crown,	  and	  the	  purchaser	  of	  the	  [KCL]	  Lease	  was	  not	  
solely	  a	  charity,	  the	  respective	  claims	  for	  relief	  from	  SDLT	  fail.	  Accordingly,	  the	  Appeals	  
of	  PETCL	  and	  KCL	  are	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/financeandtax/Documents/decisions/the_pollen_estate_trustees
_ltd_kings_collge_london_v_hmrc.pdf	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	   argument	   in	   this	   appeal	   showed	   that	   there	   was	   a	   good	   deal	   of	   uncertainty	   about	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   exemption	   provisions	   for	   charity	   in	   the	   Finance	  Act	   2003,	   even	   on	   the	  
part	  of	  HMRC.	  The	  issue	  of	  dealing	  with	  tenants	  in	  common	  came	  under	  consideration	  in	  both	  
the	   original	   Act	   and	   the	   Finance	   Act	   2007	   because	   to	   split	   the	   property	   transaction	   into	  
seemingly	   several	   transactions	   (since	   tenants	   in	   common	   are	   usually	   unconnected	   persons)	  
was	   seen	   to	   be	   a	   way	   of	   avoiding	   the	   tax,	   since	   the	   threshold	   for	   payment	   of	   the	   tax	   is	  
£125,000:	  see	  at	  http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/sdlt/index.htm.	  The	  section	  dealing	  with	  the	  matter	  
in	  both	  Acts,	  section	  75A,	  was	  an	  anti-­‐avoidance	  provision.	  The	  Tribunal	  was	  clear	  in	  this	  case	  
that	   whether	   there	   was	   a	   charity	   involved	   or	   not,	   the	   purchase	   by	   persons	   as	   tenants	   in	  
common	  was	  a	  single	  transaction	  for	  SDLT	  purposes.	  
	  
2.8.11 THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH TRUST CORPORATION OF THE ARCHDIOCESE 
OF HOBART V COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE [2012] TASSC 43 (SUPREME 
COURT OF TASMANIA, BLOW J, 4 JULY 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  in	  a	  dispute	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  transfer	  of	  the	  plant	  and	  equipment	  of	  the	  
Sacred	  Heart	  College	  at	  New	  Town	  in	  Tasmania	  was	  dutiable	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Duties	  Act	  2000	  
(Tas)	  (the	  Act).	  The	  property	  in	  question	  was	  transferred	  by	  an	  incorporated	  association	  
named	  Sacred	  Heart	  College	  Incorporated	  (SHC)	  to	  the	  appellant,	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  
Trust	  Corporation	  of	  the	  Archdiocese	  of	  Hobart,	  by	  a	  deed	  dated	  23	  December	  2010.	  	  
The	  appellant	  contended	  that	  the	  transaction	  amounted	  to	  a	  gift,	  and	  was	  therefore	  not	  
dutiable.	  The	  Commissioner	  contended	  that	  the	  transaction	  was	  not	  a	  gift,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  
dutiable.	  He	  assessed	  duty	  in	  the	  sum	  of	  $132,170,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  property	  transferred	  
was	  worth	  $3,365,446.93.	  
Section	  53(n)(i)	  of	  the	  Act	  provides:	  
Duty	  is	  not	  chargeable	  under	  this	  Chapter	  on	  the	  following:	  	  
(n)	  a	  transfer	  by	  way	  of	  gift	  of	  dutiable	  property	  so	  far	  as	  it	  passes	  or	  creates	  any	  
interest,	  legal	  or	  equitable	  —	  	  
(i)	  in	  furtherance	  of	  any	  charitable	  purpose	  or	  any	  religious	  or	  educational	  purpose	  
that	  is	  not	  charitable	  also	  ....	  
The	  word	  ‘gift’	  is	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  Act.	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The	  school	  in	  question	  was	  opened	  in	  1888.	  From	  1989,	  its	  assets,	  other	  than	  the	  premises,	  
were	  owned	  by	  SHC,	  whose	  members	  were	  individual	  members	  of	  the	  Sacred	  Heart	  religious	  
order.	  In	  2010	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  transfer	  all	  the	  school's	  assets,	  including	  the	  premises,	  to	  the	  
appellant.	  The	  deed	  dated	  23	  December	  2010	  was	  executed	  by	  SHC,	  the	  appellant,	  and	  
another	  entity	  which	  owned	  the	  premises.	  
Clauses	  within	  the	  deed	  forgave	  loans	  owed	  by	  SHC	  to	  the	  Archdiocese,	  and	  allowed	  the	  
Archdiocese	  to	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  the	  employees	  of	  the	  school.	  The	  Commissioner	  
contended	  that,	  because	  of	  the	  forgiveness	  of	  the	  loans,	  and	  because	  the	  appellant	  relieved	  
SHC	  of	  various	  obligations	  that	  it	  would	  otherwise	  have	  had	  to	  its	  former	  employees	  (including	  
long	  service	  leave	  entitlements),	  the	  transfer	  of	  plant	  and	  equipment	  to	  the	  appellant	  was	  not	  
one	  by	  way	  of	  gift.	  This	  was	  despite	  words	  in	  the	  deed	  which	  referred	  to	  a	  gift.	  
The	  Commissioner	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  material	  benefit	  being	  conferred	  on	  SHC	  by	  the	  
transfer	  of	  property.	  This	  included	  relief	  from	  the	  obligations	  to	  employees.	  His	  Honour	  said	  
that	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  assets	  to	  the	  appellant	  amounted	  to	  a	  
gift,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  deed	  and	  consider	  the	  circumstances	  of	  
the	  transaction.	  There	  was	  a	  long	  line	  of	  stamp	  duty	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  has	  been	  held	  that	  
questions	  of	  liability	  to	  duty	  should	  be	  determined	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  ‘real	  nature’	  or	  
‘substance’	  of	  a	  transaction,	  rather	  than	  the	  purported	  description	  of	  a	  document	  or	  the	  form	  
that	  the	  transaction	  took.	  This	  involved	  looking	  at	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘gift	  in	  the	  ordinary	  sense	  of	  
that	  word.	  
His	  Honour	  referred	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  evidence	  of	  the	  surrounding	  circumstances	  of	  the	  transfer	  
and	  said	  (at	  [21]):	  
On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  the	  deed	  provides	  for	  a	  transfer	  of	  the	  plant	  and	  equipment	  by	  SHC	  
to	  the	  appellant,	  the	  release	  of	  SHC's	  loan	  debts	  by	  the	  appellant,	  and	  the	  
indemnification	  of	  SHC	  by	  the	  appellant	  in	  respect	  of	  employee	  entitlements.	  I	  am	  not	  
satisfied	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  probabilities	  that	  the	  release	  of	  the	  loan	  debts	  and	  the	  
indemnities	  relating	  to	  employee	  entitlements	  were	  independent	  of	  the	  arrangement	  
for	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  plant	  and	  equipment.	  I	  am	  not	  satisfied	  that	  that	  transfer	  
amounted	  to	  a	  gift	  for	  which	  SHC	  received	  no	  consideration	  or	  material	  benefit	  by	  way	  
of	  return.	  
Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  upheld	  the	  original	  determination	  of	  the	  Commissioner	  that	  the	  transfer	  
of	  property	  in	  this	  case	  was	  not	  a	  gift.	  As	  it	  was	  not	  a	  gift,	  it	  was	  subject	  to	  duty	  under	  the	  Act.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/tas/TASSC/2012/43.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Although	  His	  Honour	  referred	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  looking	  to	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  transaction	  in	  
these	  sorts	  of	  cases,	  he	  repeatedly	  referred	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  background	  evidence	  available	  to	  
show	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  transaction,	  and	  how	  it	  came	  about.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  he	  had	  to	  
decide	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  probabilities	  what	  should	  be	  the	  outcome.	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2.8.12 COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION V BARGWANNA [2012] HCA 11 (HIGH COURT OF 
AUSTRALIA, FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON, CRENNAN JJ, 29 MARCH 
2012)  
This	  case	  was	  an	  appeal	  from	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  Full	  Court	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court:	  Bargwanna	  v	  
Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  [2010]	  FCAFC	  126.	  The	  case	  concerned	  the	  construction	  of	  Division	  
50	  of	  Part	  2-­‐15	  of	  the	  Income	  tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1997	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act)	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  
exempt	  income	  under	  those	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act.	  
The	  appellants	  in	  this	  case,	  Mr	  and	  Mrs	  Bargwanna,	  are	  the	  trustees	  of	  the	  Kalos	  Metron	  
Charitable	  Trust	  (the	  Trust).	  The	  Trust	  was	  established	  on	  14	  October	  1997,	  with	  Mrs	  
Bargwanna	  as	  settlor.	  A	  dispute	  with	  the	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  (the	  Commissioner)	  began	  
on	  22	  November	  2004	  with	  the	  Bargwannas	  applied	  for	  endorsement	  of	  the	  Trust	  by	  the	  
Commissioner,	  with	  effect	  from	  1	  July	  2000,	  as	  ‘a	  fund	  established	  in	  Australia	  for	  public	  
charitable	  purposes	  by	  ...	  instrument	  of	  trust’.	  	  
Endorsement	  would	  have	  qualified	  the	  Trust	  as	  an	  entity	  exempt	  from	  income	  tax,	  within	  the	  
operation	  of	  Division	  50	  of	  Part	  2-­‐15	  of	  the	  Act,	  but	  the	  exemption	  from	  income	  tax	  would	  only	  
apply	  if	  ‘the	  fund	  is	  applied	  for	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  it	  was	  established’	  (section	  50-­‐60	  of	  the	  
Act).	  Since	  income	  tax	  is	  payable	  in	  respect	  of	  each	  income	  year,	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  
exemption	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  and	  applied	  annually.	  
The	  endorsement	  application	  was	  refused	  by	  the	  Commissioner,	  and	  that	  decision	  was	  notified	  
to	  the	  Trust	  on	  13	  January	  2005.	  An	  objection	  to	  this	  refusal	  was	  disallowed	  by	  the	  
Commissioner	  on	  9	  September	  2005.	  The	  Bargwannas	  applied	  to	  the	  Administrative	  Appeals	  
Tribunal	  (the	  AAT)	  for	  review	  of	  that	  decision;	  in	  that	  hearing	  the	  Commissioner	  contended	  
that	  between	  2002	  and	  2007	  there	  had	  been	  a	  number	  of	  applications	  of	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  
Trust	  (called	  the	  Fund)	  which	  were	  not	  for	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  it	  was	  established.	  However,	  
the	  Bargwannas	  succeeded	  in	  the	  AAT.	  On	  7	  April	  2008,	  the	  AAT	  gave	  detailed	  reasons	  for	  
setting	  aside	  the	  Commissioner’s	  disallowance	  decision	  and	  for	  substituting	  a	  determination	  
that,	  as	  at	  9	  September	  2005,	  the	  Fund	  was	  entitled	  to	  endorsement	  as	  exempt	  from	  income	  
tax	  with	  effect	  from	  1	  July	  2000.	  
An	  appeal	  by	  the	  Commissioner	  to	  the	  Federal	  Court	  succeeded,	  and	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  
Commissioner	  rejecting	  the	  endorsement	  application	  was	  reinstated.	  The	  only	  live	  issue	  before	  
Edmonds	  J	  in	  the	  Federal	  Court	  had	  been	  whether	  the	  AAT	  had	  erred	  in	  concluding	  that	  the	  
Fund	  was	  applied	  for	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  it	  was	  established,	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  section	  
50-­‐60	  of	  the	  Act.	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  AAT	  had	  erred	  in	  the	  test	  it	  applied	  in	  determining	  
the	  issue	  under	  section	  50-­‐60.	  	  
However,	  the	  Full	  Court	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  (the	  Full	  Court)	  allowed	  an	  appeal	  by	  the	  
respondents	  (the	  Bargwannas)	  and	  remitted	  the	  proceedings	  to	  the	  AAT	  for	  determination	  of	  
such	  further	  facts	  as	  it	  deemed	  necessary.	  The	  Commissioner	  appealed	  that	  decision	  to	  the	  
High	  Court,	  and	  the	  Bargwannas	  sought	  special	  leave	  to	  cross-­‐appeal	  against	  the	  remitter	  
order	  and	  to	  achieve	  a	  ruling	  that	  the	  litigation	  was	  at	  an	  end	  by	  dismissal	  of	  the	  appeal	  from	  
the	  AAT.	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In	  Division	  50	  of	  Part	  2-­‐15	  of	  the	  Act,	  a	  distinction	  is	  drawn	  between	  the	  establishment	  by	  will	  
or	  instrument	  of	  trust	  of	  a	  fund	  for	  charitable	  purposes,	  and	  the	  actual	  application	  of	  the	  fund	  
for	  those	  purposes.	  This	  appeal	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  application	  aspect	  of	  a	  fund.	  
The	  effect	  of	  section	  50-­‐1	  of	  the	  Act	  and	  Item	  1.5B	  of	  section	  50-­‐1	  (which	  are	  found	  in	  Sub-­‐
division	  50-­‐A,	  ‘Various	  exempt	  entities’)	  is	  that	  the	  total	  ordinary	  income	  and	  statutory	  income	  
of	  an	  ‘exempt	  entity’,	  being	  a	  ‘fund	  established	  in	  Australia	  for	  public	  charitable	  purposes	  by	  
will	  or	  instrument	  of	  trust’,	  is	  exempt	  from	  income	  tax.	  The	  exemption	  conferred	  by	  these	  
provisions	  is	  subject	  to	  two	  special	  conditions:	  
1. The	  entity	  is	  not	  exempt	  from	  income	  tax	  unless	  it	  is	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Commissioner	  
(section	  50-­‐2).	  	  
2. There	  is	  no	  exemption	  ‘unless	  the	  fund	  is	  applied	  for	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  it	  was	  
established’	  (section	  50-­‐60).	  	  
To	  be	  entitled	  to	  exemption	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  Trust	  had	  to	  be	  within	  Item	  1.5B	  of	  the	  Act,	  and	  
the	  two	  special	  conditions	  had	  to	  be	  satisfied	  (section	  50-­‐110).	  
When	  dealing	  with	  an	  application,	  the	  Commissioner	  may	  request	  the	  applicant	  to	  give	  
specified	  information	  and	  documents	  (section	  50-­‐120(1)).	  The	  Commissioner	  must	  endorse	  an	  
entity	  as	  exempt	  from	  income	  tax	  if	  it	  is	  so	  entitled	  and	  has	  applied	  for	  endorsement	  (section	  
50-­‐105).	  An	  endorsement	  has	  effect	  from	  a	  date	  specified	  by	  the	  Commissioner.	  This	  may	  be	  a	  
date	  preceding	  the	  application	  date	  (section	  50-­‐130),	  as	  happened	  in	  this	  case	  in	  the	  decision	  
of	  the	  AAT.	  
The	  Commissioner	  may	  revoke	  an	  endorsement	  if	  the	  entity	  ‘is	  not	  entitled	  to	  be	  endorsed	  as	  
exempt	  from	  income	  tax’,	  or	  the	  entity	  has	  failed	  to	  provide	  information	  or	  a	  document	  which	  
is	  relevant	  to	  its	  entitlement	  to	  endorsement	  and	  which	  has	  been	  requested	  by	  the	  
Commissioner	  (section	  50-­‐155).	  
The	  conclusions	  reached	  by	  the	  Full	  Court	  respecting	  the	  contravention	  of	  section	  50-­‐60	  
resembled	  those	  of	  the	  AAT.	  Their	  Honours	  considered	  that	  the	  primary	  judge	  in	  the	  Federal	  
Court	  had	  erred	  in	  finding	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  section	  50-­‐60	  without	  treating	  the	  
explanations	  of	  the	  trustees	  as	  relevant	  and	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  Fund	  
as	  a	  whole.	  This	  was	  opposed	  to	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Commissioner	  that	  there	  had	  been	  various	  
individual	  transactions	  which	  could	  be	  impugned	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  
Trust.	  
In	  this	  appeal	  to	  the	  High	  Court,	  their	  Honours	  held	  that	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act	  
directed	  attention	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  instrument	  of	  trust	  by	  which	  a	  fund	  is	  established	  for	  
public	  charitable	  purposes.	  They	  found	  that	  too	  little	  attention	  was	  paid	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  
Deed	  of	  Trust	  in	  this	  case	  in	  submissions	  to	  the	  AAT,	  to	  the	  Federal	  Court	  at	  first	  instance,	  and	  
then	  to	  the	  Full	  Federal	  Court.	  They	  said	  that	  it	  is	  by	  reference	  to	  those	  terms	  and	  to	  the	  
general	  provisions	  of	  the	  law	  of	  trusts	  that	  a	  determination	  will	  be	  made	  about	  whether	  a	  
charitable	  trust	  has	  been	  duly	  administered	  for	  charitable	  purposes.	  In	  this	  context,	  their	  
Honours	  held	  that	  (at	  [44]–[46]):	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The	  terms	  of	  s	  50-­‐60	  of	  the	  Act	  require	  that	  this	  fund	  be	  ‘applied’	  for	  those	  purposes.	  
That	  term	  is	  used	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  so	  administered	  as	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  trusts	  
established	  by	  the	  relevant	  instrument.	  Not	  all	  breaches	  of	  trust	  will	  deny	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  the	  fund	  nevertheless	  has	  been	  applied	  for	  the	  relevant	  ‘public	  
charitable	  purposes’.	  But,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  contrary	  to	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Full	  
Court,	  upon	  which	  the	  respondents	  relied,	  the	  term	  ‘applied’	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  
as	  if	  s	  50-­‐60	  used	  such	  an	  expression	  as	  ‘substantially	  applied’	  or	  ‘on	  the	  whole,	  
applied’.	  The	  taxpayer	  seeks	  to	  gain	  a	  valuable	  benefit	  through	  establishment	  of	  
exempt	  status.	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  as	  Edmonds	  J	  held,	  there	  was	  misapplication	  of	  the	  
funds	  of	  the	  Trust	  by	  admixture	  with	  other	  funds...coupled	  with	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  
respondents	  to	  obtain	  interest	  upon	  those	  moneys,	  together	  with,	  by	  means	  of	  the	  
interest	  off-­‐set	  account,	  the	  reduction	  in	  the	  interest	  payable	  by	  the	  respondents	  in	  
their	  personal	  capacity	  upon	  their	  home	  loan.	  None	  of	  these	  acts	  of	  maladministration	  
were	  referable	  to	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  for	  which	  the	  Deed	  
provided.	  The	  acts	  of	  maladministration	  of	  the	  Trust	  occurred	  over	  the	  period	  between	  
2002	  and	  2007.	  The	  respondents	  sought	  exemption	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  period	  beginning	  
1	  July	  2000.	  It	  was	  an	  error	  for	  the	  AAT	  to	  substitute	  a	  determination	  that	  as	  at	  9	  
September	  2005	  there	  was	  an	  entitlement	  to	  endorsement.	  The	  application	  was	  
correctly	  refused	  by	  the	  Commissioner.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  was	  appropriate	  to	  have	  regard	  
to	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  evidence	  in	  refusing	  to	  grant	  under	  s	  50-­‐130	  any	  endorsement	  
from	  a	  date,	  1	  July	  2000,	  which	  preceded	  the	  application	  date	  of	  22	  November	  2004.	  
Therefore,	  the	  appeal	  was	  allowed	  and	  the	  Commissioner	  was	  successful.	  The	  respondents'	  
application	  for	  special	  leave	  to	  cross-­‐appeal	  was	  dismissed.	  Costs	  were	  borne	  by	  the	  
Commissioner	  by	  agreement.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/11.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
In	  the	  Full	  Federal	  Court	  appeal,	  their	  Honours	  had	  held	  that	  the	  words	  ‘the	  fund	  is	  applied’	  to	  
charitable	  purposes	  were	  to	  be	  considered	  having	  regard	  to	  the	  whole	  administration	  of	  the	  
fund.	  They	  had	  said	  that	  whether	  the	  applications	  or	  misapplications	  in	  each	  individual	  case	  
are	  improper	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  circumstances.	  The	  High	  Court	  comprehensively	  rejected	  this	  
outcome.	  The	  High	  Court	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  ‘applied’	  did	  not	  mean	  substantially	  applied	  or	  
mostly	  applied.	  There	  had	  been	  misapplications	  of	  Trust	  moneys	  in	  this	  case,	  and	  regardless	  of	  
the	  motivations	  behind	  these,	  they	  meant	  that	  the	  fund	  had	  not	  been	  applied	  for	  charitable	  
purposes.	  
	  
2.8.13 ROBINSON V ROCHESTER FINANCIAL LIMITED [2012] ONSC 911 (ONTARIO 
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, STRATHY J, 7 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  Canadian	  case	  concerned	  a	  tax	  shelter	  called	  the	  Banyan	  Tree	  Foundation	  Gift	  Program	  
(the	  program),	  which	  operated	  during	  2003	  to	  2007.	  It	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘leveraged’	  
charitable	  donation	  program	  because,	  in	  return	  for	  a	  proportionately	  small	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	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payment,	  a	  taxpayer	  was	  purportedly	  entitled	  to	  ‘ratchet-­‐up’	  his	  or	  her	  donation	  and	  to	  
receive	  a	  charitable	  tax	  credit	  equivalent	  to	  3.5	  times	  the	  amount	  of	  his	  or	  her	  cash	  outlay.	  
The	  program	  was	  promoted	  by	  the	  Banyan	  Tree	  Foundation	  through	  a	  network	  of	  salespeople	  
who	  were	  paid	  substantial	  commissions.	  The	  ‘leverage’	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  provided	  by	  a	  
‘loan’	  to	  the	  participant,	  made	  by	  one	  of	  the	  defendants,	  Rochester	  Financial	  Limited,	  secured	  
by	  a	  promissory	  note.	  Part	  of	  the	  participant’s	  cash	  payment	  was	  described	  as	  a	  ‘security	  
deposit’,	  which	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  invested	  so	  that	  it	  would	  pay	  off	  the	  loan	  before	  the	  
taxpayer	  was	  ever	  called	  upon	  to	  pay	  it.	  The	  effect	  of	  this	  was	  to	  allow	  the	  taxpayer	  to	  profit	  
from	  his	  or	  her	  donation	  –	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  taxpayer	  in	  the	  highest	  bracket,	  a	  payment	  of	  
$2,700	  would	  secure	  a	  tax	  credit	  of	  $4,600,	  resulting	  in	  a	  profit	  of	  about	  $1,900.	  	  
The	  Canada	  Revenue	  Agency	  (CRA)	  disallowed	  the	  charitable	  donation	  tax	  credits	  claimed	  by	  
participants	  in	  the	  program.	  The	  CRA	  took	  the	  position	  that	  the	  ‘donation’	  made	  by	  the	  
taxpayer	  was	  not	  a	  gift	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Act,	  because	  the	  loan	  was	  not	  bona	  
fide	  and	  there	  were	  only	  book-­‐keeping	  entries	  to	  give	  an	  aura	  of	  respectability	  to	  the	  
transaction.	  The	  CRA	  said	  that	  the	  participants	  were	  never	  at	  risk	  of	  needing	  to	  repay	  their	  
loans	  and	  that	  the	  program	  was	  a	  sham,	  designed	  to	  have	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  legitimate	  
charitable	  donation.	  The	  real	  purpose	  was	  to	  enrich	  the	  taxpayer,	  rather	  than	  to	  benefit	  a	  
charity.	  Having	  disallowed	  the	  charitable	  donation	  tax	  credits,	  the	  CRA	  required	  the	  
participants	  to	  repay	  the	  taxes	  they	  had	  deducted,	  with	  interest.	  
In	  addition	  to	  this	  taxation	  consequence,	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  program	  also	  lost	  their	  
security	  deposits,	  apparently	  due	  to	  defalcation	  by	  the	  investment	  manager	  of	  the	  program.	  A	  
class	  action	  ensued.	  In	  Canadian	  law,	  the	  ‘last	  person	  standing’	  becomes	  liable	  in	  a	  class	  action,	  
and	  in	  this	  case	  that	  person	  was	  the	  law	  firm	  which	  had	  provided	  legal	  opinions	  that	  the	  
program	  complied	  with	  the	  applicable	  tax	  legislation	  and	  that	  the	  tax	  receipts	  issued	  by	  the	  
Banyan	  Tree	  Foundation	  would	  be	  recognized	  by	  CRA.	  None	  of	  the	  other	  parties	  directly	  
responsible	  was	  able	  to	  be	  pursued.	  	  
A	  settlement	  was	  agreed	  for	  the	  sum	  of	  $11	  million,	  of	  which	  $7.75	  million	  was	  set	  aside	  to	  
reimburse	  participants	  (the	  remainder	  was	  for	  costs	  and	  disbursements	  of	  the	  class	  legal	  
team).	  As	  there	  were	  2,825	  participants	  in	  the	  program,	  and	  there	  were	  some	  who	  did	  not	  opt	  
in	  to	  the	  class	  action,	  the	  return	  to	  each	  participant	  was	  about	  $3,000.	  Most	  of	  the	  participants	  
did	  not	  express	  interest	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  settlement,	  but	  were	  rather	  concerned	  that	  the	  
loans	  should	  not	  be	  enforceable.	  His	  Honour	  confirmed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  settlement	  that	  the	  
loans	  and	  promissory	  notes	  within	  the	  scheme	  were	  unenforceable.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc911/2012onsc911.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  a	  class	  action	  settlement,	  and	  all	  members	  of	  the	  class	  received	  a	  payment,	  even	  if	  
was	  nowhere	  near	  the	  amount	  that	  they	  had	  lost	  in	  the	  program.	  His	  Honour	  noted	  that	  over	  
80%	  of	  participants	  were	  apathetic	  about	  the	  outcome,	  perhaps	  not	  wishing	  to	  be	  associated	  
with	  participation	  in	  a	  sham	  scheme	  which	  misrepresented	  their	  ‘donations’	  as	  charitable.	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However,	  a	  class	  action	  requires	  some	  plaintiffs	  to	  be	  the	  representative	  parties	  (their	  names	  
appear	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  case).	  The	  representative	  parties	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  Robinsons,	  were	  
denied	  any	  special	  payment	  as	  compensation,	  even	  though	  they	  had	  to	  reveal	  a	  lot	  of	  personal	  
financial	  information	  and	  put	  in	  substantial	  hours	  to	  help	  class	  counsel	  run	  the	  case.	  His	  
Honour	  felt	  that	  such	  a	  payment,	  though	  sometimes	  available	  in	  class	  actions,	  was	  not	  
appropriate	  in	  this	  case	  (at	  [43]–[44]).	  
	  
2.8.14 CANNON V FUNDS FOR CANADA FOUNDATION [2012] ONSC 399 (ONTARIO 
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, STRATHY J, 18 JANUARY 2012) 
This	  Canadian	  case	  dealt	  with	  a	  gift	  program	  for	  charity	  (the	  gift	  program),	  Donations	  for	  
Canada,	  which	  was	  allegedly	  a	  scam.	  The	  present	  hearing	  was	  an	  application	  for	  certification	  of	  
the	  class	  action	  by	  plaintiffs,	  and	  an	  application	  by	  two	  defendants	  for	  summary	  judgment.	  
Grounds	  for	  certification	  were	  found	  to	  be	  established	  and	  summary	  judgment	  was	  dismissed	  
so	  the	  case	  continues.	  	  
The	  selling	  point	  of	  the	  gift	  program	  was	  that	  a	  tax	  deduction	  of	  $10,000	  could	  be	  obtained	  for	  
a	  ‘donation’	  of	  $2,500	  to	  charity.	  Around	  $144	  million	  had	  been	  invested	  in	  the	  gift	  program	  in	  
total.	  
The	  Canada	  Revenue	  Agency	  (CRA)	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  gift	  program	  was	  nothing	  more	  than	  
a	  fraudulent	  scheme,	  in	  which	  the	  funds	  of	  ‘donors’	  flowed	  ultimately	  into	  the	  pockets	  of	  the	  
promoters	  of	  the	  scheme.	  The	  CRA	  said	  that	  donors	  involved	  in	  the	  gift	  program	  lacked	  
‘donative	  intent’	  because	  there	  was	  no	  element	  of	  impoverishment	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  charitable	  
donation.	  Rather,	  the	  donor	  expected	  to	  be	  enriched	  by	  receiving	  a	  tax	  credit	  well	  in	  excess	  of	  
his	  or	  her	  donation.	  Thus,	  the	  ‘donation’	  could	  not	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  gift,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  
allowable	  tax	  deduction	  for	  tax	  purposes.	  The	  full	  amount	  deducted	  had	  to	  be	  repaid	  to	  the	  
CRA	  with	  interest.	  
Charities	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  gift	  program.	  In	  return	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  gift	  program,	  the	  
charities	  involved	  received	  1%	  of	  the	  total	  money	  donated	  and	  the	  promoters’	  promise	  of	  a	  
20-­‐year	  income	  stream	  from	  an	  investment	  that	  the	  promoters	  would	  make,	  using	  a	  fraction	  of	  
the	  gift	  program	  donations.	  The	  Funds	  for	  Canada	  Foundation	  (FFC	  Foundation)	  was	  
established	  in	  the	  second	  year	  of	  operation	  of	  the	  gift	  program	  as	  an	  umbrella	  organisation	  to	  
receive	  donations	  and	  to	  disburse	  them	  to	  qualified	  charities.	  	  
Cannon	  was	  the	  representative	  in	  a	  class	  action	  (the	  class	  comprised	  9,926	  persons)	  against	  
the	  gift	  program.	  His	  Honour	  certified	  the	  action	  as	  a	  class	  action	  at	  this	  hearing,	  and	  dismissed	  
certain	  applications	  for	  summary	  judgement.	  
His	  Honour	  traced	  the	  history	  of	  the	  gift	  program,	  saying	  in	  this	  respect	  (at	  [15]–[16]):	  
The	  Gift	  Program	  was	  the	  brainchild	  of	  Edward	  Furtak	  (‘Furtak’),	  a	  developer	  of	  
software	  and	  a	  sometime	  promoter	  of	  tax	  avoidance	  schemes,	  who	  is	  the	  President	  
and	  CEO	  of	  the	  Trafalgar	  Group	  of	  Companies.	  Furtak	  had	  developed	  a	  computer	  
program	  called	  the	  Trafalgar	  Global	  Index	  Futures	  Program	  (the	  ‘Software	  Program’	  or	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‘Global	  Index	  Futures	  Program’),	  which	  purportedly	  had	  a	  methodology	  for	  making	  
money	  from	  the	  trading	  of	  S	  &	  P	  futures	  contracts	  by	  predicting	  short-­‐term	  
movements	  in	  the	  financial	  markets.	  Furtak	  established	  a	  trust	  in	  Bermuda,	  called	  the	  
‘Bermuda	  Longtail	  Trust’	  (the	  ‘Bermuda	  Trust’),	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  himself	  and	  his	  
family	  and	  he	  granted	  the	  Bermuda	  Trust	  the	  right	  to	  license	  the	  Software	  Program	  to	  
third	  parties.	  The	  Software	  Program	  was	  in	  turn	  licensed	  by	  the	  Bermuda	  Trust	  to	  a	  
Bermuda	  company	  owned	  by	  Furtak	  called	  Trafalgar	  Trading	  Limited	  (‘TTL’).	  Most	  of	  
the	  cash	  donated	  to	  charities	  by	  participants	  in	  the	  Gift	  Program	  found	  its	  way	  into	  the	  
pockets	  of	  Furtak’s	  companies	  and	  the	  Bermuda	  Trust.	  The	  donations	  made	  by	  
participants	  were	  super-­‐sized	  by	  the	  very	  temporary	  injection	  of	  funds	  from	  the	  
Bermuda	  Trust,	  which	  flowed	  briefly	  into	  the	  charities.	  	  
Most	  of	  these	  funds	  were	  immediately	  returned	  to	  the	  Bermuda	  Trust,	  by	  way	  of	  the	  
licensing	  agreement	  between	  the	  charities	  and	  TTL	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Software	  
Program.	  The	  super-­‐sizing	  made	  the	  taxpayer’s	  donation	  appear	  to	  be	  much	  larger	  
than	  it	  was	  in	  fact,	  thus	  justifying	  the	  enhanced	  charitable	  tax	  credit	  each	  taxpayer	  was	  
to	  receive.	  
His	  Honour	  identified	  that	  there	  were	  six	  requirements	  for	  the	  gift	  program	  to	  work	  as	  a	  
scheme:	  
1. Taxpayers	  willing	  to	  invest	  a	  minimum	  of	  $10,000	  as	  ‘donations’	  in	  the	  scheme	  (there	  
were	  several	  very	  large	  participants,	  with	  the	  largest	  sum	  invested	  being	  $4	  million);	  
2. Charities	  willing	  to	  give	  back	  99%	  of	  the	  moneys	  they	  received	  from	  the	  gift	  program,	  
in	  return	  for	  a	  flow	  of	  income	  from	  the	  use	  of	  the	  software	  program;	  
3. A	  network	  of	  companies	  and	  trusts	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  circulatory	  flow	  of	  money;	  
4. Legal	  opinion	  that	  backed	  the	  gift	  program	  as	  legitimate;	  
5. A	  sales	  force	  to	  ‘sell’	  the	  gift	  program	  (these	  were	  referred	  to	  as	  distributors);	  
6. A	  supply	  of	  short-­‐term	  cash	  to	  artificially	  inflate	  the	  donations	  so	  that	  they	  appeared	  
to	  be	  legitimate	  (this	  was	  supplied	  by	  the	  various	  Bermuda	  companies	  and	  trusts).	  
The	  gift	  program	  scheme	  worked	  as	  follows	  (for	  an	  alleged	  $10,000	  ‘donation’):	  
1. The	  taxpayer	  donated	  $2,500	  to	  a	  legitimate	  charity	  by	  cheque	  or	  pledge.	  	  
2. At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  donor	  applied	  to	  become	  a	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  Donations	  Canada	  
Financial	  Trust	  (the	  Trust).	  The	  Trust	  was	  established	  as	  a	  private	  charitable	  trust.	  	  
3. The	  Trust	  then	  made	  an	  investment	  in	  a	  sub-­‐trust,	  and	  received	  two	  units	  in	  the	  sub-­‐
trust.	  Parklane	  Financial	  Group	  Limited	  (Parklane)	  was	  appointed	  by	  each	  donor	  to	  
hold	  the	  sub-­‐trust	  units	  and	  to	  donate	  them	  to	  the	  charities	  on	  the	  donors’	  behalf.	  	  
4. The	  donor	  was	  issued	  ‘a	  confirmation	  of	  issuance	  of	  the	  discretionary	  interest’	  in	  two	  
sub-­‐trust	  units,	  having	  an	  ostensible	  value	  of	  $7,500,	  in	  return	  for	  his	  or	  her	  cheque	  or	  
pledge.	  The	  donor	  then	  donated	  the	  two	  sub-­‐trust	  units	  to	  the	  charity	  he	  or	  she	  had	  
chosen.	  	  
5. The	  charity	  then	  held	  two	  things	  from	  the	  donor:	  $2,500	  in	  cash	  and	  a	  piece	  of	  paper	  
representing	  two	  sub-­‐trust	  units,	  purported	  to	  be	  worth	  $7,500.	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6. The	  charity	  was	  now	  required	  to	  redeem	  the	  two	  sub-­‐trust	  units,	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  
extra	  $7,500	  in	  cash.	  To	  provide	  the	  funds	  to	  make	  the	  redemption,	  the	  Bermuda	  Trust	  
indirectly	  acquired	  the	  sub-­‐trust	  units,	  through	  Donations	  Canada	  Trust,	  for	  $7,500.	  
The	  charity	  was	  now	  apparently	  holding	  a	  total	  of	  $10,000	  ($2,500	  +	  $7,500)	  in	  cash.	  
7. 	  In	  return	  for	  his	  or	  her	  total	  donations,	  the	  donor	  would	  receive	  two	  charitable	  
donation	  receipts,	  a	  cash	  receipt	  for	  $2,500	  and	  a	  donation-­‐in-­‐kind	  receipt	  for	  $7,500,	  
the	  stated	  value	  of	  the	  sub-­‐trust	  units.	  The	  donor	  would	  submit	  the	  charitable	  receipts	  
along	  with	  his	  or	  her	  tax	  return.	  
8. The	  charity	  remained	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  $10,000	  in	  cash	  for	  a	  very	  short	  time.	  From	  a	  
$10,000	  ‘donation’	  only	  $100	  would	  actually	  be	  received	  by	  the	  charity.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  
money	  went	  to	  the	  promoters	  of	  the	  gift	  program.	  Even	  worse,	  where	  the	  FFC	  
Foundation	  received	  the	  ‘donations’	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  charities	  involved,	  the	  FFC	  
Foundation	  retained	  a	  further	  25%	  of	  the	  1%	  to	  be	  received	  by	  the	  charity.	  
9. The	  99%	  of	  ‘donations’	  which	  flowed	  back	  to	  the	  promoters	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  
invested	  for	  the	  charities	  using	  the	  software	  program	  developed	  by	  the	  promoters.	  A	  
leveraged	  cash	  and	  margin	  trading	  facility	  was	  established	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  charity,	  
using	  the	  charity’s	  cash.	  The	  charity	  was	  to	  receive	  a	  future	  income	  stream	  from	  use	  of	  
the	  software	  program,	  which	  by	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  a	  margin	  trading	  facility,	  was	  
speculative	  at	  best.	  This	  was	  based	  on	  60%	  of	  the	  monthly	  profits	  generated	  by	  its	  
investment	  for	  a	  period	  of	  twenty	  years.	  The	  promoters	  were	  to	  receive	  20%	  of	  the	  
monthly	  profits,	  with	  the	  remaining	  20%	  to	  be	  re-­‐invested	  in	  the	  trading	  facility.	  The	  
charity	  was	  never	  to	  receive	  a	  return	  of	  its	  principal.	  
His	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  was	  a	  sufficient	  common	  class	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  class	  action.	  
This	  was	  the	  class	  of	  persons	  who	  were	  participants	  (as	  Canadian	  residents)	  in	  the	  gift	  program	  
between	  2005	  and	  2009.	  His	  Honour	  certified	  the	  class	  action	  with	  causes	  of	  action	  against	  
some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  defendants	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  negligence,	  negligent	  misrepresentation,	  fraud	  
and	  fraudulent	  misrepresentation,	  conspiracy,	  various	  breaches	  of	  the	  Consumer	  Protection	  
Act	  2002	  (Canada),	  breach	  of	  contract,	  and	  unjust	  enrichment	  and	  constructive	  trust.	  Some	  of	  
the	  matters	  were	  inadequately	  pleaded,	  but	  His	  Honour	  took	  the	  view	  that	  this	  was	  a	  matter	  
for	  the	  trial	  judge.	  His	  Honour	  dismissed	  applications	  for	  summary	  dismissal	  of	  the	  action	  by	  
two	  defendants.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc399/2012onsc399.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  decided	  or	  settled.	  On	  its	  face,	  the	  gift	  program	  seemed	  to	  present	  many	  
problems.	  As	  His	  Honour	  pointed	  out	  (at	  [40]):	  
First,	  there	  is	  no	  conclusive	  evidence	  that	  the	  sub-­‐trust	  units	  donated	  by	  the	  donor	  
had	  any	  significant	  intrinsic	  value	  and	  certainly	  no	  evidence	  that	  they	  had	  the	  value	  of	  
$7,500	  that	  was	  assigned	  to	  them.	  Second,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  right	  to	  the	  
future	  income	  stream	  represented	  by	  the	  royalty	  agreement	  was	  commensurate	  with	  
the	  consideration	  paid	  by	  the	  charity.	  Third,	  while	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  a	  few	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charities	  have	  obtained	  some	  returns	  for	  their	  ‘investments’,	  the	  evidence	  does	  not	  
show	  whether	  the	  ‘software	  licensing	  fee’	  paid	  by	  the	  charity	  to	  [the	  promoters]	  
represented	  the	  fair	  market	  value	  of	  the	  future	  investment	  stream.	  This	  is	  particularly	  
troubling	  considering	  that	  the	  charity	  did	  not	  retain	  its	  capital.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  
the	  returns	  generated	  by	  [the	  promoters]	  for	  the	  charities	  have	  been	  meager.	  
However,	  as	  His	  Honour	  remarked,	  these	  are	  issues	  to	  be	  decided	  at	  trial.	  
On	  the	  same	  issue,	  the	  Charities	  Commission	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  has	  published	  a	  new	  
strategy	  in	  2012	  for	  charities	  to	  deal	  with	  fraud,	  financial	  crime	  and	  financial	  abuse.	  The	  
National	  Fraud	  Authority	  in	  the	  UK	  has	  found	  that	  charities	  estimate	  they	  lose	  1.7%	  of	  their	  
annual	  income	  to	  fraud,	  equal	  to	  £1.1	  billion	  of	  the	  sector's	  income	  for	  2010–11.	  The	  most	  
common	  types	  of	  fraud	  were	  cited	  as	  payment	  fraud,	  fraud	  by	  employees	  or	  volunteers	  and	  
cyber	  fraud:	  http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/RSS/News/pr_NFA_response.aspx.	  
	  
2.9 TRUSTS AND WILLS 
2.9.1  METROPOLITAN PETAR V MITRESKI [2012] NSWSC 1610 (SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW SOUTH WALES, BRERETON J, 21 DECEMBER 2012) 
This	  case	  once	  again	  revisited	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  parish	  of	  St	  Petka	  in	  
Sydney.	  The	  litigation	  arose	  from	  a	  dispute	  about	  who	  controlled	  the	  property	  and	  affairs	  of	  
the	  parish	  –	  was	  it	  the	  church	  hierarchy,	  represented	  by	  the	  bishop,	  Metropolitan	  Petar	  (the	  
plaintiffs	  in	  this	  case);	  or	  was	  it	  the	  local	  church	  itself,	  constituted	  as	  an	  incorporated	  
association?	  The	  earlier	  decisions	  had	  decided	  almost	  all	  the	  matters	  in	  contention	  in	  favour	  of	  
the	  plaintiffs.	  Thus	  it	  had	  been	  held	  that:	  
1. All	  the	  parish	  property	  was	  trust	  property	  (a	  charitable	  trust	  for	  religious	  purposes);	  
2. There	  were	  substantial	  breaches	  of	  this	  trust	  by	  the	  parish	  association;	  
3. Defences	  were	  not	  available	  (except	  where	  the	  action	  was	  statute-­‐barred);	  
4. Personal	  liability	  to	  account	  to	  the	  trust	  was	  established	  for	  the	  committee	  members.	  
This	  decision	  dealt	  with	  matters	  remaining	  from	  earlier	  judgements	  on	  the	  principal	  issues	  
during	  2012:	  see	  Metropolitan	  Petar	  v	  Mitreski	  [2012]	  NSWSC	  16	  (the	  principal	  judgement;	  see	  
casenote)	  and	  Metropolitan	  Petar	  v	  Mitreski	  [2012]	  NSWSC	  167	  (the	  costs	  judgement).	  The	  
remaining	  matters	  were	  the	  accessorial	  liability	  of	  the	  defendants	  who	  were	  committee	  
members	  of	  the	  association,	  and	  costs.	  
In	  the	  principal	  judgement,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  all	  the	  committee	  members	  were	  liable	  as	  
accessories.	  His	  Honour	  held	  (following	  on	  from	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  decision	  in	  
Farah	  Constructions	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Say-­‐Dee	  Pty	  Ltd	  [2007]	  HCA	  22	  at	  [161]–[165])	  that	  third	  parties	  
to	  a	  trust	  can	  still	  be	  liable	  for	  breach	  of	  trust	  if	  they	  knowingly	  induce	  or	  procure	  a	  breach	  of	  
trust.	  This	  form	  of	  liability	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  receipt	  of	  trust	  funds.	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  
[166]):	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For	  substantially	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  found	  my	  conclusion	  that,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
s	  85,	  the	  Association	  did	  not	  act	  honestly	  and	  reasonably,	  I	  am	  compelled	  to	  conclude	  
that	  the	  Committee	  Members	  were	  conscious	  of	  those	  elements	  of	  the	  engagement	  of	  
the	  two	  priests	  that	  made	  their	  participation	  transgress	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  honest	  
behaviour.	  They	  knew,	  or	  at	  the	  least	  ought	  to	  have	  known,	  that	  what	  they	  were	  doing	  
involved	  repudiation	  of	  a	  recently	  sworn	  undertaking	  to	  uphold	  church	  law,	  and	  yet	  
would	  achieve	  no	  religious	  purpose	  in	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  Church	  for	  want	  of	  the	  Bishop's	  
approval.	  While	  I	  accept	  that	  considerable	  doubt	  attended	  whether	  the	  Association	  
would	  be	  held	  to	  be	  a	  trustee,	  about	  which	  minds	  could	  reasonably	  differ,	  until	  
Hamilton	  J's	  judgment,	  and	  that	  the	  Committee	  Members	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  
niceties	  of	  church	  law,	  I	  cannot	  accept	  that	  it	  accorded	  with	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  
honest	  behaviour	  for	  them	  to	  repudiate	  their	  recent	  oath	  of	  office.	  
Therefore,	  each	  of	  the	  committee	  members	  was	  found	  to	  be	  liable	  as	  an	  accessory	  of	  the	  
parish	  association	  to	  account	  to	  the	  trust	  for	  the	  moneys	  paid	  as	  remuneration	  to	  two	  priests	  
who	  had	  been	  appointed	  without	  the	  Bishop’s	  consent,	  Father	  Dzeparovski	  (except	  for	  the	  
portions	  statute-­‐barred)	  and	  Father	  Despotovski,	  while	  those	  committee	  members	  remained	  
in	  office.	  
His	  Honour	  had	  since	  had	  second	  thoughts	  and	  dealt	  with	  them	  in	  this	  case	  (at	  [4]):	  
However,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  orders	  judgment,	  it	  had	  occurred	  to	  me	  that	  my	  reliance	  
on	  Mr	  Eftimov's	  [one	  of	  the	  committee	  members	  in	  question]	  evidence	  for	  the	  
purpose	  for	  which	  I	  had	  used	  it	  might	  have	  been	  misplaced,	  as	  that	  evidence	  related	  to	  
an	  earlier	  election	  than	  that	  of	  14	  April	  1997	  (when	  the	  first	  to	  fifth	  defendants	  were	  
elected	  to	  the	  Committee),	  which	  triggered	  the	  events	  that	  led	  to	  the	  dispute	  the	  
subject	  of	  these	  proceedings.	  Accordingly,	  I	  did	  not	  make	  any	  order	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  
the	  conclusion	  expressed	  in	  the	  principal	  judgment	  in	  respect	  of	  accessorial	  liability,	  
but	  observed	  (at	  [26])	  in	  the	  orders	  judgment	  that	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  make	  
directions	  for	  written	  submissions,	  inter	  alia,	  ‘on	  further	  consideration	  of	  the	  
accessorial	  liability	  of	  the	  Committee	  Members’.	  
Further	  submissions	  were	  put	  forward	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  committee	  members,	  and	  considered	  
by	  his	  Honour	  in	  this	  judgement.	  To	  establish	  accessorial	  liability	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  that	  the	  
alleged	  accessory	  knows	  that	  the	  principal	  is	  contravening	  a	  relevant	  law.	  It	  is	  sufficient	  that	  
the	  alleged	  accessory	  knows	  the	  essential	  elements	  of	  the	  principal's	  conduct	  which	  constitute	  
the	  relevant	  contravention.	  Therefore,	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  was	  not	  necessary	  that	  to	  be	  liable	  as	  an	  
accessory,	  the	  defendants	  must	  have	  known	  that	  in	  engaging	  and	  remunerating	  Father	  
Dzeparovski	  and	  Father	  Despotovski	  the	  association	  was	  committing	  a	  breach	  of	  trust.	  It	  was	  
sufficient	  that	  they	  knew	  those	  elements	  of	  the	  transaction	  that	  made	  it	  transgress	  ordinary	  
standards	  of	  honest	  behaviour.	  
After	  proper	  consideration,	  His	  Honour	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  further	  and	  more	  detailed	  
submissions	  made,	  saying	  at	  [22]):	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Reduced	  to	  the	  core	  elements,	  the	  Committee	  Members	  (other	  than	  Mr	  Minovski)	  
assumed	  office	  in	  the	  Association	  knowing	  that	  the	  Association	  was	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  
the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Church,	  and	  that	  its	  substratum	  included	  the	  law	  and	  
doctrine	  of	  the	  church.	  They	  knew	  that	  according	  to	  the	  law	  and	  doctrine	  of	  the	  
church,	  a	  parish	  priest	  could	  not	  be	  removed	  or	  replaced	  except	  by	  the	  Bishop,	  and	  
that	  a	  priest	  not	  appointed	  by	  the	  Bishop	  achieved	  nothing.	  They	  knew	  that	  the	  Bishop	  
did	  not	  approve	  or	  authorise	  the	  removal	  of	  Father	  Mitrev	  or	  the	  appointment	  of	  
Father	  Dzeparovski	  or	  Father	  Despotoski.	  In	  that	  context,	  belief	  that	  their	  own	  
Constitution	  authorised	  them	  to	  act	  as	  they	  did	  is	  insufficient	  to	  dispel	  the	  conclusion	  
that,	  in	  procuring	  the	  Association	  to	  appoint	  and	  remunerate	  a	  priest	  not	  approved	  by	  
the	  Bishop,	  to	  perform	  acts	  that	  were	  in	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  Church	  a	  religious	  nullity,	  they	  
were	  transgressing	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  honest	  behaviour.	  
Therefore,	  the	  accessorial	  liability	  of	  the	  committee	  members	  was	  established.	  His	  Honour	  
ordered	  that	  each	  of	  the	  defendant	  committee	  members	  (other	  than	  the	  third	  defendant,	  who	  
was	  not	  liable)	  was	  liable	  as	  an	  accessory	  to	  account	  to	  the	  trust	  for	  the	  emoluments	  paid	  to	  
Father	  Dzeparovski	  and	  Father	  Despotoski	  while	  that	  committee	  member	  remained	  in	  office,	  
except	  payments	  made	  prior	  to	  November	  1997	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  the	  claim	  is	  statute	  barred.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  costs,	  after	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  issues,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  
association	  should	  pay	  75%	  of	  the	  plaintiffs'	  costs	  of	  the	  proceedings	  not	  otherwise	  the	  subject	  
of	  a	  specific	  costs	  order,	  including	  reserved	  costs.	  The	  first,	  second,	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  defendants	  
(who	  were	  committee	  members)	  should	  be	  jointly	  and	  severally	  liable	  with	  the	  association	  for	  
one-­‐third	  of	  the	  costs	  for	  which	  the	  association	  is	  liable	  –	  that	  is	  to	  say	  25%	  of	  the	  plaintiffs'	  
costs	  of	  the	  proceedings	  not	  otherwise	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  specific	  costs	  order,	  including	  reserved	  
costs.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/PJUDG?jgmtid=162619	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  judgement	  continues	  the	  unfortunate	  saga	  of	  the	  Church	  of	  St	  Petka	  and	  its	  internal	  
affairs.	  Although	  this	  case	  disposes	  of	  the	  matters	  in	  question	  for	  2012,	  and	  it	  would	  also	  
appear	  for	  good,	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  further	  appeal	  in	  2013.	  
	  
2.9.2  CATHOLIC CHARITIES CLOTHES BANK LETHBRIDGE V ROMAN CATHOLIC 
DIOCESE OF CALGARY, 2012 ABCA 390 (COURT OF APPEAL OF ALBERTA, 
PAPERNY, SLATTER, BROOKER JJA, 20 DECEMBER 2012) 
In	  this	  case,	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Bishop	  of	  the	  Diocese	  of	  Calgary	  (the	  Diocese)	  appealed	  an	  
order	  granted	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Charities	  Clothes	  Bank	  of	  Lethbridge	  (the	  Clothes	  Bank)	  
which	  declared	  that	  the	  Diocese	  held	  certain	  properties	  in	  trust	  for	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  and	  
ordered	  the	  Diocese	  to	  convey	  title	  to	  the	  properties,	  to	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  within	  30	  days	  of	  the	  
filing	  of	  that	  order.	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  202	  
	  
The	  two	  properties	  were	  purchased	  by	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  with	  its	  own	  funds	  and	  a	  mortgage,	  
but	  title	  was	  registered	  is	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Diocese.	  When	  the	  Diocese	  refused	  the	  Clothes	  
Bank’s	  request	  to	  approve	  the	  sale	  or	  refinancing	  of	  these	  properties,	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  
brought	  an	  application	  for	  a	  declaration	  of	  ownership	  and	  transfer	  of	  titles	  to	  it.	  	  
The	  Clothes	  Bank	  was	  successful	  at	  first	  instance,	  with	  the	  trial	  judge	  finding	  that	  there	  was	  a	  
resulting	  trust	  created	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Clothes	  Bank.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  Diocese	  held	  the	  
properties	  on	  trust	  for	  the	  Clothes	  Bank,	  and	  had	  to	  transfer	  the	  titles	  to	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  on	  
request.	  
The	  Diocese	  argued	  that	  there	  were	  several	  legal	  and	  factual	  errors	  made	  by	  the	  trial	  judge.	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  agreed,	  and	  allowed	  the	  appeal.	  The	  errors	  of	  fact	  involved	  the	  financing	  
of	  the	  properties,	  and	  an	  issue	  of	  whether	  the	  properties	  were	  ever	  intended	  to	  be	  owned	  by	  
the	  Diocese.	  The	  Appeal	  Court	  held	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  financing	  of	  the	  properties	  by	  the	  
Diocese	  (and	  therefore	  they	  were	  not	  held	  merely	  as	  security	  for	  loans)	  and	  that	  there	  was	  
clear	  evidence	  of	  intention	  that	  the	  Diocese	  should	  own	  the	  properties	  from	  the	  outset.	  These	  
were	  ‘palpable	  and	  overriding	  errors	  of	  fact’	  and	  reversible	  on	  appeal.	  
As	  to	  errors	  of	  law,	  the	  trial	  judge	  had	  referred	  to	  Canon	  Law.	  The	  Appeal	  Court	  held	  that	  
Canon	  law	  had	  no	  bearing	  on	  a	  case	  involving	  ownership	  of	  real	  property.	  Both	  the	  Diocese	  (a	  
corporation	  sole	  incorporated	  by	  private	  statute)	  and	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  (an	  incorporated	  
society)	  were	  incorporated	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  Alberta.	  The	  issue	  of	  ownership	  of	  real	  property	  
had	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  applicable	  Alberta	  law	  on	  corporations,	  real	  property	  and	  
resulting	  trusts	  only.	  
The	  central	  issue	  was	  whether	  the	  Diocese	  owned	  the	  properties	  in	  question	  outright,	  or	  
whether	  they	  were	  held	  in	  trust	  for	  the	  Clothes	  Bank.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  an	  express	  
trust,	  so	  if	  there	  was	  any	  trust,	  it	  must	  have	  been	  a	  resulting	  trust.	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  
evidence	  of	  a	  trust	  of	  any	  type.	  
The	  Appeal	  Court	  held	  that	  it	  was	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  to	  transfer	  title	  in	  the	  
properties	  to	  the	  Diocese	  from	  the	  outset.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  had	  
always	  sought	  an	  ‘official	  or	  formal	  linkage’	  with	  the	  Diocese,	  and	  was	  at	  all	  material	  times,	  
operating	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Diocese.	  The	  evidence	  showed	  that	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  and	  
its	  unincorporated	  predecessor	  had	  obtained	  proper	  legal	  advice,	  and	  no	  mention	  had	  been	  
made	  of	  trust	  arrangements,	  and	  no	  trust	  document	  prepared.	  Other	  evidence	  of	  dealings	  with	  
the	  municipal	  authorities	  supported	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  Diocese	  was	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  
properties.	  
Therefore,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  Diocese	  of	  Calgary	  was	  the	  legal	  and	  beneficial	  owner	  of	  the	  
properties	  in	  contention.	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Canadian	  law	  on	  trust	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  in	  Australia.	  A	  resulting	  trust	  arises	  when	  title	  to	  
property	  is	  in	  one	  party’s	  name,	  but	  that	  party,	  because	  he	  or	  she	  is	  a	  fiduciary	  or	  gave	  no	  
consideration	  (value)	  for	  the	  property,	  only	  holds	  it	  on	  trust	  for	  the	  person	  who	  did	  pay	  for	  it	  –	  
and	  may	  be	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  return	  title	  to	  the	  original	  purchaser	  or	  title	  holder.	  The	  
presumption	  of	  resulting	  trust	  is	  a	  rebuttable	  presumption	  of	  law	  but	  it	  is	  a	  general	  rule	  that	  
applies	  to	  gratuitous	  transfers.	  When	  a	  transfer	  is	  challenged,	  the	  presumption	  allocates	  the	  
legal	  burden	  of	  proof.	  Thus,	  where	  a	  transfer	  is	  made	  for	  no	  consideration,	  the	  onus	  is	  placed	  
on	  the	  person	  to	  whom	  it	  was	  transferred	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  a	  gift	  (not	  a	  trust)	  was	  
intended.	  
In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  absolutely	  no	  evidence	  of	  any	  trust	  having	  been	  created	  or	  intended,	  so,	  
since	  the	  title	  was	  given	  to	  the	  Diocese,	  it	  remained	  with	  the	  Diocese.	  
	  
2.9.3  FRIENDS OF CAMP ANEESH V GIRL GUIDES OF CANADA, 2012 ONSC 6855 
(SUPERIOR COURT OF ONTARIO, VAN RENSBERG J, 4 DECEMBER 2012) 
In	  this	  Canadian	  case,	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  a	  corporation	  which	  was	  incorporated	  in	  2011.	  Its	  
objects	  included	  the	  provision	  of	  camping	  experiences	  for	  girls	  and	  young	  women	  resident	  
primarily	  in	  Bruce	  and	  Grey	  Counties,	  Ontario	  (the	  Local	  Guides).	  This	  involved	  the	  
maintenance	  and	  operation	  of	  Camp	  Aneesh,	  a	  camping	  site	  of	  some	  50	  acres,	  and	  the	  
provision	  of	  a	  site	  for	  the	  training	  of	  personnel	  involved	  in	  the	  camp.	  
The	  defendant	  was	  the	  Girl	  Guides	  of	  Canada,	  which	  is	  currently	  the	  legal	  registered	  owner	  of	  
Camp	  Aneesh.	  The	  defendant	  announced	  in	  2010	  that	  it	  would	  sell	  Camp	  Aneesh	  and	  retain	  
the	  proceeds	  of	  sale.	  
The	  allegation	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  that	  although	  the	  land	  had	  been	  transferred	  to	  the	  
defendant	  in	  1984,	  it	  was	  to	  be	  ‘held	  in	  trust’	  for	  the	  plaintiff.	  The	  1984	  transfer	  was	  without	  
consideration,	  in	  good	  faith	  and	  in	  reliance	  on	  express	  representations	  that	  the	  transfer	  was	  
for	  housekeeping	  purposes	  only,	  to	  allow	  for	  insurance	  to	  be	  placed	  against	  the	  property.	  The	  
Statement	  of	  Claim	  alleged	  that	  the	  camp	  had	  been	  purchased	  and	  developed	  exclusively	  
through	  the	  generosity	  of	  area	  residents	  who	  had	  a	  passion	  and	  commitment	  for	  guiding,	  and	  
alleged	  that	  the	  local	  girls,	  their	  families	  and	  guide	  leaders	  had	  raised	  substantial	  funds	  to	  
improve	  the	  camp	  over	  the	  years,	  and	  had	  contributed	  ‘sweat	  equity’	  through	  their	  voluntary	  
labour.	  
The	  relief	  sought	  was:	  	  
• an	  order	  for	  mandamus	  compelling	  the	  defendant	  to	  transfer	  the	  camp	  property	  to	  the	  
plaintiff,	  or	  in	  the	  alternative,	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  defendant	  held	  the	  camp	  on	  a	  
resulting,	  constructive	  or	  bare	  trust	  for	  the	  plaintiff;	  	  
• damages	  for	  misrepresentation	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $500,000;	  	  
• an	  order	  that,	  if	  the	  camp	  was	  sold,	  all	  net	  sale	  proceeds	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  plaintiff;	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• an	  order	  prohibiting	  the	  defendant	  from	  encumbering	  or	  transferring	  the	  camp	  
without	  a	  court	  order;	  and	  	  
• an	  accounting	  of	  all	  monies	  expended	  by	  the	  defendant	  on	  the	  camp	  since	  the	  
defendant	  acquired	  ownership	  of	  same.	  
The	  defendant	  claimed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  cause	  of	  action	  disclosed	  by	  the	  Statement	  of	  Claim.	  
The	  key	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  case	  was	  the	  date	  of	  incorporation	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  (2011).	  All	  of	  
the	  activities	  alleged	  to	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  trust	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  took	  place	  before	  the	  
plaintiff	  was	  incorporated.	  Her	  Honour	  therefore	  said	  that	  there	  was	  no	  prospect	  of	  success	  
for	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  defendant	  held	  the	  camp	  property	  by	  resulting	  or	  constructive	  trust	  for	  
the	  plaintiff,	  which	  did	  not	  exist	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  transfer	  (at	  [20]–[22]).	  
The	  Public	  Guardian	  and	  Trustee	  (PGT)	  of	  Ontario	  became	  involved	  at	  this	  point.	  The	  PGT’s	  role	  
includes	  the	  supervision	  of	  charities	  in	  Ontario.	  The	  PGT’s	  argument	  suggested	  an	  alternative	  
framework	  for	  a	  claim	  that	  had	  as	  its	  focus	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  the	  proper	  execution	  of	  an	  
alleged	  charitable	  trust.	  The	  PGT	  referred	  to	  the	  relief	  available	  under	  the	  inherent	  jurisdiction	  
of	  the	  court	  with	  respect	  to	  charities,	  and	  the	  Charities	  Accounting	  Act,	  R.S.O.	  1990,	  c.C.10	  (the	  
CAA).	  
The	  Superior	  Court	  of	  Ontario	  has	  inherent	  jurisdiction	  to	  supervise	  the	  activities	  of	  a	  
charitable	  corporation	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  accord	  with	  its	  charitable	  purpose	  and	  to	  intervene	  
if	  the	  charity	  is	  not	  administered	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  purpose,	  or	  its	  charitable	  funds	  are	  
misapplied.	  The	  CAA	  provides	  for	  a	  mechanism	  for	  any	  person	  to	  complain	  to	  the	  Superior	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  if	  charitable	  property	  is	  not	  being	  used	  for	  the	  intended	  purposes.	  The	  
complaint	  would	  be	  brought	  under	  section	  6(1),	  and	  would	  permit	  the	  court	  to	  require	  the	  PGT	  
to	  investigate	  the	  allegations.	  Section	  10(1)	  provides	  that	  an	  application	  may	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  
Superior	  Court	  of	  Justice	  by	  ‘any	  two	  or	  more	  persons’	  who	  allege	  a	  breach	  of	  a	  trust	  created	  
for	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  or	  who	  seek	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  court	  for	  the	  administration	  of	  a	  trust	  
for	  charitable	  purposes.	  
Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  basis	  for	  the	  plaintiff’s	  current	  claim,	  saying	  (at	  [29]):	  
...In	  a	  case	  such	  as	  this,	  where	  no	  cause	  of	  action	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  Statement	  of	  
Claim	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  who	  commenced	  the	  action,	  where	  a	  different	  legal	  
framework	  is	  warranted,	  and	  where	  no	  proposed	  amendments	  have	  been	  placed	  
before	  the	  court	  (although	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  requested	  by	  the	  defendant	  to	  do	  so	  
several	  months	  ago),	  it	  is	  preferable	  to	  strike	  the	  Claim	  without	  leave	  to	  amend	  and	  to	  
dismiss	  the	  action.	  There	  is	  no	  limitation	  period	  or	  other	  reason	  to	  keep	  the	  existing	  
action	  alive.	  The	  better	  approach	  is	  to	  terminate	  the	  action,	  while	  permitting	  the	  
plaintiff	  or	  some	  other	  party	  or	  parties	  to	  commence	  suitable	  proceedings.	  
The	  claim	  was	  dismissed	  without	  prejudice	  (meaning	  it	  could	  be	  recommenced	  with	  the	  same	  
or	  different	  pleadings,	  presumably	  using	  the	  suggestions	  of	  the	  PGT),	  and	  without	  an	  order	  as	  
to	  costs.	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The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc6855/2012onsc6855.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	   case	   turned	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   date	   of	   incorporation	   of	   the	   plaintiff	   (because	   of	   the	  
importance	  of	  its	  legal	  status	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  events).	  The	  events	  which	  the	  plaintiff	  raised	  in	  
support	  of	  its	  claim	  had	  occurred	  before	  it	  became	  an	  incorporated	  body.	  Therefore,	  the	  claim	  
made	  no	  sense	  legally	  because	  there	  was	  no	  entity	  (it	  was	  not	  a	  legal	  person)	  for	  any	  trust	  to	  
have	   been	   established	   for	   it	   in	   1984	   when	   the	   land	   was	   transferred	   to	   the	   Girl	   Guides	   of	  
Canada.	  Thus	  the	  Girl	  Guides	  of	  Canada	  became	  the	  legal	  and	  beneficial	  owners	  at	  that	  time.	  
However,	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  PGT	  might	  suggest	  a	  line	  of	  pleading	  which	  the	  plaintiff	  could	  
pursue	  in	  a	  further	  action.	  
 
2.9.4  APPLICATION OF SACHS [2012] NSWSC 1410 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH 
WALES, WHITE J, 13 NOVEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  yet	  another	  will	  case	  where	  the	  purported	  charity	  beneficiary	  was	  misnamed	  in	  the	  
will,	  and	  then	  ceased	  to	  exist	  prior	  to	  distribution	  of	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  will.	  The	  executors	  of	  
the	  deceased’s	  estate	  applied	  for	  directions	  under	  section	  63	  of	  the	  Trusts	  Act	  1925	  (NSW).	  
The	  only	  other	  possible	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  gift	  had	  herself	  died.	  
The	  testator	  made	  his	  will	  on	  3	  March	  2000,	  leaving	  half	  of	  his	  net	  estate	  to	  ‘Save	  the	  Children’	  
at	  Level	  3,	  123	  Clarence	  Street,	  Sydney.	  He	  died	  on	  18	  March	  2009.	  At	  the	  time	  the	  will	  was	  
made	  there	  was	  in	  existence	  a	  public	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee	  called	  Save	  the	  Children	  
(NSW),	  whose	  registered	  office	  was	  Level	  3,	  123	  Clarence	  Street,	  Sydney.	  However,	  this	  
company	  was	  wound	  up	  voluntarily	  on	  11	  April	  2012,	  and	  its	  assets	  transferred	  to	  Save	  the	  
Children	  Australia,	  a	  national	  body.	  
Since	  the	  body	  named	  in	  the	  will	  no	  longer	  existed,	  the	  gift	  would	  ordinarily	  have	  lapsed,	  
leading	  to	  a	  partial	  intestacy.	  However,	  the	  person	  who	  would	  have	  taken	  the	  gift	  in	  that	  event	  
had	  also	  died.	  	  
Therefore,	  in	  this	  application	  His	  Honour	  had	  no	  hesitation	  in	  saying	  that	  ‘Save	  the	  Children’	  
was	  the	  intended	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  gift.	  The	  testator	  had	  a	  clear	  general	  charitable	  intention.	  
His	  Honour	  directed	  that	  the	  gift	  be	  given	  to	  Save	  the	  Children	  Australia,	  as	  the	  successor	  body	  
to	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  charity	  which	  had	  ceased	  to	  exist.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/1410.html 
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  message	  from	  these	  cases	  is	  to	  make	  a	  formal	  will	  (not	  a	  self-­‐drawn	  will	  from	  a	  will	  pack),	  
ensuring	  that	  all	  charity	  beneficiaries	  are	  correctly	  named.	  Charity	  websites	  include	  sample	  
bequest	  clauses	  to	  ensure	  that	  names	  are	  correctly	  cited	  in	  wills.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  update	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the	  will	  regularly,	  to	  take	  account	  of	  changing	  circumstances	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  any	  charity	  
beneficiaries	  are	  still	  in	  existence,	  and	  have	  not	  changed	  their	  names.	  
The	  costs	  of	  these	  applications	  to	  court	  must	  usually	  be	  paid	  out	  of	  the	  estate.	  
	  
2.9.5  AUSTRALIAN INCENTIVE PLAN PTY LTD (AS TRUSTEE OF THE AUSTRALIAN 
INCENTIVE TRUST) V ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR VICTORIA [2012] VSCA 236 
(SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, COURT OF APPEAL, NETTLE JA, TATE JA AND 
DAVIES AJA, 28 SEPTEMBER 2012)  
The	  plaintiff	  was	  the	  corporate	  trustee	  of	  the	  Australian	  Incentive	  Trust	  (the	  Trust).	  The	  trust	  
was	  constituted	  by	  the	  Australian	  Incentive	  Trust	  Deed	  made	  in	  2004	  between	  Babcock	  &	  
Brown	  International	  Pty	  Ltd	  (the	  Settlor),	  Babcock	  &	  Brown	  Australian	  Incentive	  Plan	  Pty	  Ltd	  
(the	  Trustee)	  and	  Babcock	  &	  Brown	  Ltd	  (Listco).	  It	  had	  previously	  been	  decided	  to	  terminate	  
this	  trust	  on	  the	  liquidation	  of	  Babcock	  &	  Brown	  International	  Pty	  Ltd,	  an	  asset	  management	  
company	  which	  collapsed	  in	  2009.	  It	  was	  also	  decided	  that	  the	  residual	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  
trust	  were	  to	  be	  four	  designated	  charities	  nominated	  by	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  of	  Victoria.	  	  
In	  the	  proceeding	  below,	  the	  Trustee	  sought	  an	  order	  varying	  the	  Deed,	  pursuant	  to	  section	  
63A	  of	  the	  Trustee	  Act	  1958	  (Vic)	  to	  provide	  that	  the	  Trust	  would	  terminate	  on	  the	  
commencement	  of	  the	  winding	  up	  of	  Listco.	  The	  Trustee	  also	  sought	  a	  direction	  from	  the	  court	  
that	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  trust	  be	  distributed	  among	  57	  participants	  in	  an	  employee	  incentive	  
scheme	  whose	  interest	  had	  not	  vested	  by	  the	  date	  of	  commencement	  of	  the	  winding	  up	  of	  
Listco.	  The	  Trustee	  proposed	  that	  the	  fund	  be	  prorated	  amongst	  these	  participants.	  This	  was	  
rejected	  by	  His	  Honour	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  charity	  beneficiaries.	  	  
The	  two	  issues	  which	  arose	  for	  determination	  in	  this	  appeal	  were:	  
1. whether	   the	   judge	  was	  wrong	   in	   rejecting	   the	  Trustee’s	   suggestion	   that	   the	   fund	  be	  
distributed	   to	   the	   57	   Participants	   whose	   entitlements	   had	   not	   vested	   at	   the	  
commencement	  of	  the	  winding	  up	  of	  Listco;	  and	  
2. whether	  it	  was	  wrong	  to	  direct	  the	  Trustee	  to	  distribute	  the	  Trust	  Fund	  to	  designated	  
charities. 
The	  Trustee	  contended	  that	  the	  judge	  below	  was	  wrong	  to	  ignore	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  57	  
employees	  and	  confer	  the	  residual	  benefit	  of	  the	  fund	  on	  charities.	  The	  Attorney-­‐General	  
replied	  that	  the	  trust	  had	  failed	  since	  there	  were	  no	  longer	  employees	  to	  be	  benefited	  (the	  
company	  having	  been	  wound	  up),	  and	  so	  charities	  were	  the	  proper	  recipient	  of	  the	  fund.	  
Nettle	  JA	  and	  Davies	  AJA	  agreed	  with	  the	  contentions	  of	  the	  Attorney-­‐General,	  and	  found	  no	  
error	  in	  the	  judgement	  below.	  Nettle	  JA	  said	  (at	  [40]–[42]):	  
...it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  accept	  that,	  because	  the	  57	  Participants	  in	  question	  were	  
deprived	  of	  their	  Awards	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  liquidation	  of	  Listco,	  the	  values	  of	  their	  
Awards,	  calculated	  in	  accordance	  with	  Plan	  Share	  values	  as	  at	  the	  dates	  on	  which	  the	  
Awards	  were	  issued,	  should	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  distribution	  of	  the	  Fund	  in	  the	  manner	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which	  the	  Trustee	  proposes.	  It	  is	  plain	  that	  the	  stated	  object	  of	  the	  Plan	  was	  to	  equate	  
the	  Participants	  with	  shareholders,	  and	  it	  would	  hardly	  equate	  their	  position	  with	  the	  
shareholders,	  whose	  shares	  are	  now	  worth	  nought,	  to	  give	  them	  significant	  sums	  of	  
money	  while	  the	  shareholders	  go	  without...	  it	  is	  surely	  beyond	  argument	  that	  the	  
Settlor	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  benefit	  a	  Participant	  whose	  Award	  failed	  to	  vest	  before	  
liquidation,	  any	  more	  than	  the	  Settlor	  intended	  to	  benefit	  an	  Employee	  who	  was	  not	  a	  
Participant	  at	  all.	  In	  those	  circumstances,	  it	  being	  agreed	  on	  all	  hands	  that	  an	  
Employee	  who	  is	  not	  a	  Participant	  has	  no	  claim	  on	  the	  Fund,	  or	  any	  expectation	  of	  
receiving	  a	  distribution	  from	  the	  Fund	  in	  the	  circumstances	  which	  obtain,	  I	  concur	  with	  
the	  judge	  that	  a	  distribution	  of	  the	  Fund	  to	  the	  57	  Participants	  would	  not	  accord	  to	  the	  
Settlor’s	  intentions	  as	  expressed	  in	  the	  Deed.	  It	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  acting	  directly	  
contrary	  to	  those	  intentions.	  
On	  the	  same	  issue,	  although	  he	  found	  that	  there	  was	  still	  a	  class	  of	  beneficiary	  which	  could	  be	  
designated	  as	  ‘employees’,	  Davies	  AJA	  held	  that	  (at	  [132]):	  
Whilst	  I	  accept	  the	  Trustee’s	  submission	  that	  the	  fifty-­‐seven	  Participants	  remained	  
potential	  objects	  of	  the	  power	  of	  appointment	  within	  the	  class	  of	  ‘Employees’	  
notwithstanding	  the	  liquidation	  of	  BBL,	  I	  reject	  the	  submission	  that	  this	  makes	  it	  
‘appropriate’	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  in	  favour	  of	  them.	  The	  Trust	  was	  created	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  facilitating	  and	  effecting	  the	  Incentive	  Plan	  activities	  of	  the	  Babcock	  &	  
Brown	  group	  of	  companies.	  Awards	  were	  made,	  and	  employees	  became	  ‘Participants’	  
under	  the	  Trust	  Deed,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  their	  entitlements	  would	  lapse	  on	  the	  
liquidation	  of	  BBL.	  In	  the	  circumstances,	  the	  trial	  judge	  was	  correct	  to	  conclude	  that	  
the	  nomination	  of	  charities	  solely	  was	  within	  the	  contemplation	  or	  intention	  of	  the	  
settlor.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  awards	  were	  provided	  as	  an	  inducement	  to	  employees	  to	  stay	  
with	  the	  Babcock	  and	  Brown	  group	  of	  companies	  and	  that	  some,	  or	  indeed	  all,	  of	  the	  
fifty-­‐seven	  Participants	  may	  have	  continued	  in	  the	  employment	  of	  companies	  within	  
the	  Babcock	  &	  Brown	  group	  of	  companies	  because	  of	  an	  expectation	  that	  their	  
entitlements	  would	  vest,	  and	  be	  of	  value	  to	  them,	  does	  not	  compel	  any	  different	  
conclusion.	  The	  question	  here	  is	  not	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  fifty-­‐seven	  Participants	  who	  
continued	  in	  employment	  but	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  settlor	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  proper	  
construction	  of	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  considered	  in	  the	  context	  of	  which	  the	  Incentive	  Plan	  
forms	  an	  integral	  part.	  
However,	  Tate	  JA	  dissented	  to	  allow	  the	  appeal.	  His	  reasoning	  was	  that	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  
a	  trust	  is	  established	  are	  not	  to	  be	  ignored	  in	  determining	  how	  to	  exercise	  the	  power	  of	  
distribution	  of	  the	  remainder	  (residual	  amount),	  even	  if	  the	  purposes	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  
fulfilled.	  As	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  trust	  in	  this	  case	  was	  the	  facilitation	  of	  the	  offering	  and	  granting	  
of	  awards	  to	  employees	  in	  an	  equity	  incentive	  plan,	  those	  purposes	  continued	  to	  provide	  ‘an	  
intelligible	  and	  meaningful’	  and	  ‘proper	  basis	  for	  distribution’	  to	  those	  employees	  who	  
remained	  employed	  by	  the	  company	  ‘as	  at	  the	  date	  of	  liquidation	  of	  Listco	  and	  who	  had	  been	  
the	  recipient	  of	  an	  offer	  or	  confirmation	  of	  an	  award	  which	  was	  as	  yet	  unvested	  or	  
unexercised’	  (at	  [114]).	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As	  the	  appeal	  decision	  was	  2	  to	  1	  in	  dismissing	  the	  appeal,	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  of	  Victoria	  
was	  successful.	  Costs	  were	  ordered	  to	  be	  paid	  from	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  trust	  fund.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2012/236.html	  
The	  costs	  decision	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2012/251.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
There	  is	  a	  general	  rule	  that	  a	  trustee	  should	  seek	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  court	  on	  matters	  such	  as	  
those	  in	  this	  case.	  This	  is	  regarded	  as	  sound	  public	  policy.	  However,	  costs	  are	  usually	  borne	  at	  
the	  trustee’s	  own	  risk	  on	  appeal.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  this	  appeal,	  after	  the	  decision	  was	  given,	  the	  
judges	  made	  the	  point	  that	  costs	  would	  be	  paid	  out	  of	  the	  available	  proceeds	  of	  the	  fund,	  
which	  was	  about	  $1.6	  million.	  This	  effectively	  meant	  that	  the	  costs	  order	  would	  deprive	  the	  
charities	  who	  were	  to	  be	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  fund	  of	  some	  of	  their	  money.	  The	  judges	  
were	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  issues	  were	  sufficiently	  open	  to	  question	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  
difference	  of	  opinion	  on	  appeal)	  to	  justify	  costs	  being	  paid	  from	  the	  fund.	  Nettle	  JA	  said	  on	  this	  
point:	  
Were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  latter	  consideration,	  I	  doubt	  that	  it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  to	  impose	  
the	  costs	  of	  this	  appeal	  in	  effect	  on	  the	  charities	  in	  whose	  favour	  the	  judge	  determined	  
that	  the	  fund	  should	  be	  distributed.	  Given	  the	  long	  standing	  rule	  that	  a	  trustee	  who	  
appeals	  against	  the	  court’s	  advice	  appeals	  at	  the	  trustee’s	  own	  risk,	  I	  should	  assume	  
that	  the	  appellant	  made	  some	  sort	  of	  arrangement	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  litigation	  for	  the	  
57	  beneficiaries	  to	  indemnify	  the	  appellant	  against	  costs	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  appeal	  
proved	  unsuccessful.	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  I	  should	  not	  think	  it	  unjust	  that	  those	  
persons	  wear	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  appeal.	  
Therefore,	  although	  the	  57	  potential	  employee	  beneficiaries	  were	  not	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  
failed	  appeal,	  effectively,	  because	  of	  the	  costs	  order,	  it	  was	  the	  charities	  which	  bore	  the	  costs.	  
	  
2.9.6  MACEDONIAN ORTHODOX COMMUNITY CHURCH ST PETKA INCORPORATED V 
HIS EMINENCE METROPOLITAN PETAR DIOCESAN BISHOP OF THE 
MACEDONIAN ORTHODOX DIOCESE OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND [2012] 
NSWCA 304 (COURT OF APPEAL, NEW SOUTH WALES, ALLSOP P, 26 
SEPTEMBER 2012)  
This	  was	  part	  of	  ongoing	  litigation	  within	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  congregation	  of	  St	  Petka	  
in	  Sydney.	  (Case	  notes	  from	  some	  of	  the	  previous	  litigation,	  since	  2008,	  are	  available	  under	  
‘Trusts	  and	  Wills’,	  https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Trusts+and+Wills.)	  As	  part	  of	  that	  
litigation,	  an	  appeal	  is	  to	  be	  launched	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  of	  New	  South	  Wales.	  This	  hearing	  
was	  concerning	  security	  for	  costs	  for	  that	  appeal,	  to	  be	  held	  in	  February	  2013.	  	  
The	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  community	  involved	  in	  this	  case	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  groups,	  who	  
have	  been	  in	  dispute	  about	  property	  and	  money	  relating	  to	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	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Community	  Church	  St	  Petka	  Incorporated	  (the	  Community	  Church)	  for	  many	  years.	  Since	  2006,	  
the	  Equity	  Division	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  has	  made	  several	  substantive	  
judgments	  in	  the	  matter,	  and	  numerous	  interlocutory	  judgments	  have	  been	  published.	  At	  this	  
stage	  of	  the	  litigation,	  Brereton	  J	  has	  almost	  completed	  the	  last	  aspects	  of	  the	  matter	  at	  first	  
instance.	  Overall,	  the	  appellant	  Community	  Church	  has	  been	  largely	  unsuccessful	  to	  date.	  
The	  matter	  has	  been	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions,	  and	  the	  High	  Court	  on	  
one	  occasion.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  has	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  will	  only	  hear	  one	  more	  appeal	  
from	  the	  courts	  below.	  
The	  first	  and	  second	  respondents	  sought	  an	  order	  for	  security	  for	  their	  costs	  from	  the	  first	  
appellant,	  the	  Community	  Church.	  Security	  for	  costs	  was	  sought	  under	  the	  Uniform	  Civil	  
Procedure	  Rules	  (UPCR)	  rules	  51.50,	  and	  42.21,	  and	  the	  inherent	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  court.	  In	  
response,	  the	  issues	  canvassed	  by	  His	  Honour	  were	  as	  follows:	  
• First,	  there	  was	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Community	  Church	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  pay	  
any	  order	  for	  costs	  should	  its	  appellate	  applications	  be	  unsuccessful.	  The	  orders	  of	  
Hamilton	  J	  and	  Brereton	  J	  in	  the	  court	  below	  had	  the	  effect	  that	  all	  the	  property	  of	  the	  
Community	  Church	  (other	  than	  property	  from	  donations	  and	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  
litigation)	  was	  held	  upon	  charitable	  trust,	  and	  that	  property	  is	  not	  available	  for	  raising	  
of	  funds	  for	  the	  litigation.	  
• Second,	  the	  appeals	  were	  not	  said	  to	  be	  hopeless	  or	  vexatious	  in	  their	  nature	  or	  
character.	  	  
• Third,	  the	  security	  that	  was	  sought	  was	  in	  the	  order	  of	  $50,000	  which,	  in	  all	  the	  
circumstances,	  if	  security	  were	  ordered,	  would	  not	  be	  an	  unreasonable	  amount	  for	  a	  
four	  or	  five	  day	  appeal	  involving	  senior	  counsel.	  
• Fourth,	  a	  differential	  approach	  to	  costs	  of	  individuals	  and	  corporations	  in	  the	  one	  
appeal	  was	  ordinarily	  inappropriate.	  
• Fifth,	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  on	  the	  evidence	  that	  a	  requirement	  for	  security	  could	  not	  be	  met	  
and	  that	  its	  requirement	  would	  stifle	  one	  party's	  participation	  in	  the	  appeal.	  An	  
understanding	  of	  the	  community	  basis	  of	  the	  dispute	  made	  it	  likely,	  however,	  that	  
those	  in	  the	  Macedonian	  community	  who	  supported	  the	  appellants	  would	  be	  required	  
to	  fund	  the	  security.	  It	  was	  not	  demonstrated	  that	  this	  could	  not	  be	  done.	  To	  impose	  
this,	  however,	  was	  to	  require	  that	  the	  members	  of	  a	  community	  religious	  group	  who	  
had	  no	  financial	  (as	  opposed	  to	  spiritual	  and	  emotional)	  stake	  in	  the	  litigation	  place	  
moneys	  at	  risk	  for	  the	  litigation.	  
Taking	  all	  these	  circumstances	  into	  account,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  should	  not	  be	  security	  
for	  costs	  ordered.	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [12]	  [emphasis	  added]):	  
The	  Court	  has	  a	  general	  discretion	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ordering	  of	  security	  for	  costs.	  Such	  
an	  order	  takes	  its	  place	  in	  the	  just,	  expeditious	  and	  fair	  resolution	  of	  disputes.	  Having	  
regard	  to	  all	  the	  circumstances	  here,	  and	  having	  regard	  to	  all	  the	  arguments	  placed	  
before	  me	  in	  writing	  and	  orally,	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  it	  would	  be	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  
justice	  or	  the	  fair	  resolution	  of	  the	  dispute	  to	  order	  security.	  The	  litigation	  concerns	  a	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charitable	  trust	  and	  so	  the	  public	  interest.	  More	  than	  that,	  it	  involves	  the	  religious	  
and	  community	  life	  of	  ordinary	  people,	  unfortunately	  (and	  it	  would	  not	  be	  an	  
exaggeration	  to	  say	  tragically)	  embroiled	  in	  a	  bitter	  dispute	  with	  others	  in	  the	  same	  
community	  about	  deeply	  held	  views	  and	  beliefs.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  application	  by	  the	  respondents	  for	  security	  for	  costs	  was	  dismissed,	  with	  costs.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2012/304.html	  
 
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
It	  can	  only	  be	  hoped	  that	  this	  case	  will	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion,	  when	  it	  goes	  to	  appeal	  in	  2013.	  
The	  long	  history	  of	  the	  dispute	  has	  been	  a	  costly	  and	  pointed	  exercise	  in	  litigating	  about	  deeply	  
held	  beliefs,	  for	  which	  the	  law	  is	  merely	  a	  blunt	  and	  expensive	  instrument	  of	  resolution.	  As	  His	  
Honour	  said	  of	  the	  approaching	  appeal	  (at	  [13]):	  
As	  in	  most	  litigation,	  one	  side	  will	  ‘win’	  and	  one	  side	  will	  ‘lose’.	  Of	  importance	  to	  both	  
sides,	  however,	  is	  the	  just,	  fair	  and	  impartial	  resolution	  of	  the	  grievances	  of	  those	  
within	  the	  community....	  The	  case	  goes	  beyond	  money.	  The	  interest	  of	  those	  behind	  
the	  Community	  Church	  goes	  beyond	  money.	  
Since	  the	  case	  was	  ‘beyond	  money’,	  there	  was	  no	  advantage	  in	  granting	  security	  for	  costs	  to	  
ensure	  the	  appellants	  could	  pay	  costs	  if	  they	  lost.	  
	  
2.9.7  BOSELEY V STOWE [2012] WASC 329 (SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA, MASTER SANDERSON, 13 SEPTEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  case	  concerning	  a	  bequest	  to	  charity	  in	  a	  will.	  The	  deceased	  died	  in	  March	  2010,	  
leaving	  a	  will	  which	  divided	  his	  entire	  estate	  equally	  between	  two	  charities,	  the	  Salvation	  Army	  
(Western	  Australian)	  Property	  Trust,	  and	  the	  Australian	  Red	  Cross	  Society	  (Western	  Australian	  
Division).	  The	  deceased	  was	  unmarried	  and	  had	  no	  children.	  The	  estate’s	  value	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
the	  hearing	  was	  $201,000.	  
This	  application	  arose	  because	  the	  deceased’s	  mother	  applied	  for	  provision	  out	  of	  the	  estate	  
under	  the	  Inheritance	  (Family	  and	  Dependants	  Provision)	  Act	  1972	  (WA)	  (the	  Act).	  Master	  
Sanderson	  held	  that	  she	  was	  entitled	  to	  the	  entire	  estate	  (which	  was	  reduced	  by	  about	  half	  by	  
costs,	  fees	  and	  expenses).	  The	  charities	  received	  nothing.	  
The	  mother	  was	  an	  eligible	  applicant	  under	  the	  Act.	  As	  is	  always	  the	  situation	  in	  these	  cases,	  
the	  court	  applied	  a	  two-­‐stage	  test	  to	  determine	  the	  mother’s	  provision.	  This	  test,	  which	  
derives	  from	  the	  High	  Court	  case	  of	  Singer	  v	  Berghouse	  [1994]	  HCA	  40,	  is	  uncontroversial.	  The	  
two	  stages	  are:	  was	  the	  plaintiff	  left	  without	  adequate	  maintenance	  and	  support	  in	  the	  will,	  
and	  if	  so,	  how	  much	  should	  the	  plaintiff	  be	  awarded	  out	  of	  the	  estate?	  The	  court	  determined	  
that	  the	  mother	  was	  entitled	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  estate	  because	  the	  deceased	  had	  a	  moral	  
obligation	  to	  provide	  for	  her	  and	  had	  not	  done	  so	  in	  his	  will.	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The	  relevant	  issues	  considered	  were:	  
1. The	  mother	  and	  the	  deceased	  did	  not	  have	  a	  close	  relationship.	  He	  had	  not	  lived	  with	  
her	  since	  he	  was	  17.	  
2. However,	  she	  had	  rendered	  care	  to	  him	  in	  his	  illness.	  
3. On	  her	  divorce	  from	  the	  deceased’s	  father,	  the	  mother	  had	  received	  no	  property	  
settlement,	  but	  her	  son,	  the	  deceased,	  had	  received	  property	  from	  his	  father.	  
4. The	  mother	  had	  modest	  assets	  totalling	  about	  $300,000.	  	  
5. She	  had	  various	  needs	  arising	  from	  her	  age	  and	  circumstances,	  though	  she	  was	  in	  good	  
health	  at	  present.	  
6. There	  were	  no	  other	  legitimate	  family	  claimants	  on	  the	  deceased’s	  estate.	  
7. The	  deceased	  and	  the	  named	  charities	  did	  not	  have	  any	  particular	  relationship	  during	  
his	  lifetime,	  though	  the	  charities	  were	  otherwise	  legitimate	  claimants	  on	  the	  estate.	  
Therefore,	  balancing	  these	  factors,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  mother	  should	  receive	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  
net	  estate.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2012/329.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  outcome	  of	  this	  case	  is	  typical	  of	  cases	  where	  family	  provision	  claimants	  have	  a	  higher	  
claim	  in	  law	  on	  an	  estate	  than	  charities	  named	  in	  the	  will.	  Master	  Sanderson	  commented	  that	  
the	  second	  defendant	  (the	  Salvation	  Army)	  was	  represented	  by	  counsel.	  The	  third	  defendant	  
(the	  Red	  Cross)	  merely	  filed	  a	  notice	  indicating	  they	  would	  abide	  by	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  court.	  
The	  latter	  did	  not	  appear	  and	  made	  no	  submissions.	  Counsel	  for	  the	  Salvation	  Army	  did	  submit	  
that	  the	  plaintiff	  failed	  to	  satisfy	  the	  first	  jurisdiction	  stage	  of	  the	  two-­‐stage	  test,	  and	  then	  that	  
she	  had	  not	  demonstrated	  a	  need	  which	  would	  justify	  a	  provision	  being	  made	  from	  the	  
deceased's	  estate.	  However,	  these	  submissions	  did	  not	  prevail,	  despite	  Master	  Sanderson	  
remarking	  that	  the	  charities	  did	  ‘almost	  unlimited	  good	  work’.	  	  
Such	  outcomes	  are	  all	  too	  common	  in	  family	  provision	  cases,	  and	  costs	  of	  such	  applications	  
deplete	  the	  deceased	  estate.	  	  
	  
2.9.8  TOMASEVIC V JOVETIC [2012] VSC 405 (SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, SIFRIS 
J, 12 SEPTEMBER 2012)  
This	  case	  is	  further	  to	  earlier	  proceedings	  reported	  at	  Tomasevic	  v	  Jovetic	  [2012]	  VSC	  223.	  The	  
ongoing	  litigation	  is	  between	  rival	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  communities	  in	  Wodonga,	  Victoria.	  The	  
litigation	  commenced	  in	  2010,	  but	  the	  underlying	  dispute	  had	  deeper	  roots.	  Prior	  to	  2	  January	  
2010,	  there	  were	  two	  separate	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  churches	  in	  Wodonga.	  These	  were	  the	  Free	  
Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Congregation	  of	  St	  Peter	  and	  Paul	  Wodonga	  (the	  First	  Church)	  and	  
the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  (the	  Second	  Church).	  	  
By	  the	  first	  proceeding	  (the	  2010	  Proceeding),	  Mr	  Tomasevic	  and	  Mr	  Milutinovic	  (the	  plaintiffs,	  
who	  were	  the	  ‘merging	  trustees’)	  sought	  orders	  restraining	  Mr	  Jovetic	  and	  Mr	  Juzbasic	  (the	  
defendants,	  who	  were	  the	  ‘continuing	  trustees’)	  from	  dealing	  with	  certain	  properties	  held	  on	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trust	  for	  the	  First	  Church,	  removing	  Mr	  Jovetic	  as	  a	  trustee	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  and	  other	  
associated	  orders	  relating	  to	  the	  properties.	  In	  the	  second	  proceeding	  (the	  2011	  Proceeding),	  
the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  –	  School	  Congregation	  of	  St	  Peter	  &	  St	  Paul	  Wodonga	  Inc	  
(the	  Incorporated	  Association),	  and	  the	  continuing	  trustees	  sought	  possession	  of	  certain	  
properties	  and	  the	  delivery	  up	  of	  personal	  property	  by	  the	  merging	  trustees,	  as	  well	  as	  
damages	  and	  other	  associated	  orders.	  	  
In	  the	  third	  proceeding	  in	  June	  2012,	  His	  Honour	  declined	  to	  make	  any	  declarations	  relating	  to	  
the	  matters	  raised	  and	  ordered	  mediation	  between	  the	  parties.	  The	  mediation	  was	  
unsuccessful,	  so	  these	  proceedings	  resulted.	  
A	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  and	  school	  congregation	  was	  first	  established	  in	  Wodonga	  in	  
around	  1953.	  Property	  was	  acquired	  and	  both	  a	  hall	  and	  a	  church	  were	  subsequently	  built.	  In	  
about	  1963	  a	  split	  occurred	  in	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  because	  of	  perceived	  concerns	  
amongst	  expatriate	  Serbians	  of	  the	  influence	  which	  the	  then	  communist	  government	  might	  
have	  had	  upon	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  church.	  	  
The	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  was	  established	  in	  
1963.	  On	  31	  October	  1964	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  for	  Australia	  and	  New	  
Zealand	  was	  established	  at	  an	  assembly	  in	  Melbourne.	  The	  Wodonga	  congregation	  was	  one	  of	  
14	  congregations	  which	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  for	  Australia	  
and	  New	  Zealand.	  That	  community,	  however,	  was	  slow	  to	  accept	  newer	  arrivals	  from	  the	  now	  
former	  Yugoslavia	  into	  its	  membership.	  It	  seems	  that	  from	  about	  1964	  there	  were	  two	  parallel,	  
but	  separate	  and	  distinct,	  dioceses	  in	  Australia.	  One	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  
Church	  Diocese	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  
Church	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  The	  other	  was	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  of	  
Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  which	  was	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Diocese	  for	  the	  
United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  Canada.	  
The	  Second	  Church	  was	  established	  in	  Wodonga	  in	  the	  1980s,	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  
Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  in	  Belgrade.	  On	  a	  larger	  scale,	  discussions	  aimed	  at	  removing	  the	  
divisions	  between	  the	  congregations	  began	  in	  1991,	  at	  about	  the	  time	  that	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia	  began	  to	  disintegrate	  politically.	  In	  April	  1991	  a	  document	  was	  prepared	  setting	  out	  
recommendations	  for	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Patriarchy	  and	  the	  Serbian	  
Orthodox	  New	  Gracanica	  Archdiocese.	  
In	  Wodonga,	  a	  series	  of	  events	  occurred	  between	  2009	  and	  2010	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  two	  
communities	  of	  worshippers	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  (the	  merging	  trustees),	  had	  
resulted	  in	  a	  merger	  of	  the	  two	  churches.	  Specifically,	  the	  merging	  trustees	  contended	  that	  on	  
2	  January	  2010	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  two	  churches	  was	  held	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  
merging	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  Churches	  in	  Wodonga.	  
In	  the	  June	  2012	  proceedings,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that:	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• the	  purported	  merger	  between	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  –	  School	  
Congregation	  St	  Peter	  and	  Paul	  Wodonga	  (the	  First	  Church)	  and	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  
Church	  (the	  Second	  Church)	  was	  invalid	  and	  ineffective;	  
• the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  –	  School	  Congregation	  of	  St	  Peter	  and	  St	  Paul	  
Wodonga	  Inc	  (the	  Incorporated	  Association)	  was	  not	  the	  successor	  to	  the	  First	  Church;	  
• the	  trustees	  of	  the	  property	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  remained	  the	  continuing	  trustees	  of	  
that	  property	  (being	  Tomasevic,	  Milutinovic,	  Jovetic	  and	  Juzbasic).	  
His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [5]–[6])	  that	  there	  was	  no	  dispute	  that	  the	  Court	  had	  the	  power	  to	  appoint	  
new	  trustees	  or	  remove	  one	  or	  more	  or	  all	  of	  the	  trustees.	  The	  power	  was	  both	  statutory	  
(Trustees	  Act	  1958	  (Vic)	  section	  48)	  and	  inherent,	  and	  extended	  to	  charitable	  trusts.	  In	  
exercising	  its	  powers	  the	  Court	  must	  have	  regard	  to	  a	  number	  of	  matters	  including	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  beneficiaries,	  the	  security	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  trust	  assets	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
the	  charitable	  trust	  is	  being	  administered	  in	  terms	  of	  efficiency	  and	  faithfulness	  to	  its	  
purposes.	  
After	  considering	  the	  affidavit	  evidence,	  His	  Honour	  removed	  Juzbasic	  as	  a	  trustee	  of	  the	  First	  
Church,	  but	  declined	  to	  remove	  Jovetic.	  He	  also	  declined	  to	  add	  any	  new	  trustee,	  saying	  
somewhat	  pointedly	  (at	  [10],	  [14]–[15]):	  
However,	  what	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  the	  parties	  should	  not	  all	  remain	  as	  Trustees	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  
Trust.	  The	  litigation	  between	  them	  was	  acrimonious	  and	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  or	  reason	  to	  
believe	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  sufficient	  healing	  so	  that	  they	  will	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  managing	  
the	  trust	  efficiently	  and	  effectively.	  The	  intervention	  of	  the	  Court	  is	  required.	  The	  Court	  must	  
ensure	  that	  decisions	  of	  the	  Trustees	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  Trust	  are	  made,	  as	  and	  when	  
required,	  properly,	  efficiently,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  trust	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  
that	  complies	  with	  the	  Constitution	  and	  Declarations	  of	  Trust	  applicable	  to	  their	  important	  
position....	  	  
The	  removal	  of	  Mr	  Juzbasic	  is	  not	  punitive.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  more	  workable	  
situation	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  Trust.	  That	  is,	  to	  ensure	  that	  
the	  trust	  can	  now	  function	  in	  an	  efficient	  and	  satisfactory	  manner.	  Mr	  Jovetic	  is	  a	  
solicitor	  and	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  necessary	  checks	  and	  balances	  against	  any	  potential	  
breaches	  of	  trust.	  He	  has	  no	  doubt	  read	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  is	  fully	  aware	  of	  
the	  supervisory	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  and	  that	  resort	  to	  this	  jurisdiction	  is	  preferable	  
to	  any	  self	  help	  or	  unilateral	  action	  that	  would	  be	  bound	  to	  lead	  to	  disputation.	  The	  
same	  may	  be	  said	  of	  Mr	  Tomasevic	  and	  Mr	  Milutinovic.	  No	  doubt	  they	  now	  have	  a	  
heightened	  awareness	  of	  the	  need	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Constitution	  and	  Declarations	  of	  
Trust.	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  office	  of	  Trustee	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  all	  parties	  I	  
urge	  the	  three	  remaining	  trustees	  to	  seek	  legal	  advice	  and	  any	  required	  clarification	  as	  
to	  their	  duties	  and	  responsibilities.	  The	  office	  of	  trustee	  is	  a	  relatively	  unforgiving	  
office.	  Equity	  is	  very	  protective	  of	  beneficiaries.	  I	  have	  not	  found	  it	  necessary	  or	  
desirable	  to	  make	  critical	  comments	  against	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  trustees.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  
hoped	  that	  this	  case	  is	  a	  wake	  up	  call	  so	  far	  as	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  trustees	  is	  
concerned.	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His	  Honour	  then	  made	  formal	  declarations	  to	  the	  same	  effect	  as	  those	  he	  made	  in	  June	  2012,	  
and	  formal	  declarations	  as	  the	  position	  of	  the	  trustees.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2012/405.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  is	  part	  of	  long-­‐running	  litigation	  within	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Churches	  in	  Wodonga.	  
The	  removal	  of	  a	  trustee,	  as	  happened	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  not	  a	  punishment,	  but	  rather	  a	  necessary	  
protective	  step	  so	  far	  as	  the	  trust	  and	  its	  assets	  are	  concerned.	  The	  court	  has	  considerable	  
powers	  in	  this	  regard	  which	  are	  inherent	  supervisory	  powers	  over	  charitable	  trusts.	  It	  will	  
usually	  only	  act	  to	  remove	  a	  trustee	  or	  intervene	  in	  a	  trust	  where	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
beneficiaries	  and	  the	  due	  administration	  of	  the	  trust	  are	  being	  affected.	  
	  
2.9.9  THE FIRST CHURCH OF CHRIST SCIENTIST, BRISBANE, AS TRUSTEE V THE 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND [2012] QSC 246 
(SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND, P MCMURDO J, 6 SEPTEMBER 2012) 
This	  case	  dealt	  with	  the	  proper	  application	  of	  funds	  held	  by	  the	  First	  Church	  of	  Christ	  Scientist	  
(the	  church)	  under	  a	  charitable	  trust.	  The	  church	  contended	  that	  the	  funds	  were	  held	  by	  it	  
under	  a	  charitable	  trust,	  the	  purpose	  of	  which	  was	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion	  and,	  more	  
specifically,	  the	  religion	  of	  Christian	  Science.	  The	  Attorney-­‐General	  contended	  that	  the	  funds	  
were	  held	  under	  a	  charitable	  trust,	  the	  purpose	  of	  which	  was	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty.	  	  
The	  funds	  held	  by	  the	  church	  resulted	  from	  a	  bequest	  made	  in	  1935	  by	  Thomas	  Reynolds	  who	  
died	  leaving	  most	  of	  his	  estate	  to	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  of	  Christ	  Scientist,	  Brisbane.	  
The	  estate	  included	  six	  real	  properties	  in	  Brisbane,	  of	  which	  two	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  case.	  
They	  were	  affected	  by	  a	  codicil	  to	  the	  deceased’s	  will	  and	  were	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘codicil	  
properties’	  during	  the	  case.	  The	  properties	  were	  held	  at	  times	  by	  the	  church’s	  directors	  and	  at	  
times	  by	  the	  church	  itself,	  until	  they	  were	  sold	  by	  the	  church	  in	  1997.	  The	  proceeds	  of	  sale	  
amounted	  to	  more	  than	  $2	  million.	  	  
For	  some	  years	  the	  parties	  had	  been	  corresponding	  about	  a	  cy-­‐près	  scheme	  which,	  in	  various	  
forms,	  had	  been	  proposed	  by	  the	  church.	  However,	  before	  a	  scheme	  could	  proceed	  there	  
needed	  to	  be	  a	  determination	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  charitable	  purpose	  applicable.	  Therefore	  
the	  church	  made	  this	  application,	  under	  section	  106	  of	  the	  Trusts	  Act	  1973	  (Qld),	  for	  directions	  
from	  the	  court.	  
The	  deceased	  made	  his	  will	  in	  1931.	  On	  1	  July	  of	  that	  year,	  the	  deceased	  executed	  a	  codicil	  to	  
his	  will	  which	  stated:	  
WHEREAS	  by	  my	  said	  Will	  I	  have	  left	  all	  the	  rest	  residue	  and	  remainder	  of	  my	  estate	  to	  
the	  Directors	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  of	  Christ	  Scientist	  Brisbane	  to	  be	  used	  by	  them	  for	  the	  
sole	  purpose	  of	   furthering	   the	   cause	  of	  Christian	  Science	   in	   the	  State	  of	  Queensland	  
only	   as	   shall	   be	   thought	   best	   absolutely	   I	   NOW	   DIRECT	   that	   my	   real	   property	   and	  
improvement	   thereon	   being	   [the	   codicil	   properties]	   ...	   shall	   not	   be	   sold	   by	   the	   said	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Directors	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  of	  Christ	  Scientist	  but	  shall	  be	  retained	  by	  them	  and	  shall	  
be	   used	   as	   a	   ‘Home’	   in	   connection	   with	   the	   said	   Church	   and	   be	   available	   to	   such	  
persons	  and	  on	  such	  terms	  and	  conditions	  as	  the	  said	  Directors	  shall	  in	  their	  absolute	  
discretion	  think	  fit	  ...	  [emphasis	  added]	  
The	  Attorney-­‐General	  relied	  on	  the	  words	  ‘shall	  be	  used	  as	  a	  ‘Home’...’	  (i.e.	  the	  words	  above	  in	  
italics)	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  contending	  that	  the	  funds	  should	  be	  applied	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  poverty.	  
Until	  1964,	  when	  the	  church	  became	  an	  incorporated	  body	  under	  the	  Churches	  of	  Christ,	  
Scientist,	  Incorporation	  Act	  1964	  (Qld),	  the	  First	  Church	  of	  Christ,	  Scientist,	  Brisbane	  was	  a	  
body	  or	  association	  incorporated	  by	  the	  grant	  of	  Letters	  Patent	  under	  the	  Religious	  
Educational	  and	  Charitable	  Institutions	  Act	  1861	  (Qld)	  (now	  repealed).	  The	  Letters	  Patent	  
constituted	  the	  persons	  from	  time	  to	  time	  holding	  the	  offices	  of	  president,	  clerk	  and	  treasurer	  
to	  be	  incorporated	  by	  the	  name	  and	  style	  of	  First	  Church	  of	  Christ,	  Scientist,	  Brisbane.	  Thus,	  
the	  church	  by	  that	  name	  was	  distinct	  from	  the	  board	  of	  directors.	  
After	  probate	  of	  the	  will	  and	  codicil	  was	  granted	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1935,	  the	  six	  properties,	  
including	  the	  codicil	  properties,	  were	  incorrectly	  transferred	  to	  the	  name	  of	  the	  church,	  rather	  
than	  to	  its	  directors	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  will.	  In	  1947,	  the	  court	  ordered	  that	  the	  four	  ‘will’	  
properties	  be	  vested	  in	  the	  directors	  rather	  than	  the	  church.	  Later,	  the	  two	  codicil	  properties	  
were	  also	  transferred	  to	  the	  control	  of	  the	  directors.	  The	  four	  ‘will’	  properties	  were	  then	  sold	  
and	  the	  proceeds	  applied	  to	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  two	  codicil	  properties,	  which	  were	  used	  
as	  hostels	  until	  they	  were	  sold	  in	  1997.	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  the	  will	  left	  the	  residue	  of	  the	  estate	  upon	  a	  charitable	  trust,	  the	  purpose	  
of	  which	  was	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  religion	  of	  Christian	  Science.	  That	  residue	  would	  have	  
included	  the	  two	  parcels	  which	  were	  subsequently	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  codicil.	  The	  question	  was	  
whether	  the	  codicil	  removed	  those	  properties	  from	  the	  charitable	  trust	  which	  was	  created	  by	  
the	  will.	  His	  Honour	  said	  on	  that	  point	  (at	  [13]):	  
As	  to	  that,	  the	  codicil	  is	  not	  in	  terms	  which	  at	  least	  plainly	  revoke	  the	  gift	  under	  the	  
will	  of	  any	  of	  the	  property	  within	  the	  residue.	  Rather,	  the	  codicil	  recited	  the	  effect	  of	  
the	  will	  upon	  the	  residue,	  before	  then	  expressing	  a	  direction	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  codicil	  
properties.	  As	  the	  church	  submits,	  the	  language	  of	  the	  codicil	  was	  not	  that	  of	  
revocation	  and	  re-­‐gifting.	  
The	  Attorney-­‐General	  argued	  that	  the	  codicil	  created	  a	  separate	  and	  distinct	  trust.	  His	  Honour	  
agreed	  (at	  [15]).	  However,	  what	  was	  the	  purpose	  of	  that	  separate	  trust?	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  
it	  was	  also	  a	  trust	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion.	  The	  church	  held	  the	  codicil	  properties,	  and	  
now	  held	  their	  proceeds	  of	  sale,	  upon	  the	  trust	  created	  by	  the	  codicil,	  which	  was	  a	  charitable	  
trust	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  religion	  of	  Christian	  Science	  in	  Queensland.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  applicant	  church	  was	  directed	  to	  administer	  the	  trust	  accordingly.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/qld/QSC/2012/246.html	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
There	  was	  no	  disagreement	  in	  this	  case	  that	  this	  was	  a	  charitable	  trust.	  The	  argument	  was	  as	  
to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  charitable	  trust.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  turned	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  words	  used	  in	  the	  codicil	  to	  the	  will,	  and	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  Churches	  of	  Christ,	  Scientist,	  
Incorporation	  Act	  1964	  (Qld),	  particularly	  at	  section	  2	  and	  3.	  His	  Honour	  held	  that,	  as	  the	  
properties	  were	  vested	  in	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  church	  and	  not	  the	  church	  itself,	  they	  were	  not	  
affected	  by	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Act.	  Although	  the	  properties	  were	  returned	  to	  the	  church	  in	  
1997,	  just	  before	  they	  were	  sold,	  this	  was	  merely	  a	  change	  of	  trustee.	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  
[24]):	  ‘The	  1997	  instrument	  can	  be	  interpreted	  consistently	  with	  its	  being	  not	  a	  purported	  
variation	  of	  a	  trust,	  but	  an	  instrument	  to	  effect	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  new	  trustee	  under	  the	  
same	  trust’.	  Thus,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  charitable	  trust	  continued	  as	  one	  which	  was	  for	  the	  
advancement	  of	  religion.	  
	  
2.9.10  TUHOE CHARITABLE TRUST BOARD [2012] NZHC 1952 (NEW ZEALAND HIGH 
COURT, WOOLFORD J, 14 AUGUST 2012) 
In	  this	  New	  Zealand	  case,	  the	  trustees	  of	  three	  trusts	  associated	  with	  Ngai	  Tuhoe	  (the	  Tuhoe	  
people,	  a	  Maori	  tribal	  group),	  which	  are	  administered	  by	  the	  Tuhoe	  Charitable	  Trust	  Board,	  the	  
Tuhoe	  Fisheries	  Charitable	  Trust	  Board	  and	  the	  Tuhoe-­‐Waikaremoana	  Maori	  Trust	  Board,	  
applied	  to	  vary	  the	  purposes	  and	  the	  mode	  of	  administration	  of	  those	  trusts.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  
application	  was	  to	  seek	  court	  approval	  to	  amalgamate	  the	  three	  separate	  trusts	  into	  one	  trust.	  
This	  application	  was	  the	  start	  of	  the	  process,	  and	  required	  ratification	  by	  a	  75%	  vote	  of	  a	  group	  
meeting	  of	  the	  Tuhoe.	  
All	  three	  trusts	  had	  broadly	  similar	  objects	  and	  operated	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  Ngai	  Tuhoe.	  The	  
Ngai	  Tuhoe	  wished	  preferably	  to	  combine	  its	  separate	  asset	  management	  structures	  into	  a	  
single	  post-­‐settlement	  governance	  entity.	  As	  part	  of	  this	  process	  the	  Tuhoe	  wished	  to	  
amalgamate	  those	  entities	  that	  carried	  out	  charitable	  activities	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  Tuhoe	  
into	  one	  charitable	  trust.	  	  
The	  trustees	  were	  also	  concerned	  about	  the	  administrative	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  operating	  
three	  separate	  trusts,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  compliance	  costs	  under	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2005,	  
as	  well	  as	  in	  making	  investment	  and	  distribution	  decisions	  that	  benefited	  the	  whole	  iwi	  (people	  
or	  nation).	  
The	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1957	  imposes	  certain	  responsibilities	  on	  the	  Attorney-­‐General,	  who	  
is	  traditionally	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  protector	  of	  charities.	  These	  responsibilities	  are	  delegated	  to	  
the	  Solicitor-­‐General	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  The	  Solicitor-­‐General,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Attorney-­‐General,	  
reports	  on,	  or	  approves,	  schemes	  to	  vary	  charitable	  trusts,	  and	  may	  appear	  as	  a	  party	  to	  
charity	  proceedings	  and	  act	  for	  the	  beneficial	  interest	  to	  enforce	  charitable	  purposes.	  The	  
Solicitor-­‐General	  may	  also	  investigate	  the	  management	  and	  administration	  of	  charitable	  trusts	  
in	  the	  public	  interest.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Solicitor-­‐General	  submitted	  a	  report	  to	  the	  court	  which	  
supported	  the	  amalgamation	  in	  most	  respects.	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The	  Tuhoe-­‐Waikaremoana	  Maori	  Trust	  Board	  is	  a	  body	  corporate	  constituted	  under	  section	  9A	  
of	  the	  Maori	  Trust	  Boards	  Act	  1955,	  and	  holds	  its	  assets	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  that	  Act.	  
The	  charitable	  trust	  administered	  by	  the	  Tuhoe-­‐Waikaremoana	  Maori	  Trust	  Board	  was	  
established	  by	  a	  Declaration	  of	  Trust	  executed	  on	  12	  March	  1982	  (the	  1982	  Declaration)	  
pursuant	  to	  section	  24B	  of	  the	  Maori	  Trust	  Boards	  Act	  (the	  section	  24B	  trust).	  The	  assets	  to	  
which	  the	  1982	  Declaration	  relates	  are	  listed	  in	  the	  schedule	  to	  the	  Declaration	  and	  include	  
the	  Tuhoe	  portion	  of	  the	  bed	  of	  Lake	  Waikaremoana,	  and	  some	  other	  trust	  lands	  held	  under	  
the	  Te	  Ture	  Whenua	  Maori	  Act	  1993.	  The	  section	  24B	  trust	  is	  a	  registered	  charity.	  
The	  Tuhoe	  Fisheries	  Charitable	  Trust	  was	  established	  by	  deed	  executed	  on	  16	  August	  2006,	  
and	  is	  registered	  as	  a	  Board	  under	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1957.	  It	  was	  established	  in	  order	  to	  
act	  as	  Tuhoe’s	  mandated	  iwi	  organisation	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Maori	  Fisheries	  Act	  2004	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  Tuhoe’s	  fisheries	  settlement.	  The	  trust	  deed	  was	  based	  on	  a	  template	  document	  
provided	  by	  Te	  Ohu	  Kai	  Moana,	  which	  is	  the	  entity	  established	  under	  the	  Maori	  Fisheries	  Act	  
2004	  to	  distribute	  and	  administer	  fisheries	  settlement	  assets.	  The	  Fisheries	  Trust	  is	  a	  
registered	  charity	  under	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2005.	  
The	  Tuhoe	  Charitable	  Trust	  was	  established	  by	  a	  Deed	  executed	  on	  31	  July	  2010.	  The	  settlors	  
of	  this	  trust	  were	  the	  trustees	  of	  the	  Tuhoe	  Establishment	  Trust	  (since	  renamed	  the	  Tuhoe	  
Trust),	  which	  was	  itself	  established	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  becoming	  Tuhoe’s	  post-­‐settlement	  
governance	  entity	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  settlement	  of	  Treaty	  claims.	  The	  Tuhoe	  Charitable	  
Trust	  was	  established	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  charitable	  activities	  which	  could	  not	  be	  undertaken	  
by	  the	  Tuhoe	  Trust	  itself	  (which	  is	  a	  private	  trust).	  This	  trust	  is	  also	  registered	  as	  a	  Board	  under	  
the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1957	  and	  is	  a	  registered	  charity	  under	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2005.	  
Variation	  of	  charitable	  trusts	  is	  dealt	  with	  by	  section	  32	  of	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1957.	  It	  
provides	  that	  where	  any	  property	  or	  income	  is	  given	  or	  held	  upon	  trust,	  or	  is	  to	  be	  applied,	  for	  
any	  charitable	  purpose,	  and	  it	  is	  ‘impossible	  or	  impracticable	  or	  inexpedient	  to	  carry	  out	  that	  
purpose’,	  the	  property	  and	  income	  shall	  be	  disposed	  of	  for	  some	  other	  charitable	  purpose	  in	  
the	  manner	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  Part	  III	  of	  the	  Act.	  Previous	  decisions	  of	  the	  High	  
Court	  of	  New	  Zealand	  have	  held	  that	  those	  promoting	  a	  scheme	  under	  Part	  III	  of	  the	  Act	  
should	  seek	  to	  substitute	  beneficiaries	  or	  purposes	  resembling,	  as	  closely	  as	  possible	  in	  the	  
changed	  circumstances,	  those	  specified	  by	  the	  original	  settlor.	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  court’s	  powers	  in	  relation	  to	  schemes	  under	  Part	  III	  of	  the	  Act	  
allowed	  approval	  of	  amalgamations	  of	  the	  sort	  proposed	  in	  this	  case.	  He	  said	  (at	  [39]):	  
...cases	  show	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  jurisdiction	  under	  s	  32	  to	  make	  an	  order	  
amalgamating	  multiple	  charitable	  trusts	  into	  a	  single	  trust,	  provided	  that	  the	  statutory	  
conditions	  for	  variation	  of	  trust	  are	  met,	  that	  is,	  the	  applicants	  must	  still	  show	  that	  it	  
has	  become	  inexpedient,	  impracticable,	  or	  impossible	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  original	  
purposes	  of	  the	  individual	  trusts.	  
The	  applicants	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  impossibility	  but	  rather	  inexpedience	  and	  impracticability.	  They	  
cited	  in	  support	  of	  this	  claim	  unnecessary	  administration	  costs,	  unnecessary	  investment	  risks,	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the	  need	  to	  keep	  separate	  iwi	  rolls	  with	  resultant	  confusion	  and	  frustration	  for	  iwi	  members,	  
and	  the	  benefits	  of	  combining	  assets.	  
Case	  law	  showed	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  of	  New	  Zealand	  thought	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  
inexpediency	  introduced	  a	  value	  judgement	  rather	  than	  simply	  an	  assessment	  of	  feasibility,	  
and	  that	  the	  general	  connotation	  of	  the	  word	  was	  of	  the	  original	  charitable	  purposes	  having	  
become	  unsuitable,	  inadvisable,	  or	  inapt.	  On	  this	  point,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [53]–[54]):	  
However,	  the	  Court	  also	  stressed	  that	  the	  test	  was	  not	  whether	  the	  scheme	  would	  
carry	  out	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  trust	  better	  than	  the	  existing	  arrangements.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  
question	  of	  comparing	  the	  utility	  or	  expediency	  of	  the	  existing	  trusts	  as	  against	  the	  
proposed	  scheme.	  The	  test	  was	  whether	  it	  was	  inexpedient	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  original	  
purposes	  of	  the	  trust....	  I	  am	  of	  the	  view	  that,	  in	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  duplication	  of	  
administration	  and	  compliance	  costs,	  and	  the	  current	  inability	  to	  align	  investment	  
strategies,	  pool	  resources	  and	  make	  joint	  distribution	  decisions,	  make	  it	  inexpedient	  
for	  the	  three	  charities	  to	  continue	  separately.	  
His	  Honour	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  three	  trusts	  were	  very	  similar,	  and	  there	  
would	  be	  no	  detriment	  in	  amalgamating	  them.	  The	  only	  amendment	  of	  objects	  required	  would	  
relate	  to	  the	  trust	  being	  the	  mandated	  iwi	  organisation.	  On	  this	  point,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  
[57]–[58]):	  
I	  am,	  however,	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  Tuhoe	  Charitable	  Trust	  and	  of	  the	  
Tuhoe	  Fisheries	  Charitable	  Trust	  are	  very	  similar.	  The	  purposes	  set	  out	  in	  the	  s	  24B	  
trust,	  while	  more	  detailed,	  are	  also	  in	  a	  similar	  vein.	  All	  three	  sets	  of	  objects	  are	  
broadly	  concerned	  with	  benefiting	  Ngai	  Tuhoe	  in	  a	  charitable	  manner,	  whether	  
through	  the	  promotion	  of	  health,	  education,	  social	  welfare,	  or	  other	  means.	  I	  also	  note	  
that	  one	  of	  the	  existing	  purposes	  of	  the	  Tuhoe	  Fisheries	  Charitable	  Trust	  is	  to	  act	  as	  
the	  mandated	  iwi	  organisation	  for	  Tuhoe,	  and	  that	  the	  amalgamated	  trust	  is	  also	  
intended	  to	  function	  as	  Tuhoe’s	  mandated	  iwi	  organisation.	  As	  the	  s	  24B	  trust	  and	  the	  
Tuhoe	  Charitable	  Trust	  do	  not	  currently	  have	  any	  similar	  purposes,	  the	  amalgamation	  
will	  involve	  a	  variation	  of	  their	  purposes	  to	  include	  the	  mandated	  iwi	  organisation	  
purpose.	  In	  the	  circumstances,	  and	  given	  the	  legislative	  provision	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  
mandated	  iwi	  organisation	  status	  to	  another	  entity,	  I	  consider	  this	  amendment	  to	  be	  
appropriate.	  
In	  addition,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  three	  sets	  of	  beneficiaries	  were	  effectively	  the	  same.	  He	  
said	  that	  although	  in	  the	  past	  there	  had	  been	  doubt	  over	  whether	  trusts	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  iwi	  
groups	  could	  be	  charitable,	  New	  Zealand	  law	  did	  now	  recognise	  trusts	  of	  that	  type	  as	  capable	  
of	  being	  charitable.	  Although	  charitable	  trusts	  do	  not	  have	  individual	  beneficiaries,	  charitable	  
trusts	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  iwi	  groups	  were	  often	  expressed	  as	  being	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  
beneficiaries.	  	  
Overall,	  his	  conclusions	  were	  (at	  [72]):	  
(a)	  The	  purposes	  of	  the	  three	  existing	  trusts	  were	  charitable.	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(b)	  The	  substituted	  arrangements	  under	  the	  proposed	  amalgamation	  were	  also	  
charitable.	  
(c)	  The	  proposed	  changes	  appeared	  to	  accord	  as	  closely	  as	  is	  reasonably	  possible	  in	  the	  
circumstances	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  original	  trusts.	  
(d)	  The	  proposed	  amalgamation	  was	  appropriate	  and	  would	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
intended	  beneficiaries	  and	  of	  the	  public.	  
Therefore,	  the	  amalgamation	  proposal	  for	  the	  three	  trusts	  was	  approved.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2012/1952.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
In	  trust	  law,	  private	  trusts	  are	  trusts	  for	  persons	  and	  charitable	  trusts	  are	  trusts	  for	  charitable	  
purposes.	  Therefore,	  charitable	  trusts	  usually	  lack	  beneficiaries	  unless	  they	  are	  for	  the	  benefit	  
of	  a	  group	  of	  ‘ultimate	  beneficiaries’	  who	  constitute	  a	  sufficient	  section	  of	  the	  community	  to	  
meet	  the	  public	  benefit	  (as	  opposed	  to	  private	  benefit)	  test	  for	  charities.	  Maori	  trusts	  are	  akin	  
to	  the	  latter	  type	  of	  charitable	  trust,	  where	  there	  are	  beneficiaries,	  but	  they	  are	  still	  classified	  
as	  charitable	  trusts.	  In	  traditional	  trust	  law,	  classes	  of	  beneficiaries	  would	  not	  meet	  the	  ‘public’	  
benefit	  test	  if	  they	  were	  linked	  to	  the	  settlor	  by	  blood	  or	  family.	  However,	  New	  Zealand	  law	  
recognises	  Maori	  trusts	  based	  on	  blood	  lines	  and	  family	  as	  charitable.	  
	  
2.9.11  SAWDON ESTATE [2012] ONSC 4042 (ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, 
RICHETTI J, 23 JULY 2012) 
In	  this	  Canadian	  case,	  the	  question	  arose	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  dispositions	  in	  a	  will.	  The	  residuary	  
beneficiary	  under	  the	  will	  of	  Arthur	  Sawdon	  (the	  deceased)	  was	  The	  Watch	  Tower	  Bible	  and	  
Tract	  Society	  of	  Canada	  (Watch	  Tower),	  a	  charity	  and	  the	  corporate	  entity	  which	  acts	  as	  the	  
legal	  arm	  of	  the	  religious	  community	  of	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses	  in	  Canada.	  However,	  the	  Watch	  
Tower	  attempted	  to	  obtain	  further	  amounts	  from	  the	  estate.	  	  
The	  deceased	  had	  formed	  a	  company	  in	  the	  Cayman	  Islands	  for	  tax	  reasons.	  He	  held	  a	  75%	  
interest	  in	  the	  company	  and	  his	  five	  children	  the	  remaining	  25%	  interest.	  The	  assets	  in	  the	  
company	  were	  administered	  by	  a	  trust	  company,	  CIBC.	  The	  case	  turned	  on	  the	  fate	  of	  seven	  
joint	  bank	  accounts,	  totalling	  $1,075,872.83.	  These	  accounts	  had	  been	  held	  jointly	  by	  the	  
deceased	  and	  two	  of	  his	  sons.	  	  
The	  deceased’s	  lawyer	  was	  Mr	  Pole,	  who	  set	  up	  the	  company	  in	  the	  Cayman	  Islands	  for	  the	  
deceased,	  and	  prepared	  his	  will	  documents.	  Two	  wills	  were	  prepared,	  one	  in	  2004	  and	  one	  in	  
2006.	  The	  2004	  will	  provided	  that	  the	  estate	  was	  to	  be	  divided	  into	  five	  parts,	  one	  part	  for	  
each	  of	  his	  children	  or	  their	  issue.	  If	  one	  of	  the	  deceased’s	  children	  died	  without	  issue,	  that	  
particular	  child’s	  share	  was	  to	  go	  to	  the	  Watch	  Tower.	  The	  2006	  will	  was	  prepared	  on	  5	  July	  
2006	  along	  with	  a	  purported	  Transfer	  and	  Assignment	  to	  the	  Watch	  Tower	  of	  the	  deceased’s	  
75%	  share	  in	  the	  Cayman	  Islands	  company.	  The	  will	  left	  substantially	  more	  of	  the	  deceased’s	  
assets	  to	  the	  Watch	  Tower	  by	  not	  acknowledging	  the	  fact	  that	  joint	  bank	  accounts	  existed.	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Joint	  bank	  accounts	  would	  not	  have	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  deceased’s	  estate	  (as	  would	  be	  the	  
case	  in	  Australia).	  
Although	  by	  this	  stage	  Pole	  had	  been	  the	  family’s	  lawyer	  for	  more	  than	  12	  years,	  he	  had	  not	  
disclosed	  to	  the	  deceased	  that	  he	  was	  an	  Elder	  of	  the	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses,	  and	  that	  he	  had	  
acted	  as	  counsel	  for	  the	  Watch	  Tower	  in	  the	  past.	  After	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Transfer	  and	  
Assignment	  document,	  Pole	  travelled	  to	  the	  Cayman	  Islands	  with	  the	  document	  to	  effect	  the	  
transfer	  of	  the	  assets	  to	  the	  Watch	  Tower,	  but	  the	  trustee,	  CIBC,	  refused	  to	  recognise	  or	  act	  
upon	  the	  document.	  Pole	  informed	  the	  deceased	  that,	  notwithstanding	  this	  refusal,	  the	  
residue	  of	  the	  estate	  would	  include	  his	  share	  of	  the	  Cayman	  Islands	  company.	  
Some	  weeks	  after	  the	  2006	  will	  was	  executed,	  the	  deceased	  transferred	  more	  of	  his	  assets	  
(about	  a	  further	  60%	  in	  total)	  from	  the	  Cayman	  Islands	  company	  into	  joint	  accounts	  with	  his	  
sons.	  His	  Honour	  had	  already	  pointed	  to	  the	  plethora	  of	  evidence	  that	  indicated	  that	  the	  
deceased	  clearly	  intended	  to	  excise	  the	  joint	  accounts	  from	  his	  estate,	  and	  said	  that	  this	  late	  
change	  further	  illustrated	  that	  the	  deceased	  did	  not	  want	  the	  assets	  transferred	  to	  be	  included	  
in	  his	  estate.	  
The	  deceased	  died	  on	  27	  March	  2007.	  After	  his	  death,	  Pole	  wrote	  to	  the	  executor	  (the	  eldest	  
of	  the	  deceased’s	  sons)	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  Watch	  Tower	  was	  now	  the	  majority	  holder	  of	  the	  
Cayman	  Islands	  company	  shares,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  75%	  share	  had	  been	  transferred	  to	  the	  
Watch	  Tower	  inter	  vivos	  (while	  the	  deceased	  was	  still	  alive).	  This	  was	  based	  on	  the	  Transfer	  
and	  Assignment	  document	  which	  had	  been	  refused	  by	  the	  Cayman	  Islands	  company’s	  trustee.	  
He	  also	  wrote	  to	  the	  trustee	  threatening	  legal	  action	  if	  the	  transfer	  was	  not	  accomplished	  
immediately.	  
His	  Honour	  took	  a	  predictably	  dim	  view	  of	  Pole’s	  actions.	  As	  a	  lawyer,	  he	  should	  have	  disclosed	  
the	  very	  clear	  conflict	  of	  interest	  which	  existed	  in	  his	  dealings	  with	  the	  deceased.	  His	  Honour	  
found	  that	  his	  actions	  were	  biased	  towards	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses.	  His	  
Honour	  said	  on	  this	  point	  (at	  [51]):	  
I	  find	  it	  surprising	  and	  questionable	  that	  Mr.	  Pole	  would	  not	  disclose	  a	  conflict	  or	  even	  
a	  potential	  conflict	  that	  he	  was	  an	  ‘elder’	  or	  ‘lay	  minister’	  with	  the	  Jehovah’s	  Witness	  
church	  and	  had	  acted	  for	  the	  Jehovah’s	  Witness	  church	  prior	  to	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  
2004	  Will	  or	  the	  July	  2006	  Will	  or	  the	  Transfer	  and	  Assignment.	  Mr.	  Pole’s	  reason	  for	  
not	  doing	  so	  –	  because	  he	  wasn’t	  wearing	  his	  Jehovah’s	  Witness	  ‘hat’	  at	  the	  time	  –	  is	  
simply	  not	  a	  good	  answer.	  Arthur	  Sawdon	  and	  the	  other	  shareholders	  of	  Sawdon	  
Holdings	  were	  entitled	  to	  know	  all	  of	  Mr.	  Pole’s	  ‘hats’	  when	  Mr.	  Pole	  provided	  advice	  
or	  prepared	  documents	  for	  Arthur	  Sawdon....	  upon	  Arthur	  Sawdon’s	  death,	  Mr.	  Pole’s	  
actions	  in	  his	  attempts	  and	  threatens	  [sic]	  to	  get	  an	  immediate	  transfer	  of	  the	  shares	  
of	  Sawdon	  Holdings	  to	  the	  Watch	  Tower,	  not	  as	  a	  residual	  beneficiary	  but	  as	  an	  inter	  
vivos	  gift,	  gives	  the	  appearance	  of	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Watch	  Tower.	  Mr.	  Pole’s	  
explanation	  that	  he	  did	  this	  to	  avoid	  estate	  fees	  was	  not	  a	  credible	  explanation....	  
His	  Honour	  went	  on	  to	  find	  that	  the	  deceased	  had	  the	  clear	  intention	  of	  creating	  joint	  bank	  
accounts	  with	  his	  sons,	  and	  that	  he	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  make	  any	  inter	  vivos	  gift	  to	  the	  Watch	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Tower.	  Nor	  did	  the	  deceased	  make	  any	  gift	  of	  the	  interest	  on	  the	  accounts	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
accounts	  themselves)	  to	  the	  Watch	  Tower.	  As	  the	  ‘gift’	  of	  the	  joint	  accounts	  to	  his	  sons	  was	  
not	  a	  testamentary	  disposition,	  they	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  estate.	  
Therefore,	  the	  Watch	  Tower	  failed	  in	  its	  bid	  to	  obtain	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  joint	  accounts.	  They	  
were	  entitled	  to	  the	  residuary	  of	  the	  estate	  under	  the	  will,	  but	  as	  most	  of	  the	  assets	  had	  been	  
transferred	  to	  joint	  accounts,	  very	  little	  remained	  to	  be	  distributed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc4042/2012onsc4042.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  has	  been	  in	  the	  courts	  since	  2010,	  when	  there	  was	  an	  initial	  attempt	  by	  one	  of	  the	  
sons	  of	  the	  deceased	  to	  have	  the	  2006	  will	  declared	  invalid	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  medical	  
condition	  of	  the	  deceased	  when	  he	  made	  the	  will.	  That	  application	  was	  denied	  as	  the	  evidence	  
pointed	  to	  the	  deceased’s	  good	  health	  at	  the	  time.	  In	  the	  same	  application,	  the	  Watch	  Tower	  
attempted	  to	  stop	  distributions	  from	  the	  estate,	  and	  payment	  of	  various	  fees.	  This	  was	  in	  
order	  to	  preserve	  the	  amount	  to	  which	  they	  might	  have	  been	  entitled.	  This	  decision	  disposed	  
of	  any	  attempt	  by	  the	  charity	  to	  have	  other	  than	  the	  residuary	  from	  the	  will,	  which	  had	  been	  
the	  deceased’s	  intention	  from	  the	  beginning.	  
The	  case	  also	  highlights	  the	  conflict	  of	  interest	  which	  will	  arise	  when	  someone	  associated	  with	  
a	  charity	  to	  benefit	  under	  a	  will	  is	  also	  acting	  as	  the	  testator’s	  solicitor,	  or	  in	  another	  
professional	  capacity,	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  will	  or	  property	  distribution.	  The	  solicitor	  in	  this	  
case	  should	  have	  disclosed	  his	  connection	  to	  the	  charity	  and	  ceased	  acting	  for	  the	  testator	  
unless	  there	  was	  fully	  informed	  consent.	  
	  
2.9.12  TASMANIAN PERPETUAL TRUSTEES LTD V ROURKE [2012] TASSC 44 (SUPREME 
COURT OF TASMANIA, EVANS J, 4 JULY 2012) 
This	  case	  involved	  a	  challenge	  to	  a	  will	  in	  which	  the	  deceased	  had	  left	  her	  entire	  estate	  to	  the	  
St	  Luke's	  Anglican	  Association	  to	  be	  used	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  ‘the	  Manor’	  at	  Kings	  Meadows,	  
Launceston.	  The	  deceased,	  Betty	  Atherton,	  resided	  at	  the	  Manor	  at	  the	  time	  of	  her	  death.	  
The	  plaintiff,	  Tasmanian	  Perpetual	  Trustees	  Ltd	  (TPT),	  was	  the	  executor	  and	  trustee	  of	  a	  will	  of	  
Betty	  Cobden	  Atherton,	  dated	  28	  March	  1995.	  Mrs	  Atherton	  died	  on	  16	  June	  2007.	  The	  
plaintiff	  applied	  to	  propound	  this	  will.	  	  
The	  defendant,	  Robyn	  Rourke,	  was	  one	  of	  Mrs	  Atherton's	  two	  children.	  She	  opposed	  the	  will	  
on	  grounds	  that	  included	  a	  claim	  that	  Mrs	  Atherton	  was	  not	  of	  sound	  mind,	  memory	  and	  
understanding	  when	  she	  gave	  instructions	  for	  and	  executed	  the	  will.	  	  
A	  testator	  must	  have	  the	  necessary	  mental	  capacity	  to	  make	  a	  valid	  will.	  This	  is	  often	  referred	  
to	  legally	  as	  ‘a	  testator	  must	  be	  of	  sound	  mind,	  memory	  and	  understanding’.	  The	  defendant	  
contended	  that	  Mrs	  Atherton	  was	  not	  of	  sound	  mind,	  as	  she	  was	  suffering	  from	  dementia,	  a	  
symptom	  of	  which	  was	  a	  paranoid	  delusion	  that	  the	  defendant	  stole	  Mrs	  Atherton's	  motor	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vehicle	  and,	  more	  particularly,	  that	  the	  defendant	  had	  kept	  the	  proceeds	  of	  selling	  it.	  This	  was	  
untrue.	  
The	  deceased	  had	  made	  a	  number	  of	  wills	  or	  drafts	  of	  wills	  before	  the	  1995	  will.	  These	  were:	  
• Will	  dated	  10	  December	  1980	  	  
• Draft	  will	  dated	  11	  March	  1988	  	  
• Draft	  will	  dated	  18	  April	  1988	  	  
• Will	  dated	  23	  January	  1992	  	  
• Will	  dated	  9	  August	  1993	  	  
• Will	  dated	  25	  October	  1993	  	  
• Will	  dated	  1	  December	  1993	  
All	  the	  wills	  previous	  to	  the	  1995	  one,	  which	  left	  the	  entire	  estate	  to	  St	  Luke’s,	  made	  some	  
form	  of	  provision	  for	  the	  deceased’s	  children	  and	  grandchildren,	  though	  the	  proportions	  and	  
reasons	  for	  them	  varied.	  The	  most	  recent	  previous	  will	  (1993)	  left	  the	  deceased’s	  estate	  in	  the	  
proportion	  of	  two-­‐thirds	  to	  the	  defendant,	  and	  one-­‐third	  to	  be	  divided	  between	  five	  of	  Mrs	  
Atherton's	  grandchildren.	  
The	  law	  on	  soundness	  of	  mind	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  making	  a	  will	  is	  well-­‐established.	  If	  
testamentary	  capacity	  is	  not	  established,	  the	  will	  is	  void.	  The	  burden	  of	  proving	  testamentary	  
capacity	  lies	  on	  the	  person	  propounding	  the	  will	  (in	  this	  case	  TPT).	  Feebleness,	  grave	  illness	  or	  
extreme	  age	  are	  not	  sufficient	  of	  themselves	  to	  disentitle	  the	  testator	  of	  the	  right	  to	  dispose	  of	  
his	  or	  her	  property	  by	  will.	  It	  will	  only	  do	  so	  if	  age	  or	  illness	  so	  affected	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  testator	  
that	  testamentary	  capacity	  was	  lacking.	  
His	  Honour	  referred	  to	  case	  law	  which	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  evidence	  raises	  a	  
doubt	  about	  the	  testator's	  testamentary	  capacity,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  there	  be	  a	  vigilant	  
examination	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  evidence	  (at	  [8]).	  The	  standard	  of	  proof	  is	  the	  balance	  of	  
probabilities.	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  deceased’s	  incapacity	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
the	  1995	  will	  was	  very	  strong.	  
The	  deceased	  had	  entered	  an	  independent	  living	  unit	  at	  the	  Manor	  in	  1993	  after	  a	  series	  of	  
mini-­‐strokes.	  She	  suffered	  progressive	  deteriorating	  memory	  loss	  thereafter.	  An	  Aged	  Care	  
Assessment	  Team	  assessment	  in	  1994	  found	  that	  she	  ‘becoming	  increasingly	  forgetful	  and	  
suffering	  from	  memory	  loss	  and	  anxiety,	  and	  said	  there	  had	  been	  instances	  of	  inappropriate	  
behaviour	  and	  fabrication’.	  She	  had	  given	  her	  car	  to	  her	  daughter	  (the	  defendant)	  to	  sell	  in	  
1994.	  This	  was	  done	  and	  the	  money	  was	  deposited	  into	  the	  deceased’s	  bank	  account.	  But	  she	  
continued	  to	  be	  very	  confused	  about	  the	  sale,	  and	  thought	  the	  defendant	  had	  stolen	  it.	  
Medical	  opinion	  at	  the	  time	  was	  that	  the	  deceased	  was	  suffering	  from	  dementia.	  She	  was	  
moved	  into	  hostel	  care	  in	  January	  1995.	  
The	  deceased	  attempted	  to	  change	  her	  power	  of	  attorney	  arrangements	  as	  well	  as	  her	  will	  in	  
1995.	  Medical	  opinion	  at	  that	  time	  was	  that	  she	  lacked	  capacity.	  Her	  solicitor	  refused	  to	  act	  to	  
change	  her	  power	  of	  attorney	  arrangements,	  but	  the	  deceased	  used	  a	  trust	  officer	  at	  TPT	  to	  
make	  her	  new	  will.	  The	  new	  will	  was	  made	  leaving	  the	  deceased’s	  entire	  estate	  to	  St	  Luke’s.	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His	  Honour	  said	  that	  he	  had	  ‘no	  doubt’	  that	  the	  deceased	  lacked	  capacity	  to	  make	  the	  new	  will	  
(at	  [29]).	  She	  was	  suffering	  paranoid	  delusions	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  gave	  incorrect	  and	  incomplete	  
instructions	  as	  to	  her	  children	  to	  TPT.	  The	  1995	  will	  was	  invalid.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/tas/TASSC/2012/44.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Where	  a	  will-­‐maker	  leaves	  an	  entire	  estate	  to	  charity,	  there	  will	  always	  be	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  
challenge	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  will	  by	  family	  members.	  There	  was	  no	  suggestion	  here	  that	  there	  
had	  been	  any	  undue	  influence	  on	  the	  deceased,	  but	  rather	  the	  case	  was	  about	  testamentary	  
capacity.	  Where	  a	  will-­‐maker	  is	  elderly	  or	  infirm,	  medical	  opinion	  as	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  will-­‐
maker	  must	  always	  be	  sought	  before	  a	  new	  will	  is	  prepared.	  The	  claims	  of	  children	  and	  others	  
under	  family	  provision	  laws	  must	  also	  be	  pointed	  out	  to	  will-­‐makers	  before	  a	  will	  is	  prepared	  
that	  disinherits	  family	  members	  entirely.	  
	  
2.9.13  CURRELL V BALDOCK; ESTATE OF CURRELL [2012] NSWSC 705 (SUPREME 
COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, WHITE J, 6 JUNE 2012) 
This	  was	  another	  case	  where	  charities	  left	  a	  bequest	  in	  a	  will	  received	  less	  than	  expected.	  
However,	  this	  was	  not	  because	  of	  a	  family	  provision	  claim,	  but	  because	  the	  deceased’s	  
intentions	  were	  unclear.	  There	  were	  several	  ‘will’	  documents	  in	  contention.	  Two	  of	  the	  
documents	  in	  question,	  were	  not	  executed	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  section	  6	  of	  
the	  Succession	  Act	  2006	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act),	  and	  all	  had	  hand-­‐written	  amendments.	  
It	  had	  to	  be	  decided:	  
• Whether	  the	  hand-­‐written	  amendments	  constituted	  alterations	  to	  the	  wills;	  and	  
• Which	  of	  the	  will	  documents	  was	  valid,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  will	  document	  
revoked	  the	  previous	  ones.	  
The	  estate	  was	  modest,	  being	  around	  $430,000	  in	  total	  (net).	  In	  the	  first	  will,	  the	  deceased	  left	  
$10	  to	  each	  of	  her	  three	  elder	  daughters.	  His	  Honour	  was	  satisfied	  that	  this	  will	  was	  revoked	  
by	  the	  second	  will.	  This	  will	  again	  left	  $10	  to	  each	  of	  her	  three	  elder	  daughters,	  but	  also	  
disposed	  of	  a	  car	  and	  the	  proceeds	  of	  a	  bank	  account	  to	  her	  youngest	  daughter.	  The	  bulk	  of	  
the	  estate,	  expressed	  as	  ‘any	  money	  I	  have’	  was	  left	  70%	  to	  the	  Heart	  Foundation	  of	  New	  
South	  Wales,	  and	  30%	  to	  St	  Vincent’s	  Hospital	  Sydney.	  This	  would	  have	  included	  the	  
deceased’s	  house	  and	  contents.	  
The	  other	  two	  documents	  in	  contention	  were	  hand-­‐written	  and	  described	  as	  ‘The	  Last	  will	  and	  
Testament’	  of	  the	  deceased.	  They	  were	  unsigned,	  but	  made	  in	  circumstances	  that	  indicated	  an	  
intention	  to	  make	  a	  will	  which	  the	  deceased	  considered	  ‘right’.	  In	  the	  last	  of	  these	  two	  
documents,	  the	  deceased	  left	  $10	  to	  each	  of	  her	  three	  elder	  daughters,	  but	  left	  her	  car	  and	  her	  
home	  and	  contents	  for	  the	  use	  of	  her	  youngest	  daughter.	  The	  home	  and	  contents	  were	  left	  to	  
the	  youngest	  daughter	  ‘for	  as	  long	  as	  she	  needs	  them’.	  In	  the	  alternative,	  the	  home	  and	  
contents	  could	  be	  sold	  to	  provide	  ‘a	  small	  house	  or	  unit’	  for	  the	  youngest	  daughter.	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The	  document	  contained	  no	  revocation	  clause.	  It	  had	  several	  alterations	  made	  in	  different	  
coloured	  inks,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  initialled,	  and	  some	  of	  which	  were	  not.	  Nevertheless,	  His	  
Honour	  formed	  the	  view	  that	  the	  document	  was	  a	  will	  of	  the	  deceased.	  Did	  this	  document	  in	  
any	  way	  revoke	  the	  second	  will?	  
The	  Court	  will	  attempt	  to	  construe	  wills	  not	  containing	  revocation	  clauses	  as	  standing	  
together,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  later	  will	  should	  prevail	  over	  the	  earlier	  one	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  any	  
inconsistency.	  It	  is	  only	  to	  avoid	  inconsistency	  that	  the	  prior	  testamentary	  instrument	  will	  be	  
disturbed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  revocation	  clause.	  Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  declared	  that	  both	  the	  
second	  will	  and	  the	  final	  document	  formed	  the	  will	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  probate,	  and	  should	  be	  
read	  together.	  
The	  outcome	  was	  that	  the	  youngest	  daughter	  received	  the	  right	  to	  live	  in	  the	  home	  and	  use	  
the	  contents,	  and	  if	  that	  were	  to	  come	  to	  an	  end,	  the	  home	  was	  to	  be	  sold	  to	  provide	  other	  
accommodation	  for	  her.	  She	  also	  received	  the	  car	  absolutely.	  A	  gift	  to	  the	  youngest	  daughter	  
of	  money	  in	  a	  named	  bank	  account	  failed	  for	  uncertainty,	  because	  there	  were	  two	  bank	  
accounts.	  The	  residuary	  estate	  consisting	  of	  money	  (including	  shares)	  and	  two	  mowers,	  which	  
fell	  into	  the	  residuary	  because	  it	  could	  not	  be	  decided	  whether	  they	  were	  part	  of	  the	  home	  
contents,	  went	  to	  the	  charities	  in	  the	  proportions	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  second	  will.	  Thus,	  the	  
charities	  lost	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  home	  valued	  at	  about	  $315,000,	  and	  the	  value	  of	  the	  other	  
contents	  of	  the	  home,	  apart	  from	  the	  mowers.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/705.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  	  
The	  evidence	  in	  this	  case	  revealed	  that	  the	  deceased	  experienced	  considerable	  distress	  in	  
attempting	  to	  make	  a	  will	  which	  she	  considered	  ‘right’.	  Her	  attempts	  to	  draft	  new	  wills	  and	  her	  
frequent	  hand-­‐written	  alterations	  to	  her	  wills	  and	  drafts	  confused	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  
distribute	  the	  estate.	  Although	  the	  charities	  took	  no	  part	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  
need	  for	  will-­‐makers	  to	  follow	  a	  formal	  process	  for	  drafting	  wills,	  particularly	  where	  they	  wish	  
to	  leave	  their	  residuary	  estate	  to	  charity.	  
	  
2.9.14  TOMASEVIC V JOVETIC [2012] VSC 223 (SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA, SIFRIS 
J, 4 JUNE 2012) 
These	  proceedings	  were	  part	  of	  ongoing	  litigation	  between	  rival	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  
communities	  in	  Wodonga,	  Victoria.	  The	  litigation	  commenced	  in	  2010,	  but	  the	  underlying	  
dispute	  had	  deeper	  roots.	  Prior	  to	  2	  January	  2010,	  there	  were	  two	  separate	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  
churches	  in	  Wodonga.	  These	  were	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Congregation	  of	  St	  Peter	  
and	  Paul	  Wodonga	  (the	  First	  Church)	  and	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  (the	  Second	  Church).	  	  
By	  the	  first	  proceeding	  (the	  2010	  Proceeding),	  Mr	  Tomasevic	  and	  Mr	  Milutinovic	  (the	  plaintiffs,	  
who	  are	  the	  ‘merging	  trustees’)	  sought	  orders	  restraining	  Mr	  Jovetic	  and	  Mr	  Juzbasic	  (the	  
defendants,	  who	  are	  the	  ‘continuing	  trustees’)	  from	  dealing	  with	  certain	  properties	  held	  on	  
trust	  for	  the	  First	  Church,	  removing	  Mr	  Jovetic	  as	  a	  trustee	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  and	  other	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associated	  orders	  relating	  to	  the	  properties.	  In	  the	  second	  proceeding	  (the	  2011	  Proceeding),	  
the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  –	  School	  Congregation	  of	  St	  Peter	  &	  St	  Paul	  Wodonga	  Inc	  
(the	  Incorporated	  Association),	  and	  the	  continuing	  trustees	  sought	  possession	  of	  certain	  
properties	  and	  the	  delivery	  up	  of	  personal	  property	  by	  the	  merging	  trustees,	  as	  well	  as	  
damages	  and	  other	  associated	  orders.	  	  
A	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  and	  school	  congregation	  was	  first	  established	  in	  Wodonga	  in	  
around	  1953.	  Property	  was	  acquired	  and	  both	  a	  hall	  and	  a	  church	  were	  built	  subsequently.	  In	  
about	  1963,	  a	  split	  occurred	  in	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  because	  of	  perceived	  concerns	  
amongst	  expatriate	  Serbians	  of	  the	  influence	  which	  the	  then	  communist	  government	  might	  
have	  had	  upon	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  church.	  	  
The	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  was	  established	  in	  
1963.	  On	  31	  October	  1964	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  for	  Australia	  and	  New	  
Zealand	  was	  established	  at	  an	  assembly	  in	  Melbourne.	  The	  Wodonga	  congregation	  was	  one	  of	  
14	  congregations	  which	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  for	  Australia	  
and	  New	  Zealand.	  That	  community,	  however,	  was	  slow	  to	  accept	  newer	  arrivals	  from	  the	  now	  
former	  Yugoslavia	  into	  its	  membership.	  It	  seems	  that	  from	  about	  1964	  there	  were	  two	  parallel,	  
but	  separate	  and	  distinct,	  dioceses	  in	  Australia.	  One	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  
Church	  Diocese	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  
Church	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  The	  other	  was	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  of	  
Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  which	  was	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Diocese	  for	  the	  
United	  States	  of	  America	  and	  Canada.	  
The	  Second	  Church	  was	  established	  in	  Wodonga	  in	  the	  1980s,	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  
Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  in	  Belgrade.	  
On	  a	  larger	  scale,	  discussions	  aimed	  at	  removing	  the	  divisions	  between	  the	  congregations	  
began	  in	  1991,	  at	  about	  the	  time	  that	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  began	  to	  disintegrate	  politically.	  In	  
April	  1991	  a	  document	  was	  prepared	  setting	  out	  recommendations	  for	  reconciliation	  between	  
the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Patriarchy	  and	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  New	  Gracanica	  Archdiocese.	  
In	  Wodonga,	  a	  series	  of	  events	  occurred	  between	  2009	  and	  2010	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  two	  
communities	  of	  worshipers	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  plaintiffs	  (the	  merging	  trustees),	  has	  
resulted	  in	  a	  merger	  of	  the	  two	  churches.	  Specifically,	  the	  merging	  trustees	  contended	  that	  on	  
2	  January	  2010	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  two	  churches	  was	  held	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  
merging	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  Churches	  in	  Wodonga.	  The	  continuing	  trustees	  question	  the	  
validity	  of	  this	  meeting	  for	  various	  technical	  and	  procedural	  reasons.	  	  
Whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  a	  merger,	  the	  merging	  trustees	  also	  contended	  that	  the	  continuing	  
trustees	  were	  no	  longer	  trustees	  of	  the	  First	  Church,	  following	  their	  removal	  in	  2011	  by	  the	  
Bishop,	  or	  that	  alternatively	  they	  should	  be	  removed	  as	  trustees	  pursuant	  to	  section	  48	  of	  the	  
Trustees	  Act	  1958	  (Vic)	  (the	  Act).	  The	  continuing	  trustees	  deny	  that	  they	  have	  been	  validly	  
removed	  as	  trustees	  or	  that	  they	  should	  be	  removed	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Act.	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On	  29	  June	  2011,	  the	  Incorporated	  Association	  was	  formed,	  purportedly	  as	  the	  true	  successor	  
entity	  of	  the	  First	  Church.	  The	  continuing	  trustees	  sought	  orders	  transferring	  the	  property	  of	  
the	  First	  Church	  to	  the	  Incorporated	  Association.	  
Thus,	  there	  were	  three	  main	  issues	  in	  dispute	  in	  this	  case:	  
(a) First,	  was	  the	  purported	  merger	  of	  the	  churches	  on	  2	  January	  2010	  effective?	  	  
(b) Second,	  were	  the	  continuing	  trustees	  properly	  removed	  as	  trustees	  of	  the	  First	  
Church?	  
(c) Third,	  what	  is	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Incorporated	  Association?	  
His	  Honour	  said,	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  issues	  (at	  [10]-­‐[12]):	  
The	  resolution	  of	  the	  first	  issue	  requires	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  steps	  taken	  leading	  up	  
to	  the	  2	  January	  2010	  meeting	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  meeting	  itself,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  two	  
churches’	  constitutions.	  Further,	  an	  overarching	  issue	  that	  must	  first	  be	  resolved	  is	  
whether	  the	  court	  will	  intervene	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  a	  voluntary	  association	  and	  
adjudicate	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  2	  January	  2010	  meeting.	  If	  the	  2	  January	  2010	  
meeting	  was	  valid,	  consideration	  needs	  to	  be	  given	  to	  what	  precisely	  was	  resolved	  at	  
that	  meeting	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  purported	  merger.	  If	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  meeting	  
was	  invalid	  consideration	  needs	  to	  be	  given	  to	  precisely	  what	  the	  position	  was	  
immediately	  prior	  to	  the	  purported	  merger.	  In	  such	  a	  case	  the	  most	  important	  
question	  will	  be	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  trustees,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  second	  issue.	  The	  
resolution	  of	  the	  second	  issue	  requires	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  First	  
Church	  and	  its	  requirements	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  trustees	  and	  the	  various	  Declarations	  
of	  Trusts	  relating	  to	  the	  appointment	  and	  removal	  of	  trustees.	  The	  resolution	  of	  the	  
third	  issue	  requires	  consideration	  of	  whether,	  given	  the	  circumstances	  of	  its	  
incorporation,	  the	  makeup	  of	  its	  membership,	  and	  other	  relevant	  matters,	  the	  
Incorporated	  Association	  is	  the	  successor	  in	  law	  to	  the	  First	  Church.	  [emphasis	  added]	  	  
On	  the	  first	  issue,	  it	  was	  put	  to	  the	  court	  that	  the	  issue	  was	  not	  justiciable	  because	  the	  First	  
Church	  was	  a	  voluntary	  association.	  There	  were	  no	  contractual	  rights	  involved	  in	  the	  
proceedings,	  and	  even	  if	  there	  were,	  they	  were	  not	  proprietary	  rights.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  although	  courts	  are	  reluctant	  to	  intervene	  where	  religious	  or	  spiritual	  
matters	  are	  at	  stake,	  interference	  may	  be	  warranted	  where	  ‘civil,	  economic,	  or	  proprietary	  
rights	  are	  alleged	  to	  have	  been	  infringed’	  (at	  [44]).	  He	  held	  that	  the	  rights	  were	  proprietary	  in	  
nature,	  because	  they	  were	  proprietary	  rights	  in	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  church.	  His	  Honour	  felt	  that	  
Cameron	  v	  Hogan	  (1934)	  51	  CLR	  358	  did	  not	  apply,	  saying	  (at	  [47]):	  ‘Apart	  from	  the	  recognised	  
standing	  of	  trustees	  of	  voluntary	  associations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  proprietary	  interest	  in	  the	  
assets,	  the	  court	  has	  clear	  inherent	  supervisory	  and	  statutory	  jurisdiction	  over	  trusts	  and	  
trustees’.	  
His	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  meeting	  of	  2	  January	  2010	  was	  invalid	  on	  a	  number	  of	  technical	  
grounds	  and	  that	  the	  trustees	  of	  the	  First	  Church	  had	  not	  been	  validly	  removed.	  Therefore,	  the	  
two	  churches	  had	  not	  been	  merged	  at	  the	  meeting	  in	  question.	  In	  addition,	  His	  Honour	  held	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that	  the	  Incorporated	  Association	  was	  not	  the	  successor	  entity	  to	  the	  First	  Church,	  as	  it	  had	  
not	  been	  formed	  validly.	  	  
In	  his	  conclusion,	  His	  Honour	  added	  (at	  [94]):	  	  
Before	  making	  any	  declarations	  and	  orders	  and	  dealing	  with	  the	  application	  for	  
removal	  I	  propose	  to	  give	  the	  parties	  an	  opportunity	  to	  resolve	  their	  differences.	  At	  
the	  outset	  I	  informed	  the	  parties	  that	  church	  and	  community	  disputes	  of	  this	  kind	  are	  
not	  suitable	  for	  resolution	  by	  a	  court.	  Over	  25	  affidavits	  have	  been	  filed	  and	  the	  
dispute	  has	  become	  acrimonious	  and	  costly.	  The	  court	  is	  limited	  in	  what	  it	  can	  do.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2012/223.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
There	  are	  two	  important	  matters	  arising	  from	  this	  case.	  Firstly,	  the	  continuing	  reluctance	  of	  
courts	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  unincorporated	  associations	  was	  demonstrated.	  
This	  was	  first	  enunciated	  in	  Australia	  in	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan	  (1934)	  51	  CLR	  358.	  The	  principles	  
discussed	  in	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan	  were	  reconsidered	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Ermogenous	  v	  Greek	  
Orthodox	  Community	  of	  SA	  Inc	  [2002]	  HCA	  8.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  High	  Court	  expressly	  declined	  to	  
alter	  any	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan	  as	  they	  related	  to	  unincorporated	  associations,	  
since	  the	  law	  had	  not	  changed	  in	  the	  intervening	  period.	  Although	  Ermogenous	  concerned	  a	  
putative	  contract	  made	  by	  an	  incorporated	  body,	  the	  majority	  (Gaudron,	  McHugh,	  Hayne	  and	  
Callinan	  JJ)	  also	  discussed	  the	  position	  of	  contracts	  in	  relation	  to	  unincorporated	  associations,	  
saying	  (at	  [32]):	  
No	  doubt...there	  is	  an	  agreement	  between	  the	  members	  of	  an	  unincorporated	  body	  to	  
perform	  and	  observe	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  body,	  but	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  agreement	  is	  
enforceable	  at	  law,	  other	  than	  in	  respect	  of	  property	  rights	  to	  which	  a	  member	  is	  
entitled	  under	  the	  rules,	  is	  at	  least	  open	  to	  question.	  
In	  this	  case,	  Sifris	  J	  found	  that	  there	  was	  a	  ‘property	  right’	  involved,	  that	  of	  an	  interest	  in	  
ownership	  of	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  church.	  	  
The	  second	  issue	  mentioned	  by	  His	  Honour	  was	  that	  of	  costs	  incurred	  in	  pursuing	  internecine	  
disputes	  within	  organisations,	  which	  serve	  little	  purpose,	  and	  can	  seriously	  deplete	  the	  assets	  
of	  an	  organisation.	  
	  
2.9.15  ZINN V BERGIN [2012] SKQB 214 (QUEEN’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN, 
SCHWANN J, 24 MAY 2012) 
This	  Canadian	  case	  concerned	  a	  will.	  The	  will	  was	  a	  five	  page	  typewritten	  document	  dated	  7	  
July	  2003.	  It	  was	  signed	  by	  the	  testator	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  two	  witnesses.	  The	  plaintiffs	  were	  
appointed	  executors.	  Pursuant	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  will,	  the	  testator	  made	  several	  specific	  
bequests	  of	  personal	  property	  followed	  by	  the	  usual	  direction	  to	  convert	  the	  rest	  and	  residue	  
of	  his	  estate	  into	  cash	  to	  be	  distributed	  equally	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  following	  direction:	  	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  228	  
	  
(A)	  ...for	  the	  purpose	  of	  maintaining,	  feeding	  and	  caring	  for	  my	  pet	  animals,	  (but	  not	  
any	  off-­‐spring	  thereof)	  until	  their	  death	  (my	  pet	  animals	  presently	  consisting	  of	  four	  (4)	  
cats)...	  	  
(B)	  Upon	  the	  death	  of	  the	  last	  of	  my	  pets,	  I	  direct	  that	  the	  remaining	  balance	  of	  the	  
residue	  of	  my	  estate	  shall	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  (2)	  equal	  shares,	  to	  be	  distributed	  as	  
follows:	  	  
(i)	  To	  give	  one	  share	  to	  five	  hills	  health	  region	  home	  care...	  
(ii)	  to	  give	  one	  share	  to	  the	  Canadian	  abortion	  rights	  action	  league	  (Caral)	  ....	  
There	  was	  also	  a	  codicil	  to	  the	  will.	  The	  codicil	  was	  a	  wholly	  handwritten	  document,	  much	  of	  it	  
in	  poor	  handwriting	  to	  the	  point	  of	  being	  almost	  illegible.	  The	  date	  ‘April	  19,	  2011’	  appeared	  at	  
the	  top,	  with	  the	  signature	  of	  the	  testator	  appearing	  opposite	  the	  date.	  There	  were	  no	  
witnesses,	  but	  evidence	  was	  given	  as	  to	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  handwriting.	  The	  testator	  made	  
it	  clear	  in	  the	  codicil	  that	  his	  instructions	  in	  the	  will	  were	  continuing,	  but	  added	  in	  the	  codicil:	  
‘My	  cats	  come	  first’	  ...	  ‘After	  my	  expenses	  are	  paid	  then	  plenty	  of	  money	  for	  the	  cats....’.	  
This	  direction	  was	  followed	  by	  several	  specific	  bequests	  of	  personal	  property,	  which	  differed	  
from	  dispositions	  made	  in	  the	  earlier	  will.	  No	  real	  property	  was	  devised	  under	  the	  will.	  
However,	  under	  the	  codicil,	  a	  house	  and	  land	  were	  disposed	  of.	  In	  addition,	  the	  codicil	  
provided	  that:	  
...The	  house	  will	  likely	  be	  used	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  cats	  home	  and	  the	  expenses.	  However	  it	  
would	  be	  preferred	  to	  have	  [the	  executors]	  to	  pay	  all	  my	  expenses	  and	  then	  take	  
ownership	  of	  the	  house	  this	  would	  give	  time	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  house	  The	  
(house)	  must	  not	  be	  sold	  until	  after	  the	  cats	  are	  comfortable.	  
Disposition	  and	  treatment	  of	  the	  residue	  also	  differed	  in	  the	  codicil.	  Under	  the	  codicil	  the	  
residue	  was	  divided	  between:	  
• (CARAL)	  Canadian	  Abortion	  Rights	  Action	  League	  –	  emphasis	  on	  research	  $300	  
• To	  pay	  for	  sterilize	  and	  medicine	  for	  cats.	  M.	  Jaw	  Clinic	  $300	  
• Five	  Hills	  Home	  Care	  $300	  
• Eyebrow	  United	  Church	  $100	  
• These	  four	  last	  items	  can	  be	  deleted	  if	  money	  is	  low.	  
The	  plaintiff	  executors	  applied	  to	  have	  both	  the	  documents	  accepted	  for	  probate.	  The	  
Saskatchewan	  Wills	  Act	  1996	  applied.	  Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  both	  documents	  were	  valid	  under	  
the	  Act,	  but	  the	  question	  arose:	  did	  the	  codicil	  revoke	  the	  will?	  There	  were	  inconsistencies	  
between	  the	  two	  documents,	  particularly	  relating	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  residue	  for	  the	  cats	  and	  for	  
the	  named	  charities.	  The	  differences	  were	  summarised	  by	  Her	  Honour:	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  229	  
	  
Residue:	  
	  	  1.	  Cats:	  
	  	  	  –	  trustees	  shall	  hold	  residue	  in	  trust	  and	  may	  
use	  funds	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  maintaining,	  feeding	  
and	  caring	  for	  pet	  animals	  (4	  cats)	  until	  their	  
death.	  
	  	  	  –	  Trustees	  to	  consult	  with	  Dr.	  John	  Kessler	  as	  to	  
placement	  and	  proper	  care	  and	  vet	  services	  	  
	  	  	  –	  Trustees	  to	  find	  a	  good	  home	  for	  pets	  with	  a	  
private	  individual(s),	  Trustees	  pay	  amount	  
necessary	  to	  provide	  for	  maintenance	  and	  care	  of	  
pets.	  	  
	  	  2.	  Upon	  death	  of	  cats,	  balance	  of	  residue	  divided	  
equally	  into	  2	  shares:	  	  
• Five	  Hills	  Health	  Region	  Home	  	  
• Canadian	  Abortion	  Rights	  Action	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
League	  	  (CARAL)	  	  
	  	  
Residue:	  
	  	  1.	  Cats:	  	  
	  	  	  –	  ‘cats	  come	  first’	  
	  	  	  –	  ‘After	  my	  expenses	  are	  paid	  then	  plenty	  of	  
money	  for	  the	  cats,	  including	  medical	  	  service	  and	  if	  
deemed	  necessary	  declawing	  expenses’	  	  






2.	  Balance	  of	  residue	  
	  	  	  –	  CARAL	  –$300	  
	  	  	  –	  To	  pay	  for	  sterilize	  and	  medicine	  for	  cats	  M.	  Jaw	  
Clinic	  $300	  
	  	  	  –	  Five	  Hills	  Home	  Care	  $300	  
	  	  	  –	  Eyebrow	  United	  Church	  $100	  	  
	  	  These	  four	  last	  items	  can	  be	  deleted	  ‘if	  money	  is	  
low’.	  
	  
Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  codicil	  revoked	  the	  provisions	  in	  the	  will	  as	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  
residue.	  In	  Her	  Honour’s	  view,	  the	  codicil	  was	  clear	  and	  unambiguous.	  However,	  that	  
conclusion	  gave	  rise	  to	  further	  issues.	  The	  body	  known	  as	  ‘CARAL’	  no	  longer	  existed,	  and	  the	  
‘M.Jaw	  Clinic’	  was	  an	  unknown	  body.	  On	  this	  point,	  Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [49]–[52]):	  
Both	  instances,	  arguably,	  entail	  the	  creation	  of	  charitable	  trusts.	  In	  order	  to	  constitute	  
a	  valid	  trust,	  three	  certainties	  must	  exist:	  certainty	  of	  intention,	  subject	  matter	  and	  
objects.	  I	  find	  all	  three	  certainties	  exist	  in	  the	  circumstances.	  The	  testator’s	  intentions	  
are	  clear	  with	  regard	  to	  both	  entities,	  the	  assets	  are	  derived	  from	  estate	  residue	  and	  
the	  beneficiaries	  or	  objects	  are	  ascertained	  or	  ascertainable.	  A	  charitable	  institution	  
which	  ceases	  to	  exist,	  or	  for	  that	  matter	  has	  not	  been	  specifically	  named,	  is	  not	  
altogether	  uncommon	  in	  testamentary	  documents...	  Unfortunate	  wording	  employed	  
by	  a	  testator	  will	  not	  defeat	  a	  charitable	  trust	  where	  the	  testator’s	  intention	  is	  
evidenced	  from	  the	  testamentary	  instrument...In	  the	  case	  of	  both	  charities,	  I	  find	  the	  
wording	  of	  the	  Will	  coupled	  with	  the	  wording	  in	  the	  Codicil	  reflect	  a	  general	  
benevolent	  purpose	  rather	  than	  a	  gift	  of	  money	  to	  a	  specific	  charity	  simpliciter.	  
Accordingly,	  the	  cy-­‐pres	  doctrine	  can	  be	  applied	  by	  substituting	  another	  mode	  which	  
gives	  effect	  as	  nearly	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  testator’s	  original	  intent.	  
Although,	  this	  disposed	  of	  the	  residue	  as	  it	  affected	  the	  named	  beneficiaries,	  there	  was	  still	  
considerable	  residue	  remaining.	  Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  balance	  would	  fall	  into	  intestacy	  
under	  Saskatchewan’s	  Intestate	  Succession	  Act	  1996.	  The	  executors	  were	  directed	  to	  distribute	  
gifts	  of	  personalty	  and	  realty	  as	  directed,	  pay	  out	  all	  charitable	  gifts	  (except	  for	  M.Jaw	  Clinic	  
which	  was	  unknown),	  reserve	  and	  set	  aside	  $10,000.00	  as	  a	  fund	  for	  care	  of	  the	  cats	  (discussed	  
below),	  and	  to	  thereafter	  apply	  for	  further	  directions	  concerning	  the	  remaining	  residue	  since	  it	  
was	  possible	  that	  there	  were	  two	  relatives	  of	  the	  deceased	  who	  might	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  
estate.	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As	  to	  the	  cats,	  Her	  Honour	  considered	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  a	  charitable	  trust	  for	  the	  care	  of	  
cats	  was	  valid.	  The	  law	  of	  Canada	  on	  this	  point	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  in	  Australia.	  Gifts	  for	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  animals	  in	  general	  are	  charitable	  (such	  as	  to	  an	  animal	  charity).	  However,	  gifts	  
for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  one	  or	  more	  particular	  animals	  are	  not.	  However,	  Her	  Honour	  found	  
that	  there	  was	  case	  law	  to	  support	  the	  proposition	  that	  a	  non-­‐charitable	  purpose	  trust	  for	  the	  
upkeep	  of	  a	  given	  animal	  may	  be	  valid	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  by	  its	  nature	  it	  is	  not	  
enforceable	  by	  the	  beneficiary.	  Her	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  trust	  was	  valid,	  and	  directed	  the	  
executors	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  sum	  of	  $10,000	  for	  the	  exclusive	  purpose	  of	  the	  care,	  maintenance	  
and	  health	  of	  the	  testator’s	  cats.	  Her	  Honour	  directed	  that	  upon	  the	  death	  of	  the	  last	  of	  the	  
four	  cats,	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  $10,000	  fund	  (if	  any)	  should	  be	  disbursed	  as	  residue.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skqb/doc/2012/2012skqb214/2012skqb214.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  illustrates	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  which	  can	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  gifts	  in	  wills.	  There	  were	  
two	  documents	  prepared	  by	  the	  testator,	  one	  of	  which	  at	  least	  partially	  revoked	  the	  other,	  
there	  were	  gifts	  to	  charities	  which	  had	  ceased	  to	  exist,	  or	  which	  were	  misnamed	  (or	  perhaps	  
did	  not	  exist	  at	  all),	  there	  was	  the	  need	  to	  apply	  charitable	  gifts	  cy-­‐pres,	  and	  there	  was	  the	  
issue	  of	  whether	  a	  valid	  gift	  could	  be	  given	  to	  the	  care	  of	  pets.	  
In	  Australia,	  although	  pets	  are	  often	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	  family,	  leaving	  them	  a	  gift	  in	  a	  will	  
is	  as	  problematical	  as	  it	  is	  in	  Canada.	  Animals	  cannot	  inherit	  from	  a	  will	  directly	  since	  they	  are	  
classified	  legally	  as	  property,	  and	  have	  no	  capacity	  to	  hold	  money	  or	  property	  themselves	  (and	  
no	  capacity	  to	  enforce	  a	  gift	  under	  a	  will).	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  presumption	  that	  named	  
beneficiaries	  will	  be	  persons,	  (i.e.	  individuals	  or	  incorporated	  entities).	  The	  only	  exception	  to	  
this	  presumption	  is	  a	  legacy	  to	  an	  unincorporated	  association.	  However,	  although	  a	  gift	  cannot	  
be	  left	  directly	  to	  a	  pet,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  leave	  a	  bequest	  to	  the	  care	  of	  animals	  generally	  
provided	  the	  bequest	  is	  for	  charitable	  purposes.	  
	  
2.9.16  PHILIPPE V CAMERON [2012] EWHC 1040 (CH) (HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
CHANCERY DIVISION, ARNOLD J, 2 MAY 2012) 
This	  English	  case	  concerned	  an	  unincorporated	  association,	  the	  St	  Andrew’s	  (Cheam)	  Lawn	  
Tennis	  Club	  (the	  club)	  and	  a	  trust	  for	  land.	  The	  club	  was	  originally,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  has	  
remained,	  associated	  with	  the	  church	  of	  St	  Andrew's	  Cheam	  (the	  church).	  
At	  question	  was	  the	  beneficial	  ownership	  of	  land	  at	  Sandy	  Lane,	  Cheam	  (the	  land)	  which	  had	  
been	  occupied	  by	  the	  club	  since	  1938.	  The	  trustees	  of	  the	  land	  sought	  guidance	  from	  the	  
court.	  It	  had	  been	  thought	  by	  all	  concerned	  that	  the	  land	  was	  held	  on	  trust	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  
Declaration	  of	  Trust	  dated	  11	  July	  1938	  (the	  Trust	  Deed).	  The	  club	  claimed	  in	  this	  case	  that	  the	  
Trust	  Deed	  had	  always	  been	  invalid,	  and	  that	  the	  land	  was	  thus	  held	  on	  a	  resulting	  trust	  for	  the	  
current	  members	  of	  the	  club.	  The	  trustees	  of	  the	  church’s	  charitable	  trust	  disputed	  that	  the	  
Trust	  Deed	  was	  invalid,	  and	  wanted	  the	  land	  to	  be	  sold	  and	  the	  money	  applied	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  the	  church.	  The	  trustees	  of	  the	  land	  were	  doubtful	  that	  either	  side	  was	  correct.	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The	  church	  was	  founded	  as	  the	  St	  Andrew's	  Presbyterian	  Church	  of	  England	  Cheam	  in	  the	  
1920s.	  In	  1972	  the	  Presbyterian	  and	  Congregational	  Churches	  merged	  to	  form	  the	  United	  
Reformed	  Church.	  Since	  then,	  the	  Church	  had	  been	  known	  as	  St	  Andrew's	  United	  Reformed	  
Church	  Cheam.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  properties	  held	  under	  the	  trusts	  declared	  in	  Schedule	  2	  
of	  the	  United	  Reformed	  Church	  Act	  1972	  (as	  amended),	  all	  assets	  and	  funds	  were	  held	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  Church	  by	  the	  St	  Andrew's	  Cheam	  United	  Reformed	  Church	  Charity,	  a	  registered	  
charity	  (the	  Charity).	  Its	  governing	  document	  was	  dated	  2009.	  According	  to	  this	  document,	  the	  
trustees	  of	  the	  Charity	  were	  ‘those	  members	  of	  the	  Elders'	  Meeting	  of	  St	  Andrew's	  Cheam	  
United	  Reformed	  Church	  who	  are	  qualified	  to	  serve	  as	  charity	  trustees	  …	  and	  [who]	  are	  
appointed	  …	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  procedures	  for	  the	  time	  being	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Church	  
Meeting	  of	  St	  Andrew's	  Cheam	  United	  Reformed	  Church’.	  The	  Charity	  had	  as	  its	  sole	  object	  
‘the	  advancement	  of	  the	  Christian	  faith	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  public	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
Scheme	  of	  Union	  of	  the	  United	  Reformed	  Church’.	  
The	  St	  Andrew’s	  Tennis	  and	  Social	  Club	  was	  first	  formed	  in	  1930,	  and	  the	  club	  had	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  purchase	  the	  land	  in	  Sandy	  Lane	  Cheam	  during	  1937–38.	  However,	  the	  money	  
for	  this	  purchase	  could	  not	  be	  raised.	  The	  land	  was	  therefore	  purchased	  by	  Mr	  Tweddle,	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  the	  church	  (who	  was	  a	  club	  committee	  member),	  in	  1938.	  The	  land	  was	  then	  
leased	  to	  the	  club	  for	  a	  period	  of	  ten	  years	  (expiring	  June	  1948)	  with	  an	  option	  to	  purchase	  
during	  that	  period.	  The	  lease	  was	  put	  into	  the	  form	  of	  a	  Trust	  Deed.	  
In	  1948,	  Mr	  Tweddle	  proposed	  a	  sale	  scheme	  in	  instalments	  for	  the	  land,	  which	  was	  recorded	  
in	  what	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  1948	  Agreement’.	  This	  Agreement	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  
Trust	  Deed.	  The	  purchase	  price	  was	  £525,	  all	  of	  which	  was	  eventually	  paid	  to	  Mr	  Tweddle	  and	  
(after	  he	  died	  in	  1953)	  his	  personal	  representatives.	  On	  16	  May	  1955,	  Mr	  Tweddle's	  personal	  
representatives	  executed	  a	  transfer	  of	  the	  land	  to	  the	  then	  trustees.	  The	  Transfer	  made	  no	  
reference	  to	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  or	  to	  the	  1948	  Agreement.	  The	  land	  is	  now	  valued	  at	  more	  than	  
£1.2	  million.	  
On	  28	  May	  2006	  one	  of	  the	  defendants	  wrote	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Elders	  of	  the	  church	  to	  the	  
trustees	  asking	  the	  trustees	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  time	  had	  come	  to	  sell	  the	  land	  and	  make	  
the	  proceeds	  available	  to	  the	  church.	  The	  church	  wished	  to	  use	  the	  money	  to	  extend	  and	  
refurbish	  its	  own	  buildings,	  so	  as	  to	  enable	  the	  church	  to	  improve	  the	  parochial	  services	  it	  
provides	  to	  its	  members	  and	  the	  local	  community.	  Having	  carefully	  considered	  the	  position,	  
the	  trustees	  concluded	  in	  September	  2006	  that	  they	  should	  request	  the	  church's	  consent	  to	  
sell	  the	  land.	  The	  club	  then	  took	  legal	  advice,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  it	  challenged	  the	  validity	  of	  
the	  Trust	  Deed.	  Subsequently,	  on	  20	  October	  2008	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  advised	  the	  
trustees	  that	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  had	  not	  created	  a	  charitable	  trust.	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  first	  considered	  whether	  the	  land	  was	  subject	  to	  the	  trust	  in	  the	  Trust	  
Deed.	  He	  concluded	  that	  the	  1948	  Agreement	  was	  a	  variation	  of	  the	  clause	  in	  the	  lease	  
relating	  to	  the	  option	  to	  purchase	  the	  land.	  He	  then	  went	  on	  to	  consider	  if	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  itself	  
was	  valid.	  On	  this	  point,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [45],	  [51]):	  
It	  is	  trite	  law	  that	  a	  valid	  trust	  must	  either	  vest	  the	  trust	  property	  absolutely	  in	  
ascertainable	  persons	  within	  the	  perpetuity	  period	  or	  be	  for	  exclusively	  charitable	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purposes.	  It	  is,	  regrettably,	  fairly	  plain	  that	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  the	  
legally	  impossible:	  a	  perpetual	  trust	  for	  a	  non-­‐charitable	  purpose,	  namely	  to	  enable	  
the	  members	  of	  the	  Club	  to	  play	  tennis....	  	  
The	  validity	  of	  the	  trusts	  falls	  to	  be	  tested	  at	  the	  date	  of	  the	  Trust	  Deed.	  The	  fact	  that	  
nobody	  realised	  that	  there	  might	  be	  a	  problem	  until	  nearly	  70	  years	  later	  does	  not	  
affect	  the	  issue.	  
His	  Honour	  went	  on	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  was	  not	  validated	  by	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  
(Validation)	  Act	  1954	  because	  the	  trust	  had	  no	  charitable	  objects.	  In	  addition,	  His	  Honour	  held	  
that:	  
1. There	  was	  no	  implied	  trust	  on	  different	  terms	  arising	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  church	  –	  this	  
could	  not	  be	  so	  when	  the	  express	  trust	  had	  failed.	  
2. There	  was	  no	  resulting	  trust	  arising	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  club.	  
The	  latter	  point	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  difficult	  legal	  problem	  of	  gifts	  to	  an	  unincorporated	  
association.	  The	  purchase	  of	  the	  land	  was	  funded	  by	  gifts	  –	  from	  Mr	  Tweddle	  (who	  sold	  the	  
land	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  the	  club),	  from	  the	  club’s	  lenders	  who	  forgave	  interest	  owing,	  from	  donations,	  
and	  from	  club	  members’	  subscriptions.	  Gifts	  to	  unincorporated	  associations	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  
take	  effect	  in	  three	  ways:	  
1. a	  gift	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  association	  at	  the	  relevant	  date	  as	  joint	  tenants;	  
2. a	  gift	  to	  the	  existing	  members	  not	  as	  joint	  tenants,	  but	  subject	  to	  their	  respective	  
contractual	  rights	  and	  liabilities	  towards	  one	  another	  as	  members	  of	  the	  association;	  
3. a	  gift	  held	  in	  trust	  for,	  or	  applied	  for	  the	  purposes	  of,	  the	  association	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐
corporate	  entity.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  gift	  will	  fail	  unless	  the	  association	  is	  a	  charitable	  body.	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  gifts	  in	  question	  were	  gifts	  in	  the	  third	  category,	  and	  as	  the	  club	  was	  
not	  a	  charitable	  body,	  all	  the	  gifts	  failed.	  
Thus,	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  was	  invalid,	  so	  the	  trust	  had	  failed.	  There	  was	  no	  implied	  trust	  for	  the	  
church,	  nor	  a	  resulting	  trust	  for	  the	  members	  of	  the	  unincorporated	  club.	  Was	  there	  any	  other	  
resulting	  trust?	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  resulting	  trust	  was	  back	  to	  the	  estate	  of	  Mr	  
Tweddle.	  The	  executors	  of	  Mr	  Tweddle’s	  estate	  had	  already	  said	  that	  if	  that	  was	  the	  finding	  of	  
the	  court,	  they	  would	  renounce	  their	  beneficial	  interest	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  church.	  However,	  His	  
Honour	  said	  that	  they	  could	  not	  renounce	  their	  beneficial	  interest,	  nor	  was	  their	  attempt	  to	  do	  
so	  a	  valid	  assignment	  of	  the	  land	  to	  the	  church.	  The	  land	  could	  be	  gifted	  to	  the	  church	  
subsequently,	  but	  there	  were	  taxation	  implications	  in	  this	  course	  of	  action.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2012/1040.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  law	  relating	  to	  unincorporated	  associations	  in	  England,	  Wales	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  
similar	  to	  that	  in	  Australia.	  Unincorporated	  associations	  do	  not	  possess	  any	  legal	  personality	  
separate	  from	  their	  members.	  However,	  they	  are	  treated	  as	  entities	  for	  tax	  purposes,	  as	  in	  
Australia.	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  unincorporated	  associations,	  apart	  from	  the	  tax	  
law,	  have	  a	  legal	  identity	  by	  implication.	  This	  is	  because	  some	  eminent	  jurists	  have	  regarded	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collectives	  of	  members	  as	  having	  a	  separate	  identity	  from	  the	  members	  as	  individuals	  and	  case	  
law	  has	  sometimes	  followed	  this	  lead.	  The	  UK	  has	  no	  form	  of	  incorporated	  association	  such	  as	  
that	  found	  in	  all	  jurisdictions	  in	  Australia.	  
Although	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  has	  proposed	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  
small	  unincorporated	  charities,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  propositions	  for	  separate	  entity	  status	  or	  
limited	  liability	  in	  those	  jurisdictions	  for	  unincorporated	  associations	  which	  are	  not	  also	  
charities.	  The	  new	  legal	  form	  for	  charities,	  the	  Charitable	  Incorporated	  Organisation	  (CIO),	  will	  
allow	  charities	  to	  incorporate	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  Companies	  Act	  2006	  (UK).	  However,	  
this	  will	  only	  apply	  to	  those	  existing	  charities	  registered	  as	  companies	  which	  wish	  to	  convert	  to	  
CIO	  status,	  or	  to	  newly	  formed	  or	  currently	  unincorporated	  charities	  which	  wish	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  offered	  by	  the	  new	  form.	  If	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  is	  
not	  also	  a	  charity,	  the	  CIO	  form	  will	  not	  be	  available	  to	  it.	  
	  
2.9.17  PERPETUAL TRUSTEES LIMITED V BARNS [2012] VSCA 77 (VICTORIAN COURT 
OF APPEAL, BUCHANAN, BONGIORNO JJA, WILLIAMS AJA, 2 MAY 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  from	  a	  decision	  which	  had	  refused	  the	  appellant,	  Perpetual	  Trustees	  Ltd	  
(Perpetual),	  variation	  under	  a	  will.	  Perpetual	  is	  the	  trustee	  of	  the	  will	  of	  John	  Frederick	  Barns	  
(the	  testator),	  dated	  18	  May	  1983.	  The	  first	  respondent,	  Ms	  Barns,	  is	  the	  only	  child	  of	  the	  
testator,	  and	  the	  surviving	  life	  tenant	  of	  his	  residuary	  estate.	  The	  residuary	  estate	  was	  
ultimately	  left	  ‘for	  such	  of	  the	  general	  charitable	  purposes	  or	  charitable	  organisations	  in	  
Victoria	  which	  are	  specified	  in	  section	  21	  Probate	  Duty	  Act	  1962	  or	  any	  amendment	  thereof	  in	  
such	  shares	  as	  my	  trustees	  in	  their	  absolute	  discretion	  think	  fit	  and	  in	  default	  of	  appointment	  
for	  the	  LORD	  MAYOR’S	  FUND.’	  
The	  respondent	  suffers	  from	  a	  form	  of	  autism,	  and	  was	  represented	  in	  the	  appeal	  by	  her	  
Administrator.	  The	  Attorney-­‐General	  was	  the	  second	  respondent	  and	  represented	  those	  who	  
might	  benefit	  under	  the	  trusts	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  created	  by	  the	  will.	  	  
Under	  the	  will,	  Ms	  Barns	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  income	  from	  the	  residuary	  estate	  for	  life,	  but	  that	  
income	  had	  become	  insufficient	  for	  her	  needs.	  Because	  she	  is	  incapacitated,	  she	  is	  unable	  to	  
give	  her	  consent	  to	  an	  arrangement	  varying	  the	  trust	  upon	  which	  the	  residuary	  estate	  is	  held	  
to	  allow	  for	  access	  to	  capital	  to	  meet	  her	  needs.	  	  
Perpetual	  applied	  to	  the	  court	  for	  an	  order	  under	  section	  63A	  of	  the	  Trustee	  Act	  1958	  (Vic)	  
(the	  Act)	  approving,	  on	  Ms	  Barns’s	  behalf,	  an	  arrangement	  varying	  the	  trust	  by	  amending	  
clause	  5	  of	  the	  will,	  to	  permit	  Perpetual	  to	  advance	  capital	  to	  her	  from	  time	  to	  time	  (the	  
arrangement).	  Perpetual	  made	  the	  application	  because	  Ms	  Barns	  lacked	  the	  necessary	  funds	  
to	  do	  so.	  In	  the	  alternative,	  Perpetual	  sought	  an	  order	  empowering	  it	  to	  advance	  capital	  to	  Ms	  
Barns	  under	  s	  63	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  Attorney-­‐General	  of	  Victoria	  did	  not	  oppose	  the	  applications.	  
He	  declined	  to	  consent,	  submitting	  that	  it	  would	  be	  inappropriate	  to	  do	  so	  in	  all	  the	  
circumstances,	  and	  preferring	  to	  await	  the	  judgement	  of	  the	  court.	  Both	  applications	  by	  
Perpetual	  were	  refused	  in	  the	  lower	  court.	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Clause	  5	  of	  the	  will	  gave	  the	  trustees	  the	  power	  to	  advance	  capital	  to	  the	  testator’s	  widow	  
(now	  deceased).	  Clause	  6	  empowered	  the	  trustees	  to	  pay	  any	  income	  not	  required	  for	  Ms	  
Barns’s	  ‘adequate	  maintenance’	  to	  the	  Mentally	  Retarded	  Citizens	  Welfare	  Association	  Centre	  
or	  any	  other	  organisation	  caring	  for	  her	  full-­‐time,	  and,	  otherwise,	  at	  their	  discretion	  to	  pay	  that	  
surplus	  to	  institutions	  or	  organisations	  listed	  in	  s	  78(1)(a)	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  
1936	  (Cth)	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  By	  clause	  7,	  the	  testator	  expressed	  the	  desire	  that	  preference	  be	  
given	  to	  benefiting	  organisations	  ‘carrying	  out	  research	  relating	  to	  mental	  retardation’.	  
There	  was	  no	  issue	  arising	  from	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  will,	  even	  though	  
the	  Probate	  Duty	  Act	  1962	  (Vic)	  had	  been	  repealed	  in	  2000.	  Rather	  the	  issue	  was	  that	  clause	  5	  
of	  the	  will	  did	  not	  provide	  for	  capital	  sums	  to	  be	  advanced	  to	  the	  testator’s	  daughter	  (only	  his	  
widow).	  	  
Ms	  Barns’s	  care	  needs	  are	  intensive	  and	  carers	  live	  with	  her	  in	  the	  unit	  purchased	  for	  her	  by	  
Perpetual.	  The	  judge	  below	  found	  that	  her	  expenses	  were	  approximately	  $245,000	  per	  annum	  
and	  the	  estate	  income	  was	  approximately	  $170,000.	  Perpetual	  estimated	  that,	  if	  $50,000	  of	  
the	  capital	  were	  advanced	  each	  year,	  and	  Ms	  Barns	  lived	  to	  85,	  the	  corpus	  of	  the	  residuary	  
estate,	  currently	  valued	  at	  $3.5m,	  would	  be	  worth	  some	  $5.6m.	  If	  it	  were	  kept	  intact,	  it	  would	  
be	  valued	  at	  approximately	  $7.3m.	  
Perpetual	  proposed	  that	  clause	  5	  of	  the	  will	  be	  varied	  to	  allow	  for	  capital	  sums	  to	  be	  advanced	  
to	  the	  testator’s	  daughter.	  At	  first	  instance,	  His	  Honour	  had	  held	  that	  here	  was	  no	  jurisdiction	  
given	  by	  section	  63A	  of	  the	  Act	  to	  vary	  the	  will	  in	  this	  way.	  Their	  Honours	  agreed	  that	  the	  judge	  
below	  had	  correctly	  characterised	  the	  application	  as	  one	  for	  approval	  of	  an	  arrangement	  on	  
behalf	  of	  Ms	  Barns,	  who	  could	  not	  consent	  to	  it	  herself	  because	  she	  lacked	  capacity.	  It	  was	  not	  
one	  for	  an	  order	  which	  would	  itself	  vary	  the	  trust.	  However,	  their	  Honours	  said	  (at	  [28],	  [33]	  
and	  [35]):	  
Whilst	  the	  learned	  judge	  characterised	  the	  application	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  cited	  
authorities,	  he	  also	  considered	  it	  relevant	  that	  the	  Court	  was	  being	  asked	  to	  ‘approve	  
the	  variation	  of	  a	  trust	  that	  could	  not	  be	  varied	  by	  the	  agreement	  of	  Ms	  Barns	  if	  she	  
was	  capable	  of	  assenting	  to	  the	  variation’.	  If	  this	  demonstrates	  that	  he	  was	  concluding	  
that	  jurisdiction	  under	  s	  63A	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  which,	  but	  for	  the	  incapacity	  
of	  a	  beneficiary	  or	  object	  of	  a	  trust,	  that	  trust	  can	  be	  varied	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
principle	  in	  Saunders	  v	  Vautier,	  he	  erred...	  Further,	  s	  63A	  does	  not	  expressly	  make	  the	  
court’s	  power	  conditional	  upon	  consent	  by	  those	  beneficially	  or	  otherwise	  interested	  
under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  trust.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  sub-­‐s	  63A(1)	  confers	  a	  discretionary	  
power	  to	  approve	  an	  arrangement	  ‘(by	  whomsoever	  proposed	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  
there	  is	  any	  other	  person	  beneficially	  interested	  who	  is	  capable	  of	  assenting	  thereto)’.	  
The	  authorities	  to	  which	  the	  Court	  was	  referred	  do	  not	  support	  any	  such	  
limitation...The	  learned	  judge	  erred	  in	  law	  in	  concluding	  that	  he	  lacked	  the	  power	  to	  
make	  the	  order	  sought	  under	  s	  63A,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  consent	  by	  the	  Attorney-­‐
General	  on	  behalf	  of	  those	  entitled	  to	  benefit	  under	  the	  charitable	  trusts	  established	  
under	  clause	  4(c)	  of	  the	  will.	  
Their	  Honours	  said	  (at	  [36]):	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In	  determining	  whether	  an	  order	  under	  s	  63A(1)(a)	  should	  have	  been	  made	  and	  now	  
should	  be	  made,	  the	  Court	  must	  first	  be	  satisfied	  that	  the	  arrangement	  was	  and	  is	  both	  
for	  Ms	  Barns’	  benefit	  and	  a	  fair	  and	  proper	  one	  overall.	  It	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  
purpose	  of	  the	  trusts	  and	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  testator.	  The	  Court	  should	  engage	  in	  ‘a	  
business-­‐like	  consideration	  of	  the	  arrangement,	  including	  the	  total	  amounts	  of	  the	  
advantages	  which	  the	  various	  parties	  obtain,	  and	  their	  bargaining	  strengths’.	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  allowed	  the	  appeal	  by	  Perpetual	  because	  their	  Honours	  held	  that	  there	  
were	  ‘ample’	  reasons	  to	  approve	  the	  arrangement.	  These	  were:	  
• The	  arrangement	  was	  clearly	  for	  Ms	  Barns’s	  benefit;	  
• The	  testator	  clearly	  intended	  that	  his	  daughter	  should	  benefit	  from	  the	  residuary	  
before	  any	  charity	  benefited	  from	  the	  surplus;	  
• The	  testator	  had	  not	  anticipated	  the	  increasing	  need	  for	  capital	  for	  the	  substantial	  care	  
needs	  of	  Ms	  Barns;	  
• The	  Attorney-­‐General,	  as	  protector	  of	  charities,	  did	  not	  oppose	  the	  arrangement	  even	  
though	  the	  arrangement	  would	  mean	  a	  diminution	  of	  the	  fund	  available	  for	  charitable	  
purposes;	  
• The	  fund	  remaining	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  after	  Ms	  Barns’s	  death	  would	  still	  be	  
substantial;	  
• The	  arrangement	  accorded	  with	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  testator,	  and	  was	  a	  fair	  and	  
proper	  one.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2012/77.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  a	  case	  where	  a	  will	  made	  did	  not	  fully	  anticipate	  the	  future	  needs	  of	  the	  beneficiary	  
living	  far	  into	  the	  future	  of	  the	  date	  the	  will	  was	  made.	  Their	  Honours	  intuited	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  
testator	  as	  being	  (at	  [38]):	  
...he	  intended	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  care	  and	  well-­‐being	  of	  his	  disabled	  daughter	  and,	  
generally,	  to	  give	  priority	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  his	  widow	  and	  child	  over	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  
nominated	  charities	  who	  might	  benefit	  after	  their	  respective	  deaths.	  Ms	  Barns	  is	  to	  
have	  the	  income	  from	  the	  substantial	  residuary	  estate,	  after	  her	  mother’s	  death	  and	  
any	  surplus	  is	  to	  go	  to	  a	  body	  caring	  for	  her	  full-­‐time	  or	  to	  charity.	  The	  testator	  has	  also	  
expressed	  the	  wish	  that	  the	  trustees	  would	  favour	  institutions	  carrying	  out	  research	  
which,	  it	  would	  seem,	  might	  be	  of	  potential	  benefit	  to	  her.	  
While	  the	  fund	  remaining	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  after	  the	  respondent’s	  death	  would	  still	  be	  
substantial,	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  reduced	  by	  some	  $2	  million	  by	  this	  decision.	  However,	  the	  court	  
clearly	  took	  the	  view	  that	  present	  care	  needs	  of	  a	  disabled	  beneficiary	  are	  to	  be	  preferred	  over	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2.9.18  PHILLIPS V THE ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF BIRDS AND 
OTHERS [2012] EWHC 618(CH) (ENGLAND AND WALES HIGH COURT (CHANCERY 
DIVISION), HHJ COOKE, 16 MARCH 2012) 
In	  this	  English	  case,	  Phillips	  was	  the	  executor	  of	  the	  will	  of	  the	  testatrix,	  Mrs	  Spear.	  Mrs	  Spear	  
left	  only	  one	  specific	  bequest	  in	  her	  will,	  to	  her	  pet	  parrot.	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  estate	  was	  
left	  equally	  between	  four	  charities,	  the	  Royal	  Society	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Birds	  (RSPB),	  the	  
Peoples	  Dispensary	  for	  Sick	  Animals	  (PDSA),	  The	  New	  Forest	  Owl	  Sanctuary	  (NFOS),	  and	  
Monkey	  World	  Ltd.	  Each	  charity’s	  share	  was	  to	  be	  £65,000.	  
In	  this	  application,	  the	  executor	  sought	  the	  court’s	  directions	  on	  the	  gift	  to	  the	  NFOS,	  which	  
had	  ceased	  to	  exist.	  Another	  body,	  the	  North	  Wales	  Bird	  Trust	  (NWBT)	  sought	  the	  gift	  as	  the	  
successor	  body	  to	  the	  NFOS.	  If	  the	  gift	  failed,	  the	  amount	  would	  be	  divided	  between	  16	  
relatives	  under	  the	  rules	  of	  intestacy.	  
The	  NFOS	  had	  ceased	  to	  exist	  amidst	  scandal.	  The	  circumstances	  included	  an	  undercover	  BBC	  
report	  which	  alleged	  cruelty	  and	  unacceptable	  practices	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  birds	  kept	  at	  the	  
sanctuary.	  This	  report	  led	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  (under	  section	  8	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993)	  
to	  appoint	  an	  investigating	  officer	  on	  9	  July	  2003,	  to	  enquire	  into	  possible	  mismanagement	  by	  
the	  trustees	  and	  lack	  of	  financial	  control.	  All	  the	  trustees	  then	  resigned,	  though	  there	  were	  
some	  alleged	  misdeeds	  which	  continued.	  NFOS	  was	  deregistered	  as	  a	  charity	  on	  17	  August	  
2006.	  It	  was	  officially	  dissolved	  as	  a	  company	  on	  6	  February	  2007,	  a	  few	  days	  after	  Mrs	  Spear’s	  
death.	  Fewer	  than	  half	  the	  birds	  under	  the	  control	  of	  NFOS	  were	  transferred	  to	  an	  estate	  
controlled	  by	  NWBT.	  The	  fate	  of	  the	  other	  birds	  was	  unclear.	  
Clause	  7	  of	  the	  will	  provided	  that	  ‘if	  before	  my	  death	  (or	  after	  my	  death	  but	  before	  my	  
Trustees	  have	  given	  effect	  to	  the	  gift)	  any	  charitable	  or	  other	  body	  to	  which	  a	  gift	  is	  made	  by	  
this	  Will...	  has	  changed	  its	  name	  or	  amalgamated	  with	  any	  other	  body	  or	  transferred	  all	  its	  
assets	  then	  my	  Trustees	  shall	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  gift	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  gift	  to	  the	  body	  in	  its	  changed	  
name	  or	  to	  the	  body	  which	  results	  from	  the	  amalgamation	  or	  the	  body	  to	  which	  the	  assets	  
have	  been	  transferred’.	  
It	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  NWBT	  was	  such	  a	  body.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  this	  was	  not	  so.	  
Clause	  7	  referred	  to	  circumstances	  where	  a	  body	  merely	  changed	  its	  name,	  or	  to	  which	  all	  the	  
predecessor’s	  assets	  had	  been	  transferred	  in	  an	  amalgamation.	  NWBT	  was	  not	  such	  a	  body,	  as	  
it	  had	  received	  fewer	  than	  half	  the	  birds	  that	  NFOS	  had	  held	  and	  none	  of	  its	  other	  assets	  
(worth	  apparently	  £160,000),	  which	  were	  prevented	  from	  being	  disposed	  of	  in	  doubtful	  
circumstances	  only	  by	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  Charity	  Commission.	  
The	  counsel	  for	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  (intervening	  in	  the	  case)	  then	  suggested	  various	  
resolutions	  to	  preserve	  the	  gift	  for	  charity.	  These	  were:	  	  
i)	  Could	  the	  gift	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  gift	  for	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  of	  NFOS,	  rather	  than	  
a	  gift	  to	  NFOS	  itself	  absolutely?	  If	  so,	  the	  property	  would	  be	  impressed	  with	  a	  
charitable	  purpose	  trust	  which	  the	  court	  could	  give	  effect	  to	  by	  way	  of	  a	  scheme.	  
ii)	  If	  the	  gift	  was	  to	  NFOS	  absolutely,	  it	  failed,	  but:	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a)	  If	  it	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  case	  of	  'initial	  failure',	  a	  gift	  that	  was	  impossible	  
at	  the	  time	  it	  was	  made,	  the	  court	  may	  apply	  it	  cy-­‐près	  if	  satisfied	  that	  it	  was	  
made	  as	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  paramount	  charitable	  intent.	  
b)	  If	  it	  were	  a	  case	  of	  subsequent	  failure,	  the	  gift	  may	  be	  applied	  cy-­‐près	  in	  any	  
event.	  
The	  Attorney	  General	  submitted	  that	  it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  to	  direct	  the	  gift	  to	  the	  NWBT	  if	  
the	  gift	  was	  to	  be	  saved	  at	  all.	  
His	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  was	  no	  overall	  charitable	  intent	  –	  the	  gifts	  were	  very	  specifically	  
made	  to	  NFOS.	  Nor	  was	  there	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  gift	  at	  the	  date	  of	  death,	  i.e.	  there	  was	  no	  initial	  
failure,	  and	  therefore	  no	  need	  to	  consider	  overall	  charitable	  intent	  in	  that	  context.	  His	  Honour	  
said	  (at	  [27]):	  
This	  case	  is	  therefore	  one	  of	  supervening	  failure,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  one	  where	  the	  gift	  was	  
effective	  at	  the	  date	  of	  death	  to	  impress	  the	  funds	  with	  the	  charitable	  purpose	  
intended	  to	  be	  given	  effect	  to	  through	  NFOS,	  but	  which	  cannot	  now	  be	  carried	  through	  
in	  that	  manner	  by	  reason	  of	  NFOS	  having	  subsequently	  ceased	  to	  exist.	  In	  those	  
circumstances	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  unless	  the	  court	  finds	  that	  the	  particular	  method	  
specified	  is	  the	  only	  possible	  way	  of	  giving	  effect	  to	  the	  donor's	  charitable	  intentions,	  it	  
may	  direct	  that	  the	  funds	  be	  applied	  cy-­‐près,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  by	  the	  court	  directing	  a	  
scheme	  which	  will	  see	  the	  funds	  used	  in	  a	  manner	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  that	  which	  
the	  deceased	  intended.	  	  
His	  Honour	  agreed	  with	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  that	  the	  NWBT	  was	  an	  appropriate	  recipient	  of	  
the	  gift	  in	  all	  the	  circumstances.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2012/618.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  not	  a	  case	  of	  the	  will-­‐maker	  not	  keeping	  her	  will	  up	  to	  date.	  The	  body	  referred	  to	  in	  
the	  will	  had	  officially	  ceased	  to	  exist	  a	  few	  days	  after	  her	  death.	  Therefore,	  the	  executor	  
needed	  to	  obtain	  guidance	  on	  where	  to	  direct	  the	  gift.	  The	  court	  applied	  the	  gift	  cy-­‐près	  to	  
another	  recipient	  with	  similar	  aims,	  because	  it	  was	  able	  to	  find	  that	  the	  gift	  had	  an	  underlying	  
charitable	  intention,	  not	  a	  specific	  intention	  which	  could	  only	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  giving	  it	  to	  the	  
now	  defunct	  charity.	  
	  
2.9.19  SIR MOSES MONTEFIORE JEWISH HOME V PERPETUAL COMPANY LIMITED 
[2012] NSWSC 210 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BALL J, 15 
MARCH 2012) 
In	  these	  proceedings	  the	  plaintiff	  charitable	  institutions,	  the	  Sir	  Moses	  Montefiore	  Jewish	  
Home,	  the	  Wolper	  Jewish	  Hospital	  and	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Jewish	  War	  Memorial,	  sought	  a	  
declaration	  that	  they	  were	  entitled	  to	  the	  corpus	  (the	  capital	  sum)	  of	  the	  residuary	  estate	  of	  
the	  late	  Rupert	  Michaelis	  in	  equal	  shares.	  In	  the	  alternative,	  they	  sought	  an	  order	  appointing	  
the	  president	  or	  chairman	  respectively	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  institutions	  as	  trustees	  of	  the	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estate	  of	  the	  deceased	  in	  substitution	  for	  the	  defendants,	  Perpetual	  Trustee	  Company	  Limited	  
(Perpetual)	  and	  Rupert	  George	  Rosenblum.	  
Michaelis	  (the	  deceased)	  died	  in	  1984	  leaving	  an	  estate	  of	  about	  $4.5	  million.	  The	  deceased	  
appointed	  Perpetual	  and	  Mr	  Myer	  Rosenblum,	  or	  in	  the	  event	  that	  he	  could	  not	  or	  was	  not	  
willing	  to	  act	  as	  a	  trustee,	  Mr	  Rupert	  Rosenblum	  (his	  godson),	  as	  his	  executors	  and	  trustees.	  In	  
accordance	  with	  that	  clause,	  Mr	  Rupert	  Rosenblum	  became	  one	  of	  the	  trustees.	  	  
By	  clause	  5	  of	  his	  will,	  the	  deceased	  left	  the	  residuary	  of	  his	  estate	  to	  be	  held	  on	  trust	  to	  pay	  
the	  income	  arising	  from	  that	  residuary	  in	  perpetuity	  to	  each	  of	  the	  following	  bodies	  in	  equal	  
shares:	  	  
(i)	  New	  South	  Wales	  Jewish	  War	  Memorial	  (a	  registered	  company)	  
(ii)	  Wolper	  Jewish	  Hospital	  (a	  registered	  company)	  
(iii)	  Sir	  Moses	  Montefiore	  Jewish	  Home	  incorporated	  under	  the	  Sir	  Moses	  Montefiore	  
Jewish	  Home	  Act	  1927	  as	  amended.	  
The	  capital	  of	  the	  trust	  was	  mostly	  invested	  in	  Australian	  securities.	  The	  investment	  was	  
monitored	  by	  Perpetual	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  but	  the	  income	  earned	  on	  the	  trust	  had	  been	  
declining	  sharply	  owing	  to	  market	  conditions.	  The	  plaintiffs	  accepted	  that	  the	  trustees	  had	  
acted	  properly	  in	  discharging	  their	  duties	  as	  trustees	  of	  the	  trust	  since	  the	  testator's	  death	  and	  
were	  entitled	  to	  the	  commission	  and	  fees	  that	  had	  been	  paid	  to	  them.	  	  
The	  plaintiffs	  maintained	  that	  they	  were	  entitled	  to	  call	  for	  the	  corpus	  of	  the	  trust	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  
them	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principle	  adopted	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Congregational	  Union	  of	  
New	  South	  Wales	  v	  Thistlethwayte	  [1952]	  HCA	  48;	  (1952)	  87	  CLR	  375	  or	  alternatively,	  they	  
submitted	  that	  the	  trustees	  should	  be	  replaced,	  under	  s	  70	  of	  the	  Trustee	  Act	  1925	  (NSW)	  by	  
the	  court	  in	  exercise	  of	  its	  inherent	  power	  to	  regulate	  trusts.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  principle	  of	  construction	  of	  wills	  that	  states	  that	  a	  gift	  of	  income	  in	  perpetuity	  will	  
carry	  with	  it	  a	  gift	  of	  capital.	  As	  a	  rule	  of	  construction,	  a	  perpetual	  gift	  of	  income	  from	  real	  or	  
personal	  property	  to	  a	  person	  carries	  with	  it	  an	  absolute	  interest	  in	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  fund	  
which	  the	  person	  is	  entitled	  to	  call	  for.	  The	  rule	  is	  designed	  to	  prevent	  gifts	  of	  income	  being	  
void	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  perpetuity	  rule	  (a	  gift	  of	  income	  in	  perpetuity	  is	  void	  unless	  it	  is	  to	  a	  
charitable	  purpose).	  	  
As	  a	  perpetual	  gift	  of	  income	  for	  a	  non-­‐charitable	  object	  or	  to	  a	  non-­‐charitable	  institution	  is	  
void	  because	  of	  the	  rule	  against	  perpetuities,	  to	  adopt	  a	  construction	  that	  a	  perpetual	  gift	  of	  
income	  carries	  the	  capital	  that	  generates	  the	  income	  stream	  is	  a	  means	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  gift	  
will	  vest	  within	  the	  perpetuity	  period.	  	  
It	  is	  presumed	  that	  this	  will	  give	  effect	  to	  the	  donor's	  likely	  intention,	  in	  that	  only	  by	  payment	  
of	  the	  capital	  can	  the	  donee	  receive	  the	  full	  benefit	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  gift	  that	  the	  donor	  is	  
presumed	  to	  have	  intended.	  	  
As	  to	  the	  principle	  developed	  in	  Thistlethwayte’s	  case,	  the	  High	  Court	  stated	  in	  that	  case	  (at	  
440)	  that	  ‘the	  rule	  is	  the	  same	  whether	  the	  gift	  of	  income	  is	  to	  an	  individual	  or	  to	  a	  charity	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consisting	  of	  a	  body	  capable	  of	  holding	  property.	  The	  beneficiary	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  capital	  
unless	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  intention	  express	  or	  implied	  from	  the	  will	  that	  the	  beneficiary	  is	  not	  to	  
take	  more	  than	  income’.	  
Since	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  Thistlethwayte,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  decisions,	  
particularly	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Victoria,	  that	  have	  held	  that	  proof	  of	  a	  contrary	  intention	  
is	  more	  readily	  found	  where	  the	  beneficiary	  is	  a	  charity	  and	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  beneficiary	  is	  
a	  charity	  is	  one	  matter	  the	  court	  can	  take	  into	  account	  in	  determining	  whether	  a	  contrary	  
intention	  exists.	  For	  example,	  His	  Honour	  quoted	  Gillard	  J	  in	  The	  Melbourne	  Jewish	  Orphan	  and	  
Children's	  Aid	  Society	  Inc	  v	  ANZ	  Executors	  and	  Trustee	  Company	  Limited	  [2007]	  VSC	  26	  who	  
said	  in	  this	  respect	  (at	  [74]):	  
In	  my	  opinion,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  gift	  of	  income	  is	  given	  in	  perpetuity	  to	  a	  charitable	  
institution	  provides	  some	  evidence	  of	  a	  contrary	  intention.	  However,	  in	  the	  end,	  of	  
course,	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  intention	  of	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  trust.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  my	  
opinion,	  the	  cases	  have	  established	  that	  the	  courts	  are	  more	  ready	  to	  find	  a	  contrary	  
intention	  where	  the	  gift	  is	  to	  a	  longstanding	  charity	  in	  perpetuity.	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [14]–[15]):	  
In	  my	  opinion,	  however,	  the	  court	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  attempting	  to	  ascertain	  the	  
testator's	  intention	  in	  this	  case	  by	  comparing	  the	  conclusions	  reached	  in	  other	  cases	  
about	  wills	  that	  are	  expressed	  in	  different	  terms	  from	  the	  will	  in	  question.	  In	  addition,	  
although	  I	  accept	  that	  the	  matters	  referred	  to	  by	  Gillard	  J	  are	  relevant	  to	  ascertaining	  
the	  testator's	  intentions,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  evidence	  that	  the	  testator	  intended	  to	  make	  a	  
gift	  of	  income	  in	  perpetuity	  is	  of	  limited	  assistance	  in	  displacing	  the	  rule.	  The	  rule	  has	  
as	  its	  starting	  point	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  testator	  has	  made	  a	  gift	  of	  income	  in	  perpetuity.	  A	  
gift	  of	  income	  in	  perpetuity	  cannot	  itself	  be	  evidence	  of	  a	  contrary	  intention,	  since	  the	  
rule	  is	  concerned	  with	  what	  is	  intended	  by	  such	  a	  gift.	  Similarly,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  will	  
contains	  other	  provisions	  that	  contemplate	  the	  gift	  of	  income	  continuing	  in	  perpetuity	  
is	  of	  limited	  assistance	  in	  rebutting	  the	  rule,	  since	  those	  provisions	  are	  an	  obvious	  
incidence	  of	  such	  a	  gift.	  Of	  greater	  significance	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  terms	  in	  the	  will	  
which	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  testator	  could	  not	  have	  intended	  that	  the	  beneficiaries	  
would	  have	  the	  right,	  if	  they	  chose	  to	  exercise	  it,	  to	  call	  for	  the	  capital.	  In	  other	  words,	  
the	  fact	  that	  a	  testator	  chose	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  beneficiaries	  may	  not	  
call	  for	  the	  capital	  is	  of	  limited	  assistance	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  testator	  has	  
evinced	  a	  clear	  intention	  that	  they	  not	  be	  permitted	  to	  do	  so.	  If	  the	  rule	  of	  
construction	  is	  to	  have	  substance,	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  intention	  that	  must	  be	  clear.	  In	  this	  
case,	  the	  testator	  made	  provision	  for	  the	  gift	  of	  income	  to	  continue	  in	  perpetuity.	  He	  
appointed	  Perpetual	  as	  one	  of	  his	  executors.	  It	  was	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  that	  entity	  
would	  continue	  indefinitely.	  	  
The	  testator	  also	  made	  provision	  in	  cl	  6	  for	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  trust	  to	  be	  preserved	  and	  
provided	  a	  mechanism	  in	  cl	  9	  for	  resolving	  disputes	  about	  what	  was	  income	  and	  what	  
was	  capital.	  Although	  these	  matters	  provide	  some	  evidence	  that	  the	  testator	  intended	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to	  make	  a	  gift	  of	  income	  only,	  for	  the	  reasons	  I	  have	  given,	  I	  do	  not	  attach	  significant	  
weight	  to	  those	  considerations.	  Of	  much	  greater	  significance	  are	  the	  terms	  of	  cl	  5	  of	  
the	  will.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  terms	  of	  that	  clause,	  particularly	  the	  two	  
provisos,	  that	  the	  testator	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  give	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  trust	  to	  the	  
plaintiffs.	  	  
Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  not	  entitled	  to	  the	  capital	  sum.	  The	  two	  
provisos	  that	  His	  Honour	  referred	  to	  were:	  
1. if	  it	  is	  determined	  that	  any	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  was	  not	  a	  charity,	  then	  the	  gift	  to	  that	  
plaintiff	  was	  a	  gift	  of	  income	  to	  that	  body	  for	  the	  perpetuity	  period	  (as	  it	  then	  was)	  and	  
was	  then	  a	  gift	  of	  the	  capital	  absolutely.	  	  
2. if	  any	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  cease	  to	  exist,	  amalgamate	  or	  change	  their	  names	  before	  or	  
after	  the	  deceased's	  death,	  the	  trustees	  should	  pay	  the	  income	  gifted	  to	  that	  
institution	  to	  a	  charitable	  organisation	  which	  they	  consider	  most	  nearly	  fulfils	  the	  
objects	  the	  testator	  intended	  to	  benefit.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  these	  provisos	  meant	  that	  the	  paramount	  concern	  of	  the	  deceased	  was	  to	  
benefit	  the	  plaintiffs	  as	  they	  existed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  will	  for	  so	  long	  as	  they	  continued	  to	  
exist,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  charitable	  institutions.	  However,	  it	  was	  also	  the	  intention	  of	  
the	  testator	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  only	  to	  receive	  income	  and	  were	  only	  to	  receive	  it	  for	  so	  
long	  as	  they	  continued	  to	  exist	  in	  the	  form	  they	  had	  existed	  at	  the	  time	  the	  testator	  made	  his	  
will.	  	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  replacement	  of	  trustees,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  
trust	  would	  be	  administered	  better	  by	  different	  (though	  proper)	  trustees.	  This	  was	  particularly	  
so	  since	  Perpetual	  was	  a	  corporation	  and	  had	  continuous	  existence	  in	  perpetuity.	  
The	  declarations	  sought	  by	  the	  plaintiffs	  were	  therefore	  dismissed.	  Costs	  were	  ordered	  to	  be	  
paid	  from	  the	  trust.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/210.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  strictly	  interpreted	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  deceased’s	  will.	  He	  said	  that	  the	  
deceased	  could	  have	  indicated	  that	  he	  intended	  that	  the	  capital	  sum	  in	  the	  residuary	  should	  be	  
paid	  to	  the	  charities	  in	  equal	  shares	  if	  they	  called	  for	  it,	  but	  he	  did	  not.	  This	  was	  supported	  by	  
the	  deceased	  stating	  in	  the	  will	  that	  if	  any	  of	  the	  charities	  should	  cease	  to	  be	  charities,	  they	  
were	  still	  to	  continue	  to	  receive	  the	  income	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  perpetuity	  period,	  and	  then	  
receive	  the	  capital	  sum.	  	  
	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  241	  
	  
2.9.20  TAYLOR V PRINCESS MARGARET HOSPITAL FOR CHILDREN FOUNDATION INC 
[2012] WASC 83 (SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, EDELMAN J, 14 
MARCH 2012) 
Desmond	  Henry	  Taylor	  died	  on	  4	  July	  2008.	  His	  estate	  was	  valued	  in	  excess	  of	  $3.7	  million.	  
Taylor	  drafted	  his	  own	  Will,	  on	  a	  proforma,	  standard	  form,	  with	  handwriting	  inserted	  in	  blank	  
spaces	  under	  typed	  sections.	  The	  deceased's	  will	  purported	  to	  leave	  his	  entire	  estate	  to	  the	  
'Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital'	  and	  the	  'National	  Diabetes	  Services	  Scheme	  of	  Australia'.	  There	  
are	  no	  legal	  entities	  which	  match	  precisely	  the	  descriptions	  of	  'Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital'	  and	  
the	  'National	  Diabetes	  Services	  Scheme	  of	  Australia'.	  
This	  was	  an	  application	  for	  interpretation	  of	  the	  will	  by	  the	  executor.	  The	  executor	  (the	  
plaintiff	  in	  this	  case)	  submitted	  that	  the	  reference	  to	  'Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital'	  should	  be	  
construed	  as	  meaning	  the	  Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital	  for	  Children	  Foundation	  Inc	  (the	  
Foundation).	  This	  submission	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  Foundation.	  The	  executor	  also	  submitted	  
that	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  'National	  Diabetes	  Services	  Scheme	  of	  Australia'	  should	  be	  construed	  
as	  meaning	  the	  Diabetes	  Association	  of	  Western	  Australia	  (Inc)	  (Diabetes	  WA).	  This	  submission	  
is	  supported	  by	  Diabetes	  (WA)	  and	  also	  by	  Diabetes	  Australia.	  His	  honour	  had	  no	  difficulty	  in	  
accepting	  these	  submissions	  on	  the	  basis	  that,	  construed	  in	  their	  context,	  the	  words	  used	  in	  
the	  will	  should	  have	  these	  meanings.	  
In	  applying	  the	  law	  relating	  to	  self-­‐drafted	  wills,	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  a	  reasonable	  person	  
would	  construe	  a	  will	  which	  has	  been	  drafted	  without	  professional	  assistance	  with	  the	  
understanding	  that	  the	  words	  in	  the	  will	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  used	  in	  a	  precise	  or	  
technical	  manner.	  	  
There	  were	  four	  reasons	  for	  holding	  that	  the	  Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital	  for	  Children	  
Foundation	  was	  the	  intended	  recipient	  of	  the	  gift	  in	  the	  will:	  
1. The	  Foundation	  is	  the	  principal	  fundraising	  body	  for	  Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital.	  The	  
Foundation	  takes	  active	  steps	  to	  solicit	  donations,	  bequests,	  gifts,	  grants	  and	  
subscriptions	  and	  the	  Foundation	  is	  advertised	  as	  the	  entity	  to	  which	  donations,	  gifts	  
or	  bequests	  should	  be	  made	  where	  the	  donor	  wishes	  to	  benefit	  Princess	  Margaret	  
Hospital;	  
2. The	  Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital	  for	  Children	  has	  been	  operated	  and	  managed	  by	  the	  
Department	  of	  Health	  since	  the	  1980s	  and	  a	  gift	  to	  the	  Minister,	  incorporated	  as	  the	  
Board	  of	  Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital,	  would	  be	  a	  gift	  to	  the	  consolidated	  revenue	  of	  
the	  State	  Government	  –	  this	  was	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  deceased	  on	  the	  evidence;	  
3. As	  a	  purely	  semantic	  matter,	  the	  title	  of	  the	  Foundation	  is	  close	  to	  the	  words	  used	  by	  
the	  testator;	  
4. A	  search	  of	  the	  online	  Charity	  Directory	  for	  'Princess	  Margaret	  Hospital'	  provides	  a	  hit	  
only	  for	  the	  Foundation.	  	  
There	  are	  two	  legal	  entities	  which	  are	  related	  to	  the	  'National	  Diabetes	  Service	  Scheme	  of	  
Australia'	  (NDSS)	  –	  an	  incorporated	  association	  called	  Diabetes	  Association	  of	  Western	  
Australia	  (Inc)	  (Diabetes	  WA)	  and	  Diabetes	  Australia,	  an	  incorporated	  company.	  The	  deceased	  
had	  suffered	  from	  Type	  2	  diabetes,	  and	  as	  a	  Western	  Australian	  resident	  had	  received	  services	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related	  to	  his	  diabetes	  in	  Western	  Australia.	  Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  gift	  in	  the	  will	  
should	  be	  to	  Diabetes	  WA.	  
His	  Honour	  went	  on	  to	  comment	  that	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  consider	  a	  cy	  près	  application	  of	  
the	  gifts	  in	  the	  will.	  The	  construction	  intended	  by	  the	  deceased	  could	  be	  clearly	  discerned.	  In	  
discussing	  the	  cy	  près	  issue,	  His	  Honour	  made	  the	  point	  that	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  equitable	  
doctrine	  of	  cy	  près	  in	  Western	  Australia.	  The	  doctrine	  of	  cy	  près	  has	  been	  replaced	  in	  
exhaustive	  terms	  by	  Part	  III	  of	  the	  Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1962	  (WA)	  (the	  Act).	  Where	  
property	  is	  given	  on	  trust	  or	  to	  be	  applied	  for	  a	  charitable	  purpose,	  the	  Act	  removes	  the	  
requirement	  for	  a	  general	  charitable	  intention	  (see	  s	  7(1)).	  The	  Act	  does	  not	  mention	  the	  
previous	  equitable	  requirement	  that	  an	  application	  be	  'as	  near	  as	  possible'	  to	  the	  charitable	  
purposes	  of	  the	  bequest	  or	  trust.	  Instead	  it	  speaks	  of	  a	  disposition	  'for	  some	  other	  charitable	  
purpose'	  (s	  7(1)).	  However,	  His	  Honour	  was	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  some	  ‘degree	  of	  resemblance’	  
was	  required	  (at	  para	  [58]).	  
A	  point	  which	  His	  Honour	  mentioned	  but	  declined	  to	  consider	  was	  that	  the	  deceased	  had	  left	  a	  
small	  gift	  for	  the	  care	  of	  his	  dog	  in	  his	  will.	  Such	  a	  gift	  is	  not	  permitted	  in	  Australia	  as	  it	  
attempts	  to	  constitute	  a	  trust	  for	  a	  purpose	  which	  is	  not	  charitable.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  
commented	  that	  this	  was	  a	  case	  where	  ‘Homer	  nodded’	  (meaning	  that	  the	  mistake	  would	  not	  
be	  taken	  into	  account).	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2012/83.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  will-­‐maker	  clearly	  intended	  to	  make	  charitable	  gifts	  in	  his	  will,	  but	  drafted	  his	  own	  will	  
using	  a	  printed	  will	  form.	  This	  type	  of	  will	  making	  is	  always	  fraught	  with	  potential	  for	  difficulty	  
in	  interpretation	  of	  a	  will,	  and	  should	  be	  especially	  discouraged	  where	  charitable	  gifts	  are	  to	  be	  
included	  in	  a	  will.	  
Many	  will-­‐makers	  want	  to	  provide	  for	  their	  animals	  after	  their	  deaths.	  However,	  provision	  for	  
animals	  is	  difficult	  given	  that	  animals	  themselves	  are	  property	  and	  cannot	  inherit.	  However,	  
there	  are	  ways	  to	  ensure	  that	  pets	  are	  cared	  for	  after	  a	  will-­‐maker’s	  death,	  and	  legal	  advice	  
should	  always	  be	  taken	  on	  this	  matter.	  
 
2.9.21  IN THE ESTATE OF CHOMIAK [2012] SASC 27 (SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH 
AUSTRALIA, GRAY J, 29 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  case	  dealt	  with	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	  executor	  of	  a	  will.	  The	  deceased,	  
Anna	  Chomiak,	  died	  in	  2010,	  aged	  93	  years.	  Her	  will,	  which	  was	  prepared	  by	  a	  solicitor,	  named	  
the	  ‘Priest	  in	  Charge	  for	  the	  time	  being	  of	  the	  Ukrainian	  Catholic	  Church	  at	  Wayville’	  as	  the	  
sole	  executor	  of	  her	  will.	  The	  will	  provided	  a	  legacy	  to	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Archbishop	  of	  
Adelaide	  ‘for	  the	  time	  being’,	  with	  the	  residue	  given	  to	  ‘the	  Trustees	  of	  the	  Ukrainian	  Catholic	  
Church	  in	  Australia,	  Eparchy	  of	  St	  Peter	  and	  Paul	  of	  Melbourne	  for	  the	  use	  and	  purposes	  of	  the	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Ukrainian	  Catholic	  Church	  at	  Wayville	  aforesaid’.	  The	  Registrar	  of	  Probates	  in	  South	  Australia	  
applied	  to	  the	  Court	  for	  a	  ruling	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  executor.	  
The	  Church	  of	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Mother	  of	  God	  is	  the	  only	  Ukrainian	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  
Wayville.	  The	  applicant	  for	  probate	  of	  the	  deceased’s	  will	  was	  the	  priest	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  
Church	  at	  the	  date	  of	  the	  deceased’s	  death.	  However,	  the	  applicant	  for	  probate	  was	  not	  the	  
priest	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  church	  at	  the	  date	  of	  the	  execution	  (making	  and	  signing)	  of	  the	  will.	  
The	  Registrar	  identified	  an	  issue	  in	  respect	  of	  ‘shifting	  executorship’	  in	  a	  will,	  which	  is	  generally	  
void.	  This	  issue	  turned	  on	  the	  meaning	  and	  effect	  of	  the	  words	  ‘for	  the	  time	  being’	  in	  the	  
appointment	  clause.	  Specifically,	  the	  Registrar	  identified	  that	  those	  words	  could	  refer	  to	  the	  
person	  in	  the	  office	  at	  the	  date	  of	  the	  making	  of	  the	  will,	  the	  person	  in	  the	  office	  at	  the	  date	  of	  
the	  testator’s	  death,	  or	  a	  person	  who	  is	  in	  the	  office,	  but	  only	  while	  that	  person	  holds	  the	  
office.	  On	  this	  basis,	  the	  person	  who	  should	  be	  the	  executor	  of	  the	  will	  could	  be	  judged	  to	  be	  
uncertain.	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  priest	  ‘for	  the	  time	  being’	  as	  executor	  was	  valid.	  
The	  issue	  of	  shifting	  executorship	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  peculiarity	  mostly	  of	  Australian	  law,	  and	  
there	  were	  numerous	  cases,	  which	  were	  canvassed	  by	  His	  Honour.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  was	  
of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  so-­‐called	  principle	  was	  ‘just	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  approach	  taken	  to	  
particular	  circumstances	  within	  the	  rubric	  of	  uncertain	  appointments,	  where	  in	  the	  
circumstances	  the	  appointment	  is	  too	  uncertain	  and	  consequently	  void’	  (at	  para	  [8]).	  His	  
Honour	  found	  that	  the	  deceased	  had	  been	  sufficiently	  clear	  in	  her	  appointment:	  
A	  testator	  cannot	  speculate	  as	  to	  who,	  on	  the	  date	  of	  his	  or	  her	  death,	  will	  hold	  office.	  
However	  a	  testator	  may	  want	  a	  particular	  office	  holder	  to	  be	  appointed	  to	  the	  office	  of	  
executor.	  The	  testator	  in	  the	  present	  proceeding	  nominated	  as	  her	  executor	  ‘the	  Priest	  
in	  Charge	  for	  the	  time	  being	  of	  the	  Ukrainian	  Catholic	  Church	  at	  Wayville.’	  The	  testator	  
did	  not	  specifically	  nominate	  and	  appoint	  Father	  Ckuj,	  the	  Priest	  in	  Charge	  at	  the	  date	  
of	  the	  will.	  To	  my	  mind,	  the	  testator’s	  intentions	  are	  tolerably	  clear.	  She	  intended	  to	  
confer	  rights	  on	  the	  ‘Priest	  in	  Charge’	  who	  holds	  office	  when	  duties	  of	  an	  executor	  are	  
to	  be	  performed	  ([38]–[39]).	  
Thus	  the	  appointment	  of	  executor	  in	  the	  will	  was	  valid.	  
His	  Honour	  also	  considered	  whether	  there	  were	  any	  suspicious	  circumstances	  in	  the	  making	  of	  
the	  will.	  The	  deceased	  was	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  church	  in	  question,	  a	  benefactor	  of	  the	  
church	  while	  living,	  and	  heavily	  involved	  in	  church	  activities.	  She	  was	  certainly	  religiously	  
inclined	  and	  devotedly	  attached	  to	  the	  church.	  	  However,	  there	  was	  nothing	  to	  suggest	  any	  
improper	  conduct	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  will.	  The	  solicitor	  had	  read	  the	  will	  to	  the	  deceased	  in	  both	  
English	  and	  Ukrainian,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  inference	  that	  the	  deceased	  was	  perfectly	  at	  ease	  
with	  her	  arrangements.	  His	  Honour	  said:	  	  
Knowledge	  and	  approval	  may	  be	  established	  by	  a	  presumption	  of	  law,	  for	  a	  testator	  is	  
presumed	  by	  law	  to	  know	  and	  approve	  the	  terms	  of	  his	  or	  her	  will	  if	  it	  is	  established	  
that	  the	  testator	  read	  or	  had	  the	  will	  read	  over	  to	  himself	  or	  herself	  before	  execution	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of	  the	  document	  and	  there	  were	  no	  circumstances	  exciting	  suspicion	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  
the	  will	  may	  not	  have	  been	  fully	  known	  and	  approved	  by	  the	  testator.	  (at	  para	  [44])	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-­‐
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/sa/SASC/2012/27.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Where	  a	  will-­‐maker	  is	  elderly	  or	  close	  to	  death,	  charities	  and	  nonprofits	  must	  be	  doubly	  sure	  
that	  there	  are	  no	  improper	  circumstances	  surrounding	  bequests	  to	  them	  in	  wills.	  Many	  
bequests	  come	  to	  charities	  unprompted,	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  and	  this	  is	  an	  accepted	  way	  of	  raising	  
funds.	  However,	  if	  the	  bequest	  is	  the	  result	  of	  activity	  to	  encourage	  the	  bequest,	  there	  must	  be	  
no	  suggestion	  of	  coercion	  or	  undue	  influence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  charity,	  especially	  where	  the	  
will-­‐maker	  is	  in	  some	  way	  vulnerable.	  
	  
2.9.22  BERRY V IBS-STL LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) [2012] EWHC 666 (CH) (ENGLAND AND 
WALES HIGH COURT (CHANCERY DIVISION), DONALDSON QC (SITTING AS 
DEPUTY JUDGE), 16 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  English	  case	  concerned	  an	  application	  by	  the	  executors	  of	  a	  will.	  The	  testatrix	  had	  left	  
several	  charitable	  bequests	  from	  her	  residuary,	  including	  one	  to	  the	  International	  Bible	  Society	  
(UK)	  (IBS).	  At	  the	  date	  of	  the	  will,	  the	  IBS	  was	  an	  unincorporated	  registered	  charity.	  With	  effect	  
from	  31	  May	  2007	  it	  transferred	  the	  entirety	  of	  its	  assets	  to	  IBS-­‐STL	  Ltd,	  an	  incorporated	  
registered	  charity.	  The	  merger	  was	  registered	  on	  2	  January	  2008,	  and	  the	  register	  records	  that	  
IBS	  ceased	  to	  exist	  on	  5	  February	  2008,	  both	  dates	  preceding	  the	  death	  of	  the	  testatrix.	  	  
Section	  75F	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993	  deals	  with	  gifts	  to	  charities	  which	  have	  merged.	  On	  16	  
April	  2009,	  having	  reached	  the	  conclusion	  that	  IBS-­‐STL	  Ltd	  had	  broadly	  the	  same	  aims	  as	  the	  by	  
then	  defunct	  IBS,	  the	  executors	  made	  an	  interim	  distribution	  of	  £330,000	  to	  the	  IBS-­‐STL	  Ltd	  in	  
accordance	  with	  section	  75F.	  Subsequently,	  IBS-­‐STL	  Ltd	  became	  insolvent	  and	  went	  into	  
administration,	  and	  later	  liquidation.	  The	  executors	  still	  had	  £214,000	  to	  disburse	  to	  IBS-­‐STL	  
Ltd	  but	  it	  was	  in	  liquidation,	  so	  that	  any	  charitable	  disbursement	  would	  be	  effectively	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  its	  creditors	  rather	  than	  any	  charitable	  activity.	  The	  executors	  sought	  guidance	  from	  
the	  court	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  moneys	  should	  be	  disbursed	  to	  some	  other	  charitable	  bodies	  
under	  clause	  6.3	  of	  the	  will,	  or	  whether	  section	  75F	  required	  that	  they	  disburse	  the	  remaining	  
money	  to	  the	  merged	  body,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  in	  liquidation.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  (at	  [8]):	  
...this	  case	  was	  not	  concerned	  with	  a	  pecuniary	  legacy	  to	  IBS.	  Instead,	  the	  will	  gave	  the	  
residuary	  estate	  to	  the	  Trustees	  who	  are	  then	  to	  hold	  it	  on	  trust	  for	  the	  beneficiaries.	  
In	  normal	  language	  that	  may	  be	  a	  gift	  for	  each	  beneficiary,	  but	  not	  to	  the	  beneficiary.	  I	  
can	  however	  see	  no	  sensible	  reason	  why	  the	  application	  of	  the	  statute	  should	  be	  
confined	  by	  such	  a	  narrow	  interpretation.	  The	  obvious	  purpose	  of	  [section	  75F]	  is	  to	  
ensure	  that	  money	  (or	  property)	  which	  the	  benefactor	  has	  specified	  should	  pass	  to	  a	  
charity	  accompanies	  it	  into	  the	  entity	  into	  which	  the	  charity	  has	  been	  merged	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notwithstanding	  that	  the	  benefaction	  is	  not	  to	  take	  effect	  until	  a	  time	  which	  postdates	  
the	  merger.	  That	  purpose	  is	  in	  my	  view	  equally	  engaged	  whether	  the	  route	  of	  
benefaction	  runs	  directly	  to	  the	  donee	  or	  a	  trustee	  is	  interposed	  with	  an	  obligation	  to	  
confer	  the	  benefit	  using	  the	  money	  (or	  property)	  provided	  by	  the	  benefactor.	  
The	  gift	  to	  IBS	  could	  not	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  death	  of	  the	  testatrix.	  The	  gift	  went	  
to	  the	  merged	  body	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  will	  and	  the	  statute.	  However,	  now	  that	  the	  
merged	  body	  was	  in	  liquidation,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  it	  was	  appropriate	  that	  the	  remaining	  gift	  
be	  given	  to	  other	  charities	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  executors	  under	  clause	  6.3	  of	  the	  will.	  Section	  
75F	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993	  did	  not	  require	  that	  the	  merged	  body	  continued	  to	  benefit	  in	  
these	  circumstances.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2012/666.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  another	  case	  of	  a	  gift	  not	  being	  able	  to	  be	  given	  under	  a	  will,	  but	  the	  circumstances	  
were	  that	  the	  charity	  beneficiary	  was	  insolvent.	  This	  involved	  the	  court	  in	  interpreting	  a	  
section	  of	  the	  relevant	  Act	  to	  see	  if	  it	  had	  a	  narrow	  meaning,	  or	  whether	  there	  was	  room	  for	  
discretion	  in	  the	  somewhat	  unusual	  circumstances.	  The	  remaining	  money	  was	  not	  given	  to	  the	  
insolvent	  charity,	  but	  was	  permitted	  to	  be	  given	  to	  other	  charities	  at	  the	  executors’	  discretion.	  	  
	  
2.9.23  THE SYNOD OF THE ANGLICAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AUSTRALIA V TEE [2012] 
WASC 46 (SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, MCKECHNIE J, 15 
FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  case	  dealt	  with	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  gift	  for	  charitable	  purposes.	  Barbara	  Grimes,	  who	  died	  in	  
2010,	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Anglican	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  Western	  Australia.	  Tee,	  who	  had	  
previously	  been	  a	  solicitor,	  was	  a	  priest	  in	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  Peter	  the	  Apostle	  in	  2006.	  At	  that	  
time,	  Tee	  assisted	  Grimes	  to	  prepare	  her	  will	  which	  was	  executed	  on	  9	  December	  2006.	  Tee	  
was	  the	  executor.	  The	  bulk	  of	  Grimes’s	  estate	  was	  left	  in	  two	  parts.	  One	  part	  was	  directed	  to	  
the	  Synod	  of	  the	  Anglican	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  Australia	  (Western	  Australia)	  Incorporated	  (the	  
Church),	  and	  the	  other	  also	  to	  the	  Church,	  but	  designated	  ‘for	  the	  use	  and	  benefit	  of’	  Tee’s	  
parish	  of	  St	  Peter.	  
In	  October	  2010,	  there	  was	  a	  schism	  within	  the	  Anglican	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  Tee	  resigned	  
from	  the	  church	  as	  a	  priest.	  As	  His	  Honour	  observed,	  this	  appeared	  to	  be	  why	  ‘the	  parties	  were	  
originally	  unable	  to	  resolve	  their	  differences	  in	  Christian	  amity’.	  The	  Church	  commenced	  
proceedings	  against	  Tee,	  as	  executor,	  for	  payment	  of	  the	  bequest.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  
accepted	  that	  there	  were	  valid	  reasons	  for	  a	  delay	  in	  payment.	  
The	  main	  question	  before	  the	  court	  was	  whether	  the	  gift	  in	  the	  will,	  to	  the	  Church	  for	  the	  use	  
and	  benefit	  of	  the	  parish,	  was	  for	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  and	  thus	  a	  valid	  disposition.	  Whilst	  
there	  was	  no	  doubt	  as	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  Church	  as	  a	  legal	  person	  in	  Australia,	  there	  was	  a	  
question	  as	  to	  the	  continuing	  existence	  of	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  Peter.	  Had	  it	  ceased	  to	  exist	  with	  the	  
resignation	  of	  Tee	  as	  priest?	  The	  parish	  had	  been	  constituted	  by	  the	  Archbishop	  of	  the	  Church,	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Archbishop	  Hepworth,	  as	  from	  23	  October	  2005.	  Although	  all	  parishioners	  of	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  
Peter	  had	  either	  left	  the	  Church	  or	  moved	  to	  another	  parish,	  evidence	  from	  the	  Regional	  
Bishop	  for	  Western	  Australia,	  Bishop	  Entwistle,	  was	  that	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  Peter	  had	  not	  been	  
dissolved.	  
His	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  gift	  to	  the	  Church	  for	  the	  use	  and	  benefit	  
of	  the	  parish,	  was	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  as	  it	  was	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion.	  Therefore	  
the	  gift	  to	  the	  Church	  was	  valid.	  The	  second	  aspect	  of	  the	  gift	  was	  purposive:	  ‘for	  the	  use	  and	  
benefit	  of	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  Peter’s	  Church’	  created	  a	  trust	  with	  the	  Church	  as	  trustee.	  Was	  this	  
trust	  a	  trust	  for	  charitable	  purposes?	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  the	  cases	  on	  point	  were	  not	  easy	  to	  
reconcile.	  
However,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  was	  sufficient	  authority	  to	  reason	  by	  analogy	  that	  the	  
trust	  was	  a	  trust	  for	  charitable	  purposes:	  
In	  considering	  Mrs	  Grimes'[s]	  intentions	  and	  construing	  the	  words	  she	  used,	  the	  
context	  is	  important.	  The	  context	  includes	  the	  gift	  to	  the	  church	  under	  cl	  3(1)	  an	  
undoubted	  gift	  for	  charitable	  purposes...in	  my	  opinion,	  Mrs	  Grimes'[s]	  intention	  in	  cl	  
3(2)	  was	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion,	  a	  charitable	  purpose.	  Construing	  her	  Will,	  I	  
hold	  that	  she	  has	  validly	  achieved	  that	  purpose.	  
His	  Honour	  then	  went	  on	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  trust	  would	  in	  any	  event	  be	  valid	  under	  
section	  102	  of	  the	  Trustees	  Act	  1962	  (WA)	  (the	  Act).	  Section	  102	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  that	  a	  
mixed	  charitable	  and	  non-­‐charitable	  trust	  should	  be	  given	  effect	  as	  if	  no	  non-­‐charitable	  and	  
invalid	  purpose	  was	  present.	  	  
The	  Church,	  as	  trustee,	  would,	  under	  section	  102	  of	  the	  Act,	  be	  required	  to	  administer	  the	  
trust	  solely	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  and	  therefore	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  gift	  would	  be	  valid.	  
Thus,	  both	  parts	  of	  the	  gift	  in	  the	  will	  were	  held	  to	  be	  valid	  charitable	  gifts.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2012/46.html	  	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  gift	  to	  the	  Church	  as	  an	  incorporated	  entity	  is	  relatively	  straightforward.	  It	  was	  the	  second	  
gift	  to	  the	  Church	  ‘for	  the	  use	  and	  benefit’	  of	  a	  particular	  parish	  which	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  
trust	  –	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  Church	  as	  trustee	  had	  to	  use	  it	  for	  that	  purpose.	  Since	  charity	  
is	  the	  only	  purpose	  which	  is	  valid	  under	  trust	  law,	  the	  Court	  had	  to	  determine	  whether	  that	  
purpose	  was	  charitable.	  
A	  gift	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion	  is	  a	  gift	  for	  charitable	  purposes:	  Commissioners	  for	  
Special	  Purposes	  of	  Income	  Tax	  v	  Pemsel	  [1891]	  UKHL	  1.	  The	  validity	  of	  a	  gift	  to	  a	  trust	  for	  
charitable	  purposes	  mixed	  with	  non-­‐charitable	  purposes	  is	  more	  questionable	  –	  at	  general	  law	  
this	  would	  not	  be	  valid,	  but	  that	  has	  been	  altered	  by	  statute.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Church	  
submitted	  that	  there	  was	  no	  material	  difference	  between	  a	  gift	  to	  a	  diocese	  and	  a	  gift	  to	  a	  
parish.	  His	  Honour	  ultimately	  agreed,	  but	  found	  that	  previous	  cases	  on	  the	  issue	  revealed	  very	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fine	  distinctions	  between	  validity	  and	  invalidity.	  The	  whole	  context	  of	  the	  gift	  was	  relevant,	  
and	  here	  the	  whole	  context	  was	  charitable.	  
	  
2.9.24  HUTCHINSON V BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC [2012] QSC 28 (SUPREME COURT OF 
QUEENSLAND, APPLEGARTH J, 9 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  case	  concerned	  the	  estate	  of	  James	  MacKenzie	  who	  died	  in	  September	  2009	  aged	  93	  
years.	  He	  had	  a	  substantial	  estate,	  in	  excess	  of	  $11	  million.	  The	  deceased	  was	  a	  Scot	  who	  had	  
lived	  in	  Australia	  for	  55	  years,	  and	  held	  real	  estate	  in	  Australia,	  shares	  in	  Australia	  and	  the	  UK,	  
and	  cash	  deposits	  in	  both	  Australia	  and	  Scotland.	  His	  will	  was	  dated	  April	  2006	  and	  had	  two	  
codicils	  dated	  May	  2009.	  The	  codicils	  were	  prepared	  by	  the	  deceased	  without	  legal	  advice.	  
Probate	  had	  been	  granted.	  This	  application	  for	  directions	  was	  made	  by	  his	  executors	  and	  the	  
respondent	  bank,	  as	  the	  trustee	  of	  a	  testamentary	  trust	  created	  by	  the	  will.	  	  
The	  deceased’s	  will	  provided	  that,	  apart	  from	  a	  home	  and	  contents	  left	  to	  his	  only	  niece,	  the	  
deceased’s	  entire	  estate	  was	  left	  in	  a	  testamentary	  trust	  to	  be	  administered	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  
Scotland.	  The	  trust	  was	  to	  benefit	  beneficiaries	  all	  of	  whom	  are	  located	  in	  Scotland,	  
except	  for	  his	  niece	  who	  is	  in	  Australia.	  The	  beneficiaries	  under	  the	  testamentary	  trust	  
consist	  of	  family	  members	  and	  a	  number	  of	  charitable	  institutions:	  the	  Burghead	  
Primary	  School;	  the	  Free	  Church	  Burghead;	  the	  Alves	  and	  Burghead	  Church;	  the	  St	  
Aethan's	  Masonic	  Lodge	  Burghead;	  and	  the	  Community	  Hall	  at	  Burghead.	  
The	  first	  codicil	  left	  further	  legacies	  of	  £50,000	  to	  certain	  named	  beneficiaries	  in	  Scotland.	  The	  
second	  codicil	  related	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  estate,	  and	  appeared	  to	  separate	  the	  
administration	  of	  the	  assets	  in	  Australia	  from	  the	  administration	  of	  overseas	  assets.	  The	  
second	  codicil	  was	  confusing	  in	  its	  terminology,	  and	  made	  the	  will	  ambiguous.	  His	  Honour	  
referred	  to	  section	  33C	  of	  the	  Succession	  Act	  1981	  (Qld)	  which	  allows	  extrinsic	  evidence	  to	  be	  
considered	  in	  interpreting	  an	  ambiguous	  will.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  did	  not	  see	  any	  need	  to	  
resort	  to	  section	  33C,	  since	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  will	  and	  the	  codicils	  could	  be	  made	  on	  a	  
practical	  basis.	  The	  will	  and	  codicils	  were	  to	  be	  read	  together.	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  was	  only	  one	  trust	  created,	  which	  should	  be	  administered	  by	  the	  
appointed	  executors	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  In	  due	  course,	  the	  net	  assets	  would	  all	  be	  transferred	  
to	  the	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  for	  administration	  of	  the	  trust.	  The	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  could	  administer	  
the	  Australian	  assets	  in	  Australia	  by	  their	  representatives,	  but	  could	  equally	  transfer	  all	  the	  
asset	  proceeds	  to	  Scotland,	  at	  their	  choice.	  
The	  applicable	  law	  governing	  the	  trust	  was	  also	  considered.	  The	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  
Applicable	  to	  Trusts	  and	  on	  their	  Recognition,	  made	  at	  The	  Hague	  on	  1	  July	  1994	  applied	  (the	  
Convention).	  It	  was	  given	  legislative	  force	  in	  Australia	  by	  the	  Trusts	  (Hague	  Convention)	  Act	  
1991	  (Cth).	  	  
The	  relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention	  are	  Articles	  6	  and	  7.	  Article	  6	  provides:	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A	  trust	  shall	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  law	  chosen	  by	  the	  settlor.	  The	  choice	  must	  be	  express	  
or	  be	  implied	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  instrument	  creating	  or	  the	  writing	  evidencing	  the	  
trust,	  interpreted,	  if	  necessary	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case...In	  the	  
event	  that	  there	  is	  no	  choice	  of	  law,	  either	  express	  or	  implied,	  article	  7	  of	  the	  
Convention	  applies	  and	  identifies	  the	  matters	  to	  which	  reference	  may	  be	  made	  in	  
ascertaining	  the	  law	  with	  which	  the	  trust	  is	  most	  closely	  connected.	  	  
Applying	  these	  principles	  and	  the	  relevant	  authorities,	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  was	  no	  
practical	  difference	  as	  to	  whether	  Article	  6	  or	  Article	  7	  applied	  in	  this	  case.	  The	  factors	  in	  the	  
case	  strongly	  pointed	  to	  the	  law	  of	  Scotland	  as	  being	  the	  applicable	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  trust.	  
There	  were	  possible	  tax	  implications	  both	  in	  Australia	  and	  Scotland,	  but	  these	  were	  not	  
decisive	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-­‐
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/qld/QSC/2012/28.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  points	  to	  the	  need	  for	  legal	  advice	  when	  preparing	  a	  will,	  particularly	  where	  a	  large	  
estate	  is	  involved.	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  trust	  was	  created	  in	  the	  will,	  with	  multiple	  beneficiaries	  
including	  several	  charitable	  institutions.	  The	  large	  estate	  and	  complex	  structure	  for	  future	  
administration	  certainly	  required	  more	  legal	  and	  financial	  advice	  than	  the	  deceased	  had	  
obtained.	  
	  
2.9.25  RE FREE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH DIOCESE FOR AUSTRALIA AND NEW 
ZEALAND PROPERTY TRUST [2012] NSWSC 47 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW 
SOUTH WALES, BALL J, 6 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  application	  under	  section	  63(1)	  of	  the	  Trustee	  Act	  1925	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act)	  for	  judicial	  
advice	  to	  a	  trustee.	  Under	  section	  63(1)	  of	  the	  Act,	  a	  trustee	  may	  apply	  to	  the	  court	  for	  an	  
opinion,	  advice	  or	  direction	  on	  any	  question	  respecting	  the	  management	  or	  administration	  of	  
trust	  property,	  or	  respecting	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  trust	  instrument.	  
The	  underlying	  dispute	  is	  a	  property	  dispute,	  with	  two	  religious	  factions	  pursuing	  very	  valuable	  
property	  for	  their	  own	  use.	  In	  1963,	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  split	  into	  two	  groups,	  one	  
known	  as	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  and	  the	  other	  as	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church.	  
This	  split	  occurred	  in	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  because	  of	  perceived	  concerns	  amongst	  
expatriate	  Serbians	  about	  the	  influence	  which	  the	  then	  communist	  government	  in	  Yugoslavia	  
might	  have	  had	  upon	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  church.	  	  
The	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  was	  established	  in	  
1963.	  On	  31	  October	  1964	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  for	  Australia	  and	  New	  
Zealand	  was	  established	  at	  an	  assembly	  in	  Melbourne.	  There	  were	  14	  congregations	  which	  
affiliated	  with	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  for	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  That	  
community,	  however,	  was	  slow	  to	  accept	  newer	  arrivals	  from	  the	  now	  former	  Yugoslavia	  into	  
its	  membership.	  It	  seems	  that	  from	  about	  1964	  there	  were	  two	  parallel,	  but	  separate	  and	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distinct,	  dioceses	  in	  Australia.	  One	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  of	  
Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  in	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia.	  The	  other	  was	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  
Zealand	  which	  was	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Diocese	  for	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
America	  and	  Canada.	  
Discussions	  aimed	  at	  removing	  the	  divisions	  between	  the	  congregations	  began	  in	  1991,	  at	  
about	  the	  time	  that	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  began	  to	  disintegrate	  politically.	  In	  April	  1991	  a	  
document	  was	  prepared	  setting	  out	  recommendations	  for	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  Serbian	  
Orthodox	  Patriarchy	  and	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  New	  Gracanica	  Archdiocese.	  However,	  there	  
are	  still	  deep	  divisions	  evident	  within	  the	  church.	  
This	  application	  was	  brought	  against	  the	  Free	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  Diocese	  for	  Australia	  
and	  New	  Zealand	  Property	  Trust	  (the	  Property	  Trust)	  by	  the	  Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  in	  
Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Properties	  Limited	  (Properties	  Limited).	  The	  Property	  Trust	  is	  the	  
registered	  proprietor	  of	  land	  on	  which	  St	  Sava's	  Monastery	  and	  other	  buildings	  are	  situated	  
(the	  Property).	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  the	  Property	  is	  worth	  between	  $4.1	  million	  and	  $15	  million.	  
Apart	  from	  the	  land,	  the	  Property	  Trust	  also	  holds	  approximately	  $37,000	  in	  cash.	  	  
The	  plaintiff	  in	  the	  substantive	  proceedings	  underlying	  this	  application	  (Properties	  Ltd)	  claims	  
that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  constitutions	  by	  entities	  associated	  with	  the	  two	  churches,	  
those	  entities	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  Metropolitanate	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  of	  the	  
Serbian	  Orthodox	  Church	  and	  that,	  as	  a	  consequence:	  
(a)	   The	  Property	  is	  to	  be	  applied	  for	  the	  maintenance	  and	  propagation	  of	  the	  
Orthodox	  Christian	  faith	  through	  Properties	  Limited;	  	  
(b)	   Alternatively,	  the	  original	  purposes	  of	  the	  charitable	  trust	  to	  which	  the	  Property	  is	  
subject	  should	  be	  altered	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  the	  Property	  to	  be	  applied	  cy-­‐pres	  
towards	  the	  maintenance	  and	  propagation	  of	  the	  Orthodox	  Christian	  faith	  
through	  Properties	  Limited.	  	  
Properties	  Ltd	  also	  claims	  that	  there	  have	  been	  substantial	  breaches	  of	  trust	  by	  the	  Property	  
Trust.	  Therefore,	  Properties	  Ltd	  is	  claiming	  the	  Property	  from	  the	  Property	  Trust	  on	  the	  basis	  
that	  the	  churches	  are	  now	  one.	  
The	  leading	  case	  on	  this	  issue	  is	  the	  High	  Court	  decision	  in	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Community	  
Church	  of	  St	  Petka	  Incorporated	  v	  His	  Eminence	  Petar	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop	  of	  Macedonian	  
Orthodox	  Diocese	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  [2008]	  HCA	  42.	  In	  that	  case,	  Gummow	  ACJ,	  
Kirby,	  Hayne	  and	  Heydon	  JJ	  explained	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  jurisdictional	  bar	  to	  relief	  under	  
section	  63	  of	  the	  Act.	  That	  bar	  is	  that	  the	  applicant	  must	  be	  able	  to	  point	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
question	  respecting	  the	  management	  or	  administration	  of	  the	  trust	  property,	  or	  a	  question	  
respecting	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  trust	  instrument.	  	  
There	  are	  no	  implied	  limitations	  on	  the	  discretionary	  factors	  the	  court	  may	  take	  into	  account	  in	  
giving	  the	  advice	  sought	  under	  section	  63.	  However,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  trust	  and	  the	  issue	  that	  calls	  for	  resolution.	  Further,	  the	  fact	  that	  allegations	  of	  breach	  of	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trust	  have	  been	  made	  do	  not	  mean	  that	  an	  application	  under	  section	  63	  of	  the	  Act	  is	  not	  
appropriate.	  
His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [11]–[12]):	  
The	  Substantive	  Proceedings	  clearly	  concern	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  trust;	  and	  
consequently	  advice	  on	  whether	  those	  proceedings	  should	  be	  defended	  also	  concerns	  
the	  administration	  of	  the	  trust.	  There	  is	  a	  question	  whether	  judicial	  advice	  is	  strictly	  
necessary	  in	  relation	  to	  whether	  the	  Property	  Trust	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  seeking	  
instructions	  and	  obtaining	  legal	  advice	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  prospects	  of	  successfully	  
defending	  the	  proceedings	  since,	  at	  present,	  the	  Property	  Trust	  does	  not	  propose	  to	  
pay	  those	  legal	  costs	  out	  of	  the	  trust	  property.	  However,	  the	  expectation	  is	  that,	  once	  
the	  advice	  is	  obtained,	  the	  Property	  Trust	  will	  seek	  an	  indemnity	  and,	  in	  those	  
circumstances,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  the	  present	  application	  concerns	  the	  administration	  of	  
the	  trust.	  It	  also	  seems	  to	  me	  appropriate	  that	  the	  Property	  Trust	  incur	  legal	  fees	  in	  
determining	  whether	  the	  Substantive	  Proceedings	  should	  be	  defended.	  There	  is	  a	  
public	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  that	  charitable	  trusts	  are	  properly	  administered.	  To	  some	  
extent,	  that	  public	  interest	  is	  protected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General	  in	  the	  
Substantive	  Proceedings.	  However,	  the	  Property	  Trust	  is	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  
investigate	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  real	  issue	  concerning	  the	  relief	  sought	  in	  the	  Substantive	  
Proceedings;	  and,	  if	  there	  is,	  there	  is	  a	  public	  interest	  in	  ensuring	  that	  that	  matter	  is	  
brought	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  court.	  The	  fact	  that	  allegations	  of	  breach	  of	  trust	  are	  
made	  against	  the	  Property	  Trust	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  position.	  	  
Those	  allegations	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  Property	  Trust	  should	  remain	  the	  
trustee	  of	  the	  charitable	  trust	  in	  question	  and,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  there	  is	  a	  public	  interest	  in	  
ensuring	  that	  the	  court	  is	  properly	  informed	  of	  the	  matters	  concerning	  that	  issue	  before	  
determining	  whether	  to	  grant	  the	  relief	  sought	  in	  the	  Substantive	  Proceedings.’	  
Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  Property	  Trust	  was	  justified	  in	  obtaining	  legal	  advice	  and	  
pursuing	  a	  defence	  to	  the	  substantive	  proceedings	  in	  this	  case.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/47.html	  	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  is	  another	  case	  where	  substantial	  costs	  could	  be	  incurred	  by	  the	  churches	  concerned.	  
However,	  His	  Honour	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  submission	  put	  to	  him	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  cap	  
put	  on	  costs	  of	  the	  Property	  Trust	  at	  this	  point	  in	  the	  proceedings.	  He	  said	  that	  costs	  should	  be	  
dealt	  with	  when	  they	  arise	  later	  in	  the	  case.	  
	  
2.9.26  METROPOLITAN PETAR V MITRESKI [2012] NSWSC 16 (SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW SOUTH WALES, BRERETON J, 3 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  hearing	  was	  to	  settle	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  
Orthodox	  parish	  of	  St	  Petka	  in	  Sydney.	  The	  litigation	  arose	  from	  a	  dispute	  about	  who	  
controlled	  the	  property	  and	  affairs	  of	  the	  parish	  –	  was	  it	  the	  church	  hierarchy,	  represented	  by	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the	  bishop,	  Metropolitan	  Petar;	  or	  was	  it	  the	  local	  church	  itself,	  constituted	  as	  an	  incorporated	  
association?	  
The	  case	  had	  a	  long	  history	  of	  bitter	  litigation,	  and	  several	  issues	  were	  still	  to	  be	  decided.	  His	  
Honour	  outlined	  the	  relevant	  parts	  of	  the	  previous	  litigation.	  The	  proceedings	  of	  which	  this	  
hearing	  was	  a	  part	  were	  commenced	  in	  1997	  by	  the	  presiding	  Metropolitan	  (bishop)	  of	  the	  
Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Diocese	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  Metropolitan	  Petar.	  The	  bishop	  
was	  the	  first	  plaintiff,	  and	  the	  original	  parish	  priest,	  Father	  Mitrev,	  was	  the	  second	  plaintiff.	  
There	  were	  nine	  defendants.	  The	  first	  five	  defendants	  were	  members	  of	  the	  parish	  executive,	  
the	  sixth	  defendant	  was	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Community	  Church	  of	  St	  Petka	  Inc,	  the	  
seventh	  and	  eighth	  defendants	  were	  two	  subsequent	  parish	  priests	  (Father	  Despotoski	  and	  
Father	  Dzeparovski),	  and	  the	  ninth	  defendant	  was	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  of	  New	  South	  Wales,	  
in	  his	  capacity	  as	  overseer	  of	  charitable	  trusts.	  
The	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Church	  is	  an	  Episcopal	  church	  (i.e.	  ruled	  by	  bishops)	  and	  hence	  
hierarchical.	  The	  diocesan	  bishop	  appoints	  the	  priests,	  and	  has	  overall	  control	  of	  his	  diocese.	  
However,	  parishes	  are	  administered	  by	  parish	  councils,	  elected	  by	  a	  parish	  assembly,	  which	  
consists	  of	  all	  adult	  parishioners.	  All	  members	  of	  the	  parish	  council	  take	  an	  oath	  to	  uphold	  
church	  law.	  Day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  of	  the	  parish	  is	  delegated	  to	  a	  parish	  committee,	  of	  which	  
the	  priest	  is	  an	  ex	  officio	  member.	  	  
The	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  parish	  of	  St	  Petka	  (the	  parish)	  was	  set	  up	  as	  an	  unincorporated	  
association	  in	  October	  1977.	  In	  the	  same	  month,	  ownership	  of	  church	  property	  was	  
transferred	  to	  trustees	  of	  the	  association,	  and	  later	  the	  trustees	  acquired	  other	  properties.	  The	  
parish	  was	  incorporated	  under	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1984	  (NSW).	  Under	  that	  Act,	  
the	  assets	  held	  by	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  vest	  in	  the	  replacement	  incorporated	  
association	  automatically.	  
For	  reasons	  unknown,	  the	  parish	  had	  a	  constitution	  which	  differed	  from	  the	  usual	  mode	  of	  
management	  of	  a	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  parish.	  Its	  constitution	  provided	  that	  its	  priests	  were	  
to	  be	  appointed	  by	  a	  parish	  executive,	  not	  by	  the	  bishop.	  Father	  Mitrev	  was	  appointed	  as	  
parish	  priest	  by	  Bishop	  Petar	  in	  1996,	  and	  at	  first	  the	  divergence	  in	  rules	  relating	  to	  priestly	  
appointment	  had	  no	  effect.	  However,	  in	  1997,	  a	  faction	  emerged	  in	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  
community	  in	  Australia	  which	  opposed	  Bishop	  Petar.	  This	  faction	  included	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  
Petka.	  The	  dispute	  escalated	  through	  1997,	  and	  came	  to	  a	  head	  when	  Father	  Mitrev	  complied	  
with	  diocesan	  rules	  to	  forward	  moneys	  raised	  from	  baptisms,	  weddings	  and	  funerals	  at	  the	  
parish	  of	  St	  Petka	  to	  the	  bishop.	  In	  July	  1997,	  the	  parish	  committee	  purported	  to	  dismiss	  
Father	  Mitrev,	  and	  to	  employ	  Father	  Dzeparovski,	  and	  later	  Father	  Despotoski,	  as	  parish	  
priests.	  Neither	  appointment	  was	  sanctioned	  by	  Bishop	  Petar,	  and	  both	  priests	  were	  
subsequently	  defrocked.	  
In	  earlier	  proceedings	  (Metropolitan	  Petar	  v	  Mitreski	  [2003]	  NSWSC	  262),	  the	  primary	  issue	  
was	  whether	  the	  parish	  held	  the	  property	  vested	  in	  it	  absolutely,	  or	  as	  trustee	  for	  the	  purposes	  
of	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Church,	  or	  otherwise	  on	  trust.	  The	  property	  held	  by	  the	  parish	  
was	  divided	  into	  two	  parts:	  Schedule	  A	  property,	  used	  for	  church	  purposes;	  and	  non-­‐Schedule	  
A	  property,	  which	  included	  investment	  property.	  Hamilton	  J	  found	  that	  the	  parish	  held	  the	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Schedule	  A	  property	  on	  trust	  (as	  had	  its	  predecessor	  unincorporated	  association)	  and	  that	  the	  
trust	  was	  a	  valid	  charitable	  trust.	  There	  was	  no	  determination	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  non-­‐
Schedule	  A	  property.	  
Hamilton	  J	  did	  not	  specify	  the	  particular	  terms	  of	  the	  trust	  in	  which	  the	  Schedule	  A	  property	  
was	  held,	  but	  he	  did	  make	  clear	  that:	  
• when	  property	  was	  held	  upon	  charitable	  trust	  for	  an	  organised	  church,	  the	  property	  
must	  be	  used	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  doctrines,	  rituals	  and	  practices	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  
church	  hierarchy;	  
• in	  a	  hierarchical	  church,	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  presumption	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  property	  
being	  held	  for	  the	  national	  church,	  not	  the	  local	  parish,	  and	  this	  presumption	  was	  not	  
affected	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  local	  parish	  had	  bought	  the	  property	  without	  the	  financial	  
assistance	  of	  the	  national	  body;	  
• when,	  in	  Australia,	  a	  group	  of	  persons	  of	  ethnic	  origin	  proclaim	  that	  they	  are	  members	  
of	  an	  overseas	  church	  with	  an	  identical	  name,	  there	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  they	  are	  
members	  of	  the	  overseas	  body,	  or	  that	  the	  canon	  law	  and	  discipline	  of	  their	  church	  is	  
identical	  to	  that	  of	  the	  overseas	  body.	  
Subsequent	  litigation	  dealt	  with	  alleged	  breaches	  of	  trust:	  Metropolitan	  Petar	  v	  Mitreski	  [2009]	  
NSWSC	  106.	  The	  question	  was	  whether	  any	  of	  the	  breaches	  of	  trust	  were	  also	  breaches	  of	  
fundamental	  terms	  in	  church	  law.	  	  
The	  alleged	  breaches	  of	  trust	  were:	  
(a)	  preventing	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop	  from	  conducting	  services	  in	  the	  Church	  Building;	  
(b)	  preventing	  a	  priest	  appointed	  by	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop	  as	  parish	  priest	  of	  the	  St	  
Petka	  Parish	  from	  conducting	  religious	  services	  in	  the	  Church	  Building;	  	  
(c)	  preventing	  a	  priest,	  who	  was	  licensed	  by	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop	  to	  conduct	  religious	  
services	  in	  the	  Church	  Building,	  from	  doing	  so;	  	  
(d)	  excluding	  the	  priest	  appointed	  by	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop	  as	  a	  parish	  priest	  of	  the	  St	  
Petka	  Parish	  from	  the	  executive	  committee	  of	  the	  body	  responsible	  for	  the	  
administration	  of	  the	  St	  Petka	  Parish;	  	  
(e)	  employing	  a	  priest	  not	  appointed	  by	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop	  to	  act	  as	  the	  parish	  priest	  
of	  the	  St	  Petka	  Parish;	  
(f)	  employing	  a	  priest	  under	  valid	  ecclesiastical	  discipline	  in	  accordance	  with	  Church	  
Law	  to	  act	  as	  the	  parish	  priest	  of	  St	  Petka	  Parish;	  	  
(g)	  requiring	  or	  permitting	  a	  priest	  to	  conduct	  religious	  services	  upon	  the	  Church	  Land	  
when:	  	  
(i)	  that	  priest	  has	  not	  been	  authorised	  by	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop	  to	  do	  so;	  or	  
(ii)	  that	  priest	  is	  under	  valid	  ecclesiastical	  discipline	  in	  accordance	  with	  Church	  
Law.	  	  
(h)	  any	  or	  all	  of:	  
(i)	  closing	  the	  Church	  Building;	  	  
(ii)	  removing	  the	  Holy	  Objects	  from	  the	  Church	  Building;	  
(iii)	  installing	  Holy	  Objects;	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(iv)	  reinstalling	  Holy	  Objects;	  
(v)	  carrying	  out	  of	  building	  works	  in	  and	  upon	  the	  Church	  Building	  without	  the	  
authority	  and	  blessing	  of	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop.	  
(i)	  refusing	  or	  failing	  to	  accept	  applications	  for	  membership	  from	  believers	  in	  the	  
doctrines	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Church	  who	  have	  satisfied	  the	  criteria	  for	  
eligibility	  specified	  in	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  Diocesan	  Statute	  and	  the	  By-­‐Laws;	  	  
(j)	  failing	  to	  remit	  to	  the	  Diocesan	  Bishop	  the	  contribution	  from	  the	  income	  of	  the	  
parish	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  Diocesan	  Statute.	  	  
Young	  CJ	  in	  Equity	  held	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  relevant	  trust	  did	  not	  justify	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  
bishop	  from	  the	  parish	  church,	  or	  the	  employment	  of	  any	  priest	  not	  authorised	  by	  the	  bishop,	  
nor	  the	  closing,	  alteration	  or	  addition	  to	  the	  church	  building,	  or	  its	  ornaments,	  without	  the	  
bishop’s	  approval.	  Thus,	  (a),	  (b),	  (c)	  and	  (e)	  were	  fundamental	  terms	  of	  the	  trust.	  Young	  CJ	  had	  
doubts	  about	  alleged	  breaches	  (d),	  (i)	  and	  (j),	  although	  he	  found	  that	  they	  were	  breaches	  of	  
church	  law.	  
In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  dealt	  with	  the	  remaining	  questions.	  These	  were:	  
• whether	  the	  property	  of	  the	  parish,	  other	  than	  Schedule	  A	  property,	  was	  held	  on	  trust;	  
• whether	  there	  were	  any	  breaches	  of	  trust	  established,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  those	  
breaches	  found	  by	  Young	  CJ	  to	  be	  terms	  of	  the	  trust;	  
• whether	  there	  were	  any	  defences	  to	  breaches	  of	  trust	  that	  might	  be	  established;	  
• whether	  the	  individuals	  involved	  (the	  five	  committee	  members	  and	  Father	  Despotoski)	  
were	  liable	  as	  accessories	  to	  any	  breach	  of	  trust	  that	  might	  be	  established	  (action	  
against	  Father	  Dzeparovski	  was	  discontinued);	  
• what	  relief	  (if	  any)	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  plaintiffs.	  	  
Property	  held	  by	  the	  parish	  	  
Was	  all	  the	  property	  held	  by	  the	  parish	  part	  of	  the	  same	  trust	  as	  had	  been	  identified	  by	  
Hamilton	  J	  in	  the	  earlier	  litigation?	  Or	  was	  the	  non-­‐Schedule	  A	  property	  held	  by	  the	  parish	  free	  
of	  trust?	  Hamilton	  J	  had	  identified	  the	  Schedule	  A	  property	  as	  the	  church	  land,	  the	  child	  care	  
centre	  operated	  by	  the	  parish	  on	  adjacent	  land,	  and	  three	  pre-­‐incorporation	  investment	  
properties.	  Any	  other	  property	  was	  not	  dealt	  with.	  In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  identified	  other	  
pre-­‐incorporation	  property	  (holy	  objects	  such	  as	  icons	  and	  candles,	  ancillary	  property	  and	  
other	  funds,	  including	  donations)	  as	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  trust.	  Further	  property	  was	  acquired	  
after	  incorporation	  of	  the	  parish	  as	  an	  association,	  including	  more	  holy	  objects,	  ancillary	  
property	  and	  funds,	  as	  well	  as	  three	  further	  investment	  properties.	  His	  Honour	  designated	  this	  
property	  as	  post-­‐incorporation	  property.	  Was	  this	  also	  trust	  property?	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  all	  post-­‐incorporation	  property	  was	  trust	  property.	  He	  advanced	  three	  
reasons:	  	  
• the	  association	  was	  the	  successor	  to	  the	  unincorporated	  association;	  	  
• the	  pre-­‐incorporation	  property	  vested	  in	  the	  association	  after	  incorporation;	  and	  	  
• there	  was	  no	  segregation	  of	  trust	  and	  non-­‐trust	  assets,	  income,	  expenditure	  or	  
activities:	  it	  was	  all	  trust	  property,	  and	  all	  the	  same	  trust	  property.	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Breaches	  of	  trust	  
His	  Honour	  considered	  the	  earlier	  decision	  of	  Young	  CJ	  in	  Equity,	  and	  held	  that	  breaches	  (a),	  
(b),	  and	  (c)	  were	  established	  and	  were	  continuing	  on	  the	  facts.	  The	  bishop	  had	  been	  barred	  
from	  the	  church	  (at	  least	  when	  accompanied	  by	  Father	  Mitrev),	  as	  had	  the	  properly	  appointed	  
parish	  priest,	  and	  this	  was	  a	  continuing	  situation.	  Moreover,	  the	  replacement	  priests	  had	  not	  
been	  appointed	  by	  the	  bishop,	  so	  breach	  (e)	  was	  established.	  Breach	  (h)	  was	  also	  established	  
but	  had	  not	  been	  pursued	  in	  this	  hearing.	  
In	  relation	  to	  breaches	  (d),	  (i)	  and	  (j)	  as	  to	  which	  Young	  CJ	  had	  expressed	  doubts	  of	  their	  
fundamental	  nature,	  His	  Honour	  agreed	  that	  they	  were	  all	  breaches	  of	  church	  law.	  He	  held	  
that	  breaches	  (d)	  and	  (h)	  were	  not	  fundamental.	  Breach	  (i),	  however,	  was	  a	  breach	  which	  was	  
a	  fundamental	  breach	  of	  trust	  which	  was	  continuing.	  On	  this	  point	  His	  Honour	  said:	  
To	  exclude	  from	  membership	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  believing	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  
Christians	  within	  the	  parish	  is	  to	  exclude	  a	  portion	  of	  those	  who	  were	  intended	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  use	  the	  Church.	  If	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  believing	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  
Christians	  within	  the	  parish	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  body	  entitled	  to	  use	  the	  church	  
under	  the	  trust,	  the	  trust	  property	  is	  not	  being	  used	  for	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  
Church	  or	  religion,	  but	  for	  a	  schismatic	  purpose,	  representing	  a	  diversion	  from	  the	  
authorised	  purpose.	  Accordingly,	  this	  is	  not	  just	  a	  requirement	  of	  church	  law,	  but	  a	  
term	  of	  the	  trust.	  	  
While	  the	  Association	  says	  that	  eligibility	  for	  membership	  is	  determined	  by	  its	  
constitution,	  and	  that	  applications	  for	  membership	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  
requirements	  prescribed	  by	  or	  under	  its	  constitution,	  it	  is	  open	  to	  the	  executive	  
council	  under	  Article	  8(1)	  to	  alter	  the	  form	  of	  application.	  Breach	  (i)	  is	  established,	  is	  a	  
breach	  of	  trust,	  and	  is	  continuing.	  
Thus,	  there	  were	  substantial	  breaches	  of	  trust	  established.	  His	  Honour	  also	  identified	  
pecuniary	  breaches	  (see	  below).	  
Defences	  
Some	  of	  the	  claims	  relating	  to	  payments	  to	  Father	  Dzeparovski	  were	  statute-­‐barred	  under	  
section	  48(a)	  of	  the	  Limitation	  Act	  1968	  (NSW).	  
Section	  85	  of	  the	  Trustee	  Act	  1925	  (NSW)	  relates	  to	  excusable	  breaches	  of	  trust.	  These	  are	  
permitted,	  provided	  the	  trustee	  has	  acted	  honestly	  and	  reasonably.	  Relief	  under	  section	  85	  
does	  not	  amount	  to	  approval	  of	  the	  breach.	  Relief	  was	  sought	  in	  relation	  to	  payments	  made	  to	  
Fathers	  Dzeparovski	  and	  Despotoski.	  His	  Honour	  recognised	  that	  the	  committee	  members	  
were	  all	  volunteers,	  who	  were	  not	  sophisticated.	  Their	  English	  was	  limited,	  and	  they	  spoke	  
Macedonian	  at	  all	  material	  times.	  They	  were	  unversed	  in	  the	  law	  of	  trusts.	  Moreover,	  the	  trust	  
did	  not	  suffer	  because	  of	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  two	  priests	  –	  they	  generated	  more	  income	  
for	  the	  trust	  than	  their	  remuneration	  took	  from	  it.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  said:	  
...I	  accept	  that	  they	  honestly	  believed	  that	  the	  Association	  was	  beneficially	  entitled	  to	  
its	  property	  and	  did	  not	  hold	  it	  on	  trust;	  and	  that	  the	  parish	  property	  was	  Association	  
property	  and	  not	  trust	  property.	  That	  was	  a	  not	  unreasonable	  position,	  as	  until	  the	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decision	  of	  Hamilton	  J,	  there	  was	  doubt	  as	  to	  the	  trust	  status	  of	  the	  Association's	  
property.	  I	  further	  find	  ...that	  the	  Association's	  decision	  to	  employ	  Fr	  Dzeparovski	  and	  
later	  Fr	  Despotoski	  was	  actuated	  by	  a	  perceived	  need,	  consequent	  on	  the	  expulsion	  of	  
Fr	  Mitrev,	  to	  have	  a	  priest	  in	  the	  church	  to	  perform	  priestly	  duties	  in	  order	  to	  fulfil	  the	  
main	  function	  of	  the	  church	  and	  administer	  the	  sacraments	  to	  parishioners.	  In	  itself,	  
this	  is	  neither	  dishonest	  nor	  unreasonable.	  But	  it	  is	  affected	  by	  two	  features.	  The	  first	  
is	  that	  the	  Association	  by	  its	  officers	  also	  knew	  that	  such	  a	  course	  would	  be	  opposed	  to	  
the	  will	  of	  the	  Bishop.	  This	  was	  in	  circumstances	  where,	  but	  a	  few	  months	  earlier,	  
those	  officers	  had	  sworn	  a	  solemn	  oath	  of	  office	  by	  which	  they	  undertook...to	  uphold	  
the	  constitution	  of	  the	  church,	  the	  diocesan	  statute	  and	  the	  by-­‐laws....	  The	  second	  is	  
that	  it	  is	  a	  fundamental	  proposition	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  faith,	  that	  if	  not	  
known	  to	  the	  Committee	  Members	  who	  had	  sworn	  to	  uphold	  church	  law	  should	  have	  
been	  known	  to	  them,	  that	  it	  is	  the	  Bishop	  who	  administers	  sacraments,	  albeit	  via	  the	  
medium	  of	  a	  duly	  appointed	  priest	  as	  his	  agent;	  the	  corollary	  of	  which	  is	  that	  a	  priest	  
who	  has	  not	  been	  duly	  appointed	  by	  the	  Bishop	  cannot	  validly	  administer	  the	  
sacraments	  and	  from	  the	  Church's	  perspective	  achieves	  nothing.	  Accordingly,	  the	  
Association	  was	  paying	  these	  priests	  remuneration	  for	  performing	  a	  role	  that,	  in	  the	  
eyes	  of	  the	  Church,	  achieved	  absolutely	  no	  purpose....	  I	  cannot	  reconcile	  the	  conduct	  
of	  the	  Committee	  members,	  having	  sworn	  an	  oath	  of	  allegiance	  to	  church	  law,	  in	  
engaging	  and	  remunerating	  the	  two	  priests	  without	  the	  Bishop’s	  approval,	  to	  achieve	  
no	  useful	  purpose,	  with	  what	  would	  commonly	  be	  regarded	  as	  honest	  behaviour....	  
Resort	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  Association’s	  constitution,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  oath	  of	  
office,	  savours	  of	  the	  type	  of	  unconscionable	  insistence	  on	  strict	  legal	  right	  on	  which	  
equity	  has	  always	  frowned.	  	  
Thus,	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  relief	  under	  section	  85	  of	  the	  Trustee	  Act	  from	  
liability	  of	  the	  parish	  for	  the	  pecuniary	  breaches	  which	  had	  been	  established.	  
Liability	  as	  accessories	  
The	  plaintiffs	  made	  a	  claim	  of	  ‘knowing	  receipt’	  of	  trust	  moneys	  (as	  remuneration)	  against	  
Father	  Despotovski	  (as	  a	  ‘third	  party’	  to	  the	  Association’s	  breach).	  This	  claim	  was	  made	  under	  
what	  is	  known	  as	  ‘the	  first	  limb	  in	  Barnes	  v	  Addy’.	  Liability	  under	  the	  first	  limb	  of	  Barnes	  v	  Addy	  
depends	  on	  the	  third	  party	  having	  notice,	  actual	  or	  constructive,	  that	  the	  funds	  received	  were	  
trust	  moneys.	  Knowledge	  of	  circumstances	  that	  would	  put	  a	  reasonable	  person	  ‘on	  inquiry’	  is	  
enough	  to	  find	  the	  third	  party	  liable.	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  Father	  Despotovski	  had	  the	  
requisite	  notice.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  as	  Father	  Despotovski	  had	  given	  value	  for	  his	  
remuneration,	  and	  his	  activities,	  though	  not	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  church	  hierarchy,	  resulted	  in	  
increased	  revenue	  for	  the	  trust,	  he	  should	  not	  be	  liable	  to	  account	  to	  the	  trust	  for	  the	  moneys	  
received.	  
As	  to	  liability	  of	  the	  committee	  members	  as	  third	  parties	  to	  the	  Association’s	  breaches,	  His	  
Honour	  stated	  that	  there	  was	  no	  authority	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Barnes	  v	  Addy	  case	  which	  would	  
make	  the	  committee	  members	  liable	  to	  account	  to	  the	  trust.	  Were	  there	  any	  other	  grounds	  for	  
liability	  established?	  His	  Honour	  held	  (following	  on	  from	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  
decision	  in	  Farah	  Constructions	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Say-­‐Dee	  Pty	  Ltd	  (2007)	  HCA	  22	  at	  [161]–[165])	  that	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third	  parties	  to	  a	  trust	  can	  still	  be	  liable	  for	  breach	  of	  trust	  if	  they	  knowingly	  induce	  or	  procure	  
a	  breach	  of	  trust.	  This	  form	  of	  liability	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  receipt	  of	  trust	  funds.	  His	  Honour	  
said:	  
For	  substantially	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  found	  my	  conclusion	  that,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
s	  85,	  the	  Association	  did	  not	  act	  honestly	  and	  reasonably,	  I	  am	  compelled	  to	  conclude	  
that	  the	  Committee	  Members	  were	  conscious	  of	  those	  elements	  of	  the	  engagement	  of	  
the	  two	  priests	  that	  made	  their	  participation	  transgress	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  honest	  
behaviour.	  They	  knew,	  or	  at	  the	  least	  ought	  to	  have	  known,	  that	  what	  they	  were	  doing	  
involved	  repudiation	  of	  a	  recently	  sworn	  undertaking	  to	  uphold	  church	  law,	  and	  yet	  
would	  achieve	  no	  religious	  purpose	  in	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  Church	  for	  want	  of	  the	  Bishop's	  
approval.	  While	  I	  accept	  that	  considerable	  doubt	  attended	  whether	  the	  Association	  
would	  be	  held	  to	  be	  a	  trustee,	  about	  which	  minds	  could	  reasonably	  differ,	  until	  
Hamilton	  J's	  judgment,	  and	  that	  the	  Committee	  Members	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  
niceties	  of	  church	  law,	  I	  cannot	  accept	  that	  it	  accorded	  with	  ordinary	  standards	  of	  
honest	  behaviour	  for	  them	  to	  repudiate	  their	  recent	  oath	  of	  office.	  
Therefore,	  each	  of	  the	  committee	  members	  was	  found	  to	  be	  liable	  as	  an	  accessory	  of	  the	  
parish	  Association	  to	  account	  to	  the	  trust	  for	  the	  moneys	  paid	  as	  remuneration	  to	  Fathers	  
Dzeparovski	  (except	  for	  the	  portions	  statute-­‐barred)	  and	  Despotovski	  while	  those	  committee	  
members	  remained	  in	  office.	  
Relief	  
His	  Honour	  gave	  the	  following	  equitable	  relief	  to	  the	  plaintiffs,	  which	  reinforces	  the	  
Episcopalian	  nature	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Church,	  and	  supports	  Metropolitan	  Petar’s	  
position	  as	  bishop:	  
(1)	  a	  declaration	  that	  all	  the	  property	  of	  the	  Association	  other	  than	  the	  litigation	  funds	  
(some	  moneys	  separately	  identified	  as	  being	  to	  fund	  the	  defendants’	  case)	  are	  held	  as	  
trustee	  on	  the	  trust	  declared	  by	  Hamilton	  J;	  
(2)	  declarations	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  Association	  has,	  in	  breach	  of	  trust:	  (a)	  excluded	  
the	  diocesan	  Bishop,	  (b)	  excluded	  the	  parish	  priest	  appointed	  by	  the	  Bishop,	  (c)	  
prevented	  a	  priest	  licensed	  by	  the	  Bishop	  to	  conduct	  services	  in	  the	  church	  from	  doing	  
so,	  (d)	  employed	  priests	  not	  appointed	  by	  the	  Bishop,	  and	  (e)	  failed	  to	  accept	  
applications	  for	  membership	  from	  believers	  in	  the	  doctrines	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  
Orthodox	  Church	  who	  have	  satisfied	  the	  criteria	  for	  membership	  specified	  in	  the	  1994	  
Church	  constitution,	  the	  diocesan	  statute	  and	  the	  by-­‐laws;	  	  
(3)	  an	  injunction	  that	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  compelling	  the	  Association	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  
rules	  of	  Macedonian	  Orthodox	  Church	  as	  they	  apply	  to	  parishes	  of	  the	  Macedonian	  
Orthodox	  Church	  in	  respect	  of	  not	  excluding	  or	  impeding	  the	  Bishop,	  not	  excluding	  or	  
impeding	  Fr	  Mitrev,	  and	  admitting	  into	  membership	  those	  who	  meet	  the	  requirements	  
of	  church	  law	  for	  membership	  of	  a	  parish	  assembly;	  	  
(4)	  an	  order	  that	  the	  Association	  account	  to	  the	  trust	  for	  the	  moneys	  paid	  to	  Fr	  
Dzeparovski	  and	  Fr	  Despotoski,	  except	  for	  those	  paid	  prior	  to	  November	  1997	  in	  
respect	  of	  which	  the	  claim	  is	  statute-­‐barred;	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(5)	  an	  order	  that	  each	  of	  the	  Committee	  Members	  accounts	  to	  the	  trust	  for	  the	  
moneys	  paid	  to	  Fr	  Dzeparovski	  and	  Fr	  Despotoski	  while	  that	  Committee	  Member	  
remained	  in	  office,	  except	  for	  those	  paid	  prior	  to	  November	  1997	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  
the	  claim	  is	  statute-­‐barred.	  	  
Conclusion	  
Overall,	  His	  Honour	  found	  for	  the	  plaintiffs	  in	  almost	  all	  issues	  in	  the	  case:	  
• All	  the	  parish	  property	  was	  trust	  property	  (a	  charitable	  trust	  for	  religious	  purposes);	  
• There	  were	  substantial	  breaches	  of	  this	  trust	  by	  the	  parish	  association;	  
• Defences	  were	  not	  available	  (except	  where	  the	  action	  was	  statute-­‐barred);	  
• Personal	  liability	  to	  account	  to	  the	  trust	  was	  established	  for	  the	  committee	  members.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/action/PJUDG?jgmtid=156679	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  litigation	  has	  been	  ongoing	  since	  1997,	  with	  multiple	  court	  hearings.	  Costs	  have	  run	  into	  
the	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  dollars.	  There	  is	  still	  a	  pending	  appeal	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  
aspects	  of	  the	  case.	  The	  case	  seems	  an	  educative	  example	  of	  how	  an	  incorporated	  association	  
can	  fall	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  engaging	  in	  escalating	  conflict	  instead	  of	  resolving	  differences	  early	  in	  
order	  to	  re-­‐focus	  on	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  it	  was	  established.	  There	  were	  some	  attempts	  to	  
mediate	  this	  dispute	  but	  unfortunately	  those	  efforts	  failed.	  
The	  case	  is	  also	  important	  for	  its	  finding	  that	  the	  Association’s	  committee	  members	  were	  liable	  
as	  third	  parties	  for	  the	  Association’s	  breaches	  of	  trust.	  Under	  the	  law	  of	  equity	  and	  trusts,	  third	  
parties	  can	  be	  liable	  for	  procuring	  someone	  with	  trust	  or	  fiduciary	  obligations	  to	  breach	  those	  
obligations;	  or	  for	  knowingly	  assisting	  breaches	  of	  trust	  or	  fiduciary	  duty;	  or	  for	  receiving	  trust	  
property	  with	  notice	  of	  the	  trust.	  The	  court	  in	  this	  case	  was	  particularly	  concerned	  that	  the	  
committee	  members	  went	  against	  their	  oath	  of	  office	  to	  appoint	  and	  pay	  priests,	  against	  the	  
authority	  of	  the	  bishop	  and	  the	  church	  –	  which	  His	  Honour	  viewed	  as	  dishonest.	  For	  this	  
reason,	  the	  court	  ordered	  them	  to	  compensate	  the	  church	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  remuneration	  
paid	  to	  the	  priests.	  The	  committee	  members	  were	  found	  liable	  even	  though	  the	  priests	  were	  
excused.	  
	  
2.9.27  RE EBERWEIN ESTATE [2012] BCSC 250 (SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA, GRIFFIN J, 2 FEBRUARY 2012) 
This	  Canadian	  case	  concerned	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  will	  of	  Gertrud	  Eberwein	  (the	  testatrix)	  
who	  died	  in	  Vancouver	  in	  March	  2010,	  aged	  85	  years.	  The	  estate	  was	  worth	  nearly	  $10	  million	  
dollars.	  The	  testatrix	  did	  not	  have	  any	  children,	  and	  her	  husband	  had	  predeceased	  her.	  Ms	  
Eberwein	  left	  a	  will	  dated	  February	  20,	  2010	  (the	  Will)	  in	  which	  her	  estate	  was	  to	  be	  
distributed	  amongst	  family	  and	  friends	  in	  her	  native	  Germany,	  her	  deceased	  husband’s	  family	  
in	  Bulgaria,	  various	  friends	  in	  British	  Columbia,	  various	  Canadian	  charities,	  and	  friends	  in	  
Hawaii.	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There	  were	  various	  issues	  of	  interpretation	  considered	  in	  the	  case.	  The	  issue	  of	  interest	  here	  
was	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  gift	  in	  the	  Will	  to	  an	  organisation	  called	  Aid	  to	  Animals	  in	  Distress.	  
Aid	  to	  Animals	  in	  Distress	  was	  a	  charity	  to	  which	  the	  testatrix	  had	  previously	  given	  small	  
donations	  in	  1998,	  2000	  and	  2001	  respectively.	  It	  operated	  a	  cat	  shelter.	  The	  charity	  ceased	  to	  
exist	  in	  2007,	  prior	  to	  the	  making	  of	  the	  Will	  in	  February	  2010	  and	  the	  date	  of	  the	  testatrix’s	  
death	  in	  March	  2010.	  Therefore,	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  make	  the	  bequest.	  	  
Did	  this	  gift	  evince	  a	  general	  charitable	  intention	  such	  that,	  through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  cy-­‐
près	  doctrine,	  another	  charitable	  object	  could	  be	  benefited?	  Or	  did	  the	  gift	  lapse,	  thus	  falling	  
into	  the	  residue	  of	  the	  estate?	  	  
The	  Attorney	  General	  of	  British	  Columbia,	  who	  has	  an	  historical	  jurisdiction	  over	  charities,	  was	  
served	  with	  the	  petition	  materials	  in	  this	  proceeding,	  and	  filed	  a	  short	  response	  setting	  out	  the	  
basic	  principles	  that	  apply.	  These	  principles	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  Australia.	  Where	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  gift,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  donor	  had	  a	  general	  charitable	  
intent,	  the	  court	  has	  inherent	  jurisdiction	  to	  make	  an	  order	  for	  a	  cy-­‐près	  scheme,	  for	  the	  
property	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  way	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  that	  scheme	  set	  out	  by	  the	  testatrix.	  
Was	  there	  a	  general	  charitable	  intent	  and	  was	  there	  another	  cat	  shelter	  that	  could	  be	  
benefited	  in	  this	  case?	  
Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [44]):	  
It	  seems	  clear,	  from	  both	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Will	  and	  the	  extrinsic	  evidence,	  that	  
Ms.	  Eberwein	  loved	  cats.	  There	  is	  a	  term	  of	  the	  Will	  that	  ensures	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  
caretaker	  for	  Ms.	  Eberwein’s	  own	  cats	  and	  a	  place	  for	  them	  to	  live	  until	  the	  end	  of	  
2012.	  Amongst	  the	  many	  charities	  she	  named	  in	  her	  Will	  for	  specific	  bequests	  was	  the	  
SPCA,	  which	  further	  indicates	  that	  she	  had	  a	  fondness	  for	  the	  welfare	  of	  animals.	  The	  
petitioner	  [the	  executor	  of	  the	  Will]	  has	  provided	  evidence	  about	  discussions	  that	  his	  
wife...	  had	  with	  Ms.	  Eberwein	  concerning	  a	  shelter	  for	  hundreds	  of	  cats,	  located	  in	  
Richmond.	  [The	  wife]	  volunteered	  at	  the	  cat	  shelter	  and	  Ms.	  Eberwein	  wished	  to	  visit	  
it	  but	  never	  did	  because	  of	  her	  health	  at	  the	  time.	  
Her	  Honour	  noted	  that	  there	  were	  cases	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  if	  a	  will-­‐maker	  
showed	  an	  intention	  to	  make	  a	  gift	  to	  a	  particular	  institution,	  but	  that	  institution	  is	  no	  longer	  
in	  existence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  testator’s	  death,	  the	  gift	  will	  fail.	  There	  were	  also	  cases	  where	  
the	  will-­‐maker	  named	  one	  charity	  in	  her	  will	  as	  recipient	  of	  the	  residue	  of	  the	  estate,	  where	  
the	  court	  was	  able	  to	  construe	  a	  general	  intention	  despite	  the	  wrong	  naming	  of	  a	  charity	  that	  
never	  existed.	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  the	  will-­‐maker	  made	  nine	  separate	  bequests	  to	  nine	  identified	  charities	  covering	  a	  
range	  of	  subject	  matters,	  including	  the	  German	  Canadian	  Benevolent	  Society	  of	  British	  
Columbia,	  the	  BC	  Cancer	  Foundation,	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Diabetes	  Association.	  She	  had	  named	  
Aid	  to	  Animals	  in	  Distress	  specifically,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  a	  misnomer,	  but	  was	  a	  real	  charity	  to	  
which	  she	  had	  donated	  in	  the	  past.	  Her	  Honour	  was	  therefore	  unable	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  will-­‐
maker	  had	  a	  general	  charitable	  intent	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  gift.	  Her	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [47]):	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Ms.	  Eberwein	  was	  clearly	  very	  specific	  about	  the	  naming	  of	  the	  charities	  in	  her	  Will.	  I	  
am	  not	  satisfied	  she	  would	  have	  wanted	  the	  money	  to	  go	  to	  another	  charity	  if	  her	  gift	  
to	  Aid	  to	  Animals	  in	  Distress	  failed.	  	  
Therefore,	  Her	  Honour	  concluded	  that	  the	  gift	  to	  Aid	  to	  Animals	  in	  Distress	  pursuant	  to	  clause	  
3(c)(viii)	  of	  the	  Will	  lapsed	  and	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  residue	  of	  the	  estate.	  
This	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at: 
http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2012/2012bcsc250/2012bcsc250.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  Canadian	  case	  illustrates	  the	  difference	  between	  making	  a	  specific	  gift	  in	  a	  will	  and	  leaving	  
a	  charitable	  gift	  in	  the	  residue	  of	  an	  estate.	  The	  latter	  could	  be	  imbued	  with	  a	  general	  
charitable	  intention,	  but	  not	  the	  former.	  Charities	  in	  Australia	  always	  prefer	  to	  have	  bequests	  
left	  as	  part	  or	  all	  of	  the	  residue	  of	  an	  estate	  to	  avoid	  just	  such	  problems	  as	  this	  case	  from	  
British	  Columbia	  shows.	  
	  
2.9.28  BROWN V WILLOUGHBY [2012] WASC 20 (SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA, HEENAN J, 20 JANUARY 2012) 
This	  was	  a	  case	  involving	  multiple	  wills,	  one	  of	  which	  contained	  several	  large	  charitable	  
bequests.	  The	  deceased,	  Jean	  Wishart,	  died	  in	  2009,	  aged	  91	  years.	  There	  were	  four	  wills,	  all	  of	  
which	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  properly	  made	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  section	  8	  of	  the	  Wills	  Act	  
1970	  (WA)	  (the	  Act).	  These	  wills	  were	  dated	  1978,	  1999,	  April	  2001	  and	  July	  2001.	  The	  
executor,	  Brown,	  was	  propounding	  the	  1999	  will.	  
The	  estate	  was	  large,	  being	  almost	  $10	  million.	  The	  deceased	  had	  two	  children,	  both	  of	  whom	  
survived	  her,	  and	  both	  of	  whom	  were	  born	  profoundly	  disabled	  with	  cerebral	  palsy.	  They	  had	  
both	  lived	  in	  care	  for	  a	  long	  period.	  The	  1978	  will	  was	  made	  before	  the	  deceased’s	  husband’s	  
death.	  This	  will	  left	  the	  entire	  estate	  to	  the	  husband,	  and	  then	  in	  trust	  for	  the	  two	  disabled	  
children.	  The	  1999	  will	  was	  made	  shortly	  after	  the	  husband’s	  death.	  The	  1999	  will	  set	  up	  a	  
trust	  for	  the	  two	  disabled	  children,	  and	  after	  the	  death	  of	  the	  last	  child	  left	  the	  entire	  estate	  to	  
charity:	  15%	  to	  the	  Cerebral	  Palsy	  Association,	  and	  85%	  to	  be	  divided	  between	  Paraplegic	  
Quadriplegic	  Association	  of	  WA	  Inc,	  the	  Silver	  Chain	  Nursing	  Association	  Inc,	  the	  Women	  and	  
Infants	  Research	  Foundation	  of	  Carson	  House,	  King	  Edward	  Memorial	  Hospital	  and	  the	  Royal	  
WA	  Institute	  For	  The	  Blind.	  
The	  will	  of	  April	  2001	  appeared	  to	  be	  properly	  drawn	  in	  most	  respects.	  It	  had	  the	  same	  named	  
executor,	  Brown,	  but	  the	  entire	  estate	  was	  left	  to	  a	  second	  named	  executor,	  Timothy	  
Willoughby,	  or	  if	  he	  should	  pre-­‐decease	  the	  will-­‐maker,	  to	  Mrs	  Willoughby.	  Willoughby	  had	  
been	  the	  deceased’s	  stockbroker	  and	  financial	  advisor	  for	  some	  years.	  The	  will	  expressed	  the	  
wish	  that	  Willoughby	  should	  provide	  for	  the	  two	  disabled	  children	  if	  he	  was	  so	  disposed.	  There	  
was	  no	  expressed	  legal	  obligation	  on	  Willoughby	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  children,	  nor	  were	  there	  
any	  bequests	  to	  charity.	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The	  will	  of	  July	  2001	  also	  appeared	  to	  be	  properly	  drawn	  in	  most	  respects.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  same	  
terms	  as	  the	  April	  2001	  will,	  except	  that	  it	  provided	  instructions	  for	  the	  deceased’s	  cremation.	  
Willoughby	  pre-­‐deceased	  the	  will-­‐maker.	  Mrs	  Willoughby	  disclaimed	  any	  interest	  under	  the	  
2001	  wills.	  His	  Honour	  considered	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  disclaimer	  in	  the	  event	  that	  either	  of	  the	  
2001	  wills	  was	  valid.	  Such	  a	  disclaimer	  operates	  not	  as	  a	  disposition	  of	  property	  but	  as	  a	  non-­‐
acceptance	  of	  it,	  and	  so	  it	  prevents	  the	  gift	  from	  vesting.	  His	  Honour	  said:	  
In	  such	  an	  eventuality	  the	  defendant's	  disclaimer	  would	  result	  in	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  entire	  
residuary	  gift	  under	  either	  will	  thus	  producing	  an	  intestacy	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  net	  estate	  
after	  payment	  of	  all	  debts,	  funeral	  and	  testamentary	  expenses.	  The	  persons	  entitled	  to	  
benefit	  upon	  such	  an	  intestacy	  would	  be	  the	  two	  children	  of	  the	  deceased	  under	  s	  14	  
of	  the	  Administration	  Act.	  Neither	  child	  is	  sui	  juris	  because	  of	  their	  longstanding	  
disabilities.	  For	  this	  possibility	  to	  be	  pursued	  by	  any	  formal	  claim	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  
to	  have	  next	  friends	  appointed	  to	  initiate	  any	  proceedings	  to	  prove	  either	  will	  in	  order	  
for	  the	  children	  to	  claim	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  residuary	  estate.	  (at	  para	  [33])	  	  
This	  means	  that,	  if	  either	  of	  the	  2001	  wills	  was	  valid,	  then,	  given	  the	  disclaimer	  by	  Mrs	  
Willoughby,	  the	  deceased	  would	  have	  died	  intestate.	  The	  children,	  whose	  affairs	  were	  under	  
the	  control	  of	  the	  Public	  Trustee	  of	  Western	  Australia,	  would	  be	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  
intestacy.	  
His	  Honour	  considered	  the	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  making	  of	  the	  2001	  wills.	  The	  
circumstances	  were	  questionable.	  The	  wills	  were	  made	  at	  the	  instigation	  of	  Willoughby,	  but	  
His	  Honour	  was	  careful	  not	  to	  attribute	  improper	  or	  corrupt	  motives	  to	  Willoughby,	  
particularly	  since	  he	  was	  now	  dead,	  and	  could	  offer	  no	  explanation	  of	  his	  conduct.	  However,	  
given	  the	  facts,	  His	  Honour	  stated	  that:	  
...it	  does	  show	  the	  pivotal	  role	  of	  Mr	  Willoughby	  in	  the	  deceased’s	  affairs	  and	  suggests	  
that	  he	  had	  considerable	  influence	  upon	  her.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  influence	  may	  have	  
been	  exercised	  in	  what	  Mr	  Willoughby	  took	  to	  be	  conscientious	  manner	  designed	  to	  
be	  of	  assistance	  to	  the	  deceased	  and	  her	  children	  does	  not	  diminish	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
gives	  rise	  to	  a	  suspicion	  of	  undue	  influence	  and	  lack	  of	  full	  appreciation	  and	  
understanding	  by	  the	  testatrix	  during	  2001.	  (at	  para	  [56])	  
At	  one	  point,	  Willoughby	  had	  submitted	  to	  a	  hearing	  relating	  to	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  deceased’s	  
children	  that:	  
...the	  only	  persons	  having	  standing	  to	  make	  any	  challenge	  to	  the	  last	  will	  would	  be	  the	  
two	  children	  who	  themselves	  were	  incapable.	  This	  line	  of	  submission	  seems	  to	  have	  
been	  predicated	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  only	  challenge	  which	  might	  be	  made	  to	  the	  last	  
will	  of	  Mrs	  Wishart	  would	  be	  a	  challenge	  by	  the	  children	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
Inheritance	  (Family	  and	  Dependants	  Provision)	  Act	  1972	  (WA)	  (Inheritance	  Act).	  The	  
submission	  seems	  to	  have	  overlooked	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  might	  well	  have	  
been	  a	  challenge	  by	  any	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  charities	  named	  in	  the	  1999	  will	  
advancing	  allegations	  that,	  for	  various	  reasons	  such	  as	  want	  of	  testamentary	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capacity	  or	  other	  potential	  reasons	  such	  as	  undue	  influence,	  neither	  of	  the	  2001	  wills	  
would	  be	  valid...	  (at	  para	  [52])	  [emphasis	  added].	  
This	  seemed	  to	  show	  that	  Willoughby	  had	  an	  awareness	  that	  the	  2001	  wills	  might	  be	  
challenged,	  and	  pointed	  to	  a	  situation	  which	  His	  Honour	  termed	  ‘inadvisable’	  (at	  para	  [55]).	  
In	  December	  2002,	  the	  deceased	  had	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  dementia.	  The	  doctor	  had	  
suspicions	  about	  the	  2001	  wills,	  and	  about	  Willoughby	  generally.	  As	  His	  Honour	  expressed	  it:	  
Dr	  Holloway	  met	  and	  spoke	  with	  Mr	  Willoughby	  on	  many	  occasions	  as	  he	  often	  
telephoned	  the	  doctor	  inquiring	  after	  Mrs	  Wishart	  and	  often	  visited	  her.	  Dr	  Holloway	  
believed	  that	  Mr	  Willoughby's	  relationship	  with	  Mrs	  Jean	  Wishart	  was	  suspicious	  given	  
that	  she	  was	  wealthy	  and	  that	  due	  to	  her	  medical	  condition	  she	  was	  highly	  dependent	  
and	  vulnerable.	  	  
Dr	  Holloway	  thought	  the	  relationship	  peculiar	  in	  that	  Willoughby	  appeared	  to	  respond	  
to	  her	  emotional	  needs,	  by	  speaking	  to	  her	  on	  the	  phone	  and	  visiting	  her,	  but	  not	  her	  
physical	  needs	  (for	  example,	  he	  did	  not	  provide	  her	  with	  a	  wheelchair	  when	  she	  had	  a	  
clear	  need	  for	  this,	  and	  she	  had	  unpaid	  medical	  bills).	  (at	  para[70])	  
The	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  1999	  will	  were	  not	  in	  question.	  There	  had	  been	  a	  definite	  
wish	  that	  the	  estate	  should	  go	  to	  charity	  after	  the	  children’s	  deaths.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  
were	  numerous	  suspicious	  circumstances	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  2001	  wills.	  Therefore,	  probate	  of	  
the	  1999	  will	  was	  granted.	  Costs	  were	  to	  be	  paid	  from	  the	  estate.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WASC/2012/20.html	  	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
There	  was	  clear	  evidence	  in	  this	  case	  that	  the	  deceased	  had	  wanted	  ultimately	  to	  benefit	  her	  
chosen	  charities	  after	  her	  children	  were	  cared	  for.	  His	  Honour	  referred	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  
charities	  challenging	  the	  later	  wills,	  which	  could	  have	  been	  on	  various	  grounds.	  Charities	  
should	  always	  stand	  up	  for	  their	  bequests	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  provided	  that	  costs	  are	  not	  
prohibitive.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  a	  challenge,	  since	  the	  charities	  will	  ultimately	  
benefit	  under	  the	  will	  which	  was	  proved.	  
	  
2.10 MISCELLANEOUS 
2.10.1  HORESH V SEPHARDI ASSOCIATION OF VICTORIA [2012] VSCA 308 (VICTORIAN 
COURT OF APPEAL, REDLICH, OSBORNE JJA, CAVANOUGH AJA, 13 DECEMBER 
2012) 
This	  case	  about	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  Sephardi	  Association	  of	  Victoria	  (SAV),	  was	  an	  appeal	  from	  
Horesh	  v	  Sephardi	  Association	  of	  Victoria	  [2011]	  VSC	  26	  (see	  casenote).	  In	  1990,	  Albert	  Yehuda	  
(AY)	  had	  financed	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  synagogue	  in	  St	  Kilda,	  Melbourne.	  The	  synagogue	  was	  
named	  in	  honour	  of	  AY’s	  father,	  Sassoon	  Yehuda.	  The	  naming	  followed	  a	  dispute	  between	  the	  
parties	  which	  was	  resolved	  by	  a	  Settlement	  Agreement	  in	  which	  the	  name	  of	  the	  synagogue	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was	  to	  be	  the	  ‘Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Synagogue’	  in	  perpetuity.	  However,	  when	  the	  synagogue	  was	  
opened	  in	  1994	  it	  was	  named	  the	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Sephardi	  Centre	  (the	  Centre).	  
From	  1	  July	  1993,	  AY’s	  affairs	  were	  administered	  by	  State	  Trustees	  Ltd	  (State	  Trustees)	  under	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Guardianship	  and	  Administration	  Act	  1986	  (Vic).	  In	  2002,	  the	  SAV	  began	  a	  
fundraising	  appeal	  to	  extend	  the	  Centre	  by	  building	  a	  large	  hall	  with	  various	  attached	  facilities.	  
The	  appeal	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Synagogue	  Extension	  Appeal,	  and	  a	  brochure	  
was	  produced	  which	  included,	  inter	  alia,	  naming	  rights	  for	  the	  ‘entire	  extension	  of	  the	  
Synagogue’	  for	  a	  donation	  of	  $450,000.	  Also	  offered	  were	  naming	  rights	  for	  the	  hall	  lighting	  for	  
a	  donation	  of	  $125,000.	  
The	  SAV	  wrote	  to	  the	  State	  Trustees	  in	  November	  2006,	  in	  its	  capacity	  as	  administrator	  of	  AY’s	  
estate,	  advising	  of	  the	  hall	  plan,	  and	  offering	  AY	  ‘first	  option	  naming	  rights	  for	  the	  new	  annex’	  
and	  ‘the	  naming	  rights	  for	  the	  new	  hall’.	  The	  brochure	  was	  enclosed.	  In	  January	  2007,	  State	  
Trustees	  declined	  the	  offer.	  AY	  died	  on	  4	  July	  2007,	  and	  Horesh	  (H),	  a	  solicitor	  and	  AY’s	  
nephew,	  was	  appointed	  executor	  of	  his	  estate.	  
During	  2008,	  H,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  estate,	  agreed	  to	  forgive	  the	  remaining	  1990	  loan,	  and	  
provide	  further	  loans	  for	  the	  SAV	  extension	  plan.	  The	  amount	  to	  be	  forgiven	  was	  $100,000,	  
and	  the	  certificate	  of	  title	  was	  to	  be	  returned	  to	  the	  estate.	  Two	  documents	  were	  created,	  a	  
Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  (MOU)	  which	  provided	  that	  ‘the	  estate	  wishes	  to	  protect	  and	  
preserve	  Albert	  Yehuda’s	  legacy	  by	  obtaining	  naming	  rights	  to	  the	  proposed	  extension…’.	  The	  
MOU	  also	  provided	  that	  a	  Naming	  Rights	  Agreement	  would	  be	  ‘crafted	  and	  signed	  by	  both	  
parties	  after	  return	  of	  the	  title	  to	  SAV’.	  
The	  second	  document	  in	  issue	  was	  a	  Loan	  Agreement	  dated	  17	  August	  2008.	  This	  provided	  for	  
an	  interest	  free	  loan	  of	  $100,000	  to	  SAV	  for	  a	  period	  of	  10	  years.	  This	  document	  stated	  that	  
‘the	  lender	  in	  its	  capacity	  as	  the	  executor	  of	  the	  estate	  of	  Albert	  Yehuda	  wants	  the	  ground	  
floor	  hall	  to	  be	  named	  ‘Albert	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Hall’…’.	  The	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  the	  loan	  
were	  stated	  to	  be	  ‘in	  consideration	  for	  the	  name	  to	  the	  hall’.	  	  
Following	  this,	  the	  estate	  forgave	  the	  $100,000	  loan	  from	  1990	  and	  provided	  a	  new	  amount	  of	  
$100,000	  to	  the	  SAV.	  The	  hall	  was	  completed	  and	  was	  named	  the	  ‘Albert	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Hall’.	  	  
In	  2009,	  a	  dispute	  arose	  when	  H	  became	  aware	  that	  the	  words	  ‘Lyndi	  and	  Rodney	  Adler	  
Sephardi	  Centre’	  were	  inscribed	  over	  the	  front	  entrance	  to	  the	  entire	  extended	  premises.	  H	  
alleged	  that	  the	  SAV	  were	  thereby	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  Settlement	  Agreement,	  the	  MOU	  and	  the	  
Loan	  Agreement.	  H	  also	  alleged	  wilful	  misrepresentations	  during	  negotiations	  with	  the	  SAV	  as	  
to	  the	  naming	  of	  the	  synagogue,	  and	  unconscionable	  conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  SAV.	  
At	  trial,	  His	  Honour	  dealt	  with	  each	  document	  in	  turn.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  1990	  Settlement	  
Agreement,	  the	  naming	  issue	  turned	  on	  the	  true	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  ‘synagogue’.	  
‘Synagogue’	  was	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  Settlement	  Agreement.	  The	  SAV	  contended	  that	  it	  only	  
referred	  to	  the	  inner	  prayer	  chamber	  of	  the	  building,	  and	  not	  the	  whole	  complex.	  The	  original	  
synagogue	  consisted	  of	  a	  prayer	  hall	  with	  a	  women’s	  section	  at	  the	  back,	  toilet	  facilities,	  a	  very	  
small	  kitchen,	  a	  library	  and	  a	  study	  room.	  It	  was	  used	  solely	  for	  religious	  purposes.	  His	  Honour,	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in	  construing	  the	  document	  as	  a	  reasonable	  person	  would,	  found	  that	  the	  word	  ‘synagogue’	  
referred	  to	  the	  whole	  original	  building	  and	  not	  just	  some	  inner	  chamber	  within	  it.	  Since	  the	  
name	  ‘Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Synagogue’	  is	  now	  displayed	  prominently	  inside	  the	  original	  building	  
over	  the	  entrance	  to	  the	  prayer	  chamber,	  His	  Honour	  concluded	  that	  the	  signing	  rights	  
referred	  to	  in	  the	  Settlement	  Agreement	  had	  been	  complied	  with.	  
Should	  this	  name	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  the	  extended	  premises	  as	  a	  whole?	  The	  wording	  of	  the	  
MOU	  certainly	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  naming	  rights	  to	  the	  hall	  extension	  were	  expected,	  and	  
a	  draft	  ‘New	  Hall	  Naming	  Agreement’	  sent	  by	  the	  SAV	  to	  H	  also	  made	  this	  clear	  by	  providing	  
that	  the	  hall	  would	  be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Albert	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Hall’.	  However,	  that	  Agreement	  
was	  not	  agreed	  to	  by	  H,	  who	  wanted	  a	  simpler	  loan	  and	  naming	  agreement	  drawn	  up.	  
Subsequently,	  the	  Loan	  Agreement	  was	  completed.	  
The	  Loan	  Agreement	  certainly	  referred	  explicitly	  to	  the	  ground	  floor	  hall	  of	  the	  new	  extension	  
as	  an	  area	  to	  be	  named	  the	  ‘Albert	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Hall’.	  No	  other	  areas	  were	  referred	  to,	  
although	  it	  is	  made	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  to	  be	  a	  new	  frontage.	  His	  Honour	  concluded	  that	  a	  
reasonable	  person	  would	  not	  find	  that	  the	  rights	  to	  the	  new	  frontage	  were	  included	  in	  this	  
reference.	  The	  hall	  had	  been	  named	  after	  AY.	  The	  new	  frontage	  could	  bear	  another	  name.	  
Therefore,	  there	  was	  no	  breach	  of	  any	  agreement	  as	  to	  naming	  rights.	  
Had	  there	  been	  misrepresentation	  and	  unconscionable	  conduct?	  His	  Honour	  concluded	  that	  
these	  allegations	  could	  not	  be	  made	  out.	  There	  was	  no	  fraud,	  and	  the	  estate	  had	  received	  
precisely	  what	  it	  had	  bargained	  for,	  which	  was	  the	  naming	  rights	  to	  the	  new	  hall.	  Therefore,	  
the	  plaintiff’s	  claim	  was	  dismissed	  in	  total	  at	  first	  instance.	  
On	  appeal,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  inscribing	  and	  maintaining	  of	  the	  name	  ‘Lyndi	  and	  Rodney	  
Adler	  Sephardi	  Centre’	  over	  the	  front	  entrance	  to	  the	  extended	  building	  was	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  
1990	  Settlement	  Agreement,	  though	  not	  of	  any	  other	  agreement.	  The	  terms	  of	  the	  loan	  
agreement	  did	  not	  extinguish	  the	  appellant’s	  rights	  in	  this	  regard.	  The	  appellant	  was	  entitled	  
to	  have	  the	  extended	  building	  named	  after	  his	  grandfather,	  and	  that	  precluded	  the	  Association	  
from	  putting	  up	  any	  inconsistent	  inscription	  or	  from	  otherwise	  behaving	  inconsistently	  with	  
the	  appellant’s	  entitlement.	  The	  appellant	  was	  entitled	  to	  require	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  ‘Adler’	  
inscription	  from	  its	  current	  position	  on	  the	  front	  of	  the	  building.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  various	  documents	  in	  play,	  the	  Appeal	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  Settlement	  
Agreement	  was	  such	  that	  there	  had	  been	  inconsistent	  naming	  of	  the	  extended	  building	  by	  
naming	  it	  after	  the	  Adlers,	  but	  that	  there	  could	  be	  dual	  naming.	  The	  Court	  said	  (at	  [35]–[37]):	  
The	  vice	  in	  the	  current	  situation	  is	  that	  because	  the	  name	  ‘the	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  
Synagogue’	  is	  not	  inscribed	  on	  the	  front	  of	  the	  building,	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  ‘the	  Lyndi	  
and	  Rodney	  Adler	  Sephardi	  Centre’	  conveys	  a	  primary	  name	  to	  the	  Synagogue	  building	  
and	  complex	  as	  a	  whole	  which	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  settlement	  deed.	  The	  fact	  that	  
the	  East	  Malvern	  Synagogue	  was	  inscribed	  with	  the	  name	  ‘the	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  
Synagogue’	  on	  the	  front	  of	  the	  building	  strongly	  supports	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  
relevant	  right	  to	  name	  the	  new	  Synagogue	  was	  intended	  to	  encompass	  such	  name	  as	  
the	  synagogue	  building	  presented	  to	  the	  public.	  Nevertheless...	  it	  was	  not	  intended	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that	  substantial	  extensions	  to	  the	  Synagogue	  building	  could	  not	  have	  a	  new	  subsidiary	  
name,	  so	  long	  as	  any	  name	  on	  the	  front	  of	  the	  building	  did	  not	  derogate	  from	  the	  
rights	  conferred	  by	  the	  settlement	  deed.	  Indeed,	  if	  the	  front	  external	  wall	  were	  
inscribed	  both	  ‘the	  Sassoon	  Yehuda	  Synagogue’	  and	  ‘the	  Lyndi	  and	  Rodney	  Adler	  
Extension’	  this	  would	  not	  breach	  the	  agreement,	  because	  the	  extension	  so	  named	  
would	  be	  identified	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  Synagogue.	  
As	  to	  the	  other	  documents,	  the	  Court	  said	  that	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  MOU	  and	  the	  loan	  agreement	  
(at	  [42]–[43]):	  
...	  we	  do	  not	  accept	  that	  by	  the	  MOU	  or	  otherwise	  the	  estate	  gained	  the	  right	  to	  have	  
the	  Yehuda	  name	  displayed	  on	  the	  front	  façade	  of	  the	  extended	  building	  or	  on	  any	  
other	  external	  part	  of	  the	  building.	  There	  was	  no	  relevant	  conflict	  between	  the	  MOU	  
and	  the	  loan	  agreement.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  appellant	  did	  not,	  by	  the	  loan	  
agreement	  or	  otherwise,	  relinquish	  the	  right	  of	  the	  estate	  under	  the	  settlement	  deed	  
to	  prevent	  the	  Association	  from	  erecting	  or	  maintaining	  on	  the	  front	  façade	  or	  
elsewhere	  any	  sign	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  extended	  building	  being	  named	  after	  Sassoon	  
Yehuda.	  We	  agree	  with	  the	  Association	  that	  the	  MOU	  merely	  foreshadowed,	  but	  did	  
not	  confer,	  naming	  rights.	  
The	  Court	  concluded	  (at	  [73]):	  
...nothing	  in	  this	  judgment	  would	  preclude	  the	  Association	  from	  entering	  into	  or	  giving	  
effect	  to	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  Adlers	  or	  any	  other	  third	  party	  for	  the	  grant	  of	  naming	  
rights	  in	  respect	  of	  some	  particular	  part	  of	  the	  building	  or	  for	  the	  erection	  of	  a	  
corresponding	  external	  sign,	  provided	  that	  neither	  the	  agreement	  nor	  the	  sign	  was	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  appellant.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  if	  the	  Association	  were	  
to	  agree	  to	  name	  the	  extension	  after	  the	  Adlers,	  the	  Association	  would	  be	  free	  to	  erect	  
a	  sign	  such	  as	  ‘Adler	  extension’	  on	  some	  appropriate	  external	  part	  of	  the	  building.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  such	  a	  sign	  should	  not	  be	  so	  designed	  or	  so	  placed	  as	  to	  be	  
inconsistent	  with	  the	  naming	  of	  the	  building	  as	  it	  presently	  stands	  after	  Sassoon	  
Yehuda.	  
Damages	  were	  not	  sought	  by	  the	  appellant.	  Therefore,	  the	  appeal	  was	  allowed	  in	  part,	  with	  
the	  Court	  ordering	  (at	  [75]):	  
• a	  declaration	  that	  the	  inscribing	  and	  maintaining	  by	  the	  Sephardi	  Association	  of	  
Victoria	  Inc	  of	  the	  name	  ‘Lyndi	  and	  Rodney	  Adler	  Sephardi	  Centre’	  over	  the	  front	  
entrance	  to	  the	  building	  at	  79	  Hotham	  Street,	  East	  Kilda	  amounted	  to	  a	  breach	  by	  the	  
Association	  of	  the	  deed	  of	  agreement	  dated	  9	  November	  1990	  between	  the	  
Association	  and	  Albert	  Sassoon	  Yehuda;	  
• an	  order	  that	  as	  soon	  as	  practicable	  the	  Association	  remove	  the	  name	  ‘Lyndi	  and	  
Rodney	  Adler	  Sephardi	  Centre’	  presently	  appearing	  over	  the	  front	  entrance	  to	  the	  
building	  at	  79	  Hotham	  Street,	  East	  St	  Kilda.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2012/308.html	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  a	  complex	  case	  about	  very	  little,	  in	  which	  substantial	  costs	  could	  have	  been	  avoided	  
by	  the	  association,	  employing	  an	  easy	  compromise	  solution	  (dual	  naming	  or	  some	  variation	  of	  
dual	  naming),	  as	  was	  suggested	  by	  the	  Appeal	  Court.	  Negotiation	  of	  such	  an	  outcome	  before	  
the	  matter	  came	  to	  court	  would	  have	  avoided	  considerable	  legal	  expense.	  
	  
2.10.2  BARTLEY V THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES (FIRST TIER 
TRIBUNAL (CHARITY), GENERAL REGULATORY CHAMBER, RULING BY 
MCKENNA J, 7 DECEMBER 2012 
See	  Nonprofit	  Structure	  and	  Governance,	  case	  note	  2.7.1	  above	  
	  
2.10.3  PAPACONSTUNTINOS V HOLMES A COURT [2012] HCA 53 (HIGH COURT OF 
AUSTRALIA, FRENCH CJ, HEYDON, CRENNAN, KEIFEL, BELL JJ, 5 DECEMBER 
2012)  
This	  was	  a	  defamation	  case	  involving	  the	  South	  Sydney	  District	  Rugby	  League	  Football	  Club	  
(the	  Football	  Club).	  The	  appellant,	  Papaconstuntinos,	  was	  a	  director	  of	  the	  South	  Sydney	  
Leagues	  Club	  (the	  Leagues	  Club),	  which	  was	  a	  licensed	  club	  associated	  with	  the	  Football	  Club.	  
At	  the	  relevant	  time,	  the	  applicant	  was	  also	  employed	  by	  the	  Construction,	  Forestry,	  Mining	  
and	  Energy	  Union	  (CFMEU).	  
The	  circumstances	  behind	  the	  application	  were	  that	  the	  Football	  Cub	  was	  experiencing	  
financial	  difficulties	  in	  2005,	  and	  was	  assisted	  by	  an	  injection	  of	  $3	  million	  in	  capital	  by	  Holmes	  
a	  Court	  and	  Russell	  Crowe.	  This	  was	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  controlling	  interest	  in	  the	  club.	  The	  
applicant	  was	  firmly	  opposed	  to	  the	  transaction.	  
An	  Extraordinary	  General	  Meeting	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Football	  Club	  was	  called	  for	  19	  
March	  2006	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  voting	  on	  the	  proposed	  ‘takeover’.	  Two	  days	  prior	  to	  that	  
meeting,	  the	  respondent	  sent	  a	  letter	  which	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  proceedings	  at	  first	  
instance.	  It	  was	  addressed	  to	  Mr	  Andrew	  Ferguson,	  the	  State	  Secretary	  of	  the	  CFMEU.	  The	  
letter	  was	  expressed	  to	  be	  a	  formal	  complaint	  about	  the	  appellant,	  who	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  
official	  of	  the	  CFMEU.	  	  
The	  letter	  expressed	  concern	  that	  the	  appellant	  had	  allegedly	  contacted	  members	  of	  the	  
Football	  Club	  ‘to	  repeat	  misleading	  information	  about	  the	  proposal	  which	  is	  being	  put	  to	  
Members’.	  The	  respondent	  said	  in	  the	  letter,	  ‘I	  am,	  frankly,	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  understand	  why	  Mr	  
Papa	  has	  worked	  so	  hard	  to	  spread	  misinformation	  about	  the	  proposal’.	  	  
The	  respondent	  then	  set	  out	  a	  series	  of	  facts	  involving	  the	  appellant	  and	  his	  son,	  Mr	  Jamie	  
Papaconstuntinos.	  An	  inference	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  respondent's	  doing	  so	  was	  that	  he	  
considered	  that	  those	  facts	  provided	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  appellant's	  opposition	  to	  the	  proposal.	  
This	  was	  that	  the	  proposal	  would	  involve	  a	  change	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Football	  Club	  and	  
the	  prospect	  of	  disclosure	  of	  dealings	  concerning	  the	  appellant's	  son.	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These	  dealings	  had	  emerged	  in	  the	  course	  of	  due	  diligence	  conducted	  in	  August	  2005.	  They	  
were,	  according	  to	  the	  respondent,	  such	  that	  the	  appellant’s	  son	  was	  paid	  an	  excessive	  salary	  
for	  his	  job	  as	  an	  assistant	  coach.	  The	  amount	  was	  stated	  to	  be	  $60,000	  when	  it	  should	  have	  
been	  closer	  to	  $4000.	  The	  respondent	  then	  raised	  questions	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  payments	  were	  
made	  to	  Mr	  Jamie	  Papaconstuntinos	  at	  a	  premium	  as	  ‘a	  reward	  for	  other	  activities,	  or	  a	  
method	  of	  channelling	  funds	  to	  the	  CFMEU,	  or	  indeed	  to	  Mr	  Tony	  Papa	  [the	  appellant]’.	  	  
The	  respondent	  had	  been	  told	  by	  Football	  Club	  management	  that	  the	  overpayment	  was	  the	  
reason	  for	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  appellant’s	  son	  from	  his	  position	  some	  time	  previously.	  
Moreover,	  he	  had	  been	  told	  that	  the	  excess	  salary	  was	  met	  by	  sponsors	  who	  were	  
construction	  companies.	  
The	  relevant	  legislation	  was	  the	  Defamation	  Act	  2005	  (NSW)	  (the	  Act).	  At	  first	  instance,	  
(Papaconstuntinos	  v	  Holmes	  a	  Court	  [2009]	  NSWSC	  903)	  the	  trial	  judge	  found	  that	  the	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  payments	  were	  ‘inherently	  suspicious’.	  However,	  there	  were	  three	  
imputations	  about	  the	  appellant	  which	  Her	  Honour	  identified,	  and	  which	  she	  held	  were	  not	  
justified	  by	  qualified	  privilege	  ([2009]	  NSWSC	  903	  at	  [18],	  [30],	  [32]	  and	  [36]).	  They	  were	  that	  
the	  plaintiff	  (Papaconstuntinos,	  the	  appellant	  in	  this	  case):	  
(1)	  repeated	  information	  he	  knew	  to	  be	  misleading	  about	  the	  defendant’s	  [Holmes	  a	  
Court’s	  (the	  respondent	  in	  this	  case)]	  proposal	  to	  take	  a	  controlling	  interest	  in	  the	  ...	  
Football	  Club;	  
(2)	  was	  reasonably	  suspected	  by	  the	  defendant	  [respondent]	  of	  corruptly	  arranging	  for	  
funds	  meant	  for	  the	  ...	  Football	  Club	  to	  be	  channelled	  to	  himself;	  and	  
(3)	  was	  reasonably	  suspected	  by	  the	  defendant	  [respondent]	  of	  corruptly	  channelling	  
overpayments	  by	  the	  ...	  Football	  Club	  to	  the	  CFMEU.	  
Moreover,	  the	  respondent	  later	  acknowledged	  in	  writing	  that	  these	  imputations	  were	  false,	  
and	  issued	  a	  formal	  apology	  on	  the	  Football	  Club’s	  website.	  	  
At	  trial,	  the	  respondent	  declined	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  statutory	  defence	  of	  qualified	  privilege	  in	  
section	  30	  of	  the	  Act.	  He	  relied	  on	  the	  common	  law	  defence	  of	  qualified	  privilege.	  At	  common	  
law,	  the	  qualified	  privilege	  defence	  has	  been	  held	  to	  require	  that	  both	  the	  maker	  and	  the	  
recipient	  of	  a	  defamatory	  statement	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  what	  is	  conveyed.	  This	  is	  often	  
referred	  to	  as	  reciprocity	  of	  interest,	  although	  ‘community	  of	  interest’	  has	  been	  considered	  a	  
more	  accurate	  term	  because	  it	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  a	  perfect	  correspondence	  of	  interest	  is	  
needed.	  The	  interest	  spoken	  of	  may	  also	  be	  founded	  in	  a	  duty	  to	  speak	  and	  to	  listen	  to	  what	  is	  
conveyed,	  though	  that	  did	  not	  apply	  in	  this	  case.	  	  
Her	  Honour	  recognised	  that	  there	  was	  a	  possible	  interest	  that	  the	  respondent	  had	  to	  protect,	  
but	  felt	  that	  something	  more	  was	  required	  to	  justify	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  imputations	  in	  the	  
letter.	  She	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  reasonable	  necessity	  or	  pressing	  need	  for	  the	  statements	  in	  
the	  letter	  to	  be	  volunteered.	  	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  overturned	  the	  trial	  judge’s	  findings	  concerning	  the	  ‘interests’	  of	  the	  
respondent	  (Holmes	  a	  Court	  v	  Papaconstuntinos	  [2011]	  NSWCA	  59).	  They	  interpreted	  Her	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Honour’s	  finding	  below	  as	  denying	  that	  the	  respondent	  had	  any	  interest	  to	  protect.	  They	  said	  
that	  he	  did,	  and	  that	  the	  appellant	  was	  an	  active	  opponent	  of	  those	  interests.	  Thus,	  qualified	  
privilege	  was	  available	  to	  the	  respondent	  (the	  appellant	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal)	  in	  protection	  
of	  his	  interests,	  and	  he	  succeeded	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  
On	  appeal	  to	  the	  High	  Court,	  there	  was	  consideration	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  qualified	  privilege.	  The	  
majority	  (French	  CJ,	  Keifel,	  Crennan,	  Bell	  JJ)	  said	  on	  this	  point	  (at	  [13]):	  	  
Putting	  to	  one	  side	  the	  requirement	  of	  some	  immediacy	  of	  harm	  to	  the	  respondent's	  
interests,	  a	  ‘pressing	  need’,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  respondent	  had	  an	  interest	  
which	  would	  found	  the	  privilege.	  
The	  existence	  of	  an	  interest	  was	  enough	  to	  found	  a	  defence	  of	  privilege.	  The	  respondent	  had	  a	  
legitimate	  interest	  in	  the	  success	  of	  his	  ‘takeover’	  bid	  for	  the	  Football	  Club.	  This	  interest	  
included	  one	  in	  ‘gagging’	  the	  appellant	  in	  his	  attempts	  to	  thwart	  the	  bid.	  
The	  majority	  held	  that	  the	  appellant’s	  contention,	  that	  the	  law	  required	  the	  respondent	  not	  
only	  to	  prove	  that	  both	  he	  and	  the	  recipients	  of	  his	  letter	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  matters	  of	  
which	  he	  spoke,	  but	  also	  to	  justify	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  letter	  by	  reference	  to	  there	  being	  
some	  pressing	  need	  to	  protect	  his	  interests,	  was	  not	  correct.	  They	  held	  (at	  [38])	  that:	  
If	  the	  defendant	  has	  a	  legitimate	  interest	  which	  the	  defendant	  seeks	  to	  protect	  in	  
making	  the	  defamatory	  statement,	  the	  occasion	  for	  the	  privilege	  arises.	  There	  is	  no	  
case	  which	  holds	  that	  self-­‐interest	  operates	  as	  a	  disqualification	  or	  requires	  something	  
more,	  such	  as	  some	  compelling	  need	  or	  urgency,	  to	  justify	  a	  statement.	  
As	  the	  contention	  of	  a	  requirement	  of	  pressing	  need	  was	  the	  sole	  basis	  of	  the	  appellant’s	  case,	  
the	  appeal	  failed.	  
Heydon	  J,	  dissenting,	  expressed	  himself	  in	  stringent	  terms	  about	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  
respondent.	  He	  agreed	  with	  the	  trial	  judge	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  to	  show	  more	  than	  just	  an	  
interest	  to	  protect.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  no	  reasonable	  basis	  for	  publication	  of	  the	  
imputations	  founded	  in	  reasonable	  occasion	  or	  exigency.	  He	  said	  (at	  [53]):	  
It	  is	  rarely	  commercially	  wise	  for	  a	  poor	  plaintiff	  to	  sue	  a	  rich	  defendant	  over	  
defamatory	  material	  published	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  people	  only.	  That	  is	  so	  even	  if,	  as	  
here,	  the	  defamatory	  material	  alleges	  deceit	  and	  corruption,	  the	  defendant	  admits	  
that	  the	  defamatory	  material	  is	  untrue,	  and	  the	  defendant	  makes	  no	  attempt	  to	  
establish	  that	  the	  publication	  was	  reasonable.	  The	  appellant	  has	  lost	  this	  appeal	  and	  
lost	  the	  case.	  But	  even	  if	  he	  had	  won	  the	  case,	  it	  is	  highly	  questionable	  whether	  he	  
would	  have	  been	  financially	  better	  off	  than	  if	  he	  had	  never	  sued	  at	  all.	  
The	  appeal	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/53.html	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  refines	  the	  common	  law	  test	  of	  qualified	  privilege	  in	  defamation	  cases.	  The	  test	  
expressed	  by	  the	  majority	  judges	  (despite	  a	  very	  strong	  dissent	  by	  Heydon	  J)	  appears	  to	  be:	  
The	  modern	  emphasis	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  defence	  of	  qualified	  privilege	  is	  upon	  duties	  
and	  interests	  rather	  than	  the	  state	  of	  mind	  of	  the	  defendant,	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  would	  include	  
the	  defendant's	  motive.	  If	  the	  defendant	  has	  a	  legitimate	  interest	  which	  the	  defendant	  seeks	  
to	  protect	  in	  making	  the	  defamatory	  statement,	  the	  occasion	  for	  the	  privilege	  arises.	  There	  is	  
no	  case	  which	  holds	  that	  self-­‐interest	  operates	  as	  a	  disqualification	  or	  requires	  something	  
more,	  such	  as	  some	  compelling	  need	  or	  urgency,	  to	  justify	  a	  statement.	  
	  
2.10.4  MANUKAU GOLF CLUB INC V SHOYE VENTURE LTD [2012] NZSC 109 (SUPREME 
COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, MCGRATH, WILLIAM YOUNG, CHAMBERS, 
GLAZEBROOK JJ, 4 DECEMBER 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  to	  New	  Zealand’s	  highest	  court	  against	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Court	  
of	  Appeal	  not	  to	  grant	  costs	  to	  Manukau	  Golf	  Club	  Inc	  (the	  Club)	  when	  it	  had	  been	  successful	  
in	  a	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  hearing.	  
In	  2010	  the	  Club	  brought	  a	  claim	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  against	  Shoye	  Venture	  Ltd	  (SV)	  for	  breach	  of	  
a	  written	  contract.	  SV	  counterclaimed	  and	  was	  successful	  in	  obtaining	  summary	  judgment,	  
plus	  costs,	  against	  the	  Club.	  The	  High	  Court	  granted	  the	  summary	  judgment	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  
implied	  term	  that	  was	  not	  pleaded.	  The	  Club	  appealed	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  The	  Court	  of	  
Appeal	  granted	  the	  appeal,	  setting	  aside	  the	  summary	  judgment	  in	  SV’s	  favour	  and	  quashing	  
the	  order	  for	  costs.	  It	  made	  no	  order	  for	  costs	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  appeal,	  but	  did	  not	  give	  
reasons	  for	  not	  doing	  so.	  	  
The	  issue	  which	  went	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  for	  decision	  was	  whether	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
erred	  in	  denying	  costs	  to	  the	  Club,	  since	  it	  was	  the	  successful	  party	  in	  the	  appeal.	  Further	  to	  
rule	  41(1)(c)	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  (Civil)	  Rules	  2005,	  the	  Club	  set	  out	  in	  detail	  its	  claim	  for	  
costs	  in	  its	  written	  submissions.	  It	  calculated	  costs	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  appeal	  would	  be	  
classified	  as	  a	  ‘standard	  appeal’	  and	  that	  each	  step	  should	  have	  a	  band	  A	  time	  calculation.	  The	  
claim	  came	  to	  $12,220.	  Disbursements	  were	  also	  set	  out,	  and	  totalled	  $5,051.73.	  	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  unanimously	  held	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  erred	  in	  refusing	  the	  Club	  costs.	  
In	  denying	  the	  Club	  costs,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  departed	  from	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  that	  a	  
successful	  party	  in	  an	  appeal	  is	  generally	  entitled	  to	  costs	  against	  the	  unsuccessful	  party.	  As	  
the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  did	  not	  give	  any	  reasons	  for	  refusing	  costs,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  accepted	  
the	  Club’s	  submission	  in	  this	  appeal	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  probably	  took	  into	  account	  
irrelevant	  considerations	  in	  its	  decision	  to	  refuse	  costs.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  there	  was	  
no	  disentitling	  conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Club	  to	  justify	  a	  refusal	  of	  costs.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  
said	  on	  this	  point	  (at	  [13]–[14]):	  
In	  virtually	  every	  case	  where	  an	  appeal	  succeeds,	  the	  appellate	  court	  has	  formed	  the	  
view	  that	  the	  Judge	  below	  went	  wrong	  in	  some	  way	  or	  other.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  costs	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in	  the	  appellate	  court,	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  why	  the	  Judge	  went	  wrong.	  The	  losing	  party	  
on	  the	  appeal	  almost	  always	  has	  to	  pay	  costs	  to	  the	  winning	  party	  –	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  
‘pays	  for’	  the	  error	  (as	  found)	  of	  the	  judge	  below.	  That	  is	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  
respondent	  fighting	  to	  maintain	  its	  win	  and	  supporting	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  judge	  below.	  
If	  the	  respondent	  accepts	  the	  judge	  below	  was	  wrong,	  then	  it	  should	  settle	  with	  the	  
appellant	  or	  not	  seek	  to	  defend	  the	  appeal.	  In	  those	  circumstances,	  it	  would	  avoid	  
liability	  for	  costs.	  Shoye	  did	  not	  adopt	  that	  stance	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  We	  have	  
seen	  its	  submissions.	  It	  sought	  to	  uphold	  what	  the	  Judge	  had	  found	  in	  its	  favour.	  All	  
that	  mattered	  so	  far	  as	  costs	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  were	  concerned	  was	  how	  the	  
appeal	  was	  conducted.	  Since	  Shoye	  chose	  to	  seek	  to	  uphold	  the	  judgment	  in	  its	  favour	  
but	  was	  unsuccessful,	  it	  became	  liable	  to	  costs	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  fundamental	  
principle	  of	  costs	  that	  ‘the	  party	  who	  fails	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  appeal	  should	  pay	  costs	  
to	  the	  party	  who	  succeeds’.	  There	  was	  in	  this	  case	  no	  suggestion	  of	  any	  disentitling	  
conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Club,	  justifying	  a	  refusal	  to	  award	  costs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  r	  
53F.	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  also	  confirmed	  that	  although	  a	  court	  is	  generally	  not	  required	  to	  give	  
reasons	  for	  a	  standard	  costs	  order,	  it	  should	  do	  so	  where	  it	  is	  departing	  from	  the	  fundamental	  
principle	  that	  costs	  should	  follow	  the	  event.	  On	  this	  issue,	  the	  Court	  said	  (at	  [16]):	  
We	  wish	  to	  make	  clear	  a	  court	  does	  not	  have	  to	  give	  reasons	  for	  costs	  orders	  where	  it	  is	  simply	  
applying	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  that	  costs	  follow	  the	  event	  and	  the	  costs	  awarded	  are	  
within	  the	  normal	  range	  applicable	  to	  that	  court.	  So	  here,	  had	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  awarded	  
costs	  in	  the	  Club’s	  favour	  on	  a	  standard	  appeal	  basis,	  no	  further	  explanation	  would	  have	  been	  
required.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  something	  out	  of	  the	  ordinary	  is	  being	  done	  that	  some	  explanation,	  
which	  may	  be	  brief,	  should	  be	  given.	  
The	  appeal	  was	  allowed,	  and	  costs	  of	  $12,220,	  plus	  disbursements	  of	  $5,051.73	  ordered	  to	  be	  
paid	  by	  SV.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  from	  a	  list	  at:	  
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/decisions/judgments	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  a	  case	  which	  went	  to	  New	  Zealand’s	  highest	  court	  when	  its	  outcome	  should	  have	  
been	  obvious.	  However,	  the	  incorporated	  club	  was	  successful,	  so	  lost	  nothing	  in	  the	  attempt.	  
The	  case	  is	  perhaps	  more	  interesting	  for	  its	  criticism	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  decision.	  
	  
2.10.5  DE VARDA AND TOV-LEV V THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STRATHFIELD 
AND DISTRICT HEBREW CONGREGATION LTD [2012] NSWSC 1377 (SUPREME 
COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, BLACK J, 15 NOVEMBER 2012) 
See	  Nonprofit	  Structure	  and	  Governance,	  case	  note	  2.7.3	  above	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2.10.6  RIGHT TO LIFE NEW ZEALAND INC V THE ABORTION SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE 
[2012] NZSC 89 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, ELIAS CJ, TIPPING, 
MCGRATH, WILLIAM YOUNG JJ, 25 OCTOBER 2012) 
The	  appellant,	  Right	  to	  Life	  New	  Zealand	  Inc	  (Right	  to	  Life),	  lost	  an	  appeal	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
of	  New	  Zealand	  (New	  Zealand’s	  highest	  court)	  on	  9	  August	  2012:	  see	  Right	  to	  Life	  New	  Zealand	  
Inc	  v	  The	  Abortion	  Supervisory	  Committee	  [2012]	  NZSC	  68.	  In	  that	  case,	  Right	  to	  Life	  argued	  
that	  the	  Abortion	  Supervisory	  Committee	  (the	  Committee),	  established	  under	  the	  
Contraception,	  Sterilisation,	  and	  Abortion	  Act	  1977	  (NZ)	  (the	  Act)	  was	  not	  fulfilling	  its	  statutory	  
functions	  and	  that,	  in	  consequence,	  abortions	  were	  being	  approved	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  
they	  should	  not	  be	  permitted.	  	  
In	  the	  High	  Court	  (the	  court	  of	  first	  instance),	  Miller	  J	  held	  that	  the	  Committee	  was	  
misinterpreting	  its	  functions	  and	  powers	  by	  reasoning	  that	  it	  was	  precluded	  from	  reviewing	  or	  
scrutinising	  decisions	  of	  certifying	  consultants	  about	  abortions.	  Miller	  J	  found	  that	  the	  
Committee	  was	  able	  to	  do	  so	  using	  its	  powers	  in	  section	  36	  of	  the	  Act	  to	  require	  consultants	  
‘to	  keep	  records	  and	  report	  on	  cases	  they	  have	  considered,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  performing	  its	  
statutory	  functions’.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  overturned	  that	  decision,	  and	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  
Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  decision	  were	  then	  appealed	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  
Although	  the	  substantive	  issues	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  appeal	  were	  not	  argued	  successfully	  by	  
Right	  to	  Life,	  each	  side	  was	  said	  by	  that	  court	  to	  have	  had	  partial	  success.	  Therefore,	  a	  costs	  
order	  was	  made	  which	  meant	  that	  each	  side	  should	  bear	  its	  own	  costs	  since	  each	  side	  had	  had	  
partial	  success	  (at	  [54]).	  	  
The	  central	  issue	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  concerned	  interpretation	  of	  some	  sections	  of	  the	  
Act.	  That	  issue	  demanded	  a	  consideration	  of	  whether	  the	  Committee	  had	  the	  power	  to	  review	  
or	  scrutinise	  the	  decisions	  of	  certifying	  consultants	  and	  form	  its	  own	  view	  about	  the	  lawfulness	  
of	  their	  decisions	  to	  the	  extent	  necessary	  to	  perform	  its	  functions.	  On	  this	  issue,	  Right	  to	  Life	  
was	  partially	  successful.	  
In	  this	  application,	  Right	  to	  Life	  applied	  for	  recall	  of	  that	  part	  of	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Supreme	  
Court	  which	  dealt	  with	  costs,	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  no	  direction	  was	  given	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  costs	  
orders	  made	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  That	  Court	  had	  ordered	  Right	  to	  Life	  to	  pay	  all	  the	  costs	  of	  
a	  complex	  appeal	  back	  to	  the	  Abortion	  Supervisory	  Committee.	  Right	  to	  Life	  contended	  that,	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  partial	  success	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  costs	  order	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
should	  be	  set	  aside.	  	  
Right	  to	  Life	  submitted	  that	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  differed	  from	  that	  of	  the	  Court	  
of	  Appeal	  regarding	  some	  observations	  made	  by	  Miller	  J	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  (the	  court	  of	  first	  
instance).	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  was	  critical	  of	  the	  comments	  and	  said	  that	  they	  should	  not	  have	  
been	  made	  and	  that	  they	  had	  no	  legal	  effect.	  	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  said	  what	  Miller	  J	  said	  did	  not	  amount	  to	  conclusions	  on	  the	  issues	  before	  
him	  and	  were	  the	  type	  of	  comments	  on	  the	  materials	  before	  the	  Court	  which	  it	  is	  not	  
uncommon	  for	  a	  judge	  to	  make	  (at	  [49]).	  The	  sole	  point	  of	  agreement	  with	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
decision	  was	  that	  the	  observations	  had	  no	  legal	  effect.	  Therefore,	  Right	  to	  Life	  argued	  that	  the	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Supreme	  Court	  had	  agreed	  with	  it	  on	  that	  point	  of	  the	  appeal.	  The	  Supreme	  Court,	  however,	  
had	  made	  it	  clear	  in	  its	  judgement	  that	  comments	  such	  as	  those	  made	  by	  Miller	  J	  were	  not	  
capable	  of	  being	  appealed	  against	  (at	  [50]).	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  long	  legal	  tradition	  which	  
differentiates	  between	  comments	  made	  by	  a	  judge	  in	  passing	  (called	  obiter	  dicta),	  and	  the	  
remarks	  of	  a	  judge	  which	  constitute	  the	  actual	  judgement	  (called	  the	  ratio	  decidendi).	  
Right	  to	  Life	  also	  argued	  in	  this	  application	  that	  since	  it	  had	  properly	  brought	  before	  the	  court	  
issues	  relating	  to	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Act,	  then	  the	  costs	  order	  should	  be	  reconsidered.	  
Under	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  Rules,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  New	  Zealand	  may	  make	  any	  orders	  that	  
seem	  just	  concerning	  the	  whole	  or	  any	  part	  of	  the	  costs	  and	  disbursements	  of	  a	  civil	  appeal	  or	  
an	  application	  to	  bring	  such	  an	  appeal	  (Supreme	  Court	  Rules	  2004,	  rule	  44(1)).	  One	  of	  the	  
principles	  identified	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  the	  application	  of	  this	  rule	  is	  that	  it	  will	  rarely	  be	  
just	  to	  require	  a	  successful	  party	  to	  bear	  the	  full	  costs	  of	  its	  case.	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  in	  this	  application	  that	  it	  had	  upheld	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  finding	  that	  
the	  Committee	  was	  not	  empowered	  to	  review	  the	  decisions	  of	  clinicians	  in	  individual	  cases	  (at	  
[48]).	  Therefore,	  Right	  to	  Life	  did	  not	  succeed	  on	  that	  argument.	  However,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
also	  held	  that	  the	  Committee’s	  functions	  included	  undertaking	  general	  inquiries	  to	  keep	  under	  
review	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  abortion	  law	  and	  to	  ensure	  consistency	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  
the	  law	  throughout	  New	  Zealand	  (at	  [42]	  and	  [45]–[47]).	  This	  represented	  a	  partial	  success	  for	  
Right	  to	  Life.	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  also	  decided	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  costs	  orders	  in	  
its	  judgement	  of	  9	  August.	  On	  this	  point,	  the	  Court	  said	  in	  this	  application	  (at	  [6]):	  
That	  was	  a	  considered	  decision	  of	  the	  majority	  although	  the	  reasons	  for	  it	  were	  not	  
stated	  explicitly.	  The	  decision	  took	  into	  account	  both	  parties’	  partial	  success	  in	  the	  
appeal,	  but	  also	  the	  many	  other	  grounds	  addressed	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  judgment	  
on	  which	  Right	  to	  Life	  was	  not	  given	  leave	  to	  appeal	  by	  this	  Court.	  In	  these	  
circumstances,	  this	  Court	  decided	  that	  the	  just	  outcome	  was	  to	  leave	  the	  Court	  of	  
Appeal’s	  costs	  orders	  in	  place.	  All	  members	  of	  the	  Court	  are	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  
appellant’s	  submissions	  show	  no	  basis	  for	  recalling	  that	  or	  any	  other	  aspect	  of	  this	  
Court’s	  costs	  orders.	  
Therefore,	  the	  recall	  application	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZSC/2012/89.html	  
The	  substantive	  decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZSC/2012/68.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case  
This	  is	  yet	  another	  example	  of	  a	  nonprofit	  organisation	  pursuing	  litigation	  to	  the	  highest	  court,	  
which	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  very	  large	  costs	  burden	  for	  the	  organisation.	  There	  was	  already	  settled	  
law	  in	  New	  Zealand	  on	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  legislation	  in	  question:	  Wall	  v	  Livingston	  [1982]	  1	  
NZLR	  734	  (CA).	  This	  litigation	  sought	  to	  refine	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  legislation’s	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requirements	  about	  certification	  of	  abortion	  procedures	  by	  clinicians	  before	  they	  were	  
performed.	  While	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  supported	  ‘generalised	  enquiries’	  by	  the	  Abortion	  
Supervisory	  Committee,	  it	  did	  not	  hold	  that	  the	  Act	  allowed	  for	  any	  more	  detailed	  overview	  of	  
clinicians’	  decisions.	  
	  
2.10.7  RETURNED & SERVICES LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA (QUEENSLAND BRANCH) 
SARINA SUB BRANCH INC V RETURNED & SERVICES LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA 
(QUEENSLAND BRANCH) [2012] FCA 1105 (FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA, 
COLLIER J, 12 OCTOBER 2012) 
The	  applicant	  is	  an	  association	  incorporated	  under	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  
(Qld).	  The	  first	  respondent	  is	  a	  body	  corporate	  originally	  incorporated	  pursuant	  to	  the	  
Religious	  Educational	  and	  Charitable	  Institutions	  Act	  1861	  (Qld)	  (the	  RECI	  Act).	  The	  RECI	  Act	  
was	  repealed	  by	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  (Qld)	  (the	  Act)	  which	  came	  into	  force	  
on	  1	  July	  1982.	  However,	  section	  144	  of	  the	  Act	  provides	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  bodies	  
incorporated	  under	  previous	  legislation.	  
This	  application	  sought	  interlocutory	  (interim)	  relief	  in	  relation	  to	  substantive	  proceedings	  
concerning	  a	  claim	  by	  a	  Sub-­‐Branch	  of	  the	  Returned	  Services	  League	  of	  Australia	  (Queensland	  
Branch)	  (the	  applicant)	  against	  the	  Returned	  Services	  League	  of	  Australia	  (Queensland	  Branch)	  
(the	  first	  respondent)	  and	  Mr	  H	  Fewings,	  trading	  as	  Cranky	  Lizard	  Consultant	  (the	  second	  
respondent),	  in	  respect	  of,	  inter	  alia,	  a	  Heads	  of	  Agreement	  entered	  between	  the	  applicant	  
and	  the	  first	  respondent	  on	  18	  October	  2010.	  	  
The	  applicant	  was	  formed	  on	  22	  October	  2009	  following	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  two	  separate	  
incorporated	  associations,	  the	  Returned	  &	  Services	  League	  of	  Australia	  (Queensland	  Branch)	  
Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  Inc	  (Sarina	  Sub	  Branch)	  and	  the	  Sarina	  and	  District	  Services	  Club	  
Incorporated	  (Sarina	  RSL	  Club).	  Prior	  to	  amalgamation,	  the	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  owned	  land	  and	  
buildings	  at	  34	  Central	  Street,	  Sarina,	  in	  Queensland	  (the	  Sarina	  land	  and	  buildings).	  	  
In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  2007	  the	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  experienced	  a	  downturn	  in	  profits,	  and	  
approached	  the	  first	  respondent	  for	  financial	  assistance	  and	  guidance.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  Sarina	  
Sub	  Branch	  owed	  debts	  of	  approximately	  $130,000,	  including	  amounts	  to	  the	  National	  
Australia	  Bank	  and	  to	  the	  Australian	  Taxation	  Office.	  	  
On	  14	  October	  2007	  a	  Deed	  of	  Transfer	  of	  Land	  was	  executed	  between	  the	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  
and	  the	  Queensland	  Branch	  transferring	  a	  51%	  interest	  in	  the	  Sarina	  land	  and	  buildings	  to	  the	  
Queensland	  Branch	  for	  the	  sum	  of	  $185,000.	  The	  evidence	  was	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  Sarina	  
land	  and	  buildings	  at	  that	  date	  was	  approximately	  $1.36	  million.	  	  
Between	  2007	  and	  2010	  differences	  emerged	  between	  the	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  and	  the	  
Queensland	  Branch	  as	  to	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  Deed	  and	  of	  a	  Deed	  of	  Variation	  executed	  on	  4	  
June	  2009.	  Heads	  of	  Agreement	  were	  entered	  into	  on	  18	  October	  2012	  with	  the	  object	  of	  
resolving	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  parties.	  Part	  of	  the	  arrangements	  between	  the	  two	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parties	  was	  that	  the	  51%	  interest	  in	  the	  Sarina	  land	  and	  buildings	  could	  be	  repurchased	  for	  the	  
sum	  of	  $315,000	  within	  two	  years	  (i.e.	  by	  18	  October	  2012).	  
The	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  claimed	  that	  the	  Heads	  of	  Agreement	  were	  entered	  into	  in	  difficult	  
circumstances	  for	  it,	  including	  increasing	  levels	  of	  its	  debt,	  advice	  from	  the	  second	  respondent	  
(Fewings)	  that	  he	  would	  close	  down	  the	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch;	  and	  also,	  the	  knowledge	  that	  its	  
Gaming	  Licence	  required	  renewal	  on	  20	  October	  2010,	  and	  that	  there	  were	  requirements	  for	  
that	  Licence	  that	  it	  needed	  to	  meet	  urgently.	  
In	  its	  claim,	  the	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  sought	  to	  show	  that	  the	  respondents	  had	  acted	  in	  
contravention	  of	  sections	  20	  and/or	  21	  of	  the	  Australian	  Consumer	  Law	  and/or	  its	  predecessor	  
provisions	  under	  the	  Trade	  Practices	  Act	  1974	  (Cth)	  (Trade	  Practices	  Act),	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
unconscionable	  conduct	  by	  the	  respondents.	  The	  unconscionable	  conduct	  was	  claimed	  to	  arise	  
because	  of	  the	  following	  circumstances:	  
• the	  first	  respondent	  was	  in	  a	  special	  relationship	  with	  the	  applicant	  which	  extended	  to	  
imposing	  on	  the	  first	  respondent	  fiduciary	  and/or	  other	  duties	  owed	  to	  the	  applicant;	  	  
• the	  relative	  strength	  of	  the	  bargaining	  position	  of	  the	  first	  respondent	  was	  superior	  to	  
that	  of	  the	  applicant;	  	  
• as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  respondents’	  conduct,	  the	  applicant	  was	  required	  to	  comply	  with	  
and/or	  accept	  conditions	  which	  were	  not	  reasonably	  necessary	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  
the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  first	  respondent;	  	  
• the	  applicant	  did	  not	  fully	  understand	  the	  various	  documents	  it	  executed;	  	  
• in	  particular,	  the	  18	  October	  2010	  Heads	  of	  Agreement	  was	  entered	  into	  by	  the	  
applicant	  late	  at	  night,	  under	  pressure	  and	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  legal	  advice;	  	  
• the	  respondents’	  conduct	  involved	  undue	  influence	  or	  pressure	  being	  exerted	  on,	  
and/or	  unfair	  tactics	  being	  used	  against	  the	  applicant;	  and	  	  
• the	  respondents’	  conduct	  involved	  the	  applicant	  receiving	  services	  from	  the	  first	  
respondent	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  applicant	  could	  have	  acquired	  identical	  or	  
equivalent	  services	  from	  another	  or	  others	  for	  an	  amount	  less	  than	  that	  for	  which	  the	  
first	  respondent	  provided	  those	  services.	  
The	  substantive	  relief	  sought	  by	  the	  applicant	  included	  declarations	  of	  unconscionable	  
conduct,	  damages	  and	  injunctions.	  
A	  key	  concern	  of	  the	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  at	  the	  time	  of	  this	  application	  was	  that	  the	  price	  the	  
Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  would	  be	  required	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  51%	  interest	  in	  the	  Sarina	  
land	  and	  buildings	  would	  escalate	  dramatically	  after	  18	  October	  2012.	  This	  was	  because,	  
pursuant	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Heads	  of	  Agreement	  between	  the	  parties,	  the	  option	  of	  the	  
Sarina	  Sub	  Branch	  to	  repurchase	  that	  interest	  for	  the	  sum	  of	  $315,000	  expired	  two	  years	  from	  
the	  date	  of	  execution	  of	  the	  Heads	  of	  Agreement,	  on	  18	  October	  2012,	  which	  was	  the	  week	  
after	  this	  application	  was	  made.	  The	  injunction	  sought	  related	  specifically	  to	  this	  point.	  	  
An	  applicant	  seeking	  interlocutory	  relief	  must	  demonstrate	  that:	  	  
1. there	  is	  a	  serious	  question	  to	  be	  tried	  as	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  entitlement	  to	  relief;	  and	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2. the	  applicant	  is	  likely	  to	  suffer	  injury	  for	  which	  damages	  will	  not	  be	  an	  adequate	  
remedy;	  and	  	  
3. the	  ‘balance	  of	  convenience’	  favours	  the	  granting	  of	  an	  interlocutory	  injunction.	  
Her	  Honour	  considered	  each	  of	  these	  matters	  in	  turn.	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  
serious	  issue	  to	  be	  tried,	  Her	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  was.	  On	  the	  damages	  issue,	  Her	  Honour	  
said	  that	  (at	  [30]):	  ‘I	  am	  not	  persuaded	  that	  any	  future	  award	  of	  damages	  would	  adequately	  
compensate	  the	  applicant	  for	  the	  costs	  and	  risks	  associated	  with	  a	  future	  application	  to	  the	  
Court	  to	  restore	  the	  position	  it	  currently	  holds’.	  In	  addition,	  Her	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  balance	  
of	  convenience	  favoured	  the	  applicant.	  	  
Therefore,	  interlocutory	  relief	  was	  available	  to	  the	  Sarina	  Sub	  Branch,	  and	  granted	  to	  it	  in	  the	  
terms	  that	  it	  sought.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  this	  outcome	  was	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Heads	  of	  
Agreement	  between	  the	  parties	  were	  suspended	  until	  the	  substantive	  hearing	  was	  
determined.	  This	  removed	  the	  pressure	  to	  repurchase	  the	  Sarina	  land	  and	  buildings	  at	  an	  
escalated	  price.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2012/1105.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  was	  an	  application	  for	  interlocutory	  relief	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  injunction)	  which	  would	  
operate	  until	  the	  substantive	  (main)	  proceedings	  were	  concluded.	  This	  helps	  an	  applicant	  to	  
proceed	  with	  its	  substantive	  case	  without	  undue	  pressure.	  However,	  there	  are	  requirements	  
to	  be	  met	  as	  discussed	  by	  Her	  Honour	  in	  this	  case.	  The	  injunction	  is	  granted	  until	  the	  final	  
hearing	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo,	  but	  an	  injunction	  will	  not	  be	  ordered	  readily	  if	  the	  
applicant	  could	  be	  compensated	  with	  a	  simple	  damages	  award.	  The	  ‘balance	  of	  convenience’	  
test	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  balancing	  the	  injustice	  to	  one	  party	  if	  the	  injunction	  is	  not	  ordered	  against	  
the	  injustice	  to	  the	  other	  party	  if	  it	  is.	  
	  
2.10.8  NSW RIFLE ASSOCIATION INC V THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (NO 2) 
[2012] NSWSC 1098 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, WHITE J, 14 
SEPTEMBER 2012) 
On	  20	  July	  2012,	  White	  J	  gave	  judgement	  against	  the	  Commonwealth	  in	  NSW	  Rifle	  Association	  
Inc.	  v	  The	  Commonwealth	  of	  Australia	  [2012]	  NSWSC	  818	  (see	  casenote	  2.10.10	  below).	  His	  
Honour	  ordered	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  pay	  the	  costs	  of	  that	  case.	  This	  was	  an	  application	  to	  
alter	  the	  costs	  decision	  arising	  from	  that	  judgement.	  
This	  application	  arose	  because	  on	  27	  July	  2012	  the	  Commonwealth	  sought	  to	  have	  the	  costs	  
order	  of	  20	  July	  set	  aside,	  seeking	  instead,	  an	  order	  that	  the	  NSW	  Rifle	  Association	  Inc.	  
(NSWRA)	  pay	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  costs	  of	  those	  proceedings	  on	  a	  full	  indemnity	  basis	  
including	  all	  consultants'	  fees	  incurred	  by	  the	  Commonwealth.	  	  
The	  Commonwealth	  submitted	  that	  pursuant	  to	  clause	  12.10(b)(iii)	  of	  the	  licence	  agreement	  
which	  governed	  the	  use	  of	  the	  rifle	  range	  in	  question,	  the	  NSWRA	  was	  contractually	  liable	  to	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pay	  its	  costs	  and	  expenses	  of	  the	  proceedings,	  notwithstanding	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  had	  
failed	  in	  its	  defence	  of	  the	  NSWRA's	  claims	  and	  failed	  in	  its	  cross-­‐claim.	  	  
The	  submission	  was	  put	  on	  two	  bases.	  First,	  the	  Commonwealth	  submitted	  that	  the	  NSWRA	  
was	  required	  to	  pay	  all	  reasonable	  costs	  and	  expenses	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
NSWRA's	  enforcement	  or	  protection,	  or	  attempted	  enforcement	  or	  protection,	  of	  NSWRA's	  
rights	  under	  the	  licence.	  Secondly,	  the	  Commonwealth	  stated	  that	  the	  NSWRA	  was	  liable	  to	  
pay	  the	  Commonwealth's	  reasonable	  costs	  and	  expenses	  of	  the	  Commonwealth's	  attempted	  
enforcement	  of	  its	  asserted	  rights	  under	  the	  licence.	  	  
Clause	  12.10(b)	  of	  the	  licence	  provided:	  
12.10	  Costs	  and	  expenses	  
...	  
(b)	  The	  User	  [in	  this	  case	  the	  NSWRA]	  must	  pay	  all	  reasonable	  costs	  and	  expenses	  of	  
the	  Owner	  [the	  Commonwealth]	  in	  relation	  to:	  
(i)	  any	  variation	  [of]	  this	  document;	  
(ii)	  the	  termination	  of	  this	  document;	  
(iii)	  the	  enforcement	  or	  protection,	  attempted	  enforcement	  or	  protection	  or	  waiver	  of	  
any	  right	  under	  this	  document;	  and	  
(iv)	  the	  consideration	  or	  giving	  of	  any	  consent	  by	  the	  Owner	  under	  this	  document,	  
including	  legal	  costs	  and	  expenses	  on	  a	  full	  indemnity	  basis,	  and	  consultants'	  fees.	  
The	  Commonwealth	  further	  contended	  that	  if	  it	  were	  not	  entitled	  to	  the	  orders	  sought	  under	  
clause	  12.10,	  it	  was	  nonetheless	  entitled	  to	  orders	  requiring	  the	  plaintiff	  to	  pay	  part	  of	  the	  fees	  
of	  consultants	  engaged	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  whose	  reports	  were	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  remedy	  
notices.	  This	  was	  because	  of	  clause	  9.7(b)	  and	  (f)	  of	  the	  licence	  agreement,	  which	  read	  
9.7	  Indemnity	  
The	  User	  indemnifies	  the	  Owner	  against	  any	  claim,	  action,	  damage,	  loss,	  liability,	  cost	  
or	  expense	  which	  the	  Owner	  incurs	  or	  is	  liable	  for	  in	  connection	  with:	  
(a)	  any	  damage,	  loss,	  injury	  or	  death,	  caused	  or	  contributed	  to	  by	  the	  User	  or	  User's	  
Agents;	  
(b)	  any	  default	  by	  the	  User	  under	  this	  document;	  
(c)	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Licensed	  Area,	  the	  Licensed	  Range	  and	  the	  Caravan	  Park	  by	  the	  User	  
or	  User's	  Agents;	  
(d)	  any	  service	  or	  the	  misuse	  of	  any	  service	  to	  the	  Licensed	  Area	  or	  the	  Caravan	  Park,	  
unless	  caused	  by	  the	  act	  or	  negligence	  of	  the	  Owner;	  
(e)	  any	  ammunition,	  firearms	  or	  related	  items	  or	  equipment	  located	  or	  used	  on	  the	  
Licensed	  Area,	  the	  Licensed	  Range,	  the	  Caravan	  Park	  or	  any	  other	  part	  of	  the	  Range	  if	  
brought	  onto	  the	  Range	  by	  the	  User	  or	  the	  User's	  Agents;	  
(f)	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  User	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Environmental	  
Management	  Plan	  or	  the	  Fire	  Safety	  Management	  Plan,	  
except	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  any	  such	  claim,	  action,	  damage,	  loss,	  liability,	  cost	  or	  expense	  
is	  caused	  by	  the	  negligence	  of	  the	  Owner	  or	  its	  agents.	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The	  Commonwealth	  submitted	  that	  in	  accordance	  with	  clause	  9.7(b),	  the	  NSWRA	  should	  be	  
ordered	  to	  pay	  its	  costs	  of	  and	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  defaults	  identified	  in	  paragraphs	  [147]–
[154]	  and	  [214]	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  judgment	  in	  the	  decision	  of	  20	  July.	  It	  submitted	  that	  
pursuant	  to	  clause	  9.7(f),	  the	  NSWRA	  should	  be	  ordered	  to	  pay	  its	  costs	  or	  expenses	  in	  
connection	  with	  the	  NSWRA's	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Fire	  Safety	  Management	  Plan	  
discussed	  in	  that	  decision.	  However,	  these	  contentions	  were	  raised	  in	  this	  application	  without	  
seeking	  the	  court’s	  leave	  to	  amend	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  pleadings.	  
His	  Honour	  first	  considered	  whether	  the	  Commonwealth	  was	  entitled	  to	  raise	  the	  arguments	  
at	  a	  late	  stage.	  The	  NSWRA	  submitted	  that	  the	  sole	  reason	  the	  court	  did	  not	  originally	  consider	  
the	  operation	  of	  clauses	  12.10	  and	  9.7	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  Commonwealth's	  asserted	  
entitlement	  to	  costs	  and	  expenses	  was	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  failed	  to	  plead	  those	  clauses	  
and	  to	  raise	  its	  contentions	  as	  it	  should	  have	  done	  at	  the	  original	  hearing.	  
His	  Honour	  agreed	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  should	  not	  be	  permitted	  to	  reopen	  the	  costs	  issue	  
at	  this	  stage.	  The	  matters	  it	  was	  raising	  in	  this	  application	  should	  have	  been	  raised	  at	  the	  
original	  hearing.	  No	  reasons	  were	  advanced	  as	  to	  why	  they	  were	  not	  raised.	  His	  Honour	  held	  
that	  the	  costs	  order	  should	  not	  be	  varied.	  He	  said	  at	  [18]:	  
In	  my	  view	  it	  would	  not	  be	  a	  just	  outcome	  if	  the	  NSWRA	  were	  required	  to	  pay	  the	  
Commonwealth's	  costs	  even	  though	  it	  was	  compelled	  to	  bring	  this	  litigation	  by	  the	  
Commonwealth's	  purported	  termination	  of	  the	  licence	  on	  three	  months'	  notice,	  that	  
was	  subsequently	  withdrawn,	  and	  to	  assert	  the	  invalidity	  of	  the	  remedy	  notices	  that	  I	  
have	  found	  were	  invalid.	  Moreover,	  even	  if	  the	  Commonwealth	  has	  a	  contractual	  right	  
under	  clause	  12.10	  to	  recover	  its	  costs,	  I	  do	  not	  see	  why	  the	  Commonwealth	  should	  
not	  be	  required	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  discretion	  conferred	  by	  s	  98	  [of	  the	  Civil	  
Procedure	  Act	  2005	  (NSW)]	  to	  pay	  the	  NSWRA's	  costs	  in	  circumstances	  where	  those	  
costs	  were	  incurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  conduct	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  that	  I	  have	  found	  had	  
no	  valid	  basis.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  that	  the	  clauses	  of	  the	  licence	  relied	  on	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  were	  not	  ‘plain	  
and	  unambiguous’	  (at	  [21]	  and	  [26]).	  Clause	  12.10	  did	  not	  apply	  because	  its	  possible	  
application	  was	  so	  unclear,	  and	  clause	  9.7	  could	  not	  apply	  because	  the	  Commonwealth	  did	  not	  
apply	  for	  leave	  to	  amend	  its	  pleadings	  to	  add	  this	  argument	  to	  its	  submissions.	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  application	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/1098.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
At	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  original	  hearing,	  neither	  party	  in	  this	  case	  made	  any	  submissions	  as	  to	  
costs.	  White	  J	  held	  that	  prima	  facie	  the	  NSWRA	  was	  entitled	  to	  its	  costs	  of	  both	  proceedings,	  
and	  accordingly	  ordered	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  pay	  the	  costs	  of	  both	  proceedings.	  The	  costs	  
order	  was	  made	  pursuant	  to	  section	  98	  of	  the	  Civil	  Procedure	  Act	  2005	  (NSW),	  and	  in	  
accordance	  with	  rule	  42.1	  of	  the	  Uniform	  Civil	  Procedure	  Rules	  that	  prima	  facie	  costs	  should	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follow	  the	  event.	  The	  Commonwealth’s	  application	  to	  vary	  this	  costs	  order	  was	  
comprehensively	  dismissed	  in	  this	  application.	  
it	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  Court’s	  comments	  about	  clauses	  12.10	  and	  9.7	  that	  were	  relied	  
on	  by	  the	  Commonwealth:	  because	  the	  application	  of	  one	  was	  unclear,	  and	  the	  other	  could	  
not	  be	  relied	  on	  without	  specific	  pleadings,	  the	  Court’s	  discretion	  to	  order	  costs	  under	  the	  Civil	  
Procedure	  Act	  overrode	  them.	  
 
2.10.9 GUNNS LTD V TASMANIAN CONSERVATION TRUST INC [2012] TASSC 51 
(SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA, BLOW J, 8 AUGUST 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  against	  a	  decision	  relating	  to	  security	  for	  costs.	  (See	  Tasmanian	  
Conservation	  Trust	  Inc	  v	  Gunns	  Ltd	  [2012]	  TASSC	  18	  casenote:	  
https://wiki.qut.edu.au/display/CPNS/Tasmanian+Conservation+Trust+Inc+v+Gunns+Ltd.)	  In	  
the	  original	  decision,	  Associate	  Judge	  Holt	  concluded	  that,	  using	  a	  balancing	  exercise,	  the	  
justice	  of	  the	  case	  did	  not	  require	  that	  security	  for	  costs	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  Tasmanian	  
Conservation	  Trust	  Inc	  (the	  Trust)	  in	  its	  litigation	  against	  Gunns	  Limited	  (Gunns).	  Therefore,	  the	  
application	  by	  Gunns	  for	  an	  order	  for	  security	  for	  costs	  was	  dismissed.	  In	  this	  case,	  Gunns	  
appealed	  that	  decision.	  Its	  appeal	  was	  dismissed	  for	  the	  following	  reasons.	  
The	  appellant	  (Gunns)	  proposes	  to	  build	  a	  paper	  pulp	  mill	  in	  Tasmania	  at	  an	  estimated	  cost	  of	  
about	  $2.3	  billion.	  The	  pulp	  mill	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  built.	  A	  special	  Act	  of	  Parliament,	  the	  Pulp	  
Mill	  Assessment	  Act	  2007	  (Tas),	  was	  passed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  proposed	  development.	  On	  30	  
August	  2007	  a	  permit	  called	  the	  Pulp	  Mill	  Permit	  came	  into	  effect	  as	  a	  result	  of	  resolutions	  of	  
each	  House	  of	  the	  Tasmanian	  Parliament.	  That	  permit	  authorised	  Gunns	  to	  develop	  and	  
operate	  the	  proposed	  pulp	  mill.	  	  
The	  respondent	  to	  this	  appeal,	  the	  Tasmanian	  Conservation	  Trust	  Inc	  (the	  Trust),	  commenced	  
an	  action	  seeking	  declaratory	  relief,	  hoping	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  proposed	  development	  could	  
not	  lawfully	  proceed.	  Gunns	  applied	  to	  the	  court	  for	  an	  order	  for	  security	  for	  costs.	  That	  
application	  was	  dismissed	  on	  20	  April	  2012.	  Gunns	  appealed	  under	  section	  191B(4)	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  Civil	  Procedure	  Act	  (Tas).	  That	  provision	  states	  that	  a	  judge	  hearing	  such	  an	  
appeal	  has	  the	  same	  jurisdiction	  and	  powers	  as	  the	  Full	  Court.	  Therefore,	  although	  this	  appeal	  
was	  heard	  by	  only	  one	  judge,	  he	  was	  exercising	  the	  same	  jurisdiction	  and	  powers	  as	  the	  Full	  
Court.	  	  
Since	  the	  original	  Associate	  Judge	  had	  a	  discretion	  to	  make	  or	  refuse	  the	  order	  appealed	  from,	  
the	  bases	  upon	  which	  such	  an	  appeal	  could	  succeed	  were	  restricted	  by	  section	  45(1)	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  Civil	  Procedure	  Act	  (Tas).	  These	  bases	  were:	  
(a)	  the	  judge	  has,	  in	  fact,	  declined	  or	  failed	  to	  exercise	  the	  discretion;	  
(b)	  the	  judge	  has	  proceeded	  on	  a	  wrong	  principle	  or	  otherwise	  contrary	  to	  law,	  or	  on	  
irrelevant	  or	  insufficient	  materials,	  or	  has	  misapprehended	  the	  facts	  or	  has	  failed	  to	  
consider	  any	  material	  fact;	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(c)	  the	  adjudication	  is	  founded	  wholly	  or	  in	  part	  on	  an	  erroneous	  finding	  of	  fact	  or	  an	  
erroneous	  determination	  in	  point	  of	  law;	  or	  
(d)	  by	  reason	  of	  further	  evidence	  received	  by	  the	  Full	  Court	  in	  exercise	  of	  the	  powers	  
conferred	  by	  section	  48,	  or	  some	  special	  circumstance,	  the	  adjudication	  should	  be	  
reversed	  or	  varied.	  
The	  Trust	  is	  an	  incorporated	  association	  under	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1964	  (Tas).	  
An	  incorporated	  association	  is	  a	  ‘corporation’	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  rule	  828	  of	  the	  Supreme	  
Court	  Rules	  2000	  (Tas).	  The	  power	  to	  order	  corporations	  to	  provide	  security	  for	  costs	  exists	  in	  
order	  that	  defendants	  may	  be	  protected	  from	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  unable	  to	  recover	  costs.	  The	  
power	  is	  exercised	  ‘when	  justice	  so	  requires’.	  If	  the	  litigation	  commenced	  by	  the	  Trust	  was	  
ultimately	  unsuccessful,	  it	  is	  highly	  likely	  that	  it	  will	  be	  ordered	  to	  pay	  Gunns’s	  costs	  of	  those	  
proceedings	  on	  a	  party	  and	  party	  basis.	  The	  Associate	  Judge	  made	  a	  finding,	  not	  challenged	  in	  
this	  appeal,	  that	  there	  was	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  those	  costs	  would	  be	  in	  the	  order	  of	  
$300,000	  to	  $400,000.	  His	  Honour	  made	  another	  finding,	  also	  unchallenged,	  that	  there	  was	  
reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Trust	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  pay	  all	  of	  those	  costs	  if	  unsuccessful	  in	  the	  
case,	  even	  if	  the	  Trust	  was	  liquidated.	  
Some	  of	  the	  matters	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  the	  Associate	  Judge	  at	  first	  instance	  included:	  
• The	  Trust’s	  case	  was	  not	  lacking	  merit	  or	  weak	  
• Success	  in	  the	  litigation	  would	  not	  result	  in	  a	  financial	  benefit	  to	  the	  Trust	  or	  others.	  
• The	  Trust	  was	  not	  litigating	  on	  behalf	  of	  others,	  but	  had	  brought	  the	  proceedings	  
pursuant	  to	  the	  specific	  objects	  contained	  in	  its	  constitution.	  
• The	  case	  was	  being	  pursued	  in	  furtherance	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  having	  a	  binding	  
determination	  made	  as	  to	  whether	  authority	  for	  the	  project	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  pulp	  
mill	  permit	  still	  existed.	  
• The	  overall	  cost	  of	  the	  project	  was	  in	  the	  order	  of	  $2.3	  billion.	  Gunns	  had	  expended	  
about	  $239,000,000	  so	  far	  on	  it.	  Gunns	  estimated	  its	  party	  and	  party	  costs	  to	  be	  
between	  $300,000	  and	  $400,000.	  Even	  assuming	  that	  Gunns	  was	  left	  with	  a	  shortfall	  
of	  about	  $300,000	  in	  respect	  of	  its	  party	  and	  party	  costs,	  this	  was	  a	  tiny	  proportion	  of	  
the	  overall	  cost	  of	  the	  project.	  Proportionality	  was	  relevant.	  	  
Gunns	  raised	  various	  grounds	  of	  appeal	  against	  the	  Associate	  Judge’s	  decision	  at	  first	  instance	  
not	  to	  grant	  an	  order	  for	  security	  for	  costs.	  His	  Honour	  did	  not	  find	  in	  Gunns’s	  favour	  in	  regard	  
to	  those	  grounds.	  There	  was	  no	  failure	  by	  the	  Associate	  Judge	  to	  exercise	  his	  discretion	  against	  
a	  costs	  order	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  security	  for	  costs	  order.	  There	  were	  no	  ‘wrong	  
assumptions’	  about	  the	  funds	  available	  to	  the	  Trust,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  failure	  to	  provide	  for	  
alternatives	  to	  a	  costs	  order.	  None	  of	  the	  Associate	  Judge’s	  findings	  of	  fact	  about	  the	  pledges	  
of	  funds	  made	  to	  the	  Trust	  were	  held	  to	  be	  erroneous.	  There	  were	  no	  mistakes	  as	  to	  the	  
character	  or	  effect	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  fact,	  and	  adequate	  reasons	  were	  given.	  No	  ‘wrong	  
principles’	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  judgement.	  
On	  the	  issues	  of	  litigation	  in	  the	  public	  interest,	  His	  Honour	  in	  this	  appeal	  could	  see	  no	  
difference	  between	  litigation	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  litigation	  to	  enforce	  individuals’	  rights.	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The	  same	  principles	  applied	  to	  both	  types	  of	  litigation,	  and	  there	  had	  been	  no	  error	  by	  the	  
Associate	  Judge	  in	  this	  respect.	  
On	  proportionality,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [56]):	  
If	  Gunns’[s]	  party	  and	  party	  costs	  of	  this	  litigation	  amount	  to	  $400,000,	  that	  will	  be	  less	  
than	  0.018%	  of	  the	  estimated	  overall	  cost	  of	  the	  project.	  In	  my	  view	  proportionality	  
was	  a	  relevant	  consideration	  that	  the	  Associate	  Judge	  was	  entitled	  to	  take	  into	  
account,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  finding	  that	  the	  making	  of	  an	  order	  for	  security	  for	  
costs	  might	  result	  in	  the	  litigation	  not	  proceeding.	  
Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  did	  not	  find	  in	  favour	  of	  Gunns	  on	  any	  of	  its	  grounds	  of	  appeal,	  and	  the	  
appeal	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/tas/TASSC/2012/51.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  	  
This	  is	  a	  case	  involving	  litigation	  between	  two	  very	  unequal	  parties	  in	  terms	  of	  funding	  
available	  to	  support	  the	  litigation.	  Both	  at	  first	  instance	  and	  on	  appeal,	  the	  judges	  took	  the	  
view	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Trust	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  pay	  
Gunns's	  costs	  was	  a	  factor	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  but	  did	  not	  result	  in	  a	  predisposition	  to	  
order	  security	  for	  costs.	  Orders	  requiring	  the	  provision	  of	  security	  for	  costs	  involve	  a	  balancing	  
of	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  applicant	  to	  pursue	  its	  claimed	  entitlement	  to	  remedies	  
against	  wrongs	  allegedly	  done	  to	  it	  and	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  the	  respondents	  that	  they	  
not	  be	  exposed	  to	  irrecoverable	  loss	  by	  reason	  of	  proceedings	  which	  cause	  them	  to	  incur	  
substantial	  expense	  but	  are	  ultimately	  unsuccessful	  against	  them.	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  
balancing	  exercise	  in	  this	  case	  was	  that	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  an	  order	  for	  security	  for	  costs,	  
perhaps	  mostly	  because	  of	  the	  proportionality	  element.	  
	  
2.10.10  NSW RIFLE ASSOCIATION INC V THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2012] 
NSWSC 818 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, WHITE J, 20 JULY 2012) 
The	  NSW	  Rifle	  Association	  Inc	  (NSWRA)	  is	  an	  incorporated	  association	  which	  has	  existed	  in	  
some	  form	  since	  1860.	  This	  dispute	  concerned	  the	  use	  by	  the	  NSWRA	  of	  a	  rifle	  range	  on	  
Commonwealth	  land	  at	  Malabar	  Headland	  in	  New	  South	  Wales.	  The	  NSWRA	  used	  the	  land,	  
called	  the	  ANZAC	  rifle	  range,	  under	  a	  licence	  agreement	  with	  the	  Commonwealth	  dating	  from	  
2000.	  The	  Commonwealth	  government	  proposed	  to	  transfer	  the	  land	  to	  the	  State	  of	  New	  
South	  Wales	  as	  a	  national	  park.	  
The	  first	  question	  in	  these	  proceedings	  was	  whether	  the	  Commonwealth	  was	  entitled	  to	  evict	  
the	  NSWRA	  from	  the	  rifle	  range	  and	  associated	  buildings.	  If	  not,	  the	  second	  question	  was	  
whether	  the	  Commonwealth	  could	  in	  any	  event	  transfer	  part	  of	  the	  Malabar	  Headland,	  known	  
as	  lot	  2,	  to	  the	  State	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  for	  use	  as	  a	  national	  park.	  Most	  of	  lot	  2	  is	  a	  safety	  
template	  (an	  area	  used	  as	  a	  buffer	  zone	  for	  safety	  reasons)	  for	  the	  rifle	  range.	  The	  NSWRA	  said	  
that	  if	  lot	  2	  was	  transferred,	  it	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  use	  the	  rifle	  range,	  contrary	  to	  what	  it	  
claimed	  are	  the	  rights	  granted	  by	  the	  licence.	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The	  use	  of	  the	  disputed	  land	  has	  a	  complicated	  history.	  The	  land	  was	  first	  used	  by	  the	  NSWRA	  
from	  1968	  under	  a	  permissive	  occupancy.	  The	  buildings	  were	  built	  with	  Commonwealth	  
grants.	  In	  1986,	  the	  then	  Commonwealth	  government	  resolved	  to	  sell	  the	  land,	  giving	  a	  notice	  
of	  termination	  of	  the	  permissive	  occupancy	  in	  March	  1986.	  A	  court	  challenge	  to	  this	  notice	  
resulted	  in	  a	  declaration	  of	  its	  invalidity.	  The	  court	  indicated	  that	  about	  three	  years	  notice	  
would	  be	  appropriate.	  
In	  1990,	  the	  then	  Commonwealth	  government	  gave	  valid	  notice	  to	  terminate	  the	  permissive	  
occupancy	  in	  1993.	  On	  22	  July	  1994	  Bryson	  J	  gave	  judgment	  for	  the	  Commonwealth	  for	  
possession	  of	  the	  land.	  An	  appeal	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  was	  dismissed	  on	  15	  August	  1997.	  In	  
the	  meantime	  there	  had	  been	  a	  change	  of	  government.	  Notwithstanding	  that	  the	  
Commonwealth	  had	  been	  found	  to	  be	  entitled	  to	  possession	  of	  the	  rifle	  range,	  it	  did	  not	  seek	  
to	  enforce	  that	  remedy.	  	  
The	  LNP	  government	  took	  a	  different	  view	  as	  to	  how	  the	  interests	  of	  rifle	  shooters	  should	  be	  
accommodated	  with	  the	  preferred	  uses	  for	  the	  headland,	  and	  proposed	  the	  building	  of	  a	  
completely	  new	  rifle	  range	  at	  Holdsworthy	  Army	  Base,	  to	  be	  ready	  in	  2001.	  The	  NSWRA	  and	  
the	  Commonwealth	  negotiated	  a	  deed	  of	  licence	  (dated	  15	  March	  2000)	  for	  the	  NSWRA's	  
continued	  occupation	  of	  the	  ANZAC	  Rifle	  Range	  at	  Malabar	  Headland	  until	  the	  new	  site	  
became	  available.	  The	  new	  site	  has	  never	  been	  made	  available.	  
The	  deed	  described	  the	  Commonwealth	  as	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  land	  and	  the	  NSWRA	  as	  the	  user.	  
The	  NSWRA	  was	  required	  to	  pay	  an	  annual	  licence	  fee	  of	  $24,363	  per	  annum	  which	  was	  
adjusted	  for	  changes	  to	  the	  Consumer	  Price	  Index.	  His	  Honour	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  licence	  
effected	  a	  significant	  change	  to	  the	  legal	  relationship	  between	  the	  NSWRA	  and	  the	  
Commonwealth.	  Subject	  to	  one,	  and	  possibly	  two,	  qualifications,	  the	  NSWRA	  was	  entitled	  to	  
continue	  to	  occupy	  the	  buildings	  and	  to	  use	  the	  designated	  firing	  ranges	  until	  at	  least	  2001	  and	  
in	  any	  event,	  until	  the	  Commonwealth	  gave	  a	  notice	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  Holsworthy	  range,	  
or	  a	  comparable	  range	  nominated	  by	  it,	  was	  available	  for	  the	  NSWRA's	  use.	  One	  qualification	  
to	  the	  licence	  was	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  was	  entitled	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence	  if	  the	  NSWRA	  
was	  in	  default	  (as	  defined).	  This	  had	  not	  occurred.	  Rather,	  the	  Commonwealth	  submitted	  that	  
there	  was	  a	  second	  qualification	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  licence,	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  was	  
entitled	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence	  in	  the	  public	  interest.	  	  
This	  case	  had	  definite	  political	  implications.	  The	  Malabar	  Headland	  is	  in	  the	  Commonwealth	  
electorate	  of	  Kingsford	  Smith.	  The	  local	  member	  is	  the	  Honourable	  Mr	  Peter	  Garrett	  MP.	  He	  
has	  consistently	  campaigned	  for	  the	  Malabar	  Headland	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  the	  State	  of	  New	  
South	  Wales	  for	  use	  as	  a	  national	  park	  and	  for	  public	  open	  space.	  	  
Prior	  to	  October	  2011	  there	  was	  no	  indication	  from	  the	  Commonwealth	  that	  transfer	  of	  the	  
Malabar	  Headland	  would	  proceed	  otherwise	  than	  by	  first	  relocating	  the	  NSWRA	  to	  a	  
comparable	  range.	  As	  late	  as	  28	  September	  2011,	  the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Property	  and	  
Construction	  Division	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  Department	  of	  Finance	  and	  Deregulation	  advised	  
the	  treasurer	  of	  the	  NSWRA	  and	  others	  that	  the	  NSWRA	  would	  remain	  on	  Malabar	  Headland	  
until	  a	  suitable	  alternative	  site	  was	  available	  for	  its	  relocation.	  This	  however,	  changed	  on	  7	  
October	  2011,	  when	  a	  termination	  notice	  was	  issued	  giving	  three	  months	  notice.	  This	  notice,	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which	  was	  patently	  void	  and	  of	  no	  effect,	  given	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  licence,	  and	  the	  previous	  case	  
law	  relating	  to	  the	  site,	  was	  withdrawn	  on	  25	  May	  2012.	  
However,	  on	  25	  January	  2012,	  the	  Commonwealth	  reviewed	  its	  strategy,	  and	  issued	  a	  remedy	  
notice	  to	  the	  NSWRA.	  This	  notice	  related	  to	  a	  clause	  in	  the	  licence	  deed	  which	  required	  the	  
NSWRA	  to	  maintain	  the	  buildings	  on	  the	  site	  in	  good	  repair.	  It	  also	  referred	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  
hazardous	  materials	  on	  the	  site.	  The	  notice	  was	  received	  by	  the	  solicitors	  for	  the	  NSWRA	  on	  31	  
January	  2012.	  The	  NSWRA	  claimed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  breach	  relating	  to	  the	  buildings,	  and	  
even	  if	  there	  were,	  the	  notice	  received	  on	  31	  January	  was	  void	  and	  of	  no	  effect.	  
A	  second	  remedy	  notice	  was	  served	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  on	  2	  April	  2012.	  This	  notice	  
referred	  to	  the	  management	  of	  asbestos	  on	  the	  site.	  A	  third	  remedy	  notice,	  served	  on	  9	  May	  
2012,	  referred	  to	  the	  fire	  safety	  management	  on	  the	  site.	  Prior	  to	  the	  service	  of	  these	  remedy	  
notices	  the	  Commonwealth	  had	  made	  no	  complaint	  about	  NSWRA's	  compliance	  with	  the	  
relevant	  clause	  (clause	  6.2)	  of	  the	  licence.	  	  
The	  NSWRA's	  principal	  contention	  in	  this	  case	  was	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  was	  under	  a	  duty	  
to	  act	  reasonably	  and	  in	  good	  faith	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  its	  power	  under	  the	  licence	  to	  specify	  a	  
time	  for	  the	  remedying	  of	  the	  alleged	  breaches.	  It	  submitted	  that	  in	  requiring	  the	  alleged	  
breaches	  to	  be	  remedied	  in	  14	  or	  16	  days	  the	  Commonwealth	  did	  not	  act	  reasonably	  and	  in	  
good	  faith.	  The	  Commonwealth	  admitted	  that	  it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  for	  the	  NSWRA	  
to	  carry	  out	  all	  the	  work	  required	  by	  each	  remedy	  notice	  within	  the	  times	  specified.	  	  
The	  NSWRA	  also	  submitted	  that	  the	  remedy	  notices	  were	  issued	  as	  part	  of	  a	  political	  campaign	  
to	  evict	  the	  NSWRA	  from	  the	  range,	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  a	  political	  promise	  made	  by	  Mr	  Garrett,	  
in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  Commonwealth	  was	  unwilling	  to	  fund	  the	  NSWRA's	  relocation	  to	  a	  
suitable	  alternative	  location.	  The	  NSWRA	  also	  sought	  relief	  against	  forfeiture	  if	  it	  were	  found	  
that	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  licence	  was	  effective.	  	  
On	  18	  May	  2012,	  the	  NSWRA	  became	  aware	  that	  a	  Bill	  had	  been	  introduced	  into	  the	  
Commonwealth	  parliament,	  the	  Malabar	  Headland	  Protection	  Bill	  2012	  (Cth).	  The	  Bill	  set	  a	  
date	  for	  transfer	  of	  the	  land	  to	  New	  South	  Wales:	  31	  July	  2012.	  The	  NSWRA	  sought	  an	  
injunction	  to	  prevent	  the	  transfer.	  
The	  NSWRA	  submitted	  that	  the	  transfer	  of	  Lot	  2	  to	  the	  State	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  would	  have	  
the	  effect	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  could	  no	  longer	  fulfil	  its	  contractual	  duty	  to	  make	  the	  land	  
available	  for	  use	  by	  its	  members	  as	  a	  rifle	  range.	  The	  Commonwealth	  admitted	  that	  the	  
transfer	  of	  that	  part	  of	  Lot	  2	  that	  constituted	  the	  safety	  template	  would	  have	  the	  consequence	  
that	  the	  NSWRA	  and	  its	  members	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  permitted	  to	  undertake	  rifle	  and	  pistol	  
shooting	  on	  the	  range	  unless	  the	  conditions	  relating	  to	  the	  range	  were	  varied,	  or	  the	  NSWRA	  
constructed	  further	  barriers	  to	  prevent	  projectiles	  leaving	  the	  range.	  
The	  Commonwealth	  relied	  on	  the	  doctrine	  of	  executive	  necessity	  –	  that	  the	  Crown,	  when	  
contracting	  in	  one	  capacity,	  cannot	  fetter	  a	  power	  it	  has	  in	  another	  capacity,	  whether	  under	  
statute	  or	  prerogative,	  that	  is	  to	  be	  exercised	  in	  the	  public	  interest.	  However,	  His	  Honour	  said	  
that	  the	  issue	  raised	  in	  this	  case	  was	  whether	  a	  contract	  entered	  into	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  as	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land	  owner	  could	  be	  terminated	  at	  will	  or	  on	  reasonable	  notice	  (even	  if	  this	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  
express	  terms	  of	  the	  contract),	  or	  whether	  terms	  that	  might	  otherwise	  be	  implied	  could	  not	  be	  
implied	  because	  the	  Commonwealth	  had	  changed	  its	  policy	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  licence	  granted	  in	  
2000	  to	  the	  NSWRA.	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  no	  decision	  cited	  had	  gone	  so	  far	  in	  its	  findings.	  
The	  Commonwealth	  submitted	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  was	  entitled	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence	  for	  
breach,	  it	  was	  not	  bound	  to	  continue	  the	  licence	  for	  the	  defined	  term,	  because	  it	  now	  
considered	  it	  to	  be	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  that	  the	  land	  should	  be	  used	  as	  a	  national	  park	  and	  
not	  as	  a	  rifle	  range.	  Counsel	  for	  the	  Commonwealth	  accepted	  that	  on	  the	  Commonwealth's	  
contentions,	  its	  assessment	  of	  what	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  whether	  there	  had	  been	  a	  
change	  of	  public	  policy	  were	  unexaminable.	  	  
His	  Honour	  was	  unimpressed	  with	  this	  argument,	  saying	  at	  [97],	  [100]–[101]	  and	  [105]–[106]:	  
In	  my	  view,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  executive	  necessity	  has	  no	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  present	  case.	  
The	  deed	  of	  licence	  did	  not	  fetter	  the	  exercise	  of	  a	  future	  duty	  or	  discretion	  by	  the	  
Crown.	  It	  was	  a	  contract	  by	  which	  the	  Crown	  acted	  in	  what	  was	  then	  perceived	  to	  be	  
the	  public	  interest	  in	  reconciling	  the	  competing	  demands	  for	  use	  of	  the	  Malabar	  
Headland.	  It	  was	  a	  present	  exercise	  of	  the	  Commonwealth's	  power	  as	  owner	  of	  the	  
land,	  not	  the	  fettering	  of	  a	  future	  exercise	  of	  a	  duty	  or	  discretion.	  
....	  
The	  power	  (not	  discretion)	  the	  Commonwealth	  exercised	  in	  entering	  into	  the	  deed	  of	  
licence	  was	  not	  an	  exercise	  of	  the	  prerogative....	  It	  was	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  Crown's	  
power	  as	  owner	  of	  the	  land.	  In	  that	  respect,	  the	  Crown	  had	  the	  same	  capacity	  and	  
stood	  in	  the	  same	  position	  as	  any	  other	  person.	  ....	  By	  asserting	  the	  alleged	  right	  to	  
terminate	  the	  licence	  at	  will	  or	  on	  reasonable	  notice,	  or	  by	  asserting	  that	  the	  licence	  is	  
not	  binding	  on	  it,	  or	  that	  terms	  should	  not	  be	  implied	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  implied,	  
the	  Commonwealth	  is	  not	  seeking	  to	  exercise	  a	  power	  or	  discretion	  in	  a	  different	  
capacity	  from	  that	  in	  which	  it	  contracted....	  	  
....	  
The	  Commonwealth	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence	  either	  at	  will	  or	  on	  
reasonable	  notice.	  The	  licence	  is	  for	  a	  defined	  term,	  that	  is,	  until	  14	  days	  after	  the	  
giving	  of	  a	  Relocation	  Notice.	  It	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  that	  express	  term	  for	  the	  licence	  
to	  be	  terminated	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  either	  at	  will	  or	  on	  reasonable	  notice.	  There	  
was	  no	  dispute	  that	  even	  though	  at	  law	  a	  mere	  licence	  to	  occupy	  the	  land	  would	  be	  
terminable	  at	  will,	  even	  in	  breach	  of	  contract...in	  an	  appropriate	  case	  equity	  would	  
restrain	  the	  licensor	  from	  revoking	  the	  licence	  in	  breach	  of	  contract....	  By	  its	  cross-­‐
claim	  in	  the	  2012	  proceeding	  the	  Commonwealth	  purported	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence.	  
Counsel	  for	  the	  Commonwealth	  said	  that	  that	  was	  not	  done	  by	  way	  of	  termination	  for	  
breach,	  but	  pursuant	  to	  the	  asserted	  power	  to	  bring	  the	  licence	  to	  an	  end	  because	  
there	  had	  been	  a	  change	  of	  public	  policy.	  That	  purported	  termination	  should	  be	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restrained	  unless	  the	  Commonwealth	  is	  entitled	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence	  because	  the	  
NSWRA	  is	  in	  default.	  
On	  the	  issue	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  good	  faith,	  the	  Commonwealth	  submitted	  that	  if	  a	  term	  of	  
reasonableness	  and	  good	  faith	  might	  otherwise	  be	  implied	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  
Commonwealth's	  power	  to	  fix	  a	  period	  of	  time	  for	  the	  remedying	  of	  the	  alleged	  breaches,	  
there	  could	  be	  no	  such	  implication	  where	  the	  Government	  was	  acting	  in	  what	  it	  considered	  to	  
be	  the	  public	  interest	  to	  bring	  the	  licence	  to	  an	  end.	  	  
The	  NSWRA	  alleged	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  had	  given	  notice	  under	  the	  relevant	  
clause	  (clause	  10.1(b))	  for	  an	  extraneous	  purpose	  and	  unreasonably.	  His	  Honour	  was	  
firm	  that	  there	  was	  an	  implied	  term	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  good	  faith	  (at	  [107]–[108]):	  
The	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  Government	  has	  changed	  its	  policy	  and	  now	  considers	  that	  the	  
Malabar	  Headland	  should	  be	  made	  available	  as	  a	  national	  park,	  irrespective	  of	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  Rifle	  Association	  can	  be	  relocated	  to	  another	  rifle	  range,	  is	  not	  a	  
reason	  for	  qualifying	  any	  term	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  implied.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  
contract	  is	  with	  the	  Government	  does	  not	  displace	  an	  obligation	  of	  good	  faith	  and	  
reasonableness.	  If	  anything,	  that	  is	  a	  factor	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  term.	  
Moreover,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  term	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  good	  faith	  could	  be	  implied	  
on	  any	  of	  the	  available	  bases	  raised	  by	  the	  NSWRA	  –	  by	  law,	  by	  construction,	  under	  equity	  (by	  
analogy	  to	  equitable	  restraint	  on	  exercise	  of	  power	  for	  improper	  purpose)	  and	  by	  ad	  hoc	  
implication.	  He	  said	  (at	  [139]–[140]):	  
To	  imply	  a	  term	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  act	  in	  good	  faith	  and	  reasonably	  in	  exercising	  
its	  power	  under	  clause	  10.1(b)	  is	  not	  to	  subordinate	  its	  legitimate	  interest	  to	  that	  of	  
the	  NSWRA.	  As	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  clause	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  NSWRA	  
to	  remedy	  a	  breach,	  the	  Commonwealth	  does	  not	  have	  a	  legitimate	  interest	  in	  using	  
the	  contractual	  power	  unreasonably	  by	  requiring	  the	  remedying	  of	  breaches	  that	  are	  
of	  no	  genuine	  concern,	  within	  a	  timeframe	  it	  knows	  could	  not	  be	  met.	  For	  these	  
reasons	  the	  Commonwealth	  was	  required	  to	  act	  reasonably	  and	  in	  good	  faith	  in	  
exercising	  its	  powers	  under	  clause	  10.1(b)	  if	  the	  NSWRA	  were	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  licence.	  	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  all	  three	  remedy	  notices	  were	  invalid,	  as	  was	  the	  purported	  exercise	  of	  
executive	  power	  (at	  [218]):	  
The	  Commonwealth	  is	  not	  entitled	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence	  unless	  it	  gives	  a	  valid	  
notice	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  breach	  or	  breaches	  of	  the	  licence	  that	  is	  not	  remedied	  after	  the	  
Commonwealth,	  acting	  reasonably,	  gives	  a	  notice	  under	  clause	  10.1(b)	  and	  such	  a	  
notice	  is	  not	  complied	  with.	  The	  purported	  termination	  of	  the	  licence	  by	  the	  
Commonwealth’s	  cross-­‐claim	  based	  on	  the	  asserted	  executive	  discretion	  is	  also	  
ineffective.	  There	  should	  be	  declarations	  accordingly	  and	  an	  injunction	  restraining	  the	  
Commonwealth	  from	  purporting	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence	  by	  reason	  of	  the	  Rifle	  
Association’s	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  any	  of	  the	  Remedy	  Notices	  and	  from	  its	  seeking	  to	  
give	  effect	  to	  the	  purported	  termination	  of	  the	  licence	  in	  its	  cross-­‐claim.	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Therefore,	  there	  was	  no	  basis	  for	  termination	  of	  the	  licence.	  Even	  though	  his	  decision	  meant	  
that	  relief	  against	  forfeiture	  was	  not	  required,	  His	  Honour	  dealt	  with	  the	  issue.	  The	  NSWRA	  
was	  a	  licensee	  without	  exclusive	  possession	  of	  the	  land.	  However,	  it	  had	  been	  held	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  cases	  that	  the	  court	  had	  jurisdiction	  to	  relieve	  against	  the	  forfeiture	  of	  contractual	  
licences	  entitling	  a	  licensee	  to	  occupy	  land.	  On	  this	  point,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [233],	  [234]	  and	  
[235]):	  
As	  the	  NSWRA	  does	  not	  have	  a	  proprietary	  interest,	  but	  seeks	  relief	  from	  forfeiture	  
of	  its	  contractual	  right	  of	  possession,	  and	  as	  I	  am	  dealing	  with	  the	  claim	  for	  relief	  
against	  forfeiture	  on	  the	  assumption	  (contrary	  to	  my	  earlier	  findings)	  that	  the	  
NSWRA's	  contractual	  right	  could	  be	  terminated,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  NSWRA	  must	  
establish	  that	  it	  would	  be	  unconscientious	  for	  the	  Commonwealth	  to	  exercise	  its	  
contractual	  right	  of	  termination....	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  Commonwealth's	  conduct	  does	  
make	  it	  against	  conscience	  for	  it	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  the	  remedy	  
notices	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  terminating	  the	  licence.	  	  
In	  Tanwar	  Enterprises	  v	  Cauchi,	  ...	  conduct	  by	  the	  terminating	  party	  that	  
contributed	  to	  the	  breach,	  such	  as	  by	  lulling	  the	  opposite	  party	  into	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  
terms	  of	  the	  contract	  would	  not	  be	  strictly	  enforced,	  could	  make	  it	  unconscientious	  
for	  the	  terminating	  party	  to	  exercise	  its	  legal	  rights....	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  
Commonwealth	  contributed	  to	  the	  breaches	  that	  led	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  remedy	  
notices.	  	  
On	  the	  proposed	  transfer	  of	  the	  land	  in	  Lot	  2	  to	  the	  State	  of	  New	  South	  Wales,	  His	  Honour	  
held	  that	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  an	  anticipatory	  breach	  of	  the	  licence	  by	  the	  Commonwealth,	  even	  
in	  the	  event	  the	  Malabar	  Headland	  Protection	  Bill	  2012	  (Cth)	  became	  law.	  This	  was	  because	  
the	  Bill	  did	  not	  effect	  the	  actual	  transfer,	  but	  related	  to	  the	  use	  and	  management	  of	  the	  land	  
after	  a	  transfer	  (at	  [264]–[266]):	  
If	  the	  Bill	  becomes	  law,	  and	  if	  Lot	  2	  is	  transferred	  to	  New	  South	  Wales,	  then	  Lot	  2	  
must	  be	  used	  as	  a	  national	  park.	  But	  the	  Bill	  (if	  it	  became	  law)	  would	  not	  have	  any	  
operation	  on	  the	  anterior	  question	  whether	  the	  Commonwealth	  is	  entitled	  to	  
transfer	  Lot	  2	  to	  New	  South	  Wales	  if,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  NSWRA	  could	  not	  use	  the	  
Licensed	  Range	  for	  rifle	  shooting.	  The	  Bill	  applies	  only	  to	  land	  once	  it	  has	  been	  
transferred.	  It	  is	  silent	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  Commonwealth	  is	  entitled	  to	  transfer	  the	  
land	  to	  New	  South	  Wales	  consistently	  with	  its	  contractual	  obligations.	  If	  the	  Bill	  
becomes	  law	  it	  would	  not	  destroy	  the	  contract	  between	  the	  NSWRA	  and	  the	  
Commonwealth.	  The	  NSWRA	  is	  entitled	  to	  an	  injunction	  to	  restrain	  the	  
Commonwealth	  from	  transferring	  the	  land	  because	  that	  is	  an	  anticipatory	  breach	  of	  
contract.	  For	  the	  reasons	  given	  earlier,	  the	  so-­‐called	  doctrine	  of	  executive	  necessity	  
does	  not	  relieve	  the	  Commonwealth	  from	  its	  contractual	  obligations.	  For	  these	  
reasons	  the	  NSWRA	  is	  entitled	  to	  an	  injunction	  to	  restrain	  the	  Commonwealth	  from	  
transferring	  Lot	  2,	  unless	  such	  a	  transfer	  can	  be	  effected	  in	  a	  way	  that	  continues	  to	  
secure	  the	  NSWRA's	  right	  to	  use	  the	  Licensed	  Range	  as	  a	  rifle	  range,	  which	  includes	  
its	  use	  of	  the	  danger	  zone	  or	  safety	  template	  on	  Lot	  2.	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Thus,	  the	  NSWRA	  was	  successful	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  its	  application.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/818.html	  
(See	  casenote	  2.10.8	  above,	  for	  an	  application	  to	  alter	  the	  costs	  order	  in	  this	  decision.)	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
One	  of	  the	  bases	  for	  ejecting	  the	  NSWRA	  from	  the	  land	  in	  this	  case	  was	  a	  form	  of	  executive	  
power,	  called	  the	  doctrine	  of	  executive	  necessity.	  This	  doctrine	  holds	  that	  the	  executive	  cannot	  
by	  representation	  or	  promise	  disable	  itself	  from,	  or	  hinder	  itself	  in,	  performing	  a	  statutory	  duty	  
or	  exercising	  a	  statutory	  discretion	  to	  be	  performed	  or	  exercised	  in	  the	  public	  interest,	  by	  
binding	  itself	  not	  to	  perform	  the	  duty	  or	  exercise	  the	  discretion	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  in	  advance	  
of	  the	  actual	  performance	  of	  the	  duty	  or	  exercise	  of	  the	  power.	  It	  was	  submitted	  for	  the	  
Commonwealth	  in	  this	  case	  that	  where	  the	  Crown	  exercises	  its	  common	  law	  powers	  as	  an	  
owner	  of	  land	  by	  entering	  into	  a	  contract	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  future	  use	  of	  that	  land,	  it	  cannot	  
disable	  itself	  from	  deciding	  in	  the	  future	  that	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  the	  land	  should	  be	  used	  in	  a	  
different	  way	  –	  in	  this	  case	  as	  a	  national	  park.	  	  
But	  His	  Honour	  in	  this	  case	  could	  see	  no	  reason	  for	  finding	  such	  an	  expansive	  view	  of	  the	  
doctrine	  of	  executive	  necessity.	  Indeed,	  he	  held	  that	  it	  did	  not	  apply	  at	  all.	  The	  power	  (not	  
discretion)	  the	  Commonwealth	  exercised	  in	  entering	  into	  the	  deed	  of	  licence	  with	  the	  NSWRA	  
was	  not	  an	  exercise	  of	  the	  prerogative	  in	  its	  usual	  sense.	  It	  was	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  Crown's	  
power	  as	  owner	  of	  the	  land.	  In	  that	  respect,	  the	  Crown	  had	  the	  same	  capacity	  and	  stood	  in	  the	  
same	  position	  as	  any	  other	  person	  –	  it	  was	  just	  a	  contract,	  and	  ordinary	  contractual	  principles	  
applied.	  
By	  asserting	  the	  alleged	  right	  to	  terminate	  the	  licence	  at	  will	  or	  on	  reasonable	  notice,	  or	  by	  
asserting	  that	  the	  licence	  was	  not	  binding	  on	  it,	  or	  that	  terms	  should	  not	  be	  implied	  that	  would	  
otherwise	  be	  implied,	  the	  Commonwealth	  was	  not	  seeking	  to	  exercise	  a	  power	  or	  discretion	  in	  
a	  different	  capacity	  from	  that	  in	  which	  it	  contracted	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Its	  submissions	  were	  
comprehensively	  rejected.	  
Another	  important	  point	  in	  the	  case	  was	  the	  implied	  contractual	  term	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  
good	  faith	  which	  His	  Honour	  said	  the	  Commonwealth	  could	  not	  deny	  in	  exercising	  its	  
contractual	  powers.	  
	  
2.10.11  THAPLIYAL V MRS AUSTRALIA GROUP (CIVIL CLAIMS) [2012] VCAT 914 
(VICTORIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, J SMITHERS SENIOR 
MEMBER, 29 JUNE 2012) 
This	  case	  revolved	  around	  a	  civil	  claim	  for	  damages,	  but	  the	  context	  was	  that	  of	  an	  alleged	  
charity.	  The	  applicant’s	  wife	  was	  an	  entrant	  in	  the	  Mrs	  Australia	  Pageant	  2011.	  The	  pageant	  
was	  promoted	  on	  Facebook	  as	  a	  means	  of	  raising	  money	  for	  the	  Women	  In	  Need	  Foundation	  
(WIN	  Foundation).	  In	  evidence	  it	  was	  said	  that	  the	  Mrs	  Australia	  Group	  was	  a	  partnership	  
between	  the	  two	  individual	  named	  respondents,	  which	  raised	  funds	  for	  the	  WIN	  Foundation.	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The	  partnership	  has	  since	  been	  dissolved.	  The	  respondents	  indicated	  the	  fundraising	  was	  for	  
an	  Australian	  version	  of	  an	  American	  charity,	  also	  called	  the	  WIN	  Foundation.	  
One	  of	  the	  ways	  of	  raising	  money	  was	  for	  members	  of	  the	  public	  to	  cast	  votes	  for	  their	  
favoured	  candidate	  in	  the	  pageant	  via	  a	  Facebook	  page.	  Each	  vote	  cost	  $5.	  The	  applicant	  cast	  
20	  votes	  for	  his	  wife,	  costing	  $100.	  A	  representation	  was	  made	  on	  Facebook	  that	  the	  most	  
favoured	  entrant	  in	  the	  electronic	  Facebook	  voting	  would	  be	  named	  ‘Choice	  of	  the	  People’,	  
and	  automatically	  be	  entered	  in	  the	  top	  5	  finalists.	  This	  did	  not	  happen,	  and	  the	  applicant	  
claimed	  $100	  damages	  and	  vexation,	  and	  made	  alternative	  claims	  under	  the	  Australian	  
Consumer	  Law	  for	  misleading	  and	  deceptive	  conduct.	  
The	  respondents	  claimed	  that	  the	  Facebook	  representation	  was	  incorrect,	  and	  that	  this	  had	  
been	  indicated	  to	  contestants.	  The	  Facebook	  page	  linked	  to	  the	  Mrs	  Australia	  website	  which	  in	  
turn	  linked	  to	  terms	  and	  conditions	  for	  the	  pageant	  on	  the	  American	  website	  of	  the	  WIN	  
charity.	  The	  respondents’	  evidence	  was	  that	  the	  money	  raised	  had	  gone	  straight	  to	  the	  WIN	  
charity,	  and	  that	  they	  had	  gained	  nothing	  from	  it.	  	  
The	  applicant	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Paypal	  receipt	  gave	  the	  ‘merchant’	  name	  as	  Mrs	  
Australia	  Group,	  and	  not	  the	  WIN	  Foundation,	  and	  that	  the	  Mrs	  Australia	  Group	  was	  not	  a	  
registered	  fundraiser.	  The	  respondents	  said	  that	  the	  Paypal	  receipt	  name	  must	  have	  been	  a	  
mistake.	  
The	  Tribunal	  doubted	  that	  there	  was	  contract	  between	  people	  who	  paid	  to	  vote	  via	  Facebook,	  
or	  if	  there	  was,	  that	  there	  was	  any	  real	  damage	  suffered	  by	  voters.	  If	  there	  was	  a	  contract,	  it	  
was	  an	  unusual	  one.	  The	  Tribunal	  said	  (at	  [18]–[19]):	  
It	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  say	  exactly	  what	  the	  voters	  were	  getting	  for	  their	  money.	  The	  fact	  that	  
it	  is	  for	  a	  charitable	  cause	  is	  quite	  significant	  in	  assessing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  contract.	  On	  
one	  of	  the	  pages	  printed	  off	  from	  Facebook	  which	  the	  applicant	  attached	  to	  his	  claim	  
the	  following	  statement	  appeared	  after	  the	  statement	  that	  the	  winner	  of	  Virtual	  
Voting	  would	  be	  crowned	  Choice	  of	  the	  People	  and	  gain	  an	  automatic	  spot	  in	  the	  top	  
5:	  The	  money	  raised	  through	  VV	  goes	  to	  Women	  In	  Need	  of	  Australia	  and	  is	  Tax	  
Deductable.	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  context	  of	  the	  arrangement	  overall,	  that	  the	  votes	  
were	  donations	  to	  a	  charitable	  cause.	  The	  key	  obligation	  which	  the	  respondents	  had	  to	  
the	  applicant	  was	  to	  pass	  the	  money	  on	  to	  the	  charitable	  cause.	  There	  may	  well	  also	  
be	  an	  obligation	  to	  associate	  the	  amounts	  donated	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  particular	  
contestant,	  with	  that	  contestant.	  	  
The	  Tribunal	  found	  that	  the	  applicant	  had	  no	  provable	  claim.	  It	  accepted	  that	  the	  money	  raised	  
via	  the	  pageant	  actually	  did	  go	  to	  the	  nominated	  charity.	  The	  Tribunal	  also	  accepted	  that	  the	  
respondent	  giving	  evidence	  was	  honestly	  attempting	  to	  say	  how	  the	  pageant	  was	  conducted,	  
and	  that	  neither	  of	  the	  respondents	  profited	  from	  the	  pageant.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2012/914.html	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Electronic	  methods	  of	  fundraising	  are	  convenient,	  but	  must	  be	  conducted	  with	  the	  same	  care	  
and	  attention	  to	  legislative	  requirements	  as	  any	  other	  form	  of	  fundraising.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
Tribunal	  accepted	  that	  the	  moneys	  raised	  all	  went	  to	  the	  charity	  concerned,	  though	  the	  
method	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  moneys	  was	  not	  totally	  clear	  in	  evidence.	  In	  cases	  of	  fundraising,	  
good	  intentions	  are	  not	  enough.	  Relevant	  legislation	  in	  each	  state	  should	  be	  a	  matter	  for	  close	  
attention:	  see	  Charitable	  Fundraising	  Act	  1991	  (NSW);	  Fundraising	  Act	  1998	  (Vic);	  Collections	  
Act	  1966	  (Qld);	  Collections	  for	  Charitable	  Purposes	  Act	  1939	  (SA);	  Charitable	  Collections	  Act	  
1946	  (WA);	  Collections	  for	  Charities	  Act	  2001	  (Tas);	  Charitable	  Collections	  Act	  2003	  (ACT).	  
In	  Victoria,	  a	  fundraising	  appeal	  occurs	  if	  a	  person	  solicits	  or	  receives	  money	  or	  a	  benefit	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  a	  representation	  that	  the	  soliciting	  or	  receiving	  is	  not	  solely	  for	  the	  profit	  or	  
commercial	  benefit	  of	  the	  person	  or	  any	  other	  person,	  cause	  or	  thing	  on	  whose	  behalf	  the	  
person	  is	  soliciting	  or	  receiving	  the	  money	  or	  benefit	  (section	  5(1)	  of	  the	  Fundraising	  Act	  1998	  
(Vic)).	  A	  fundraising	  appeal	  can	  only	  be	  conducted	  by	  a	  registered	  fundraiser:	  section	  17A.	  
Exceptions	  apply	  in	  section	  16A,	  and	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  the	  fundraiser	  in	  this	  case	  may	  have	  
fitted	  the	  exemptions,	  since	  the	  evidence	  was	  that	  the	  Facebook	  appeal	  raised	  only	  about	  
$5000.	  The	  latter	  point	  was	  not	  considered	  in	  detail	  by	  the	  Tribunal.	  
	  
2.10.12  WILLIAMS V COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [2012] HCA 23 (HIGH COURT OF 
AUSTRALIA, FULL COURT, 20 JUNE 2012) 
This	  case	  concerned	  the	  extent	  of	  executive	  power	  of	  the	  Commonwealth.	  In	  particular,	  the	  
case	  dealt	  with	  the	  power	  of	  the	  executive	  to	  enter	  into	  contracts	  and	  expend	  money.	  	  
The	  Constitution	  of	  Australia	  divides	  power	  between	  the	  executive,	  the	  legislature	  (parliament)	  
and	  the	  judicature	  (the	  courts).	  Executive	  government	  is	  dealt	  with	  in	  Chapter	  II	  of	  the	  
Constitution,	  and	  vests	  executive	  power	  in	  the	  Queen,	  exercisable	  by	  the	  Governor-­‐General	  as	  
the	  Queen’s	  representative:	  section	  61.	  The	  Governor-­‐General	  is	  to	  be	  advised	  by	  the	  ‘Federal	  
Executive	  Council’:	  section	  62.	  
There	  is	  no	  mention	  in	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  or	  the	  Cabinet.	  This	  was	  because	  
the	  parliament	  was	  always	  intended	  to	  operate	  on	  the	  ‘Westminster’	  system	  (the	  same	  as	  the	  
English	  parliament).	  The	  Westminster	  system	  allows	  for	  a	  Prime	  Minister,	  ministers	  in	  a	  
Cabinet,	  government	  departments	  and	  ministerial	  responsibility	  to	  the	  parliament.	  This	  was	  
regarded	  as	  a	  given	  when	  Australia	  was	  constituted	  as	  a	  nation.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  
Cabinet	  effectively	  wield	  the	  executive	  power	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  Constitution.	  	  
The	  plaintiff,	  Williams,	  challenged	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  power	  to	  enter	  into	  contracts	  with	  
Scripture	  Union	  Queensland	  (SUQ)	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  ‘chaplaincy’	  services	  into	  schools	  
operated	  by	  the	  Queensland	  state	  government.	  In	  particular,	  he	  challenged	  the	  provision	  of	  
such	  services	  to	  Darling	  Heights	  State	  School	  in	  Toowoomba,	  where	  his	  children	  attended	  
primary	  school.	  Money	  was	  expended	  on	  chaplaincy	  services	  under	  this	  contract	  during	  2007	  
to	  2012.	  Although	  the	  expenditure	  was	  said	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  to	  have	  met	  the	  necessary	  
condition	  of	  a	  parliamentary	  appropriation	  for	  each	  year	  in	  which	  it	  had	  been	  made,	  no	  Act	  of	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Parliament	  had	  conferred	  power	  on	  the	  Commonwealth	  to	  contract	  and	  expend	  public	  money	  
in	  this	  way.	  
Payments	  for	  chaplaincy	  service	  had	  first	  been	  implemented	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  in	  
2006,	  and	  the	  services	  were	  extended	  in	  2009	  and	  have	  continued	  since	  then.	  Thus,	  both	  
parties	  of	  government	  had	  supported	  the	  scheme	  since	  its	  inception.	  
The	  Full	  Court	  held	  in	  this	  case	  that:	  
1. Williams	  had	  standing	  to	  challenge	  certain	  payments	  made	  by	  the	  Commonwealth;	  
2. Payments	  made	  from	  consolidated	  revenue	  to	  the	  Darling	  Heights	  Funding	  (DHF)	  
Agreement	  in	  Toowoomba,	  Queensland	  were	  beyond	  the	  power	  of	  the	  
Commonwealth	  under	  section	  61	  of	  the	  Constitution;	  
3. Payments	  made	  to	  Scripture	  Union	  Queensland	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Darling	  Heights	  
Funding	  Agreement	  as	  above	  were	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  executive	  power	  of	  the	  
Commonwealth	  under	  section	  61	  of	  the	  Constitution;	  
4. None	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  in	  the	  case	  were	  contrary	  to	  section	  116	  of	  the	  Constitution	  
(the	  section	  which	  forbids	  the	  Commonwealth	  from	  establishing	  a	  religion,	  imposing	  
any	  religious	  observance,	  prohibiting	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  religion,	  or	  imposing	  a	  
religious	  test	  on	  employment).	  
The	  main	  points	  made	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  were	  as	  follows:	  
On	  the	  extent	  of	  executive	  power	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  to	  contract	  and	  spend	  
1. Parliamentary	  appropriation	  (via	  an	  Appropriation	  Act)	  is	  not	  a	  source	  of	  spending	  
power,	  contrary	  to	  long-­‐standing	  assumption.	  
2. Also	  contrary	  to	  common	  assumption,	  the	  Executive	  cannot	  spend	  money	  on	  anything	  
it	  chooses	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  commonwealth	  head	  of	  power	  in	  the	  Constitution.	  
3. There	  may	  be	  some	  scope,	  however,	  for	  payments	  to	  be	  made	  in	  this	  way	  in	  times	  of	  
national	  disaster	  or	  national	  economic	  or	  other	  emergency:	  see	  Pape	  v	  Federal	  
Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  [2009]	  HCA	  23.	  
4. The	  Commonwealth	  argued	  that	  the	  Executive	  is	  a	  legal	  person	  with	  ordinary	  powers	  
to	  contract	  and	  spend.	  However,	  the	  Executive	  is	  not	  a	  separate	  juristic	  person.	  The	  
Executive	  is	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  national	  polity.	  The	  character	  of	  the	  Executive	  
Government	  as	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  national	  polity	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  power	  of	  that	  branch	  and	  the	  powers	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  legislative	  branch	  and,	  
particularly,	  the	  Senate.	  
5. Unlike	  a	  natural	  person,	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  power	  to	  contract	  and	  to	  pay	  money	  
was	  constrained	  by	  the	  need	  for	  an	  appropriation	  and	  by	  the	  requirements	  of	  political 
accountability.	  The	  Executive	  spends	  public	  money,	  not	  its	  own	  money.	  
6. The	  exercise	  of	  legislative	  power	  must	  yield	  a	  law	  able	  to	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  law	  
with	  respect	  to	  a	  subject	  matter	  within	  the	  constitutional	  grant	  of	  legislative	  authority	  
to	  the	  Parliament.	  The	  subject	  matters	  of	  legislative	  power	  are	  specified	  for	  that	  
purpose,	  not	  to	  give	  content	  to	  the	  executive	  power.	  Executive	  action,	  except	  in	  the	  
exercise	  of	  delegated	  legislative	  authority,	  is	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  legislative	  
action.	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  289	  
	  
7. The	  executive	  power	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  does	  extend	  to	  the	  doing	  of	  all	  things	  
which	  are	  necessary	  or	  reasonably	  incidental	  to	  the	  execution	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  
valid	  law	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  once	  that	  law	  has	  taken	  effect.	  That	  field	  of	  action	  
does	  not	  require	  express	  statutory	  authority,	  nor	  is	  it	  necessary	  to	  find	  an	  implied	  
power	  deriving	  from	  the	  statute.	  The	  necessary	  power	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  words	  
‘execution	  and	  maintenance	  ...	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  Commonwealth’	  appearing	  in	  section	  
61	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  
8. Neither	  the	  DHF	  Agreement	  nor	  the	  expenditure	  made	  under	  it	  was	  done	  in	  the	  
administration	  of	  a	  department	  of	  State	  in	  the	  sense	  used	  in	  section	  64	  of	  the	  
Constitution.	  Neither	  constituted	  an	  exercise	  of	  the	  prerogative	  aspect	  of	  the	  
executive	  power.	  Neither	  involved	  the	  exercise	  of	  a	  statutory	  power,	  nor	  executive	  
action	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  a	  statute	  enacted	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  chaplaincy	  or	  
like	  services	  to	  State	  schools.	  	  
9. There	  was	  no	  statute,	  general	  or	  specific,	  identified	  by	  the	  parties,	  which	  could	  be	  
invoked	  as	  a	  source	  of	  executive	  power	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  DHF	  Agreement	  and	  to	  
undertake	  the	  challenged	  expenditure.	  
10. Whatever	  the	  scope	  of	  that	  aspect	  of	  the	  executive	  power	  which	  derives	  from	  the	  
character	  and	  status	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  as	  a	  national	  government,	  it	  did	  not	  
authorise	  the	  contract	  and	  the	  expenditure	  under	  it	  in	  this	  case.	  	  
11. It	  is	  possible	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  power	  in	  the	  Constitution	  anyway	  i.e.	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  there	  could	  not	  have	  been	  a	  valid	  law	  about	  the	  provision	  of	  chaplaincy	  services.	  
12. Section	  61	  therefore	  did	  not	  empower	  the	  Commonwealth,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  statutory	  
authority,	  to	  contract	  for	  or	  undertake	  the	  challenged	  expenditure	  on	  chaplaincy	  
services	  in	  Darling	  Heights	  State	  School.	  
On	  federal	  vs	  state	  powers	  
1. Even	  if,	  as	  the	  Commonwealth	  argued,	  the	  DHF	  Agreement	  and	  expenditure	  under	  it	  
could	  be	  referred	  to	  either	  section	  51(xxiiiA)	  (the	  pensions	  payment	  power)	  or	  section	  
51(xx)	  (the	  corporations	  power)	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  they	  are	  fields	  in	  which	  the 
Commonwealth	  and	  the	  States	  have	  concurrent	  competencies	  subject	  to	  the	  
paramountcy	  of	  Commonwealth	  laws	  effected	  by	  section	  109	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  
character	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  Government	  as	  a	  national	  government	  does	  not	  
entitle	  it,	  as	  a	  general	  proposition,	  to	  enter	  into	  any	  such	  field	  of	  activity	  by	  executive	  
action	  alone.	  Such	  an	  extension	  of	  Commonwealth	  executive	  powers	  would,	  in	  a	  
practical	  sense,	  correspondingly	  reduce	  those	  of	  the	  States	  and	  compromise	  the	  
essential	  and	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  federal	  government.	  	  
2. The	  existence	  of	  Commonwealth	  executive	  power	  in	  areas	  beyond	  the	  express	  grants	  
of	  legislative	  power	  will	  ordinarily	  be	  clearest	  where	  Commonwealth	  executive	  or	  
legislative	  action	  involves	  no	  real	  competition	  with	  State	  executive	  or	  legislative	  
competence.	  
3. The	  States	  have	  the	  legal	  and	  practical	  capacity	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  scheme	  such	  as	  the	  
National	  School	  Chaplaincy	  Program	  (NSCP).	  The	  conduct	  of	  the	  public	  school	  system	  in	  
Queensland,	  where	  the	  Darling	  Heights	  State	  School	  is	  situated,	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
that	  State.	  Indeed,	  Queensland	  maintains	  its	  own	  programme	  for	  school	  chaplains.	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4. If	  the	  Commonwealth's	  capacities	  to	  contract	  and	  to	  spend	  generally	  permitted	  the	  
Commonwealth	  Executive	  to	  intrude	  into	  areas	  of	  responsibility	  within	  the	  legislative	  
and	  executive	  competence	  of	  the	  States	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  statutory	  authority	  other	  
than	  appropriation	  Acts,	  access	  to	  section	  109	  of	  the	  Constitution	  (which	  provides	  for	  
Commonwealth	  paramountcy	  in	  the	  case	  of	  inconsistent	  legislation)	  may	  be	  impeded.	  	  
On	  the	  question	  of	  religion	  
All	  the	  justices	  agreed	  that	  neither	  the	  DHF	  Agreement	  nor	  the	  payments	  made	  under	  it	  were	  
prohibited	  by	  section	  116	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  chaplains	  were	  not	  holders	  of	  government	  
office,	  were	  not	  employed	  by	  the	  Commonwealth,	  and	  had	  no	  characteristics	  to	  which	  section	  
116	  might	  apply.	  
Dissenting	  judgement	  
Heydon	  J	  in	  dissent	  held	  that:	  
1. The	  plaintiff	  had	  no	  standing	  to	  challenge	  payments	  from	  the	  Consolidated	  Revenue	  
Fund.	  
2. The	  common	  assumption	  that	  the	  Executive	  could	  spend	  money	  on	  anything	  within	  
the	  legislative	  powers	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  in	  the	  Constitution	  was	  correct.	  
3. A	  capacity	  to	  contract	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  a	  capacity	  which	  both	  the	  Executive	  and	  
persons	  other	  than	  the	  Executive	  possess.	  
4. If	  the	  NSCP	  involved	  the	  creation	  of	  rights	  and	  obligations	  which	  collided	  with	  pre-­‐
existing	  rights	  and	  obligations	  or	  with	  state	  or	  federal	  laws,	  no	  doubt	  statute	  would	  be	  
necessary.	  If	  the	  conflicting	  law	  was	  a	  federal	  enactment,	  a	  federal	  enactment	  
repealing	  it	  would	  be	  necessary.	  If	  the	  conflicting	  legal	  provision	  was	  a	  state	  
enactment,	  a	  federal	  enactment	  would	  also	  be	  necessary.	  There	  would	  be	  federal	  
legislative	  power	  to	  support	  that	  enactment	  and	  it	  would	  prevail	  over	  the	  state	  
enactment	  by	  reason	  of	  section	  109	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  If	  the	  conflicting	  legal	  
provision	  was	  a	  rule	  of	  the	  common	  law,	  a	  federal	  enactment	  would	  be	  necessary,	  and	  
there	  would	  be	  legislative	  power	  to	  enact	  it.	  But	  the	  NSCP	  does	  not	  create	  rights	  and	  
obligations	  which	  conflict	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  rights	  and	  obligations,	  or	  with	  state	  or	  
federal	  laws.	  Hence	  no	  statute	  is	  necessary	  to	  support	  it	  on	  that	  account.	  
Therefore,	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  6	  to	  1,	  the	  High	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  NSCP	  was	  unable	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  
by	  the	  Commonwealth	  Executive	  without	  supporting	  legislation.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/23.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  raised	  serious	  implications	  for	  many	  programs	  which	  might	  be	  paid	  for	  by	  the	  
Commonwealth	  government	  as	  part	  of	  executive	  power,	  and	  thus	  without	  supporting	  federal	  
legislation.	  The	  main	  casualty	  was	  the	  common	  assumption	  that	  executive	  power	  extends	  to	  all	  
things	  for	  which	  a	  head	  of	  legislative	  power	  exists	  in	  the	  Constitution.	  This	  was	  held	  not	  to	  be	  
so.	  Although	  the	  Executive	  retains	  many	  powers,	  including	  prerogative	  powers,	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  
the	  control	  of	  parliament	  on	  issues	  which	  involve	  expenditure	  from	  Consolidated	  Revenue.	  In	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addition,	  it	  should	  not	  exercise	  executive	  power	  in	  circumstances	  where	  state	  powers	  may	  be	  
curtailed	  on	  similar	  issues.	  
The	  government	  passed	  legislation	  to	  overcome	  this	  decision	  on	  28	  June	  2012:	  see	  the	  
amended	  Financial	  Management	  and	  Accountability	  Act	  1997	  (Cth)	  (the	  FMA	  Act).	  The	  
amendments	  insert	  a	  new	  Division	  3B	  into	  the	  FMA	  to	  establish	  a	  supplementary	  power	  for	  
the	  Commonwealth	  to	  make	  commitments	  to	  spend	  public	  money	  where	  there	  is	  no	  existing	  
legislative	  authority.	  This	  was	  said	  not	  to	  be	  a	  new	  Commonwealth	  power,	  but	  does	  not	  place	  
a	  limit	  on	  what	  the	  Executive	  could	  do	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  legislative	  authority:	  new	  section	  32E.	  
In	  order	  to	  put	  beyond	  doubt	  that	  public	  money	  may	  continue	  to	  be	  spent	  where	  legislative	  
authority	  (other	  than	  Appropriation	  Acts)	  does	  not	  exist,	  a	  new	  section	  32B(1)	  was	  inserted	  
into	  the	  FMA	  Act	  which	  provides	  authority	  to:	  
• make,	  vary	  or	  administer	  arrangements	  or	  grants	  of	  financial	  assistance	  that	  are	  
prescribed	  in	  the	  Financial	  Management	  and	  Accountability	  Regulations	  1997	  (Cth)	  
(the	  Regulations)	  
• make,	  vary	  or	  administer	  arrangements	  or	  grants	  which	  are	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  
program	  specified	  in	  the	  Regulations,	  or	  
• include	  classes	  of	  arrangement	  or	  grants	  that	  are	  specified	  in	  the	  Regulations.	  
An	  arrangement	  is	  defined	  to	  include	  a	  contract,	  agreement	  or	  deed.	  All	  terms	  of	  such	  
arrangements	  have	  to	  be	  set	  out	  in	  writing:	  new	  section	  32C.	  The	  Minister’s	  power	  may	  be	  
delegated	  to	  an	  official	  of	  any	  agency:	  new	  section	  32D.	  
The	  amendments	  also	  provided	  new	  sections	  44(1A)	  and	  (B)	  in	  the	  FMA	  Act	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  
that	  Chief	  Executives	  of	  agencies	  have	  the	  power	  to	  make,	  vary	  or	  administer	  arrangements	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  Commonwealth.	  This	  latter	  amendment	  was	  to	  overcome	  the	  finding	  in	  this	  case	  
that	  section	  44(1)	  of	  the	  FMA	  did	  not	  empower	  Chief	  Executives	  of	  agencies	  of	  the	  
Commonwealth	  with	  the	  power	  to	  spend	  money.	  Section	  44(1A)	  provides,	  via	  a	  note,	  that	  this	  
power	  may	  be	  delegated	  to	  other	  officials	  of	  an	  agency.	  
The	  Regulations	  were	  amended	  to	  include	  new	  Part	  5AA,	  and	  a	  new	  Schedule	  1AA.	  Part	  5AA	  
provides	  that	  the	  programs	  listed	  in	  Schedule	  1AA	  are	  arrangements,	  classes	  of	  arrangements,	  
grants	  and	  classes	  of	  grants,	  and	  programs	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  new	  section	  32B(1)(b)	  of	  the	  
FMA.	  Schedule	  1AA	  lists	  a	  large	  number	  of	  existing	  Commonwealth	  programs	  which	  were	  
placed	  in	  doubt	  by	  this	  decision	  because	  they	  have	  no	  supporting	  legislation.	  
	  
2.10.13  WOMEN’S AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH NETWORK INC V JC, JC AND KC (BY HER 
LITIGATION GUARDIAN) [2012] SASC 104 (SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH 
AUSTRALIA, WHITE J, 1 JUNE 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  application	  under	  parens	  patriae	  jurisdiction	  by	  the	  Women's	  and	  Children’s	  
Hospital	  (the	  Hospital)	  for	  authority	  to	  administer	  transfusions	  of	  blood	  products	  to	  a	  child	  in	  
the	  situation	  where	  the	  parents	  of	  child	  objected	  to	  blood	  transfusions	  on	  religious	  grounds.	  
The	  question	  before	  the	  court	  was:	  what	  are	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  child?	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Parens	  patriae	  jurisdiction	  is	  an	  inherent	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  protect	  the	  person	  and	  
property	  of	  those	  who	  are	  unable	  to	  look	  after	  themselves.	  The	  jurisdiction	  had	  its	  origin	  in	  the	  
Court	  of	  Chancery	  in	  England	  and,	  by	  virtue	  of	  section	  17(2)	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  Act	  1935	  
(SA),	  was	  vested	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  South	  Australia.	  His	  Honour	  was	  satisfied	  that	  this	  
inherent	  power	  of	  the	  Court	  has	  not	  been	  displaced	  by	  statute.	  Further,	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  it	  
was	  well	  settled	  that	  the	  parens	  patriae	  jurisdiction	  may	  be	  exercised	  to	  authorise	  transfusions	  
to	  be	  given	  to	  a	  child,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  parental	  objection.	  The	  judge	  ordered	  that	  the	  blood	  
products	  be	  administered.	  
The	  child,	  KC,	  had	  acute	  lymphoblastic	  leukaemia,	  and	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  her	  oncologist,	  a	  poor	  
prognosis.	  Without	  treatment,	  acute	  lymphoblastic	  leukaemia	  is	  invariably	  fatal.	  The	  hospital	  
wished	  treatment	  without	  delay.	  Although	  the	  treatment	  protocol	  involves	  high	  levels	  of	  
chemotherapy	  drugs,	  these	  must	  be	  accompanied	  by	  blood	  transfusions	  to	  be	  effective.	  KC’s	  
parents	  objected	  to	  KC	  having	  blood	  transfusions	  because	  of	  their	  religious	  convictions	  as	  
Jehovah’s	  Witnesses.	  These	  were	  based	  on	  their	  understanding	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Bible	  
and,	  in	  particular,	  Acts:	  15:29.	  	  
His	  Honour	  accepted	  that	  the	  religious	  beliefs	  of	  KC’s	  parents	  were	  sincerely	  held	  and	  that	  KC’s	  
parents	  loved	  their	  child	  and	  wanted	  the	  best	  care	  for	  her.	  He	  found	  that	  they	  accepted	  the	  
accuracy	  of	  KC’s	  diagnosis	  and	  accepted	  that	  the	  course	  of	  treatment	  proposed	  by	  the	  Hospital	  
was	  the	  best	  chance	  for	  KC’s	  survival.	  They	  accepted	  the	  Hospital’s	  view	  that	  there	  are	  no	  safe	  
alternatives	  to	  the	  treatment	  regime	  involving	  chemotherapy	  and	  blood	  transfusions.	  	  
It	  was	  also	  clear	  to	  His	  Honour	  that	  KC’s	  parents	  had	  given	  consideration	  to	  the	  issues	  involved	  
and	  to	  the	  consequences	  which	  their	  objection	  would	  have	  for	  KC.	  In	  making	  their	  objection	  to	  
the	  blood	  transfusions,	  they	  had	  taken	  into	  account	  KC’s	  present	  physical	  wellbeing,	  and	  her	  
long-­‐term	  spiritual	  and	  physical	  wellbeing	  as	  they	  perceived	  it	  to	  be.	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  
parents’	  decision	  to	  object	  to	  blood	  transfusions	  was	  not	  arbitrary,	  or	  a	  result	  of	  indifference	  
to	  KC’s	  welfare.	  The	  parents	  had	  also	  agreed	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  court’s	  decision	  on	  the	  matter.	  
His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  child	  were	  paramount;	  however,	  a	  court	  must	  
act	  cautiously	  in	  overcoming	  parental	  rights.	  His	  Honour	  considered	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Consent	  
to	  Medical	  Treatment	  and	  Palliative	  Care	  Act	  1995	  (SA)	  (the	  Act).	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  Act	  
did	  not	  apply	  to	  KC	  because	  it	  involved	  treatment	  without	  consent	  when	  there	  was	  a	  medical	  
emergency,	  which	  was	  not	  the	  situation	  in	  this	  case.	  This	  was	  a	  situation	  of	  preventative	  or	  
facilitative	  treatment,	  rather	  than	  reactive	  treatment.	  	  
Therefore,	  if	  the	  Act	  could	  not	  be	  used	  to	  authorise	  treatment	  for	  KC	  then	  the	  parens	  patriae	  
jurisdiction	  was	  appropriate	  to	  the	  circumstances.	  On	  this	  point,	  His	  Honour	  said:	  (at	  [37]–
[38]):	  
I	  am	  satisfied	  that	  it	  is	  appropriate	  and,	  indeed,	  necessary	  for	  KC	  to	  receive	  blood	  
transfusions	  as	  an	  incident	  of	  the	  recognised	  course	  of	  treatment	  for	  her	  leukaemia	  if	  
she	  is	  to	  have	  any	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  survival	  in	  good	  health.	  In	  forming	  this	  view	  I	  
have	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  religious	  beliefs	  of	  KC’s	  parents.	  Despite	  the	  parents’	  
religious	  beliefs	  and	  despite	  the	  concerns	  which	  they	  have	  about	  KC’s	  spiritual	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wellbeing,	  I	  am	  satisfied	  that	  it	  is	  in	  KC’s	  best	  interests	  to	  receive	  the	  blood	  
transfusions.	  That	  is	  because,	  without	  the	  blood	  transfusions,	  there	  is	  a	  very	  high	  
prospect	  that	  she	  will	  die.	  The	  provision	  of	  blood	  transfusions	  will	  reduce	  that	  
prospect	  markedly	  and	  increase	  not	  only	  the	  prospects	  of	  her	  survival,	  but	  of	  that	  
being	  a	  survival	  in	  good	  health.	  I	  am	  satisfied	  that	  there	  are	  no	  reasonable	  alternatives	  
to	  the	  provision	  of	  blood	  transfusions	  as	  a	  means	  of	  treatment.	  Accordingly,	  I	  am	  
satisfied	  that	  this	  is	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  should	  exercise	  the	  parens	  patriae	  
jurisdiction	  so	  as	  to	  permit	  KC	  to	  receive	  the	  treatment	  which	  will	  give	  her	  a	  
reasonable	  chance	  of	  survival,	  and	  that	  it	  should	  do	  so	  despite	  the	  objection	  of	  KC’s	  
parents	  to	  that	  treatment.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/sa/SASC/2012/104.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
The	  hospital	  authority	  in	  this	  case	  is	  an	  incorporated	  association.	  It	  has	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  similar	  
cases	  for	  parens	  patriae	  jurisdiction	  on	  previous	  occasions:	  see	  Children,	  Youth	  &	  Women’s	  
Health	  Services	  Inc	  v	  YJL,	  MHL	  and	  TL	  [2012]	  SASC	  175.	  This	  jurisdiction	  is	  very	  ancient.	  Its	  
origins	  lie	  with	  the	  wardship	  jurisdiction	  which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  sovereign’s	  feudal	  obligations	  as	  
parens	  patriae	  (standing	  as	  a	  father)	  to	  protect	  the	  person	  and	  property	  of	  his	  subjects,	  
particularly	  those	  unable	  to	  look	  after	  themselves,	  such	  as	  infants.	  It	  was	  a	  paternal	  jurisdiction	  
in	  which	  the	  Chancery	  Court	  acted	  later	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Crown,	  as	  the	  guardian	  of	  all	  infants.	  
This	  jurisdiction	  supports	  orders	  relating	  to	  custody,	  care	  and	  control,	  protection	  of	  property,	  
health	  problems,	  religious	  upbringing,	  and	  protection	  against	  harmful	  associations.	  The	  
jurisdiction	  also	  supports	  blood	  transfusion	  cases,	  and	  where	  the	  parents	  are	  intransigent,	  can	  
go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  order	  a	  child	  to	  be	  made	  a	  ward	  of	  the	  State.	  
	  
2.10.14  NOONE, DIRECTOR OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS VICTORIA V OPERATION SMILE 
(AUSTRALIA) INC [2012] VSCA 91 (COURT OF APPEAL, VICTORIA, WARREN CJ, 
NETTLE JA, CAVANOUGH AJA, 11 MAY 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  appeal	  against	  a	  judgement	  which	  had	  dismissed	  the	  appellant’s	  case	  against	  the	  
respondents.	  The	  appellant	  was	  the	  Director	  of	  Consumer	  Affairs	  Victoria	  (the	  Director).	  The	  
respondent,	  Operation	  Smile	  Inc,	  was	  an	  incorporated	  association	  under	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  (Vic).	  There	  were	  three	  other	  respondents:	  Operation	  Hope	  and	  Hope	  
Research,	  both	  incorporated	  under	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth),	  and	  Mr	  Campbell,	  the	  sole	  
director	  of	  the	  two	  corporations,	  the	  public	  officer	  and	  a	  committee	  member	  of	  the	  
association.	  The	  respondents	  collectively	  operated	  the	  ‘Hope	  Clinic’,	  which	  was	  described	  as	  a	  
complementary	  medicine	  centre	  specialising	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  cancer.	  	  
At	  the	  relevant	  time,	  Operation	  Smile’s	  website	  (www.smile.org.au)	  listed	  and	  described	  the	  
treatments	  offered	  at	  the	  Hope	  Clinic	  and	  contained	  statements	  relating	  to	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
these	  treatments.	  The	  Director	  alleged	  that	  by	  making	  these	  statements	  Operation	  Smile	  
engaged	  in	  misleading	  or	  deceptive	  conduct	  in	  trade	  or	  commerce	  contrary	  to	  section	  9(1)	  of	  
the	  Fair	  Trading	  Act	  1999	  (Vic)	  (the	  Act).	  The	  Director’s	  claim	  was	  that	  the	  statements	  falsely	  
represented	  that	  the	  treatments	  offered	  by	  Operation	  Smile	  were	  effective	  in	  treating	  cancer	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  294	  
	  
and	  had	  scientific	  support.	  Operation	  Smile	  admitted	  making	  the	  statements,	  but	  denied	  that	  
they	  were	  misleading	  or	  deceptive.	  	  
The	  trial	  judge	  had	  held	  that	  the	  Operation	  Smile	  treatments	  did	  not	  have	  the	  support	  of	  
conventional	  science	  and,	  according	  to	  conventional	  science,	  were	  of	  no	  benefit	  to	  cancer	  
sufferers.	  However,	  his	  Honour	  held	  that,	  with	  one	  exception,	  the	  impugned	  statements	  were	  
not	  misleading	  or	  deceptive.	  His	  Honour	  determined	  that	  readers	  of	  the	  statements	  would	  
understand	  them	  as	  mere	  expressions	  of	  opinion	  and	  as	  claiming	  no	  support	  from	  
conventional	  medicine	  or	  science.	  His	  Honour	  considered	  that,	  because	  of	  supervening	  events,	  
the	  one	  exception	  did	  not	  require	  any	  judicial	  intervention.	  	  
On	  appeal,	  their	  Honours	  held	  that	  all	  the	  34	  impugned	  statements	  made	  on	  the	  website	  were	  
misleading	  and	  deceptive	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  section	  9	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  
The	  evidence	  showed	  that	  Mr	  Campbell,	  who	  had	  variously	  described	  himself	  as	  ‘Dr’	  or	  
‘Professor’	  Campbell,	  had	  no	  appropriate	  qualifications	  which	  would	  support	  those	  titles.	  He	  
had	  been	  refused	  registration	  as	  a	  dentist	  in	  Victoria,	  and	  had	  been	  once	  appointed	  as	  a	  
visiting	  professor	  at	  a	  Chinese	  university	  offering	  courses	  in	  complementary	  medicine.	  
The	  Health	  Services	  Commission	  Victoria	  (HSVC)	  had	  produced	  a	  report	  of	  an	  inquiry	  into	  the	  
conduct	  of	  Mr	  Campbell	  which	  was	  undertaken	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Minister	  for	  Health,	  
pursuant	  to	  section	  9(1)(m)	  of	  the	  Health	  Services	  (Conciliation	  and	  Review)	  Act	  1987	  (Vic).	  In	  
the	  report,	  HSCV	  found	  that	  the	  Hope	  Clinic	  offered	  complementary	  therapies	  for	  the	  
treatment	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  illnesses	  and	  conditions,	  including	  cancer,	  constipation,	  multiple	  
sclerosis,	  Crohn’s	  disease,	  bird	  flu,	  shingles,	  autism,	  Gulf	  War	  syndrome	  and	  heavy	  metal	  
toxicity.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  clinic,	  however,	  was	  the	  treatment	  of	  cancer,	  for	  which	  it	  
offered	  three	  forms	  of	  therapies:	  
(a) Tumour	  destructive	  therapies	  consisting	  of	  photo-­‐dynamic	  therapy	  (PDT),	  radiowave	  
therapy	  with	  glucose-­‐blocking	  agents,	  ozone	  therapy,	  electrotherapy,	  mild	  
hyperthermia	  therapy	  and	  sonodynamic	  therapy	  (SDT);	  	  
(b) Metabolic	  support	  therapies	  consisting	  of	  organic	  foods,	  nutritional	  supplementation	  
with	  vitamins	  and	  amino	  acids,	  immune	  boosting	  supplements	  (namely,	  the	  Chinese	  
herb	  Astragalus	  and	  Japanese	  reishi	  and	  shitake	  mushrooms);	  	  
(c) Mind-­‐body	  therapies	  consisting	  of	  meditation	  and	  counselling.	  	  
The	  HSVC	  report	  concluded	  that	  all	  these	  therapies	  were	  ineffective.	  Moreover,	  it	  found	  there	  
were	  significant	  costs	  involved	  for	  vulnerable	  patients,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  treatments	  were	  
‘ridiculous’	  and	  ‘undignified’	  for	  patients	  who	  were	  seriously	  ill.	  The	  HSVC	  recommended	  that	  
Consumer	  Affairs	  Victoria	  (CAV)	  consider	  breaches	  of	  the	  fair	  trading	  laws	  relating	  to	  
unconscionable	  conduct	  and	  misleading	  and	  deceptive	  conduct.	  
On	  studying	  the	  Operation	  Smile	  website,	  officers	  of	  CAV	  discovered	  extensive	  material	  
relating	  to	  cures	  for	  many	  kinds	  of	  cancer,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  diseases.	  On	  19	  February	  2010,	  the	  
Director	  wrote	  to	  Mr	  Campbell	  requesting	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  offending	  material	  from	  the	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website.	  After	  some	  correspondence	  between	  the	  parties,	  the	  original	  action	  was	  commenced	  
in	  March	  2010.	  
In	  the	  original	  action,	  the	  Director	  alleged	  34	  impugned	  statements	  from	  the	  Operation	  Smile	  
website,	  which	  were	  considered	  individually	  by	  his	  Honour.	  All	  were	  held	  not	  to	  be	  in	  breach	  
except	  for	  one	  which	  claimed:	  ‘SUCCESSFULLY	  TREATED	  DISEASES	  ...	  Cancers	  including	  
Gastrointestinal,	  Thyroid,	  Pancreas,	  Breast	  Cancer	  with	  brain	  metastases,	  Cervical	  cancers,	  
Lymphoma,	  Leukaemia	  and	  many	  others	  ...’	  
The	  trial	  judge	  found	  that	  this	  statement	  was	  misleading	  and	  deceptive,	  but	  declined	  to	  make	  
any	  order	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  statement	  because	  of	  a	  Disclaimer	  which	  was	  added	  to	  the	  website	  
after	  12	  February	  2010.	  However,	  their	  Honours	  on	  appeal	  held	  that	  this	  Disclaimer	  was	  
ineffective.	  
The	  trial	  had	  also	  raised	  an	  issue	  relating	  to	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  the	  Charter	  of	  Human	  
Rights	  and	  Responsibilities	  (Vic),	  but	  their	  Honours	  ultimately	  declined	  to	  rule	  on	  it.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSCA/2012/91.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  case	  involved	  the	  making	  of	  statements	  on	  an	  association’s	  website.	  This	  case	  turned	  on	  
its	  own	  facts,	  but	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  care	  and	  attention	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  statements	  made	  
on	  an	  association’s	  website	  is	  universal.	  	  
The	  legislation	  under	  consideration	  in	  this	  case	  has	  now	  been	  replaced	  by	  Commonwealth	  
legislation:	  see	  the	  Australian	  Consumer	  Law,	  which	  commenced	  operation	  on	  1	  January	  2011.	  
This	  national	  legislation	  now	  replaces	  the	  state	  fair	  trading	  legislation	  referred	  to	  above: 
http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=fact_sheets/FAQ.htm	  
In	  addition,	  the	  organisation	  in	  this	  case	  had	  not	  registered	  its	  business	  name	  under	  the	  
relevant	  Victorian	  business	  names	  legislation.	  This	  should	  be	  a	  matter	  for	  all	  associations	  to	  
pay	  attention	  to.	  On	  28	  May	  2012	  the	  Australian	  Securities	  and	  Investments	  Commission	  (ASIC)	  
took	  over	  responsibility	  for	  the	  registration	  of	  business	  names	  and	  introduce	  a	  national	  
registration	  service	  for	  business	  names.	  Existing	  registered	  business	  names	  will	  be	  
automatically	  transferred	  to	  the	  national	  system	  and	  attain	  a	  national	  registration	  status.	  See: 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/Business%20names	  
	  
2.10.15  TASMANIAN CONSERVATION TRUST INC V GUNNS LTD [2012] TASSC 18 
(SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA, HOLT ASJ, 20 APRIL 2012) 
This	  was	  an	  action	  by	  the	  defendant	  (Gunns)	  requiring	  the	  plaintiff	  (the	  Trust)	  to	  give	  security	  
for	  its	  costs.	  The	  main	  action,	  concerning	  a	  pulp	  mill	  to	  be	  built	  by	  the	  defendant,	  was	  to	  be	  
stayed	  until	  security	  for	  costs	  was	  given.	  The	  defendant	  had	  been	  issued	  with	  a	  permit	  on	  30	  
August	  2007,	  to	  build	  a	  pulp	  mill	  in	  Tasmania.	  Various	  pieces	  of	  special	  legislation	  enabled	  this	  
permit,	  with	  the	  permit	  expiring	  after	  four	  years	  from	  the	  date	  of	  issue	  (i.e.	  30	  August	  2011).	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The	  Trust,	  an	  association	  incorporated	  under	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1964	  (Tas)	  
(the	  Act),	  was	  established	  in	  1975	  with	  objects	  relating	  to	  environmental	  protection.	  It	  alleged	  
that	  the	  pulp	  mill	  project	  had	  not	  been	  substantially	  commenced	  by	  30	  August	  2011,	  and	  that	  
the	  dam	  works	  specified	  in	  the	  permit	  were	  not	  substantially	  completed	  by	  the	  due	  date.	  Thus,	  
its	  contention	  was	  that	  the	  permit	  granted	  on	  30	  August	  2007	  had	  expired.	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  an	  inherent	  power	  to	  provide	  for	  security	  for	  costs,	  and	  Rule	  828(1)(b)	  
of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  Rules	  2000	  (Tas)	  (the	  Rules)	  allows	  this	  power	  to	  extend	  to	  
‘corporations’.	  The	  first	  question	  was	  whether	  the	  plaintiff	  association	  was	  a	  corporation	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  Rule	  828(1)(b).	  	  
‘Corporation’	  is	  defined	  in	  the	  Rules	  as	  having	  the	  same	  meaning	  as	  in	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  
2001	  (Cth).	  There	  was	  no	  dispute	  that	  the	  Trust	  was	  a	  corporation	  within	  the	  meaning	  ascribed	  
to	  that	  word	  in	  the	  Corporations	  Act.	  However,	  the	  Trust	  contended	  that	  the	  definition	  in	  the	  
Corporations	  Act	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  it	  by	  virtue	  of	  section	  3	  of	  the	  Act.	  Section	  3	  of	  the	  Act	  
provides	  that	  an	  incorporated	  association	  is	  declared	  to	  be	  an	  excluded	  matter	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  section	  5F	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act.	  	  
However,	  His	  Honour	  said	  that	  this	  exclusion	  had	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  
‘corporation’	  because	  the	  Rules	  embraced	  the	  relevant	  meaning,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  
Corporations	  Act	  in	  other	  respects	  applied	  to	  incorporated	  associations.	  It	  followed	  that	  the	  
inherent	  power	  to	  make	  an	  order	  for	  security	  for	  costs	  against	  an	  incorporated	  association	  had	  
not	  been	  excluded.	  
His	  Honour	  also	  rejected	  the	  Trust’s	  contention	  that,	  as	  the	  defendant	  was	  not	  impecunious,	  
there	  should	  be	  no	  order	  for	  security	  of	  costs.	  In	  this	  respect,	  His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [12]):	  
It	  is	  clear...[that]	  the	  word	  ‘impecuniosity’,	  [is	  used]	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  person	  having	  
little	  or	  no	  money,	  but	  to	  describe	  a	  corporation	  which	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  pay	  the	  
defendant's	  costs.	  To	  require	  as	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  to	  the	  making	  of	  an	  order	  that	  a	  
plaintiff	  has	  little	  or	  no	  money	  would	  be	  to	  impose	  an	  impermissible	  fetter	  on	  the	  
inherent	  jurisdiction	  to	  do	  what	  is	  required	  by	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  matter.	  
The	  parties	  differed	  as	  to	  the	  probable	  cost	  of	  the	  trial.	  The	  defendant’s	  solicitors	  estimated	  
taxed	  costs	  at	  between	  $300,000	  and	  $400,000.	  Naturally,	  the	  Trust	  took	  a	  very	  different	  
position.	  His	  Honour	  concluded	  (at	  [29]):	  
Although	  I	  cannot	  estimate	  the	  defendant's	  likely	  party	  and	  party	  costs,	  I	  am	  
persuaded	  that	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  those	  costs	  will	  be	  in	  the	  order	  of	  
$300,000	  to	  $400,000.	  The	  case	  involves	  potentially	  highly	  complex	  factual	  and	  legal	  
issues.	  At	  stake	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  $2.3	  billion	  project	  can	  proceed.	  The	  defendant	  has	  
engaged	  senior	  counsel	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  $12,000	  per	  day.	  The	  defendant	  contemplates	  
calling	  many	  witnesses	  to	  present	  highly	  detailed	  evidence.	  This	  is	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  
the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  belief.	  	  
The	  Trust’s	  assets	  (about	  $43,000	  as	  at	  29	  February	  2012)	  and	  income	  are	  modest	  (it	  had	  a	  net	  
loss	  of	  between	  $3000	  and	  $4000	  in	  the	  2011	  financial	  year,	  likely	  to	  increase	  in	  the	  2012	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financial	  year).	  It	  had	  engaged	  a	  special	  team	  of	  lawyers	  to	  conduct	  the	  main	  litigation	  at	  a	  cost	  
capped	  at	  $15,000,	  and	  had	  pledges	  towards	  the	  litigation	  costs	  from	  donors	  of	  $107,000.	  It	  
also	  had	  a	  donor	  fund	  of	  $75,800	  which	  had	  been	  given	  some	  time	  ago	  and	  never	  used.	  His	  
Honour’s	  calculations	  were	  that	  the	  most	  that	  would	  be	  available	  for	  payment	  of	  the	  
defendant’s	  costs	  (perhaps	  $226,000)	  in	  the	  case	  would	  be	  far	  short	  of	  the	  estimated	  taxed	  
costs	  referred	  to	  above.	  
His	  Honour	  took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  Trust’s	  case	  was	  not	  lacking	  merit	  or	  weak,	  but	  it	  was	  
possible	  that	  there	  might	  be	  a	  costs	  order	  against	  it.	  The	  decision	  to	  make	  an	  order	  for	  security	  
for	  costs	  was	  a	  balancing	  exercise.	  Some	  of	  the	  matters	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  included:	  
• Success	  in	  the	  litigation	  would	  not	  result	  in	  a	  financial	  benefit	  to	  the	  plaintiff	  or	  others.	  
• The	  plaintiff	  was	  not	  litigating	  on	  behalf	  of	  others,	  but	  had	  brought	  the	  proceedings	  
pursuant	  to	  the	  specific	  objects	  contained	  in	  its	  constitution.	  
• The	  case	  was	  being	  pursued	  in	  furtherance	  of	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  having	  a	  binding	  
determination	  made	  as	  to	  whether	  authority	  for	  the	  project	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Pulp	  
Mill	  Permit	  still	  existed.	  
• The	  overall	  cost	  of	  the	  project	  was	  in	  the	  order	  of	  $2.3	  billion.	  It	  had	  expended	  about	  
$239,000,000	  so	  far	  on	  the	  project.	  The	  defendant	  estimated	  its	  party	  and	  party	  costs	  
to	  be	  between	  $300,000	  and	  $400,000.	  Even	  assuming	  that	  the	  defendant	  was	  left	  
with	  a	  shortfall	  of	  about	  $300,000	  in	  respect	  of	  its	  party	  and	  party	  costs,	  this	  was	  a	  tiny	  
proportion	  of	  the	  overall	  cost	  of	  the	  project.	  Proportionality	  was	  relevant.	  	  
His	  Honour	  said	  (at	  [46]–[50]):	  
Whether	  or	  not	  the	  power	  to	  provide	  for	  security	  for	  costs	  ought	  [to]	  be	  exercised	  
depends	  upon	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  matter.	  There	  are	  no	  rigid	  rules	  or	  practices	  to	  be	  
followed.	  I	  have	  found	  that	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  
pay	  the	  defendant's	  costs.	  The	  existence	  of	  this	  feature	  does	  not	  result	  in	  a	  
predisposition	  to	  order	  security	  for	  costs...It	  is	  nonetheless	  a	  factor	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  
account	  in	  considering	  whether	  an	  order	  ought	  [to]	  be	  made.	  Factors	  weighing	  against	  
an	  order	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  provide	  security	  for	  the	  defendant's	  costs	  include	  my	  
findings	  that	  the	  plaintiff's	  case	  has	  not	  been	  shown	  as	  lacking	  merit	  or	  weak;	  the	  
plaintiff	  is	  pursuing	  the	  case	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  not	  for	  financial	  benefit	  for	  itself	  
or	  others;	  the	  plaintiff	  has	  made	  financial	  arrangements	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  defendant's	  
costs...and	  finally,	  the	  defendant's	  costs	  represent	  only	  a	  tiny	  portion	  of	  the	  $2.3billion	  
estimated	  cost	  of	  the	  project.	  	  
His	  Honour	  concluded	  that,	  using	  a	  balancing	  exercise,	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  case	  did	  not	  require	  
that	  security	  for	  costs	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  Trust.	  Therefore,	  the	  defendant’s	  application	  for	  an	  
order	  for	  security	  for	  costs	  was	  dismissed.	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/tas/TASSC/2012/18.html	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Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
Costs	  are	  a	  major	  issue	  in	  litigation	  pursued	  by	  incorporated	  associations	  and	  other	  nonprofits,	  
even	  in	  ‘public	  interest’	  litigation.	  While	  costs	  are	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  court,	  in	  most	  cases,	  
costs	  follow	  the	  event,	  meaning	  that	  the	  party	  who	  wins	  also	  has	  their	  costs	  paid	  by	  the	  losing	  
party.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  parties’	  resources	  was	  very	  dissimilar.	  On	  the	  facts	  
presented,	  if	  there	  was	  a	  costs	  order	  against	  the	  Trust	  after	  the	  main	  litigation	  concluded,	  all	  
its	  resources	  (and	  more)	  would	  be	  drained,	  even	  though	  it	  had	  taken	  steps	  to	  restrict	  its	  own	  
costs.	  However,	  this	  was	  a	  matter	  His	  Honour	  was	  prepared	  to	  leave	  to	  the	  trial	  process.	  
	  
2.10.16  VICTORIA ORDER OF NURSES FOR CANADA V GREATER HAMILTON WELLNESS 
FOUNDATION [2012] ONSC 1527 (ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, 
BEAUDOIN J, 7 MARCH 2012) 
This	  Canadian	  case	  was	  an	  application	  for	  costs	  following	  successful	  litigation	  by	  the	  
applicants,	  the	  Victoria	  Order	  of	  Nurses	  for	  Canada	  (VON),	  in	  2011.	  The	  amount	  sought	  was	  
$454,686.19.	  The	  applicants	  asserted	  that	  they	  were	  entitled	  to	  an	  award	  of	  costs	  based	  on	  
Ontario’s	  substantial	  indemnity	  scale	  of	  costs	  for	  three	  reasons.	  
• First,	  they	  asserted	  that	  the	  Greater	  Hamilton	  Wellness	  Foundation	  (GHWF)	  conducted	  
itself	  throughout	  the	  proceeding	  by	  alleging	  that	  the	  applicants	  had	  engaged	  in	  
deceitful	  or	  dishonest	  behaviour,	  which	  was	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  applicants’	  honesty	  and	  
integrity.	  	  
• Second,	  the	  applicants	  served	  two	  Offers	  to	  Settle	  in	  this	  proceeding	  (which	  were	  
rejected),	  but	  obtained	  a	  better	  judgement	  against	  the	  respondent	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
case.	  
• Third,	  given	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  respondent	  and	  the	  Offers	  to	  Settle,	  the	  applicants	  
argued	  that	  an	  award	  of	  costs	  on	  a	  substantial	  indemnity	  scale	  was	  within	  the	  judge’s	  
discretion.	  
During	  and	  after	  the	  proceeding,	  the	  VON	  claimed	  that	  the	  GHWF	  made	  unsubstantiated	  and	  
unsuccessful	  allegations	  against	  them	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  VON	  had	  engaged	  in	  conduct	  
which	  was	  dishonest	  or	  deceitful.	  The	  GHWF	  claimed	  that	  the	  VON	  had	  seized	  or	  diverted	  
money	  which	  was	  used	  in	  a	  way	  which	  was	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  VON’s	  charitable	  purposes.	  In	  
particular,	  the	  GHWF	  alleged	  that	  the	  VON	  had	  diverted	  $6,500,000.00	  from	  the	  Hamilton	  
community	  and	  had	  misapplied	  that	  money	  to	  pay	  its	  own	  restructuring	  and	  reorganizations	  
costs.	  	  
The	  GHWF	  claimed	  that	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  were	  transferred	  to	  the	  VON	  from	  
2003	  to	  2007	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  its	  disbursement	  quota.	  The	  GHWF	  alleged	  that	  this	  money	  
was	  accumulated	  and	  in	  effect	  deliberately	  diverted	  away	  from	  charitable	  programs	  in	  
Hamilton	  or	  from	  the	  ‘expansion’	  of	  charitable	  programs	  in	  Hamilton.	  The	  VON	  pointed	  out	  
that	  the	  GHWF	  incorrectly	  claimed	  that	  it	  was	  never	  aware	  that	  there	  was	  an	  accumulation	  of	  
money	  in	  the	  VON’s	  deferred	  revenue	  account.	  In	  fact,	  the	  evidence	  demonstrated	  that	  the	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GHWF	  was	  aware	  that	  all	  deferred	  revenue	  was	  to	  be	  used	  to	  support	  the	  activities	  of	  VON	  
Hamilton.	  
In	  the	  main	  litigation,	  all	  the	  allegations	  of	  dishonesty	  were	  determined	  to	  be	  unfounded.	  
Moreover,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  there	  were	  numerous	  and	  serious	  breaches	  of	  fiduciary	  duty	  
by	  the	  GHWF.	  In	  this	  case,	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  making	  allegations	  of	  dishonesty	  was	  a	  ground	  
for	  awarding	  substantial	  indemnity	  costs.	  He	  said	  (at	  [19],	  [92]	  and	  [99]):	  	  
The	  cost	  sanction	  should	  be	  imposed	  sharply	  and	  firmly	  by	  the	  Courts,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  
at	  any	  stage	  in	  the	  proceedings	  when	  unsupported	  and	  unproven	  allegations	  of	  fraud	  
and	  dishonesty	  are	  put	  forward...	  I	  am	  satisfied	  that	  that	  the	  Applicants	  are	  entitled	  to	  
their	  costs	  on	  a	  substantial	  indemnity	  basis	  throughout	  these	  proceedings.	  I	  do	  so	  
primarily	  because	  of	  the	  Respondent's	  reckless	  and	  sustained	  allegations	  of	  dishonest	  
and	  deceitful	  behaviour	  against	  the	  Applicants;	  the	  Respondent's	  serious	  
misrepresentations	  of	  fact	  and	  the	  early	  Offer	  to	  Settle...	  
I	  find	  that	  the	  Respondent's	  continued	  attempts	  to	  justify	  its	  behaviour	  by	  making	  
reckless	  allegations	  against	  the	  Applicants	  to	  be	  deserving	  of	  condemnation...This	  was	  
more	  than	  misguided	  litigation.	  This	  was	  litigation	  that	  was	  prompted	  by	  a	  stubborn	  
refusal	  to	  consider	  a	  voluminous	  20-­‐year	  evidentiary	  record	  and	  the	  relevant	  law.	  This	  
was	  ‘malicious	  and	  counter-­‐productive’	  litigation	  that	  attacked	  the	  integrity	  of	  a	  
national	  non-­‐profit,	  registered	  charity	  that	  has	  existed	  since	  1899.	  The	  Respondent	  
was	  so	  focused	  in	  its	  animosity	  towards	  the	  Applicants	  that	  it...only	  hurt	  the	  very	  
community	  whose	  interests	  it	  was	  claiming	  to	  protect.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  my	  findings	  of	  
multiple	  breaches	  of	  fiduciary	  duties	  on	  its	  part	  and	  the	  part	  of	  its	  Directors,	  the	  
Foundation	  cannot	  seek	  immunity	  from	  costs	  as	  a	  public	  interest	  litigant.	  
The	  VON’s	  position	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  Public	  Guardian	  and	  Trustee	  of	  Ontario	  (PGT),	  which	  
also	  sought	  its	  costs.	  These	  were	  granted.	  In	  granting	  both	  sets	  of	  costs,	  His	  Honour	  took	  into	  
account	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  matter,	  the	  volume	  of	  evidence,	  the	  length	  of	  time	  involved,	  and	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  solicitors	  for	  the	  applicants	  had	  already	  discounted	  their	  costs.	  He	  saw	  ‘no	  
reason	  to	  discount	  them	  any	  further’	  (at	  [106]).	  In	  addressing	  these	  issues,	  His	  Honour	  said	  
that	  (at	  [103]):	  
The	  matter	  was	  factually	  complex	  as	  noted	  by	  both	  the	  Applicants	  and	  the	  PGT.	  There	  
was	  a	  lengthy	  history	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  examined	  and	  there	  were	  numerous	  volumes	  
of	  documents	  to	  be	  reviewed.	  There	  were	  no	  new	  issues	  of	  law	  that	  were	  decided	  but	  
the	  Application	  did	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  to	  summarize	  the	  legal	  principles	  that	  were	  
in	  play.	  The	  PGT	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  clarifying	  the	  law	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  a	  Foundation's	  
authority	  to	  amend	  its	  objects	  and	  has	  adjusted	  its	  claim	  for	  costs	  accordingly.	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  GHWF	  had	  to	  pay	  the	  costs	  ordered	  prompted	  His	  Honour	  to	  remark	  (at	  
[106]):	  
It	  is	  regrettable	  that	  funds	  raised	  to	  support	  community	  initiatives	  may	  now	  have	  to	  be	  
directed	  to	  the	  payment	  of	  legal	  fees.	  The	  Applicants	  did	  what	  they	  could	  to	  preserve	  
those	  assets	  and	  they	  should	  not	  have	  to	  bear	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  these	  proceedings.	  The	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  300	  
	  
Respondent	  has	  its	  own	  reckless	  and	  stubborn	  behaviour	  to	  blame.	  I	  note	  that	  the	  PGT	  
supports	  the	  Applicants'	  claim	  for	  costs	  as	  well	  as	  their	  request	  that	  these	  amounts	  be	  
paid	  out	  of	  the	  funds	  orders	  transferred	  from	  the	  Foundation,	  if	  necessary.	  
Thus,	  His	  Honour	  condemned	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  GHWF	  in	  strong	  terms,	  and	  awarded	  costs	  
against	  them.	  
This	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc1527/2012onsc1527.html	  
The	  original	  litigation	  from	  2011	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2011/2011onsc5684/2011onsc5684.html	  
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2011/2011onsc6801/2011onsc6801.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
This	  is	  another	  example	  of	  nonprofits	  becoming	  involved	  in	  complex	  litigation	  which	  resulted	  
in	  a	  negative	  outcome	  for	  one	  of	  them.	  The	  respondent	  nonprofit	  refused	  two	  offers	  to	  settle	  
during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  proceedings,	  and	  fought	  the	  case	  to	  the	  bitter	  end.	  There	  was	  
animosity,	  malice	  and	  bitterness	  noted	  by	  the	  court	  in	  the	  dealings	  of	  GHWF	  with	  the	  VON.	  His	  
Honour	  used	  unusually	  strong	  language	  to	  condemn	  their	  actions	  in	  this	  regard,	  noting	  that	  
money	  raised	  for	  doing	  good	  in	  the	  Hamilton	  (a	  city	  in	  Ontario)	  community	  would	  now	  have	  to	  
be	  directed	  to	  pay	  properly	  incurred	  legal	  fees.	  
	  
2.10.17  AUSTRALIAN VACCINATION NETWORK INC V HEALTH CARE COMPLAINTS 
COMMISSION [2012] NSWSC 110 (SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 
ADAMSON J, 24 FEBRUARY 2012) 
The	  plaintiff	  organisation	  (the	  AVN)	  is	  an	  incorporated	  association	  formed	  in	  Northern	  New	  
South	  Wales	  in	  1994	  to	  offer	  information	  and	  advice	  sceptical	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  vaccination.	  Its	  
main	  vehicle	  for	  dissemination	  of	  information	  is	  a	  website.	  In	  2009,	  two	  complaints	  were	  made	  
against	  the	  AVN	  to	  the	  defendant,	  the	  Health	  Care	  Complaints	  Commission	  (HCCC).	  These	  
complaints	  alleged	  misleading	  and	  deceptive	  conduct	  surrounding	  advice	  given	  about	  
vaccination.	  
The	  HCCC,	  after	  assessing	  the	  two	  complaints,	  decided	  to	  investigate	  them.	  The	  investigation	  
involved	  a	  review	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  plaintiff's	  website.	  After	  it	  had	  completed	  its	  
investigation,	  the	  HCCC	  released	  its	  final	  report	  on	  7	  July	  2010	  (the	  Investigation	  Report)	  in	  
which	  it	  made	  a	  recommendation	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  publish	  a	  disclaimer	  on	  its	  website.	  When	  
the	  plaintiff	  did	  not	  do	  so,	  the	  HCCC	  issued	  a	  public	  warning	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  plaintiff	  on	  26	  
July	  2010	  pursuant	  to	  s	  94A	  of	  the	  Health	  Care	  Complaints	  Act	  1993	  (Cth)	  (the	  Act).	  The	  public	  
warning	  stated:	  	  
The	  AVN’s	  failure	  to	  include	  a	  notice	  on	  its	  website	  of	  the	  nature	  recommended	  by	  the	  
Commission	  may	  result	  in	  members	  of	  the	  public	  making	  improperly	  informed	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decisions	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  vaccinate,	  and	  therefore	  poses	  a	  risk	  to	  public	  
health	  and	  safety.	  
The	  Investigation	  Report,	  its	  recommendation	  and	  the	  public	  warning	  were	  then	  relied	  upon	  
by	  the	  Minister	  for	  Gaming	  and	  Racing	  (the	  minister	  administering	  the	  Charitable	  Fund	  Raising	  
Act	  1991	  (NSW)	  (the	  Charitable	  Fundraising	  Act))	  to	  revoke	  the	  plaintiff's	  fundraising	  capacity.	  	  
In	  these	  proceedings	  the	  plaintiff	  sought	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  HCCC's	  investigation,	  the	  
Investigation	  Report,	  the	  recommendation	  and	  the	  public	  warning	  were	  ultra	  vires	  (beyond	  the	  
HCCC’s	  power)	  because	  neither	  of	  the	  complaints	  was	  a	  ‘complaint’	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
Act.	  The	  AVN	  also	  sought	  an	  order	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  certiorari	  quashing	  the	  HCCC's	  decision	  to	  
issue	  the	  public	  warning.	  The	  Minister	  for	  Gaming	  and	  Racing	  was	  originally	  named	  as	  the	  
second	  defendant,	  but	  on	  5	  July	  2011	  the	  plaintiff	  discontinued	  proceedings	  against	  him.	  	  
It	  was	  important	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  that	  the	  ‘complaints’	  were	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  
the	  Act.	  Section	  7	  of	  the	  Act	  provides:	  
(1)	  A	  complaint	  may	  be	  made	  under	  this	  Act	  concerning:	  	  
(a)	  the	  professional	  conduct	  of	  a	  health	  practitioner	  (including	  any	  alleged	  
breach	  by	  the	  health	  practitioner	  of	  Division	  3	  of	  Part	  2A	  of	  the	  Public	  Health	  
Act	  1991	  or	  of	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  prescribed	  under	  section	  10AM	  of	  that	  Act),	  
or	  	  
(b)	  a	  health	  service	  which	  affects	  the	  clinical	  management	  or	  care	  of	  an	  
individual	  client.	  	  
(2)	  A	  complaint	  may	  be	  made	  against	  a	  health	  service	  provider.	  	  
(3)	  A	  complaint	  may	  be	  made	  against	  a	  health	  service	  provider	  even	  though,	  at	  the	  
time	  the	  complaint	  is	  made,	  the	  health	  service	  provider	  is	  not	  qualified	  or	  entitled	  to	  
provide	  the	  health	  service	  concerned.	  
The	  AVN	  contended	  that	  the	  matters	  complained	  of	  were	  not	  within	  section	  7(1)(b)	  or	  7(2).	  
Although	  it	  admitted	  that	  is	  was	  a	  health	  service	  provider,	  it	  did	  not	  offer	  clinical	  advice	  to	  
individuals.	  The	  HCCC	  submitted	  that	  the	  information	  published	  on	  the	  AVN’s	  website	  had	  
affected	  the	  decisions	  of	  individuals	  on	  whether	  to	  vaccinate	  themselves	  or	  their	  children	  
against	  various	  diseases.	  
His	  Honour	  accepted	  that	  the	  complaints	  concerned	  a	  health	  service	  provided	  by	  a	  health	  
service	  provider.	  However,	  was	  there	  any	  causal	  connection	  between	  the	  advice	  given	  and	  any	  
individual?	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  section	  7(2)	  did	  not	  apply.	  Under	  section	  7(1)(b),	  the	  evidence	  
was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  any	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  website	  information	  and	  any	  
individual.	  Therefore,	  there	  was	  no	  basis	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  HCCC,	  and	  they	  were	  ultra	  vires.	  
That	  being	  so,	  the	  plaintiff	  was	  entitled	  to	  a	  declaration	  to	  that	  effect.	  
Was	  certiorari	  also	  available?	  Were	  the	  legal	  rights	  of	  the	  AVN	  affected	  by	  the	  HCCC’s	  
decision?	  The	  plaintiff	  argued	  that	  the	  public	  warning	  was	  a	  matter	  that	  the	  Minister	  for	  
Gaming	  was	  obliged	  to	  (and	  in	  fact	  did)	  take	  into	  account	  in	  determining	  whether	  to	  revoke	  
the	  plaintiff's	  authority	  to	  raise	  funds	  under	  the	  Charitable	  Fundraising	  Act.	  The	  AVN	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submitted	  that	  its	  legal	  rights	  had	  been	  affected	  and	  altered	  by	  the	  public	  warning	  which	  had	  
labelled	  the	  AVN	  a	  public	  health	  risk.	  It	  argued	  that	  the	  decision	  directly	  exposed	  it	  to	  ‘a	  new	  
hazard	  of	  an	  adverse	  exercise	  of	  public	  power,	  that	  of	  having	  its	  fundraising	  capacity	  revoked’	  
(at	  para	  [66]).	  	  
However,	  the	  plaintiff	  could	  not	  point	  to	  any	  provision	  in	  the	  Charitable	  Fundraising	  Act	  that	  
made	  the	  public	  warning	  a	  mandatory	  relevant	  consideration	  in	  the	  Minister's	  decision	  
whether	  to	  revoke	  the	  authority.	  Therefore,	  His	  Honour	  found	  that	  there	  was	  no	  basis	  on	  
which	  he	  could	  find	  that	  the	  Minister	  for	  Gaming	  was	  legally	  obliged	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  
public	  warning.	  In	  that	  situation,	  certiorari	  was	  not	  available.	  	  
The	  case	  may	  be	  viewed	  at:	  http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-­‐
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2012/110.html	  
Implications	  of	  this	  case	  
A	  plaintiff	  seeks	  certiorari	  when	  it	  wishes	  to	  have	  a	  decision	  by	  a	  government	  body	  quashed.	  In	  
this	  case,	  the	  decision	  in	  question	  was	  the	  decision	  by	  the	  HCCC	  to	  issue	  a	  public	  warning	  
about	  the	  AVN’s	  website	  information.	  This	  in	  turn	  caused	  the	  Minister	  for	  Gaming	  to	  withdraw	  
the	  association’s	  capacity	  for	  fundraising.	  His	  Honour	  held	  that	  the	  decision	  about	  the	  public	  
warning	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  legal	  rights	  of	  the	  association	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  was	  entitled	  to	  an	  
order	  quashing	  it.	  This	  was	  because	  the	  Minister	  for	  Gaming	  was	  not	  obliged	  to,	  though	  he	  did,	  
take	  the	  public	  warning	  into	  consideration	  in	  his	  decision.	  His	  Honour	  dealt	  with	  the	  matter	  of	  
the	  public	  warning	  in	  the	  declaration	  which	  he	  granted	  to	  the	  AVN.	  
  
	  	  





The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  the	  Commonwealth	  (federal)	  jurisdiction	  include:	  
• Corporations	  Act	  2001	  
• Corporations	  (Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander)	  Act	  2006	  
• Extension	  of	  Charitable	  Purpose	  Act	  2004	  
• Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1997	  
• Australian	  Charities	  And	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  Act	  2012	  
• Personal	  Liability	  for	  Corporate	  Fault	  Reform	  Act	  2012	  
In	  addition,	  many	  other	  federal	  laws	  apply	  to	  nonprofit	  organisations,	  such	  as	  those	  governing	  
employment	  of	  staff,	  anti-­‐discrimination,	  using	  digital	  communication,	  sending	  funds	  overseas	  
and	  being	  in	  receipt	  of	  government	  agency	  funding.	  
All	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  for	  the	  Commonwealth	  jurisdiction	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/	  
During	  2012,	  amendments	  were	  made	  to	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  by	  the	  Corporations	  
Amendment	  (Phoenixing	  and	  Other	  Measures)	  Act	  2012,	  the	  Corporations	  Amendment	  (Future	  
of	  Financial	  Advice)	  Act	  2012,	  the	  Corporations	  Legislation	  Amendment	  (Audit	  Enhancement)	  
Act	  2012,	  the	  Corporations	  Amendment	  (Proxy	  Voting)	  Act	  2012,	  the	  Corporations	  Legislation	  
Amendment	  (Financial	  Reporting	  Panel)	  Act	  2012,	  and	  the	  Corporation	  Legislation	  Amendment	  
(Derivative	  Transactions)	  Act	  2012.	  However,	  these	  amendments	  mainly	  affected	  listed	  
companies	  and	  the	  financial	  advice	  industry.	  
The	  main	  legislative	  developments	  affecting	  nonprofits	  for	  2012	  were	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  
Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  Act	  2012	  and	  Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐
for-­‐profits	  Commission	  (Consequential	  and	  Transitional)	  Act	  2012;	  and	  the	  Personal	  Liability	  for	  
Corporate	  Fault	  Reform	  Act	  2012.	  
AUSTRALIAN CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFITS COMMISSION ACT 2012 
Australia's	  first	  independent	  charities	  regulator,	  the	  Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  
Commission	  (ACNC)	  commenced	  operation	  on	  3	  December	  2012,	  following	  Royal	  Assent	  of	  the	  
Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  Act	  2012	  (the	  ACNC	  Act)	  and	  Australian	  
Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  (Consequential	  and	  Transitional)	  Act	  2012	  (the	  ACNC	  
(C&T)	  Act).	  	  
The	  ACNC	  deals	  only	  with	  the	  regulation	  of	  charities	  registered	  with	  it.	  Registration	  by	  charities	  
is	  voluntary,	  but	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  tax	  concessions,	  exemptions	  and	  other	  benefits.	  
At	  the	  commencement	  of	  the	  legislation,	  charities	  which	  were	  already	  endorsed	  for	  charity	  tax	  
concessions	  were	  automatically	  registered	  with	  the	  ACNC	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  ACNC	  
(C&T)	  Act.	  Health	  promotion	  charities	  and	  public	  benevolent	  institutions	  were	  also	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automatically	  registered	  if	  they	  were	  endorsed	  by	  the	  ATO	  for	  fringe	  benefits	  tax	  or	  as	  a	  
deductible	  gift	  recipient.	  Religious	  charities	  were	  treated	  differently	  depending	  on	  their	  
existing	  endorsement	  status:	  for	  details	  see	  www.acnc.gov.au.	  
The	  regulatory	  impact	  of	  the	  Act	  will	  be	  in	  the	  information	  gathering	  and	  reporting	  aspects	  of	  
the	  legislation.	  A	  standard	  information	  gathering	  form	  will	  be	  used	  to	  obtain	  information	  on	  
charities	  for	  the	  ACNC	  Register.	  The	  information	  gathered	  by	  the	  ACNC	  in	  both	  its	  registration	  
forms,	  and	  later,	  under	  the	  reporting	  obligations	  put	  in	  place,	  will	  facilitate	  a	  determination	  of	  
whether	  each	  charity	  is	  operating	  for	  its	  charitable	  purpose/s,	  and	  whether	  there	  are	  sound	  
financial	  and	  governance	  arrangements	  in	  place.	  
An	  organisation	  which	  registers	  with	  the	  ACNC	  has	  ongoing	  obligations	  under	  the	  Act	  to:	  
• notify	  changes	  to	  the	  organisation	  (such	  as	  changes	  to	  board	  membership	  or	  governing	  
rules)	  
• keep	  records	  (financial	  and	  operational,	  to	  ensure	  purposes	  and	  obligations	  are	  being	  
met)	  
• report	  annually	  (in	  2012–13	  only	  an	  annual	  report	  of	  activity	  will	  be	  required;	  from	  
2013–14	  some	  financial	  reporting	  will	  also	  be	  required)	  
• comply	  with	  governance	  and	  external	  conduct	  standards	  (these	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  in	  
place	  for	  1	  July	  2013)	  
Reporting	  obligations	  will	  be	  standardised	  over	  time	  to	  result	  in	  uniform	  reporting	  for	  charities	  
for	  the	  financial	  years	  ending	  on	  or	  after	  30	  June	  2014,	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  seek	  permission	  to	  
vary	  the	  end	  date	  of	  a	  charity’s	  financial	  year.	  Ultimately,	  this	  will	  mean	  that	  all	  charities,	  
whether	  companies	  limited	  by	  guarantee,	  incorporated	  associations,	  unincorporated	  bodies	  or	  
trusts	  will	  have	  to	  prepare	  similar	  financial	  reports,	  and	  undergo	  similar	  audit	  or	  review	  
processes.	  The	  proposed	  reporting	  system	  will	  consist	  of	  three	  tiers,	  which	  may	  mean	  that	  
some	  charities	  will	  have	  increased	  reporting	  obligations	  over	  time.	  
For	  a	  comprehensive	  guide	  to	  the	  Act,	  see:	  
http://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/About_ACNC/ACNC_leg/ACNC/Legal/ACNC_leg.aspx	  
PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT REFORM ACT 2012  
The	  Personal	  Liability	  for	  Corporate	  Fault	  Reform	  Act	  2012	  was	  assented	  to	  on	  10	  December	  
2012.	  The	  Act	  amended	  a	  number	  of	  Commonwealth	  Acts	  including	  (relevantly)	  the	  
Corporations	  Act	  2001,	  and	  the	  Corporations	  (Aboriginal	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islander)	  Act	  2006	  to	  
remove	  personal	  criminal	  liability	  of	  directors	  for	  corporate	  fault	  except	  where:	  
• the	  director	  or	  officer	  knew	  of	  the	  offence,	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  offence,	  or	  failed	  to	  
take	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  prevent	  the	  offence;	  
• the	  harm	  that	  the	  offence	  aims	  to	  prevent	  is	  of	  a	  serious	  nature	  (such	  as	  serious	  harm	  
to	  the	  national	  economy,	  effects	  on	  public	  health	  and	  safety,	  or	  exploitation	  of	  the	  
vulnerable);	  
• corporate	  penalties	  alone	  would	  be	  ineffective	  in	  preventing	  the	  conduct	  in	  question.	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The	  amendments	  to	  the	  various	  Acts	  include:	  
• removal	  of	  entire	  provisions;	  
• changes	  to	  provisions	  to	  apply	  civil	  rather	  than	  criminal	  liability;	  
• changes	  to	  provisions	  to	  remove	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  from	  defendants;	  
• changes	  to	  provisions	  to	  require	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  knowledge	  or	  involvement	  by	  the	  
director	  before	  liability	  is	  imposed.	  
This	  Act	  was	  passed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  Council	  of	  Australian	  Governments	  (COAG)	  process	  under	  
which	  both	  the	  Commonwealth	  and	  the	  States	  are	  obligated	  to	  amend	  legislation	  which	  affects	  
the	  criminal	  liability	  of	  directors	  of	  corporations	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  corporation	  having	  
committed	  an	  underlying	  offence.	  
Directors’	  liability	  reform	  was	  one	  of	  the	  27	  deregulation	  priorities	  decided	  under	  the	  National	  
Partnership	  Agreement	  to	  Deliver	  a	  Seamless	  National	  Economy,	  a	  project	  which	  has	  been	  
overseen	  by	  the	  COAG	  Reform	  Council	  through	  the	  Business	  Reform	  Council	  Working	  Group.	  
COAG	  developed	  an	  agreed	  set	  of	  principles	  and	  guidelines	  which	  required	  each	  Australian	  
jurisdiction	  to	  audit	  its	  legislation	  to	  comply	  with	  both	  principles	  and	  guidelines.	  
The	  COAG	  guidelines	  established	  a	  three	  tier	  system	  for	  justification	  of	  directors’	  liability	  for	  
criminal	  fault:	  
• Type	  1	  liability	  places	  the	  onus	  on	  the	  prosecution to	  prove	  that	  the	  director	  failed	  to	  
take	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  prevent	  the commission	  of	  the	  offence.	  This	  is	  the	  default	  
position	  unless	  Type	  2	  or	  3 liability	  can	  be	  justified	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis. 
• Type	  2	  liability	  deems	  the	  director	  liable	  for	  the	  corporation’s	  criminal conduct.	  
However,	  directors	  have	  a	  defence	  if	  they	  have	  taken	  reasonable steps	  to	  avoid	  the	  
contravention.	  While	  directors	  bear	  the	  onus	  of	  bringing evidence	  to	  show	  that	  they	  
did	  take	  reasonable	  steps,	  the	  prosecution	  is	  required	  to	  prove	  beyond	  reasonable	  
doubt	  that	  either	  those	  reasonable	  steps	  were	  not	  taken,	  or	  other	  steps	  should	  have	  
been	  taken. 
• Type	  3	  liability	  deems	  a	  director	  criminally	  liable	  for	  a	  corporate	  breach, thereby	  
reversing	  the	  onus	  of	  proof.	  This	  liability	  type	  requires	  directors	  to prove	  that	  they	  
exercised	  due	  diligence,	  were	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  influence	  the corporation’s	  conduct	  
or	  took	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  prevent	  the	  commission	  of the	  offence	  by	  the	  corporation.	  
Unlike	  Type	  2	  liability,	  the	  prosecution	  is	  not required	  to	  disprove	  the	  application	  of	  
the	  defence. 
Types	  2	  and	  3	  liability	  have	  been	  reserved	  for	  offences	  which create	  a	  risk	  of	  significant	  public	  
harm	  (to	  life,	  public	  health	  and	  the	  environment)	  or	  are	  considered	  essential	  to	  protect	  
Commonwealth	  or	  state	  government	  revenue	  collection.	  For	  example,	  in	  Queensland	  (under	  
the	  Directors’	  Liability	  Reform	  Amendment	  Bill	  2012),	  Types	  2	  and	  3	  liability	  will	  apply	  to	  
animal	  cruelty,	  child	  protection,	  fire	  and	  building	  safety,	  public	  health	  and safety	  (in	  areas	  
including	  nuclear	  facilities;	  water	  supply,	  waste	  services	  and	  disposal,	  food	  safety;	  pest	  
management	  and	  radiation	  sources),	  electricity	  generation	  and	  supply,	  transport	  of	  dangerous	  
goods,	  marine	  pollution,	  environmental	  and	  heritage	  protection,	  and	  unauthorised	  mining	  
activities.	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Individual	  State/Territory	  responses	  are	  outlined	  under	  ‘Directors’	  Liability’	  in	  relevant	  State	  or	  
Territory	  summaries	  below. 
NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME  
The	  National	  Disability	  Insurance	  Scheme	  Bill	  2012	  was	  introduced	  into	  parliament	  on	  29	  
November	  2012.	  The	  Bill	  creates	  the	  framework	  for	  a	  national	  scheme,	  including	  eligibility	  
criteria,	  age	  requirements,	  and	  what	  constitutes	  reasonable	  and	  necessary	  support.	  It	  
proposes	  to	  establish	  the	  NDIS	  Launch	  Transition	  Agency	  as	  an	  independent	  body,	  working	  
with	  people	  to	  identify	  their	  goals	  and	  aspirations,	  and	  providing	  them	  with	  the	  support	  they	  
need	  to	  help	  them	  reach	  their	  full	  potential.	  This	  Agency	  is	  to	  work	  with	  service	  providers	  and	  
other	  organisations	  to	  make	  sure	  people	  with	  disability	  can	  access	  the	  kind	  of	  care	  and	  support	  
they	  need	  to	  pursue	  their	  goals,	  including	  supporting	  carers	  in	  their	  important	  role.	  For	  details	  
on	  this	  legislation,	  see	  www.ndis.gov.au.	  
	  
3.2 NEW SOUTH WALES 
The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  New	  South	  Wales	  are:	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  2009	  	  
• Association	  Incorporation	  Regulation	  2010	  	  
• Charitable	  Fundraising	  Act	  1991	  
• Charitable	  Fundraising	  Regulation	  2008	  
• Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1993	  
• Cooperatives	  Act	  1992	  
• Lotteries	  and	  Art	  Unions	  Act	  1901	  
• Lotteries	  and	  Art	  Unions	  Regulation	  2007	  
All	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  for	  New	  South	  Wales	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/.	  
There	  were	  new	  regulations	  passed	  in	  2012	  for	  associations	  related	  matters,	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Amendment	  (Fees)	  Regulation	  2012,	  which	  introduced	  a	  new	  schedule	  of	  fees	  
for	  associations	  matters	  and	  commenced	  on	  1	  July	  2012,	  and	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  
Amendment	  (Unacceptable	  Names)	  Regulation	  2012.	  The	  latter	  Regulation	  added	  to	  Schedule	  
2	  of	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Regulation	  2010	  the	  following	  unacceptable	  name:	  ‘A	  name	  
that	  is	  likely	  to	  mislead	  the	  public	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  nature,	  objects	  or	  functions	  of	  an	  
association	  or	  proposed	  association	  or	  in	  any	  other	  respect’.	  This	  amendment	  commenced	  on	  
21	  December	  2012.	  
The	  Lotteries	  and	  Art	  Unions	  Amendment	  (Fees)	  Regulation	  2012	  introduced	  a	  new	  schedule	  of	  
fees	  for	  matters	  under	  that	  legislation,	  and	  commenced	  on	  1	  July	  2012.	  The	  Lotteries	  and	  Art	  
Unions	  Regulation	  2007	  which	  was	  due	  for	  repeal	  on	  1	  September	  2012	  under	  the	  Subordinate	  
Legislation	  Act	  1989,	  had	  its	  repeal	  postponed	  to	  1	  September	  2013	  by	  the	  Subordinate	  
Legislation	  (Postponement	  of	  Repeal)	  Order	  2012.	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DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY  
In	  line	  with	  the	  COAG	  process	  in	  other	  states,	  the	  Miscellaneous	  Act	  Amendment	  (Director’s	  
Liability)	  Bill	  2012	  passed	  both	  houses	  of	  parliament	  on	  20	  November	  2012,	  and	  was	  assented	  
to	  on	  26	  November	  2012.	  The	  Act	  is	  to	  commence	  by	  proclamation.	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  Acts	  
listed	  above	  is	  amended	  by	  the	  Bill.	  
COOPERATIVES NATIONAL LAW 
Another	  COAG	  process	  which	  commenced	  in	  2012	  was	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Cooperatives	  
National	  Law	  (CNL)	  for	  which	  New	  South	  Wales	  is	  the	  lead	  jurisdiction.	  The	  Cooperatives	  
(Adoption	  of	  National	  Law)	  Act	  2012	  was	  assented	  to	  on	  18	  May	  2012.	  The	  Act	  has	  not	  yet	  
commenced,	  but	  will	  do	  so	  when	  the	  Cooperatives	  National	  Regulations	  (CNR)	  have	  been	  
agreed	  to	  and	  introduced.	  Jurisdictions	  have	  until	  18	  May	  2014	  to	  secure	  proclamation	  of	  the	  
same	  law	  or	  alternative	  consistent	  law.	  
To	  date,	  New	  South	  Wales,	  Victoria,	  Queensland,	  Tasmania	  and	  the	  Australian	  Capital	  Territory	  
have	  agreed	  to	  adopt	  the	  CNL.	  South	  Australia,	  Western	  Australia,	  and	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  
have	  agreed	  to	  enact	  consistent	  legislation.	  
A	  key	  change	  under	  the	  CNL	  is	  simplification	  of	  financial	  reporting	  by	  small	  cooperatives.	  The	  
definition	  of	  a	  small	  cooperative	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  obligations	  for	  small	  cooperatives	  to	  report	  




3.3 VICTORIA  
The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  Victoria	  are:	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Reform	  Act	  2012	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Reform	  Regulations	  2012	  	  
• Charities	  Act	  1978	  
• Charities	  Regulations	  2005	  
• Cooperatives	  Act	  1996	  
• Fundraising	  Act	  1998	  
• Fundraising	  Regulations	  2009	  
• Gambling	  Regulation	  Act	  2003	  
• Gambling	  Regulation	  Regulations	  2005	  
All	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  for	  Victoria	  can	  be	  found	  at	  http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/	  	  
INCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 
In	  2009	  and	  2010	  the	  Victorian	  Government	  passed	  legislation	  which	  made	  a	  number	  of	  
changes	  to	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  (the	  old	  Act)	  -­‐	  the	  legislation	  that	  
previously	  regulated	  all	  incorporated	  associations	  in	  Victoria.	  The	  majority	  of	  these	  changes	  
never	  came	  into	  effect,	  instead	  many	  were	  deferred	  to	  reforms	  occurring	  in	  2012.	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In	  April	  2012,	  the	  Victorian	  Parliament	  passed	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Reform	  Act	  2012	  
(the	  new	  Act).	  This	  new	  Act	  incorporated	  the	  changes	  previously	  passed	  in	  2009	  and	  2010	  (in	  
addition	  to	  some	  further	  incidental	  changes)	  and	  consolidated	  them	  in	  a	  ‘re-­‐write'	  of	  the	  Act.	  	  
The	  new	  Act	  received	  Royal	  Assent	  on	  1	  May	  2012	  and	  commenced	  operation	  on	  26	  
November	  2012.	  A	  new	  set	  of	  Regulations	  and	  Model	  Rules	  also	  came	  into	  effect	  on	  this	  date.	  
Some	  of	  the	  key	  reforms	  introduced	  by	  the	  new	  Act	  include:	  
• revised	  annual	  reporting	  requirements	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  three-­‐tiered	  approach	  to	  
reporting,	  based	  on	  total	  revenue	  for	  the	  organisation’s	  financial	  year;	  
• new	  governance	  arrangements	  for	  incorporated	  associations,	  including	  a	  codification	  of	  
legal	  duties	  owed	  by	  office	  holders,	  modelled	  on	  directors’	  duties	  found	  in	  the	  
Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth);	  
• legislative	  defences	  and	  protections	  for	  office	  holders,	  including	  the	  business	  judgment	  
rule,	  a	  defence	  based	  on	  reasonable	  reliance	  on	  information	  or	  advice	  and	  a	  statutory	  right	  
to	  be	  indemnified	  against	  any	  liability	  incurred	  in	  good	  faith	  by	  an	  office	  holder	  on	  behalf	  
of	  the	  association	  in	  the	  course	  of	  performing	  his	  or	  her	  duties;	  
• abolition	  of	  the	  prohibition	  on	  trading,	  allowing	  associations	  to	  engage	  in	  trade	  or	  trading	  
activities	  consistent	  with	  their	  purposes,	  whilst	  maintaining	  the	  general	  prohibition	  on	  
securing	  pecuniary	  profits	  for	  members;	  	  
• references	  to	  ‘public	  officer’	  are	  replaced	  by	  the	  term	  ‘secretary’	  –	  in	  most	  cases,	  the	  
secretary	  will	  assume	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  public	  officer.	  The	  requirement	  that	  this	  
role	  be	  undertaken	  by	  a	  Victorian	  resident	  has	  also	  been	  removed	  (the	  secretary	  now	  must	  
be	  a	  resident	  of	  Australia);	  
• the	  ability	  for	  associations	  to	  hold	  committee	  and	  general	  meetings	  via	  new	  technology	  
(e.g.	  teleconference)	  provided	  that	  the	  technology	  allows	  meeting	  participants	  to	  ‘clearly	  
and	  simultaneously	  communicate	  with	  each	  other’;	  
• new	  matters	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  association,	  including	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
keeping	  of,	  and	  access	  to,	  minutes	  of	  meetings;	  and	  	  
• clarification	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  members	  and	  enhanced	  transparency	  on	  a	  member’s	  right	  of	  
access	  to	  information	  held	  by	  the	  association.	  
More	  information	  on	  the	  reforms	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  PilchConnect	  web	  portal	  (available	  at:	  
http://www.pilch.org.au/newlawsincassoc/).	  PilchConnect’s	  free	  monthly	  e-­‐bulletin	  (available	  
at:	  www.pilch.org.au/ebulletin/)	  provides	  updates	  of	  Victorian	  legislative	  changes	  and	  
proposed	  law	  reforms.	  To	  subscribe,	  go	  to	  www.pilch.org.au/subscribe.	  (More	  information	  
about	  PilchConnect	  appears	  under	  ‘Contributing	  Organisations’	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  Almanac.)	  
	  
3.4 QUEENSLAND 
The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  Queensland	  are:	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1981	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Regulation	  1999	  
• Collections	  Act	  1966	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• Collections	  Regulation	  2008	  
• Cooperatives	  Act	  1997	  
• Charitable	  Funds	  Act	  1958	  
• Charitable	  and	  Non-­‐Profit	  Gaming	  Act	  1999	  
• Charitable	  and	  Non-­‐Profit	  Gaming	  Regulation	  1999	  
All	  Queensland	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/Acts_SLs/Acts_SL.htm	  
The	  Charitable	  and	  Non-­‐Profit	  Gaming	  Act	  1999	  was	  amended	  by	  the	  Charitable	  and	  Non-­‐
Profit	  Gaming	  (Two-­‐Up)	  Amendment	  Act	  2012	  which	  was	  passed	  on	  14	  February	  2012.	  The	  
amendments	  were	  to	  sections	  6	  and	  11	  of	  the	  Act	  to	  include	  two-­‐up	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  an	  ‘art	  
union’	  and	  a	  ‘game’	  and	  to	  insert	  new	  Part	  8A	  into	  the	  Act.	  This	  Part	  deals	  with	  lawful	  two-­‐up	  
games	  to	  be	  played	  at	  RSL	  clubs	  and	  on	  designated	  days.	  The	  Dictionary	  in	  the	  Act	  was	  
amended	  to	  make	  designated	  days	  either	  Anzac	  Day	  or	  any	  other	  day	  that	  is	  ‘significant	  for	  the	  
remembrance	  of	  the	  sacrifice	  for	  the	  nation	  by	  the	  men	  and	  women	  of	  its	  defence	  force’.	  
There	  were	  no	  other	  material	  changes	  to	  the	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  Queensland.	  	  
DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY  
In	  line	  with	  the	  COAG	  process	  in	  other	  states,	  the	  Directors’	  Liability	  Reform	  Amendment	  Bill	  
2012	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  Queensland	  parliament	  on	  the	  28	  November	  2012.	  Of	  the	  Acts	  
listed	  above,	  the	  Charitable	  and	  Non-­‐Profit	  Gaming	  Act	  1999	  is	  amended	  by	  the	  Bill,	  at	  section	  
20.	  The	  Bill	  also	  amends	  the	  liability	  of	  members	  of	  a	  governing	  body	  of	  an	  association	  
(incorporated	  or	  unincorporated)	  under	  the	  Weapons	  Act	  1990.	  The	  Bill	  will	  insert	  a	  new	  
section	  162	  into	  the	  Weapons	  Act	  1990	  which	  makes	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  governing	  body	  of	  
such	  an	  association	  liable	  if	  the	  association	  commits	  an	  offence	  under	  the	  Act,	  unless	  there	  is	  
lack	  of	  knowledge	  or	  proper	  due	  diligence.	  
	  
3.5 WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  Western	  Australia	  are:	  	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1987	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Regulations	  1988	  	  
• Charitable	  Collections	  Act	  1946	  
• Charitable	  Collections	  Regulations	  1947	  
• Charitable	  Trusts	  Act	  1962	  
• Cooperatives	  Act	  2009	  
• Gaming	  and	  Wagering	  Commission	  Act	  1987	  
• Gaming	  And	  Wagering	  Commission	  Regulations1988	  
• Street	  Collections	  (Regulation)	  Act	  1940	  
• Street	  Collections	  Regulations	  1999	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All	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  for	  Western	  Australia	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/statutes.nsf/default.html	  
No	  material	  changes	  were	  made	  to	  this	  legislation	  during	  2012.	  The	  review	  of	  Western	  
Australia’s	  associations	  incorporation	  legislation,	  originally	  commenced	  with	  the	  Associations	  




3.6 SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  South	  Australia	  are:	  	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1985	  	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Regulations	  2008	  	  
• Collections	  for	  Charitable	  Purposes	  Act	  1939	  
• Cooperatives	  Act	  1997	  
• Gaming	  Machines	  Act	  1992	  
• Health	  Services	  Charitable	  Gifts	  Act	  2011	  
• Health	  Services	  Charitable	  Gifts	  Regulations	  2011	  
• Lottery	  and	  Gaming	  Act	  1936	  	  
• Lottery	  and	  Gaming	  Regulations	  2008	  
There	  were	  no	  material	  changes	  to	  any	  of	  the	  above	  legislation	  in	  South	  Australia	  during	  2012.	  




The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  Tasmania	  are:	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1964	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Regulations	  2007	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  (Model	  Rules)	  Regulations	  2007	  
• Collections	  for	  Charities	  Act	  2001	  
• Collections	  for	  Charities	  Regulations	  2011	  
• Cooperatives	  Act	  1999	  
• Gaming	  Control	  Act	  1993	  
• Gaming	  Control	  Regulations	  2004	  
All	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  for	  Tasmania	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
http://www.legislation.tas.gov.au/index.w3p.	  
There	  were	  no	  material	  changes	  to	  the	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  2012.	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DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY  
The	  Directors’	  Liability	  (Miscellaneous	  Amendments)	  Bill	  2012	  (Tas)	  is	  pending,	  having	  had	  its	  
first	  reading	  on	  11	  November	  2012.	  This	  Bill	  is	  a	  response	  to	  the	  COAG	  undertaking	  by	  States	  
to	  reform	  their	  legislation	  relating	  to	  directors’	  liability.	  However,	  the	  Tasmanian	  Bill	  does	  not	  
reference	  any	  of	  the	  above	  Acts.	  
	  
3.8 AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  the	  ACT	  are:	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Act	  1991	  
• Associations	  Incorporation	  Regulation	  1991	  
• Charitable	  Collections	  Act	  2003	  
• Charitable	  Collections	  Regulation	  2003	  
• Cooperatives	  Act	  2002	  
• Gaming	  Machine	  Act	  2004	  
• Gaming	  Machine	  Regulation	  2004	  
• Lotteries	  Act	  1964	  
• Unlawful	  Gambling	  Act	  2009	  
• Unlawful	  Gambling	  Regulation	  2010	  
All	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  for	  the	  ACT	  can	  be	  found	  at	  http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/	  	  
ASSOCIATIONS INCORPORATION ACT 1991 
This	  Act	  was	  amended	  by	  the	  Business	  Names	  Registration	  (Transition	  to	  Commonwealth)	  Act	  
2012.	  The	  amendment	  inserted	  section	  32(5)(ba)	  to	  reference	  a	  business	  name	  registered	  
under	  the	  Business	  Names	  Registration	  Act	  2011(Cth). 
GAMING MACHINE ACT 2004  
This	  Act	  was	  amended	  by	  the	  Gaming	  Machine	  Amendment	  Act	  2012	  which	  commenced	  on	  1	  
January	  2013	  (except	  for	  sections	  28	  and	  29).	  The	  amending	  Act	  makes	  substantial	  technical	  
amendments	  regarding	  the	  conditions	  for	  gaming	  licences	  in	  the	  ACT,	  including	  the	  use	  of	  
social	  impact	  statements	  in	  obtaining	  licence	  approval.	  The	  Gaming	  Machine	  Act	  2004	  was	  also	  
amended	  by	  the	  Business	  Names	  Registration	  (Transition	  to	  Commonwealth)	  Act	  2012	  to	  
substitute	  the	  section	  152	  (3)	  definition	  of	  registered	  business	  name	  to	  mean	  a	  business	  name	  
registered	  under	  the	  Business	  Names	  Registration	  Act	  2011	  (Cth).	  
DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY  
The	  Directors	  Liability	  Legislation	  Amendment	  Bill	  2012	  is	  pending,	  having	  had	  its	  first	  reading	  
on	  29	  November	  2012.	  Of	  the	  above	  Acts,	  only	  the	  Unlawful	  Gambling	  Act	  2009	  is	  affected	  by	  
the	  Bill,	  which	  will	  amend	  section	  34	  of	  that	  Act.	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3.9 NORTHERN TERRITORY 
The	  relevant	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  in	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  are:	  
• Associations	  Act	  	  
• Associations	  Regulations	  
• Associations	  (Model	  Constitution)	  Regulations\	  
• Cooperatives	  Act	  
• Gaming	  Control	  Act	  	  
• Gaming	  Control	  (Community	  Gaming)	  Regulations	  
• Gaming	  Machine	  Act	  
• Gaming	  Control	  (Gaming	  Machines)	  Regulations	  
• Gaming	  Machine	  Rules	  
All	  Acts	  and	  Regulations	  for	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  can	  be	  found	  at	  
http://www.dcm.nt.gov.au/strong_service_delivery/supporting_government/current_norther
n_territory_legislation_database.	  
There	  were	  no	  material	  changes	  to	  relevant	  legislation	  during	  2012.	  There	  were	  amendments	  
to	  the	  Gaming	  Control	  Act	  for	  revenue	  (fees	  and	  taxes)	  purposes	  only:	  see	  the	  Revenue	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4.0 ACCOUNTING AND 
AUDITING 
 
4.1 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ACCOUNTING AND 
AUDITING STANDARDS 
Stephen	  Marsden	  	  
INTRODUCTION 
The	  1st	  of	  January	  2013	  not	  only	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  year,	  but	  also	  a	  significant	  date	  
for	  preparers	  and	  auditors	  of	  financial	  statements,	  as	  no	  fewer	  than	  five	  Accounting	  Standards	  
revised	  by	  the	  Australian	  Accounting	  Standards	  Board	  (AASB)	  during	  2011	  become	  operative.	  
These	  are:	  
• AASB	  10	  Consolidated	  Financial	  Statements;	  
• AASB	  11	  Joint	  Arrangements;	  
• AASB	  12	  Disclosure	  of	  Interests	  in	  Other	  Entities;	  
• AASB	  13	  Fair	  Value	  Measurement;	  and	  
• AASB	  119	  Employee	  Benefits.	  
However,	  many	  of	  these	  standards	  do	  not	  have	  widespread	  application	  to	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  (NFP)	  
entities.	  For	  example,	  AASBs	  10,	  11	  and	  12	  only	  apply	  to	  entities	  with	  subsidiaries,	  joint	  
ventures	  or	  associates.	  As	  many	  NFPs	  (particularly	  small	  NFPs)	  do	  not	  have	  these	  investments,	  
their	  application	  is	  limited.	  AASB	  13,	  which	  also	  came	  into	  operation	  on	  1	  January	  2013,	  
provides	  a	  single	  source	  of	  authoritative	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  measure	  fair	  value.	  This	  standard	  
defines	  fair	  value,	  establishes	  a	  framework	  for	  measuring	  fair	  value	  and	  outlines	  required	  
disclosures.	  It	  embodies	  many	  of	  the	  fair	  valuation	  measurement	  techniques	  in	  other	  
Accounting	  Standards	  and	  in	  this	  respect,	  the	  standard	  merely	  formalises	  fair	  valuation	  
techniques	  already	  being	  applied.	  The	  amendments	  made	  to	  AASB	  119	  only	  affect	  those	  
entities	  with	  defined	  benefit	  plans	  in	  place.	  As	  most	  NFPs	  do	  not	  have	  defined	  benefit	  plans,	  
the	  changes	  made	  to	  this	  standard	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  affect	  many	  NFPs.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  changes	  made	  in	  September	  2011	  to	  AASB	  101	  Presentation	  of	  Financial	  
Statements	  have	  an	  operative	  date	  of	  1	  July	  2012.	  These	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  more	  impact	  on	  
those	  preparing	  and	  auditing	  financial	  statements	  for	  NFPs.	  For	  that	  reason,	  this	  paper	  will	  
focus	  on	  these	  changes	  as	  well	  as	  reviewing	  some	  significant	  disclosures	  required	  by	  AASB	  101.	  	  
The	  Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  (ACNC)	  came	  into	  existence	  on	  3	  
December	  2012.	  On	  17	  December	  2012,	  the	  Assistant	  Treasurer	  announced	  the	  release	  of	  
draft	  regulations	  and	  accompanying	  explanatory	  material	  outlining	  the	  proposed	  financial	  
reporting	  requirements	  applying	  to	  charities	  registered	  with	  the	  ACNC.	  This	  paper	  will	  
summarise	  the	  proposed	  financial	  reporting	  requirements	  for	  those	  registered	  entities	  
required	  to	  prepare	  and	  lodge	  their	  financial	  reports	  with	  the	  ACNC.	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APPLICATION OF AASB 101 PRESENTATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
According	  to	  paragraph	  Aus	  1.1,	  AASB	  101	  applies	  not	  only	  to	  those	  entities	  that	  prepare	  
general	  purpose	  financial	  statements	  but	  also	  to	  those	  entities	  (regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  
considered	  reporting	  or	  non-­‐reporting	  entities)	  required	  to	  prepare	  financial	  reports	  in	  
accordance	  with	  Part	  2M.3	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001.	  In	  fact,	  AASB	  101	  is	  only	  one	  of	  four	  
Accounting	  Standards	  that	  apply	  to	  both	  reporting	  and	  non-­‐reporting	  entities	  that	  must	  
prepare	  financial	  reports	  under	  Part	  2M.3.3	  For	  this	  reason,	  AASB	  101	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  
of	  the	  most	  important	  Accounting	  Standards	  of	  the	  53	  currently	  on	  issue.	  	  
Changes	  to	  AASB	  101	  
AASB	  101	  outlines	  the	  minimum	  requirements	  for	  the	  presentation	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  
financial	  statements	  as	  well	  as	  the	  minimum	  requirements	  for	  content.	  As	  already	  noted,	  
AASB	  101	  was	  amended	  in	  September	  2011.	  Apart	  from	  minor	  changes	  to	  terminology	  to	  
reflect	  changes	  to	  new	  and	  updated	  Accounting	  Standards	  issued	  since	  its	  last	  revision,	  the	  
most	  significant	  amendment	  was	  in	  the	  terminology	  of	  the	  titles	  of	  the	  financial	  statements.	  
Paragraph	  10	  has	  been	  revised	  such	  that	  from	  1	  July	  2012,	  the	  titles	  of	  the	  financial	  statements	  
are	  referred	  to	  as:	  
• a	  statement	  of	  profit	  or	  loss	  and	  other	  comprehensive	  income	  for	  the	  period;	  
• a	  statement	  of	  changes	  in	  equity	  for	  the	  period;	  
• a	  statement	  of	  cash	  flows	  for	  the	  period;	  
• notes	  to	  the	  accounts;	  and	  
• a	  statement	  of	  financial	  position.	  
However,	  despite	  these	  changes	  in	  terminology,	  paragraph	  10	  provides	  that	  an	  entity	  is	  not	  
obliged	  to	  use	  these	  titles	  and	  may	  choose	  to	  use	  any	  other	  titles	  that	  it	  considers	  appropriate.	  
Therefore,	  while	  the	  title,	  ‘statement	  of	  comprehensive	  income’	  has	  been	  replaced	  with	  
‘statement	  of	  profit	  or	  loss	  and	  other	  comprehensive	  income’,	  many	  NFPs	  may	  choose	  to	  
continue	  using	  titles	  such	  as	  ‘statement	  of	  financial	  performance’	  or	  ‘operating	  statement’	  
instead	  of	  the	  new	  title.	  	  
The	  option	  to	  present	  a	  one-­‐statement	  approach	  or	  a	  two-­‐statement	  approach	  has	  been	  
retained	  in	  the	  revised	  version	  of	  the	  standard	  (paragraph	  10A).	  This	  paragraph	  has	  effectively	  
combined	  the	  wording	  used	  in	  paragraphs	  12	  and	  81	  of	  the	  former	  AASB	  101,	  to	  reflect	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  July	  2005,	  ASIC	  released	  Regulatory	  Guide	  85,	  Reporting	  Requirements	  for	  Non-­‐Reporting	  Entities,	  
which	  outlined	  the	  reporting	  obligations	  of	  entities	  that	  are	  required	  to	  prepare	  and	  lodge	  audited	  
accounts	  with	  ASIC.	  In	  that	  10-­‐page	  document,	  ASIC	  confirms	  that	  the	  four	  Accounting	  Standards	  that	  
non-­‐reporting	  entities	  lodging	  special	  purpose	  financial	  statements	  must	  comply	  with	  are:	  
• AASB	  101	  Presentation	  of	  Financial	  Statements;	  
• AASB	  107	  Statement	  of	  Cash	  Flows;	  
• AASB	  108,	  Accounting	  Policies,	  Changes	  in	  Accounting	  Estimates	  and	  Errors;	  and	  
• AASB	  1048	  Interpretation	  of	  Standards.	  
The	  Regulatory	  Guide	  also	  advises	  that	  an	  entity	  must	  ensure	  it	  complies	  with	  as	  many	  other	  AASB	  
Accounting	  Standards	  as	  necessary	  so	  that	  the	  financial	  statements	  give	  a	  ‘true	  and	  fair’	  view.	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corresponding	  changes	  made	  by	  the	  International	  Accounting	  Standards	  Board	  (IASB)	  in	  their	  
revisions	  to	  IAS	  1	  Presentation	  of	  Financial	  Statements.	  	  
Disclosures	  Required	  under	  AASB	  101	  
It	  is	  also	  timely	  to	  remind	  preparers	  and	  auditors	  of	  some	  of	  the	  key	  disclosure	  requirements	  
under	  AASB	  101:	  
• to	  disclose	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  significant	  accounting	  policies	  applied	  by	  the	  entity	  
(paragraphs	  114(c)	  and	  117));	  
• to	  prepare	  financial	  statements	  on	  a	  going	  concern	  basis	  unless	  another	  measurement	  
basis	  is	  considered	  more	  appropriate,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  entity	  is	  required	  to	  disclose	  
this	  fact	  together	  with	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  it	  prepared	  the	  financial	  statements	  and	  the	  
reason	  why	  the	  entity	  is	  not	  regarded	  as	  a	  going	  concern	  (paragraph	  25);	  
• to	  apply	  the	  accrual	  basis	  of	  accounting,	  except	  for	  cash	  flow	  information	  (paragraph	  
27);	  
• to	  present	  each	  material	  class	  of	  similar	  items	  separately	  in	  the	  financial	  report	  
(paragraph	  29);	  
• not	  to	  offset	  assets	  and	  liabilities,	  or	  income	  and	  expenses	  unless	  required	  or	  
permitted	  by	  an	  Australian	  Accounting	  Standard	  (paragraph	  32);	  
• to	  identify	  the	  reporting	  period	  covered	  by	  the	  financial	  statement	  (paragraph	  36);	  
• to	  include	  comparative	  information	  (paragraph	  38);	  
• to	  use	  consistent	  presentation	  and	  classification	  from	  one	  reporting	  period	  to	  the	  next	  
(paragraph	  45);	  and	  
• to	  disclose	  the	  following	  information:	  
o the	  domicile	  and	  legal	  form	  of	  the	  entity,	  its	  country	  of	  incorporation	  and	  the	  
address	  of	  its	  registered	  office;	  	  
o a	  description	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  entity’s	  operations	  and	  its	  principal	  activities;	  	  
o the	  name	  of	  the	  parent	  and	  the	  ultimate	  parent	  of	  the	  group;	  and	  	  
o if	  it	  is	  a	  limited	  life	  entity,	  information	  regarding	  the	  length	  of	  its	  life.	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  AASB	  101	  disclosures,	  preparers	  and	  auditors	  should	  also	  be	  mindful	  of	  the	  
additional	  disclosure	  requirements	  under	  AASB	  1054	  Australian	  Additional	  Disclosures.	  
AASB	  1054	  was	  issued	  in	  May	  2011	  and	  prescribes	  additional	  Australia-­‐specific	  disclosure	  
requirements.	  For	  example,	  it	  requires	  disclosure	  of	  the	  following:	  
• the	  statutory	  basis	  or	  other	  reporting	  framework,	  if	  any,	  under	  which	  the	  financial	  
statements	  were	  prepared	  (paragraph	  8(a));	  
• whether	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  preparing	  the	  financial	  statements,	  the	  entity	  is	  a	  for-­‐
profit	  or	  a	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  entity	  (paragraph	  8(b));	  and	  
• whether	  the	  financial	  statements	  are	  general	  purpose	  financial	  statements	  or	  special	  
purpose	  financial	  statements	  (paragraph	  9).	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  paragraph	  114(a)	  of	  AASB	  101	  requires	  entities	  to	  make	  a	  
statement	  of	  compliance	  with	  Australian	  Accounting	  Standards.	  (Paragraph	  16	  requires	  an	  
entity	  also	  to	  make	  an	  unreserved	  statement	  of	  compliance	  with	  IFRS.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	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apply	  to	  NFPs,	  because	  of	  the	  addition	  of	  Australian	  requirements	  specifically	  for	  NFPs	  (as	  
identified	  by	  the	  prefix	  ‘Aus’	  in	  various	  AASB	  Accounting	  Standards).	  This	  is	  confirmed	  in	  
paragraph	  Aus	  16.3	  of	  AASB	  101.)	  
FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE ACNC FRAMEWORK 
The	  proposed	  financial	  reporting	  requirements	  for	  entities	  registered	  with	  the	  ACNC	  comprise	  
a	  tier-­‐based	  reporting	  framework	  with	  three	  tiers:	  
• small	  –	  defined	  as	  an	  entity	  with	  an	  annual	  turnover	  of	  less	  than	  $250,000;	  
• medium	  –	  defined	  as	  an	  entity	  with	  an	  annual	  turnover	  of	  $250,000	  or	  more,	  but	  less	  
than	  $1	  million;	  and	  
• large	  –	  defined	  as	  an	  entity	  with	  an	  annual	  turnover	  of	  $1	  million	  or	  more.	  
These	  revenue	  thresholds	  mirror	  the	  existing	  thresholds	  that	  apply	  to	  companies	  limited	  by	  
guarantee	  (CLGs)	  under	  section	  45B	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act.	  Under	  the	  draft	  regulations,	  small	  
registered	  entities	  will	  not	  be	  required	  to	  lodge	  an	  annual	  financial	  report	  with	  the	  ACNC.	  
Medium	  registered	  entities	  will	  be	  required	  to	  lodge	  an	  annual	  financial	  report,	  however,	  
these	  entities	  can	  elect	  to	  have	  their	  financial	  report	  reviewed	  rather	  than	  audited.	  Large	  
registered	  entities	  will	  be	  required	  to	  lodge	  an	  audited	  annual	  financial	  report	  with	  the	  ACNC.4	  
For	  medium	  and	  large	  registered	  entities,	  the	  first	  financial	  report	  will	  not	  be	  due	  for	  
lodgement	  until	  31	  December	  2014.	  	  
For	  medium	  and	  large	  registered	  entities,	  the	  annual	  financial	  report	  comprises	  the	  following	  
documents:	  
• the	  financial	  statements;	  
• the	  notes	  to	  the	  financial	  statements;	  and	  
• the	  declaration	  made	  by	  the	  ‘responsible	  entities’5	  about	  the	  financial	  statements	  and	  
the	  notes.	  
These	  requirements	  mirror	  the	  lodgement	  requirement	  for	  companies	  under	  section	  295(1)	  of	  
the	  Corporations	  Act.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  financial	  reporting	  requirements,	  the	  draft	  regulations	  do	  
not	  propose	  altering	  the	  current	  reporting	  guidelines	  for	  both	  reporting	  and	  non-­‐reporting	  
entities	  already	  in	  place.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  an	  entity	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  reporting	  entity,	  it	  will	  
continue	  to	  prepare	  and	  lodge	  general	  purpose	  financial	  statements	  with	  the	  ACNC.	  
Conversely,	  if	  the	  entity	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  non-­‐reporting	  entity,	  it	  will	  be	  required	  to	  prepare	  
and	  lodge	  special	  purpose	  financial	  statements	  with	  the	  ACNC.	  However,	  in	  doing	  so,	  non-­‐
reporting	  entities	  are	  required	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  financial	  reporting	  requirements	  outlined	  in	  
ASIC’s	  Regulatory	  Guide	  85.	  	  
The	  ‘financial	  statements’	  are	  defined	  as	  those	  required	  to	  be	  prepared	  by	  the	  AASB	  
Accounting	  Standards.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  revised	  AASB	  101,	  the	  financial	  
statements	  comprise:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  All	  levels	  of	  registered	  entity	  will	  have	  to	  lodge	  an	  Annual	  Information	  Statement.	  
5	  ‘Responsible	  entity’	  is	  defined	  by	  section	  205-­‐30	  of	  the	  Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  
Commission	  Act	  2012	  and	  includes	  e.g.	  directors	  of	  a	  company,	  or	  trustees	  of	  a	  trust.	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• a	  statement	  of	  profit	  or	  loss	  and	  other	  comprehensive	  income	  for	  the	  period;	  
• a	  statement	  of	  changes	  in	  equity	  for	  the	  period;	  
• a	  statement	  of	  cash	  flows	  for	  the	  period;	  
• notes	  to	  the	  accounts;	  and	  
• a	  statement	  of	  financial	  position.	  
These	  financial	  statements	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  AASB	  Accounting	  Standards	  and	  must	  be	  
drawn	  up	  to	  give	  a	  ‘true	  and	  fair’	  view	  of	  the	  financial	  position	  and	  performance	  of	  the	  
registered	  entity.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  sections	  296	  and	  297	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act.	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  responsible	  entities’	  declaration,	  the	  regulations	  require	  the	  responsible	  
entities	  of	  the	  registered	  entity	  (e.g.	  the	  directors,	  members	  of	  the	  management	  committee,	  
trustees	  etc.)	  to	  provide	  a	  declaration	  stating:	  
• whether,	  in	  their	  opinion,	  there	  are	  reasonable	  grounds	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  registered	  
entity	  is	  able	  to	  pay	  all	  of	  its	  debts,	  as	  and	  when	  they	  become	  due	  and	  payable;	  and	  	  
• whether,	  in	  their	  opinion,	  the	  financial	  statements	  and	  notes	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  
of	  the	  Act.	  	  
This	  declaration	  must	  be	  signed	  by	  a	  responsible	  entity	  that	  is	  authorised	  to	  do	  so	  and	  be	  
attached	  to	  the	  financial	  statements	  and	  notes	  to	  the	  accounts.	  Once	  again,	  this	  requirement	  
is	  virtually	  identical	  to	  the	  Directors’	  Declaration	  under	  section	  295(4)	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act.	  	  
Lodgement	  of	  Annual	  Information	  Statement	  for	  all	  Registered	  Charities	  
The	  only	  ACNC	  reporting	  obligation	  that	  all	  registered	  charities	  will	  have	  for	  2012–13	  is	  the	  
requirement	  to	  submit	  an	  annual	  information	  statement	  (AIS).	  The	  first	  AIS	  for	  all	  charities	  
(small,	  medium	  and	  large)	  will	  only	  contain	  basic	  non-­‐financial	  information	  about	  their	  
operations	  for	  the	  2012–13	  reporting	  period	  –	  such	  as	  the	  numbers	  of	  volunteers	  and	  staff,	  
type	  of	  clients	  benefited	  and	  progress	  towards	  achieving	  purposes.	  The	  charity’s	  AIS	  will	  be	  
due	  within	  six	  months	  of	  the	  end	  of	  its	  reporting	  period.	  
For	  2013–14,	  all	  ACNC-­‐registered	  charities	  must	  submit	  an	  AIS	  that	  includes	  information	  about	  
a	  charity’s	  operations	  and	  finances.	  Unlike	  the	  2012–13	  statement,	  statements	  from	  2013–14	  
onwards	  are	  expected	  to	  require	  basic	  financial	  information	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐financial	  
information.	  The	  contents	  of	  the	  2013–14	  AIS	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  finalised.	  	  
Submissions	  and	  comments	  about	  the	  draft	  regulations	  can	  be	  made	  to	  the	  public	  consultation	  
until	  the	  closing	  date,	  Friday	  15	  February	  2013.	  It	  will	  be	  noted	  from	  the	  above	  discussion	  that	  
the	  proposed	  financial	  reporting	  guidelines	  for	  ACNC-­‐registered	  entities	  are	  virtually	  identical	  
to	  the	  existing	  financial	  reporting	  obligations	  under	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001.	  In	  this	  regard,	  
the	  new	  framework	  does	  not	  make	  any	  significant	  change	  to	  the	  existing	  financial	  reporting	  
rules	  for	  those	  entities	  currently	  reporting	  under	  Part	  2M.3	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act.	  For	  this	  
reason,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  we	  will	  witness	  any	  changes	  in	  the	  draft	  regulations	  when	  they	  are	  
passed	  into	  law.	  However,	  until	  finalised,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  be	  certain.	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4.2 FRINGE BENEFITS TAX 
John	  McIntosh	  
In	  2012,	  the	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  (NFP)	  sector	  was	  subjected	  to	  another	  year	  of	  consultation	  on	  a	  raft	  
of	  reforms	  affecting	  the	  sector.	  Possibly	  due	  to	  this,	  there	  were	  few	  fringe	  benefits	  tax	  (FBT)	  
changes	  specific	  to	  the	  sector	  during	  the	  year.	  
The	  major	  FBT	  change	  impacting	  the	  NFP	  sector	  came	  in	  an	  announcement	  contained	  in	  the	  
federal	  government’s	  Mid-­‐Year	  Economic	  and	  Fiscal	  Outlook	  2012-­‐13	  (MYEFO).	  
SALARY SACRIFICED ‘IN-HOUSE’ FRINGE BENEFITS 
The	  MYEFO	  announcement	  included	  a	  proposed	  measure	  that	  affects	  salary	  sacrifice	  
arrangements	  where	  an	  employee	  receives	  in-­‐house	  fringe	  benefits	  as	  a	  component	  of	  that	  
salary	  sacrifice	  arrangement.	  Specifically	  the	  measure	  will	  affect	  all	  new	  salary	  sacrifice	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arrangements	  entered	  into	  from	  22	  October	  2012.	  For	  arrangements	  already	  in	  place	  prior	  to	  
that	  date,	  a	  transitional	  period	  will	  apply	  and	  the	  measure	  will	  take	  effect	  from	  1	  April	  2014.	  
How	  will	  the	  measure	  operate?	  
Currently	  when	  an	  employee	  receives	  an	  in-­‐house	  fringe	  benefit,	  the	  taxable	  value	  of	  the	  
benefit	  is	  75%	  of	  either	  the	  lowest	  price	  at	  which	  an	  identical	  benefit	  is	  sold	  to	  the	  public	  or	  
the	  lowest	  price	  under	  an	  arm’s	  length	  transaction	  (depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  benefit).	  The	  
taxable	  value	  of	  the	  benefit	  is	  then	  reduced	  further	  by	  $1,000.	  
The	  proposed	  MYEFO	  announced	  measure	  removes	  both	  the	  25%	  concession	  and	  $1,000	  
reduction.	  Accordingly,	  in-­‐house	  fringe	  benefits	  obtained	  as	  a	  result	  of	  entering	  into	  a	  salary	  
sacrifice	  arrangement	  will	  be	  valued	  as	  either	  the	  lowest	  price	  an	  identical	  benefit	  is	  sold	  to	  
the	  public	  or	  the	  lowest	  price	  under	  an	  arm’s	  length	  transaction	  (depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  the	  
benefit).	  
Who	  will	  be	  affected?	  
The	  proposed	  measure	  will	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  value	  of	  fringe	  benefits	  provided	  
to	  teachers	  operating	  in	  the	  education	  sector	  who	  salary	  sacrifice	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  
remuneration	  to	  pay	  school	  fees	  for	  their	  children	  to	  attend	  the	  school	  at	  which	  they	  are	  
employed.	  	  
The	  NFP	  child	  care	  sector	  will	  also	  be	  affected	  by	  this	  measure	  for	  the	  same	  reason,	  although	  
possibly	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent.	  
What	  is	  the	  status	  of	  the	  measure?	  
The	  measure	  is	  contained	  in	  Schedule	  7	  of	  the	  Tax	  Laws	  Amendment	  (2012	  Measures	  No.	  6)	  
Bill	  2012).	  The	  Bill	  was	  referred	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  
Economics	  on	  29	  November	  2012	  and	  their	  report	  on	  the	  Bill	  was	  released	  on	  11	  February	  
2013.	  Currently	  (April	  2013)	  the	  Bill	  is	  still	  waiting	  passage	  through	  the	  Senate.	  	  
NOT-FOR-PROFIT SECTOR TAX CONCESSION WORKING GROUP CONSULTATION 
In	  February	  2012	  the	  Not-­‐for-­‐Profit	  Sector	  Tax	  Concession	  Working	  Group	  (‘the	  Working	  
Group’)	  was	  formed	  and	  tasked	  to	  consider	  and	  consult	  on	  a	  range	  of	  ideas	  about	  how	  to	  
deliver	  support	  via	  the	  tax	  concession	  framework	  more	  effectively	  to	  the	  NFP	  sector.	  
The	  Working	  Group	  released	  a	  Discussion	  Paper	  in	  November	  2012,	  in	  advance	  of	  their	  final	  
report	  to	  the	  federal	  government	  which	  is	  due	  in	  2013.	  The	  Discussion	  Paper	  covered	  a	  range	  
of	  tax	  concessions	  provided	  to	  the	  sector,	  including	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  FBT	  issues	  the	  
Working	  Group	  were	  considering.	  Eight	  different	  FBT	  options	  were	  canvassed	  and	  the	  Working	  
Group	  requested	  feedback	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  options	  presented.	  	  
The	  reform	  options	  ranged	  from	  tinkering	  around	  the	  edges	  of	  the	  FBT	  regime	  through	  to	  
radical,	  wholesale	  changes	  to	  the	  FBT	  landscape	  as	  it	  affects	  the	  NFP	  sector.	  The	  options	  
identified	  can	  be	  grouped	  into	  three	  areas:	  
• The	  first	  area	  related	  to	  whether	  the	  list	  of	  entities	  eligible	  for	  either	  an	  FBT	  exemption	  
or	  rebate	  should	  be	  revised.	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• The	  second	  area	  related	  to	  short	  term	  options	  and	  these	  included	  alternatives	  such	  as	  
bringing	  meal	  entertainment	  and	  entertainment	  facility	  leasing	  fringe	  benefits	  within	  
relevant	  FBT	  caps,	  how	  this	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  achieved,	  the	  associated	  
appropriateness	  of	  current	  FBT	  cap	  limits	  and	  whether	  individuals	  should	  have	  access	  
to	  FBT	  caps	  from	  more	  than	  one	  employer	  at	  any	  one	  time.	  	  
• The	  third	  set	  of	  options	  addressed	  longer	  term	  reforms,	  including	  whether	  or	  not	  FBT	  
concessions	  can	  be	  replaced	  with	  some	  other	  means	  of	  government	  assistance.	  	  	  
The	  Working	  Group	  was	  also	  required	  to	  present	  any	  proposals	  in	  line	  with	  a	  restriction,	  across	  
the	  board,	  that	  proposals	  had	  to	  be	  revenue	  neutral.	  The	  impacts	  of	  the	  revenue	  neutral	  
restriction	  will	  certainly	  make	  the	  Working	  Group’s	  final	  report	  an	  interesting	  read.	  	  
The	  sector	  will	  be	  waiting	  with	  baited	  breath	  to	  see	  the	  federal	  government’s	  response	  to	  the	  
Working	  Group’s	  report.	  There	  is	  a	  good	  chance	  we	  will	  see	  a	  number	  of	  announcements	  in	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5.0 SPECIAL ISSUES 
 
5.1 WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY LAWS: MODEL WORK 
HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT 
Frances	  Hannah,	  The	  Australian	  Centre	  for	  Philanthropy	  and	  Nonprofit	  Studies	  
A	  process	  of	  harmonisation	  of	  occupational	  health	  and	  safety	  laws	  across	  Australia	  was	  
intended	  to	  be	  in	  place	  by	  1	  January	  2012.	  The	  Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Act	  2011	  (Cth)	  (WHS	  
Act)	  was	  to	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  WHS	  Acts	  enacted	  across	  Australia	  to	  harmonise	  work	  health	  
and	  safety	  law	  in	  all	  jurisdictions.	  However,	  not	  all	  state	  and	  territory	  jurisdictions	  have	  yet	  
passed	  the	  new	  legislation.	  The	  table	  below	  sets	  out	  the	  present	  position:	  
Current	  status	  of	  Model	  WHS	  Act	  harmonisation	  in	  Australian	  jurisdictions	  (as	  at	  1	  January	  
2013)	  
Commonwealth	   Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Act	  2011	  –	  this	  was	  the	  model	  law	  for	  the	  
states	  to	  follow	  
NSW	   Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Act	  2011	  
Queensland	   Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Act	  2011	  
NT	   Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  (National	  Uniform	  Legislation)	  Act	  2011	  
ACT	   Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Act	  2011	  
South	  Australia	  	   Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Act	  2012	  
Tasmania	   Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Act	  2012	  
Western	  Australia	   Western	  Australia	  has	  not	  announced	  any	  commitment	  to	  introduce	  
harmonised	  WHS	  laws	  
Victoria	   The	  Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Bill	  was	  initially	  expected	  to	  be	  
introduced	  by	  the	  Victorian	  Government	  by	  1	  January	  2012.	  
Following	  the	  election	  of	  the	  current	  Victorian	  Government,	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  Bill	  was	  deferred	  pending	  a	  review	  of	  the	  
legislation.	  	  
	  	  
As	  a	  part	  of	  the	  2012	  State	  Budget,	  the	  Government	  announced	  that	  
Victoria	  will	  not	  sign	  up	  to	  the	  current	  proposal	  for	  harmonised	  
legislation	  for	  occupational	  health	  and	  safety.	  Therefore	  the	  national	  
work	  health	  and	  safety	  laws	  have	  not	  been	  implemented	  in	  Victoria.	  	  
The	  Commonwealth	  has	  also	  published	  the	  Australian	  Work	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Strategy	  2012-­‐
2022	  (the	  Australian	  Strategy),	  which	  provides	  a	  10	  year	  framework	  to	  continue	  to	  drive	  
improvements	  in	  workplace	  health	  and	  safety	  in	  Australia.	  This	  provides	  a	  list	  of	  priority	  
industries	  and	  injuries	  which	  will	  be	  targeted	  over	  the	  coming	  years.	  A	  review	  in	  2017	  is	  part	  of	  
the	  process.	  
The	  duties	  and	  obligations	  under	  the	  harmonised	  WHS	  law	  are	  placed	  on	  ‘persons	  conducting	  
a	  business	  or	  undertaking’	  (PCBU).	  A	  PCBU	  may	  be	  a	  corporation,	  a	  partnership,	  an	  
unincorporated	  or	  incorporated	  association,	  a	  self-­‐employed	  person,	  a	  sole	  trader	  or	  the	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Crown.	  Some	  volunteer	  organisations,	  such	  as	  those	  that	  run	  retail	  businesses	  for	  example,	  
may	  also	  be	  PCBUs.	  PCBUs	  owe	  duties	  to	  all	  workers,	  including	  volunteers.	  
The	  model	  legislation	  differentiates	  between	  volunteer	  organisations	  and	  volunteer	  
associations.	  Volunteer	  organisations	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  Act.	  Volunteer	  associations	  are	  exempt	  
under	  the	  Act	  because	  section	  5(7)	  excludes	  ‘volunteer	  associations’	  from	  PCBU	  duties	  and	  
obligations.	  However,	  volunteer	  associations	  are	  only	  excluded	  from	  duties	  and	  obligations	  
under	  the	  legislation	  if	  they	  have	  one	  or	  more	  ‘community	  purposes’	  and	  they	  do	  not	  have	  any	  
employees	  carrying	  out	  work	  for	  the	  association	  (section	  5(8)).	  The	  term	  ‘community	  
purposes’	  is	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  legislation	  but	  is	  intended	  to	  cover	  purposes	  including:	  
• philanthropic	  or	  benevolent	  purposes,	  including	  the	  promotion	  of	  art,	  culture,	  science,	  
religion,	  education,	  medicine	  or	  charity,	  and	  
• sporting	  or	  recreational	  purposes,	  including	  the	  benefiting	  of	  sporting	  or	  recreational	  
clubs	  or	  associations.	  
In	  relation	  to	  employees,	  hiring	  an	  independent	  contractor	  (e.g.	  to	  audit	  accounts,	  or	  to	  drive	  a	  
bus	  on	  a	  day	  trip	  etc)	  should	  not	  alter	  a	  volunteer	  association’s	  exempt	  status	  under	  the	  
exemption	  provision.	  However,	  volunteer	  associations	  that	  do	  have	  one	  or	  more	  employees	  
owe	  duties	  and	  obligations	  to	  those	  employees,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  any	  volunteers	  who	  carry	  out	  
work	  for	  the	  association.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  even	  where	  the	  work	  health	  and	  safety	  laws	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  
volunteers	  (because	  they	  are	  volunteering	  for	  a	  ‘volunteer	  association’	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  Act),	  
the	  general	  law	  duties	  (not	  those	  contained	  in	  statutes)	  of	  volunteer	  organisations	  to	  
volunteers	  are	  well-­‐established.	  Australian	  courts	  have	  long	  recognised	  that	  volunteers	  are	  
owed	  a	  general	  duty	  of	  care	  by	  the	  people	  and	  the	  organisations	  they	  support,	  so	  that	  
organisations	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  claims	  for	  negligence	  under	  the	  general	  law.	  	  




5.2 CONSOLIDATION OF COMMONWEALTH ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
Frances	  Hannah,	  The	  Australian	  Centre	  for	  Philanthropy	  and	  Nonprofit	  Studies	  
Commonwealth	  anti-­‐discrimination	  law	  is	  currently	  found	  chiefly	  in	  four	  separate	  Acts,	  each	  of	  
which	  deals	  with	  a	  different	  ground	  of	  discrimination:	  	  
• Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  1975	  (RDA)	  
• Sex	  Discrimination	  Act	  1984	  (SDA)	  	  
• Disability	  Discrimination	  Act	  1992	  (DDA)	  
• Age	  Discrimination	  Act	  2004	  (ADA)	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In	  November	  2012,	  the	  Commonwealth	  Attorney-­‐General	  released	  an	  exposure	  draft	  of	  the	  
Human	  Rights	  and	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Bill	  2012	  for	  discussion.	  On	  21	  November	  2012,	  the	  
Senate	  referred	  the	  exposure	  draft	  of	  the	  Bill	  for	  inquiry	  and	  report.	  The	  report	  was	  due	  on	  18	  
February	  2013.	  
The	  Bill	  seeks	  to	  consolidate	  the	  four	  existing	  Commonwealth	  anti-­‐discrimination	  Acts.	  It	  does	  
not	  propose	  significant	  changes	  to	  existing	  laws	  or	  protections,	  but	  is	  intended	  to	  simplify	  and	  
clarify	  the	  existing	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislative	  framework.	  The	  most	  useful	  reform	  in	  the	  Bill	  
will	  possibly	  be	  to	  make	  a	  single	  standard	  for	  discrimination,	  with	  a	  single	  definition	  framework	  
and	  concomitant	  single	  compliance	  rules.	  
The	  Bill’s	  proposals	  include:	  	  
• a	  single,	  simplified	  test	  for	  discrimination;	  	  
• the	  introduction	  of	  additional	  protected	  attributes,	  including	  protections	  against	  
discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity;	  
• the	  extension	  of	  protections	  against	  relationship	  discrimination	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  in	  
any	  area	  of	  public	  life;	  
• the	  recognition	  of	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  attributes;	  	  
• coverage	  of	  discrimination	  and	  sexual	  harassment	  in	  any	  area	  of	  public	  life;	  	  
• a	  streamlined	  approach	  to	  exceptions	  (this	  applies	  to	  charities,	  clubs	  and	  associations);	  	  
• additional	  measures	  to	  assist	  and	  promote	  voluntary	  compliance	  with	  the	  Bill;	  	  
• improvements	  to	  the	  complaints	  process;	  and	  	  
• rationalisation	  of	  some	  functions	  of	  the	  Australian	  Human	  Rights	  Commission.	  	  
The	  Bill	  deals	  with	  exceptions	  to	  the	  law	  based	  on	  religion	  in	  Subdivision	  C	  sections	  32	  and	  33,	  
and	  for	  registered	  charities,	  clubs	  and	  associations	  in	  Subdivision	  D	  sections	  34	  and	  35.	  
However,	  the	  Bill	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  report	  from	  the	  Senate	  Constitutional	  and	  Legal	  
Affairs	  Committee	  which	  was	  published	  on	  21	  February	  2013.	  The	  Committee’s	  report	  made	  
12	  recommendations	  for	  changes	  to	  the	  Bill,	  all	  of	  which	  may	  affect	  charities	  and	  nonprofits.	  
These	  were:	  
• To	  add	  'voluntary	  or	  unpaid	  work'	  as	  a	  specific	  and	  separately	  listed	  area	  of	  public	  life	  
in	  subclause	  22(2)	  of	  the	  draft	  Bill;	  
• To	  amend	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘employment’	  in	  the	  Bill	  to	  remove	  the	  reference	  to	  
voluntary	  or	  unpaid	  work	  (clause	  6);	  
• To	  add	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  ‘voluntary	  or	  unpaid	  work’	  to	  the	  Bill	  (clause	  6)	  which	  
differentiates	  between	  employees	  and	  volunteers;	  
• To	  remove	  exceptions	  allowing	  religious	  organisations	  to	  discriminate	  against	  people	  
in	  the	  provision	  of	  services,	  where	  the	  discrimination	  would	  be	  otherwise	  unlawful.	  It	  
was	  recommended	  to	  use	  the	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Act	  1998	  (Tas)	  as	  a	  model.	  The	  
exceptions	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Act	  are	  narrower	  than	  elsewhere	  and	  extend	  only	  to	  the	  
protected	  grounds	  of	  'religious	  belief	  or	  affiliation'	  and	  'religious	  activity',	  and	  not	  to	  
other	  attributes	  such	  as	  'sexual	  orientation'	  or	  'gender	  identity’;	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• To	  require	  any	  organisation	  intending	  to	  offer	  services	  to	  the	  public,	  which	  intends	  to	  
rely	  on	  the	  exceptions	  clause	  (clause	  33),	  to	  provide	  a	  publicly	  available	  document	  
outlining	  its	  intention	  to	  rely	  on	  clause	  33,	  to	  provide	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  document	  to	  any	  
prospective	  employee,	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  copy	  free	  of	  charge	  to	  any	  member	  of	  the	  
public	  who	  requests	  it;	  
• To	  remove	  draft	  clause	  19(2)(b)	  from	  the	  Bill	  –	  this	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘offend	  or	  insult’	  
section.	  However,	  ‘unfavourable	  treatment’	  would	  remain	  an	  inclusive	  and	  possibly	  
wide	  concept	  capable	  of	  interpretation	  by	  the	  courts;	  
• To	  add	  a	  test	  of	  ‘reasonableness’	  to	  subclause	  23(3)	  of	  the	  Bill;	  
• To	  alter	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘gender	  identity’;	  
• To	  add	  protected	  extra	  attributes	  to	  the	  list	  in	  the	  Bill	  viz.	  intersex	  status,	  domestic	  
violence,	  and	  irrelevant	  criminal	  record.	  
The	  Bill	  has	  been	  opposed	  by	  the	  Coalition	  in	  toto.	  
General	  information	  about	  the	  law	  as	  it	  currently	  stands	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  
http://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/HumanRights/Pages/default.aspx	  
General	  information	  about	  the	  development	  and	  progress	  of	  the	  Bill	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  
http://www.ag.gov.au/antidiscrimination	  
The	  Exposure	  Draft	  of	  the	  Bill	  is	  available	  at:	  
http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Pages/ConsolidationofCommonwealthanti-­‐
discriminationlaws.aspx	  




5.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITY IN 
AUSTRALIA – LOGICAL, SEQUENTIAL AND CONSISTENT 
Jennifer	  Batrouney	  S.C.,	  Douglas	  Menzies	  Chambers	  
There	  has	  been	  considerable	  parliamentary	  angst	  over	  recent	  cases	  involving	  charitable	  
organisations	  in	  Australia.6	  This	  is	  unfortunate,	  as	  the	  development	  of	  the	  law	  of	  charity	  in	  
Australia	  and	  throughout	  the	  common	  law	  world	  has,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  been	  remarkably	  logical,	  
sequential	  and	  consistent.	  That	  is	  only	  to	  be	  expected	  in	  a	  legal	  system	  based	  on	  precedent.	  
Justice	  Kirby	  has	  recently	  commented	  that:7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See	  Chris	  Bowen	  Assistant	  Treasurer	  and	  Minister	  for	  Competition	  Policy	  and	  Consumer	  Affairs,	  
‘Government's	  Interim	  Response	  to	  High	  Court's	  Decision	  in	  Word	  Investments	  Case’	  Media	  Release	  No	  
043	  12	  May	  2009.	  See	  also	  State	  Taxation	  Acts	  Further	  Amendment	  Act	  2011	  (Vic).	  
7	  The	  Hon	  Justice	  Michael	  Kirby,	  ‘Precedent	  –	  Report	  on	  Australia’,	  International	  Academy	  of	  
Comparative	  Law,	  Conference,	  Utrecht,	  The	  Netherlands,	  17	  July	  2006.	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Advocates	  of	  a	  strict	  view	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  precedent	  claim	  that	  the	  consistency,	  
continuity	  and	  predictability	  resulting	  from	  adherence	  to	  binding	  precedent	  is	  essential	  
to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  law	  and	  the	  efficient	  discharge	  by	  the	  
judiciary	  of	  its	  functions,	  performed	  in	  a	  lawful	  and	  predictable	  manner.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  Justice	  Lionel	  Murphy	  saw	  a	  risk	  of	  serious	  injustice	  in	  too	  rigid	  an	  adherence	  to	  
precedent.	  He	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  an	  approach	  ‘eminently	  
suitable	  for	  a	  nation	  overwhelmingly	  populated	  by	  sheep’.8	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  bourgeoning	  development	  of	  the	  4th	  head	  of	  charity	  by	  reference	  to	  
purposes	  analogous	  to	  those	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Statute	  of	  Charitable	  Uses9	  has	  
given	  rise	  to	  some	  quite	  trenchant	  criticism.	  As	  noted	  by	  Adam	  Parachin	  of	  the	  University	  of	  
Western	  Ontario:10	  
One	  can	  say	  that	  an	  egg	  is	  analogous	  to	  a	  football	  by	  reason	  of	  its	  shape.	  One	  can	  also	  
say	  that	  an	  egg	  is	  analogous	  to	  baking	  powder	  by	  reason	  of	  its	  capacity	  to	  make	  cakes	  
rise.	  One	  should,	  however,	  be	  a	  little	  wary	  of	  saying	  that	  baking	  powder	  is	  analogous	  
to	  a	  football	  because	  they	  both	  share	  an	  attribute	  with	  an	  egg.	  
Despite	  these	  words	  of	  caution,	  in	  my	  view	  the	  law	  of	  charity	  is	  evolving	  in	  a	  logical	  and	  
predictable	  manner.	  As	  it	  does	  move	  forward,	  it	  embraces	  new	  activities	  as	  charitable	  and	  
leaves	  some	  of	  those	  that	  may	  have	  been	  regarded	  as	  charitable	  in	  the	  past	  in	  its	  wake.11	  In	  
order	  to	  make	  this	  point	  in	  a	  local	  context,	  I	  have	  briefly	  analysed	  the	  precedential	  foundation	  
of	  a	  couple	  of	  recent	  cases.	  
Bicycle	  Victoria	  Inc	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  (2011)	  ATC	  4001	  
In	  this	  case,	  Bicycle	  Victoria	  successfully	  claimed	  that	  it	  was	  a	  charitable	  institution,	  despite	  the	  
ancient	  view	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  ‘mere	  sport’	  could	  never	  be	  charitable.	  This	  view	  can	  be	  
traced	  back	  to	  In	  re	  Nottage,12	  a	  case	  involving	  a	  trust	  for	  a	  yachting	  prize.	  In	  that	  case,	  Lindley	  
LJ	  held:	  
...	  It	  is	  a	  prize	  for	  a	  mere	  game.	  ...	  Now	  I	  should	  say	  that	  every	  healthy	  sport	  is	  good	  for	  
the	  nation	  –	  cricket,	  football,	  fencing,	  yachting,	  or	  any	  other	  healthy	  exercise	  and	  
recreation;	  but	  if	  it	  had	  been	  the	  idea	  of	  lawyers	  that	  a	  gift	  for	  the	  encouragement	  of	  
such	  exercises	  is	  therefore	  charitable,	  we	  should	  have	  heard	  of	  it	  before	  now.	  I	  do	  not	  
attempt	  to	  draw	  the	  line.	  The	  authorities	  shew	  that	  sometimes	  a	  case	  is	  a	  little	  on	  one	  
side	  of	  it,	  sometimes	  a	  little	  on	  the	  other;	  but	  I	  deal	  with	  the	  present	  case	  on	  the	  broad	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  LK	  Murphy,	  ‘The	  Responsibility	  of	  Judges’,	  opening	  address	  for	  the	  First	  National	  Conference	  of	  Labor	  
Lawyers,	  29	  June	  1979,	  in	  G	  Evans	  (ed.)	  Law	  Politics	  and	  the	  Labor	  Movement	  (1980).	  
9	  Preamble	  to	  the	  Statute	  of	  Charitable	  Uses	  1601.	  
10	  ‘Common	  Misconceptions	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  of	  Charity’,	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Melbourne	  Law	  School	  conference	  Defining,	  Taxing	  and	  regulating	  Not-­‐for-­‐Profits	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  
July	  2012,	  p.5.	  
11	  See	  Scottish	  Burial	  Reform	  and	  Cremation	  Society	  Ltd	  v	  Glasgow	  Corporation	  [1968]	  AC	  138	  per	  Lord	  
Wilberforce	  at	  154.	  In	  Re	  Pleasants	  (1923)	  39	  TLR	  675	  the	  promotion	  of	  good	  housewifery	  was	  held	  to	  
be	  charitable	  but	  it	  would	  hardly	  be	  regarded	  as	  such	  today.	  
12	  [1895]	  2	  Ch	  649.	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ground	  that	  I	  am	  not	  aware	  of	  any	  authority	  pointing	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  a	  gift	  for	  
the	  encouragement	  of	  a	  mere	  sport	  can	  be	  supported	  as	  charitable.13	  	  
Lopes,	  L.J	  agreed:	  
I	  am	  of	  opinion	  that	  a	  gift,	  the	  object	  of	  which	  is	  the	  encouragement	  of	  a	  mere	  sport	  or	  
game	  primarily	  calculated	  to	  amuse	  individuals	  apart	  from	  the	  community	  at	  large,	  
cannot	  upon	  the	  authorities	  be	  held	  to	  be	  charitable,	  though	  such	  sport	  or	  game	  is	  to	  
some	  extent	  beneficial	  to	  the	  public.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  hold	  the	  gift	  before	  us	  to	  be	  
charitable	  we	  should	  open	  a	  very	  wide	  door,	  for	  it	  would	  then	  be	  difficult	  to	  say	  that	  
gifts	  for	  promoting	  bicycling,	  cricket,	  football,	  lawn-­‐tennis,	  or	  any	  outdoor	  game,	  were	  
not	  charitable,	  for	  they	  promote	  the	  health	  and	  bodily	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  community.14	  
[emphasis	  added]	  
...	  and	  that	  is	  EXACTLY	  what	  was	  held	  in	  Bicycle	  Victoria!	  
One	  can	  see	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  result	  through	  three	  cases	  in	  particular.	  The	  first	  is	  Re	  
Hadden,	  Public	  Trustee	  v	  Moore	  [1931]	  1	  Ch	  133.	  In	  that	  case	  the	  testator	  established	  a	  trust	  
for	  the	  supply	  of	  healthy	  recreation	  carried	  on	  mainly	  in	  the	  open	  air	  and,	  in	  particular,	  by	  
means	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  playing	  fields,	  parks	  and	  gymnasiums	  for	  the	  working	  classes.	  It	  was	  
held	  by	  Clauson	  J	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  promotion	  of	  mere	  sport:	  
...	  I	  am	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  prizes	  and	  like	  means	  for	  the	  
mere	  encouragement	  of	  sport	  has	  been	  held	  not	  to	  be	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  (see	  In	  re	  
Nottage	  ...)	  offers	  no	  obstacle	  in	  the	  way	  of	  my	  conclusion.	  I	  see	  no	  trace	  in	  the	  
present	  will	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  encourage	  mere	  sport;	  the	  health	  and	  welfare	  of	  the	  
working	  classes	  is	  obviously	  the	  dominant	  object	  in	  the	  testator’s	  mind.	  
Thus	  we	  see	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘mere	  sport’	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  
health	  and	  welfare	  of	  participants.	  
Re	  Laidlaw	  Foundation	  (1984)	  13	  DLR	  (4th)	  491	  
The	  second	  case	  is	  the	  Canadian	  case	  of	  Re	  Laidlaw	  Foundation	  which	  concerned	  gifts	  to	  
organisations	  promoting	  amateur	  sports.	  Southey	  J	  agreed	  with	  the	  trial	  judge’s	  findings	  and	  
conclusion	  that:	  
Promotion	  of	  amateur	  athletic	  sports	  under	  controlled	  conditions	  promotes	  health,	  
and	  is	  akin	  to	  those	  cases	  which	  have	  decided	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  health	  is	  a	  
charitable	  purpose,	  e.g.,	  Re	  McClellan’s	  Will	  (1918)	  46	  NBR	  161.	  
...	  
It	  is	  my	  view	  that	  an	  organization,	  the	  main	  object	  of	  which	  is	  the	  promotion	  of	  an	  
amateur	  athletic	  sport	  which	  involves	  the	  pursuit	  of	  physical	  fitness	  is	  prima	  facie	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  [1895]	  2	  Ch	  649,	  655-­‐656.	  
14	  See	  also	  Royal	  National	  Agricultural	  and	  Industrial	  Association	  v	  Chester	  (1974)	  3	  ALR	  486	  (Breeding	  
and	  racing	  of	  homing	  pigeons);	  IRC	  v	  McMullen	  [1981]	  AC	  1	  (trust	  to	  promote	  physical	  education);	  In	  re	  
Dupree’s	  Deed	  Trusts	  [1945]	  Ch	  16	  (a	  chess	  prize).	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organization	  beneficial	  to	  the	  community	  within	  the	  spirit	  and	  intendment	  of	  the	  
Statute	  of	  Elizabeth	  and	  may	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  charitable	  organization	  provided	  that	  
any	  other	  non-­‐charitable	  object	  of	  the	  organization	  be	  incidental	  or	  ancillary	  to	  the	  
promotion	  of	  that	  amateur	  sport,	  and	  provided	  that	  the	  public	  benefit	  test	  be	  met	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  class	  of	  persons	  who	  will	  benefit.	  
Strathalbyn	  Show	  Jumping	  Club	  Inc	  v	  Mayes	  and	  Ors	  (2001)	  79	  SASR	  54	  
The	  third	  case,	  Strathalbyn	  Show	  Jumping	  Club	  Inc	  v	  Mayes,	  concerned	  a	  trust	  with	  two	  limbs:	  
the	  first	  permitting	  the	  land	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  polo	  ground	  and	  the	  second	  permitting	  it	  to	  be	  
used	  as	  a	  recreational	  ground	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  any	  sports	  or	  games.	  Bleby	  J	  of	  the	  South	  
Australian	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  first	  limb	  was	  invalid	  as	  not	  satisfying	  the	  public	  
benefit	  test	  but	  that	  the	  second	  limb	  was	  a	  valid	  trust:	  
It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  test	  of	  public	  benefit	  is	  satisfied	  in	  
respect	  of	  the	  second	  limb	  of	  the	  trusts.	  One	  is	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  physical	  health,	  
well-­‐being	  and	  recreation	  of	  those	  who	  participate	  in	  such	  activities,	  and	  in	  respect	  of	  
these	  second	  limb	  activities,	  there	  is	  no	  restriction	  in	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  on	  who	  may	  so	  
participate.	  The	  second	  way	  is	  the	  relief	  on	  the	  public	  purse	  by	  the	  provision	  of	  such	  
facilities,	  being	  facilities	  which	  might	  otherwise	  have	  to	  be	  provided	  out	  of	  rate	  
revenue	  by	  the	  Corporation	  of	  the	  Town	  of	  Strathalbyn.	  
Returning	  to	  Bicycle	  Victoria,	  four	  experts	  gave	  evidence	  about	  the	  health	  problems	  caused	  by	  
our	  sedentary	  lifestyle	  and	  the	  beneficial	  effects	  of	  bike	  riding.	  The	  Tribunal	  found,	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  their	  evidence,	  that	  ‘one	  of	  the	  greatest	  public	  health	  challenges	  facing	  Australia	  is	  
obesity.	  ...	  Cycling	  is	  a	  form	  of	  physical	  activity	  that	  can	  prevent,	  remediate	  and	  control	  
diseases,	  including	  those	  associated	  with	  obesity’.15	  Forgie	  DP	  held:	  
The	  fact	  that	  cycling	  may	  be	  a	  sport	  in	  some	  instances	  and	  a	  leisure	  activity	  in	  another	  
does	  not	  characterise	  Bicycle	  Victoria’s	  purpose	  as	  being	  for	  sporting	  purposes	  or	  for	  
recreational	  purposes	  as	  such.	  It	  is	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  cycling	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  
and	  for	  the	  overall	  purpose	  of	  promoting	  fitness.	  That	  is	  a	  purpose	  that	  has	  been	  
recognised	  as	  charitable.16	  
This	  series	  of	  cases	  illustrate	  the	  evolving	  nature	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  charity.	  While	  sedentary	  
lifestyle	  was	  not	  an	  issue	  in	  1895	  when	  Re	  Nottage	  was	  decided,	  it	  is	  now,	  and	  so	  the	  law	  of	  
charity	  has	  evolved	  to	  characterise	  sport	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  fitness	  as	  charitable.	  
Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  and	  Industry	  WA	  (Inc)	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  State	  Revenue	  [2012]	  
WASAT	  146	  (18	  July	  2012,	  Chaney	  J)	  
This	  is	  the	  latest	  in	  a	  long	  line	  of	  public	  /	  private	  benefit	  cases.	  The	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  and	  
Industry	  (WA)	  (CCI)	  claimed	  to	  be	  exempt	  from	  payroll	  tax	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  a	  
‘charitable	  body	  or	  organisation’.	  The	  stated	  purpose	  of	  CCI	  was	  ‘the	  promotion	  of	  industry	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  (2011)	  ATC	  4001,	  [181].	  
16	  (2011)	  ATC	  4001,	  [195].	  Cf	  Northern	  NSW	  Football	  Ltd	  v	  Chief	  Commissioner	  of	  State	  Revenue	  [2011]	  
NSWCA	  51	  where	  the	  NSW	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  dismissed	  Laidlaw	  as	  not	  forming	  part	  of	  the	  law	  in	  
Australia.	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and	  commerce	  in	  WA’.	  The	  Commissioner	  accepted	  that	  the	  promotion	  of	  industry	  or	  
commerce	  in	  general	  can	  be	  a	  charitable	  purpose17	  but	  argued	  that	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  CCI	  
was	  to	  provide	  support	  and	  services	  to	  individual	  members	  to	  help	  them	  carry	  on,	  improve	  or	  
build	  their	  businesses.18	  
The	  issue	  boiled	  down	  to	  whether	  CCI	  was	  ‘beneficial	  to	  the	  community’	  or	  only	  beneficial	  to	  
its	  members.	  	  
The	  seminal	  case	  in	  this	  strand	  of	  precedent	  is	  Commissioners	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  v	  Forrest19	  
which	  dealt	  with	  the	  Institution	  of	  Civil	  Engineers.	  Lord	  Macnaghten	  said:20	  
It	  cannot	  I	  think	  be	  doubted	  that	  the	  institution	  has	  raised	  the	  standard	  of	  the	  
profession,	  and	  that	  to	  a	  civil	  engineers	  it	  is	  of	  advantage	  and	  probably	  of	  pecuniary	  
advantage	  to	  be	  a	  member.	  But	  is	  that	  result	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  society,	  or	  is	  it	  an	  
incidental,	  though	  an	  important	  and	  perhaps	  a	  necessary	  consequence	  of	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  the	  institution	  does	  its	  work	  ...?	  
This	  line	  of	  authority	  can	  be	  traced	  through	  cases	  such	  as	  Commissioners	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  v	  
Yorkshire	  Agricultural	  Society,21	  to	  Commissioners	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  v	  White.22	  This	  was	  a	  case	  
concerning	  whether	  an	  association	  formed	  to	  promote	  craftsmanship	  was	  charitable.	  Justice	  
Fox	  noted	  that:	  
The	  benefit	  of	  craftsmen	  is	  not	  an	  object	  of	  the	  Association	  at	  all.	  The	  object	  of	  the	  
Association	  is,	  broadly,	  the	  furtherance	  of	  crafts	  and	  craftsmanship;	  the	  benefiting	  of	  
craftsmen,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  takes	  place,	  is	  just	  a	  means	  to	  that	  end.	  No	  doubt	  in	  the	  
Yorkshire	  Agricultural	  Society	  case	  individual	  farmers	  might	  benefit	  from	  the	  activities	  
of	  the	  Society,	  but	  that	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  charitable	  status.	  The	  authorities,	  I	  think,	  
distinguish	  between	  cases	  where	  benefit	  to	  the	  individual	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  trust	  or	  
society	  and	  cases	  where	  it	  is	  merely	  incidental	  to	  that	  purpose.	  	  
There	  have	  been	  several	  Australian	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  has	  been	  held	  that	  assistance	  to	  business	  
and	  industry	  can	  provide	  a	  public	  benefit	  of	  the	  kind	  which	  the	  law	  recognises	  as	  charitable.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  fact	  that	  individual	  businesses	  may	  benefit	  from	  that	  assistance	  is	  not	  a	  
disqualifying	  factor	  but	  rather	  an	  inevitable	  result	  of	  that	  assistance.23	  
Building	  on	  these	  cases,	  Chaney	  J	  held	  that	  CCI	  was	  a	  charitable	  body:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  [2012]	  WASAT	  146	  [25]–[26].	  
18	  [2012]	  WASAT	  146	  [25].	  
19[1890]	  15	  AC	  334.	  
20	  [1890]	  15	  AC	  334,	  354.	  
21	  [1928]	  1	  K.B.	  611.	  
22	  (1980)	  55	  Tax	  Cases	  651	  
23	  Tasmanian	  Electronic	  Commerce	  Centre	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  (2005)	  142	  FCR	  371;	  
Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  v	  The	  Triton	  Foundation	  (2005)	  147	  FCR	  362;	  Federal	  Commissioner	  of	  
Taxation	  v	  Co-­‐Operative	  Bulk	  Handling	  Ltd	  (2010)	  189	  FCR	  322.	  See	  also	  Royal	  College	  of	  Surgeons	  of	  
England	  v	  National	  Provincial	  Bank	  Ltd	  [1952]	  AC	  631	  at	  659	  per	  Lord	  Morton.	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There	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  service	  provision	  to	  members	  has	  played	  a	  major	  part	  in	  
the	  planning	  and	  activities	  of	  CCI	  …	  however,	  the	  focus	  on	  building	  the	  membership	  
base	  and	  achieving	  a	  strong	  financial	  position,	  which	  necessarily	  required	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  service	  activities	  of	  the	  organisation,	  must	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  a	  view	  that	  strength	  through	  membership	  numbers	  and	  resources	  better	  enables	  
the	  achievement	  of	  the	  primary	  object	  of	  the	  organisation,	  namely	  the	  promotion	  of	  
trade	  commerce	  and	  industry	  and	  the	  development	  generally.24	  
These	  two	  series	  of	  cases	  illustrate	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  law	  of	  charity	  in	  Australia	  is	  
following	  a	  logical	  and	  consistent	  precedential	  trail.	  The	  charitable	  universe	  is	  unfolding	  as	  it	  
should.25	  As	  such,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  we	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  rushing	  toward	  a	  statutory	  definition	  of	  
charity.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Leonard	  Cohen:26	  
Forget	  your	  perfect	  offering	  
There	  is	  a	  crack,	  a	  crack	  in	  everything	  
That’s	  how	  the	  light	  gets	  in.	  
	  
5.4 DOES THE CHURCH EXIST? 
Brian	  Lucas,	  Australian	  Catholic	  Bishops	  Conference27	  
Throughout	  Australia	  there	  is	  ample	  evidence	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  Christian	  Churches	  –	  places	  of	  
worship,	  aged	  care	  and	  health	  facilities,	  schools,	  community	  centres,	  welfare	  programmes.	  
More	  than	  61%	  of	  people	  in	  the	  2011	  census	  described	  themselves	  as	  belonging	  to	  one	  or	  
other	  Christian	  denomination.	  The	  work	  of	  Churches	  in	  education,	  health,	  social	  welfare,	  aged	  
care	  and	  community	  life	  is	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  the	  social	  fabric	  of	  the	  nation.	  
How	  was	  it,	  then,	  in	  an	  article	  in	  the	  Law	  Society	  Journal,	  that	  Andrew	  Morrison	  SC	  could	  say	  
this?28	  
But	  I	  think	  people	  ought	  to	  know	  that	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  says	  in	  open	  court	  
that,	  if	  someone	  is	  injured,	  not	  just	  by	  a	  clergyman,	  but	  a	  teacher,	  whether	  it	  is	  sexual	  
abuse	  or	  mere	  negligence,	  there	  is	  no	  one	  to	  sue.	  
While	  this	  statement	  is	  overly	  simplistic	  and	  somewhat	  misleading	  it	  raises	  a	  broader	  issue	  
which	  this	  article	  will	  consider:	  What	  is	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  Churches	  and	  their	  various	  entities	  
and	  enterprises?	  This	  has	  relevance,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  area	  of	  identifying	  defendants	  in	  liability	  
cases,	  but	  in	  other	  areas	  including	  the	  law	  of	  contract,	  trusts,	  and	  especially	  for	  statutory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  [2012]	  WASAT	  146,	  [97]–[98].	  
25	  With	  apologies	  to	  Desiderata	  Max	  Ehrmann.	  
26	  Anthem	  
27	  Fr	  Brian	  Lucas	  LL.M.,	  M.Gen.Stud.,	  S.T.L.,	  Dip.Jur.,	  Grad.Dip.R.E.,	  GAICD	  is	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  
Australian	  Catholic	  Bishops	  Conference.	  
28	  A	  Susskind,	  ‘Shouldering	  Blame	  and	  Saying	  Sorry	  are	  still	  often	  too	  hard’,	  (2009)	  47(7)	  Law	  Society	  
Journal	  26.	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definitions	  in	  rating	  legislation,	  work	  health	  and	  safety	  legislation	  and,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  
more	  detail	  below,	  in	  taxation	  law.	  
In	  common	  parlance	  a	  Church	  is	  thought	  of	  in	  a	  way	  analogous	  to	  a	  large	  corporation	  with	  
multiple	  divisions	  and	  branches.	  This	  is	  not	  correct	  theologically	  or	  legally.	  
The	  New	  Revised	  Standard	  Version	  translation	  of	  the	  New	  Testament	  has	  118	  listings	  for	  the	  
word	  ‘church’.	  The	  English	  word	  church	  translates	  the	  New	  Testament	  usage	  of	  the	  Greek	  
word	  ekklesia,	  which	  means	  ‘a	  calling	  together’.	  The	  first	  followers	  of	  Jesus	  called	  their	  
worshipping	  community	  a	  ‘church’.29	  Ekklesia	  was	  used	  in	  the	  New	  Testament	  to	  designate	  
people	  assembled	  for	  worship,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  faith	  community	  at	  particular	  places,	  such	  
as	  Jerusalem,	  Antioch,	  Thessalonika,	  Corinth,	  and	  Galatia.30	  	  
In	  general	  usage,	  when	  people	  speak	  of	  ‘the	  Church’	  they	  are	  usually	  referring	  to	  a	  group	  of	  
people	  who	  have	  a	  common	  religious	  belief,	  founded	  on	  the	  person	  of	  Jesus	  Christ	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
collection	  of	  entities	  they	  have	  established	  to	  further	  the	  advancement	  of	  their	  religious	  
purposes.	  The	  Church	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  people.	  
These	  entities	  will	  have	  different	  characteristics.	  The	  larger	  Churches	  will	  often	  have	  examples	  
of	  most	  of	  the	  various	  types	  of	  non-­‐profit	  entity	  which	  Professor	  Myles	  McGregor-­‐Lowndes	  
and	  Frances	  Hannah	  have	  identified:	  31	  
The	  vast	  majority	  of	  nonprofit	  organisations	  are	  formed	  as	  incorporated	  associations,	  
as	  companies	  limited	  by	  guarantee	  or	  as	  unincorporated	  associations.	  There	  are	  a	  
range	  of	  other	  legal	  forms	  such	  as	  charitable	  trusts,	  special	  purpose	  legislation	  for	  
unions,	  school	  parent	  bodies	  and	  indigenous	  organisations,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  exotic	  royal	  
charters,	  letters	  patent,	  private	  acts	  of	  parliament	  and	  even	  self-­‐generated	  corporate	  
entities.32	  
Australian	  tax	  law	  has	  a	  concept	  of	  ‘entity’	  which	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  a	  legal	  entity	  with	  
legal	  personality.	  
Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1997	  Section	  960.100	  	  
(1)	  Entity	  means	  any	  of	  the	  following:	  	  
(a)	  an	  individual;	  	  
	  (b)	  a	  body	  corporate;	  	  
	  (c)	  a	  body	  politic;	  	  
(d)	  a	  partnership;	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Matthew	  18:17,	  1	  Corinthians	  11:18.	  	  
30	  Acts	  5:11,	  8:1,	  11:22,	  13:1,	  15:22;	  1	  Thessalonians	  1:1;	  1	  Corinthians	  1:2;	  Galatians	  1:1.	  	  
31	  M	  McGregor-­‐Lowndes	  and	  FM	  Hannah,	  ‘Unincorporated	  associations	  as	  entities:	  a	  matter	  of	  balance	  
between	  regulation	  and	  facilitation?’	  (2010)	  28	  Company	  and	  Securities	  Law	  Journal	  197,	  199.	  
32	  Ibid,	  199	  fn	  19:	  ‘Some	  organisations	  established	  by	  private	  act	  of	  parliament	  have	  been	  given	  the	  
power	  to	  incorporate	  their	  own	  bodies	  such	  as	  in	  the	  Uniting	  Church	  in	  Australia	  Act	  1976	  (WA)	  and	  the	  
Anglican	  Church	  of	  Australia	  (Bodies	  Corporate)	  Act	  1938	  (NSW)’.	  See	  M	  Lyons	  M,	  Third	  Sector:	  The	  
Contribution	  of	  Nonprofit	  Cooperative	  Enterprises	  in	  Australia	  (Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  2001)	  21.	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(e)	  any	  other	  unincorporated	  association	  or	  body	  of	  persons;	  	  
(f)	  a	  trust;	  	  
(g)	  a	  superannuation	  fund;	  	  
(h)	  an	  approved	  deposit	  fund.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  Note	  which	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  important	  and	  instructive:	  
The	  term	  entity	  is	  used	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  but	  related	  senses.	  It	  covers	  all	  kinds	  
of	  legal	  person.	  It	  also	  covers	  groups	  of	  legal	  persons,	  and	  other	  things,	  that	  in	  practice	  
are	  treated	  as	  having	  a	  separate	  identity	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  legal	  person	  does.33	  	  
This	  same	  definition	  of	  entity	  is	  carried	  over	  to	  section	  205-­‐5	  the	  Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐
for-­‐profits	  Commission	  Act	  2012	  which	  also	  replicates	  the	  note	  to	  section	  960.100(1)	  of	  the	  
Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1997	  (ITAA)	  
Churches	  will	  comprise	  various	  entities,	  only	  some	  of	  which	  will	  have	  legal	  personality.	  It	  is	  a	  
matter	  of	  factual	  analysis	  to	  see	  whether	  what	  is	  being	  spoken	  of	  in	  the	  Note	  as	  ‘other	  things’	  
do	  ‘in	  practice’	  have	  a	  separate	  identity.	  	  
Only	  entities	  with	  legal	  personality	  can	  be	  held	  legally	  liable.	  You	  cannot,	  for	  example,	  sue	  ‘the	  
Catholic	  Church’.34	  In	  some	  instances	  representative	  actions	  may	  be	  available.35	  
In	  Trustees	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  for	  the	  Archdiocese	  of	  Sydney	  v	  Ellis	  &	  Anor	  36	  (Ellis’s	  
case),	  the	  question	  of	  who	  was	  the	  proper	  defendant	  to	  a	  liability	  claim	  arose.	  It	  is	  a	  useful	  
example	  of	  the	  complexity	  that	  arises	  in	  characterising	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  Church	  entities.	  	  
On	  the	  question	  of	  a	  representative	  action	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  said:37	  
The	  plaintiff	  invoked	  Pt	  8	  r13	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  Rules	  1970	  (see	  now	  Uniform	  Civil	  
Procedure	  Rules	  2005	  r7.4)	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  representative	  order	  whereby	  one	  person	  
(here	  Archbishop	  Pell)	  might	  be	  appointed	  to	  represent	  a	  wider	  group	  (here	  ‘the	  
Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  the	  Archdiocese	  of	  Sydney’).	  A	  judgment	  duly	  obtained	  by	  
such	  procedure	  will	  bind	  all	  who	  are	  represented	  and	  may	  be	  enforceable	  against	  any	  
of	  them	  with	  leave....	  
Representative	  proceedings	  may	  be	  brought	  in	  tort	  claims	  for	  damages,	  but	  only	  
where	  the	  basal	  requirement	  of	  showing	  that	  the	  numerous	  persons	  have	  the	  ‘same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘entity’	  see	  Miscellaneous	  Taxation	  Ruling	  MT2006/1	  The	  
New	  System:	  the	  meaning	  of	  entity	  carrying	  on	  an	  enterprise	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  entitlement	  to	  an	  
Australian	  Business	  Number.	  
34	  RW	  Donlevy,	  ‘Reflections	  on	  Catholic	  Involvement	  in	  the	  Indian	  Residential	  School	  Legacy’,	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  42nd	  Annual	  Convention	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Canon	  Law	  Society,	  15-­‐18	  October,	  2007,	  
35ff.	  
35	  KL	  Fletcher,	  The	  Law	  Relating	  to	  Non-­‐profit	  Associations	  in	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  (Law	  Book	  
Company,	  1986)	  190–195.	  
36	  [2007]	  NSWCA	  117.	  
37	  [2007]	  NSWCA	  117,	  [62]–[65].	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liability’	  in	  the	  proceedings	  is	  satisfied.	  Bryson	  J	  remarked	  in	  Shepherd	  v	  Australia	  and	  
New	  Zealand	  Banking	  Group	  Ltd	  (1996)	  20	  ACSR	  81	  at	  96	  that	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  
rule	  ‘refers	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  proceedings	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  person	  and	  not	  the	  person’s	  
wish	  or	  lack	  of	  wish	  to	  assert	  rights’.	  I	  agree	  with	  this	  proposition	  and	  with	  the	  
defendants’	  submission	  that	  it	  applies	  to	  defendants	  as	  much	  as	  it	  does	  to	  plaintiffs.	  
The	  plaintiff	  has	  not	  disclosed	  whether	  he	  is	  seeking	  to	  bind	  all	  members	  of	  the	  Church	  
in	  the	  Sydney	  Archdiocese	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  alleged	  tort,	  the	  time	  when	  the	  
proceedings	  were	  commenced,	  or	  the	  time	  of	  judgment.	  This	  significant	  omission	  may,	  
in	  a	  proper	  case,	  be	  able	  to	  be	  met	  by	  confining	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  representative	  order.	  
But	  in	  reality	  it	  points	  to	  difficulties	  of	  substance	  in	  using	  representative	  proceedings	  in	  
the	  present	  case,	  as	  well	  as	  unsurmountable	  obstacles	  to	  establishing	  liability	  against	  
the	  class	  or	  classes	  aimed	  at.	  
Patten	  AJ	  rejected	  the	  claim	  against	  Archbishop	  Pell	  as	  a	  representative	  party	  because	  
([55]):	  
It	  could	  hardly,	  I	  think,	  be	  suggested	  that	  a	  person	  within	  the	  Sydney	  
Archdiocese	  who	  adheres	  to	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  faith	  even	  a	  regular	  church	  
goer	  would	  have	  a	  liability	  to	  the	  Plaintiff	  for	  the	  acts	  of	  Father	  Duggan	  or	  for	  
the	  breaches	  of	  duty	  alleged	  by	  the	  Plaintiff.	  
The	  trial	  judge	  held	  that	  there	  was	  ‘an	  arguable	  case’	  that	  the	  trust	  corporation38	  constituted	  
the	  entity	  that	  the	  Archdiocese	  of	  Sydney	  adopted	  as	  its	  permanent	  corporate	  identity.	  The	  
Court	  of	  Appeal	  held	  that	  the	  trust	  corporation	  did	  not	  in	  fact	  appoint	  priests	  and	  so	  could	  not	  
be	  liable	  for	  any	  failures	  in	  connection	  therewith.	  Nor	  could	  it	  be	  claimed	  that	  the	  trust	  
corporation	  was	  a	  universal	  nominal	  defendant	  responsive	  in	  law	  to	  any	  and	  every	  claim	  for	  
legal	  redress	  that	  a	  person	  might	  wish	  to	  bring	  against	  a	  Catholic	  in	  the	  Archdiocese.	  
Ellis’s	  case	  went	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  which	  denied	  special	  leave	  to	  appeal.	  In	  the	  
course	  of	  argument,	  Morrison	  SC,	  acting	  for	  the	  plaintiff,	  commented,	  that	  the	  trial	  judge	  had	  
found	  there	  was	  an	  arguable	  case	  to	  go	  to	  trial	  ‘on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  Church	  in	  the	  Archdiocese	  
of	  Sydney	  did	  exercise	  functions’.	  Hayne	  J,	  quickly	  and	  perceptively	  interrupted,	  ‘Sorry,	  that	  
the	  Trust’s	  corporation	  exercised,	  that	  the	  Church	  exercised?	  We	  need	  to	  be	  quite	  precise,	  do	  
we	  not?’39	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Most	  of	  the	  larger	  Churches	  have	  specific	  State/	  Territory	  Statutes	  establishing	  bodies	  corporate	  to	  
act	  as	  trustees	  of	  church	  property.	  A	  legal	  entity	  holds	  the	  property	  on	  trust	  for	  church	  purposes,	  cf	  
Priestly	  JA	  in	  Glebe	  Administration	  Board	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Payroll	  Tax	  (1987)	  10	  NSWLR	  352,	  357–358.	  
This	  overcomes	  the	  problem	  that	  as	  an	  unincorporated	  entity,	  property	  could	  only	  be	  owned	  by	  all	  the	  
members	  and	  at	  no	  point	  in	  time	  can	  that	  membership	  be	  adequately	  identified.	  These	  Statutes	  are	  
quite	  varied	  in	  their	  form,	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  various	  bodies	  corporate	  operate	  differs	  from	  
Church	  to	  Church	  and	  State	  to	  State:	  P	  McFarlane	  and	  S	  Fisher,	  Churches,	  Clergy	  and	  the	  Law	  
(Federation	  Press,	  1996)	  135–138,	  lists	  over	  110	  such	  statutes.	  
39	  Ellis	  v	  The	  Trustees	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  for	  the	  Archdiocese	  of	  Sydney	  [2007]	  HCATrans	  697	  
(16	  November	  2007).	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This	  question	  of	  being	  ‘precise’	  in	  identifying	  various	  entities	  arose	  in	  Catholic	  Charities	  Clothes	  
Bank	  Lethbridge	  v	  Roman	  Catholic	  Diocese	  of	  Calgary40	  where	  the	  question	  arose	  concerning	  
the	  respective	  parties’	  claims	  with	  respect	  to	  ownership	  of	  a	  property.	  The	  Diocese	  (a	  
corporation	  sole	  incorporated	  by	  private	  statute)	  and	  the	  Clothes	  Bank	  (a	  society)	  were	  
incorporated	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  Alberta.	  Although	  they	  were	  separate	  entities	  the	  evidence	  
showed	  a	  connection	  and	  the	  court	  held	  that	  the	  property	  was	  held	  by	  the	  Diocese	  absolutely	  
and	  not	  on	  trust	  for	  Clothes	  Bank.	  Importantly	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  ownership	  of	  
real	  property	  had	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  applicable	  Alberta	  law	  on	  corporations,	  real	  
property	  and	  resulting	  trusts	  only	  and	  that	  the	  Church	  law	  (the	  canon	  law)	  was	  not	  relevant.	  
This	  has	  implications	  in	  Australian	  law	  where	  a	  Church	  trust	  corporation	  holds	  property	  and	  
there	  is	  no	  specific	  deed	  of	  trust	  indicating	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  trust.	  One	  may	  need	  to	  
consider	  the	  internal	  law	  of	  the	  relevant	  Church	  to	  ascertain	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  the	  trust	  
corporation	  holds	  the	  property.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  this	  sense	  the	  Church	  law	  could	  
provide	  evidence	  of	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  parties	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  resulting	  trust	  in	  favour	  of	  
certain	  church	  purposes.	  This	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  question	  of	  which	  property,	  held	  by	  the	  
trust	  corporation,	  might	  be	  available	  to	  satisfy	  some	  liability	  claim.	  
Another	  issue,	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  members	  of	  Church	  congregations	  is	  how	  to	  
characterise	  the	  most	  common	  church	  entity,	  the	  parish.	  It	  does	  not	  have	  legal	  personality	  but	  
it	  can	  still	  be	  an	  entity	  either	  as	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  or	  another	  body	  of	  persons.	  
The	  High	  Court	  case	  of	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan	  41	  is	  usually	  cited	  as	  authority	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  
membership	  of	  an	  unincorporated	  association	  involves	  some	  form	  of	  consensus	  among	  the	  
members	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  matter	  of	  legal	  contract:42	  
[unincorporated]	  associations	  are	  established	  upon	  a	  consensual	  basis,	  but	  unless	  
there	  were	  some	  clear	  positive	  indication	  that	  the	  members	  contemplated	  the	  
creation	  of	  legal	  relations	  inter	  se,	  the	  rules	  adopted	  for	  their	  governance	  would	  not	  
be	  treated	  as	  amounting	  to	  an	  enforceable	  contract.	  
The	  Church	  Administration	  Handbook	  noted	  the	  essential	  elements	  of	  voluntary	  associations:43	  	  
• two	  or	  more	  persons	  must	  come	  together	  voluntarily	  to	  pursue	  one	  or	  more	  common	  
aims	  or	  purposes;	  and	  	  
• those	  persons	  must	  agree	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  mutual	  undertakings	  as	  members	  of	  that	  
association.	  	  
McGregor-­‐Lowndes	  and	  Hannah	  refer	  to	  entities	  that	  are	  ‘on	  the	  border	  of	  being	  a	  mere	  body	  
of	  persons,	  rather	  than	  an	  association	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  law’.44	  They	  go	  on	  to	  state	  the	  
current	  law:45	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  2012	  ABCA	  390	  
41	  (1934)	  51	  CLR	  358.	  
42	  (1934)	  61	  CLR	  358	  at	  370-­‐371	  
43	  B	  Lucas,	  W	  d’Apice	  and	  P	  Slack,	  Church	  Administration	  Handbook	  (St	  Pauls	  Publications,	  2008),	  241	  
citing	  Halsbury’s	  Laws	  of	  Australia	  [435-­‐1].	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The	  unincorporated	  association	  is	  not	  traditionally	  regarded	  as	  a	  legal	  entity	  with	  
rights	  and	  obligations.	  In	  effect,	  unincorporated	  associations	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  law.	  This	  is	  
clearly	  a	  problem	  when	  unincorporated	  associations	  do	  in	  fact	  ‘exist’	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  
public	  and	  have	  members,	  bank	  accounts	  and	  perhaps	  other	  assets,	  and	  conduct	  
activities	  which	  are	  often	  of	  real	  civic	  value.	  	  
They	  refer	  to	  City	  of	  Gosnells	  v	  Roberts46	  in	  which	  Pidgeon	  J,	  when	  considering	  the	  existential	  
problem	  presented	  by	  an	  unincorporated	  association’s	  non-­‐status	  in	  law,	  said:	  47	  
The	  proper	  conclusion...is	  that	  the	  body	  did	  exist	  as	  an	  unincorporated	  association.	  
The	  evidence	  showed	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  group	  of	  persons	  carrying	  on	  an	  activity...It	  
had	  a	  bank	  account	  and	  it	  held	  meetings	  and	  the	  activities	  it	  pursued	  were	  determined	  
at	  those	  meetings....	  
The	  separate	  reference	  in	  the	  tax	  and	  charity	  statutes	  to	  unincorporated	  associations	  and	  
other	  bodies	  of	  persons	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  them,	  even	  if	  in	  practice	  it	  
is	  a	  difference	  that	  may	  not	  make	  much	  of	  a	  difference.	  	  
How	  then	  do	  we	  describe	  the	  border	  between	  ‘unincorporated	  association’	  and	  ‘other	  body	  of	  
persons’	  and	  what	  criteria	  will	  determine	  which	  entities	  belong	  to	  which	  side	  of	  that	  border?	  
To	  what	  extent	  is	  some	  form	  of	  consent	  or	  connectedness	  required?	  Does	  the	  usual	  form	  of	  
Church	  parish/congregation	  exhibit	  such	  characteristics?	  
The	  traditional	  and	  somewhat	  undisputed	  view	  was	  that	  Churches	  were	  unincorporated	  
associations.	  In	  Ellis’s	  case	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  acknowledged	  this:	  
41	  There	  are	  many	  statements	  in	  the	  cases	  about	  unincorporated	  ‘Churches’	  in	  
Australia	  being	  voluntary	  or	  unincorporated	  associations	  (see	  e.g.	  Attorney-­‐General	  
(NSW)	  v	  Grant	  [1976]	  HCA	  38;	  (1976)	  135	  CLR	  587	  at	  600,	  Ermogenous48	  at	  118	  [64]).	  
Some	  denominations	  or	  congregations	  regulate	  membership	  and	  governance	  by	  a	  
single	  Constitution,	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  a	  district	  sporting	  club.	  But	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  
Church	  in	  a	  particular	  place	  would	  appear	  to	  have	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  structure.	  
The	  Church	  Administration	  Handbook49	  put	  the	  position	  as	  follows:	  
Civil	  law	  recognises	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  its	  dioceses	  and	  parishes	  as	  unincorporated	  
associations	  in	  civil	  law.	  His	  Honour	  Mr	  Justice	  Campbell	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  New	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  McGregor-­‐Lowndes	  and	  Hannah	  above	  n	  31,	  203,	  citing	  Kibby	  v	  Registrar	  of	  Titles	  (Vic)	  [1999]	  1	  VR	  
861,	  872,	  Mandie	  J;	  Conservative	  &	  Unionist	  Central	  Office	  v	  Burrell	  (Inspector	  of	  Taxes)	  [1982]	  2	  All	  ER	  1,	  
4,	  Lawton	  LJ.	  
45	  McGregor-­‐Lowndes	  and	  Hannah	  above	  n	  31,	  205.	  
46	  (1994)	  12	  WAR	  437,	  443.	  
47	  See	  also:	  K	  Fletcher,	  ‘In	  search	  of	  an	  associations	  definition:	  City	  of	  Gosnells	  v	  Roberts	  (1994)	  12	  WAR	  
437’	  (1999)	  1	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Australia	  Law	  Review	  71.	  
48	  Ermogenous	  v	  Greek	  Orthodox	  Community	  of	  SA	  Inc	  (2002)	  209	  CLR	  95.	  
49	  Lucas,	  d’Apice	  and	  Slack,	  above	  n	  43,	  241	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South	  Wales50	  provided	  the	  following	  insight	  into	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  church	  bodies	  in	  
civil	  law	  (after	  providing	  some	  observations	  on	  the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  Code	  of	  Canon	  
Law):	  
The	  position	  in	  civil	  law	  is	  somewhat	  different.	  It	  does	  not	  recognise	  a	  parish	  as	  
having	  any	  separate	  legal	  personality.	  Indeed,	  it	  does	  not	  recognise	  a	  church,	  
or	  parish,	  as	  having	  any	  separate	  legal	  personality.	  Rather,	  churches	  and	  
parishes	  are	  voluntary	  unincorporated	  associations	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  civil	  law.	  
Therefore,	  unless	  a	  religious	  association	  has	  been	  incorporated	  in	  itself	  (and	  does	  not	  
just	  have	  an	  incorporated	  trustee),	  then	  it	  is	  an	  unincorporated	  association.	  	  
In	  Kibby	  v	  Registrar	  of	  Titles51	  Mandie	  J	  held	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  an	  association	  was	  ‘some	  form	  
of	  combination	  of	  persons	  (with	  a	  common	  interest	  or	  purpose)	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  organisation	  
and	  continuity	  at	  least	  sufficient	  to	  distinguish	  the	  combination	  from	  an	  amorphous	  or	  
fluctuating	  group	  of	  individuals	  and	  with	  some	  clear	  criteria	  or	  method	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  
its	  members’.	  	  
A	  leading	  Australian	  expert	  in	  Catholic	  Church	  Law,	  Dr	  Rodger	  Austin,	  citing	  Church	  
Administration	  Handbook	  (noting	  its	  reference	  to	  the	  Halsbury	  summary)	  asked	  whether	  
dioceses	  and	  parishes	  met	  ‘these	  criteria	  for	  voluntary	  associations’.	  	  
He	  makes	  the	  argument	  that	  dioceses	  and	  parishes	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  civil	  law	  criteria	  for	  a	  
voluntary	  association:52	  
Parishes	  may	  have,	  for	  example,	  a	  process	  for	  registration	  for	  people	  becoming	  part	  of	  
the	  community,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  constitute	  juridical	  membership	  of	  the	  parish	  if	  the	  
persons	  so	  registering	  live	  outside	  its	  territory.	  Dioceses	  and	  parishes	  are	  not	  
established	  by	  agreement	  among	  the	  individual	  members.	  
This	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  the	  law	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church,	  parochial	  
membership	  of	  the	  baptised	  is	  determined	  by	  domicile	  whether	  or	  not	  that	  is	  the	  place	  where	  
they	  worship	  or	  have	  any	  other	  connection.	  
In	  Ellis’s	  case,	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  fluctuating	  membership	  was	  acknowledged:53	  
The	  ‘People	  of	  God	  entrusted	  to	  a	  bishop’	  in	  an	  area	  obviously	  include	  laity	  and	  clergy,	  
adults	  and	  infants.	  The	  body	  fluctuates	  as	  members	  depart	  through	  death	  or	  other	  
reasons	  and	  are	  added	  through	  birth	  (or	  baptism),	  arrival	  within	  the	  ecclesiastical	  
jurisdiction	  or	  other	  reasons.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Trustees	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  for	  the	  Archdiocese	  of	  Sydney	  v	  TGP	  Architects	  &	  Planners	  Pty	  
Limited	  [2005]	  NSWSC	  381.	  
51	  [1999]	  1	  VR	  861,	  872.	  
52	  ‘Workshop	  Canon	  Law	  and	  Civil	  Law	  Interface’	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Forty-­‐Second	  Annual	  Conference	  of	  
the	  Canon	  Law	  Society	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  Adelaide	  September	  2008,	  69	  at	  71–72.	  
53	  [2007]	  NSWCA	  117,	  [40].	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Various	  Churches	  will	  have	  their	  own	  criteria	  for	  determining	  membership	  of	  a	  parish,	  
congregation	  or	  worshipping	  community.	  This	  could	  be	  described	  as	  a	  continuum	  from	  those	  
denominations	  which	  have	  a	  clear	  enrolment	  process	  and	  a	  structure	  for	  identifying	  members,	  
through	  to	  those	  who	  regard	  as	  a	  member	  anyone	  who	  happens	  to	  attend	  a	  worship	  service.	  
There	  are	  various	  grades	  along	  that	  continuum.	  	  
In	  some	  Churches	  membership	  is	  determined	  by	  a	  sacramental	  event	  (baptism)	  and	  parish	  
membership	  is	  determined	  by	  domicile.	  How	  determinative	  that	  would	  be,	  especially	  with	  
respect	  to	  those	  ‘members’	  who	  never	  participate,	  or	  now	  regard	  themselves	  as	  ‘lapsed’	  is	  
uncertain.	  	  
The	  degree	  of	  fluctuation	  may	  vary	  significantly.	  In	  a	  small	  rural	  parish	  there	  may	  be	  very	  little	  
actual	  change	  in	  membership	  whereas	  in	  a	  growth	  area	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  a	  major	  city,	  or	  
those	  areas	  where	  people	  tend	  to	  reside	  for	  a	  shorter	  period	  of	  time	  there	  may	  be	  significant	  
change.	  	  
The	  fact	  of	  a	  separate	  identity	  does	  not	  help	  as	  this	  applies	  to	  both	  unincorporated	  association	  
and	  ‘other	  body	  of	  persons’.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘association’	  suggests	  some	  form	  of	  link	  
between	  the	  members.	  They	  share	  something	  in	  common.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  
necessarily	  must	  know	  each	  other.	  Members	  of	  many	  large	  unincorporated	  associations	  will	  
not	  know	  each	  other	  but	  each	  individual	  will	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  reality	  of	  
membership,	  usually	  by	  way	  of	  inclusion	  in	  a	  register	  of	  members.	  
But	  the	  membership	  register	  may	  not	  be	  authoritative.	  It	  may	  not	  be	  up	  to	  date.	  People	  may	  
have	  died,	  moved	  out	  of	  the	  area,	  or	  joined	  another	  church	  or	  simply	  ceased	  to	  be	  involved.	  
Some	  people	  may	  participate	  in	  activities,	  consider	  themselves	  members,	  have	  even	  paid	  a	  
membership	  fee,	  but	  not	  have	  had	  the	  name	  entered	  into	  a	  register.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  an	  
association	  seems	  to	  require	  something	  more	  than	  simply	  a	  collection	  of	  people	  who	  claim	  to	  
be	  members.	  An	  association	  suggests	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  disassociated,	  and	  expulsion	  (as	  
in	  Cameron	  v	  Hogan)	  is	  a	  ready	  source	  of	  litigation	  about	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  group	  and	  
the	  powers	  of	  those	  responsible	  for	  governing	  it.	  
The	  internal	  governance	  of	  the	  Church	  may	  be	  relevant	  in	  determining	  character	  of	  the	  parish	  
or	  congregation.	  Those	  that	  are	  congregationally	  governed	  (a	  vestry	  committee,	  or	  group	  of	  
elders)	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  a	  stable	  membership.	  That	  would	  tend	  to	  put	  
them	  on	  the	  ‘unincorporated	  association’	  side	  of	  the	  border	  whereas	  those	  that	  are	  governed	  
by	  an	  individual	  (parish	  priest,	  or	  rector)	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  more	  fluid	  membership	  base	  that	  
puts	  them	  on	  the	  other	  side	  as	  ‘another	  body	  of	  persons’.	  
Conclusion	  
While	  it	  may	  appear	  simplistic	  to	  say	  that	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  Church	  
bodies	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  facts,	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  the	  variations	  in	  Church	  structure	  and	  
governance	  are	  so	  wide	  that	  each	  situation	  must	  be	  carefully	  assessed.	  Now	  that	  the	  
Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  has	  taken	  on	  the	  role	  of	  supervising	  
charities,	  and	  will,	  in	  due	  course,	  implement	  some	  governance	  standards,	  it	  may	  be	  important	  
to	  ensure	  that	  the	  entity	  is	  property	  characterised.	  One	  could	  well	  expect	  that	  entities	  that	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have	  a	  more	  defined	  membership	  may	  need	  to	  meet	  a	  different	  governance	  standard	  to	  those	  
where	  this	  is	  less	  well	  defined.	  The	  language	  of	  ‘association’	  may	  set	  up	  expectations	  about	  
internal	  relations	  that	  in	  turn	  find	  expression	  in	  expectations	  of	  governance	  processes	  and	  
standards.	  
While	  the	  structure	  of	  incorporated	  bodies	  is	  well	  defined	  in	  law,	  the	  broad	  scope	  of	  
unincorporated	  associations,	  unincorporated	  bodies	  and	  other	  bodies	  of	  persons	  leaves	  a	  
number	  of	  issues	  unresolved.	  Who	  owns	  the	  property?	  Who	  can	  sue	  or	  be	  sued?	  Who	  will	  be	  
responsible	  for	  what	  aspects	  of	  the	  entity’s	  activities?	  
McGregor-­‐Lowndes	  and	  Hannah	  have	  proposed	  one	  solution:54	  
The	  easy	  solution	  to	  these	  difficulties	  would	  seem	  obvious	  in	  the	  Australian	  context.	  All	  
unincorporated	  associations	  should	  incorporate	  as	  incorporated	  associations.	  
Another	  reform	  might	  be	  to	  solve	  the	  liability	  imperative	  for	  incorporation	  by	  statutorily	  
limiting	  liability	  to	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  entity	  itself	  (removing	  the	  exposure	  of	  individual	  members	  
or	  the	  governing	  committee).	  Such	  a	  move	  is	  counter-­‐intuitive	  to	  the	  tendency,	  more	  and	  
more,	  to	  look	  through	  the	  corporate	  veil	  and	  expose	  individuals	  to	  liability	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  
work,	  health	  and	  safety,	  environmental	  law	  and	  taxation	  law.	  	  
In	  this	  way	  all	  entities	  will,	  in	  fact,	  if	  not	  in	  law,	  be	  treated	  as	  having	  separate	  legal	  personality.	  
It	  might	  be	  time	  to	  revisit	  Professor	  Laski’s	  1916	  ‘radical	  thesis’	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  
incorporated	  and	  unincorporated	  associations	  should	  be	  abolished,	  because	  the	  personality	  of	  
associations	  was	  real,	  and	  required	  no	  concession	  of	  incorporation	  from	  the	  State.55	  
	  
5.5 A VERITABLE HEATWAVE A GOVERNANCE LAWYER’S 
PERSPECTIVE ON D&O AND THE RISING TEMPERATURE 
OF DIRECTOR LIABILITY  
Elizabeth	  Jameson,	  Managing	  Director	  &	  Principal	  Consultant,	  Board	  Matters	  
There	  is	  much	  debate	  today	  about	  whether	  director	  liability	  has	  ‘gone	  too	  far’.56	  One	  school	  of	  
thought	  is	  that	  we	  expect	  far	  more	  of	  directors	  than	  is	  realistic	  in	  view	  of	  the	  practical	  
limitations	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  access,	  freely	  and	  in	  any	  real	  depth,	  all	  of	  the	  information	  they	  
need	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  the	  high	  standards	  expected	  by	  the	  courts	  in	  applying	  the	  growing	  body	  
of	  law	  surrounding	  the	  statutory57	  and	  fiduciary	  duties	  of	  directors.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  McGregor-­‐Lowndes	  and	  Hannah,	  above	  n	  31,	  203.	  
55	  Ibid	  206,	  citing	  HJ	  Laski,	  ‘The	  Personality	  of	  Associations’	  (1916)	  29	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  404,	  424.	  
56	  For	  an	  excellent	  ‘white	  paper’	  summarising	  the	  current	  status	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  the	  major	  
contributors	  to	  it,	  see	  Steven	  Cole,	  Mind	  the	  Expectation	  Gap:	  The	  Role	  of	  a	  Company	  Director	  
(Australian	  Institute	  of	  Company	  Directors,	  2012),	  www.companydirectors.com.au	  
57	  Predominantly	  referring	  to	  ss	  180	  to	  184	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	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The	  competing	  school	  of	  thought,	  not	  surprisingly,	  holds	  to	  the	  opposite	  view.	  	  For	  those	  from	  
this	  school,	  directors	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  the	  stewardship	  of	  the	  assets	  and	  resources	  that	  
belong	  to	  the	  collective	  owners	  (namely	  the	  shareholders	  or	  members)	  and	  their	  
accountability	  to	  them	  collectively	  is,	  and	  should	  remain	  extremely	  high.	  
A	  number	  of	  corporate	  dramas	  playing	  out	  in	  courtrooms	  over	  recent	  years	  have	  done	  nothing	  
to	  quench	  this	  heat	  or	  quell	  the	  rising	  anxiety	  of	  directors.	  	  As	  the	  dust	  settles	  on	  the	  hearing	  
of	  ASIC’s	  allegations	  of	  breaches	  of	  directors’	  duties	  against	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  Centro	  
Property	  Group,	  attention	  is	  now	  turned	  to	  the	  –	  today	  almost	  inevitable	  –	  class	  action	  by	  
shareholders	  and	  the	  equally	  predictable	  legal	  dispute	  over	  associated	  Directors’	  and	  Officers’	  
Insurance	  (D&O)	  claims	  by	  the	  directors.	  	  At	  stake	  is	  whether	  shareholders	  claiming	  in	  the	  
order	  of	  $200	  million	  will	  have	  a	  priority	  claim	  over	  the	  D&O	  policy	  proceeds	  in	  question,	  
ahead	  of	  the	  directors’	  claim	  for	  defence	  costs.	  
Legal	  teams	  and	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Supreme	  Court	  will	  doubtless	  be	  watching	  with	  interest	  
what	  happens	  in	  two	  separate	  legal	  actions	  around	  the	  same	  issues,	  expected	  to	  be	  heard	  
together	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  
The	  Directors’	  Liability	  Armoury	  
Directors	  and	  officers	  of	  companies	  today	  have	  a	  heightened	  awareness	  that	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  
have	  the	  ‘critical	  triumvirate’	  of	  heatproof	  armoury	  against	  claims	  for	  breach	  of	  their	  statutory	  
and	  fiduciary	  duties	  as	  directors.	  	  The	  triumvirate	  are,	  in	  the	  writer’s	  view,	  in	  order	  of	  
importance	  from	  most	  to	  least	  important:	  
1. A	  strong	  practical,	  ethical	  and	  legal	  understanding	  of	  society’s	  expectations	  of	  
directors	  today	  in	  carrying	  out	  their	  role	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  corporations;	  
2. Deeds	  of	  indemnity	  and	  access	  -­‐	  to	  provide	  directors	  with	  greater	  access	  to	  document	  
and	  records	  of	  the	  company	  than	  is	  afforded	  to	  them	  under	  section	  198F	  of	  the	  
Corporations	  Act	  2001;58	  and	  	  	  	  
3. D	  &	  O	  Insurance	  –	  typically	  a	  ‘claims	  made’	  cover	  against	  claims	  for	  breaches	  of	  
directors	  duties,	  other	  than	  knowing	  or	  wilful	  breaches.	  
As	  mentioned,	  from	  the	  writer’s	  perspective	  the	  first	  of	  these	  is	  the	  most	  important,	  and	  most	  
difficult,	  of	  the	  protection	  mechanisms	  available	  to	  any	  director,	  or	  aspiring	  director.	  	  This	  
means	  ensuring	  that	  the	  director	  must	  first	  and	  foremost	  become	  sufficiently	  knowledgeable,	  
skilled	  and	  practised	  in	  the	  art	  of	  directorship	  to	  minimise	  the	  chance	  of	  breaching	  their	  legal	  
duties	  rather	  than	  merely	  holding	  indemnities	  against	  the	  loss	  suffered	  by	  them	  as	  a	  result.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Under	  s	  198F	  directors	  (and	  former	  directors)	  have	  limited	  rights	  to	  inspect	  the	  ‘books’	  of	  the	  
company,	  other	  than	  its	  financial	  records,	  ‘at	  all	  reasonable	  times	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  current	  or	  
proposed	  legal	  proceedings’.	  To	  supplement	  this	  limited	  right,	  a	  deed	  of	  access	  or	  indemnity	  will	  
traditionally	  grant	  directors	  access	  to	  the	  books	  of	  the	  company	  at	  all	  reasonable	  times,	  irrespective	  of	  
whether	  legal	  proceedings	  are	  proposed	  or	  on	  foot.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  statutory	  right	  of	  access	  to	  
financial	  records	  of	  the	  company	  granted	  under	  s	  290	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001,	  by	  which	  a	  director	  
has	  a	  right	  of	  access	  to	  financial	  records	  of	  the	  company	  ‘at	  all	  reasonable	  times’.	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Put	  differently	  it	  is	  obviously	  always	  preferable	  never	  to	  have	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  the	  coverage	  
afforded	  by	  legal	  documents,	  such	  as	  deeds	  of	  indemnity	  and	  access,	  which	  are	  inherently	  
always	  open	  to	  a	  range	  of	  legal	  challenges.	  	  Likewise,	  D&O	  insurance	  should	  only	  ever	  be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  ‘last	  gasp’	  option	  to	  assist	  the	  director	  to	  meet	  his	  or	  her	  liabilities	  and	  the	  
inevitably	  extensive	  costs	  associated	  with	  defending,	  even	  successfully,	  legal	  claims.	  
Just	  one	  illustration	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  any	  director	  who	  blindly	  places	  all	  faith	  in	  a	  deed	  of	  
indemnity	  from	  the	  company	  as	  being	  sufficient	  to	  cover	  them	  for	  all	  loss	  they	  suffer	  ‘as	  a	  
director’,	  is	  the	  case	  of	  NRMA	  v	  Whitlam.59	  
In	  NRMA	  v	  Whitlam	  the	  Court	  had	  to	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Nicholas	  Whitlam,	  former	  
director	  and	  president	  of	  NRMA,	  was	  entitled	  to	  indemnity	  under	  a	  deed	  of	  indemnity	  from	  
the	  company.	  	  He	  sought	  indemnity	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  claims	  for	  defamation	  against	  a	  major	  
radio	  station	  and	  a	  television	  network	  for	  allegedly	  defamatory	  imputations	  made	  by	  them	  
during	  a	  television	  interview	  with	  Mr	  Whitlam	  which	  was	  subsequently	  rebroadcast	  in	  a	  radio	  
program.	  	  	  
The	  NSW	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  ultimately	  upheld	  NRMA’s	  refusal	  to	  indemnify	  Mr	  Whitlam	  on	  the	  
basis	  that	  ‘loss’	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘liability’	  in	  the	  relevant	  deed	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  loss	  in	  
the	  form	  of	  ‘loss	  of	  reputation’	  actionable	  in	  defamation.	  	  Specifically	  it	  was	  held	  that	  whilst	  he	  
participated	  in	  the	  interview	  as	  an	  officer	  of	  NRMA,	  his	  decision	  to	  take	  action	  for	  defamation	  
as	  a	  consequence	  could	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  his	  duties	  as	  a	  director	  of	  NRMA	  and	  so	  did	  
not	  fall	  within	  the	  relevant	  wording	  of	  the	  deed.	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  directors	  relying	  for	  their	  sole	  comfort,	  as	  they	  frequently	  do,	  on	  that	  which	  
is	  the	  outwardly	  most	  easily	  acquired	  of	  the	  ‘critical	  triumvirate’	  of	  director	  liability	  defence	  
weapons,	  namely	  D&O	  insurance,	  it	  is	  surprising	  how	  many	  directors	  are	  oblivious	  to	  the	  very	  
common	  pitfalls	  that	  can	  render	  this	  piece	  of	  the	  armoury	  useless	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  long	  and	  
distressing	  legal	  battle.	  
Common	  D&O	  Pitfalls	  
It	  is	  important	  that	  directors	  be	  made	  better	  aware	  of	  the	  broad	  number	  of	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  
reliance	  on	  D&O	  insurance	  alone	  as	  their	  most	  important	  defence	  against	  legal	  claims.	  	  
Limitations	  include:	  
• Legislative	  prohibition	  under	  the	  sections	  199B	  and	  199C	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  
from	  paying	  or	  agreeing	  to	  pay	  the	  insurance	  of	  a	  director	  against	  liability	  (other	  than	  
for	  legal	  costs)	  arising	  out	  of:	  	  
• Conduct	  involving	  wilful	  breach	  of	  duty	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  company;	  or	  
• A	  breach	  of	  the	  duties	  under	  sections	  .182	  or	  183	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (not	  
to	  misuse	  their	  position	  as	  a	  director	  or	  information	  gained	  by	  them	  as	  a	  director	  
respectively);	  
• Standard	  exclusions	  from	  D	  &	  O	  policies,	  such	  as	  exclusions	  for	  prospectus	  liability,	  
professional	  indemnity	  and	  insured–v–insured	  claims;	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  National	  Roads	  and	  Motorists	  Association	  Limited	  v	  Nicolas	  Whitlam	  [2007]	  NSWCA	  81	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• Refusal	  of	  cover	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  inadequate	  disclosure	  or	  misrepresentation	  under	  
section	  21	  on	  the	  Insurance	  Contracts	  Act	  1984.	  
A	  recent	  example	  of	  the	  latter	  type	  of	  case	  is	  Martin	  John	  Green	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  liquidator	  of	  
Arimco	  Mining	  Pty	  Limited	  (in	  liq.)	  v	  CGU	  Insurance	  Limited	  and	  Ors.60	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  court	  
upheld	  CGU’s	  refusal	  to	  pay	  out	  under	  the	  D&O	  policy	  for	  insolvent	  trading	  claims	  against	  the	  
directors	  pursuant	  to	  section	  588G	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001.	  CGU	  successfully	  relied	  on	  
the	  fact	  that	  upon	  policy	  renewal	  the	  company	  had	  not	  disclosed	  to	  the	  insurer	  that	  the	  
apparently	  strong	  profit	  and	  cash	  position	  of	  the	  company,	  as	  reflected	  in	  its	  1998	  Annual	  
Report,	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  a	  rights	  issue	  which	  also	  had	  not	  been	  disclosed	  in	  the	  Annual	  
Report.	  
These	  types	  of	  exclusions	  and	  limitations	  are	  of	  critical	  importance	  to	  the	  insured	  director	  (and	  
obviously,	  too,	  the	  insurer)	  if	  the	  policy	  is	  activated.	  	  However,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  
paper	  which	  instead	  primarily	  examines	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  law	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  
ability	  of	  directors	  to	  access	  defence	  costs,	  which	  is	  frequently	  of	  great	  and	  early	  practical	  
concern	  to	  the	  director	  seeking	  to	  defend	  their	  actions	  against	  legal	  claims.	  	  
Defence	  Costs	  Cases	  
A	  succession	  of	  cases	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  illustrates	  various	  limitations	  for	  directors	  accessing	  
defence	  costs,	  particularly	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  substantive	  hearing	  of	  the	  claim.	  	  Several	  of	  the	  
cases	  highlight	  the	  uncontroversial	  and	  somewhat	  self-­‐evident	  truism	  that	  policy	  wording	  is	  all-­‐
important	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  any	  form	  of	  insurance.	  	  In	  the	  area	  of	  D&O	  there	  
is	  a	  critical	  difference	  between	  policy	  wording	  which	  gives	  the	  insurer	  some	  discretion	  to	  pay	  
defence	  costs	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  substantive	  hearing	  of	  allegations	  of	  breach	  of	  directors’	  
duties	  and	  that	  which	  does	  not.	  	  These	  types	  of	  issues	  were	  highlighted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  
over	  the	  past	  decade	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  wave	  of	  corporate	  collapses	  in	  Australia	  towards	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  early	  2000s	  including	  HIH	  and	  One-­‐Tel.61	  
An	  important	  development	  in	  the	  line	  of	  defence	  cost	  cases	  has	  been	  most	  recently	  brought	  in	  
to	  focus	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  decision	  of	  Steigrad	  v	  BFSL	  2007	  Limited62	  (the	  Bridgecorp	  case),	  
which	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  appeal.	  	  The	  decision,	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  its	  
appeal,	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  actions	  instituted	  in	  the	  New	  South	  
Wales	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Centro	  Property	  Group.	  
The	  Bridgecorp	  case	  arose	  out	  of	  the	  collapse	  in	  mid-­‐2007	  of	  the	  Bridgecorp	  group	  of	  finance	  
companies	  which	  were	  placed	  into	  receivership,	  owing	  investors	  nearly	  NZ$500	  million.	  
Following	  the	  collapse,	  several	  directors	  within	  the	  group,	  including	  the	  plaintiffs,	  faced	  
numerous	  civil	  and	  criminal	  claims	  alleging	  breaches	  of	  director’s	  duties.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  [2008]	  NSWSC	  875.	  
61	  Rich	  v	  CGU	  Insurance	  Ltd;	  Silbermann	  v	  CGU	  Insurance	  Ltd	  (2005)	  214	  ALR	  370;	  Wilkie	  v	  Gordian	  
RunOff	  (2005)	  221	  CLR	  522.	  
62	  [2011]	  NZHC	  1037	  (High	  Court	  of	  New	  Zealand).	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The	  Bridgecorp	  companies	  had	  held	  a	  D&O	  policy	  which	  indemnified	  the	  directors	  in	  respect	  of	  
any	  ‘loss’	  arising	  out	  of	  any	  claim	  of	  a	  wrongful	  act,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  defence	  costs	  
incurred	  in	  defending	  the	  claim.	  By	  1	  August	  2011,	  the	  plaintiffs	  had	  exhausted	  their	  
entitlement	  under	  a	  separate	  statutory	  liability	  policy	  and	  sought	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  D&O	  policy	  in	  
order	  to	  meet	  ongoing	  defence	  costs.	  However,	  the	  receivers	  and	  liquidators	  of	  the	  group	  
asserted	  that	  the	  plaintiff	  directors	  could	  not	  access	  these	  funds,	  as	  a	  charge	  arose	  over	  the	  
monies	  payable	  under	  the	  D&O	  policy	  by	  virtue	  of	  section	  9	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  Law	  Reform	  Act	  
1936.	  	  
Section	  9(1)	  of	  the	  Law	  Reform	  Act	  states	  that,	  where	  a	  person	  is	  indemnified	  by	  an	  insurance	  
policy	  against	  liability	  to	  pay	  compensation	  or	  damages,	  ‘the	  amount	  of	  this	  liability	  shall,	  on	  
the	  happening	  of	  the	  event	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  claim’,	  be	  a	  charge	  on	  all	  insurance	  money	  that	  is	  
or	  may	  become	  payable	  in	  respect	  of	  that	  liability.	  Furthermore,	  section	  9(3)	  provides	  that	  any	  
charge	  created	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Act	  has	  priority	  over	  all	  other	  charges	  affecting	  the	  said	  
insurance	  money.	  	  
The	  question	  which	  arose	  was	  whether	  the	  statutory	  charge	  created	  by	  this	  section	  prevented	  
the	  directors	  from	  accessing	  the	  D&O	  policy	  to	  meet	  their	  defence	  costs.	  
Lang	  J	  held	  that	  the	  directors	  were	  indeed	  prevented	  by	  the	  charge	  from	  accessing	  the	  D&O	  
policy	  to	  meet	  their	  defence	  costs.	  His	  Honour	  noted	  with	  approval	  the	  decision	  of	  Pattinson	  v	  
General	  Accident,	  Fire,	  and	  Life	  Assurance	  Corporation	  Ltd63	  in	  which	  the	  New	  Zealand	  
Supreme	  Court	  laid	  down	  the	  proposition	  that	  payment	  of	  defence	  costs	  should	  not	  reduce	  the	  
pool	  of	  funds	  that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  available	  to	  meet	  claims	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  a	  
charge	  has	  arisen.	  This	  now	  70	  year	  old	  case	  has	  previously	  been	  cited	  with	  approval	  by	  both	  
the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  in	  Bailey	  v	  New	  South	  Wales	  Medical	  Defence	  Union	  Ltd	  64	  and	  by	  
the	  NZ	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Ludgater	  Holdings	  Ltd	  v	  Gerling	  Australia	  Insurance	  Co	  Pty	  Ltd.65	  	  
In	  coming	  to	  his	  conclusion,	  Lang	  J	  made	  several	  observations,	  namely:	  
• Section	  9	  charges	  ‘all	  insurance	  money’	  that	  is	  or	  may	  become	  payable	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  
particular	  liability	  to	  pay	  damages	  or	  compensation;	  
• Consequently,	  where	  the	  level	  of	  cover	  under	  a	  policy	  is	  less	  than	  the	  amount	  of	  a	  
prospective	  claim,	  the	  entire	  amount	  for	  which	  cover	  may	  be	  available	  to	  the	  insured	  is	  
subject	  to	  the	  charge;	  
• In	  this	  case	  the	  claim	  by	  the	  receivers	  and	  liquidators	  was	  for	  a	  sum	  significantly	  
greater	  than	  the	  amount	  of	  cover	  available	  under	  the	  D&O	  policy;	  and	  
• As	  a	  result,	  the	  insurer	  was	  bound	  to	  keep	  the	  entire	  insurance	  fund	  intact	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  the	  receivers	  and	  liquidators	  irrespective	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  had	  not	  yet	  
filed	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  directors	  and	  potentially	  would	  not	  do	  so	  for	  some	  time.	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  [1941]	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  1029.	  
64	  (1995)	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  CLR	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65	  [2008]	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Lang	  J	  noted	  that	  the	  position	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  different	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  amount	  of	  a	  
prospective	  claim	  is	  well	  within	  the	  amount	  of	  cover	  available	  under	  a	  policy.	  His	  Honour	  
suggested	  that	  under	  these	  circumstances	  the	  insured	  may	  be	  able	  to	  access	  funds	  to	  meet	  
defence	  costs,	  as	  the	  charge	  could	  only	  extend	  to	  the	  likely	  amount	  of	  the	  claim	  and	  its	  
associated	  costs.	  
Irrespective	  of	  the	  apparent	  harshness	  of	  this	  result	  for	  the	  directors,	  Lang	  J	  explained	  that	  his	  
conclusions	  were	  clearly	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  section	  9.	  His	  Honour	  
was	  clear	  that	  if	  the	  directors	  were	  able	  to	  obtain	  access	  to	  funds	  under	  the	  policy	  to	  meet	  
their	  defence	  costs,	  the	  pool	  of	  funds	  available	  to	  meet	  civil	  claims	  would	  be	  significantly	  
depleted,	  defeating	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  statutory	  charge.	  
Of	  significance	  to	  directors	  seeking	  D&O	  cover,	  it	  was	  also	  noted	  in	  proceedings	  that	  the	  
directors	  in	  this	  case	  had	  taken	  out	  a	  single	  D&O	  policy	  that	  provided	  cover	  for	  both	  defence	  
costs	  and	  claims	  for	  damages	  and	  compensation.	  It	  was	  suggested	  that	  if	  the	  directors	  had	  
taken	  a	  separate	  statutory	  liability	  policy	  which	  covered	  only	  defence	  costs	  it	  would	  not	  have	  
been	  subject	  to	  the	  section	  9	  charge.	  
Directors	  (and	  insurers)	  in	  Australia	  must	  now	  await	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  appeal	  from	  this	  
decision.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  appeal,	  and	  the	  principles	  it	  establishes	  are	  being	  challenged	  in	  a	  New	  
Zealand	  shareholder	  class	  action	  against	  failed	  carpet	  manufacturer,	  Feltex,	  and	  in	  a	  New	  
South	  Wales	  shareholder	  class	  action	  against	  the	  Centro	  property	  group.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  and	  
the	  Bridgeman	  case,	  the	  applicable	  D&O	  policies	  were	  issued	  by	  Chartis.	  	  The	  New	  Zealand	  
Court	  of	  Appeal	  has	  been	  asked	  to	  hear	  the	  Bridgecorp	  appeal	  and	  the	  Feltex	  case	  together	  
given	  those	  common	  factors	  and	  their	  consequences.	  
The	  Bridgecorp	  decision	  has	  relevance	  to	  the	  Centro	  case	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  common	  
D&O	  policy	  in	  issue	  but	  also	  because	  in	  New	  South	  Wales,	  there	  is	  an	  equivalent	  of	  section	  9	  of	  
the	  New	  Zealand	  Law	  Reform	  Act	  in	  the	  form	  of	  section	  6	  of	  the	  Law	  Reform	  (Miscellaneous	  
Provisions)	  Act	  1946	  (NSW).	  
Directors	  will	  be	  hoping	  that,	  as	  the	  heat	  is	  progressively	  turned	  up,	  this	  line	  of	  cases	  doesn’t	  
burn	  yet	  another	  bridge	  to	  some	  safety	  and	  protection	  for	  directors	  withstanding	  legal	  attacks	  
on	  their	  actions.	  
However,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  insurers	  considering	  that,	  if	  too	  many	  more	  such	  D&O	  bridges	  are	  
burned,	  directors	  may	  start	  to	  consider	  this	  weapon	  to	  be	  more	  of	  a	  ‘pop	  gun’	  and	  many	  of	  
them,	  particularly	  in	  smaller	  companies,	  will	  potentially	  question	  its	  value	  and	  prefer	  the	  risky	  
strategy	  of	  acting	  as	  a	  director	  without	  such	  cover.	  
	  
5.6 A FAILURE OF GOVERNANCE 
Jonathan	  Casson	  
The	  imperatives	  of	  good	  governance,	  and	  the	  benefits	  that	  flow	  from	  maintaining	  
appropriate	  standards	  are	  well	  publicised.	  Why	  then	  do	  so	  many	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  (NFP)	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organisations	  fail	  to	  follow	  the	  basic	  precepts?	  Often	  it	  is	  a	  crisis	  in	  the	  organisation	  that	  
sets	  the	  environment	  for	  a	  deliberate	  or	  unwitting	  departure	  from	  the	  standards	  to	  
which	  they	  nominally	  subscribe.	  The	  following	  explores	  what	  standards	  are	  prescribed	  in	  
non-­‐corporate	  NFP	  organisations	  and	  reviews	  a	  case	  where	  adherence	  to	  the	  standards	  
broke	  down.	  
GOVERNANCE 
The	  object	  of	  governance	  rules	  is	  to	  ensure	  compliance,	  transparency	  and	  
accountability	  of	  NFP	  entities	  to	  their	  volunteers,	  donors,	  beneficiaries,	  the	  public	  at	  
large	  and	  members	  (where	  applicable).	  Further,	  the	  governance	  rules	  should	  create	  a	  
framework	  to	  protect	  the	  entity	  and	  its	  mission	  or	  purpose	  from	  mismanagement,	  and	  
ensure	  that	  the	  entity	  is	  focused	  on	  its	  mission,	  and	  not	  the	  goals	  or	  interests	  of	  
others.66	  
Governance	  is	  also	  about	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  various	  groups	  that	  make	  up	  an	  
organisation	  –	  the	  board	  or	  committee,	  the	  CEO	  and	  management,	  members,	  beneficiaries,	  
government,	  suppliers	  and	  other	  stakeholders.	  The	  successful	  board	  or	  committee	  will	  manage	  
the	  relationships	  between	  these	  elements	  and	  will	  appreciate	  the	  limits	  of	  responsibility	  for	  
each	  group.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  are	  the	  dynamics	  within	  the	  board	  or	  committee,	  as	  well	  as	  
between	  the	  board	  or	  committee	  and	  the	  senior	  management	  team.	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  
those	  relationships	  are	  managed	  will,	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  determine	  the	  success	  of	  the	  
organisation.	  	  
There	  are	  many	  sources	  of	  guidance	  for	  boards	  or	  committees	  of	  management.	  Even	  though	  
they	  are	  designed	  for	  for-­‐profit	  boards,	  The	  Australian	  Stock	  Exchange’s	  Corporate	  Governance	  
Committee’s	  Corporate	  Governance	  Principles	  and	  Recommendations	  are	  often	  cited	  as	  a	  
cornerstone	  for	  governance.	  Standards	  Australia	  has	  introduced	  Good	  Governance	  Principles	  
(Australian	  Standard	  8000–2003)	  with	  specific	  standards	  for	  NFP	  organisations.	  	  
The	  board’s	  or	  committee’s	  governance	  role	  is	  to	  provide	  leadership	  rather	  than	  to	  
manage	  the	  organisation.	  Its	  focus	  must	  be	  on	  realising	  the	  mission	  of	  the	  organisation	  
and	  fulfilling	  its	  objects.	  Despite	  this,	  a	  strict	  reading	  of	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  2001	  (Cth)	  
so	  far	  as	  it	  governs	  companies	  limited	  by	  guarantee	  might	  be	  confusing.	  Section	  198A(1)	  
of	  that	  Act	  states,	  ‘The	  business	  of	  the	  company	  is	  to	  be	  managed	  by	  or	  under	  the	  
direction	  of	  the	  directors’.	  Queensland,67	  New	  South	  Wales,68	  Victoria,69	  South	  
Australia,70	  Western	  Australia	  (WA),71	  and	  the	  Australian	  Capital	  Territory	  (ACT)72	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Treasury,	  Review	  of	  Not-­‐for-­‐Profit	  Governance	  Arrangements,	  (2011),	  para	  32,	  
http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Submissions/2011/nfp-­‐governance-­‐
arrangements.	  
67	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  1981	  (Qld),	  s	  60.	  
68	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  2009	  (NSW)	  s	  28.	  
69	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  1981	  (Vic)	  s	  6,	  now	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Reform	  Act	  2012	  (Vic)	  
Part	  6.	  
70	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  1985	  (SA),	  s	  29.	  
71	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  1987	  (WA),	  s	  20.	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similar	  provisions	  in	  their	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Acts.	  The	  Tasmanian	  and	  Northern	  
Territory	  (NT)	  legislation	  is	  less	  clear	  and	  only	  by	  implication	  places	  the	  management	  of	  
an	  association	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  committee.	  	  
For	  companies,	  there	  is	  relatively	  straightforward	  legislative	  direction	  regarding	  
minimum	  rules	  of	  governance.	  For	  over	  20	  years	  corporate	  governance	  has	  been	  
regulated	  in	  the	  Corporations	  Act	  and	  its	  predecessors.	  The	  regulation	  by	  black	  letter	  law	  
for	  Associations	  has	  taken	  longer.	  
Duties	  of	  committee	  members	  are	  regulated	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  the	  Associations	  
Incorporation	  Acts	  of	  Victoria,73	  New	  South	  Wales,74	  and	  South	  Australia.75	  New	  South	  
Wales,	  Victoria,	  South	  Australia,	  Western	  Australia	  and	  the	  ACT	  have	  provisions	  
regarding	  disclosure	  of	  interests.76	  There	  are	  no	  equivalent	  provisions	  in	  Queensland,	  the	  
Northern	  Territory	  and	  Tasmania.	  The	  modernised	  Victorian	  Associations	  Incorporation	  
Reform	  Act	  commences	  in	  July	  2013	  and	  deals	  squarely	  with	  corporate	  governance	  in	  
Victorian	  associations.	  
Committee	  members	  of	  an	  association	  in	  South	  Australia	  have	  statutorily	  imposed	  duties	  
similar	  to	  those	  imposed	  on	  directors	  of	  a	  company.	  Before	  the	  2009	  changes	  to	  the	  
Associations	  Incorporation	  Acts	  in	  New	  South	  Wales	  and	  Victoria,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  
issue	  in	  those	  states	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  committee	  of	  management	  in	  an	  association	  bore	  
the	  same	  responsibilities	  and	  liabilities	  as	  a	  board	  in	  a	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee;	  
other	  than	  in	  respect	  of	  insolvent	  trading.77	  The	  changes	  to	  those	  Acts	  impose	  duties	  on	  
committee	  members	  in	  an	  association	  substantially	  equivalent	  to	  those	  on	  a	  company	  
board.	  	  
There	  are	  specific	  obligations	  imposed	  on	  committee	  members	  in	  the	  ACT,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  
widely	  stated	  duty.	  Limited	  duties	  are	  imposed	  on	  committee	  members	  in	  WA.	  	  
In	  States	  where	  the	  changes	  have	  not	  been	  implemented,	  the	  question	  remains	  whether	  
members	  of	  a	  committee	  of	  management	  in	  an	  incorporated	  association	  bear	  the	  same	  
liability	  as	  company	  board	  members	  and	  committee	  members	  in	  jurisdictions	  where	  the	  
changes	  have	  been	  made.	  There	  are	  no	  specific	  statutory	  duties	  imposed	  on	  members	  of	  
the	  management	  committee	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association	  in	  either	  Tasmania	  or	  the	  
Northern	  Territory.	  	  
For	  entities	  registered	  with	  the	  Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  
(ACNC),	  there	  is	  no	  distinction,	  in	  terms	  of	  responsibilities	  between	  the	  board	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  1991	  (ACT).	  
73	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  1981	  (Vic)	  s	  29A;	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Reform	  Act	  2012	  (Vic),	  
Part	  6	  Div	  3.	  
74	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  2009	  (NSW),	  ss	  31–33.	  
75	  Associations	  Incorporations	  Act	  1985	  (SA),	  s	  39A.	  
76	  NSW	  s	  31,	  Vic	  s	  29,	  SA	  s	  31,	  WA	  s	  21,	  ACT	  s	  65.	  
77	  In	  Victoria,	  the	  new	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Reform	  Act	  2012	  now	  clarifies	  the	  position	  in	  that	  
State.	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company	  limited	  by	  guarantee,	  the	  committee	  of	  an	  incorporated	  association,	  or	  
‘responsible	  entities’	  of	  unincorporated	  associations,	  such	  as	  trusts	  and	  other	  entities.	  
This	  is	  because	  the	  governance	  standards	  apply	  to	  all	  registered	  entities.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  
distinction	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  standard	  depending	  on	  the	  size	  or	  nature	  
of	  the	  registered	  entity,	  but	  this	  distinction	  is	  not	  related	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  entity.	  
Currently,	  and	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  the	  ACNC	  will	  only	  have	  responsibility	  for	  
charities,	  leaving	  other	  associations	  to	  consider	  their	  governance	  obligations	  against	  the	  
applicable	  state	  legislation	  or	  the	  Corporations	  Act,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  common	  law.	  
Despite	  the	  inconsistency	  between	  the	  Associations	  Incorporation	  Acts,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  
statutorily	  imposed	  duties	  in	  some	  jurisdictions,	  the	  better	  view	  is	  that	  even	  if	  the	  
statutes	  are	  silent	  or	  incomplete,	  the	  common	  law	  imposes	  on	  all	  NFP	  board	  or	  
committee	  members	  duties	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  imposed	  on	  company	  directors.	  
Nevertheless,	  case	  law	  is	  replete	  with	  examples	  of	  organisations	  losing	  their	  way	  
regarding	  the	  basics	  of	  corporate	  governance.	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  Esposito	  v	  The	  
Wilderness	  Society	  Inc,78	  a	  Tasmanian	  case	  concerning	  a	  Tasmanian	  registered	  
association.	  	  
ESPOSITO V THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY INC 
Whilst	  the	  background	  to	  the	  case	  is	  particularly	  complicated,	  the	  key	  issue	  in	  this,	  as	  in	  
many	  other	  cases,	  was	  the	  control	  of	  the	  organisation.	  	  
Crisis	  
The	  methods	  used	  to	  either	  maintain	  or	  wrest	  control	  of	  an	  organisation	  will	  often	  raise	  
questions	  of	  ethics	  and	  governance.	  Political	  manoeuvring	  may	  divert	  attention	  and	  
focus	  from	  the	  organisation’s	  mission.	  As	  tensions	  develop	  and	  positions	  become	  more	  
entrenched,	  the	  organisation	  falls	  into	  crisis.	  At	  this	  time	  concepts	  of	  compliance,	  
transparency	  and	  accountability	  may	  be	  forgotten	  by	  all	  factions	  especially	  if	  it	  is	  thought	  
that	  the	  ends	  justify	  the	  means.	  	  
The	  Wilderness	  Society	  operates	  through	  various	  incorporated	  associations	  in	  different	  
states	  and	  territories,	  each	  with	  its	  own	  governance	  structure.	  Only	  one,	  the	  
incorporated	  association	  in	  Tasmania,	  has	  charitable	  and	  deductible	  gift	  recipient	  (DGR)	  
status.	  It	  is	  by	  far	  the	  wealthiest	  of	  the	  Wilderness	  associations.	  The	  members	  of	  the	  
various	  local	  associations	  are	  also	  members	  of	  the	  Tasmanian	  Association.	  The	  most	  
vocal	  members	  were	  often	  also	  employees	  also.	  
The	  governance	  structure	  of	  the	  Association	  suffered	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  and	  although	  
management	  attempted	  to	  improve	  the	  governance	  structure	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  
over	  a	  number	  of	  years	  (including	  involving	  consultants	  and	  lawyers)	  it	  continued	  to	  
suffer	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  clearly	  defined	  roles.	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One	  of	  the	  greatest	  concerns	  for	  the	  management	  committee	  was	  to	  protect	  the	  
taxation	  status	  of	  the	  organisation.	  Before	  the	  High	  Court's	  decision	  in	  the	  Commissioner	  
of	  Taxation	  v	  Aid/Watch,79	  this	  was	  the	  significant	  problem.	  Executive	  management	  
expressed	  a	  fear	  that	  political	  commentary,	  especially	  during	  election	  periods,	  would	  
give	  ground	  for	  a	  removal	  of	  charitable	  status	  by	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  Taxation,	  or	  even	  
removal	  of	  the	  Association	  from	  the	  Register	  of	  Environmental	  Organisations	  by	  the	  
Treasurer	  and	  the	  Minister	  for	  the	  Environment,	  leading	  to	  loss	  of	  DGR	  status.	  	  
In	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  events	  that	  led	  to	  dispute,	  the	  tax	  office	  had	  instigated	  
three	  separate	  tax	  audits.	  These	  audits	  had	  been	  dealt	  with	  successfully,	  nevertheless	  
conservative	  forces	  from	  outside	  the	  Association	  continued	  to	  impose	  pressure	  for	  
removal	  of	  the	  tax	  benefits.	  This	  would	  have	  had	  a	  catastrophic	  impact	  on	  the	  
fundraising	  ability	  of	  the	  organisation.	  Therefore	  the	  committee	  of	  management	  saw	  
good	  reason	  to	  limit	  political	  commentary	  and	  direct	  action.	  
The	  membership	  did	  not	  universally	  support	  the	  stance	  taken	  by	  committee	  of	  
management.	  A	  political	  rift	  arose	  between	  members	  and	  the	  committee,	  and	  within	  the	  
committee	  regarding,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  the	  appropriate	  stance	  for	  the	  Association	  
to	  take	  in	  respect	  of	  political	  campaigning,	  advocacy	  and	  direct	  action.	  	  
The	  committee	  of	  management	  became	  concerned	  that	  the	  Association’s	  finances	  might	  
be	  put	  in	  jeopardy	  if	  the	  forces	  opposed	  to	  it	  took	  control	  of	  the	  organisation.	  It	  
proposed	  changes	  to	  the	  Constitution	  to	  reduce	  the	  ease	  by	  which	  the	  members	  could	  
requisition	  a	  general	  meeting,	  justifying	  the	  action	  as	  protecting	  the	  long	  term	  viability	  of	  
the	  organisation.	  The	  committee	  of	  management	  proceeded	  to	  hold	  the	  Annual	  General	  
Meeting	  at	  which	  the	  changes	  were	  approved.	  	  
However	  it	  was	  severely	  criticised	  by	  the	  Tasmanian	  Supreme	  Court	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
it	  published	  notices	  of	  the	  AGM,	  actions	  which	  the	  Court	  considered	  amounted	  to	  a	  
‘subterfuge’.	  This	  included	  placing	  notices	  regarding	  the	  holding	  of	  the	  meeting	  on	  
notice	  boards	  as	  required,	  but	  then	  obscuring	  the	  notice;	  advertising	  the	  meeting	  only	  in	  
the	  Burnie	  Advocate	  newspaper,	  (which	  was	  strictly	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  Tasmanian	  
Act	  but	  had	  the	  effect	  that	  many	  members	  would	  not	  see	  the	  notice);	  not	  explicitly	  
describing	  the	  detail	  of	  the	  proposed	  resolution;	  and	  failing	  to	  respond	  to	  or	  avoiding	  
questions	  from	  members	  as	  to	  the	  holding	  of	  the	  AGM.	  
The	  tactics	  failed.	  When	  the	  so-­‐called	  secret	  AGM	  came	  to	  light,	  a	  group	  of	  members	  
called	  a	  general	  meeting	  and	  Esposito,	  as	  a	  member,	  took	  proceedings	  which	  were	  
ultimately	  settled	  by	  consent.	  A	  fresh	  AGM	  was	  held	  resulting	  in	  a	  change	  in	  regime.	  
In	  the	  realpolitik	  of	  the	  Wilderness	  Association	  this	  might	  not	  mean	  much:	  essentially	  the	  
rules	  prescribed	  notice	  in	  a	  Tasmanian	  newspaper,	  and	  in	  the	  association’s	  offices.	  It	  is	  
likely	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  46,000	  or	  so	  members	  most	  of	  whom	  are	  outside	  Tasmania	  
and	  rarely	  visit	  the	  offices	  would	  not	  have	  seen	  the	  notices	  anyway.	  Electronic	  notice	  or	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web	  announcements	  were	  not	  mandatory.	  Under	  the	  Tasmanian	  Act	  as	  it	  was	  at	  the	  
time,	  proxy	  voting	  was	  not	  permissible	  so	  only	  local	  or	  highly	  motivated	  members	  were	  
likely	  to	  attend	  and	  vote.	  
This	  though	  is	  beside	  the	  point.	  Governance	  is	  about	  compliance,	  transparency	  and	  
accountability,	  and	  taking	  steps	  to	  obscure	  the	  management	  committee’s	  intentions,	  
even	  in	  a	  jurisdiction	  like	  Tasmania	  where	  black	  letter	  rules	  are	  at	  best	  vague,	  is	  not	  
acceptable,	  no	  matter	  how	  good	  the	  intentions	  might	  be.	  The	  case	  caused	  a	  lot	  of	  
damage	  to	  an	  organisation	  for	  which	  reputation	  is	  extremely	  valuable	  and	  the	  conflict	  
could	  have	  been	  prevented	  with	  effective,	  transparent	  arrangements	  for	  governance	  
and	  accountability.	  
 
5.7 THE ATO’S NEW APPROACH TO SCHOOL BUILDING 
FUNDS: TAXATION RULING TR 2013/2 
Anne	  Robinson,	  Claire	  Jones,	  Jae	  Yang	  and	  John	  King,	  Prolegis	  Lawyers	  
What	  is	  a	  school	  building	  fund	  (SBF)?	  
Subsection	  30-­‐25(1)	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  Act	  1997	  (Cth)	  (ITAA)	  confers	  deductible	  
gift	  recipient	  (DGR)	  status	  on	  a	  school	  building	  fund	  (SBF).	  Item	  2.1.10	  in	  the	  table	  defines	  an	  
SBF	  for	  this	  purpose	  as:	  
• a	  public	  fund;	  
• established	  and	  maintained	  solely	  for	  providing	  money	  for	  the:	  
o acquisition;	  
o construction;	  or	  
o maintenance;	  
• of	  a	  building	  used	  or	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  school	  or	  college	  (together	  a	  school);	  by:	  
(a) a	  government;	  
(b) a	  public	  authority;	  or	  
(c) a	  society	  or	  association	  which	  is	  carried	  on	  otherwise	  than	  for	  the	  profit	  or	  gain	  to	  
the	  individual	  members	  of	  the	  society	  or	  association	  (an	  NFP	  entity).	  
The	  public	  fund	  must	  also	  be	  either:	  
• registered	  (as	  a	  charity)	  under	  the	  Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  
Act	  2012	  (Cth)	  (the	  ACNC	  Act);	  or	  
• not	  be	  an	  ACNC	  type	  of	  entity	  (that	  is,	  not	  be	  an	  entity	  which	  is	  capable	  of	  being	  
registered	  with	  the	  ACNC.	  The	  types	  of	  entities	  capable	  of	  being	  registered	  are	  listed	  in	  
column	  1	  of	  the	  table	  in	  section	  25-­‐5(5)	  of	  the	  ACNC	  Act).	  
What	  is	  the	  current	  status	  of	  old	  Ruling	  TR	  96/8?	  
Paragraph	  14	  of	  the	  previous	  Ruling,	  TR	  96/8,	  contained	  the	  old	  ‘more	  than	  50%	  use’	  
administrative	  rule	  of	  thumb.	  At	  the	  time	  that	  Draft	  Taxation	  Ruling	  TR	  2011/D5	  was	  released,	  
on	  5	  December	  2011,	  TR	  96/8	  was	  officially	  withdrawn,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  was	  incorrect	  in	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law.	  As	  a	  practical	  matter,	  what	  this	  meant	  was	  that	  the	  ‘more	  than	  50%	  use’	  rule	  ceased	  to	  
apply	  from	  that	  day.	  However,	  the	  old	  rule	  is	  preserved	  for	  certain	  purposes	  by	  paragraphs	  116	  
to	  119	  of	  the’	  Date	  of	  Effect’	  part	  of	  the	  new	  Ruling	  (which	  is	  binding).	  In	  effect,	  these	  are	  
transitional	  provisions.	  
The	  initial	  Draft	  Ruling	  TR	  2011/D5	  
TR	  2011/D5	  contained	  a	  radically	  revised	  (and,	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  authors	  and	  many	  other	  
commentators,	  patently	  incorrect)	  interpretation	  of	  item	  2.1.10,	  which	  would	  have	  
significantly	  narrowed	  the	  permitted	  uses	  of	  an	  SBF	  and	  also	  given	  rise	  to	  anomalous	  and	  
capricious	  consequences.	  Fortunately,	  the	  ATO	  paid	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  numerous	  
submissions	  that	  it	  received	  and	  had	  the	  courage	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  proposed	  
interpretation	  in	  TR	  2011/D5	  was	  flawed	  in	  certain	  respects.	  
TR	  2013/2	  –	  overview	  
The	  final	  Ruling,	  TR	  2013/2,	  released	  on	  13	  February	  2013,	  contains	  a	  substantially	  revised	  
interpretation	  that	  reflects	  the	  actual	  wording	  of	  item	  2.1.10	  more	  correctly.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  
it	  deals	  with	  the	  integrity	  concerns	  and	  policy	  issues	  which	  apparently	  prompted	  the	  issue	  of	  
TR	  2011/D5.	  	  
The	  new	  interpretation	  avoids	  (or	  at	  least	  minimises)	  anomalous	  or	  capricious	  consequences	  
and	  provides	  for	  reasonable	  transitional	  arrangements.	  Overall,	  most	  schools	  and	  SBFs	  should	  
be	  able	  to	  adapt	  to	  and	  comply	  with	  the	  new	  Ruling	  without	  material	  adverse	  impacts.	  In	  
practice,	  probably	  the	  greatest	  impact	  will	  be	  on	  SBFs	  associated	  with	  churches,	  and	  in	  
particular	  on	  multi-­‐purpose	  buildings	  and	  complexes	  and	  on	  their	  Sunday	  schools	  and	  other	  
religious	  education;	  but	  many	  of	  them	  should	  be	  able	  to	  reorganise	  their	  governance,	  their	  
practices	  and	  procedures	  and	  how	  they	  approach	  the	  design	  of	  any	  multi-­‐purpose	  buildings	  
and	  complexes,	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  to	  use	  their	  SBFs	  for	  part,	  if	  not	  all	  of	  the	  building.	  
TR	  2013	  –	  the	  detail	  
The	  key	  elements	  of	  the	  new	  interpretation	  are	  summarised	  below.	  
1. What	  is	  a	  school?	  
The	  new	  Ruling	  elaborates	  on	  the	  necessary	  indicia	  for	  a	  school,	  within	  the	  ordinary	  meaning	  
of	  that	  term,	  as	  derived	  from	  case	  law:	  
• There	  must	  be	  a	  place	  of	  assembly,	  that	  is,	  one	  or	  more	  buildings	  where	  people	  come	  
together	  in	  order	  to	  be	  instructed	  in	  an	  area	  of	  knowledge.	  
• There	  must	  be	  an	  educational	  organisation	  which	  meets	  both	  the	  following	  
requirements:	  
o has	  a	  distinct	  identity.	  Normally,	  this	  will	  require	  it	  to	  have	  its	  own	  name;	  and	  be	  
an	  institution	  in	  its	  own	  right	  (even	  though	  it	  may	  exist	  within	  a	  broader	  
institution	  or	  organisation,	  such	  as	  a	  church).	  This	  in	  turn	  requires	  that	  it	  have:	  
defined	  purposes;	  a	  quality	  of	  permanence;	  and,	  importantly,	  a	  governing	  body	  
which	  controls	  its	  affairs.	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o provides	  regular,	  ongoing	  and	  systemic	  instruction	  in	  a	  course	  of	  non-­‐recreational	  
education.	  
• Normally,	  this	  will	  require	  that	  it	  satisfy	  each	  of	  the	  following	  requirements:	  
o a	  set	  curriculum;	  
o instruction	  or	  training	  provided	  by	  suitably	  qualified	  persons;	  
o a	  formal	  procedure	  for	  the	  enrolment	  of	  students	  (as	  distinct	  from	  perhaps	  being	  
open	  to	  anyone	  who	  turned	  up	  on	  the	  day,	  and	  without	  keeping	  any	  attendance	  
records);	  
o some	  form	  of	  assessment	  and	  correction;	  
o the	  creation	  of	  a	  qualification	  or	  status	  which	  is	  recognised	  outside	  of	  the	  
organisation	  (for	  this	  purpose,	  recognition	  within	  the	  broader	  institution	  or	  
organisation,	  such	  as	  a	  church,	  would	  suffice);	  and	  
o the	  instruction	  provided	  must	  not	  be	  either	  in	  any	  way,	  or	  more	  than	  incidentally,	  
recreational	  in	  character.	  
Paragraphs	  137	  to	  145	  of	  the	  Ruling	  outline	  this	  requirement	  in	  some	  detail,	  by	  reference	  to	  
relevant	  cases.	  Paragraph	  145	  gives	  some	  practical	  examples.	  
2. What	  is	  ‘a	  building’?	  
The	  word	  ‘building’	  has	  its	  ordinary	  meaning:	  a	  permanent	  structure	  (fixed	  to	  the	  ground),	  
roofed	  and	  usually	  with	  walls	  and	  flooring,	  that	  provides	  protection	  from	  the	  elements.	  
(However,	  a	  covered	  outdoor	  learning	  area	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  building	  even	  though	  it	  does	  
not	  have	  walls.)	  
Importantly,	  a	  part	  of	  a	  building	  can	  itself	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  building	  where:	  
• it	  is	  a	  permanent,	  fixed	  and	  structurally	  delineated	  part	  of	  the	  building	  (for	  example,	  a	  
separate	  floor	  or	  separate	  floors	  of	  a	  multi-­‐storey	  building,	  or	  a	  wing	  of	  a	  building,	  or	  
another	  part	  of	  a	  building	  which	  could	  be	  delineated	  on	  a	  floor	  plan	  or	  other	  
architectural	  type	  drawing);	  
• it	  is	  capable	  of	  being	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  separately	  identifiable	  legal	  or	  equitable	  interest	  
(such	  as	  an	  area	  which	  could	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  lease	  or	  an	  area	  that	  could	  be	  the	  
subject	  of	  a	  separate	  unit	  in	  a	  strata	  plan).	  This	  criterion	  may	  require	  special	  
consideration	  when	  planning	  or	  designing	  a	  multi-­‐purpose	  building	  or	  complex:	  some	  
relatively	  minor	  changes	  or	  refinements	  to	  the	  building	  or	  complex	  design	  may	  permit	  
part	  of	  the	  building	  or	  complex	  to	  qualify,	  whereas	  otherwise	  no	  part	  of	  it	  (regarded	  as	  
a	  whole)	  would	  qualify.	  
This	  is	  a	  correct	  and	  sensible	  interpretation,	  which	  has	  significant	  practical	  implications	  for	  
multi-­‐purpose	  buildings	  and	  complexes.	  There	  are	  special	  and	  very	  important	  paragraphs	  (254	  
to	  269)	  in	  the	  Ruling	  regarding	  possible	  apportionment	  in	  the	  case	  of	  multi-­‐purpose	  buildings	  
and	  complexes.	  
So,	  normally,	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  either:	  
• a	  particular	  building	  (or	  a	  particular	  part	  of	  a	  particular	  building);	  or	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• an	  objective	  intention	  to	  acquire	  or	  construct	  a	  particular	  building	  (or	  a	  particular	  part	  
of	  a	  building)	  at	  some	  time	  in	  the	  future	  (see	  Example	  19	  at	  paragraph	  112	  of	  the	  
Ruling).	  
3. What	  is	  ‘use	  (of	  a	  building)	  as	  a	  school’?	  
Normally,	  this	  requires	  that:	  
• the	  building	  is	  used	  to	  provide	  instruction	  of	  the	  kind	  described	  in	  (1)	  above	  (what	  we	  
call	  Primary	  Use);	  and	  
• the	  extent	  and	  character	  of	  that	  use	  is	  such	  that	  the	  building	  itself	  can	  be	  described	  as	  
‘used	  as	  a	  school’	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ordinary	  language	  (what	  we	  call	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘Drive-­‐by’	  or	  
‘Walk-­‐through’	  type	  Building	  character	  test).	  
However,	  a	  building	  is	  also	  ‘used	  as	  a	  school’	  where	  its	  use	  is	  incidental	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  
instruction	  in	  another	  building	  which	  satisfies	  the	  Primary	  Use	  test:	  for	  example,	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  
toilet	  block	  or	  tuckshop	  building	  (Example	  13	  in	  the	  Ruling)	  or	  a	  school	  chapel	  (Examples	  15	  
and	  16);	  but	  contrast	  Examples	  14	  and	  17.	  This	  Incidental	  Use	  test	  is	  elaborated	  on	  in	  
paragraphs	  190	  to	  196	  of	  the	  Ruling.	  
A	  building	  is	  a	  ‘school	  building’	  if	  it	  satisfies	  either	  the	  Primary	  Use	  /	  Building	  Character	  tests	  or	  
the	  Incidental	  Use	  test,	  and	  the	  relevant	  use	  is	  called	  ‘school	  use’	  (other	  non-­‐qualifying	  uses	  
are	  called	  ‘non-­‐school	  use’).	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  building	  which	  satisfies	  the	  Primary	  Use	  test,	  a	  critical	  issue	  will	  be	  whether	  the	  
building	  also	  satisfies	  the	  Building	  Character	  test:	  
• This	  is	  an	  objective	  test.	  
• The	  test	  requires	  a	  weighing	  up	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  factors,	  some	  positive	  and	  others	  
negative.	  
• The	  Physical	  Attributes	  of	  the	  building	  are	  the	  most	  important,	  and	  potentially	  the	  
decisive,	  factor.	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  looking	  at	  it	  from	  the	  outside,	  or	  by	  walking	  
through	  it,	  you	  must	  be	  able	  to	  conclude	  that,	  objectively,	  the	  building	  should	  be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  school	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ordinary	  language.	  Sub-­‐factors	  relevant	  to	  this	  
factor	  include:	  
o An	  Extent	  of	  Modifications	  test:	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  any	  specific	  design	  features	  or	  
material	  adaptations	  to	  enable	  non-­‐school	  use	  prevent	  the	  building	  being	  
properly	  regarded	  as	  a	  school	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ordinary	  language?	  This	  is	  particularly	  
relevant	  for	  multi-­‐purpose	  halls	  or	  other	  areas	  that	  can	  also	  be	  used	  for	  church	  
services	  or	  other	  church	  related	  activities.	  See	  Examples	  19	  and	  12	  in	  the	  Ruling.	  
(Although	  note	  that	  even	  if	  the	  extent	  of	  those	  design	  features	  or	  material	  
adaptations	  is	  not	  fatal,	  an	  apportionment	  is	  normally	  required	  in	  respect	  of	  any	  
material	  additional	  costs:	  see	  paragraphs	  40	  and	  70	  and	  Example	  18.)	  
o A	  Disproportionate	  Size	  test:	  is	  the	  building	  bigger	  than	  is	  reasonably	  required	  for	  
the	  present	  and	  future	  needs	  of	  the	  school?	  See	  paragraphs	  71	  and	  249	  and	  
Example	  12.	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Other	  requirements	  relevant	  to	  the	  use	  test	  include:	  
• School	  use	  must	  be	  substantial.	  
• Correspondingly,	  non-­‐school	  use	  must	  not	  be	  substantial.	  In	  practice,	  this	  is	  just	  a	  
manifestation	  of	  the	  physical	  Building	  Character	  test:	  is	  the	  non-­‐school	  use	  of	  such	  a	  
kind,	  frequency	  or	  relative	  magnitude	  that,	  objectively,	  the	  building	  should	  not	  be	  
described	  as	  a	  school	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ordinary	  language?	  
• A	  No	  Material	  Limitation	  test:	  any	  non-­‐school	  use	  must	  not	  materially	  limit,	  detract	  
from	  or	  otherwise	  be	  incompatible	  with	  school	  use.	  However,	  importantly	  (and	  in	  
contrast	  to	  TR	  2011/D5),	  there	  is	  no	  requirement	  that	  any	  non-­‐school	  use	  be	  only	  
minor	  or	  occasional;	  it	  can	  be	  regular	  and	  more	  than	  minor:	  see	  Examples	  8	  and	  16.	  
• Time/number	  of	  people/physical	  area	  tests:	  see	  the	  first	  three	  dot	  points	  in	  
paragraphs	  34	  and	  180.	  Part	  of	  this	  factor	  relates	  to	  the	  old	  ‘more	  than	  50%	  use’	  rule.	  
But	  now	  this	  is	  only	  one	  factor,	  and	  effectively	  subordinate	  to	  a	  range	  of	  other	  more	  
important	  criteria	  (and	  in	  particular	  the	  Physical	  Attributes	  factor).	  See	  Example	  9,	  and	  
note	  also	  Example	  12.	  
• In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  multi-­‐activity	  body	  (that	  is,	  a	  qualifying	  body	  that	  acts	  in	  two	  or	  more	  
capacities	  –	  that	  is,	  operates	  a	  school	  and	  does	  something	  else,	  such	  as	  operate	  a	  
church),	  there	  is	  also	  an	  additional	  Control	  test:	  in	  practice,	  normally	  there	  must	  be	  a	  
separate	  organisation	  which	  runs	  the	  school	  and	  is	  able	  to	  control	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
relevant	  building,	  separate	  from	  the	  main	  qualifying	  body.	  See	  Example	  1.	  Other	  
Examples	  (8	  and	  11)	  expressly	  or	  impliedly	  assume	  that	  this	  Control	  test	  is,	  or	  is	  not	  
(Example	  2),	  satisfied.	  
4. The	  building	  must	  be	  used	  as	  a	  school	  by	  a	  qualifying	  body	  
The	  term	  qualifying	  body	  means	  government,	  a	  public	  authority	  or	  an	  NFP	  entity,	  which	  refers	  
to	  a	  society	  or	  association	  that	  is	  not	  carried	  on	  for	  the	  profit	  or	  gain	  of	  individual	  members.	  
Paragraph	  199	  says	  that	  ‘ordinarily’	  the	  members	  of	  an	  association	  are	  bound	  by	  a	  contract.	  
That	  will	  not	  be	  the	  case	  in	  respect	  of	  any	  church	  or	  other	  religious	  body	  formed	  as	  an	  
association	  (whether	  incorporated	  or	  not)	  whose	  governing	  rules	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  create	  
any	  contractual	  relationships	  and	  are	  non-­‐justiciable.	  However,	  the	  word	  ‘ordinarily’	  permits	  
an	  exception	  such	  as	  this.	  
The	  qualifying	  body	  must	  also	  have	  sufficient	  control	  over	  the	  building’s	  use	  to	  enable	  it	  to	  
direct	  the	  application	  of	  the	  building	  to	  school	  purposes.	  This	  control	  will	  arise	  from	  a	  legal	  or	  
equitable	  interest	  in	  the	  building	  held	  by	  the	  qualifying	  body,	  its	  members	  or	  an	  entity	  which	  
the	  qualifying	  body	  controls.	  So,	  a	  building	  hired	  for	  some	  hours	  each	  weekday	  by	  a	  school	  is	  
used	  by	  a	  school,	  but	  not	  as	  a	  school.	  
5. There	  must	  be	  acquisition,	  construction	  or	  maintenance	  
Acquisition	  may	  include	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  leasehold	  interest	  (provided	  that	  the	  lease	  does	  
not	  have	  a	  short	  duration	  (see	  paragraph	  212)).	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Maintenance	  may	  include	  some	  security	  monitoring	  costs	  (see	  paragraphs	  306	  to	  308).	  This	  is	  
a	  change	  from	  TR	  2011/D5.	  
6. The	  sole	  purpose	  test	  
The	  interpretation	  of	  this	  test	  is	  significantly	  changed	  from	  that	  proposed	  in	  TR	  2011/D5.	  
The	  test	  relates	  to	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  the	  SBF	  is	  established	  and	  maintained.	  Significantly,	  
in	  certain	  limited	  circumstances,	  an	  apportionment	  may	  be	  permitted:	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  will	  
be	  permissible	  for	  an	  SBF	  to	  be	  established	  and	  maintained	  to	  pay	  only	  costs	  relating	  to	  the	  
school	  use	  of	  a	  building,	  with	  the	  school	  itself	  or	  a	  third	  party	  paying	  for	  any	  non-­‐school	  use	  
acquisition,	  construction	  or	  maintenance	  costs.	  
The	  Ruling	  describes	  the	  kinds	  of	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  ATO	  might	  conclude	  that,	  
objectively,	  the	  sole	  purpose	  test	  was	  not	  met:	  see	  paragraphs	  235	  to	  253.	  
7. Miscellaneous	  matters	  
The	  Ruling	  also	  deals	  with	  a	  range	  of	  miscellaneous	  matters,	  including:	  
• How	  apportionment	  may	  apply	  in	  different	  circumstances:	  
o Re	  acquisition:	  The	  Ruling	  heralds	  a	  stricter	  approach	  re	  the	  cost	  of	  land:	  a	  school	  
(or	  an	  SBF)	  will	  be	  expected	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  estimate	  of	  how	  much	  of	  the	  
land	  will	  eventually	  be	  physically	  occupied	  by	  a	  school	  building;	  broadly,	  only	  that	  
proportion	  of	  the	  purchase	  price	  of	  the	  land	  may	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  SBF	  –	  the	  balance	  
cannot	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  SBF.	  
o Re	  construction:	  If	  a	  building	  or	  adaption	  incorporates	  design	  or	  other	  features	  
referable	  solely	  to	  non-­‐school	  use,	  and	  they	  involve	  material	  extra	  cost,	  then	  the	  
SBF	  cannot	  pay	  for	  that	  extra	  cost	  (but	  can	  pay	  for	  the	  balance).	  
o Re	  maintenance:	  A	  similar	  principle	  applies	  where	  material	  maintenance	  costs	  
relate	  to	  non-­‐school	  use.	  
Special	  and	  proper	  recognition	  is	  given	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  complying	  with	  special	  conditions	  
imposed	  by	  a	  local	  government	  or	  other	  public	  authority	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  building	  construction	  
project,	  even	  where	  those	  costs	  do	  not	  directly	  relate	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  school	  building	  
and	  otherwise	  should	  not	  be	  paid	  for	  by	  the	  SBF.	  See	  paragraphs	  81	  and	  294	  to	  297.	  
• The	  Ruling	  heralds	  a	  greater,	  or	  at	  least	  more	  public,	  insistence	  on	  compliance	  with	  
arm’s	  length	  principles.	  For	  example:	  
o Paragraphs	  72	  and	  250	  to	  251	  effectively	  impose	  an	  arm’s	  length	  requirement	  in	  
respect	  of	  contracts	  (by	  the	  school)	  for	  the	  acquisition,	  construction	  or	  
maintenance	  of	  a	  relevant	  building	  (or	  land).	  
o Similarly,	  paragraphs	  88	  and	  318	  effectively	  also	  impose	  an	  arm’s	  length	  test	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  investment	  of	  the	  funds	  of	  the	  SBF.	  See	  also	  Example	  20.	  
The	  Ruling	  also	  gives	  helpful	  guidance	  about	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  fund	  administration,	  including:	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• Where	  apportionment	  is	  permitted	  (permitting	  funds	  to	  be	  outlaid	  from	  the	  SBF,	  
provided	  that	  they	  are	  promptly	  reimbursed	  to	  the	  SBF	  by	  the	  school	  or	  a	  third	  party:	  
see	  paragraphs	  77	  and	  274,	  second	  dot	  point	  in	  each	  case);	  
• How	  to	  deal	  with	  composite	  or	  mixed	  amounts	  (such	  as	  a	  single	  cheque	  or	  transfer	  
covering	  school	  fees	  and	  a	  voluntary	  donation	  to	  the	  SBF):	  while	  they	  don’t	  have	  to	  go	  
directly	  to	  the	  SBF,	  they	  are	  not	  permitted	  say	  to	  go	  first	  to	  the	  school’s	  general	  bank	  
account	  or	  another	  body	  (such	  as	  a	  church),	  with	  the	  relevant	  SBF	  donation	  being	  then	  
passed	  on	  to	  the	  SBF.	  Instead,	  the	  Ruling	  adopts	  a	  stricter	  approach,	  requiring	  the	  
composite	  or	  mixed	  amount	  to	  initially	  be	  paid	  into	  a	  special	  clearing	  account,	  which	  
effectively	  operates	  as	  a	  trust	  account,	  with	  the	  school	  fees	  then	  being	  paid	  on	  to	  the	  
school’s	  general	  account	  and	  the	  SBF	  donation	  being	  paid	  on	  to	  the	  SBF’s	  separate	  
bank	  or	  other	  investment	  account.	  
8. Transitional	  rules	  
Paragraphs	  116	  to	  119	  contain	  transitional	  rules.	  In	  relation	  to	  paragraphs	  116	  to	  118:	  
• Both	  SBFs	  themselves,	  and	  persons	  who	  make	  a	  gift	  or	  contribution	  to	  an	  SBF	  
(Donors),	  are	  permitted	  to	  apply	  the	  old	  ‘more	  than	  50%	  use’	  rule	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
arrangements	  for	  the	  acquisition	  or	  construction	  of	  a	  building	  to	  which	  the	  fund	  
became	  committed	  before	  13	  February	  2013.	  These	  circumstances	  include	  where,	  
before	  that	  date,	  the	  SBF:	  
o accepted	  significant	  donations	  or	  contributions	  relating	  to	  the	  arrangement;	  or	  
o incurred,	  or	  became	  legally	  required	  to	  incur,	  significant	  financial	  costs	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  entering	  into	  or	  carrying	  out	  the	  arrangement.	  
• There	  are	  some	  uncertainties	  based	  on	  the	  literal	  wording	  of	  this	  exception,	  including:	  
o How	  does	  the	  exception	  apply	  where	  the	  SBF	  is	  not	  constituted	  as	  an	  express	  
trust,	  but	  (as	  is	  typically	  the	  case)	  is	  merely	  governed	  by	  a	  set	  of	  rules.	  In	  
particular,	  how	  could	  such	  a	  fund	  (as	  distinct	  from	  the	  entity	  carrying	  on	  the	  
school)	  become	  committed	  to	  an	  arrangement	  or	  itself	  incur	  any	  costs?	  
o Even	  where	  the	  SBF	  is	  constituted	  as	  an	  express	  trust,	  what	  evidence	  is	  necessary	  
to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  SBF	  ‘incurred,	  or	  became	  legally	  required	  to	  incur’	  
significant	  financial	  costs	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  entering	  into	  or	  carrying	  out	  the	  
relevant	  pre	  13	  February	  2013	  arrangement?	  
However,	  the	  paragraphs	  are	  obviously	  intended	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  all	  too	  typical	  situation	  
where	  before	  13	  February	  2013	  a	  school	  has	  embarked	  upon	  either	  or	  both	  of	  an	  acquisition	  
or	  construction	  program	  (typically	  under	  a	  Master	  Plan	  already	  provided	  to	  a	  local	  government	  
or	  other	  public	  authority)	  or	  a	  fundraising	  program	  to	  finance	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  such	  a	  
program;	  and	  where,	  in	  either	  case,	  the	  program	  anticipated	  ongoing	  donations	  to	  the	  SBF	  and	  
the	  SBF	  making	  funds	  available	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  program.	  The	  clear	  intention	  is	  that,	  
effectively,	  the	  old	  rule	  continues	  to	  apply	  to	  acquisition	  or	  construction	  arrangements	  
committed	  to	  before	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  Ruling,	  provided	  that	  the	  SBF	  meets	  the	  requirements	  of	  
the	  new	  Ruling	  for	  any	  arrangements	  entered	  into	  on	  or	  after	  13	  February	  2013.	  But,	  where	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there	  is	  any	  doubt	  about	  whether	  an	  SBF	  falls	  under	  the	  transitional	  rules,	  it	  may	  be	  prudent	  
for	  the	  SBF	  to	  seek	  a	  private	  ruling	  from	  the	  ATO.	  
Paragraph	  119	  also	  contains	  a	  transitional	  rule	  in	  relation	  to	  maintenance	  expenses.	  
	  
5.8 THE LOWDOWN ON ‘DGR’ – WHAT IS IT, DO I REALLY 
NEED IT, HOW DO I GET IT AND WHY MIGHT I HAVE 
BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL? 
Darren	  Fittler,	  Gilbert	  +	  Tobin	  
This	  article	  gives	  some	  tips	  to	  be	  used	  when	  applying	  for	  Deductible	  Gift	  Recipient	  (DGR)	  
endorsement,	  explores	  the	  question	  of	  how	  important	  DGR	  endorsement	  is	  and	  provides	  some	  
reasons	  why	  some	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  (NFP)	  organisations	  get	  it	  and	  some	  don’t.	  I	  have	  attempted	  
to	  be	  thorough,	  at	  least	  for	  an	  introductory	  level,	  but	  this	  article	  cannot	  possibly	  cover	  all	  there	  
is	  to	  know	  about	  achieving	  DGR	  status.	  Remember,	  it	  is	  the	  Australian	  Taxation	  Office	  (ATO)	  
that	  will	  assess	  your	  application	  for	  DGR	  endorsement,	  even	  if	  the	  information	  is	  collected	  by	  
or	  filtered	  through	  another	  government	  agency	  such	  as	  the	  newly	  established	  Australian	  
Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  (ACNC).	  	  
With	  this	  in	  mind	  it	  is	  worth	  spending	  some	  time	  reading	  up	  on	  DGR	  before	  launching	  into	  an	  
application.	  Time	  spent	  on	  learning	  and	  preparation	  can	  help	  boost	  the	  chances	  of	  success.	  A	  
good	  place	  to	  start	  is	  the	  ATO’s	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  pages	  found	  by	  visiting	  
www.ato.gov.au/nonprofit,	  in	  particular,	  the	  ATO	  publication	  entitled	  ‘Gift	  Pack	  for	  deductible	  
gift	  recipients	  and	  donors’.	  It	  is	  the	  ATO	  after	  all	  that	  will	  be	  assessing	  the	  application,	  so	  why	  
not	  see	  what	  it	  has	  to	  say	  about	  it?!	  	  
As	  with	  many	  things,	  you	  can	  save	  time	  and	  effort	  by	  getting	  someone	  else	  to	  do	  all	  this	  for	  
you.	  But	  make	  sure	  that	  those	  helping	  you	  are	  suitably	  experienced	  in	  the	  laws	  and	  regulations	  
relating	  to	  charities	  and	  to	  DGR	  in	  particular,	  and	  are	  up	  to	  date	  with	  regulatory	  reform	  in	  this	  
space,	  of	  which	  there	  is	  much.	  	  
With	  the	  above	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  of	  no	  surprise	  that	  DGR	  endorsement	  is	  currently	  under	  review	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  government’s	  ‘Better	  Targeting	  of	  Not-­‐for-­‐profit	  Tax	  Concessions’	  initiative.	  It	  is	  my	  
hope	  that	  this	  review	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  simplification	  of	  the	  DGR	  regime,	  but	  only	  time	  will	  tell.	  In	  
any	  event,	  I	  predict	  some	  law	  reform	  in	  this	  space	  in	  the	  next	  six	  to	  18	  months.	  	  
Preliminary	  Points	  
Before	  reading	  on,	  please	  note	  that	  being	  endorsed	  as	  a	  DGR:	  	  
• does	  not	  give	  your	  organisation	  access	  to	  income	  tax	  and	  fringe	  benefit	  tax	  
concessions	  –	  a	  separate	  process	  is	  required	  to	  access	  these	  concessions	  (visit	  
www.acnc.gov.au	  and	  www.ato.gov.au/nonprofit	  for	  more	  information);	  
• even	  if	  your	  organisation	  is	  endorsed	  as	  a	  DGR	  it	  will,	  in	  most	  cases,	  still	  need	  a	  
charitable	  fundraising	  authority	  if	  it	  wishes	  to	  engage	  in	  charitable	  fundraising	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activities	  (visit	  the	  relevant	  Fair	  Trading	  or	  Consumer	  Affairs	  body	  in	  your	  state	  or	  
territory	  for	  more	  information);	  and	  	  
• if	  your	  organisation	  wishes	  to	  conduct	  raffles,	  lotteries	  or	  other	  games	  of	  chance,	  you	  
may	  require	  a	  licence	  to	  do	  so	  regardless	  of	  whether	  your	  organisation	  is	  a	  DGR	  (visit	  
the	  relevant	  gaming	  and	  racing	  authority	  in	  your	  state	  or	  territory	  for	  more	  
information).	  	  
Note	  also,	  there	  are	  transitional	  arrangements	  for	  DGRs	  endorsed	  before	  3	  December	  2012.	  	  
The	  ATO	  publication	  Gift	  Pack	  states	  under	  the	  heading	  ‘what’s	  new’	  that	  from	  3	  December	  
2012,	  in	  addition	  to	  registration	  with	  the	  ACNC	  for	  charitable	  DGRs,	  minor	  amendments	  have	  
been	  made	  to	  some	  DGR	  general	  categories.	  If	  your	  organisation	  was	  endorsed	  as	  a	  DGR	  
before	  3	  December	  2012,	  it	  has	  12	  months	  to	  comply	  with	  these	  changes.	  
The	  ATO	  recommends	  that	  you	  self-­‐review	  your	  organisation	  as	  follows:	  
Step	  1:	   Find	  your	  organisation’s	  notice	  of	  DGR	  endorsement	  and	  note	  the	  number	  advised	  at	  
'Item(s)	  in	  Subdivision	  30-­‐B	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Assessment	  1997'	  on	  the	  notice.	  	  
Step	  2:	   Check	  that	  your	  organisation	  meets	  the	  description	  of	  the	  item	  number	  in	  the	  DGR	  
table	  in	  the	  ATO’s	  Gift	  Pack	  including	  any	  requirement	  for	  the	  fund,	  authority	  or	  
institution	  to	  be	  either:	  	  
• an	  Australian	  government	  agency;	  or	  	  
• a	  charity	  or	  part	  of	  a	  charity	  registered	  with	  the	  ACNC.	  
Failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  new	  requirements	  by	  2	  December	  2013	  could	  result	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  
DGR	  endorsement.	  Right,	  so,	  now	  let’s	  get	  on	  with	  it!	  
1. What	  is	  DGR	  	  
DGR	  endorsement	  is	  often	  heralded	  as	  the	  holy	  grail	  for	  NFP	  organisations.	  But	  what	  exactly	  is	  
DGR?	  	  
DGR	  is	  the	  abbreviation	  for	  deductible	  gift	  recipient.	  To	  become	  a	  DGR	  you	  must	  be	  endorsed	  
as	  such	  by	  the	  ATO	  or	  be	  specifically	  listed	  as	  a	  DGR	  in	  the	  income	  tax	  law,	  but	  more	  about	  that	  
later.	  A	  DGR	  is	  allowed	  to	  receive	  certain	  types	  of	  gifts	  (as	  money	  or	  property),	  the	  value	  of	  
which	  can	  be	  deducted	  from	  the	  giver’s	  income	  tax.	  It’s	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  frequent	  statement,	  
‘Donations	  of	  $2	  or	  more	  are	  tax	  deductible’.	  	  
Why	  is	  DGR	  status	  desirable?	  	  
Before	  going	  on	  to	  explain	  how	  to	  apply	  for	  DGR	  endorsement,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  
why	  this	  endorsement	  is	  so	  highly	  sought	  after.	  An	  organisation	  will	  usually	  seek	  DGR	  
endorsement	  for	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  reasons:	  	  
• To	  attract	  gifts	  –	  endorsement	  permits	  an	  organisation	  to	  receive	  ‘deductible	  gifts’	  and	  
‘deductible	  contributions’,	  and	  thereby	  enables	  the	  giver	  to	  claim	  an	  income	  tax	  
deduction;	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• To	  open	  the	  door	  to	  grants	  and	  other	  philanthropic	  contributions	  –	  endorsement	  is	  
needed	  to	  seek	  and	  receive	  gifts	  and	  grants	  from	  those	  philanthropic	  donors	  that,	  due	  
to	  law	  or	  internal	  policy,	  can	  only	  give	  to	  DGRs;	  and	  	  
• To	  gain	  credibility	  –	  endorsement	  can	  give	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  credibility	  to	  an	  
organisation	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  donors	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  	  
Types	  and	  categories	  of	  DGR	  endorsement	  	  
There	  are	  approximately	  50	  different	  categories	  of	  DGR	  endorsement	  grouped	  under	  the	  
broad	  headings	  of	  health,	  education,	  sport	  and	  recreation,	  public	  and	  private	  ancillary	  funds,	  
research,	  welfare	  and	  rights,	  defence,	  culture,	  fire	  and	  emergency	  services,	  environment,	  the	  
family,	  and	  international	  affairs.	  Many	  DGR	  categories	  are	  administered	  by	  the	  ATO	  but	  some	  
are	  administered	  by	  other	  government	  agencies.	  DGR	  endorsement	  can	  be	  for:	  
• the	  entire	  organisation	  –	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘whole	  of	  organisation	  endorsement’;	  or	  
• a	  part	  or	  subset	  of	  the	  organisation,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘endorsement	  for	  the	  
operation	  of	  a	  fund,	  authority	  or	  institution’.	  
You	  may	  also	  hear	  the	  terms	  ‘type	  1’	  and	  ‘type	  2’	  DGR.	  Basically	  a	  type	  2	  DGR	  is	  a	  giver,	  not	  a	  
doer,	  which	  is	  only	  allowed	  to	  support	  other	  DGRs	  (but	  not	  other	  type	  2	  DGRS)	  –	  for	  example	  
public	  and	  private	  ancillary	  funds.	  The	  rest	  are	  type	  1	  DGRs.	  	  
The	  main	  ‘whole	  of	  organisation’	  endorsement	  categories	  are:	  
• public	  benevolent	  institutions	  (PBIs);	  
• health	  promotion	  charities;	  and	  
• charitable	  services	  institutions.	  
The	  most	  common	  funds	  for	  which	  an	  organisation	  is	  endorsed	  as	  a	  DGR	  to	  operate	  are:	  
• school/college	  building	  funds;	  
• scholarship	  funds;	  
• public	  library	  funds;	  	  
• developed	  country	  relief	  funds;	  and	  
• necessitous	  circumstances	  funds.	  
In	  some	  circumstances,	  funds	  such	  as	  those	  listed	  above	  can	  be	  established	  as	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  
entity	  and	  be	  granted	  DGR	  endorsement	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  	  
To	  make	  things	  a	  little	  more	  complicated,	  some	  categories	  of	  DGR	  require	  an	  organisation,	  
together	  with	  any	  public	  fund	  it	  operates,	  to	  be	  listed	  on	  a	  particular	  register	  maintained	  by	  a	  
government	  department.	  More	  detail	  on	  that	  will	  be	  given	  below.	  	  
2. Is	  DGR	  endorsement	  absolutely	  necessary?	  	  
While	  in	  some	  cases	  an	  organisation's	  viability	  will	  depend	  on	  obtaining	  and	  maintaining	  DGR	  
endorsement,	  in	  many	  circumstances,	  while	  desirable,	  it	  is	  not	  essential.	  This	  is	  because	  there	  
are	  a	  good	  number	  of	  fundraising	  and	  revenue	  raising	  opportunities	  that	  do	  not	  require	  DGR	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endorsement.	  Basically,	  if	  a	  giver	  gets	  something	  material	  in	  return	  for	  a	  gift,	  the	  gift	  cannot	  be	  
claimed	  as	  a	  tax	  deduction	  and	  the	  organisation	  cannot	  give	  a	  tax	  deductible	  receipt.	  This	  is	  so	  
even	  if	  that	  organisation	  is	  a	  DGR.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  open	  to	  any	  NFP	  or	  charitable	  
organisation,	  DGR	  or	  not,	  to	  raise	  money	  through	  things	  like	  raffles	  and	  lotteries,	  the	  sale	  of	  
merchandise,	  membership	  fees,	  conference	  attendance	  fees,	  sponsorship,	  events	  (such	  as	  a	  
dinner	  or	  golf	  day),	  government	  or	  other	  grants,	  gifts	  from	  overseas	  donors	  and	  its	  own	  
commercial	  enterprise.	  Note	  however	  that	  a	  DGR	  can	  receive	  ‘deductible	  contributions’	  for	  
events	  and	  auctions	  in	  certain	  circumstances.	  Visit	  the	  ATO	  website	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  
deductible	  gifts	  and	  contributions	  
(http://www.ato.gov.au/nonprofit/content.aspx?doc=/content/8568.htm).	  	  
Also,	  a	  good	  number	  of	  charitable	  foundations,	  trusts	  and	  other	  similar	  philanthropic	  givers	  
will	  give	  donations	  and	  grants	  to	  registered	  charities	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  endorsed	  as	  DGRs.	  In	  
fact,	  some	  corporate	  foundations	  are	  set	  up	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  give	  to	  any	  
organisation	  they	  wish.	  	  
Lastly,	  let’s	  not	  forget	  that	  an	  organisation	  can	  still	  receive	  gifts	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  a	  DGR,	  it	  just	  
cannot	  give	  a	  tax	  deductible	  receipt.	  I	  have	  observed	  that	  if	  someone	  wants	  to	  give	  to	  a	  charity	  
then	  they	  will,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  organisation	  has	  DGR	  endorsement.	  However,	  that	  
same	  person	  is	  likely	  to	  give	  more	  if	  the	  recipient	  is	  a	  DGR.	  	  
3. Applying	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  
Many	  people	  working	  in,	  or	  wanting	  to	  establish,	  a	  NFP	  are	  convinced	  that	  the	  organisation	  
must	  be	  endorsed	  as	  a	  DGR	  and	  that	  because	  it	  is	  a	  NFP	  entity	  and	  is	  doing	  ‘good’	  things,	  
obtaining	  such	  endorsement	  will	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  simply	  completing	  and	  lodging	  the	  necessary	  
forms.	  While	  in	  some	  cases	  DGR	  endorsement	  will	  be	  granted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  application	  
forms	  alone,	  it	  is	  often	  helpful	  to	  provide	  further	  submissions	  on	  why	  the	  organisation	  is	  
entitled.	  Explanatory	  submissions	  and	  other	  supporting	  materials	  are	  particularly	  helpful	  if	  the	  
purpose	  of	  the	  organisation	  and	  the	  way	  it	  pursues	  that	  purpose	  do	  not	  fit	  squarely	  within	  the	  
specified	  legal	  requirements	  or	  government	  policies.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  DGR	  endorsement	  can	  
be	  more	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  than	  many	  expect.	  
Eligibility	  and	  application	  for	  endorsement	  as	  a	  DGR	  
Generally	  speaking,	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  DGR	  endorsement,	  an	  organisation	  must:	  
• be	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  and	  have	  a	  provision	  within	  its	  governing	  rules	  (e.g.	  its	  constitution	  or	  
trust	  deed)	  that	  compels	  the	  organisation	  to	  give	  any	  surplus	  assets	  to	  another	  DGR	  on	  
its	  winding	  up;	  
• have	  an	  ABN;	  
• subject	  to	  certain	  exemptions,	  be	  in	  Australia;	  
• subject	  to	  certain	  exemptions,	  be	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  with	  the	  ACNC;	  and	  
• satisfy	  the	  specific	  criteria	  for	  the	  category	  of	  DGR	  under	  which	  it	  is	  seeking	  DGR	  
endorsement.	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In	  addition	  some	  DGR	  category	  types	  require	  the	  establishment	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  ‘gift	  
fund’	  (see	  http://www.ato.gov.au/content/13269.htm	  for	  more	  on	  gift	  funds).	  
For	  the	  majority	  of	  DGR	  categories,	  the	  application	  is	  made	  to	  the	  ATO.	  However,	  some	  DGR	  
categories	  such	  as	  harm	  prevention	  charities,	  cultural	  organisations,	  environmental	  
organisations	  and	  overseas	  aid	  funds	  require	  applications	  to	  be	  made	  to	  specific	  
Commonwealth	  government	  departments	  first,	  before	  applying	  to	  the	  ATO.	  
Where	  do	  I	  apply	  for	  DGR	  endorsement?	  	  
While	  DGR	  endorsement	  is	  assessed	  and	  determined	  by	  the	  ATO,	  since	  the	  establishment	  of	  
the	  ACNC	  in	  December	  2012,	  a	  couple	  of	  additional	  pathways	  to	  DGR	  now	  exist.	  Where	  you	  
apply	  and	  what	  forms	  you	  use	  will	  vary	  depending	  on	  which	  of	  the	  following	  scenarios	  apply.	  
More	  details	  are	  given	  below.	  	  
• You	  are	  applying	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  applying	  to	  be	  registered	  
as	  a	  charity	  with	  the	  ACNC;	  	  
• You	  are	  already	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  with	  the	  ACNC,	  but	  now	  want	  to	  be	  endorsed	  as	  
either	  a	  health	  promotion	  charity	  or	  a	  public	  benevolent	  institution;	  
• You	  wish	  to	  be	  endorsed	  as	  a	  DGR	  under	  a	  category	  of	  DGR	  administered	  by	  the	  ATO,	  
other	  than	  health	  promotion	  charity	  or	  PBI;	  	  
• You	  are	  an	  organisation	  that	  wishes	  to	  be	  endorsed	  as	  a	  DGR	  under	  a	  category	  that	  is	  
administered	  by	  a	  government	  department	  other	  than	  the	  ATO;	  or	  	  
• You	  do	  not	  fit	  within	  a	  DGR	  category	  and	  have	  exhausted	  all	  other	  avenues.	  
The	  different	  processes	  are	  partly	  because	  once	  an	  Australian	  Business	  Number	  (ABN)	  has	  
been	  used	  to	  register	  a	  charity	  with	  the	  ACNC,	  the	  same	  ABN	  cannot	  be	  used	  again	  through	  the	  
ACNC’s	  online	  portal	  and	  partly	  because	  the	  ACNC	  does	  not	  yet	  have	  interdepartmental	  
arrangements	  in	  place	  with	  the	  other	  government	  bodies	  and	  agencies	  that	  administer	  some	  
DGR	  categories.	  	  
Applying	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  registering	  as	  a	  charity	  
Organisations	  that	  are	  not	  yet	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  can	  do	  so	  online	  through	  the	  ACNC’s	  
online	  application	  form.	  This	  form	  (which	  has	  an	  accompanying	  guide)	  also	  enables	  an	  
applicant	  to	  apply	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  and	  includes	  the	  facility	  to	  upload	  documents	  with	  
the	  application.	  Go	  to	  www.acnc.gov.au	  and	  follow	  the	  links	  to	  registering	  your	  charity.	  	  
The	  ACNC	  will	  pass	  on	  the	  DGR	  application	  component	  of	  the	  online	  form	  to	  the	  ATO.	  The	  ATO	  
will	  then	  contact	  you	  if	  needed.	  
Registered	  charities	  applying	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  as	  a	  public	  benevolent	  institution	  (PBI)	  
or	  health	  promotion	  charity	  (HPC)	  	  
If	  you	  are	  already	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  with	  the	  ACNC	  and	  you	  wish	  to	  apply	  for	  DGR	  
endorsement	  as	  a	  HPC	  or	  PBI,	  then	  you	  will	  need	  to	  contact	  the	  ACNC	  and	  request	  a	  ‘change	  to	  
charity	  subtype’	  form.	  This	  form	  is	  mostly	  identical	  to	  the	  online	  application	  form,	  but	  because	  
it	  is	  being	  handled	  in	  a	  paper	  form,	  ACNC	  staff	  can	  identify	  and	  process	  the	  application	  
properly	  as	  required.	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If	  you	  happen	  to	  be	  an	  organisation	  that	  is	  endorsed	  as	  a	  PBI	  or	  HPC	  but	  only	  for	  income	  tax	  
and	  FBT	  exemption	  purposes	  –	  that	  is,	  not	  as	  a	  DGR	  –	  then	  any	  application	  for	  DGR	  
endorsement	  under	  these	  categories	  will	  need	  to	  be	  made	  using	  the	  review	  of	  subtype	  form	  
described	  above.	  Beware	  however,	  a	  request	  for	  subtype	  review	  involves	  a	  full	  review	  of	  the	  
organisation’s	  eligibility,	  almost	  as	  if	  it	  is	  applying	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  	  
Information	  relating	  to	  DGR	  endorsement	  collected	  as	  part	  of	  this	  process	  will	  be	  provided	  to	  
the	  ATO.	  The	  ATO	  will	  then	  contact	  you	  if	  needed.	  
Applying	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  under	  an	  ATO-­‐administered	  DGR	  category	  other	  than	  PBI	  or	  
HPC	  
If	  you	  are	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  with	  the	  ACNC	  and	  wish	  to	  apply	  for	  the	  same	  organisation	  to	  
be	  endorsed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  operating	  a	  fund	  (such	  as	  a	  school	  building	  fund),	  then	  you	  will	  
need	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  ATO	  directly.	  	  
However,	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  entity	  (including	  a	  trust)	  to	  house	  the	  fund	  and	  this	  
new	  entity	  will	  have	  its	  own	  ABN,	  then	  you	  can	  use	  this	  new	  ABN	  to	  apply	  for	  registration	  as	  a	  
charity	  with	  the	  ACNC	  and	  apply	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  set	  out	  above.	  	  
If	  you	  are	  a	  NFP	  organisation	  that	  is	  not	  charitable	  then	  you	  can	  apply	  for	  endorsement	  directly	  
to	  the	  ATO.	  Note	  however	  that	  many	  DGR	  categories	  require	  you	  to	  be	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  
with	  the	  ACNC	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  DGR	  endorsement.	  
Applying	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  under	  a	  category	  not	  administered	  by	  the	  ATO.	  	  
Certain	  categories	  of	  DGR	  are	  administered	  by	  other	  government	  departments,	  namely:	  	  
• organisations	  listed	  on	  the	  Register	  of	  Harm	  Prevention	  charities,	  administered	  by	  the	  
Department	  of	  Families,	  Housing,	  Community	  Services	  and	  Indigenous	  Affairs;	  
• organisations	  listed	  on	  the	  Register	  of	  Environmental	  Organisations,	  administered	  by	  
the	  government	  department	  responsible	  for	  the	  environment;	  
• organisations	  listed	  on	  the	  Register	  of	  Cultural	  Organisations,	  administered	  by	  the	  
government	  department	  responsible	  for	  the	  arts;	  and	  	  
• overseas	  aid	  funds	  registered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Overseas	  Aid	  Gift	  Deductibility	  Scheme,	  
administered	  by	  AusAid.	  
If	  you	  are	  applying	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  under	  any	  of	  these	  categories	  then	  you	  will	  need	  to	  
use	  the	  application	  forms	  and	  follow	  the	  guidelines	  provided	  by	  the	  relevant	  government	  
agency.	  	  
Specific	  listing	  in	  the	  income	  tax	  law	  	  
If	  you	  are	  not	  eligible	  for	  endorsement	  as	  a	  DGR	  under	  one	  of	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  categories,	  you	  
can	  pursue	  specific	  listing	  (also	  referred	  to	  as	  special	  listing)	  through	  submissions	  to	  the	  
Commonwealth	  Treasury.	  As	  the	  phrase	  suggests,	  specific	  listing	  requires	  the	  ITAA	  to	  be	  
amended	  to	  list	  your	  organisation.	  This	  is	  often	  more	  of	  a	  political,	  than	  a	  legal,	  process	  which	  
commonly	  takes	  12	  to	  18	  months	  or	  more.	  Even	  then,	  success	  is	  far	  from	  guaranteed.	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Support	  for	  the	  type	  of	  activities	  and	  purposes	  of	  the	  organisation	  seeking	  listing,	  by	  the	  
relevant	  Commonwealth	  minister	  (through	  his	  or	  her	  portfolio),	  is	  often	  required	  for	  success.	  
For	  example,	  an	  environmental	  organisation	  that	  has	  explored	  and	  exhausted	  all	  other	  DGR	  
endorsement	  options	  and	  believes	  that	  it	  should	  be	  eligible	  for	  endorsement,	  despite	  there	  
being	  no	  DGR	  category	  relevant	  to	  its	  purposes,	  is	  likely	  to	  need	  the	  support	  of	  the	  
Commonwealth	  minister	  responsible	  for	  the	  environment.	  
For	  more	  on	  specific	  listing,	  including	  links	  to	  lists	  of	  organisations	  currently	  listed	  in	  the	  
income	  tax	  law	  go	  to	  the	  ATO	  website	  at	  
http://www.ato.gov.au/nonprofit/PrintFriendly.aspx?ms=nonprofit&doc=/content/31654.htm	  
Tips	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  applications	  	  
While	  some	  applicants	  will	  neatly	  meet	  the	  DGR	  criteria	  for	  which	  they	  are	  applying	  and	  may	  
obtain	  endorsement	  based	  on	  the	  forms	  and	  other	  required	  documents	  alone,	  it	  is	  advisable	  to	  
provide	  additional	  submissions	  if:	  
• the	  application	  form(s)	  do	  not	  provide	  enough	  space	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  properly;	  
and/or	  
• you	  do	  not,	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  fit	  the	  exact	  criteria	  and	  need	  to	  explain	  why	  you	  do.	  
It	  is	  often	  helpful	  for	  submissions	  supporting	  a	  DGR	  endorsement	  application	  to	  set	  out	  each	  of	  
the	  criteria	  under	  separate	  headings.	  You	  can	  then	  address	  them	  one	  by	  one,	  including,	  where	  
available	  and	  relevant,	  references	  to:	  
• legislation	  and	  case	  law;	  
• taxation	  rulings,	  taxation	  determinations	  and	  other	  ATO	  guides	  and	  policies;	  
• relevant	  extrinsic	  materials	  such	  as	  government	  reports,	  government	  policies,	  
academic	  writings,	  newspaper	  and	  journal	  articles	  and	  expert	  reports;	  
• documents	  relating	  to	  the	  organisation	  itself	  such	  as	  annual	  reports	  and	  brochures	  
about	  its	  services;	  and	  
• letters	  of	  support	  from	  politicians,	  business	  people	  and	  well-­‐recognised	  public	  figures	  
and	  written	  testamentary	  of	  those	  who	  have	  benefited	  from	  the	  work	  of	  the	  
organisation.	  Particular	  care	  should	  be	  taken,	  however,	  when	  using	  material	  of	  this	  
nature,	  as	  the	  author	  may	  not	  understand	  the	  intricacies	  of	  what	  endorsement	  
requires	  and	  can	  damage,	  rather	  than	  support,	  your	  application.	  
The	  purposes	  of	  your	  organisation	  are	  also	  key.	  But	  remember	  that	  it	  is	  not	  just	  what	  an	  
organisation	  says	  it	  will	  do,	  it	  is	  what	  it	  actually	  does,	  that	  will	  directly	  affect	  whether	  it	  is	  
granted	  endorsement	  and	  whether	  it	  continues	  to	  maintain	  it.	  To	  have	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  
success,	  it	  is	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  really	  drill	  down	  and	  work	  out	  what	  your	  organisation’s	  true	  and	  
core	  purpose	  is,	  and	  then	  determine	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  DGR	  category	  that	  fits,	  or	  almost	  fits	  
this	  purpose.	  It	  is	  not	  useful	  to	  review	  the	  various	  categories	  and	  types	  of	  endorsement	  first	  
and	  then	  change	  the	  organisation's	  purpose	  to	  fit	  the	  criteria	  for	  the	  identified	  endorsement.	  
For	  example,	  it	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  change	  the	  language	  used	  to	  express	  the	  purposes	  of	  your	  
organisation	  to	  align	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  DGR	  endorsement	  you	  are	  
seeking.	  It	  is	  another	  thing	  altogether	  –	  and	  I	  would	  strongly	  advise	  against	  it	  –	  to	  adopt	  an	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  361	  
	  
approach	  that	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  your	  organisation's	  philosophy	  and	  desire,	  merely	  for	  the	  
sake	  of	  endorsement.	  If	  you	  follow	  the	  latter	  path	  and	  are	  granted	  DGR	  endorsement,	  you	  
could	  very	  well	  find	  yourself	  in	  breach	  of	  DGR	  requirements	  as	  your	  organisation	  moves	  
forward	  pursuing	  its	  original	  purposes.	  
4. Unsuccessful	  DGR	  endorsement	  applications	  	  
The	  four	  main	  reasons	  why	  organisations	  are	  unsuccessful	  in	  obtaining	  DGR	  endorsement	  are:	  
• the	  application	  form(s)	  are	  not	  completed	  properly;	  
• the	  governing	  rules	  (such	  as	  a	  constitution	  or	  trust	  deed)	  are	  deficient	  in	  some	  way;	  
• the	  organisation's	  purposes	  and	  activities	  do	  not	  properly	  fit	  the	  criteria	  of	  DGR	  
endorsement	  that	  is	  being	  sought	  or	  else	  they	  have	  not	  been	  properly	  articulated	  in	  
the	  founding	  documents,	  in	  the	  application,	  within	  promotional	  materials	  or	  on	  its	  
website;	  and	  
• an	  organisation's	  objects	  and	  activities	  are	  broad	  and	  cover	  two	  or	  more	  DGR	  
categories,	  often	  meaning	  that	  it	  is	  ineligible	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  at	  all.	  This	  situation	  
arises	  because	  many	  of	  the	  DGR	  categories	  require	  the	  organisation	  to	  have	  a	  ‘sole’,	  
‘exclusive’	  or	  ‘primary	  purpose’	  and	  obviously	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  have	  more	  than	  one	  
exclusive,	  sole	  or	  primary	  purpose.	  
When	  an	  application	  for	  DGR	  endorsement	  is	  declined,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  look	  at	  other	  
organisations	  that	  have	  been	  successful	  and	  to	  draw	  comparisons.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  
very	  difficult	  to	  work	  out	  why	  your	  organisation	  failed	  where	  others	  succeeded.	  Reasons	  why	  
one	  organisation	  may	  be	  granted	  DGR	  endorsement	  while	  another	  apparently	  similar	  
organisation	  is	  not,	  include:	  
• the	  endorsed	  organisation	  was	  endorsed	  some	  time	  ago	  and	  may,	  over	  time,	  have	  
changed	  such	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  entitled	  to	  be	  endorsed	  and	  this	  fact	  has	  not	  been	  
identified	  through	  either	  self-­‐assessment	  or	  ATO	  audit;	  
• there	  has	  been	  a	  change	  to	  the	  relevant	  endorsement	  laws	  or	  ATO	  policies	  and	  again,	  
a	  self	  review	  or	  ATO	  audit	  has	  not	  revealed	  this	  fact;	  
• the	  endorsed	  organisation	  obtained	  its	  DGR	  endorsement	  by	  being	  specifically	  listed	  in	  
the	  ITAA	  because	  it	  too	  was	  not	  eligible	  for	  endorsement	  under	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  
category;	  
• the	  endorsed	  organisation,	  having	  been	  refused	  endorsement	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  
appealed	  the	  decision	  and	  was	  eventually	  successful;	  
• the	  actual	  facts	  of	  the	  matter,	  if	  known,	  would	  reveal	  that	  the	  two	  organisations	  are	  
not	  as	  similar	  as	  may	  appear	  on	  the	  surface;	  and	  
• the	  endorsed	  organisation	  was	  able	  to	  prepare	  a	  more	  compelling	  argument	  or	  
provide	  more	  convincing	  material	  in	  support	  of	  its	  application.	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  
WORKING PAPER No 59	  	  	  362	  
	  
6.0 WORLD ROUND UP 
	  
6.1 MAJOR LEGISLATION, REFORMS, AND CASES 
AFFECTING THE UK NONPROFIT SECTOR IN 2012–13 
Kerry	  O’Halloran	  
LEGISLATION 
The	  relevant	  legislative	  changes	  in	  the	  UK	  jurisdictions	  are:	  	  
• Charities	  Act	  2011	  
• Small	  Charitable	  Donations	  Act	  2012	  
• Charities	  Act	  (Northern	  Ireland)	  2013	  
• Public	  Services	  Reform	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2010	  
1.	  The	  Charities	  Act	  2011	  
This	  statute	  came	  into	  effect	  on	  14	  March	  2012.	  It	  replaced	  and	  consolidated	  most	  of	  the	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Charities	  Acts	  of	  1992,	  1993	  and	  2006	  together	  with	  all	  of	  the	  Recreational	  
Charities	  Act	  1958.	  Apart	  from	  those	  additions,	  it	  does	  not	  materially	  alter	  the	  law	  as	  stated	  in	  
the	  2006	  Act.	  This	  legislative	  initiative	  has	  not	  been	  followed	  in	  the	  other	  two	  UK	  jurisdictions	  
where	  the	  primary	  legislation	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  charity	  law	  reform	  acts	  viz	  the	  Charities	  and	  
Trustee	  Investment	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2005	  and	  the	  Charities	  Act	  (Northern	  Ireland)	  2008.	  Although	  
the	  2011	  Act	  reiterates	  the	  important	  changes	  made	  by	  the	  2006	  statute,	  the	  core	  traditional,	  
common	  law	  requirements	  –	  that	  a	  charity	  must	  be	  confined	  exclusively	  to	  charitable	  
purposes;	  be	  for	  the	  public	  benefit;	  be	  independent,	  non-­‐profit-­‐distributing	  and	  non-­‐political	  –	  
continue	  in	  force	  but	  are	  now	  vested	  with	  statutory	  authority.	  As	  the	  four	  Pemsel	  heads	  and	  
the	  ‘spirit	  and	  intendment	  rule’	  are	  also	  retained,	  this	  ensures	  that	  established	  precedents	  will,	  
at	  least	  initially,	  provide	  some	  continuity.	  
Definition	  of	  ‘charity’	  
A	  statutory	  definition	  of	  ‘charity’	  was	  introduced	  by	  the	  2006	  Act,	  as	  had	  been	  recommended	  
by	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Income	  Tax	  1920	  (Cmd	  615)	  and	  by	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  
the	  Taxation	  of	  Profits	  and	  Income	  1955	  (Cmd	  9474).	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  2011	  Act	  (repeating	  
section	  1	  of	  the	  2006	  Act)	  states,	  under	  the	  heading	  ‘Meaning	  of	  charity’,	  that	  ‘for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  the	  law	  of	  England	  and	  Wales,	  “charity”	  means	  an	  institution	  which:	  (a)	  is	  
established	  for	  charitable	  purposes	  only,	  and	  (b)	  falls	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  control	  of	  the	  High	  
Court	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  its	  jurisdiction	  in	  respect	  of	  charities’.	  
Public	  benefit	  
The	  2006	  Act	  reversed	  the	  public	  benefit	  presumption	  traditionally	  granted	  to	  the	  first	  three	  
Pemsel	  heads	  to	  give	  the	  public	  benefit	  test	  an	  unequivocal	  mandatory	  application	  in	  respect	  
of	  all	  charitable	  purposes,	  including	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion,	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  The	  
duty	  to	  satisfy	  the	  public	  benefit	  test,	  previously	  to	  be	  found	  in	  section	  2(2)(b)	  of	  the	  2006	  Act	  
is	  now	  in	  section	  4(2)	  of	  the	  2011	  Act	  which	  states:	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In	  determining	  whether	  the	  public	  benefit	  requirement	  is	  satisfied	  in	  relation	  to	  any	  
purpose	  falling	  within	  section	  3(1),	  it	  is	  not	  to	  be	  presumed	  that	  a	  purpose	  of	  a	  
particular	  description	  is	  for	  the	  public	  benefit.	  
This	  has	  had	  a	  radical	  effect	  on	  religious	  organizations	  as	  the	  presumption	  that	  the	  default	  
position	  of	  religion	  is	  one	  that	  it	  operates	  for	  the	  public	  benefit	  has	  gone.	  Therefore	  it	  can	  no	  
longer	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  that	  the	  services	  of	  charities	  working	  to	  advance	  religion	  are	  
inherently	  beneficial.	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  Preston	  Down	  Trust	  case	  as	  reported	  below.	  
Although	  the	  2011	  Act	  does	  not	  expressly	  mention	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘detriment’	  (introduced	  in	  
Scottish	  legislation),	  when	  assessing	  the	  public	  benefit	  of	  a	  charity,	  including	  one	  for	  the	  
advancement	  of	  religion,	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  will	  consider	  or	  may	  consider	  any	  evidence	  
that	  arises	  of	  significant	  detrimental	  or	  harmful	  effects,	  from	  the	  charity	  carrying	  out	  its	  aims.	  
In	  so	  doing,	  the	  Commission	  advises	  that	  it	  will	  take	  into	  account	  ‘public	  opinion	  where	  there	  
are	  objective	  and	  informed	  public	  concerns	  about,	  or	  evidence	  that,	  the	  beliefs	  or	  practices	  of	  
an	  organisation	  advancing	  religion	  causes	  detriment	  or	  harm’.80	  As	  Briggs	  J	  explained	  in	  
Catholic	  Care	  (Diocese	  of	  Leeds)	  v	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  81	  ‘an	  organisation	  which	  proposes	  
to	  fulfil	  a	  purpose	  for	  the	  public	  benefit	  will	  only	  qualify	  as	  a	  charity	  if,	  taking	  into	  account	  any	  
dis-­‐benefit	  arising	  from	  its	  modus	  operandi,	  its	  activities	  nonetheless	  yield	  a	  net	  public	  
benefit’.	  
Charitable	  purpose	  
A	  statutory	  definition	  of	  charitable	  purpose	  was	  introduced	  by	  section	  2(1)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  
2006	  when	  it	  was	  defined	  as	  one	  that:	  (a)	  falls	  within	  the	  list	  of	  descriptions	  of	  charitable	  
purposes	  set	  out	  in	  section	  2(2);	  and	  (b)	  is	  for	  the	  public	  benefit.	  The	  identical	  definition	  is	  
repeated	  in	  section	  3	  of	  the	  2011	  Act	  where	  the	  list	  of	  charitable	  purposes	  is	  now	  stated	  as	  
follows:	  
s.3(1)	  A	  purpose	  falls	  within	  this	  subsection	  if	  it	  falls	  within	  any	  of	  the	  following	  
descriptions	  of	  purposes—	  	  
(a)	  the	  prevention	  or	  relief	  of	  poverty;	  	  
(b)	  the	  advancement	  of	  education;	  	  
(c)	  the	  advancement	  of	  religion;	  	  
(d)	  the	  advancement	  of	  health	  or	  the	  saving	  of	  lives;	  	  
(e)	  the	  advancement	  of	  citizenship	  or	  community	  development;	  	  
(f)	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  arts,	  culture,	  heritage	  or	  science;	  	  
(g)	  the	  advancement	  of	  amateur	  sport;	  	  
(h)	  the	  advancement	  of	  human	  rights,	  conflict	  resolution	  or	  reconciliation	  or	  the	  
promotion	  of	  religious	  or	  racial	  harmony	  or	  equality	  and	  diversity;	  	  
(i)	  the	  advancement	  of	  environmental	  protection	  or	  improvement;	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  England	  and	  Wales,	  The	  Advancement	  of	  Religion	  for	  the	  Public	  Benefit	  
(Version	  December	  2008,	  as	  amended	  December	  2011)	  
81	  Catholic	  Care	  (Diocese	  of	  Leeds)	  v	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	  the	  Equality	  and	  
Human	  Rights	  Commission	  [2010]	  EWHC	  520,	  [97].	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(j)	  the	  relief	  of	  those	  in	  need	  by	  reason	  of	  youth,	  age,	  ill-­‐health,	  disability,	  financial	  
hardship	  or	  other	  disadvantage;	  	  
(k)	  the	  advancement	  of	  animal	  welfare;	  	  
(l)	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	  the	  Crown,	  or	  of	  the	  
efficiency	  of	  the	  police,	  fire	  and	  rescue	  services	  or	  ambulance	  services;	  	  
(m)	  any	  other	  purposes—	  	  
(i)	  that	  are	  not	  within	  paragraphs	  (a)	  to	  (l)	  but	  are	  recognised	  as	  charitable	  
purposes	  by	  virtue	  of	  section	  5	  (recreational	  and	  similar	  trusts,	  etc.)	  or	  
under	  the	  old	  law,	  	  
(ii)	  that	  may	  reasonably	  be	  regarded	  as	  analogous	  to,	  or	  within	  the	  spirit	  of,	  
any	  purposes	  falling	  within	  any	  of	  paragraphs	  (a)	  to	  (l)	  or	  sub-­‐paragraph	  (i),	  
or	  	  
(iii)	  that	  may	  reasonably	  be	  regarded	  as	  analogous	  to,	  or	  within	  the	  spirit	  of,	  
any	  purposes	  which	  have	  been	  recognised,	  under	  the	  law	  relating	  to	  
charities	  in	  	  
England	  and	  Wales,	  as	  falling	  within	  sub-­‐paragraph	  (ii)	  or	  this	  sub-­‐paragraph.	  	  
In	  an	  important	  adjustment,	  the	  2011	  Act	  repeats	  the	  innovation	  introduced	  by	  the	  2006	  Act	  
to	  allow	  prevention	  as	  well	  as	  relief	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  concerned	  with	  
poverty	  (section	  3(1)(a))	  and	  also	  health	  (section	  3(1)(d)	  and	  (b)).	  A	  further	  significant	  
adjustment	  was	  made	  in	  relation	  to	  religion.	  Section	  3(2)(a)	  of	  the	  2011	  Act	  (previously	  section	  
2(3)(a)	  of	  the	  2006	  Act)	  states	  that	  ‘religion’	  includes:	  (i)	  a	  religion	  which	  involves	  belief	  in	  
more	  than	  one	  god;	  and	  (ii)	  a	  religion	  which	  does	  not	  involve	  belief	  in	  a	  god.	  In	  keeping	  with	  
this	  change,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2011	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  registered	  the	  British	  Humanist	  
Association	  as	  a	  charity,	  thereby	  recognising	  as	  charitable	  the	  Association’s	  aim	  to	  pursue	  the	  
‘advancement	  of	  humanism,	  namely	  a	  non-­‐religious	  ethical	  life	  stance,	  the	  essential	  elements	  
of	  which	  are	  a	  commitment	  to	  human	  wellbeing	  and	  a	  reliance	  on	  reason,	  experience	  and	  a	  
naturalistic	  view	  of	  the	  world’.	  Most	  important,	  however,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  charitable	  
purposes	  are	  now	  placed	  on	  the	  statute	  book,	  which	  enables	  any	  future	  government,	  swiftly	  
and	  directly,	  to	  delete,	  amend,	  or	  add,	  charitable	  purposes	  by	  simply	  amending	  the	  legislation.	  
Charity	  Commission	  
The	  Commission	  is	  vested	  with	  the	  statutory	  authority	  to	  determine	  charitable	  status	  and	  it	  
maintains	  a	  register	  of	  all	  charities,	  which	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  supervising	  and	  holding	  to	  
account	  all	  organisations	  so	  registered.	  In	  the	  main,	  the	  provisions	  relating	  to	  the	  Charity	  
Commission	  are	  now	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Part	  2	  of	  the	  2011	  Act	  (sections	  13	  to	  22)	  and	  are	  
unchanged	  from	  the	  2006	  iteration.	  The	  Commissioner’s	  statutory	  duty	  of	  ‘promoting	  the	  
effective	  use	  of	  charitable	  resources	  …’	  as	  previously	  stated	  in	  section	  1(3)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  
1993	  is	  now	  to	  be	  found	  in	  section	  14(4)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2011.	  Its	  duty	  to	  encourage	  and	  
facilitate	  the	  better	  administration	  of	  charities	  is	  now	  stated	  in	  section	  15(1)(2)	  of	  the	  Act.	  
Exempt	  and	  excepted	  charities	  
Exempt	  charities	  are	  those	  granted	  exemption	  by	  the	  Charities	  Act	  1993,	  from	  supervision	  by	  
the	  Charity	  Commission.	  Excepted	  charities	  are	  those	  that	  have	  always	  been	  excepted	  from	  
the	  requirement	  to	  register	  with	  the	  Charity	  Commission,	  but	  have	  otherwise	  been	  fully	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subject	  to	  supervision	  by	  it,	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  either:	  (a)	  connected	  with	  churches	  and	  chapels	  
belonging	  to	  various	  Christian	  denominations;	  or	  (b)	  charitable	  service	  funds	  of	  the	  armed	  
forces;	  or	  (c)	  Scout	  and	  guide	  groups.	  
The	  Charities	  Act	  2006	  required	  excepted	  charities	  with	  an	  annual	  income	  over	  £100,000	  to	  be	  
registered	  and	  provided	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  regulatory	  regime	  for	  exempt	  charities.	  The	  
relevant	  provisions	  relating	  to	  exempt	  and	  excepted	  charities	  are	  now	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Parts	  3	  
and	  4	  of	  the	  2011	  Act	  (sections	  22	  to	  33).	  
Charitable	  Incorporated	  Organisations	  (CIOs)	  
Section	  34	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2006	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘charitable	  incorporated	  
organisations’	  (CIOs)	  into	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  are	  now	  to	  be	  found	  
in	  sections	  204	  to	  244	  of	  the	  2011	  Act.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  legal	  structure	  created	  specifically	  to	  
meet	  the	  needs	  of	  charities	  and	  is	  available	  exclusively	  to	  charities.	  Current	  unincorporated	  
organisations	  and	  new	  organisations	  can	  establish	  themselves	  as	  CIOs.	  
The	  legislation	  also	  contains	  provisions	  to	  enable	  charitable	  companies	  and	  charitable	  
industrial	  and	  provident	  societies	  to	  convert	  to	  CIOs.	  The	  new	  CIO	  will	  not	  be	  a	  new	  corporate	  
body	  to	  which	  the	  undertaking	  of	  a	  company	  or	  industrial	  and	  provident	  society	  is	  transferred,	  
instead	  the	  existing	  corporate	  body	  is	  simply	  reregistered	  as	  a	  CIO,	  and	  the	  conversion	  process	  
does	  not	  affect	  the	  legal	  personality	  of	  the	  organisation	  or	  its	  business	  relationships.	  It	  offers	  
all	  the	  benefits	  of	  incorporation,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  ‘legal	  personality’	  for	  the	  charity	  and	  limited	  
liability	  for	  trustees,	  but	  it	  needs	  neither	  separate	  registration	  with	  the	  company	  regulator	  nor	  
regulation	  under	  company	  law.	  It	  is	  a	  corporate	  body	  with	  a	  constitution,	  registered	  with	  and	  
regulated	  by	  the	  Charity	  Commission.	  It	  will	  enable	  charities	  to	  obtain	  the	  benefits	  of	  
incorporation	  without	  having	  to	  undergo	  dual	  registration	  and	  regulation.	  By	  providing	  a	  more	  
appropriate	  alternative	  to	  the	  company	  limited	  by	  guarantee	  it	  allows	  members	  and	  managers	  
to	  be	  insulated	  from	  the	  financial	  liabilities	  of	  the	  company;	  permits	  it	  to	  agree	  to	  contracts,	  
hold	  land	  titles,	  sue	  and	  be	  sued;	  and	  provides	  for	  simple	  registration	  and	  reporting	  
requirements.	  The	  CIO	  will	  have	  its	  assets	  locked	  in	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  community	  and	  will	  
not	  be	  able	  to	  distribute	  profits	  or	  assets	  to	  its	  members.	  Following	  protracted	  delays,	  it	  is	  
expected	  that	  existing	  charitable	  companies	  will	  be	  able	  to	  convert	  to	  CIOs	  in	  2014.	  	  
The	  Charity	  Tribunal	  
Introduced	  by	  Schedule	  1D	  of	  the	  2006	  Act,	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  are	  now	  to	  be	  found	  in	  
sections	  315	  to	  331	  of	  the	  2011	  Act.	  The	  Tribunal,	  known	  as	  the	  First-­‐tier	  Tribunal	  (Charity),	  
hears	  appeals	  from	  Charity	  Commission	  decisions	  and	  may	  also	  accept	  referrals	  from	  the	  
Commission	  and	  from	  the	  Attorney	  General.	  Although	  it	  got	  off	  to	  a	  slow	  start	  it	  is	  now	  
bedding	  down	  and	  is	  making	  infrequent	  but	  important	  contributions	  to	  the	  post-­‐reform	  
development	  of	  charity	  law.	  While	  its	  decisions	  have	  no	  standing	  as	  case	  precedents,	  appeals	  
lie	  from	  it	  to	  the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  and	  from	  there	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal.	  This	  procedure	  locks	  
the	  Charity	  Commission	  decision-­‐making	  into	  the	  formal	  court	  machinery.	  	  
2.	  Small	  Charitable	  Donations	  Act	  2012	  
This	  Act	  introduced	  the	  Gift	  Aid	  Small	  Donations	  Scheme	  (GASDS)	  which	  was	  announced	  in	  the	  
2011	  Budget.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  scheme	  is	  to	  enable	  charities	  and	  Community	  Amateur	  Sports	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Clubs	  (CASCs)	  to	  claim	  a	  Gift	  Aid-­‐style	  payment	  on	  small	  cash	  donations	  up	  to	  £20	  where	  it	  is	  
often	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  a	  Gift	  Aid	  declaration.	  The	  scheme	  is	  administered	  by	  HMRC	  in	  the	  
same	  way	  as	  gift	  aid	  is	  administered.	  It	  cannot	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  tax	  relief	  because	  there	  is	  no	  
formal	  link	  with	  the	  donor.	  Charities	  will	  be	  able	  to	  claim	  top-­‐up	  payments	  on	  small	  cash	  
donations	  of	  £20	  or	  less	  without	  the	  need	  to	  record	  any	  details	  of	  a	  donor.	  There	  is	  an	  upper	  
limit	  of	  £5,000,	  which	  could	  return	  a	  maximum	  of	  £1,250	  per	  annum	  in	  top-­‐up	  payments	  to	  a	  
charity.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  by	  2015	  there	  could	  be	  an	  additional	  £100	  million	  a	  year	  in	  top-­‐up	  
payments	  for	  charities	  across	  the	  UK.	  
Concerns	  have	  been	  expressed	  in	  the	  charitable	  sector	  about	  complexities	  in	  the	  new	  scheme	  
and	  about	  disqualifying	  conditions	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  aligned	  with	  the	  formal	  gift	  aid	  
scheme.	  However,	  the	  Treasury	  is	  insistent	  that	  the	  new	  scheme	  must	  be	  aligned	  to	  gift	  aid	  in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  are	  safeguards	  in	  place	  and	  that	  any	  potential	  fraud	  is	  minimised.	  
The	  Treasury	  claims	  that	  the	  fundamental	  issue	  for	  any	  tax	  relief	  scheme	  is	  that	  proper	  control	  
measures	  must	  be	  in	  place	  to	  prevent	  fraudulent	  claims	  and	  is,	  therefore,	  striving	  to	  achieve	  a	  
balance	  between	  the	  need	  for	  proper	  accountability	  and	  the	  requirements	  of	  small	  charities	  
that	  may	  wish	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  new	  scheme.	  This	  means	  that	  any	  charity	  that	  wishes	  to	  
claim	  a	  top-­‐up	  payment	  under	  the	  scheme	  must	  register	  with	  HMRC	  for	  tax	  purposes	  and	  
submit	  gift	  aid	  claims	  for	  three	  consecutive	  years.	  The	  Minister	  agreed	  to	  review	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  scheme	  within	  three	  years.	  The	  review	  will	  look	  at	  take-­‐up	  levels	  for	  the	  
scheme	  and	  at	  any	  problems	  that	  small	  charities	  may	  have	  faced.	  
Some	  amendments	  were	  agreed	  at	  Committee	  Stage,	  mainly	  to	  address	  some	  technical	  issues	  
around	  what	  are	  called	  connected	  charities	  and	  community	  buildings.	  Connected	  charities	  are	  
those	  that	  may	  be	  connected,	  perhaps	  through	  their	  trustees,	  and	  can	  pool	  their	  donations	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  making	  a	  claim	  for	  top-­‐up	  payments.	  The	  community	  buildings	  clause	  is	  also	  
very	  beneficial	  for	  charities.	  It	  means	  that	  those	  that	  are,	  perhaps,	  centrally	  controlled	  with	  
one	  single	  registration	  can	  submit	  additional	  claims	  for	  each	  component	  part	  of	  the	  charity.	  
That	  will	  be	  very	  beneficial	  for	  local	  churches.	  
Treasury	  also	  maintains	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  regional	  variations	  to	  the	  scheme,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  
funded	  and	  administered	  centrally	  by	  HMRC.	  It	  has	  requested	  that	  the	  scheme	  be	  made	  an	  
excepted	  matter	  under	  schedule	  2	  to	  the	  Northern	  Ireland	  Act	  1998,	  which	  has	  been	  agreed.	  	  
The	  Act	  received	  Royal	  Assent	  on	  19	  December	  2012	  and	  came	  into	  force	  on	  6	  April	  2013.	  
3.	  Charities	  Act	  (Northern	  Ireland)	  2013	  
In	  addition	  to	  transferring	  certain	  functions	  from	  the	  Department	  for	  Social	  Development	  to	  
the	  Charity	  Commission,	  this	  Act	  amends	  the	  existing	  wording	  on	  public	  benefit	  in	  section	  3	  of	  
the	  Charities	  Act	  (NI)	  2008	  to	  overcome	  potential	  problems	  with	  the	  previous	  wording.	  The	  
new	  wording	  replicates	  that	  used	  in	  the	  equivalent	  provision	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2011	  in	  
England	  and	  Wales,	  therefore	  placing	  the	  principal	  emphasis	  on	  the	  public	  benefit	  requirement	  
under	  charitable	  purpose	  as	  opposed	  to	  including	  a	  prescribed	  charity	  test	  in	  legislation	  which	  
is	  found	  in	  Scottish	  charity	  legislation.	  The	  amendment	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  requirement	  in	  the	  
Act	  that	  no	  particular	  purpose	  should	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	  for	  the	  public	  benefit.	  There	  will	  be	  
no	  presumption	  of	  public	  benefit	  for	  certain	  types	  of	  charity	  as	  had	  been	  initially	  considered	  as	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a	  potential	  option	  for	  the	  Bill.	  Interestingly,	  at	  the	  Social	  Development	  Committee,	  
Department	  Officials,	  in	  response	  to	  a	  question	  on	  the	  fears	  that	  religious	  organisations	  may	  
not	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  public	  benefit,	  assured	  the	  Committee	  that	  if	  a	  religious	  
organisation	  were	  to	  hold	  an	  act	  of	  worship	  once	  a	  week	  then	  this	  would	  in	  itself	  satisfy	  the	  
public	  benefit	  requirement.	  
The	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  Northern	  Ireland	  has	  recently	  released	  a	  draft	  guidance	  on	  the	  
public	  benefit	  requirement,	  for	  public	  consultation.82	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  the	  register	  of	  charities	  
will	  be	  established	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  2013.	  
4.	  The	  Public	  Services	  Reform	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2010	  
This	  legislation	  made	  a	  number	  of	  changes	  to	  Scottish	  charity	  law,	  in	  particular	  Part	  9	  of	  the	  
2010	  Act	  which	  amends	  the	  Charities	  and	  Trustee	  Investment	  (Scotland)	  Act	  2005,	  including	  
removing	  the	  prohibition	  on	  the	  purchase	  of	  trustee	  indemnity	  insurance.	  While	  the	  majority	  
of	  provisions	  on	  charity	  matters	  came	  into	  force	  on	  1	  August	  2010,	  the	  implementation	  of	  
provision	  on	  the	  reorganisation	  of	  restricted	  funds	  was	  not	  implemented	  until	  1	  November	  
2012,	  from	  which	  date	  charities	  have	  been	  able	  to	  apply	  to	  OSCR	  for	  consent	  to	  reorganise	  
restricted	  funds.	  	  
These	  ‘restricted	  funds’	  consist	  of	  property	  given	  to	  the	  charity	  for	  a	  specific	  purpose,	  and	  
which	  it	  can	  only	  use	  under	  particular	  conditions.	  Until	  now,	  the	  only	  way	  for	  charities	  to	  
reorganise	  and	  make	  changes	  to	  restricted	  funds	  (for	  instance	  where	  a	  fund’s	  purposes	  had	  
become	  outdated	  and	  no	  longer	  allowed	  its	  assets	  to	  be	  used	  effectively)	  was	  by	  application	  to	  
the	  court.	  Changes	  to	  the	  law	  now	  mean	  that	  charities	  can	  ask	  OSCR	  to	  approve	  
reorganisations	  of	  restricted	  funds	  in	  accordance	  with	  procedures	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Charities	  
Restricted	  Funds	  Reorganisation	  (Scotland)	  Regulations	  2012.	  	  
CASES 
Preston	  Down	  Trust	  (Exclusive	  Plymouth	  Brethren)	  v	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  England	  &	  
Wales	  (June	  2012).	  
This	  was	  a	  refusal	  by	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  to	  accept	  an	  application	  by	  the	  Trust	  to	  be	  
registered	  as	  a	  charity	  as	  it	  was	  unconvinced	  that	  the	  Trust	  was	  established	  for	  the	  
advancement	  of	  religion	  for	  public	  benefit.	  The	  Trust	  is	  responsible	  for	  meetinghouses	  in	  
Torquay,	  Paignton,	  and	  Newton	  Abbott	  which	  belong	  to	  Plymouth	  Brethren.	  This	  religious	  
group,	  established	  in	  1828	  and	  granted	  charitable	  status	  for	  the	  past	  50	  years,	  currently	  has	  
about	  16,000	  adherents	  and	  has	  been	  in	  dispute	  with	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  the	  past	  7	  
years.	  Unlike	  closed	  religious	  orders,	  which	  are	  denied	  charitable	  status	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  
being	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  public,	  the	  Plymouth	  Brethren	  are	  not	  a	  closed	  sect,	  but	  an	  
organisation	  that	  welcomes	  the	  public	  to	  participate	  in	  its	  activities.	  Its	  public	  benefit	  activities	  
are	  said	  to	  include	  support	  for	  families,	  care	  for	  young	  people,	  disaster	  relief,	  visits	  to	  prisons,	  
hospitals,	  donations	  of	  substantial	  funds	  to	  many	  charities,	  including	  the	  British	  Heart	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Foundation,	  Royal	  National	  Lifeboat	  Institution,	  Macmillan	  nurses,	  and	  dozens	  of	  others.	  In	  
Holmes	  v	  Attorney-­‐General	  [1981]	  the	  High	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  Plymouth	  Brethren’s	  Kingston	  
Meeting	  Rooms	  Trust	  was	  a	  valid	  charitable	  trust,	  despite	  the	  Brethren’s	  well-­‐known	  
‘separatist	  distinctives’.	  	  
The	  Charity	  Commission’s	  decision	  was	  explained	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Trust	  dated	  7	  June	  2012.	  Its	  
key	  concern	  appeared	  to	  be	  openness;	  that	  is,	  that	  non-­‐Brethren	  members	  of	  the	  public	  might	  
not	  be	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  their	  services.	  It	  questioned	  whether	  a	  notice	  board	  identifying	  
the	  Preston	  Down	  Trust’s	  meeting	  hall	  as	  a	  public	  place	  of	  worship,	  with	  contact	  details,	  ‘is	  
sufficient	  to	  demonstrate	  meaningful	  access	  to	  participate	  in	  public	  worship’.	  The	  Commission	  
expressed	  ‘concerns	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  access	  to	  participation	  in…Holy	  Communion’.	  It	  
also	  commented	  on	  the	  beneficial	  impact	  of	  the	  Preston	  Down	  Trust,	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  ‘perhaps	  
more	  limited	  than	  other	  Christian	  organisations	  as	  their	  adherence	  limits	  their	  engagement	  
with	  the	  wider	  public’	  and	  that	  ‘the	  evidence	  in	  relation	  to	  any	  beneficial	  impact	  on	  the	  wider	  
public	  is	  perhaps	  marginal	  and	  insufficient	  to	  satisfy	  us	  as	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  community’.	  
A	  Charity	  Commission	  spokeswoman	  said:	  ‘Our	  consideration	  of	  the	  public	  benefit	  
requirement	  took	  into	  account	  the	  nature	  of	  Christian	  religion	  embraced	  by	  the	  Trust	  and	  the	  
means	  through	  which	  this	  was	  promoted,	  including	  the	  public	  access	  to	  its	  services	  and	  the	  
potential	  for	  its	  beneficial	  impact	  on	  the	  wider	  community.	  The	  central	  issue	  in	  the	  appeal	  will	  
be	  whether	  the	  public	  benefit	  requirement	  is	  satisfied	  in	  relation	  the	  Exclusive	  Brethren	  
organisations	  under	  the	  law	  as	  it	  now	  is	  ….	  It	  is	  for	  the	  organisation	  to	  satisfy	  the	  Commission	  
that	  it	  is	  a	  charity,	  not	  for	  the	  Commission	  to	  demonstrate	  it	  is	  not’.	  
This	  is	  the	  first	  time	  that	  charitable	  status	  has	  been	  refused	  to	  a	  religious	  group,	  since	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2006,	  which	  reversed	  the	  public	  benefit	  test	  (removing	  what	  
was	  previously	  considered	  a	  presumption).	  The	  refusal	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  appeal	  listed	  for	  
hearing	  by	  the	  First-­‐tier	  Tribunal.	  A	  sister	  organisation,	  the	  Horsforth	  Gospel	  Hall	  Trust	  a	  Leeds-­‐
based	  Brethren	  group	  that	  was	  granted	  charitable	  status	  in	  1988,	  has	  joined	  the	  appeal.	  The	  
result	  may	  well	  have	  implications	  for	  many	  religious	  organisations	  registered	  as	  charities	  
before	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2006	  took	  effect.	  	  
	  
6.2 IMPROPER FUNDRAISING ACTIVITIES: HOLDING THE 
ADVISERS ACCOUNTABLE IN CANADA 
Don	  Bourgeois,	  Barrister	  and	  Solicitor,	  Ontario	  
Introduction	  
Canadian	  law	  provides	  for	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  to	  hold	  charitable	  organisations	  accountable	  with	  
respect	  to	  fundraising.	  Historically,	  there	  has	  been	  little	  action	  taken	  by	  governments	  or	  by	  the	  
membership.	  While	  not	  unheard	  of,	  regulators	  seemed	  to	  be	  reluctant	  to	  take	  legal	  action	  
against	  charities	  or	  those	  who	  led	  the	  organisation.	  Similarly,	  members	  generally	  did	  not	  look	  
to	  the	  courts	  to	  enforce	  rights	  or	  to	  correct	  perceived	  wrongs.	  Donors,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
could	  take	  remedial	  action	  by	  not	  giving	  to	  that	  organisation	  in	  the	  future.	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The	  21st	  century	  has	  seen	  a	  change	  in	  approach.	  The	  causes	  are	  likely	  situational,	  but	  arguably	  
the	  development	  of	  various	  statutory	  provisions,	  in	  particular	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  focused	  the	  
attention	  of	  taxing	  authorities	  and	  others.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  Canada	  Revenue	  
Agency	  (CRA)	  began	  to	  review	  ‘tax	  shelter’	  schemes	  with	  more	  rigour,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  
amendments	  to	  the	  federal	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  came	  into	  force	  to	  support	  CRA.	  The	  intention	  of	  
these	  amendments	  –	  which	  continued	  into	  the	  2012	  Budget	  –	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  abusive	  
activities	  by	  which,	  at	  times,	  fraudulent	  activities	  are	  cloaked	  in	  ‘charitable’	  regalia.	  	  
CRA,	  which	  administers	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  for	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  similar	  taxing	  
legislation	  for	  most	  of	  the	  provincial	  governments,	  took	  action	  against	  the	  donors	  who	  
participated	  in	  the	  tax	  shelters.	  Over	  the	  last	  decade,	  it	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  reducing	  the	  
viability	  of	  many	  of	  the	  abusive	  tax	  shelters	  by	  challenging	  the	  receipts	  issued	  for	  income	  tax	  
purposes.	  A	  charity	  may	  issue	  receipts	  for	  income	  tax	  purposes	  and	  individuals	  may	  use	  those	  
receipts	  for	  credit	  as	  against	  federal	  and	  provincial	  income	  tax	  payable.	  As	  CRA	  challenged	  
different	  variations	  on	  the	  tax	  shelters,	  the	  tax	  shelters	  became	  increasingly	  complex,	  at	  times	  
involving	  multiple	  transactions	  (or	  purported	  transactions)	  and	  entities	  located	  outside	  
Canada.	  Operators	  of	  the	  tax	  shelters	  began	  to	  use	  legal	  and	  accounting	  advice	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
promotion	  of	  a	  tax	  shelter	  scheme	  to	  give	  comfort	  to	  potential	  donors.	  	  
Holding	  the	  Advisers	  Accountable	  in	  Civil	  Law	  
The	  donors,	  who	  were	  denied	  the	  claims,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  were	  required	  to	  pay	  penalties	  
under	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Act,	  looked	  to	  the	  promoters	  of	  the	  tax	  shelter	  schemes	  and	  the	  advisers	  
for	  compensation.	  A	  number	  of	  the	  cases	  were	  decided	  in	  2011	  and	  2012,	  Justice	  Strathy’s	  
decision	  in	  Charette	  v	  Trinity	  Capital	  Corporation83	  being	  one	  of	  several	  class	  proceedings	  
before	  the	  courts	  in	  Ontario.	  These	  cases	  are	  largely	  at	  early	  stages	  in	  the	  civil	  litigation	  
process	  –	  determination	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  case	  can	  be	  certified	  as	  a	  class	  proceeding	  
under	  the	  Class	  Proceedings	  Act,	  1992,	  S.O.	  1992,	  c.C.6,	  or	  if	  the	  two-­‐year	  limitation	  period	  
under	  the	  Limitations	  Act,	  2002,	  S.O.	  202,	  c.24,	  Sched.	  B,	  applied	  to	  bar	  a	  proceeding	  against	  
the	  legal	  adviser.	  
The	  cases,	  not	  surprisingly,	  turn	  on	  their	  facts.	  Justice	  Perell,	  in	  Lipson	  v	  Cassels	  Brock	  &	  
Blackwell	  LLP,84	  concluded	  that	  the	  limitation	  period	  did	  apply	  to	  bar	  the	  claim	  against	  the	  law	  
firm.	  However,	  the	  Court,	  found	  in	  Charette	  v	  Trinity	  Capital	  Corporation	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
law	  firm	  which	  provided	  the	  legal	  advice	  used	  by	  the	  promoter	  in	  promotional	  materials,	  also	  
acted	  for	  the	  taxpayer	  in	  litigation	  against	  CRA,	  extended	  the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  taxpayer	  
ought	  to	  have	  discovered	  the	  law	  firm’s	  potential	  liability.	  
While	  the	  Court	  considered	  the	  limitation	  period	  based	  on	  the	  discoverability	  principles	  in	  the	  
statute,	  a	  number	  of	  the	  judges	  also	  examined	  the	  use	  of	  class	  proceedings	  and	  the	  basis	  for	  
the	  certification.	  In	  Cannon	  v	  Funds	  for	  Canada	  Foundation,85	  the	  Court	  followed	  the	  approach	  
in	  Robinson	  v	  Rochester	  Financial	  Limited86	  in	  certifying	  the	  claims	  against	  the	  law	  firm	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  2012	  ONSC	  2854.	  
84	  2011	  ONSC	  6724.	  
85	  2012	  ONSC	  6101	  (Ontario	  Superior	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (Divisional	  Court),	  29	  October	  2012).	  
86	  2010	  ONSC	  1899.	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provided	  the	  ‘comfort	  letter’	  or	  similar	  documentation	  that	  was	  used	  in	  the	  promotional	  
materials	  –	  in	  particular	  when	  the	  lawyer	  knew	  it	  was	  to	  be	  used	  for	  that	  purpose,	  as	  in	  
Cannon.	  In	  the	  Cannon	  case,	  the	  Divisional	  Court	  upheld	  the	  previous	  decision	  of	  Mr	  Justice	  
Strathy87	  to	  certify	  the	  proceeding,	  including	  against	  the	  law	  firm.	  	  
These	  cases	  are	  not	  determinative	  of	  the	  law	  on	  the	  legal	  liability	  of	  the	  lawyers	  or	  of	  any	  
accountants	  involved	  in	  the	  design	  and	  promotion	  of	  the	  tax	  shelter	  scheme.	  Rather,	  the	  
decisions	  continue	  the	  litigation	  and	  allow	  the	  trial	  judge	  to	  make	  the	  assessments	  of	  fact	  and	  
law	  based	  on	  the	  evidence	  adduced	  at	  the	  trial.	  There	  are	  issues	  to	  be	  tried.	  The	  Divisional	  
Court	  in	  Cannon,88	  quoted	  from	  Strathy	  J’s	  reasons:	  
The	  entire	  purpose	  of	  the	  elaborate	  structure	  was	  to	  achieve	  the	  ramped-­‐up	  tax	  
deduction.	  It	  can	  reasonably	  be	  inferred	  that	  taxpayers	  did	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  Gift	  
Program	  only	  because	  they	  wanted	  to	  make	  a	  gift	  to	  the	  underlying	  charity.	  They	  did	  
so	  due	  to	  the	  representation	  that	  they	  would	  receive	  an	  enhanced	  tax	  deduction’.	  A	  
trial	  Court	  may	  conclude	  that	  it	  can	  and	  should	  draw	  the	  inference	  that	  the	  Plaintiffs	  
relied	  upon	  the	  one	  or	  two	  representations	  in	  the	  written	  materials	  made	  to	  each	  
Class	  Member	  [to	  the	  effect	  that	  this	  was	  a	  legitimate	  tax	  avoidance	  program	  that	  
would	  pass	  muster	  with	  Revenue	  Canada]	  for	  which	  the	  Lawyers,	  among	  others,	  may	  
be	  held	  responsible.	  
The	  Tax	  Court	  of	  Canada,	  which	  is	  a	  federal-­‐level	  court	  that	  deals	  exclusively	  with	  tax	  matters,	  
also	  examined	  the	  involvement	  of	  a	  lawyer	  in	  providing	  advice.	  In	  Guindon	  v	  Her	  Majesty	  the	  
Queen,89	  Ms	  Guindon	  provided	  legal	  advice	  outside	  her	  usual	  area	  of	  practice,	  but	  also	  was	  an	  
official	  who	  signed	  the	  receipts	  for	  income	  tax	  purposes	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  charity	  involved	  in	  
the	  scheme.	  She	  wrote	  and	  endorsed	  a	  legal	  opinion	  which	  she	  knew	  would	  be	  part	  of	  the	  
promotional	  package,	  an	  opinion	  that	  she	  knew	  was	  flawed	  and	  misleading.90	  She	  then	  
involved	  the	  charity	  in	  the	  Program	  and	  later	  signed	  the	  receipts	  for	  that	  charity.	  The	  Court	  
found	  that	  she,	  as	  an	  official	  of	  the	  charity	  who	  signed	  the	  receipts	  for	  income	  tax	  purposes,	  
could	  have	  relied	  upon	  a	  different	  professional’s	  legal	  opinion,	  but	  she	  could	  not	  rely	  on	  her	  
own	  legal	  opinion	  which	  she	  knew	  to	  be	  incomplete.	  The	  Court	  found	  that	  ‘her	  conduct	  is	  
indicative	  either	  of	  complete	  disregard	  of	  the	  law	  and	  whether	  it	  was	  complied	  with	  or	  not	  or	  
of	  wilful	  blindness’.91	  	  
The	  Tax	  Court	  concluded	  in	  Guindon	  that	  her	  ‘culpable	  conduct	  leads	  me	  to	  conclude	  that	  she	  
would	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  known	  that	  the	  tax	  receipts	  were	  false	  statements.	  The	  
penalty	  would	  therefore	  be	  applicable	  if	  that	  penalty	  were	  a	  civil	  one’.	  However,	  the	  Court	  
concluded	  that	  the	  statutory	  authority	  used	  by	  CRA	  was	  criminal	  and	  penal	  in	  nature	  and	  not	  
civil.	  Therefore,	  she	  was	  not	  liable	  for	  the	  penalty	  for	  providing	  false	  statements	  (the	  receipts	  
for	  income	  tax	  purposes).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Court’s	  focus	  on	  her	  behaviour	  as	  a	  professional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Cannon	  v	  Funds	  for	  Canada	  2012	  ONSC	  399.	  (Ontario	  Superior	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  18	  January	  2012)	  
88	  2012	  ONSC	  6101,	  [197].	  
89	  2012	  TCC	  287.	  
90	  Ibid	  [105].	  
91	  Ibid	  [108].	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reinforced	  this	  developing	  approach	  to	  hold	  lawyers	  and	  accountants	  more	  accountable	  in	  tax	  
shelter	  schemes.	  	  	  
Potential	  for	  Criminal	  Liability	  
The	  court	  has	  also	  examined	  the	  availability	  of	  criminal	  law	  to	  address	  improper	  fundraising	  
activities.	  In	  R	  v	  Adam	  Gour,92	  the	  Ontario	  Superior	  Court	  of	  Justice	  considered	  a	  defence	  
argument	  that	  the	  Crown	  ought	  not	  to	  have	  proceeded	  by	  way	  of	  criminal	  charge	  of	  fraud	  over	  
$5,000.	  Mr	  Gour	  operated	  a	  campaign	  using	  paid	  fundraisers	  where	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  
the	  funds	  raised	  remained	  with	  the	  fundraisers.	  The	  Crown	  took	  the	  position	  that	  there	  was	  an	  
obligation	  to	  advise	  donors	  and	  potential	  donors	  that	  a	  commission	  was	  being	  paid	  out	  of	  the	  
donation,	  failing	  which,	  the	  activity	  amounted	  to	  fraud.	  The	  defence	  argued	  that	  any	  legal	  
proceeding	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  taken	  under	  the	  provincial	  Charities	  Accounting	  Act,	  R.S.O.	  
1990,	  c.C10	  as	  a	  regulatory	  rather	  than	  criminal	  matter	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  Mr	  Gour	  should	  not	  be	  
found	  guilty.	  
The	  Court	  disagreed	  with	  the	  defence	  argument.	  McIsaac	  J	  commented	  that	  he	  was	  ‘similarly	  
unimpressed	  with	  the	  submission	  that	  the	  alleged	  misconduct	  canvassed	  in	  this	  case	  would	  be	  
better	  dealt	  with	  under	  the	  Charities	  Accounting	  Act	  …	  instead	  of	  being	  policed	  under	  the	  
heavy	  hand	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Code.	  There	  is	  no	  question	  that	  the	  allegation	  could	  have	  formed	  
the	  basis	  for	  civil	  proceedings	  under	  that	  legislation.	  …	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  see	  the	  Crown’s	  
choice	  to	  proceed	  under	  the	  Criminal	  Code	  as	  being	  in	  any	  way	  inappropriate’.	  The	  Court	  found	  
Mr	  Gour	  guilty.	  	  
Conclusion	  
The	  accountability	  of	  fundraisers	  and	  their	  legal	  and	  accounting	  advisers	  to	  those	  from	  whom	  
the	  funds	  are	  collected	  –	  either	  as	  donations	  for	  which	  a	  receipt	  for	  income	  tax	  purposes	  may	  
be	  issued	  or	  cash	  donations	  collected	  at	  the	  door	  or	  on	  the	  street	  –	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  several	  
court	  cases	  in	  Canada,	  primarily	  in	  Ontario.	  These	  cases	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  departure	  from	  a	  
previous	  reluctance	  to	  hold	  accountable	  in	  law	  fundraisers	  who	  use	  inappropriate	  or	  illegal	  
fundraising	  techniques	  or	  activities	  and	  those	  who	  provided	  the	  legal	  and	  accounting	  advice	  to	  
support	  the	  fundraising	  techniques,	  in	  particular	  where	  the	  advice	  provided	  ‘comfort’	  to	  
potential	  donors.	  	  
A	  series	  of	  class	  proceedings	  or	  individual	  proceedings	  against	  the	  promoters	  and	  their	  
advisers,	  combined	  with	  the	  use	  of	  criminal	  prosecution,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  alter	  the	  
behaviour	  of	  fundraisers	  who	  are	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  the	  law	  –	  or,	  perhaps,	  drive	  them	  out	  of	  
charitable	  fundraising	  into	  other	  areas	  to	  continue	  their	  approaches	  to	  raising	  funds	  to	  benefit	  
themselves.	  The	  new	  authority	  under	  subsections	  149.1(4.1)	  and	  (25)	  of	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  for	  
Canada	  Revenue	  Agency	  to	  determine	  that	  someone	  is	  an	  ‘ineligible	  individual’	  to	  be	  involved	  
in	  the	  management	  or	  direction	  of	  a	  charity,	  may	  also	  be	  a	  tool	  to	  eliminate	  promoters	  and	  
advisers	  who	  promote	  abusive	  and	  fraudulent	  tax	  shelters	  or	  other	  fundraising	  schemes,	  from	  
participation	  in	  charitable	  fundraising.	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5.3 CHARITABLE PURPOSE AND ADVOCACY: GREENPEACE 
OF NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED 
Susan	  Barker	  &	  Michael	  Gousmett	  
History	  of	  incorporation	  
The	  register	  of	  societies	  and	  trusts	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Companies	  Office	  records	  three	  entities	  
registered	  under	  the	  name	  ‘Greenpeace’,	  with	  one	  of	  those	  entities	  also	  to	  be	  found	  on	  the	  
Charities	  Register:	  
NAME	   DATE	  	   NO.	   LEGAL	  FORM	   REGISTER	  




244043	   Society	  
Companies	  
Office	  
The	  Greenpeace	  New	  Zealand	  



























With	  the	  exception	  of	  The	  Greenpeace	  New	  Zealand	  Charitable	  Trust,	  for	  which	  no	  documents	  
were	  filed	  with	  the	  Companies	  Office,	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  other	  entities	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  
Companies	  Office	  and	  the	  Charities	  register.	  The	  issue	  for	  the	  (former)	  Charities	  Commission	  
(the	  Commission)	  concerned	  the	  application	  by	  Greenpeace	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Incorporated	  
(GNZI)	  to	  be	  registered	  as	  a	  charity	  under	  section	  13(1)(b)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2005.	  
Objects	  of	  Greenpeace	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Incorporated	  
The	  Rules	  of	  GPNZI	  dated	  19	  June	  1999	  declare	  at	  Clause	  2	  that	  the	  Objects	  of	  the	  Society	  are	  
to:	  
a) Promote	  the	  philosophy	  that	  humanity	  is	  part	  of	  the	  planet	  and	  its	  interconnected	  
web	  of	  life	  and	  whatever	  we	  do	  to	  the	  planet	  we	  do	  to	  ourselves	  
b) Promote	  the	  protection	  and	  preservation	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  environment,	  including	  the	  
oceans,	  lakes,	  rivers	  and	  other	  waters,	  the	  land	  and	  the	  air	  and	  flora	  and	  fauna	  
everywhere	  and	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  conservation,	  
disarmament	  and	  peace	  
c) Identify,	  research	  and	  monitor	  issues	  affecting	  these	  objects,	  and	  develop	  and	  
implement	  programmes	  to	  increase	  public	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  these	  and	  
related	  issues	  
d) Undertake,	  promote,	  organise	  and	  participate	  in	  seminars,	  research	  projects,	  
conferences	  and	  other	  educational	  activities	  which	  deal	  with	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  
objects	  of	  the	  Society	  
e) Promote	  education	  on	  environmental	  issues	  by	  giving	  financial	  and	  other	  support	  to	  
the	  Greenpeace	  New	  Zealand	  Charitable	  Trust	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f) Co-­‐operate	  with	  other	  organisations	  having	  similar	  or	  compatible	  objects	  and	  in	  
particular	  to	  co-­‐operate	  with	  Stichting	  Greenpeace	  Council	  by	  abiding	  by	  its	  
determinations	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  lawful	  to	  do	  so	  
g) Promote	  the	  adoption	  of	  legislation,	  policies,	  rules,	  regulations	  and	  plans	  which	  
further	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  Society	  and	  support	  the	  enforcement	  or	  implementation	  
through	  political	  or	  judicial	  process,	  as	  necessary[.]	  	  
Application	  for	  registration	  as	  a	  charity:	  Registration	  decision	  
The	  issue	  of	  GNZI	  and	  charitable	  status	  began	  in	  2010	  with	  the	  Registration	  Decision,	  in	  a	  21-­‐
page	  document,	  of	  the	  (former)	  Charities	  Commission	  in	  declining	  to	  register	  Greenpeace	  as	  a	  
charitable	  entity	  on	  the	  basis	  that:93	  
[t]he	  Applicant	  has	  failed	  to	  meet	  an	  essential	  requirement	  for	  registration	  as	  a	  
charitable	  entity	  in	  that	  the	  Applicant	  is	  not	  a	  society	  or	  institution	  established	  and	  
maintained	  for	  exclusively	  charitable	  purposes,	  as	  required	  by	  section	  13(1)(b)(i)	  of	  the	  
[Charities]	  Act	  [2005].	  
Section	  13(1)(b)(i)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  2005	  requires	  that	  a	  society	  or	  institution	  ‘is	  established	  
and	  maintained	  exclusively	  for	  charitable	  purposes’.	  
The	  Commission	  analysed	  the	  application	  for	  registration	  by	  GNZI	  on	  21	  January	  2009,	  and	  
subsequently	  advised	  the	  Applicant	  by	  notice	  that	  the	  application	  may	  be	  declined	  ‘on	  the	  
basis	  that	  its	  winding	  up	  clause	  did	  not	  limit	  the	  distribution	  of	  surplus	  assets	  to	  charitable	  
purposes’.	  The	  Commission	  also	  recommended	  that	  a	  clause	  be	  added	  to	  the	  Applicant’s	  
constitution	  ‘preventing	  private	  pecuniary	  profit’,	  and	  also	  ‘sought	  further	  information	  about	  
how	  the	  Applicant	  promotes	  disarmament	  and	  peace,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  programmes	  the	  
Applicant	  undertakes	  under	  clause	  2(c),	  and	  information	  about	  the	  “Greenpeace	  New	  Zealand	  
Charitable	  Trust”	  and	  the	  “Stichting	  Greenpeace	  Council”’.	  
The	  Applicant	  responded	  on	  24	  September	  2009,	  advising	  the	  Commission	  that	  clauses	  had	  
been	  added	  to	  prevent	  private	  pecuniary	  profit,	  as	  well	  as	  amending	  the	  winding	  up	  clause	  as	  
advised	  by	  the	  Commission.	  The	  Applicant’s	  Objects	  were	  also	  renumbered	  as	  follows:	  
2.1 Promote	  the	  philosophy	  that	  humanity	  is	  part	  of	  the	  planet	  and	  its	  interconnected	  
web	  of	  life	  and	  whatever	  we	  do	  to	  the	  planet	  we	  do	  to	  ourselves	  
2.2 Promote	  the	  protection	  and	  preservation	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  environment,	  including	  the	  
oceans,	  lakes,	  rivers	  and	  other	  waters,	  the	  land	  and	  the	  air	  and	  flora	  and	  fauna	  
everywhere	  and	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  conservation,	  
disarmament	  and	  peace	  
2.3 Identify,	  research	  and	  monitor	  issues	  affecting	  these	  objects,	  and	  develop	  and	  
implement	  programmes	  to	  increase	  public	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  these	  and	  
related	  issues	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Charities	  Commission,	  Registration	  decision:	  Greenpeace	  of	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  2010)	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2.4 Undertake,	  promote,	  organise	  and	  participate	  in	  seminars,	  research	  projects,	  
conferences	  and	  other	  educational	  activities	  which	  deal	  with	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  
objects	  of	  the	  Society	  
2.5 Promote	  education	  on	  environmental	  issues	  by	  giving	  financial	  and	  other	  support	  to	  
the	  Greenpeace	  New	  Zealand	  Charitable	  Trust	  
2.6 Co-­‐operate	  with	  other	  organisations	  having	  similar	  or	  compatible	  objects	  and	  in	  
particular	  to	  co-­‐operate	  with	  Stichting	  Greenpeace	  Council	  by	  abiding	  by	  its	  
determinations	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  lawful	  to	  do	  so	  
2.7 Promote	  the	  adoption	  of	  legislation,	  policies,	  rules,	  regulations	  and	  plans	  which	  
further	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  Society	  and	  support	  the	  enforcement	  or	  implementation	  
through	  political	  or	  judicial	  process,	  as	  necessary.	  
The	  amendments	  were	  accepted	  by	  the	  Commission.	  The	  Applicant	  also	  provided	  detailed	  
information	  about	  its	  activities,	  and	  information	  about	  the	  Greenpeace	  New	  Zealand	  
Education	  Trust,	  and	  the	  Stichting	  Greenpeace	  Council.	  The	  Commission	  responded	  on	  14	  
December	  2009	  with	  a	  further	  notice:	  
that	  may	  lead	  to	  decline	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  ‘promotion	  of	  disarmament	  and	  peace’	  
was	  not	  exclusively	  charitable;	  that	  political	  advocacy	  is	  a	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  
Applicant	  and	  is	  not	  charitable;	  and	  that	  the	  Applicant	  appears	  to	  engage	  in	  illegal	  
activities	  which	  do	  not	  provide	  public	  benefit.	  	  
The	  Applicant	  responded	  on	  1	  February	  2010	  with	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  its	  position.	  In	  its	  
decision,	  the	  Commission	  laid	  out	  a	  detailed	  five-­‐page	  analysis	  of	  the	  law	  on	  charitable	  
purposes,	  followed	  by	  the	  Commission’s	  11-­‐page	  analysis	  of	  the	  objects	  of	  GNZI,	  leading	  to	  the	  
decision	  to	  decline	  registration.	  
Greenpeace	  appeal	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  
The	  response	  by	  Greenpeace	  was	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  under	  section	  59	  of	  the	  Charities	  
Act	  2005.94	  The	  appeal	  was	  heard	  on	  11	  November	  2010,	  with	  judgment	  on	  6	  May	  2011.	  The	  
primary	  issue	  was	  whether	  Greenpeace	  ‘had	  been	  established	  and	  was	  maintained	  “exclusively	  
for	  charitable	  purposes”’.95	  The	  subsidiary	  question	  was	  whether,	  if	  not	  maintained	  ‘exclusively	  
for	  charitable	  purposes’,	  was	  there	  a	  non-­‐charitable	  purpose	  that	  was	  ‘merely	  ancillary	  to	  a	  
charitable	  purpose	  of	  the	  ...	  society’.96	  Heath	  J	  noted	  that	  ‘[t]he	  appeal	  point	  was	  framed	  as	  
whether	  a	  modern	  law	  of	  charities	  ought	  to	  exclude	  from	  registration	  societies	  that	  promote	  
charitable	  objectives	  through	  the	  use	  of	  advocacy,	  interacting	  with	  the	  executive,	  legislative	  
and	  judicial	  branches	  of	  government’.97	  
Heath	  J	  also	  noted98	  two	  decisions	  which	  were	  handed	  down	  after	  the	  hearing	  of	  this	  case,	  first	  
from	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia,	  Aid/Watch	  Incorporated	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation99	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94Greenpeace	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Incorporated	  [2011]	  2	  NZLR	  815	  (HC),	  Heath	  J	  (Greenpeace).	  
95	  Ibid	  [4].	  
96	  Ibid	  [5].	  
97	  Ibid	  [6].	  
98	  Greenpeace	  [2011]	  2	  NZLR	  815,	  [7].	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(Aid/Watch),	  and	  from	  the	  New	  Zealand	  High	  Court,	  Re	  Draco	  Foundation	  (NZ)	  Charitable	  
Trust100	  (Re	  Draco).	  Had	  a	  similar	  question	  to	  that	  of	  Greenpeace	  arisen	  in	  Australia,	  Heath	  J	  
considered	  that,	  under	  Australian	  law	  following	  Aid/Watch,	  the	  answer	  would	  have	  been	  ‘in	  
terms	  favourable	  to	  Greenpeace’,101	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  having	  stated	  ‘that	  in	  
Australia	  [unlike	  New	  Zealand]	  there	  is	  no	  general	  doctrine	  which	  excludes	  from	  charitable	  
purposes	  “political	  activities”’.102	  Regarding	  Re	  Draco,	  Heath	  J	  noted	  that	  ‘Ronald	  Young	  J	  
declined	  to	  apply	  the	  majority	  judgment	  in	  Aid/Watch,	  holding	  that	  [the	  High	  Court]	  was	  
bound	  to	  apply	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  in	  Bowman	  v	  Secular	  Society	  Ltd	  [1917]	  AC	  
406,	  which	  remained	  good	  law	  in	  New	  Zealand’.103	  Bowman	  was	  followed	  in	  New	  Zealand	  by	  
the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Molloy	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  Revenue.104	  
A	  significant	  matter	  that	  Heath	  J	  also	  canvassed	  was	  whether	  further	  evidence	  should	  be	  
allowed	  on	  appeal,	  Greenpeace	  having	  initially	  being	  denied	  that	  opportunity,	  but	  Heath	  J	  
granted	  leave	  ‘for	  the	  additional	  evidence	  to	  be	  adduced’,105	  Greenpeace	  having	  argued	  ‘that	  
there	  was	  an	  incomplete	  record	  [of	  Greenpeace’s	  activities]	  before	  the	  Court’.106	  However,	  
Heath	  J	  concluded	  ‘albeit	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  reluctance’107	  that	  ‘the	  extent	  to	  which	  Greenpeace	  
relies	  on	  its	  political	  activities	  to	  advance	  its	  causes	  means	  that	  the	  political	  element	  cannot	  be	  
regarded	  as	  ‘merely	  ancillary’	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  charitable	  purposes’108	  and	  that	  ‘the	  political	  
activities	  designed	  to	  put	  Greenpeace’s	  plea	  for	  disarmament	  and	  peace	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
independent	  purpose’.109	  Therefore,	  Heath	  J	  concluded,	  in	  dismissing	  the	  appeal,	  ‘[i]n	  
qualitative	  terms,	  the	  charitable	  purposes	  of	  Greenpeace	  could	  be	  met	  without	  resort	  to	  the	  
type	  of	  political	  activities	  that	  deny	  its	  right	  to	  registration’.110	  
Greenpeace	  appeal	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
On	  4	  September	  2012	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal111	  considered	  an	  appeal	  from	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  
High	  Court	  to	  deny	  Greenpeace	  registration	  as	  a	  charitable	  entity.	  The	  specific	  matters	  for	  
determination	  were:112	  
(a) whether	  Greenpeace’s	  object	  of	  promoting	  peace	  and	  nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  
the	  elimination	  of	  all	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  is	  a	  ‘charitable	  purpose’;	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100	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  February	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  [2012]	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(b) whether	  Greenpeace’s	  object	  of	  promoting	  the	  adoption	  of	  legislation,	  policies,	  
rules,	  regulations	  and	  plans	  which	  further	  its	  objects	  and	  its	  use	  of	  political	  or	  
judicial	  processes	  to	  enforce	  or	  implement	  its	  objects	  are	  merely	  ancillary	  to	  its	  
charitable	  purposes	  and	  not	  independent	  purposes;	  
(c) whether,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  proposed	  amendments	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  objects	  and	  in	  
light	  of	  its	  activities,	  Greenpeace	  would	  be	  involved	  in	  illegal	  activities	  that	  mean	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  maintained	  ‘exclusively	  for	  charitable	  purposes’,	  and	  
(d) whether,	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  this	  Court	  should	  remit	  Greenpeace’	  application	  
for	  registration	  to	  the	  Board	  for	  reconsideration.	  
In	  their	  submissions	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  Greenpeace	  submitted	  that:113	  
(a) The	  decision	  of	  this	  court	  in	  Molloy	  is	  ‘stale’	  and	  should	  be	  departed	  from.	  The	  
exemption	  of	  ‘political’	  activities	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  relevant	  or	  useful	  touchstone	  for	  
what	  is	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  in	  New	  Zealand’s	  modern	  democratic	  environment.	  
New	  Zealand	  law	  should	  be	  brought	  in	  line	  with	  Aid/Watch	  Inc.	  
(b) Greenpeace’s	  ‘disarmament	  and	  peace’	  activities	  meet	  the	  public	  benefit	  test.	  
Political	  advocacy	  is	  acceptable,	  only	  contentious	  political	  activity	  is	  non-­‐
charitable.	  
(c) Object	  2.7	  complied	  with	  the	  requirements	  for	  an	  ancillary	  purpose	  and	  the	  High	  
Court	  was	  wrong	  to	  decide	  otherwise.	  
The	  Charities	  Board	  supported	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  High	  Court,	  and	  also	  
submitted	  that:114	  
(a) A	  change	  to	  the	  law	  to	  permit	  a	  charity	  to	  have	  a	  political	  object	  would	  have	  far	  
reaching	  consequences	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  charities	  are	  viewed	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  
including	  the	  possibility	  that	  commercial	  or	  political	  organisations	  would	  qualify	  
for	  registration	  as	  charities.	  
(b) The	  wider	  contextual	  evidence	  and	  argument	  necessary	  to	  support	  such	  a	  law	  
change	  was	  not	  before	  the	  Court	  and	  any	  such	  change	  would	  be	  better	  considered	  
by	  Parliament.	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  agreed	  ‘that	  any	  significant	  change	  to	  the	  law	  [with	  respect	  to	  the	  nature	  
and	  scope	  of	  the	  expression	  “charitable	  purpose”	  in	  New	  Zealand]	  should	  be	  made	  by	  
Parliament	  and	  not	  the	  Court’.	  The	  Court	  gave	  four	  reasons	  for	  this	  view:115	  
First,	  as	  already	  noted,	  when	  Parliament	  enacted	  the	  [Charities]	  Act	  in	  2005	  it	  did	  not	  
accept	  the	  Working	  Party	  recommendation	  that	  a	  new	  definition	  for	  ‘charitable	  
purpose’	  should	  be	  adopted.	  In	  particular,	  Parliament	  did	  not	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
abolish	  the	  well-­‐established	  prohibition	  on	  purposes	  that	  are	  primarily	  political.63	  
Instead,	  by	  drawing	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘advocacy’	  as	  a	  permitted	  non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  Ibid	  [23].	  
114	  Ibid	  [24].	  
115	  Ibid	  [56]–[60].	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independent	  ancillary	  purpose	  and	  as	  a	  prohibited	  primary	  purpose,	  Parliament	  
endorsed	  the	  prohibition	  and,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  decision	  of	  this	  Court	  in	  Molloy	  v	  
Commissioner	  of	  Inland	  Revenue	  [1981]	  1	  NZLR	  688	  (CA).	  	  
Second,	  no	  steps	  were	  taken	  by	  Parliament	  to	  amend	  the	  definition	  this	  year	  beyond	  
the	  addition	  of	  the	  reference	  to	  amateur	  sporting	  clubs.	  In	  particular,	  Parliament	  did	  
not	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  amend	  the	  definition	  so	  as	  to	  reverse	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  
Commission	  and	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  this	  case.	  	  
Third,	  the	  fiscal	  consequences	  involved	  in	  amending	  the	  definition	  to	  enlarge	  its	  scope	  
mean	  that	  it	  is	  a	  policy	  matter	  that	  constitutionally	  should	  be	  left	  to	  Parliament.	  As	  
Iacobucci	  J,	  delivering	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  in	  
Vancouver	  Society	  of	  Immigrant	  and	  Visible	  Minority	  Women	  v	  Minister	  of	  National	  
Revenue1	  SCR	  10	  at	  [197]	  and	  [200]	  said:	  	  
...	  the	  Society	  has	  submitted	  that	  a	  new,	  ‘contextual’	  approach	  to	  charity	  should	  
be	  adopted	  ...	  .	  This	  new	  approach,	  which	  would	  be	  triggered	  only	  upon	  an	  
organization’s	  failing	  to	  meet	  the	  traditional	  requirements,	  would	  be	  to	  ask	  
whether	  the	  organization	  is	  performing	  a	  ‘public	  benefit’.	  	  
...	  the	  new	  approach	  would	  constitute	  a	  radical	  change	  to	  the	  common	  law	  and,	  
consequently,	  to	  tax	  law.	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ITA	  [the	  Income	  Tax	  Act]	  
does	  not	  define	  ‘charitable’,	  leaving	  it	  instead	  to	  the	  tests	  enunciated	  by	  the	  
common	  law,	  indicates	  the	  desire	  of	  Parliament	  to	  limit	  the	  class	  of	  charitable	  
organizations	  to	  the	  relatively	  restrictive	  categories	  available	  under	  [Pemsel]	  and	  
the	  subsequent	  case	  law.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  reflecting	  the	  preferable	  tax	  policy:	  
given	  the	  tremendous	  tax	  advantages	  available	  to	  charitable	  organizations,	  and	  
the	  consequent	  loss	  of	  revenue	  to	  the	  public	  treasury,	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  
limit	  the	  number	  of	  taxpayers	  who	  are	  entitled	  to	  this	  status.	  For	  this	  Court	  
suddenly	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  and	  more	  expansive	  definition	  of	  charity,	  without	  
warning,	  could	  have	  a	  substantial	  and	  serious	  effect	  on	  the	  taxation	  system.	  In	  
my	  view,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  prominent	  role	  played	  by	  legislative	  priorities	  
in	  the	  ‘new	  approach’,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  change	  better	  effected	  by	  Parliament	  
than	  by	  the	  courts.	  
Fourth,	  while	  there	  have	  been	  significant	  developments	  in	  the	  law	  since	  the	  
prohibition	  on	  political	  purposes	  was	  adopted,	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  prohibition	  has	  not	  
necessarily	  been	  undermined.	  There	  is	  little	  doubt	  that,	  like	  Australia	  and	  Canada,	  New	  
Zealand	  may	  now	  be	  described	  as	  a	  modern	  participatory	  democracy	  with	  well-­‐
developed	  constitutional	  arrangements	  for	  public	  involvement.65	  It	  also	  has	  a	  Bill	  of	  
Rights	  protecting	  freedoms	  of	  thought,	  conscience,	  religion	  and	  expression.66	  It	  is	  
consequently	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  position	  in	  England	  a	  hundred	  years	  ago	  when	  the	  
prohibition	  on	  primary	  political	  purposes	  was	  adopted.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  it	  
remains	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  exercising	  those	  rights	  to	  support	  purposes	  
which	  are	  recognised	  as	  primarily	  charitable	  and	  pursuing	  purely	  political	  purposes.	  As	  
the	  Canadian	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  said	  in	  Human	  Life	  International	  in	  Canada	  Inc	  v	  
Minister	  of	  National	  Revenue	  [1998]	  3	  FC	  202	  at	  [18]:	  
With	  respect	  to	  the	  Charter	  argument	  based	  on	  alleged	  infringement	  of	  freedom	  
of	  expression,	  the	  basic	  premise	  of	  the	  appellant	  is	  untenable.	  Essentially	  its	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argument	  is	  that	  a	  denial	  of	  tax	  exemption	  to	  those	  wishing	  to	  advocate	  certain	  
opinions	  is	  a	  denial	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  on	  this	  basis.	  On	  this	  premise	  it	  
would	  be	  equally	  arguable	  that	  anyone	  who	  wishes	  the	  psychic	  satisfaction	  of	  
having	  his	  personal	  views	  pressed	  on	  his	  fellow	  citizens	  is	  constitutionally	  
entitled	  to	  a	  tax	  credit	  for	  any	  money	  he	  contributes	  for	  this	  purpose.	  The	  
appellant	  is	  in	  no	  way	  restricted	  by	  the	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  from	  disseminating	  any	  
views	  or	  opinions	  whatever.	  The	  guarantee	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  in	  
paragraph	  2(b)	  of	  the	  Charter	  is	  not	  a	  guarantee	  of	  public	  funding	  through	  tax	  
exemptions	  for	  the	  propagation	  of	  opinions	  no	  matter	  how	  good	  or	  how	  
sincerely	  held.	  
Having	  reached	  this	  view,	  we	  proceed	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  Parliament	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  
alter	  the	  well-­‐established	  principles	  of	  law	  relating	  to	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  
expression	  ‘charitable	  purpose’	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  This	  means	  in	  particular	  that	  we	  are	  
not	  prepared	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  decision	  of	  this	  Court	  in	  Molloy	  v	  Commissioner	  of	  
Inland	  Revenue	  which	  has	  effectively	  been	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Act	  and	  which	  established	  
that	  a	  society	  established	  for	  contentious	  political	  purposes	  could	  not	  be	  said	  to	  be	  
established	  principally	  for	  charitable	  purposes.	  	  
However,	  the	  Court	  in	  Molloy	  ‘was	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  ‘mere	  existence’	  of	  a	  political	  
object	  or	  purpose	  did	  not	  of	  itself	  preclude	  recognition	  as	  a	  valid	  charity.	  As	  Somers	  J	  said	  [at	  
695]:116	  ‘To	  reach	  that	  conclusion	  the	  political	  object	  must	  be	  more	  than	  an	  ancillary	  purpose,	  
it	  must	  be	  the	  main	  or	  a	  main	  object.	  If	  such	  purpose	  is	  ancillary,	  secondary,	  or	  subsidiary,	  to	  a	  
charitable	  purpose	  will	  not	  have	  a	  vitiating	  effect	  ...	  .’	  The	  Court	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  
‘important	  qualification	  to	  the	  prohibition	  on	  political	  objects’	  was	  now	  effected	  by	  statute	  in	  
section	  5(3)–(4)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act.117	  
At	  the	  hearing,118	  there	  was	  some	  discussion	  of	  a	  proposed	  further	  change	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  
objects,	  from	  ‘the	  promotion	  of	  disarmament	  and	  peace’	  to	  ‘the	  promotion	  of	  nuclear	  
disarmament	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  all	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction’.	  The	  Court	  found	  that	  
this	  amended	  purpose	  was	  charitable,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  both	  analogy	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  
peace,	  and	  the	  presumption	  of	  charitability.119	  	  
Having	  considered	  all	  the	  relevant	  factors,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  was	  ‘satisfied	  that	  the	  
appropriate	  course	  is	  for	  [the	  Court]	  to	  exercise	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  refer	  Greenpeace’s	  
application	  for	  registration	  to	  the	  chief	  executive	  and	  the	  Board	  for	  reconsideration’.120	  The	  
Court	  explained	  its	  reason:121	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  proposed	  amendments	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  objects,	  the	  nature	  of	  
Greenpeace’s	  application	  for	  registration	  has	  changed	  so	  significantly	  that	  Greenpeace	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  [1981]	  1	  NZLR	  688,	  695.	  
117	  Greenpeace	  CA	  [2012]	  NZCA	  533,	  [62].	  
118	  Ibid	  [9].	  
119	  Ibid	  [43],	  [81]	  
120	  Ibid	  [101].	  
121	  Ibid	  [102].	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ought	  to	  be	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  satisfy	  the	  chief	  executive	  and	  the	  Board	  that	  it	  
should	  now	  be	  registered.	  The	  chief	  executive	  and	  the	  Board	  would	  then	  have	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  reconsider	  the	  application	  in	  light	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  amended	  objects,	  
our	  decision	  that	  object	  2.2	  as	  amended	  is	  a	  charitable	  purpose	  and	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  
information	  relating	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  proposed	  activities.	  	  
The	  Court	  considered	  that,	  when	  reviewing	  an	  application	  by	  Greenpeace	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  
Court’s	  judgment,	  the	  Board	  would	  need	  to	  decide:	  
(a)	  whether	  in	  light	  of	  relevant	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information	  relating	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  
proposed	  activities	  its	  new	  ‘political	  advocacy’	  object	  is	  truly	  ancillary	  to	  its	  principal	  
charitable	  purposes	  and	  is	  not	  an	  independent	  stand-­‐alone	  object;	  and	  	  
(b)	  whether	  Greenpeace	  is	  involved	  in	  illegal	  activities	  that	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  not	  entitled	  
to	  registration	  as	  a	  charitable	  entity.	  
Was	  the	  application	  for	  registration,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  appeals,	  necessary	  in	  the	  first	  
place?	  
From	  the	  incorporation	  details	  provide	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  commentary,	  subsequent	  to	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  the	  Society	  in	  1976,	  Greenpeace	  had	  incorporated	  two	  charitable	  trusts,	  The	  
Greenpeace	  New	  Zealand	  Charitable	  Trust	  (1991),	  and	  the	  Greenpeace	  Educational	  Trust	  
(2008).	  There	  are	  no	  documents	  on	  record	  at	  the	  Companies	  Office	  with	  respect	  to	  The	  
Greenpeace	  New	  Zealand	  Charitable	  Trust,	  therefore	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  is	  not	  available	  to	  the	  
public.	  However,	  the	  Trust	  Deed	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  Educational	  Trust	  is	  available	  to	  the	  public	  
both	  through	  the	  Companies	  Office	  and	  the	  Charities	  Register.	  The	  Objects	  refer	  specifically	  to	  
the	  environment,	  without	  any	  overt	  or	  covert	  reference	  to	  issues	  relating	  to	  peace	  and	  
disarmament.	  
Could	  Greenpeace	  have	  operated	  as	  a	  society	  without	  charitable	  purposes,	  promoting	  peace	  
and	  disarmament	  without	  the	  need	  for	  registration,	  and	  therefore	  tax	  privileges,	  as	  in	  Australia	  
and	  England	  where	  Greenpeace	  undertakes	  both	  political	  and	  non-­‐political	  activities	  through	  
charitable	  and	  non-­‐charitable	  arms?	  
The	  IRD	  
Will	  the	  IRD	  reconsider	  Greenpeace’s	  donee	  status,	  even	  if	  Greenpeace	  is	  finally	  registered	  as	  
a	  charity?	  IRD	  retains	  the	  authority	  to	  determine	  which	  entities	  are	  eligible	  for	  donee	  status	  
(available	  to	  entities	  whose	  funds	  are	  applied	  ‘wholly	  or	  mainly	  to	  charitable,	  benevolent,	  
philanthropic	  or	  cultural	  purposes	  within	  New	  Zealand’).122	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  administrative	  law,	  
IRD	  must	  turn	  its	  own	  mind	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  an	  entity’s	  purposes	  are	  ‘charitable’	  for	  
the	  purposes	  of	  this	  test.	  Even	  if	  Greenpeace	  is	  registered	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Internal	  
Affairs	  –	  Charities,	  the	  IRD	  could	  withhold	  donee	  status.123Alternatively,	  Greenpeace	  could	  
take	  the	  option	  of	  not	  reapplying	  for	  registration	  as	  a	  charitable	  entity,	  leave	  unresolved	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Income	  Tax	  Act	  2007	  s	  LD	  3(2).	  	  
123	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  note	  that	  the	  statutory	  definitions	  of	  ‘charitable	  purpose’	  in	  the	  Income	  
Tax	  Act	  and	  the	  Charities	  Act	  are	  not	  consistent.	  Codification	  amendments	  made	  to	  s	  5(2A),	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  
of	  the	  Charities	  Act	  have	  not	  been	  correspondingly	  made	  in	  the	  income	  tax	  legislation.	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question	  of	  whether	  involvement	  by	  Greenpeace	  or	  its	  representatives	  in	  illegal	  activities	  is	  
sufficiently	  material	  to	  preclude	  registration	  under	  the	  Charities	  Act,	  and	  focus	  instead	  on	  the	  
(likely	  more	  valuable)	  donee	  status.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  Greenpeace	  will	  decide	  to	  
proceed.	  	  
Significance	  of	  the	  case	  
The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  decision	  is	  significant	  in	  that	  the	  matter	  of	  advocacy	  and	  political	  activity	  
in	  New	  Zealand	  was	  not	  brought	  into	  line	  with	  Aid/Watch.	  The	  reference	  to	  ‘advocacy’,	  as	  an	  
example	  of	  an	  ancillary	  purpose	  in	  section	  5(3)	  of	  the	  Charities	  Act,	  was	  intended	  to	  be	  merely	  
a	  helpful	  clarification	  in	  the	  codification	  of	  the	  existing	  common	  law	  regarding	  ancillary	  
purposes	  (see	  Report	  of	  the	  Social	  Services	  Committee	  considering	  the	  Charities	  Bill	  108-­‐2,	  at	  
4).	  However,	  the	  unintended	  consequence	  following	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  decision	  on	  
Greenpeace	  is	  that	  the	  specific	  reference	  to	  advocacy	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  interpreted	  as	  an	  
indication	  that	  Bowman	  must	  remain	  good	  law	  in	  New	  Zealand,124	  despite	  all	  the	  very	  good	  
arguments	  to	  the	  contrary	  that	  have	  been	  aired	  (including	  in	  the	  Greenpeace	  case	  itself,	  in	  
Aid/Watch	  and	  elsewhere).	  This	  result	  is	  unfortunate,	  and	  represents	  a	  significant	  opportunity	  
lost	  for	  New	  Zealand	  in	  terms	  of	  reassessing	  the	  political	  purposes	  limitation.	  The	  Court	  of	  
Appeal	  appears	  to	  limit	  the	  political	  purposes	  doctrine	  to	  areas	  of	  controversy,125	  but	  then	  
casts	  doubt	  on	  this.126	  	  
The	  reference	  to	  ‘fiscal	  consequences’127	  is	  also	  unfortunate.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  makes	  no	  
mention	  of	  the	  principle	  that:	  ‘To	  the	  extent	  that	  Parliament	  has…legislated	  that	  taxation	  
consequences	  are	  determined	  by	  reference	  to	  charitable	  status,	  those	  consequences	  must	  
follow	  the	  application	  of	  the	  common	  law	  principles	  which	  govern	  charitable	  status.	  The	  
taxation	  consequences	  should	  not	  play	  a	  part	  in	  the	  application	  of	  those	  common	  law	  
principles’.128	  
It	  now	  remains	  to	  see	  whether	  Greenpeace	  will	  reapply	  for	  Charities	  Act	  registration,	  how	  the	  
Charities	  Board	  will	  deal	  with	  any	  application,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  reaction	  from	  the	  IRD	  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Greenpeace	  CA	  [2012]	  NZCA	  533,	  [45],	  [56].	  
125	  Ibid	  [60],	  [63],	  [64].	  
126	  Ibid	  [91],	  [92].	  
127	  Ibid	  [58].	  
128	  Re	  Queenstown	  Lakes	  Community	  Housing	  Trust	  [2011]	  3	  NZLR	  502	  (HC),	  [77]–[78],	  MacKenzie	  J.	  
	  	  





THE AUSTRALIAN CENTRE FOR PHILANTHROPY AND 
NONPROFIT STUDIES 
The	  Australian	  Centre	  for	  Philanthropy	  and	  Nonprofit	  Studies	  (ACPNS)	  is	  part	  of	  the	  QUT	  
Business	  School	  which	  is	  internationally	  recognised	  for	  its	  high	  quality	  teaching	  and	  research.	  	  
ACPNS	  brings	  together	  academics	  and	  research	  students	  from	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  disciplines,	  
however	  all	  have	  expertise	  in	  philanthropy,	  nonprofit	  organisations,	  and	  the	  social	  economy.	  	  
The	  Centre’s	  research	  activities	  incorporate	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  of	  interest	  and	  concern	  to	  
philanthropic	  and	  nonprofit	  organisations	  and	  government	  including:	  
Accounting	  and	  Finance	  
• QUT	  Standard	  Chart	  of	  Accounts	  
• Reserves	  
• Management	  ratios	  
Nonprofit	  Governance	  
• Governance	  and	  management	  research	  
• Nonprofit	  board	  evaluation	  
Nonprofit	  Regulation	  
• Law	  reform	  	  
• Taxation	  	  
• Liability	  of	  nonprofit	  organisations	  and	  key	  personnel	  
• Human	  services	  contracts	  and	  partnerships	  
Philanthropy	  and	  Fundraising	  
• High	  net	  worth	  giving	  
• Professional	  advisers’	  role	  in	  philanthropy	  
• Philanthropy	  for	  Indigenous	  and	  Torres	  Strait	  Islanders’	  causes	  
• Planned	  giving	  
Social	  Enterprise	  
• Mapping	  and	  scoping	  the	  sector	  
• Strategic	  management	  of	  social	  enterprises	  
• Social	  enterprise	  and	  public	  policy	  
• Legal	  issues	  affecting	  social	  enterprise	  
Apart	  from	  the	  research	  activities	  of	  its	  members,	  staff	  associated	  with	  the	  Centre	  also	  teach	  
programs	  designed	  for	  students	  interested	  in	  following	  careers	  in	  the	  management	  of	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philanthropic	  and	  nonprofit	  organisations	  or	  in	  public	  administration	  associated	  with	  nonprofit	  
organisations.	  	  
The	  Graduate	  Certificate	  in	  Business	  (Philanthropy	  and	  Nonprofit	  Studies)	  comprises	  eight	  core	  
units	  which	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  articulation	  into	  the	  Master	  of	  Business	  (Philanthropy	  and	  
Nonprofit	  Studies).	  The	  Graduate	  Certificate	  is	  available	  to	  students	  based	  outside	  of	  Brisbane	  
via	  flexible	  delivery	  mode.	  
The	  Centre	  has	  an	  active	  community	  service	  and	  continuing	  professional	  education	  program	  
and	  has	  conducted	  public	  and	  specialist	  seminars	  for	  several	  years.	  The	  Centre	  also	  publishes	  
working	  papers,	  manuals	  and	  monographs.	  
Mission	  
...to	  bring	  to	  the	  community	  the	  benefits	  of	  teaching,	  research,	  technology	  and	  service	  
relevant	  to	  philanthropic	  and	  nonprofit	  communities.	  
History	  
Established	  in	  2001,	  the	  Centre	  builds	  on	  the	  former	  Program	  on	  Nonprofit	  Corporations	  
(PONC),	  which	  commenced	  in	  the	  School	  of	  Accountancy,	  Faculty	  of	  Business	  in	  1991.	  PONC	  
involved	  various	  staff	  within	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Business	  in	  research,	  consultancy	  and	  community	  
service	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  law,	  tax,	  management,	  marketing,	  fundraising	  and	  ethics	  for	  nonprofits	  
organisations.	  
The	  Program	  developed	  a	  strong	  reputation	  for	  research	  and	  community	  service	  in	  the	  legal,	  
accounting,	  taxation	  and	  public	  policy	  aspects	  of	  philanthropic	  and	  nonprofit	  entities.	  
In	  2001,	  generous	  support	  was	  received	  from	  The	  Myer	  Foundation	  and	  the	  Reid	  Family	  
Charitable	  Trusts.	  This	  support	  was	  matched	  by	  QUT.	  In	  2007,	  the	  Centre	  became	  a	  fully	  
accredited	  member	  of	  the	  Nonprofit	  Academic	  Centers	  Council.	  
	  
PILCHCONNECT 
WHAT IS PILCH? 
The	  Public	  Interest	  Law	  Clearing	  House	  (Vic)	  Inc	  (PILCH)	  is	  an	  independent,	  nonprofit	  
community	  legal	  service.	  Based	  in	  Melbourne,	  PILCH	  was	  established	  in	  1994.	  
PILCH	  seeks	  to	  meet	  the	  legal	  needs	  of	  people	  from	  disadvantaged	  or	  marginalised	  
backgrounds,	  and	  nonprofit	  organisations	  that	  support	  them.	  PILCH	  works	  creatively	  to	  match	  
clients	  with	  lawyers	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  give	  their	  services	  without	  charge	  and	  has	  also	  
developed	  a	  reputation	  for	  well-­‐targeted	  law	  reform	  and	  advocacy,	  drawing	  on	  experience	  
from	  its	  case	  and	  referral	  work.	  
Since	  its	  inception,	  PILCH	  has	  successfully	  established	  a	  range	  of	  innovative	  services	  including	  
the	  Homeless	  Persons’	  Legal	  Clinic	  –	  this	  award-­‐winning	  outreach	  service	  turned	  10	  in	  2011	  
and	  has	  been	  replicated	  in	  several	  states.	  PILCH	  collaborates	  with	  its	  counterparts	  in	  other	  
states:	  PILCH	  NSW;	  Q-­‐PILCH;	  Justice	  Net	  SA;	  and	  ACT	  Pro	  Bono	  Clearing	  House.	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PILCH's	  core	  funding	  comes	  from	  its	  members	  (private	  law	  firms,	  the	  Victorian	  Bar,	  Law	  
Institute	  of	  Victoria,	  corporate	  legal	  departments,	  community	  legal	  centres,	  all	  Victorian	  
university	  law	  faculties	  and	  others	  in	  ancillary	  fields)	  plus	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  philanthropic	  
supporters.	  
PILCH	  has	  developed	  into	  a	  unique	  ‘one-­‐stop	  shop’	  for	  pro	  bono	  and	  access	  to	  justice.	  
PILCHCONNECT – A SPECIALIST LEGAL SERVICE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONS 
PilchConnect	  is	  an	  independent,	  specialist	  community	  legal	  service	  that	  provides	  nonprofits	  
with	  access	  to	  free	  or	  low	  cost,	  high	  quality,	  practical	  and	  plain	  language	  legal	  help	  
(information,	  advice	  and	  training).	  PilchConnect	  helps	  those	  Victorian	  (and,	  increasingly,	  NSW)	  
nonprofits	  that	  cannot	  afford	  or	  otherwise	  access	  private	  legal	  advice,	  and	  prioritises	  those	  in	  
rural	  and	  regional	  areas.	  It	  also	  matches	  eligible	  ‘public	  interest’	  nonprofits,	  with	  more	  
complex	  legal	  issues,	  to	  PILCH	  member	  law	  firms	  who	  act	  on	  a	  pro	  bono	  basis.	  PilchConnect	  
has	  undertaken	  significant	  law	  reform	  and	  policy	  work	  at	  both	  state	  and	  federal	  levels.	  	  
PilchConnect	  aims	  to	  develop	  a	  sector-­‐based	  hub	  of	  nonprofit	  legal	  expertise.	  PilchConnect	  
assists	  community	  organisations	  to	  be	  governed	  better,	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  and	  sustainable	  
organisations.	  This	  maximises	  their	  limited	  resources	  for	  achieving	  their	  mission	  –	  to	  help	  
vulnerable	  people	  and	  build	  more	  socially	  inclusive	  communities.	  	  By	  supporting	  nonprofits	  in	  
this	  way,	  PilchConnect	  aims	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  better	  civil	  society	  and	  more	  connected	  
communities.	  PilchConnect	  ‘helps	  the	  helpers’.	  	  
PilchConnect	  works	  with	  peak	  bodies	  such	  as	  VCOSS,	  Volunteering	  Victoria	  and	  Volunteering	  
Australia.	  In	  particular,	  we	  enjoy	  a	  formal	  partnership	  with	  the	  Australian	  Centre	  for	  
Philanthropy	  and	  Nonprofit	  Studies	  and	  are	  grateful	  to	  the	  ACPNS	  team	  for	  tremendous	  
support	  and	  encouragement.	  See	  http://www.pilchconnect.org.au	  for	  more	  information	  about	  
PilchConnect’s	  services.	  	  
	  
THE AUSTRALIAN CHARITY LAW ASSOCIATION 
The	  Australian	  Charity	  Law	  Association	  was	  established	  in	  2009	  in	  response	  to	  the	  emerging	  
need	  for	  accountable,	  charity-­‐related	  legal	  services	  in	  Australia.	  The	  Association	  is	  registered	  
as	  a	  charity	  with	  the	  Australian	  Charities	  and	  Not-­‐for-­‐profits	  Commission	  (ACNC).	  
The	  Association’s	  aim	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  forum	  for	  professionals,	  academics	  and	  employees	  and	  
volunteers	  of	  charities	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  (NFP)	  organisations,	  who	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  charity	  
and	  NFP	  law,	  to	  increase	  their	  knowledge	  in	  this	  area,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence,	  raise	  the	  
standard	  of	  legal	  assistance	  provided	  to	  charities	  and	  NFP	  organisations.	  This	  education	  is	  
provided	  through	  seminars	  and	  conferences	  conducted	  by	  members,	  including	  international	  as	  
well	  as	  Australian	  guest	  speakers.	  
The	  many	  recent	  reforms	  targeting	  the	  charity	  and	  NFP	  sector	  serve	  to	  highlight	  the	  
importance	  of	  education	  to	  keep	  abreast	  of	  current	  legislative	  requirements,	  whether	  from	  a	  
compliance	  or	  advisory	  perspective.	  Recent	  events	  hosted	  by	  the	  Australian	  Charity	  Law	  
Association	  have	  included	  a	  conference	  in	  September	  2012,	  focusing	  on	  changes	  in	  governance	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and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  ACNC,	  and	  seminars	  in	  March	  2013	  on	  changes	  to	  the	  School	  
Building	  Fund	  Regulation	  for	  school	  and	  church	  employees	  and	  volunteers.	  	  
The	  2013	  Conference	  will	  be	  held	  in	  Melbourne	  in	  July	  2013	  and	  will	  include	  presentations	  on	  
Tax	  Reforms,	  the	  Definition	  of	  ‘Charity’	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Religion.	  In	  addition,	  a	  website	  which	  
will	  provide	  a	  forum	  facility	  for	  members	  to	  exchange	  information	  is	  planned	  to	  be	  operational	  
by	  July	  2013.	  
The	  current	  Board	  of	  the	  Australian	  Charity	  Law	  Association	  is:	  
• Anne	  Robinson	  (Solicitor	  Director,	  Prolegis	  Lawyers)	  (Chair)	  
• Matthew	  Harding	  (Associate	  Professor,	  Melbourne	  University	  Law	  School)	  
• Claire	  Jones	  (Senior	  Associate,	  Prolegis	  Lawyers)	  
• Elaine	  Leong	  (Partner,	  Applebee	  Legal)	  
• Dr	  Matthew	  Turnour	  (Partner,	  Neuman	  &	  Turnour	  Lawyers)	  
How	  you	  can	  get	  involved	  
• Become	  a	  member	  –	  Membership	  is	  open	  to	  anyone	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  charity	  law.	  
Benefits	  of	  membership	  include	  information	  about	  events	  and	  legislative	  changes,	  
access	  to	  the	  forums	  on	  the	  website	  and	  discounted	  fees	  for	  seminars	  and	  
conferences.	  Applications	  for	  Membership	  are	  available	  from	  the	  Administrator:	  
Merrin	  Marks	  
admin@charitylawassociation.org.au	  
0401	  486	  844	  
• Assist	  with	  the	  organisation	  of,	  or	  participate	  in	  meetings,	  seminars	  and	  conferences	  
relating	  to	  charity	  and	  NFP	  law	  issues,	  whether	  as	  a	  presenter	  or	  attending.	  
	  
CONTACT INFORMATION
The Australian Centre for 
Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
Queensland University of Technology
Phone +61 7 3138 1020 
Email acpns@qut.edu.au 
Website: www.qut.edu.au/business/acpns 
GPO Box 2434 BRISBANE 
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